The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union vs.

NLRC
GR No. 156635 January 11, 2016

Facts: Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union (Union) was the duly
recognized collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation (HSBC). The company and the union was governed by a CBA which
includes a salary structure of the employees comprising of grade levels, entry level pay rates and
the individual pays depending on the length of service.
HSBC (company) announced the implementation of a job evaluation program (JEP)
retroactively. The JEP consists of a job designation per grade level with salary scale which
provides the minimum and maximum pay an employee is entitled per grade level. The Union
sent letter to company and demanded the suspension of the JEP because it constitutes an unfair
labor practice (ULP). It also inform HSBC that it would exercise its right to concerted action.
On the same day the Union members started picketing during breaktime. HSBC (company) in its
letter to the union insist that the JEP was an express recognition of its obligation under the CBA.
The Union's concerted activities persisted for 11 month, which impelled HSBC to suspend the
negotiations and issued memoranda, warnings and reprimands to remind the members of the
Union to comply with HSBC's Code of Conduct. Due to the sustained concerted actions, HSBC
filed a complaint for ULP in the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) he NLRC, and directed the remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter for further
proceedings.
The Union conducted a strike after majority of the members of the Union voted in favor of a
strike in protest of the continued implementation of the JEP. The Union's officers and members
walked out and gathered outside the premises of HSBC's offices. It was alleged that there were
Union members who blocked the entry and exit points of the bank premises preventing bank
officers from entering the bank including its CEO. HSBC filed its complaint to declare the strike
illegal with prayer for temporary restraining order and injunction with NLRC.
When HSBC issued return-to-work notices to the striking employees only 25 employees
complied and returned to work. Due to the continuing concerted actions, HSBC terminated
employment of the the individual petitioners.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) declared the strike illegal for failure of the Union to file the notice of
strike, observe the cooling-off period; and to submit the results of the strike vote to NCMB
pursuant to Article 263 of the Labor Code and because of the illegality of the strike the Union
members and officers were deemed to have lost their employment status. NLRC modified the
ruling of LA that the dismissal of the 18 Union members unlawful for failure of HSBC to accord
procedural due process.
Issues:
Whether or Not the strike commenced by the union is lawfully conducted?
Whether or Not dismissal of the union members is valid?
Ruling:
NO. The petitioners neither filed the notice of strike with the DOLE, nor observed the cooling-
off period, nor submitted the result of the strike vote although the strike vote was conducted, the
same was done by open, not secret, balloting,42 in blatant violation of Article 26. Petitioners
strike was rendered unlawful because their picketing which constituted an obstruction to the free
use of the employer's property or the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, when
accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence, and coercion as to constitute nuisance, should be
regulated. The strike, even if justified as to its ends, could become illegal because of the means
employed, especially when the means came within the prohibitions under Article 264(e) of the
Labor Code.
The procedural requirements for a valid strike are, therefore, the following, to wit: ( 1) a notice
of strike filed with the DOLE at least 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case
of ULP; (2) a strike vote approved by the majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (3)
a notice of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike given to the
DOLE. These requirements are mandatory, such that non-compliance therewith by the union will
render the strike illegal.
On the second issue.
NO. The failure by HSBC to strictly observe the twin-notice requirement resulted in the illegal
dismissal.
As a general rule, the mere finding of the illegality of the strike does not justify the wholesale
termination of the strikers from their employment the responsibility for the illegal strike is
individual instead of collective.
Under Article 264 there is a need to distinguish between the officers and the members of the
union who participate in an illegal strike. The officers may be deemed terminated from their
employment upon a finding of their knowing participation in the illegal strike, but the members
of the union shall suffer the same fate only if they are shown to have knowingly participated in
the commission of illegal acts during the strike.
HSBC fail to give them sufficient opportunity to present their side and adequate opportunity to
answer the charges against them. The twin requirement of notice and hearing in termination
cases are as much indispensable and mandatory as the procedural requirements enumerated in
Article 262 of the Labor Code. HSBC notice to return-to work is not as substantial compliance
with due process requirement.
HIJO RESOURCES CORPORATION vs.EPIFANIO P. MEJARES, REMEGIO C. BAL
URAN, JR., DANTE SAYCON, and CECILIO CUCHARO, represented by
NAMABDJERA-HRC
G.R. No. 208986 January 13, 2016

FACTS: Petitioners claimed that they were employed by HPI as farm workers in HPI’s
plantations as area harvesters, packing house workers, loaders, or labellers. HRC, formerly
known as Hijo Plantation Incorporated (HPI), owns agricultural lands. Respondents assert that
contractor-growers receive compensation and are under the control of HRC. Petitioners formed
their union NAMABDJERA-HRC registered with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE). Later, they filed a petition for certification. When HRC learned that complainants
formed a union, the three contractor-growers filed a notice of cessation of business that led to the
termination of complainant’s employment. Petitioners, represented by NAMABDJERA-HRC,
filed a case for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal, and illegal deductions.
DOLE Med-Arbiter Jasa dismissed the petition for certification election claiming there was no
employer-employee relationship. Petitioners did not appeal but pursued the illegal dismissal case.
Labor Arbiter Sagmit held that res judicata does not apply and that finding by the Med-Arbiter
that no employment relationship exists between HRC and complainants does not bar the Labor
Arbiter from making his own independent finding on the same issue. HRC filed TRO and seeks
to nullify the orders of LA Sagmit. NLRC granted the petition holding that LA Sagmit gravely
abused her discretion. Court of Appeals concluded that the decision in a certification election
case does not foreclose further dispute as to the existence or non-existence of an employer-
employee relationship between HRC and the complainants. CA set aside the NLRC decision and
remanded case to Labor Arbiter for further proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter, in the illegal dismissal case, is bound by the ruling of
the Med-Arbiter regarding the existence or non-existence of employer-employee relationship
between the parties in the certification election case
RULING:
No. The decision in a certification election case, by the very nature of that proceeding, does not
foreclose all further dispute between the parties as to the existence or non-existence of an
employer-employee relationship. The Med-Arbiter’s order in this case dismissing the petition for
certification election based on non-existence of employer-employee relationship was issued after
the members of the respondent union were dismissed from their employment.
The purpose of a petition for certification election is to determine which organization will
represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. The respondent union,
without its member-employees, was stripped of its personality to challenge the Med-Arbiter’s
decision in the certification election case. Thus, the members of the respondent union were left
with no option but to pursue their illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter. To dismiss
the illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter on the basis of the pronouncement of the
Med-Arbiter in the certification election case that there was no employer-employee relationship
between the parties would be tantamount to denying due process to the complainants in the
illegal dismissal case.
ALLAN M. MENDOZA vs. OFFICERS OF MANILA WATER EMPLOYEES UNION
(MWEU), EDUARDO B. BORELA, BUENAVENTURA QUEBRAL, ELIZABETH
COMETA et al.
G.R. No. 201595 January 25, 2016

Facts: Petitioner was a member of the Manila Water Employees Union (MWEU) a duly
registered labor organization of the rank-and-file employees within Manila Water Company.
During the period material to this Petition, Eduardo Borela as President and Chairman of the
MWEU Executive Board, Buenaventur Quebral as First Vice-President and Treasurer, and
Elizabeth Cometa as Secretary.
Union Secretary (Cometa) informed Petitioner (Mendoza) that the union was unable to deduct
the increased P200.00 union dues from his salary due to lack of the required check-off
authorization from him and that his failure to pay the unions he can be sanctioned.
Quebral (Vice President and Treasurer) informed Borela (President and Chairman) about the
failure of petitioner together with others to pay their union dues such failure amounts to violation
of MWEU’s Constitution and By-Laws Borela referred the situation to the grievance committee
for investigation after which it recommended that petitioner be suspended for 30 days.
When Petitioner learned about the suspension he indicated his intention to appeal to the General
Membership Assembly in accordance with union’s Constitution and By-Laws, which grants him
the right to appeal any arbitrary resolution, policy and rule promulgated by the Executive Board.
Petitioner sent two letters about its intention to appeal but both were not acted upon.
When MWEU scheduled an election of officers Mendoza filed certificate of candidacy but was
disqualified for not being a member of good standing due to his suspension. Later Mendoza was
expelled from the union, all his pleas for appeal were let unheeded.
Petitioner then joined another union (WATER-AFWC) and was elected union President. Other
MWEU members were inclined to join WATER-AFWC, but MWEU director Torres threatened
others that they will not get benefits from the new CBA, on the proposed CBA it contains a
provisions that in that in the event of retrenchment, non-MWEU members shall be removed first,
and that upon the signing of the CBA, only MWEU members shall receive a signing bonus.
Petitioner filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against MWEU, the Labor Arbiter ordered
that the case be referred to the Union level. While NLRC declared order of LA null and void for
being rendered without jurisdiction and conflict fall under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, as these are inter/intra-union disputes.
Petitioner filed appeal to CA arguing that unfair labor practices is cognizable by the Labor
Arbiter; that the fact that the dispute is inter- or intra-union in nature cannot erase the fact that
respondents were guilty of unfair labor practices in interfering and restraining him in the exercise
of his right to self-organization as member of both MWEU and WATER-AFWC, and in
discriminating against him and other members through the provisions of the proposed 2008 CBA
which they drafted.
Issue: Whether or Not labor organization MWEU committed unfair labor practice against the
petitioner?
Ruling:
Yes. Unfair labor practices may be committed both by the employer under Article 248 and by
labor organizations under Article 249 of the Labor Code.
Mendoza claim on illegal suspension on the union, the documentary evidence is clear that when
petitioner letter about his suspension. He immediately and timely filed a written appeal.
However, the Executive Board did not act. The Court finds that petitioner was illegally
suspended and thereafter unlawfully expelled from MWEU due to respondents’ failure to act on
his written appeals. The petitioner was unceremoniously suspended, disqualified and deprived of
his right to run for the position of MWEU Vice-President in the September 14, 2007 election of
officers, expelled from MWEU, and forced to join another union, WATER-AFWC. For these,
respondents are guilty of unfair labor practices under Article 249 (a) and (b) – that is, violation of
petitioner’s right to self-organization, unlawful discrimination, and illegal termination of his
union membership – which case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiters, in accordance with Article 217 of the Labor Code.
Samahan ng Magsasaka at Mangingisda sa Sitio Nasawe, Inc v. Tan,
GR 196028, 18 April 2016
FACTS: Petitioner is an association of farmers and fishermen residing at Sitio Talaga, Barangay
Ipag, Mariveles, Bataan. It that its members “have resided in the area for several years doing
farming activities” from which they “derive their income for their daily sustenance.” In 1995,
the Philippine Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) published in the newspaper an
Invitation to Bid for the sale of its assets, which included 34 hectares of a 129.4227-hectare land
in Barangay Ipag, Mariveles, Bataan, previously owned by Anchor Estate Corporation. The
PCGG sequestered the properties of said Corporation after it was identified to be a dummy
corporation of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Respondent Tomas Tan emerged as the
highest bidder in the bidding of the 34-hectare property. The PCGG Committee on
Privatization approved the sale and a Notice of Award was issued to the respondent. The Office
of the President (OP) also approved the sale of the property. The PCGG, representing the
Republic of the Philippines, executed a Deed of Sale in the respondent’s favor. Then Chairman of
the PCGG Committee on Privatization Sarmiento wrote the DAR requesting to stop the
acquisition of the property under the CARP. It appeared that a Notice of Coverage had been
issued over the 129.4227-hectare land and that the 34 hectares sold by the PCGG to Tan had
been already identified for CARP coverage and targeted for acquisition in the year 2000. In an
Order, DAR Secretary Morales, Jr. granted Sarmiento’s request and lifted the Notice of
Coverage on the 129.4227-hectare property. Secretary Morales also ordered to stop the
acquisition proceedings on the property. Thereafter, the petitioner filed with the DAR a Petition
to Revoke Secretary Morales’s order. The DAR denied both the petitioner’s petition and its
subsequent motion for reconsideration. The DAR based its denial on the ground that the subject
property, being government-owned, does not fall as ‘private agricultural land’ subject to the
CARP. The petitioner then appealed to the OP, which dismissed the same for lack of merit and
affirmed the DAR Secretary’s Order. The motion for reconsideration was denied. The petitioner
then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 with the CA. The CA held that, while the lifting of
the subject Notice of Coverage was irregular and erroneous, the petitioner’s petition for
review must be dismissed on the ground that the petitioner was not a real party in interest to the
case. Nothing is stated as to them being beneficiaries, or at least potential beneficiaries, under
CARP.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly held petitioners as not a real party in interest.
HELD: Yes. The petitioner is not a real party-in-interest to question the July 26, 2000 DAR
Order. The Constitutional right to form associations does not make the petitioner a real party-in-
interest in this case. While organizations and associations may represent their members before
the DAR, these members must have such real, actual, material, or substantial interest in the
subject matter of the action, NOT merely an expectancy, or a future contingent interest. Here, the
petitioner alleged that it is duly registered with the SEC acting on behalf of its farmers and
fishermen members which allegation gave it the right to represent its members. However, it
failed to allege and prove that these members are identified and registered qualified
beneficiaries of the subject land, or have already been actually awarded portions of it, or have
been issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award for which they could validly claim the status
of the land’s grantees having a real, actual, material interest to question the Order of the DAR
Secretary lifting the Notice of Coverage. Not being identified and duly registered qualified
beneficiaries, these members’ interest over the subject land were at most an expectancy that,
unfortunately for them, did not ripen to actual award and ownership. Thus, notwithstanding its
representative capacity, the petitioner and its members are not real parties-in-interest to question
the DAR’s Order. The constitutional considerations: provisions governing agrarian reform
program do not entail automatic grant of lands to every farmer and farmworker. Social justice in
the land reform program also applies to landowners, not merely to farmers and farmworkers.
This is precisely why the law – RA No. 6657 – and the applicable rules provide for the
procedure for determining the proper beneficiaries and grantees or awardees of the lands
covered or to be covered under the CARP. Jurisprudence dictates that the “CARL is specific in
its requirements for registering qualified beneficiaries.” Those who have not been identified and
registered as qualified beneficiaries are not real parties-in-interest. Furthermore, the SC held that
DAR Order has already attained finality is no longer reviewable by the Court.
WILLIAM GO QUE CONSTRUCTION AND/OR WILLIAM GO QUE vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND DANNY SINGSON, RODOLFO PASAQUI, LENDO LOMINIQUI, AND
JUN ANDALES
G.R. No. 191699, April 19, 2016
Facts: Singson, Pasaqui, Lominiqui, and Andales filed complaints for illegal dismissal against
William Go Que Construction and/or William Go Que before the NLRC, claiming that they were
hired as steelmen on various dates, and were regular employees of Go Que until their illegal
dismissal on June 3, 2006. Go Que averred that they were hired as project employees, and that
sometime in May 2006, he learned that some workers were getting excess and cutting unused
steel bars, and selling them to junk shops, prompting him to announce that he will bring the
matter to the proper authorities. Thereafter, the private respondents no longer reported for work.
The LA ruled that the employees were illegally dismissed by Go Que and declared that they were
regular employees and not project or contractual employees considering that there was no written
contract duly signed by said employees and that they were continuously employed to perform the
same tasks for 2 to 8 years. However, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA. The private
respondents then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA but the CA noted that the Affidavit
of Service and the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping contained a defective jurat.
The CA required private respondents anew to submit a Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping with a properly accomplished jurat indicating competent evidence of their identities.
After submitting photocopies of Ids and a Joint-Affidavitattesting to the identity of Andales who
was unable to submit his ID , the CA held that these served as competent evidence of private
respondents' identities and cured the defect. The CA also dismissed the petition with respect to
Singson and Pasaqui on account of the Satisfaction of Judgment/Release of Claim they had
submitted after amicable settlement with Go Que.
Issues: 1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition with respect to Singson and Pasaqui
2. WON the CA erred in refusing to dismiss the petition on the ground of non-compliance with
the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping.
Ruling: 1. No. The settled rule is that legitimate waivers resulting from voluntary settlements of
laborers' claims should be treated and upheld as the law between the parties. Since Singson and
Pasaqui filed a motion to dismiss the petition filed by them after having entered into an amicable
settlement with Go Que, there is no longer any justiciable controversy between them, rendering
the instant case moot and academic and dismissible with respect to them.
2. Yes. The IDs presented by the private respondents were not issued by an official agency and
the Joint-Affidavit identifying Andales and assuring that he was a party-litigant is not competent
evidence of Andales's identity under Section 12 (b), Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, considering that they (i.e., Singson, Pasaqui, and Lominiqui) themselves are privy to
the instrument, i.e., the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, in which Andales's
participation is sought to be proven. To note, it cannot be presumed that an affiant is personally
known to the notary public; the jurat must contain a statement to that effect. Tellingly, the
notarial certificate of the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the
petition before the CA did not state whether they presented competent evidence of their
identities, or that they were personally known to the notary public, and, thus, runs afoul of the
requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping under Section 1,68 Rule
65, in relation to Section 3,69 Rule 46, of the Rules of Court. Because of this, the fact that even
one of the private respondents swore that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct of
his knowledge and belief is shrouded in doubt. There was also no substantial compliance with
the certification against forum shopping requirement and non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of 'substantial compliance' or
presence of'special circumstances or compelling reasons. Here, the CA did not mention - nor
does there exist - any perceivable special circumstance or compelling reason which justifies the
rules' relaxation. At all events, it is uncertain if any of the private respondents certified under
oath that no similar action has been filed or is pending in another forum.
EDREN RICASATA v. CARGO SAFEWAY
GR Nos. 208896-97, Apr 06, 2016

FACTS: Ricasata was hired as an engine fitter for M.V. Uni Chart, a ship owned by Evergreen
Marine Corporation, represented in the Philippines by its local manning agency, Cargo Safeway.
The deployment was for a period of nine months with a basic monthly salary of US$704 and was
found fit for sea duty without restrictions and was deployed. His work included handling noisy
equipment such as grinders, generators, and pumps in the vessel's engine room on a regular eight
to five shift schedule. Ricasata experienced severe pain in his ears. He reported it to the Chief
Engineer and requested for a medical check-up, but his request was denied. He experienced
another bout of severe pain in his ears, but wad again denied. He was then replaced by a reliever
and thereafter disembarked from the vessel and returned to the Philippines. Ricasata underwent
an Audiogram and was diagnosed with "Permanent Medical Unfitness with a Disability Grade 1"
due to a "profound hearing loss." Ricasata filed an action against Cargo Safeway and Evergreen
Marine before the NLRC, for his claim. Cargo Safeway and Evergreen Marine moved for the
dismissal of the case and its referral for Voluntary Arbitration on the ground that Ricasata's
employment was covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Associated
Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines and the National Chinese Seamen's
Union. The Panel of Arbitrators ruled in favour of Ricasata and also rejected the contention of
Cargo Safeway and Evergreen Marine that the flexibility provision of the CBA for the
completion of the contract "one month more or one month less as a result of operational
convenience or convenience of the port of call" should apply to justify Ricasata's early
embarkment.. Ricasata appealed for the modification of the Decision of the Panel of Arbitrators
by increasing the award for back disability benefit and sick allowance but was denied by CA on
the ground that that entitlement to disability benefits is a matter governed by law and contract
and not solely by medical findings and that Ricasata forfeited his claim for compensation by
failing to comply with the mandatory reporting requirements.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Ricasata is entitled to disability benefits, sickness allowance, and
attorney's fees.
(2) Whether Ricasata was able to finish his contract of employment
HELD:
(1) Ricasata arrived in the Philippines on 23 March 2010. On 29 March 2010, he
underwent an Audiogram at the Seamen's Hospital. On 27 April 2010, Dr. Lara-Orencia
diagnosed him with "Permanent Medical Unfitness with a Disability Grade 1" based on the
Audiogram.

It is a settled rule that for a seaman's disability claim to prosper, it is mandatory that within three
days from repatriation, he is examined by a company-designated physician. His failure to do so
will result to the forfeiture of his right to claim for compensation and disability benefits. Ricasata
failed to comply with this requirement. He also failed to show that he was physically
incapacitated to be medically examined by a company-designated physician that would have
justified his non-compliance with the mandatory three-day period. We note the finding of the
Court of Appeals that Ricasata was inconsistent on whether he was referred to a company-
designated physician. In his Petition before the Court of Appeals, he alleged that Cargo Safeway
referred him to a company-designated physician while in his Memorandum; he alleged that
Cargo Safeway refused to refer him for post-medical check-up. Considering the foregoing, the
Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Ricasata failed to prove that he is entitled to the
disability benefits and sickness allowance that he was claiming.
(2) In their Comment, Cargo Safeway and Evergreen Marine contend that Ricasata is not entitled
to unearned wages, unearned leave pay, and basic wages corresponding to the unserved portion
of his contract. They invoke Section 19(C) of the POEA-SEC to the effect that "[i]f the vessel
arrives at a convenient port within a period of three (3) months before the expiration of his
contract, the master/employer may repatriate the seafarer from such port x x x.” but the Court did
not agree because Cargo Safeway and Evergreen Marine only quoted a portion of Section 19(C)
of POEA-SEC and if quoted in full, will not apply to this case. Section 19(C) of POEA-SEC
states that the mode of termination it provides may only be exercised by the master/employer if
the original period of the seafarer is at least ten months. Ricasata's contract of employment is
only for nine months. Granting that the provision is applicable, Cargo Safeway and Evergreen
Marine failed to present proof that they paid Ricasata all his earned wages, his leave pay for the
entire contract period, and his termination pay equivalent to one month of his basic salary. The
Court held that the provision of the CBA was specific: the flexibility period is one month more
or one month less from the term of the contract. Ricasata disembarked one and a half months
before the expiration of his contract, meaning it does not fall within the one month more or one
month less covered by the CBA. The CBA also provides that if any lesser period is agreed for
operational convenience, it should be specified in the employment contract. No such provision is
present in this case. Hence, the flexibility provision of the CBA does not also apply to this case.
Robina Farms Cebu v. Villa
G.R. No. 175869, April18, 2016

FACTS: Respondent Elizabeth Villa brought against the petitioner her complaint for illegal
suspension, illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, and nonpayment of service incentive
leave pay in the RAB No. VII of the NLRC in Cebu City. In her verified position paper, Villa
averred that she had been employed by petitioner Robina Farms as sales clerk since August
1981; that in the later part of 2001, the petitioner had enticed her to avail herself of the
company's special retirement program; that on March 2, 2002, she had received a memorandum
from Lily Ngochua requiring her to explain her failure to issue invoices for unhatched eggs in the
months of January to February 2002; that she had explained that the invoices were not delivered
on time because the delivery receipts were delayed and overlooked; that despite her explanation,
she had been suspended for 10 days; that upon reporting back to work, she had been advised to
cease working because her application for retirement had already been approved; that she had
been subsequently informed that her application had been disapproved, and had then been
advised to tender her resignation with a request for financial assistance; that she had manifested
her intention to return to work but the petitioner had confiscated her gate pass; and that she had
since then been prevented from entering the company premises and had been replaced by another
employee. The petitioner admitted that Villa had been its sales clerk at Robina Farms. It stated
that her attention had been called by the accounting department to explain her failure to issue
invoices for the unhatched eggs for the month of February; After the administrative hearing Villa
was found to have violated the company rule on the timely issuance of the invoices that had
resulted in delay in the payment of buyers considering that the payment had depended upon the
receipt of the invoices; that she had been suspended from her employment as a consequence; that
after serving the suspension, she had returned to work and had followed up her application for
retirement with Lucina de Guzman, who had then informed her that the management did not
approve the benefits equivalent to 86% of her salary rate applied for, but only 1/2 month for
every year of service; and that disappointed with the outcome, she had then brought her
complaint against the petitioners LA rendered a decision finding that Villa had not been
dismissed from employment. The NLRC rendered its judgment dismissing the appeal by the
petitioner but granting that of Villa. CA upheld the finding of the NLRC that the petitioner had
illegally dismissed Villa
ISSUE: Whether or not Villa illegally dismissed?

HELD:
Yes, private respondent was illegally dismissed. It is undeniable that private respondent was
suspended for ten (10) days. Ordinarily, after an employee [has] served her suspension, she
should be admitted back to work and to continue to receive compensation for her services. In the
case at bar, it is clear that private respondent was not admitted immediately after her suspension.
When she reported back after her suspension, she was advised not to report back anymore as her
application was approved, which was latter [sic] on disapproved. She was then advised to tender
a resignation letter with request for financial assistance by Lucy de Guzman. After that another
letter of petitioner Lily Ngochua advised private respondent to do the same. Clearly, these acts
are strong indication that petitioners wanted to severe [sic] the employer-employee relationship
between them and that of private respondent. This is buttressed by the fact that when private
respondent signified her intention to return back to work after learning of the disapproval of her
application, she was prevented to enter the petitioner's premises by confiscating her ID and
informing her that a new employee has already replaced her.
Moreover, private respondent’s application for early retirement did not manifest her intention to
sever the employer-employee relationship. Although she applied for early retirement, she did so
upon the belief that she would receive a higher benefit based on the petitioner's offer. As such,
her consent to be retired could not be fairly deemed to have been knowingly and freely given
DIVINE WORD COLLEGE OF LAOAG vs. SHIRLEY B. MINA, as heir-substitute of the
late DELFIN A. MINA
G.R. No. 195155
Facts: DWCL is a non-stock educational institution offering catholic education to the public. It
is run by the Society of Divine Word (SVD), a congregation of Catholic priests. Then, the
Society of Divine Word Educational Association (DWEA) established a Retirement Plan to
provide retirement benefits for qualified employees of their member institutions. Said retirement
plan contains a clause about the portability of benefits.
Mina was first employed in as a high school teacher, and later on a high school principal, at the
Academy of St. Joseph (ASJ), a school run by the SVD. Then, he transferred to DWCL and was
accorded a permanent status after a year of probationary status. He was subsequently transferred
to DWCL’s college department as an Associate Professor III. Thereafter, Mina was assigned as
the College Laboratory Custodian of the School of Nursing and was divested of his teaching
load, subject to automatic termination and without need for any further notification.
Mina was thereafter offered early retirement but initially declined it. He later received a
Memorandum from the Office of the Dean enumerating specific acts of gross or habitual
negligence, insubordination, and reporting for work under the influence of alcohol. He answered
the allegations but sensing that it was useless, he negotiated for his retirement benefits. Then, it
was made to appear that his services were terminated by reason of redundancy to avoid any tax
implications. Mina was also made to sign a deed of waiver and quitclaim. Mina then filed a case
for illegal dismissal and recovery of separation pay and other monetary claims.
The LA ruled that there was no constructive dismissal and that his retirement pay should include
the number of years he had worked for ASJ. However, the NLRC ruled otherwise as to the
constructive dismissal. The NLRC also held that Mina was not deemed to have waived all his
claims against DWCL as quitclaims cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which
they are legally entitled, but disregarded his years of service in ASJ for the computation of
retirement pay. The CA sustainedthe NLRC's ruling.
Issues:WON there was constructive dismissal
WON the retirement benefits should include Mina's service in ASJ
Ruling:Yes. The Constitution and the Labor Code mandate that employees be accorded security
of tenure. The right of employees to security of tenure, however, does not give the employees
vested rights to their positions to the extent of depriving management of its prerogative to change
their assignments or to transfer them. In cases of transfer of an employee, the employer is
charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action are for valid and legitimate
grounds such as genuine business necessity and that the transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee. If the employer cannot overcome this burden of
proof, the employee’s transfer shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal.
Here, Mina’s transfer clearly amounted to a constructive dismissal since for almost 23 years, he
was a teacher enjoying a permanent status but then was appointed as a college laboratory
custodian, which is a clear relegation from his previous position. Not only that. He was also
divested of his teaching load and his appointment even became contractual in nature and was
subject to automatic termination after one year "without any further notification." DWCL failed
to show any reason for Mina’s transfer and that it was not unreasonable, inconvenient, or
prejudicial to him. Mina’s appointment as laboratory custodian was a demotion.
SC also affirmed that the eight years of service rendered by Mina in ASJ shall not be included in
the computation of his retirement benefits. No adequate proof is shown that he has complied with
the portability clause of the DWEA Retirement Plan. The employee has the burden of proof to
show compliance with the requirements set forth in retirement plans, being in the nature of
privileges granted to employees. Failure to overcome the burden of proof would necessarily
result in the employee’s disqualification to receive the benefits.
Mariano v. Martinez Memorial Colleges, Inc,
GR 194119, 13 April 2016

FACTS: Martinez Memorial Colleges, Inc. (MMC) is a private educational institution, with
respondents Martinez as the College incumbent President and Del Rio as the College Executive
Vice-President. The petitioner was MMC's Assistant Cashier. Part of her job was to accept
payments and issue receipts and deposit slips to MMC students. In 2008, the petitioner went on
an authorized leave of absence, as she and her husband Dario Mariano (Dario), Director for
Finance of MMC, would be vacationing. When the petitioner returned to work, she received a
Memorandum signed by the respondents, stating that in line with the streamlining activities of
MMC, she would be transferred from the Cashier's Office to the Office of the Vice-President
(OVP) for Finance, her husband's office. Dario then advised the petitioner to file an extended
leave of absence, which was granted. Subsequently, the petitioner went to MMC to file another
application for leave as she was not feeling well but this was denied by the Human Resources.
The resident physician at Martinez Memorial Hospital recommended her confinement and she
was later hospitalized. In the meantime Muallil was tasked to conduct an audit review of MMC's
Finance Department. Muallil submitted her report and findings, which showed the petitioner's
improper handling of cash accounts of MMC. A separate account called "non-essential accounts"
(containing a total amount of P40,490,619.26) in which some collections of MMC were
deposited and diverted from MMC's general fund was likewise discovered. Thereafter, Dario
received a letter from Martinez, addressed to the petitioner, where the latter was asked to explain
in writing, within five days, her possible involvement in the diversion of MMC's funds. In a
letter, they explained that the MMC Board of Directors sanctioned the non-essential account. The
petitioner did not submit any separate reply. Then, petitioner received a letter from Martinez,
informing her that her employment has been terminated on the ground of serious or gross
dishonesty in relation to the discovered misappropriation and diversion of funds of MMC, and
aggravated by her continuous absence from office without leave or any explanation. Petitioner
amended her earlier complaint of constructive dismissal to illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter
declared the dismissal as illegal for failure of the respondents to prove lawful or just cause for
the termination of her employment and for their failure to accord her due process. On appeal, the
NLRC vacated and set aside the LA' s decision. The CA denied the petitioner’s appeal, saying
that the petitioner was the Assistant Cashier who performs the duties of a cashier, position that
requires a high degree of trust and confidence, and her infraction reasonably taints the trust and
confidence reposed upon her by her employer
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Mariano was illegally dismissed.
RULING: No. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The CA correctly ruled that MMC's act of
transferring the petitioner from the Cashier's Office to the OVP for Finance is a valid exercise of
management prerogative. The Court has often declined to interfere in legitimate business
decisions of employers, as long as the company's exercise of the same is in good faith to advance
its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under
the laws or valid agreements. In this case, the MMC's exercise of its management prerogative
was done for the advancement of its interest and not for the purpose of defeating the lawful
rights of the petitioner. It was within MMC's discretion to allow husband and wife to be in one
department and there is no express prohibition on this matter. The Board of Directors' decision to
transfer the petitioner to her husband's department did not cause any conflict at all and the same
was on an interim basis only. As regards the petitioner's dismissal from employment, the Court
also affirms the CA ruling that the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
declaring its validity. In this case, MMC's ground for terminating the petitioner's employment
was "serious or gross dishonesty and for having committed an offense against [MMC]," which
was based on the findings in the System Review Report submitted by Muallil. The Court has
ruled that in dismissing a cashier on the ground of loss of confidence, it is sufficient that there is
some basis for the same or that the employer has a reasonable ground to believe that the
employee is responsible for the misconduct, thus making him unworthy of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. Courts cannot justly deny the employer the authority to dismiss him
for employers are allowed wider latitude in dismissing an employee for loss of trust and
confidence. The petitioner contends that she had no opportunity to defend herself from the
charges as MMC deliberately failed to provide her a copy of the System Review Report. The
letter that Martinez sent to the petitioner ordering her to explain in writing her possible
involvement in the diversion of MMC's funds complies with the first written notice requirement
as it specified the ground for termination and gave the petitioner an opportunity to explain her
side. The due process mandate does not require that the entire report from which the termination
is based should be attached to the notice. What is essential is that the particular acts or omissions
for which her dismissal is sought are indicated in the letter. Accordingly, the CA's denial of the
petitioner's petition must be upheld.
BLUE EAGLE MANAGEMENT, INC. vs. NAVAL
G.R. No. 192488. April 19, 2016

FACTS: By virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), finalized on September 29, 2006,

Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU), owner of the Moro Lorenzo Sports Center (MLSC)
located within the ADMU compound, gave petitioner BEMI the authority to manage and operate
the following businesses at MLSC. Petitioners Bonoan and Dela Rama were then the General
Manager and Human Resources (HR) Manager, respectively, of petitioner BEMI. Respondent
was hired on January 15, 2005 by petitioner BEMI as a member of its maintenance staff.
During its first year of operation in 2005, petitioner BEMI suffered financial losses. In an attempt
to reduce its financial losses, the Management of petitioner BEMI (Management) resolved to
decrease the operational expenses of the company. One of the measures the Management
intended to implement was the downsizing of its workforce. Pursuant to such decision of the
Management, petitioners Bonoan and Dela Rama evaluated and identified several employees
who could be the subject of retrenchment proceedings, taking into consideration the employees’
positions and tenures at petitioner BEMI. After their evaluation, petitioners Bonoan and Dela
Rama identified five employees for retrenchment. Respondent was included in the list because
she was one of the employees with the shortest tenures.
Before actually commencing retrenchment proceedings, petitioner Dela Rama separately met
with each of the five aforementioned employees and presented to them the option of resigning
instead. The employees who would choose to resign would no longer be required to report for
work after their resignation but would still be paid their full salary for February 2006 and their
prorated 13th month pay, plus financial assistance in the amount of one-month salary for every
year of service at petitioner BEMI. This option would also give the employees free time to seek
other employment while still receiving salary from petitioner BEMI.
Since all the five employees identified for retrenchment decided to voluntarily resign instead and
avail themselves of the financial package offered by petitioner BEMI, there was no more need
for the company to initiate retrenchment proceedings. The five employees were instructed to
return on February 28, 2006 to comply with the exit procedure of petitioner BEMI and receive
the amounts due them by reason of their voluntary resignation.
On February 28, 2006, the resigned employees, except for respondent, completed their exit
procedures, received the amounts due them, and executed release waivers and quitclaims in favor
of petitioner BEMI. Respondent’s nonappearance on prompted petitioner Bonoan to write her a
letter stating that in connection with respondent’s voluntary resignation, she must comply with
the exit procedures of petitioner BEMI. Respondent appeared at petitioner Bonoan’s office on
March 3, 2006. Because respondent was finding it difficult to find new employment, she asked if
it was possible for her to return to work for petitioner BEMI. However, petitioner Bonoan replied
that respondent’s resignation had long been approved and that petitioner BEMI would not be able
to rehire respondent given the difficult financial position of the company. Petitioner Bonoan
advised respondent to just receive the amount she was entitled to by reason of her voluntary
resignation.
On the afternoon of March 3, 2006, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioners before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision on October 12, 2006
finding that respondent was illegally dismissed. According to the Labor Arbiter, petitioners were
not able to prove that petitioner BEMI was suffering from serious business losses that would
have justified retrenchment of its employees. Petitioners appealed before the NLRC. The NLRC
reversed the assailed decision. This prompted respondent to file a Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated March 11, 2010, favored
respondent. The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners.
Petitioners now come before the Court via the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed; which depends on the question of
whether or not respondent’s resignation was voluntary.

HELD: For the resignation of an employee to be a viable defense in an action for illegal
dismissal, an employer must prove that the resignation was voluntary, and its evidence thereon
must be clear, positive, and convincing. The employer cannot rely on the weakness of the
employee’s evidence. In this case, petitioners, as employers, were able to present sufficient
evidence to establish that respondent’s resignation was voluntary. As borne out by the Financial
Statements for 2005 of petitioner BEMI, there was ground for the company to implement a
retrenchment of its employees at the time respondent resigned.
The evaluation and identification of the employees to be retrenched were jointly undertaken by
petitioners Bonoan and Dela Rama, as the General Manager and HR Manager, respectively, of
petitioner BEMI, based on fair and reasonable criteria, i.e., the employees’ positions and tenures
at the company. Respondent was included in the final list of five employees to be retrenched
because she was one of the employees with the shortest tenures. That there were four other
employees of petitioner BEMI who were to be retrenched and similarly offered the option of
resigning in exchange for a more favorable financial package refutes respondent’s insinuation of
a scheme by petitioners to remove her because of Dr. Florendo’s complaint against her for the
incident that took place in December 2005.
Because the five employees to be retrenched opted to voluntarily resign instead and avail
themselves of the financial package offered, there was no more need for petitioner BEMI to
comply with the notice requirement to the Department of Labor and Employment. Said five
employees were to receive more benefits than what the law prescribed in case of retrenchment,
particularly: (a) full salary for February 2006 although they were no longer required to report to
work after submission of their resignation letters in mid-February 2006; (b) prorated 13th month
pay; and (c) financial assistance equivalent to one-month salary for every year of service.

The foregoing circumstances persuade the Court that no fraud or deception was employed upon
respondent to resign because petitioner BEMI was indeed about to implement in good faith a
retrenchment of its employees in order to advance its interest and not merely to defeat or
circumvent the respondent’s right to security of tenure.
COCOPLANS, INC. vs. VILLAPANDO
G.R. No. 183129. May 30, 2016

FACTS: Respondent Ma. Socorro R. Villapando, began working as a financial Advisor for
petitioner Cocoplans, Inc., (Cocoplans) in 1995. In 2000, she was eventually promoted to
Division Head/Senior Sales Manager. On 2002, however, her employment was terminated by
Cocoplans, through its President, Michelena, on the alleged ground that she was deliberately
influencing people to transfer to another company thereby breaching the trust and losing the
confidence given to her by Cocoplans. Consequently, Villapando filed an action for illegal
dismissal alleging that she was dismissed without the just cause mandated by law.
On 2004, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Villapando finding that she was illegally terminated
from her employment. However, the NLRC disagreed with the Labor Arbiter in its Decision
holding that the matter of resignation is a nonissue as the termination of Villapando’s
employment was affected for reasons other than her resignation. Yet, in its 2008 Decision, the
CA disagreed with the NLRC and reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, finding that while
Villapando was duly afforded the required due process mandated by law, the evidence adduced
by herein petitioners was not substantial enough to support their allegation that Villapando
deliberately influenced people to transfer to another company.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was terminated for just cause.
HELD: Settled is the rule that to constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two (2)
requisites must concur, viz.: (a) the employee must be afforded due process, i.e., he must be
given an opportunity to be heard and defend himself; and (b) the dismissal must be for a valid
cause, as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code, or for any of the authorized causes under
Articles 283 and 284 of the same Code. In the case before the Court, it is already undisputed that
petitioners duly afforded Villapando the opportunity to be heard and defend herself, thereby
complying with the first requisite. The issue that remains, therefore, is whether Villapando was
dismissed for valid and just cause.
To be a valid ground for dismissal, loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach
of trust and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally,
knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done
carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial grounds and not
on the employer’s arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would
eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. Loss of confidence must not also be
indiscriminately used as a shield by the employer against a claim that the dismissal of an
employee was arbitrary. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained
of must be work-related and show that the employee concerned is unfit to continue working for
the employer.
In the instant case, the Court does not find the evidence presented by petitioners to be substantial
enough to discharge the burden of proving that Villapando was, indeed, dismissed for just cause.
Thus, in view of the irregularities identified by the CA, the Court cannot take Ms. Gurango’s
affidavit into account. In dismissing an employee for just cause, it must be shown that the
employer fairly made a determination of just cause in good faith, taking into consideration all of
the evidence available to him. Thus, not only is there no showing that said affidavit was
considered by petitioners in arriving at their decision to dismiss Villapando; Villapando never
had the opportunity to address the accusations stated therein. As such, the Court cannot consider
the same.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. LIGAN
G.R. No. 203932. June 8, 2016

FACTS: PAL and Synergy Services Corporation (Synergy) entered into a station services
agreement and a janitorial services agreement whereby Synergy provided janitors and station
attendants to PAL at Mactan airport. Enrique Ligan was among the personnel of Synergy posted
at PAL to carry out the contracted tasks. Claiming to be performing duties directly desirable and
necessary to the business of PAL, the respondents, along with 12 other co-employees, filed
complaints in March 1992 against PAL and Synergy in the NLRC Region VII Office in Cebu
City for regularization of their status as employees of PAL, underpayment of salaries and
nonpayment of premium pay for holidays, premium pay for rest days, service incentive leave
pay, 13th month pay and allowances.
In the Decision dated August 29, 1994, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that Synergy was an
independent contractor and dismissed the complaint for regularization, but granted the
complainants’ money claims. On appeal, the NLRC, 4th Division, Cebu City on January 5, 1996
declared Synergy a labor-only contractor and ordered PAL to accept the complainants as regular
employees and as such, to pay their salaries, allowances and other benefits under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement subsisting during the period of their employment. PAL went to this Court
on certiorari, but the case was referred to the CA. On September 29, 2000, the CA, in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 52329, affirmed the NLRC in toto.
Meanwhile, while the above regularization cases were pending in the CA, PAL terminated its
service agreements with Synergy effective June 30, 1998, alleging serious business losses.
Consequently, Synergy also terminated its employment contracts with the respondents, who
forthwith filed individual complaints for illegal dismissal against PAL. PAL in turn filed a third
party complaint against Synergy.
In his Decision dated July 27, 1998, Executive LA Reynoso A. Belarmino declared that Synergy
was an independent contractor and the respondents were its regular employees, and therefore
Synergy was solely liable for the payment of their separation pay, wage differential, and
attorney’s fees. In their appeal to the NLRC, the respondents cited seven previous cases wherein
the NLRC also declared that Synergy was a labor-only contractor. They argued that Synergy and
PAL dismissed them without just cause. In the Decision dated August 27, 2004, the NLRC found
that the functions performed by the respondents under Synergy’s service contracts with PAL
indicated that they were directly related to PAL’s air transport business. PAL’s motion for
reconsideration having denied, it filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. On February 15,
2012, the CA dismissed PAL’s petition, and on September 27, 2012, it also denied its motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed by PAL.

ISSUE: Whether the termination of the respondents’ employment by Synergy in June 1998 was
without just cause and observance of due process.
HELD:
PAL has insisted that the NLRC erroneously relied on an inexistent CA decision, and therefore
its decision is void, but the CA in its resolution of September 27, 2012 has concluded that “[a]
perusal of the Decision of the NLRC shows that it is not without basis,” that the NLRC “made
findings of facts, analyzed the legal aspects of the case taking into consideration the evidence
presented and formed conclusions after noting the relevant facts of the case.” But more
importantly, the Court cannot lose sight of the settled rule that in illegal dismissal cases, the onus
to prove that the employee was not dismissed, or if dismissed, that his dismissal was not illegal,
rests on the employer, and that its failure to discharge this burden signifies that the dismissal is
not justified and therefore illegal. Unfortunately, in this petition, PAL has advanced no such
justification whatsoever to dismiss or retrench the respondents. The Court is left with no
conclusion: PAL’s petition is misleading and clearly baseless and dilatory.
G.R. No. 205061, June 08, 2016
EMERTIA G. MALIXI vs. MEXICALI PHILIPPINES AND/OR FRANCESCA
MABANTA,
DEL CASTILLO, J.

Facts: Petitioner was hired by respondents as a team leader at delivery service. Due to her
satisfactory performance, she was then transferred at a newly opened branch in Alabang Town
Center as a store manager. In December 2008, she was compelled to sign an end of contract letter
due to her criminal complaint for sexual harassment against the respondent’s operations manager.
However, she refused to do so. Thereafter, Luna went to the branch and caused the signing of the
same and informed her that it was her last day.
Respondents denied responsibilities to the petitioner on the ground that she was no longer an
employee of Mexicali but rather Calexico. That the two are distinct and Separate Corporation.
Petitioner alleged that it was Mexicali who engaged, dismissed and controlled her. That her
resignation was a condition for her promotion as a store manager.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of the petitioner. Declaring that Mexicali and Calexico are one
and the same with interlocking board of directors. The NLRC, nevertheless, ordered Mexicali,
being the employer of Teves and Luna who caused petitioner's termination from her employment
with Calexico, to reinstate petitioner to her job at Calexico but without paying her any
backwages. The CA affirmed the decision of NLRC that there was no illegal dismissal.
Issue: Whether or not there was an illegal dismissal
Held:
The Court finds that there exists no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
respondents as to hold the latter liable for illegal dismissal. "Resignation is the voluntary act of
an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed
in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from
employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of
relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish
must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the
alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she, in fact, intended to
sever his or her employment."30 Here, petitioner tendered her resignation letter preparatory to her
transfer to Calexico for a higher position and pay. In the said letter, she expressed her gratitude
and appreciation for the two months of her employment with Mexicali and intimated that she
regrets having to leave the company. Clearly, expressions of gratitude and appreciation as well as
manifestation of regret in leaving the company negates the notion that she was forced and
coerced to resign. In the same vein, an inducement for a higher position and salary cannot defeat
the voluntariness of her actions. It should be emphasized that petitioner had an option to decline
the offer for her transfer, however, she opted to resign on account of a promotion and increased
pay. "In termination cases, the employee is not afforded any option; the employee is dismissed
and his only recourse is to institute a complaint for illegal dismissal against his employer x x
x."31 Clearly, this does not hold true for petitioner in the instant case. Further, as aptly observed
by the CA, petitioner is a managerial employee, who, by her educational background could not
have been coerced, forced or induced into resigning from her work.
 YUMANG v. RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC. G.R No. 201016
FACTS:

On May 1, 1998, the petitioner Leoncia A. Yumang started her employment with the
respondent Radio Philippines Network, Inc. She was a member of the Radio
Philippines Network Employees Union (RPNEU) which had a collective bargaining
agreement with RPN 9 effective July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2009.

Allegedly, after the conclusion of the CBA, a new Toyota Revo driven by RPNEU
President Reynato Siozon Jr., was found to be registered in the name of the RPN 9
General Manager. The petitioner and 14 other union members filed complaints with
the DOLE-NCR against the RPNEU officers and members of the Board of Directors
for: impeachment, an audit of union funds, and the conduct of a snap election.

On August 17, 2005, Mediator-Arbiter Clarissa G. Beltran-Lerios (Med-Arbiter Lerios)

ordered the conduct of a referendum to determine whether the incumbent RPNEU
officers would be impeached. The union officers and the BOD appealed to the
Bureau of Labor Relations. BLR Director Henry Parel granted the appeal and
reversed Med-Arbiter Lerios' ruling.

In the meantime or on June 1, 2005, two complaints were filed with the RPNEU
Executive Board against several union members. The complaints involved alleged
violations of the RPNEU Constitution and Bylaws (CBL),6 principally: (1) the
commission of acts inimical to the interests of the union and the general
membership; (2) the attempt to form another union; and (3) an appeal to the
general membership urging them to commence legal action without exhausting
remedies under the RPNEU CBL.

The CA denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC ruling.

ISSUES:
 WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
 WON the expulsion of the petitioner was justified
HELD:

We find no reversible error in the CA's affirmation of the NLRC's acceptance of the
appeal despite its non-perfection as described by the petitioner. Article 227
(formerly Art. 221) of the Labor Code (renumbered by R. A. No. 10151, An Act
Allowing the Employment of Night Workers), provides that "In any proceeding
before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this
Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiter shall use every and
all means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without
regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
In the issue of the expulsion case, which is paramount in the mind of the
management, we asked ourselves whether the so-called General Assembly
resolution that they tout as having reversed the expulsion case actually
occurred. When asked whether a General Assembly meeting was actually held
to discuss the reversal of the expulsion case, no categorical answer was given
by Ms. Ruth Yap, et al. In our search for truth, we called some members who
signed and asked them if indeed a General Assembly was called and if any
deliberation on the expulsion was discussed, the answer of the member-
signatories that we called was negative. In fact they said that one of the 15 in
the group of Ms.Yap approached them and appealed to them to sign lest they
be expelled from the union.

The constitution and bylaws of the union provide that charges for any violations
thereof shall be filed before the said board. But as explained by the lower court, if the
complainants had done so the board of directors would in effect be acting as
respondent investigator and judge at the same time. To follow the procedure indicated
would be a farce under the circumstances; where exhaustion of administrative
remedies within the union itself would practically amount to a denial of justice or
would be illusory or vain, it will not be insisted upon.

The records show that there was no categorical finding of the petitioner's guilt on
this question. But we find the petitioner well within her rights as a union member
when she took the officers to task for then handling of the affairs of the union,
especially with respect to matters relating to the union funds and the quality of the
union leadership. The union President's integrity was itself put in serious doubt
when he was seen using a vehicle registered in the name of the RPN9 General
Manager after the conclusion of the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2009 CBA.

In sum, the court finds merit in the petition. The petitioner was illegally
dismissed, as her expulsion from the union had no basis.
 BARRIO FIESTA RESTAURANT v. BERONIA, G.R No. 206690
FACTS:
ON Aug. 17, 2009, respondent Helen C. Beronia filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and money claims against petitioners Barrio Fiesta Restaurant, Liberty Ilagan,
Sunshine Ongpauco-Ikeda, and Marico Cristobal. The petitioners, through Atty.
Richard Neil S. Chua of Ligon Solis Mejia Florendo law firm, denied the claims prayed
for. In a decision dated May 31, 2010, the labor arbiter (LA) declared that Beronia
had been illegally dismissed. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
reversed the LA’s ruling in its Dec. 7, 2010 decision. Beronia moved for
reconsideration of the NLRC decision. On Jan. 13, 2011, the petitioners filed their
opposition to Beronia’s motion for reconsideration. The opposition was signed and
personally filed by Ilagan and Ikeda. In its July 21, 2012 decision, the Court of
Appeals (CA) reinstated the LA decision. On Nov. 29, 2012, the petitioners, through
Real Bartolo & Real law offices, filed with the CA an entry of appearance with
manifestation and motion for reconsideration. In its April 5, 2013 resolution, the CA
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for being 138 days late, pointing out
that petitioners’ counsel has long received a copy of its June 21, 2012 decision.
Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners asked for a liberal application of the
procedural rules, reasoning that they believed all the while that they were being
represented by their former counsel, Ligon, et. al., through Atty. Chua. They argued
that the procedural lapse before the CA was clearly due to a miscommunication with
the law firm for which they should not be made to suffer, in the interest of
substantial justice.

ISSUE:
Does this argument find merit?
HELD:
No.
In the present case, the only permissible consideration we can take is to determine
whether circumstances exist to excuse the petitioners’ delay in the filing of their
motion for reconsideration. If there are none, as indeed we find because the
petitioners utterly failed to show us one, then the delay is fatal.

We note that on Jan. 13, 2011, the petitioners filed an Opposition, dated January 5,
2011, to the motion filed by Beronia seeking reconsideration of the NLRC’s Dec. 7,
2010 decision. Significantly, this Jan. 5, 2011 opposition was signed personally by
petitioners Ilagan and Ikeda, on behalf of themselves and of petitioner Barrio Fiesta,
instead of by Atty. Chua for Ligon, et al. as the petitioners’ counsel. As a rule, when a
party to a proceeding is represented by counsel, it is the counsel who signs any
pleading filed in the course of the proceeding. The party represented does not have
to sign the pleadings, save only in the specific instances required by the rules; they
appear before the court and participate in the proceedings only when specifically
required by the court or tribunal. In the petitioners’ case, they were themselves
aware that Beronia sought reconsideration of the NLRC decision as they had, in fact,
personally opposed this motion instead of through their counsel on record, Ligon, et
al. Had they still been represented by their counsel, through Atty. Chua as they claim,
the latter would have signed and filed the opposition in their behalf. Viewed in this
light, the petitioners must have known that Ligon, et al. no longer represented them
in this case; this was true even at the NLRC level and before the case reached the CA.
(Brion, J.; SC 2nd Division, Barrio Fiesta Restaurant, et. al. vs. Helen C. Beronia, G.R.
No. 206690, July 11, 2016).
 GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES v. GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES FACULTY
LABOR UNION, G.R No. 204693
FACTS:
GNC is an educational institution located in Sta. Filomena, Guagua, Pampanga. On the
other hand, respondents Guagua National Colleges Faculty Labor Union (GNCFLU)
and Guagua National Colleges Non-Teaching and Maintenance Labor Union
(GNCNTMLU) were the bargaining agents for GNC's faculty members and non-
teaching and maintenance personnel, respectively.

Beginning 1994 until their present dispute, the parties concluded their Collective
Bargaining Agreements (CBA) without issue as follows: (1) CBA effective June 1,
1994 to May 31, 1999 (1994-1999 CBA), the economic provisions of which were
renegotiated on November 3, 1997 for years 1997-1999; (2) CBA effective June
1,1999 to May 31, 2004, the economic provisions of which were renegotiated on July
4, 2002 for years 2002-2004; and, (3) CBA effective June 1, 2004 to May 31, 2009.
The aforementioned CBAs applied to both GNCFLU and GNCNTMLU without
distinction. Significantly, the 1994-1999 CBA has a "no-strike, no lock-out" clause
under Section 17 thereof which likewise provides for mechanism for grievance
resolution and voluntary arbitration. This provision was considered carried over in
the subsequent CBAs.

Respondents alleged that after several mediation meetings, the parties finally agreed
on the details regarding the grant of signing bonus. Hence, they undertook to
compose the final draft of the 2009-2014 CBA which it submitted to the NCMB on
May 14, 2010 and copy furnished GNC on May 21, 2010. Respondents likewise
averred that the parties already agreed to schedule the signing of the said CBA on
May 28, 2010.

GNC, on the other hand, contended that during mediation meetings with the NCMB,
respondents submitted several CBA drafts for its consideration. Upon its receipt on
May 21, 2010 of another draft CBA23 from respondents under cover letter dated
May 20, 2010, it decided to secure the services of Atty. Padilla to assist it in its
negotiations with respondents. Hence, on May 28, 2010, Atty. Padilla appeared
before the NCMB and asked for 10 days to submit GNC's comment/counter-proposal
to the purported draft CBA of respondents. However, on June 1, 2010, respondents
filed a notice of strike.

GNC called attention to the fact that when it requested the Secretary of Labor and
Employment to assume jurisdiction over the dispute, it also prayed that the same be
ordered submitted to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration provided
for under the parties' CBA. It stressed that its participation in the compulsory
arbitration proceeding should therefore not be construed as a waiver of its position
that jurisdiction over the dispute rests with the voluntary arbitrator in view of the
parties' agreement in the CBA, the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code.
The NLRC rendered a decision that GNC committed unfair labor practice by violating
the statutory duty to bargain collectively in good faith.

GNC’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. It sought recourse
from the CA through a petition for certiorari.

The CA also denied the petition for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE CA COMMITTED GRIEVOUS AND IRREVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DISMISSED GNC's PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
HELD:
GNC asserts that it is the voluntary arbitrator which has jurisdiction over the
grounds cited by respondents in their notice of strike in view of Section 17 of the
parties' 1994-1999 CBA. The said provision contains the agreement of the parties on
a "no strike, no lock-out" policy and on grievance resolution and voluntary
arbitration which was carried over to their subsequent CBAs up to the existing one.
According to GNC, respondents should not have filed a notice of strike in view of
such "no-strike, no lock-out" clause and also since respondents' grounds for strike
are within the scope of "grievance" to be resolved in accordance with the said
Section 17. It argues that respondents, by the simple expedient of filing a notice of
strike, were able to circumvent the "no strike, no lock-out" clause and the grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitration provision of their CBA.

Indeed, the parties through their CBA, agreed to a "no-strike, no lock-out" policy and
to resolve their disputes through grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration.
Despite these, respondents were justified in filing a notice of strike in light of the
facts of this case. It is settled that a "no strike, no lock-out" provision in the CBA
"may [only] be invoked by [an] employer when the strike is economic in nature or
one which is conducted to force wage or other agreements from the employer that
are not mandated to be granted by law. It [is not applicable when the strike] is
grounded on unfair labor practice." 48 Here, while respondents enumerated four
grounds in their notice of strike, the facts of the case reveal that what primarily
impelled them to file said notice was their perception of bad faith bargaining and
violation of the duty to bargain collectively by GNC - charges which constitute unfair
labor practice under Article 248(g) of the Labor Code.

The CA, on certiorari petition, found merit in the University's argument that the
Secretary of Labor abused his/her discretion in resolving the economic issues on the
ground that the same were proper subject of the grievance machinery as embodied
in the parties' CBA. Accordingly, the said court directed the parties to submit the
economic issues to voluntary arbitration.

This Court affirmed the CA's ruling based on the following ratiocinations:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We xxx find logic in the CA's directive for the herein parties to proceed with
voluntary arbitration as provided in their CBA. As we see it, the issue as to the
economic benefits, which included the issue on the formula in computing the TIP
share of the employees, is one that arises from the interpretation or implementation
of the CBA. To be sure, the parties' CBA provides for a grievance machinery to
resolve any 'complaint or dissatisfaction arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the CBA and those arising from the interpretation of enforcement
of company personnel policies.' Moreover, the same CBA provides that should the
grievance machinery fail to resolve the grievance or dispute, the same shall be
'referred to a Voluntary Arbitrator for arbitration and final resolution.' However,
through no fault of the University these processes were not exhausted. It must be
recalled that while undergoing preventive mediation proceedings before the NCMB,
the Union declared a bargaining deadlock, filed a notice of strike and thereafter,
went on strike. The University filed a Motion to Strike Out Notice of Strike and to
Refer the Dispute to Voluntary Arbitration but the motion was not acted upon by the
NCMB. As borne by the records, the University has been consistent in its position
that the Union must exhaust the grievance machinery provisions of the CBA which
ends in voluntary arbitration.
 HSY Marketing Ltd. Co. v. VILLASTIQUE, G.R No. 2119569
FACTS:
On January 3, 2003, petitioner hired respondent as a field driver for Fabulous Jeans
& Shirt & General Merchandise, tasked to deliver ready-to-wear items and/or
general merchandise for a daily compensation of P370.00. On January 10, 2011,
respondent figured in an accident when the service vehicle he was driving in Iligan
City bumped a pedestrian, Ryan Dorataryo. Fabulous jeans shouldered the
hospitalization and medical expenses of Dorataryo which respondent was asked to
reimburse, but to no avail.

On February 24, 2011, respondent was allegedly required to sign a resignation letter,
which he refused to do. A couple of years later. He tried to collect his salary for that
week but was told that it was withheld because of his refusal to resign. Convinced
that he was already terminated on February 26, 2011, he lost no time in filing a
complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against petitioner, Fabulous Jeans
and its owner before the NLRC.

In their defense, petitioner, et al. contended that respondent had committed several
violations in the course of his employment, and had been found by his superior and
fellow employees to be a negligent and reckless driver, which resulted in the
vehicular mishap involving Dorataryo. After they paid for Dorataryo's
hospitalization and medical expenses, respondent went on absence without leave,
presumably to evade liability for his recklessness. Since respondent was the one who
refused to report for work, he should be considered as having voluntarily severed his
own employment. Thus, his money claims cannot prosper, as he was not terminated.

LA dismissed the charge of illegal dismissal. Petitioner appealed to NLRC.

NLRC affirmed the finding of LA that there was no illegal dismissal. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration, but was denied.
CA affirmed NLRC decision.

ISSUE:
WON respondent was illegally dismissed.
HELD:

Respondent had not been dismissed at all. Other that the latter’s unsubstantiated
allegation of having been verbally terminated from his work, no substantial evidence
was presented to show that he was indeed dismissed or was prevented from
returning to his work. In the absence of any showing of an overt or positive act
proving that petitioner had dismissed respondent, the latter’s claim of illegal
dismissal cannot be sustained as such supposition would be self-serving, conjectural
and of no probative value.

Similarly, petitioner’s claims of respondent’s voluntary resignation and/or

abandonment deserve scant consideration, considering petitioner’s failure to
discharge the burden of proving the deliberate and unjustified refusal of respondent
to resume his employment without any intention of returning. It was incumbent
upon petitioner to ascertain respondent’s interest or non-interest in the continuance
of his employment, but to no avail.

Hence, since there is no dismissal or abandonment to speak of, the appropriate

course of action is to reinstate the employee.

PENINSULA EMPLOYEE UNION v. ESQUIVEL, G.R No. 218454

FACTS:

On December 13, 2007, Peninsula Employees Union’ (PEU) Board of Directors

passed Local Board Resolution No. 12, series of 20078 authorizing, among others,
the affiliation of PEU with NUWHRAIN, and the direct membership of its individual
members thereto. On the same day, the said act was submitted to the general
membership, and was duly ratified by 223 PEU members. Beginning January 1,
2009, PEU-NUWHRAIN sought to increase the union dues/agency fees from one
percent (1%) to two percent (2%) of the rank and file employees’ monthly salaries,
brought about by PEU’s affiliation with NUWHRAIN, which supposedly requires its
affiliates to remit to it two percent (2%) of their monthly salaries.

The non-PEU members objected to the assessment of increased agency fees arguing
that: (a) the new CBA is unenforceable since no written CBA has been formally
signed and executed by PEU-NUWHRAIN and the Hotel; (b) the 2% agency fee is
exorbitant and unreasonable; and (c) PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the
mandatory requirements for such increase.

OSEC’s June 2, 2010 decision upheld PEU-NUWHRAIN's right to collect agency fees
from the non-PEU members in accordance with Article 4, Section 2 of the expired
CBA, which was declared to be in full force and effect pursuant to the October 10,
2008 Decision, but only at the rate of one percent (1%), and denied its bid to
increase the agency fees to two percent (2%) for failure to show that its general
membership approved the same

PEU moved for reconsideration. On March 6, 2012, the OSEC issued an

Order partially granting PEU-NUWHRAIN's motion for reconsideration, and
declaring it entitled to collect two percent (2%) agency fees from the non-PEU
members beginning July 2010 since the GMR showing approval for the increase of
the union dues from one percent (1%) to two percent (2%) was only procured at
that time

CA reinstated the June 2, 2010 OSEC’s decision.

PEU-NUWHRAIN moved for reconsideration, which was denied.

ISSUE:
 WON PEU-NUWHRAIN has right to collect the increased agency fees
 WON PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory requirements for
such increase
HELD:

1. Yes.

The recognized collective bargaining union which successfully negotiated the CBA
with the employer is given the right to collect a reasonable fee called “agency fee”
from non-union members who are employees of the appropriate bargaining unit, in
an amount equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union members, in case
they accept the benefits under the CBA. While the collection of agency fees is
recognized by Article 259 (formerly Article 248) of the Labor Code, as amended,
the legal basis of the union’s right to agency fees is neither contractual nor
statutory, but quasi-contractual, deriving from the established principle that non-
union employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from
employment conditions negotiated by the bargaining union. In the present case,
PEU-NUWHRAIN’s right to collect agency fees is not disputed.

2. Yes.

Case law interpreting Article 250 (n) and (o) of the Labor Code mandates the
submission of three (3) documentary requisites in order to justify a valid levy of
increased union dues. These are: (a) an authorization by a written resolution of the
majority of all the members at the general membership meeting duly called for the
purpose; (b) the secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting, which shall
include the list of all members present, the votes cast, the purpose of the special
assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessment or fees; and (c) individual
written authorizations for check-off duly signed by the employees conceded. In the
present case, however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to show compliance with the
foregoing requirements. It attempted to remedy the “inadvertent omission” of the
matter of the approval of the deduction of two percent (2%) union dues from the
monthly basic salary of each union member.
 PEOPLE’S SECURITY INC. v. FLORES, G.R No. 211312
FACTS:

Julius S. Flores and Esteban S. Tapiru (respondents) were security guards

previously employed by People's Security, Inc. (PSI). The respondents were assigned
at the various facilities of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
pursuant to a security services agreement between PSI and PLDT

On October 1, 2001, however, PSI's security services agreement with PLDT was
terminated and, accordingly, PSI recalled its security guards assigned to PLDT
including the respondents.

On October 8, 2001, the respondents, together with several other security guards
employed by PSI, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) against PLDT and PSI, claiming that they are PLDT
employees.

Thereafter, PSI assigned the respondents to the facilities of its other clients such as
the warehouse of a certain Marivic Yulo in Sta. Ana, Manila and Trinity College's
Elementary Department in Quezon City.

On January 13, 2003, the respondents were relieved from their respective
assignments pursuant to Special Order No. 200310108 dated January 10, 2003
issued by Col. Leonardo L. Aquino, the Operations Manager of PSI.9 Accordingly,
Flores and Tapiru, on September 6 and 27, 2005, respectively, filed with the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Quezon City a complaint for illegal dismissal
and non-payment of service incentive leave pay and cash bond, with prayer for
separation pay, against PSI and its President Nestor Racho (Racho) (collectively, the
petitioners).

Respondents claimed that, after they were relieved from their assignment in the
warehouse in Sta. Ana, Manila on January 13, 2003, they repeatedly reported to PSI's
office for possible assignment, but the latter refused to give them any assignment.

Petitioners, in their position paper, claimed that the respondents were merely
relieved from their assignment in the warehouse in Sta. Ana, Manila and that the
same was on account of their performance evaluation, which indicated that they
were ill-suited for the said assignment.

On January 30, 2009, the LA rendered a Decision finding that the respondents
were illegally dismissed from their employment and, thus, directing the
petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay the former separation pay and back
wages.

On appeal, the NLRC, in its Decision dated April 14, 2010, reversed the LA Decision
dated January 30, 2009. On April 25, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed
Decision, reversing the NLRC's Decision dated April 14, 2010 and Resolution dated
June 15, 2010. In finding that the respondents were illegally dismissed, the CA
found that the petitioners failed to prove that the respondents had abandoned
their work and that their defense of abandonment was negated by the filing of
a case for illegal dismissal.

In this petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners claim that the CA
committed reversible error in ruling that the respondents were illegally dismissed
from their employment. They maintain that PSI never terminated the
respondents' employment. On the contrary, they claim that the respondents freely
and voluntarily resigned from their employment.

Petitioners also claim that the CA erred when it ruled that they should be held jointly
and solitarily liable to pay the respondents separation pay and back wages
considering that there was absolutely no allegation or proof of participation, bad
faith, or malice on the part of Racho in dealing with the respondents.

ISSUES:

 Whether respondents were illegally dismissed?

 Whether Racho is jointly and solidarily liable with PSI for the payment of the
monetary awards to the respondents?

HELD:

 Yes

As rule, employment cannot be terminated by an employer without any just or

authorized cause. No less than the 1987 Constitution in Section 3, Article 13
guarantees security of tenure for workers and because of this, an employee may only
be terminated for just or authorized causes that must comply with the due process
requirements mandated by law. Hence, employers are barred from arbitrarily
removing their workers whenever and however they want.

Further, as aptly ruled by the CA, the petitioners miserably failed to prove that the
respondents abandoned their work. Abandonment is a matter of intention and
cannot lightly be inferred or legally presumed from certain equivocal acts. For
abandonment to exist, two requisites must concur: first, the employee must have
failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable
reason; and second, there must have been a clear intention on the part of the
employee to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt
acts. The Court is not convinced that the respondents failed to report for work or
have been absent without valid or justifiable cause. After the petitioners relieved
them from their previous assignment in Sta. Ana, Manila, the respondents were no
longer given any assignment.

What is more, PSI did not afford the respondents due process. The validity of the
dismissal of an employee hinges not only on the fact that the dismissal was for a just
or authorized cause, but also on the very manner of the dismissal itself. It is
elementary that the termination of an employee must be effected in accordance with
law. It is required that the employer furnish the employee with two written notices:
(1) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side; and (2) a written notice of termination served on the employee
indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.

 No

Anent, the propriety of holding Racho, PSI's President, jointly and solidarily liable
with PSI for the payment of the money awards in favor of the respondents, the Court
finds for the petitioners.

The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only when the corporate fiction is
used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime. In
the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific provision of law making a corporate
officer liable, such corporate officer cannot be made personally liable for corporate
liabilities.

The respondents failed to adduce any evidence to prove that Racho, as President and
General Manager of PSI, is hiding behind the veil of corporate fiction to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime. Thus, it is only PSI who is
responsible for the respondents' illegal dismissal

MARINA’S CREATION ENTERPRISES v. ANCHETA, G.R No. 218333

FACTS:
Petitioner Marina Creation Enterprises (Marina) is engaged in the business of
making shoes and bags. In 2010, Marina hired respondent Romeo V. Ancheta
(Ancheta) as a sole attacher in Marina. In 2011, Ancheta suffered a stroke and was
placed under home care. Thereafter, Ancheta suffered another stroke and was
confined at St. Victoria Hospital in Marikina City for 4 days.
Ancheta filed for a Sickness Notification with the Social Security System (SSS) and
was paid sickness benefits. The physician who examined Ancheta told that he would
be fit to resume work after ninety (90) days.
When Ancheta reported for work. He was required by Marina to submit a new
medical certificate before he could resume his work in Marina. However, Ancheta did
not comply and therefore was not able to resume work. He filed a complaint with the
LA against Marina for illegal dismissal and non-payment of separation pay.
Ancheta alleged that he recovered from his illness and went to work but Marina
advised him to just wait for the companies call. He was also told that he should take
more rest and that Marina employed 2 new workers as his replacement. He alleged
that there was no notice for his termination.
On the other hand, Marina claimed that Ancheta was employed on a piece rate bases
and was not terminated but instead was not allowed to work because of his failure to
submit a medical clearance showing he was fit to resume to work. Furthermore, it is
the companies precautionary measure to avoid any incident that would endanger
the life of Ancheta.
The Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission ruled in favor of
Marina but reversed by The Court of Appeals stating that the medical certificate
given by Ancheta’s examining physician attached to his SSS Sickness Notification was
enough proof that he is fit to work.

ISSUE:
The issue in this case is whether Ancheta was illegally dismissed by Marina.

HELD:
Yes, In its petition, Marina argues that the company's action of requiring Ancheta to
undergo a medica1 examination and to submit a medical certificate was a valid
exercise of management prerogative. Marina's contention is not correct. Article 279
of the Labor Code provides: "In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by
this title. x x x." Since Ancheta was a regular employee of Marina, Ancheta's
employment can only be terminated by Marina based on just or authorized causes
provided in the Labor Code. In its position paper, Marina admitted that the company
had refused to give Ancheta work assignments until Ancheta submitted a new
medical certificate. It is Marina's position that Ancheta's employment would not
continue if Ancheta would not submit a new medical certificate. Marina's action in
refusing to accept Ancheta notwithstanding the medical certificate attached to
Ancheta's SSS Sickness Notification stating that Ancheta was physically fit to resume
his work in Marina on 12 August 2011 amounts to an illegal dismissal of Ancheta.
Book VI, Rule I, Section 8 of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code provides:

Section 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal. - Where the employee suffers from a
disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his
health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his
employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health
authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be
cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment . If
the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not
terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer
shall reinstate the employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration
of his normal health. (Emphasis supplied)

The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code impose upon the employer the duty not
to terminate an employee until there is a certification by a competent public health
authority that the employee's disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it
cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment.
In this case, Marina terminated Ancheta from employment without seeking a prior
certification from a competent public health authority that Ancheta's disease is of
such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months
even with proper medical treatment. Hence, Ancheta was illegally dismissed by
Marina.

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILIPPINES v. MAGLAYA Sr. G.R No. 212774

FACTS:

Wesleyan University-Philippines (WUP) is a non-stock, non-profit, non-sectarian

educational corporation duly organized and existing under the Philippine laws.

Respondent Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya, Sr. (Maglaya) was appointed as a corporate

member and was elected as a member of the Board of Trustees (Board), both for a
period of five years. Then he was elected as President of the University for a five-year
term and was re-elected as a trustee.

In a Memorandum created by the incumbent Bishops of the United Methodist Church

(Bishops) apprised all the corporate members of the expiration of their terms, unless
renewed by the former. The said members, including Maglaya, sought the renewal of
their membership in the WUP's Board, and signified their willingness to serve the
corporation.

Maglaya learned that the Bishops created an Ad Hoc Committee to plan the efficient and
orderly turnover of the administration of the WUP in view of the alleged "gentleman's
agreement” and that the Bishops have appointed the incoming corporate members and
trustees. He clarified that there was no agreement and any discussion of the turnover
because the corporate members still have valid and existing corporate terms.

Complaint was filed as the termination of their membership in the corporation

necessarily resulted in the conclusion of their positions as members of the Board
pursuant to the WUP by-laws.

Thereafter, Maglaya filed the present illegal dismissal case against the WUP, claiming
that he was unceremoniously dismissed in a wanton, reckless, oppressive and
malevolent manner. He also alleged that he faithfully discharged his necessary and
desirable functions as President.

WUP, on the other hand, asseverated that the dismissal or removal of Maglaya, being a
corporate officer and not a regular employee, is a corporate act or intra-corporate
controversy under the jurisdiction of the RTC. WUP also maintained that since Maglaya's
appointment was not renewed, he ceased to be a member of the corporation and of the
Board; thus, his term for presidency has also been terminated.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of WUP and held that the action between employers
and employees where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental is
within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the regular courts. This instant case
involves intra-corporate dispute, which was definitely beyond the jurisdiction of the
labor tribunal.
Ruling in favor of Maglaya, the NLRC explicated that although the position of the
President of the University is a corporate office, the manner of Maglaya's
appointment, and his duties, salaries, and allowances point to his being an employee
and subordinate.
In a Resolution, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by WUP.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Maglaya is a corporate officer or a mere employee.

HELD:

This Court expounded that an "office" is created by the charter of the corporation
and the officer is elected by the directors or stockholders, while an "employee"
usually occupies no office and generally is employed not by action of the directors or
stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the
compensation to be paid to such employee.
It is under the By-laws of WUP that the president was one of the officers of the
corporation, and was an honorary member of the Board. He was appointed by the
Board and not by a managing officer of the corporation. The Court held that one who
is included in the by-laws of a corporation in its roster of corporate officers is an
officer of said corporation and not a mere employee.
A corporate officer's dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate
controversy which arises between a stockholder and a corporation, and the nature is
not altered by the reason or wisdom with which the Board of Directors may have in
taking such action. The issue of the alleged termination involving a corporate officer,
not a mere employee, is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within
the area of corporate affairs and management and is a corporate controversy in
contemplation of the Corporation Code.

In sum, this Court finds that the NLRC erred in assuming jurisdiction over, and thereafter
in failing to dismiss, Maglaya's complaint for illegal dismissal against WUP, since the
subject matter of the instant case is an intra-corporate controversy which the NLRC has
no jurisdiction.

TURKS SHAWARMA COMPANY v. FELICIANO PAJARON, G.R. No. 207156

FACTS:
Gem Zenñ arosa, owner of Turks Shawarma Company, hired Feliciano Z. Pajaron in
May 2007 as service crew and Larry A. Carbonilla in April 2007 as head crew. On
April 15, 2010, Pajaron and Carbonilla filed their respective Complaints for
constructive and actual illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay,
holiday premium, rest day premium, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay
against petitioners.

Pajaron alleged that on April 9, 2010, Zenñ arosa asked him to sign a piece of paper
stating that he was receiving the correct amount of wages and that he had no claims
whatsoever from petitioners. Disagreeing to the truthfulness of the statements,
Pajaron refused to sign the paper prompting Zenñ arosa to fire him from work.
Carbonilla, on the other hand, alleged that sometime in June 2008, he had an
altercation with his supervisor Conchita Marcillana while at work. When the
incident was brought to the attention of Zenñ arosa, he was immediately dismissed
from service. He was also asked by Zenñ arosa to sign a piece of paper acknowledging
his debt amounting to ₱7,000.00.

Both Pajaron and Carbonilla claimed that there was no just or authorized cause for
their dismissal and that petitioners also failed to comply with the requirements of
due process. Petitioners denied having dismissed Pajaron and Carbonilla; they
averred that they actually abandoned their work.

The Labor Arbiter found credible Pajaron and Carbonilla's version and held them
constructively and illegally dismissed by petitioners. The National Labor Relations
Commission and Court of Appeals both denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the
petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether the Labor Arbiter's Decision declaring Pajaron and Carbonilla illegally
terminated from employment was not based on substantial evidence.

HELD:
The Court ruled that the Labor Arbiter's Decision declaring Pajaron and Carbonilla
illegally dismissed was supported by substantial evidence. While petitioners
vehemently argue that Pajaron and Carbonilla abandoned their work, the records
are devoid of evidence to show that there was intent on their part to forego their
employment. In fact, petitioners adamantly admitted that they refused to rehire
Pajaron and Carbonilla despite persistent requests to admit them to work. Hence,
petitioners essentially admitted the fact of dismissal. However, except for their
empty and general allegations that the dismissal was for just causes, petitioners did
not proffer any evidence to support their claim of misconduct or misbehavior on the
part of Pajaron and Carbonilla. "In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on
the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just cause."37 For lack of any clear,
valid, and just cause in terminating Pajaron and Carbonilla's employment,
petitioners are indubitably guilty of illegal dismissal.

PNCC Skyway Corporation v. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, G.R No.

196110
FACTS:

The Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) was awarded by the Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB) with the franchise of constructing, operating and
maintaining the north and south expressways, including the South Metro Manila
Skyway (referred as Skyway herein). It created the petitioner PNCC Skyway
Corporation (PSC) on December 15, 1998, for the purpose of taking charge of its
traffic safety, maintaining its facilities and collecting toll.
Eight years have passed, the Citra Metro Manila Tollway Corporation (Citra), a
private investor under a build-and-transfer scheme, entered into an agreement with
the TRB and the PNCC to transfer the operation of the Skyway from petitioner PSC to
the Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO). The said transfer provided for a five-month
transition period from July 2007 until the full turn-over of the Skyway at 10:00 p.m.
of December 31, 2007 upon which petitioner PSC will close its operation.
However, on December 28, 2007 or three (3) days before the full transfer of the
operation of the Skyway to SOMCO, petitioner PSC served termination letters to its
employees, many of whom were members of private respondent PNCC Skyway
Traffic Management and Security Division Worker's Organization (Union).
According to the letter, PSC has no choice but to close its operations resulting in the
termination of its employees effective January 31, 2008. However, the employees are
entitled to receive separation pay amounting to 250% of the basic monthly pay for
every year of service, among others things. Petitioner PSC, likewise, served a notice
of termination to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
On that same day of December 28, 2007, private respondent Union, immediately
upon receipt of the termination letters, filed a Notice of Strike before the DOLE
alleging that the closure of the operation of PSC is tantamount to union-busting
because it is a means of terminating employees who are members thereof. In
addition, the notices of termination were served on its employees three (3) days
before petitioner PSC ceases its operations, hence violating the employees' right to
due process.
As a matter of fact, the employees were no longer allowed to work as of January 1,
2008. Private respondent Union, thus, prayed that petitioner PSC be held guilty of
unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal. It, likewise, prayed for the reinstatement
of all dismissed employees, along with the award of backwages, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
PSC denied that the closure of its operation was intended to remove employees who
are members of private respondent Union. Instead, it claimed that it was done in
good faith and in the exercise of management prerogative, considering that it was
anchored on an agreement between the TRB, the PNCC and the private investor
Citra.
PSC likewise denied that it had violated the right to due process of its employees,
considering that the notices of termination were served on December 28, 2007
while the termination was effective only on January 31, 2008. PSC alleged that the
Union was guilty of an illegal strike when it started a strike on the same day it filed a
notice of strike on December 28, 2007.
Public Respondent Secretary of Labor found that there was authorized cause for the
closure of the operation however it failed to comply with the procedural
requirements set forth under Article 283 of the Labor Code.
On appeal, PSC filed a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Secretary of Labor
when it additionally directed payment of an additional ₱30,000.00 to PSC's former
employees pursuant to Article 283 of the Labor Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PSC failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Article
283 of the Labor Code

HELD:

YES. The SC agreed with the appellate court's stance that public respondent
Secretary of Labor committed no grave abuse of discretion in its resolution that
while there was an authorized cause for the closure of PSC's operations and the
subsequent termination of its employees, it however failed to comply with the
procedural requirements set forth under Article 283 of the Labor Code, that is, by
serving notices of termination upon the employees and the DOLE at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof.

Article 283 of the Labor Code provides the three requirements are necessary for a
valid cessation of business operations which are as follows: (a) service of a written
notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one month before the intended date
thereof; (b) the cessation of business must be bona fide in character; and (c)
payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to one month pay or at
least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.

The required written notice under Article 283 of the Labor Code is to inform the
employees of the specific date of termination or closure of business operations and
must be served upon them at least one (1) month before the date of effectivity to
give them sufficient time to make the necessary arrangements. The purpose of this
requirement is to give employees time to prepare for the eventual loss of their jobs,
as well as to give DOLE the opportunity to ascertain the veracity of the alleged cause
of termination.

Thus, considering that the notices of termination were given merely three (3) days
before the cessation of the PSC's operation, it defeats the very purpose of the
required notice and the mandate of Article 283 of the Labor Code. Neither the
payment of employees' salaries for the said one-month period nor the employees'
alleged actual knowledge of the ASTOA is sufficient to replace the formal and written
notice required by the law.

Moreover, as early as July 2007, PSC already had knowledge of the eventual take-
over by SOMCO of the Skyway by December 31, 2007. Thus, considering that PSC
had ample time of more than five (5) months to serve the notice of termination to its
employees, its failure to comply with the notice requirement under Article 283 of the
Labor Code is inexcusable.

PJ LHUILLIER, INC v. CAMACHO, G.R No. 223073

FACTS:
On 2011, petitioner P.J. Lhuillier, Inc. (PJLI), the owner and operator of the "Cebuana
Lhuillier" chain of pawnshops, hired petitioner Feliciano Vizcarra as PLJI's Regional
Manager for Northern and Central Luzon pawnshop operations and respondent
Camacho as Area Operations Manager (AOM) for Area 213, covering the province of
Pangasinan. Camacho was assigned to administer and oversee the operations of
PJLI's pawnshop branches in the area.

On May 15, 2012, Vizcarra received several text messages from some personnel
assigned in Area 213, reporting that Camacho brought along an unauthorized
person, a non-employee, during the QTP operation (pull-out of "rematado" pawned
items) from the different branches of Cebuana Lhuillier Pawnshop in Pangasinan.
During the formal investigation on June 1, 2012, Camacho admitted that he brought
along a non-employee, Marasigan, during the QTP operations on May 15, 2012. He
explained that on May 12, 2012, he went home to Manila to celebrate Mother's Day
with his family on May 13, 2012. He drove himself using the service vehicle assigned
to him and arrived in Manila at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening.

Camacho admitted that he knew that it was prohibited to bring unauthorized

personnel, especially a non-employee, during the QTP operations because this was
discussed in the seminars facilitated by the company's Security Service Division. He
only realized his mistake at the end of their 13-branch stop when he noticed that his
companions were unusually quiet throughout the trip. It was also discovered that
Camacho committed another violation of company policy when he allowed an
unauthorized person to drive a company vehicle.

On June 14, 2012, the Formal Investigation Committee issued the Report of Formal
Investigation. The committee concluded that Camacho was guilty as charged. This
prompted Camacho to file a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) against the
petitioners for illegal dismissal, money claims, damages, and attorney's fees.

The NLRC reversed and set aside the May 14, 2013 Decision of the LA. It declared the
dismissal of Camacho as illegal. It opined that there was no indication that Camacho,
in allowing his mother's driver to be present during the conduct of the QTP
operation, was motivated by malicious intent so as to construe the infraction as
serious misconduct punishable by dismissal.

The CA reversed the NLRC resolutions. It held that contrary to the findings of the LA
and the NLRC, the misconduct of Camacho was not of a serious nature as to warrant
a dismissal from work. At most, said the CA, he was negligent and remiss in the
exercise of his duty as an AOM.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Camacho was illegally dismissed

HELD:
The Court finds merit in the petition.

Article 282(c) of the Labor Code authorizes the employer to dismiss an employee for
committing fraud or for willful breach of trust reposed by the employer on the
employee. Loss of confidence, however, is never intended to provide the employer with
a blank check for terminating its employee a. "Loss of trust and confidence" should not
be loosely applied in justifying the termination of an employee." For loss of trust and
confidence to be valid ground for termination, the employer must establish that: (1) the
employee holds a position of trust and confidence; and (2) the act complained against
justifies the loss of trust and confidence.

The first requisite mandates that the erring employee must be holding a position of trust
and confidence. Loss of trust and confidence is not a one-size- fits-all cause that can be
applied to all employees without distinction on their standing in the work organization.
Distinction yet should be made as to what kind of position of trust is the employee
occupying.

The law contemplates two (2) classes of positions of trust. The first class consists
of managerial employees. They are as those who are vested with the power or
prerogative to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff,
recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such
managerial actions. The second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians,
etc. who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle
significant amounts of money or property.

Clearly from the foregoing, it can be deduced that Camacho held a managerial position
and, therefore, enjoyed the full trust and confidence of his superiors. As a managerial
employee, he was "bound by more exacting work ethics" and should live up to this high
standard of responsibility."

The second requisite for loss of confidence as a valid ground for termination is that it
must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts.

As can be culled from the records of the case, Camacho admitted that he had committed
a breach of trust when he brought along his mother's driver, an unauthorized person,
during the QTP operation, a very sensitive and confidential operation. As explained by
PJLI in its petition for review:

Camacho, as AOM, was a managerial employee. As such, he could be terminated on the

ground of loss of confidence by mere existence of a basis for believing that he had
breached the trust of his employer. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. It
would already be sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as
when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the concerned employee is
responsible for the purported misconduct and the nature of his participation
therein. This distinguishes a managerial employee from a fiduciary rank-and-file where
loss of trust and confidence, as ground for valid dismissal, requires proof of involvement
in the alleged events in question, and that mere uncorroborated assertion and
accusation by the employer will not be sufficient.

In this case, there was such basis. It was established that Camacho had breached PJLI's
trust when he took an unauthorized person with him to the QTP operation which was
already a violation of company existing policy and security protocol. His explanation that
his alleged misdeed was brought about by his poor physical and health condition on that
day could not prevail over two significant details that PJLI pointed out in its petition.

Although it may be true that PJLI did not sustain damage or loss on account of
Camacho's action, this is not reason enough to absolve him from the consequence of his
misdeed. The fact that an employer did not suffer pecuniary damage will not obliterate
the respondent's betrayal of trust and confidence reposed on him by his employer.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission is REINSTATED.

STA. ANA v. MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC. G.R No. 208459

FACTS:

Julieta Sta. Ana was hired by MJCI as outlet teller of its off-track betting (OTB)
station in Tayuman, Manila. As teller, Sta. Ana performed the following duties and
functions:

1. Waits on [OTB] tellers' booth for customers/clients; sells betting tickets.

2. Answers bettor's inquiries, provides information on racing events, assists patrons

with information, and takes bet orders.

3. Processes cash payments through terminal registers; balances registers and

makes daily ticket sales reports after the races.

4. Handles cash and transactions with due diligence and honesty to the bettors and
to the company as well.

5. Coordinates with the Betting Operations Department (BOD) on matters beyond

the standard operating procedure of the BOD.

6. Strictly observes and implements' company policies and procedures to protect the
interests of the company against unscrupulous bettors and operators

7. Reports incidents to the company on matters pertaining to the operations.

8, Submits or remits the cash sales for the day to the official collection team and/or
to the assigned banks with night depository box.1âwphi1

9. May be assigned to different OTBs as necessary to the company's operations.

10. Performs miscellaneous job-related duties as assigned. 8

It was found out by MJCI that its treasury department has been illegally appropriating
funds and lending it out to the employees of the latter corporation. The Special
Disciplinary Committee of MJCI found Sta. Ana conducting her lending business during
office hours and using the funds and personnel of MJCI; thus, she was found guilty of
dishonesty and other fraudulent acts by the said committee.

On her defense, she alleged that she started her lending business 15 years ago prior to
the takeover of the new management of MJCI and she sold her fishing vessels 2 years
ago to finance her lending business.

She was eventually terminated by MJCI. Consequently, she filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal.
Note that Sta. Ana was dismissed for willful breach of trust and confidence.

The LA dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit.

The NLRC affirmed the LA Decision. It ruled that MJCI validly dismissed Sta. Ana for loss
of trust and confidence.

The CA also affirmed the NLRC Resolutions.

ISSUE:
Whether Sta. Ana was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence.
HELD:

The Supreme Court enumerated the elements to legally dismiss an employee on the
ground of loss and trust, to wit:

“The employer must establish that:

a) the employee occupied a position of trust and confidence, or has been routinely
charged with the care and custody of the employer’s money or property;

b) the employee committed a willful breach of trust based on clearly established facts;
and

c) such loss of trust relates to the employee’s performance of duties.”

In the case at bar, only the first element was proven by MCJI. The SC ruled that nowhere
in the evidence presented by MJCI that Sta. Ana utilized the funds of the corporation for
her lending business. Also, Sta. Ana was able to present documents to show her
capability to engage in loan operations.

Quoting the words of the SC:

“Particularly, it [MJCI] failed to establish that Sta. Ana used its employee for her personal
business during office hours, and used its money, without authority, to lend money to
another”

MJCI failed to prove that Sta. Ana committed willful breach of its trust. Particularly, it
failed to establish that Sta. Ana used its employee for her personal business during
office hours, and used its money; without authority, to lend money to another. Hence,
to dismiss her on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is unwarranted.
Under these circumstances. Sta. Ana is also entitled to receive backwages and
separation pay.

DE OCAMPO MEMORIAL SCHOOLS, INC. v. BIGKIS MANGGAGAWA SA DE

 OCAMPO, INC, G.R No. 192648
FACTS:

De Ocampo Memorial Schools, Inc. a domestic corporation has two main divisions;
De Ocampo Memorial Medical Center (DOMMC), its hospital entity, and the De
Ocampo Memorial Colleges (DOMC), its school entity.

A Union Registration was issued in favor of Bigkis Manggagawa sa De Ocampo

Memorial Medical Center - LAKAS (BMDOMMC) while Bigkis Manggagawa sa De
Ocampo Memorial School, Inc. (BMDOMSI) was later declared a legitimate labor
organization. Due to this, De Ocampo Memorial Schools, Inc. filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Ce1iificate of Registration to cancel the Certificate of Registration of
BMDOMSI on the following grounds: 1) misrepresentation, false statement and fraud
in connection with its creation and registration as a labor union as it shared the
same set of officers and members with BMDOMMC; 2) mixed membership of rank-
and-file and managerial/supervisory employees; and 3) inappropriate bargaining
unit.

DOLE-NCR ruled that BMDOMSI committed misrepresentation by making it

appear that the bargaining unit is composed of faculty and technical employees. In
fact, all the union officers and most of the members are from the General Services
Division. Furthermore, the members of the union do not share commonality of
interest, as it is composed of academic and non-academic personnel. However,
reversed the Regional Director's finding. The CA affirmed the decision of the
Regional Director but also ruled that there was no commonality of interest present.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the union committed fraud and misrepresentation by having same
set of officers with BMDOMMC

HELD:
No.
For fraud and misrepresentation to constitute grounds for cancellation of union
registration under the Labor Code Art. 247, the nature of the fraud and
misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a
majority of union members. Moreover, there is nothing in the form "Report of
Creation of Local Chapter" that requires the applicant to disclose the existence of
another union, much less the names of the officers of such other union. Although
commonality of interest is absent, it is not a ground for cancellation of union
registration.

27. MANGGAGAWA NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS V. PLDT

 G.R. NO. 190389 April 19, 2017

FACTS:
Labor organization Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP), which represented the
employees of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, filed a notice of strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board. MKP charged Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company with unfair labor practice "for transferring several employees of its Provisioning
Support Division to Bicutan, Taguig." The notice of strike contains the following unfair labor
practices:
1. PLDT's abolition of the Provisioning Support Division
2. PLDT's unreasonable refusal to honor its commitment before this Honorable Office
that it will provide MKP its comprehensive plan/s with respect to personnel
downsizing/ reorganization and closure of exchanges.
3. PLDT's continued hiring of "contractual," "temporary," "project," and "casual"
employees for regular jobs performed by union members, resulting in the decimation
of the union membership and in the denial of the right to self-organization to the
concerned employees
Another notice of strike was filed by MKP. The labor organization accused PLDT of unfair labor
practice where PLDT's alleged restructuring of its [Greater Metropolitan Manila] Operation
Services December 31, 2002 and its closure of traffic operations at the Batangas, Calamba,
Davao, Iloilo, Lucena, Malolos and Tarlac Regional Operator Services effective December 31,
2002. These twin moves unjustly imperil the job security of 503 of MKP's members and will
substantially decimate the parties' bargaining unit.
Secretary of Labor and Employment certified the labor dispute at the PLDT to the NLRC
compulsory Arbitration pursuant to Article 263 (g) of Labor Code. All striking workers are
hereby directed to return to work within twenty four (24) hours from receipt of this Order, except
those who were terminated due to redundancy. The employer is hereby enjoined to accept the
striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. The parties
are likewise directed to cease and desist from committing any act that might worsen the situation.
CA nullified and set aside the order of Secretary of Labor and Employment. PLDT appealed
CA’s decision to the SC. SC upheld the CA’s decision and ordered to readmit all the workers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.
However, NLRC dismissed MKP’s charges of unfair labor practices against PLDT. MKP filed a
petition for certiorari with CA. CA upheld the validity of PLDT’s redundancy program.
Consequently, Sec of Labor and Employment dismissed MKP’s motion for execution of the SC’s
decision of readmitting all the workers. MKP filed a petition for certiorari before CA. CA found
that NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretiona and that PLDT’s redundancy program was
not unattended by unfair labor practice.

ISSUES:
1. WHETHER THE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF PLDT’S 2002 REDUNDANCY PROGRAM
2. WHETHER THE RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT WAS RENDERED MOOT WHEN THE NLRC UPHELD THE
VALIDITY OF THE REDUNDANCY PROGRAM
RULING:
1. NO. The Court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it regarded the
technological advancements resulting in less work for the redundated employees as
justifying PLDT’s declaration of redundancy.
PLDT’s declaration of redundancy was backed by substantial evidence showing a
consistent decline for operator-assisted calls for both local and international calls because
of cheaper alternatives like direct dialing services, and the growth of wireless
communication. Thus, the National Labor Relations Commission did not commit grave
abuse of discretion when it upheld the validity of PLDT's redundancy program.
Redundancy is ultimately a management prerogative, and the wisdom or soundness of
such business judgment is not subject to discretionary review by labor tribunals or even
this Court, as long as the law was followed and malicious or arbitrary action was not
shown.
2. YES. Return-to-work order aims to preserve the status quo ante while the validity of
redundancy program is being threshed out in the proper forum. When the petitioner filed
its Motion for Execution pursuant to the Court’s ruling in PLDT, there was no longer any
existing basis for the return-to-work order. This was because the Secretary of Labor and
Employment’s return-to-work order had been superseded by the NLRC’s Resolution.
Hence, the Secretary did not err in dismissing the motion for execution on the ground of
mootness.

28. EDITHA M. CATOTOCAN v. LOURDES SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY,

INC./LOURDES SCHOOL, INC. AND REV. FR. CESAR F. ACUIN, OFM CAP, RECTOR
FACTS:
Editha Catotocan was a music teacher with a monthly salary Php30,081.00 of Lourdes School of
Quezon City (LSQC). By the school year 2005-2006, she had already served for 35 years.
LSQC has an existing retirement plan providing for retirement at 60 years old, or separation pay
depending on the number of years
On November 25, 2003, LSQC issued another retirement plan providing that “an employee may
apply for retirement or be retired by the school when he /she reaches the age of 60 years or when
he/she completes 30 years of service, whichever comes first”.
Catotocan and other co-employees assailed the said order. They believed that they do not deserve
to be retired and be rehired when they are, in fact, very much capable of doing their duties and
responsibilities.
LSQC retired Catotocan sometime in June 2006 after completing 35 years of service. Full
retirement benefits were given to her computed based on the latest salary multiplied by the total
years of service. Under the school's retirement policy, 60% of her retirement benefit was paid in
lump sum by the trustee bank, and the balance was to be paid in equal monthly pensions over the
next 3 years.
60% or Php571,701.00 was credited to her savings account, which she opened in accordance
with the school's retirement policy.
Catotocan was told that if she desires, she may signify in writing her intent to continue serving
the school on a contractual basis. She responded by submitting a "Letter of Intent" on February
14, 2006.
LSQC rehired Catotocan twice as a Grade School Guidance Counselor. On the 3 rd re-application,
LSQC no longer considered her application for the position.
Catotocan filed a complaint to the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, which the latter dismissed
for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter pointed out that, although there were exchanges of
communications between her and respondents regarding her earlier opposition to the school's
retirement policy, her subsequent actions, however, such as opening her own individual savings
account where the retirement benefits were deposited and credited thereto, her subsequent
withdrawals therefrom, her application for contractual employment after her retirement,
constituted implied consent to the assailed addendum in LSQC's retirement policy and, in effect,
abandoned her objection thereto.
NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. The NLRC held that Catotocan performed all the
acts that a retired employee would do after retirement under the new school policy. These were
voluntary acts and she cannot be considered to have been forced to retire or to have been
illegally dismissed.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or no Catotocan was illegally dismissed by LSQC.
RULING:
No, she was not for there was no illegal dismissal.
Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the
employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his or
her employment with the former. Article 287 of the Labor Code is the primary provision: In the
absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees
in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not
beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has
served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to
retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a
fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases discussing the employer's prerogative to lower the
compulsory retirement age subject to the consent of its employees.
Thus LSQC's retirement plan, allowing employers to retire employees who have not yet reached
the compulsory retirement age of 65 years are not per se repugnant to the constitutional guaranty
of security of tenure. The Labor Code permits employers and employees to fix the applicable
retirement age at 60 years or below, provided that the employees' retirement benefits under any
CBA and other agreements shall not be less than those provided therein.
Acceptance by the employees of an early retirement age option must be explicit, voluntary, free,
and uncompelled. While an employer may unilaterally retire an employee earlier than the legally
permissible ages under the Labor Code, this prerogative must be exercised pursuant to a
mutually instituted early retirement plan. Due process only requires that notice of the employer's
decision to retire an employee be given to the employee.
Here, the CA and the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion. It must be stressed that
Catotocan's subsequent actions after her "retirement" are actually tantamount to her consent to
the addendum to the LSQC's retirement policy of retiring her from service upon serving the
school for at least thirty (30) continuous years, to wit: (1) after being notified that she was being
retired from service by LSQC, she opened a savings account with BDO, the trustee bank; (2) she
accepted all the proceeds of her retirement package: the lump sum and all the monthly payments
credited to her account until June 2009; (3) upon acceptance of the retirement benefits, there was
no notation that she is accepting the retirement benefits under protest or without prejudice to the
filing of an illegal dismissal case. We also did not find an iota of evidence showing that LSQC
exerted undue influence against Catotocan to acquire her consent on the school's retirement
policy. Suffice it to say that from the foregoing, Catotocan performed all the acts to ratify her
retirement in accordance with LSQC's retirement policy.
Although there was an exchange of communications about the retirees' objection to the new
retirement policy years earlier, eventually, appellant assented thereto when she opened a savings
account with BDO, withdrew the money for her personal use and applied again for a teaching job
with the school.
While it is true that the acceptance of retirement pay and her eventual appointment as Guidance
Counselor did not amount to a waiver to contest her alleged forced retirement or illegal
dismissal, the voluntary nature of her acts from June 2006 up to June 2009 clearly belies her
claim of illegal dismissal.
Obviously, appellant filed this complaint claiming illegal dismissal after she had benefited from
the proceeds of her retirement in June 2006, and received salaries as Guidance Counselor of the
appellee school for the subsequent three (3) years which ended in 2009. By her actuations, she is
already estopped from questioning the legality of the new retirement policy.
Moreover, in the Letter dated August 6, 2006 addressed to Fr. Acuin, Catotocan, along with other
co-employees, referred to themselves as "retirees" and even signed as "the retired employees."
The context of the letter does not, in any way, show any animosity with LSQC which would
otherwise indicate that they still harbor ill feelings towards LSQC due to their alleged illegal
dismissal. Thus, We hold that Catotocan's filing of the illegal dismissal case was just an
afterthought subsequent to LSQC's denial of her fourth re-application for the Guidance
Counselor position.
It must be stressed also that Catotocan's repeated application and availment of the re-hiring
program of LSQC for qualified retirees for 3 consecutive years is a supervening event that would
reveal that she has already voluntarily and freely signified her consent to the retirement policy
despite her initial opposition to it. In this case, not only did Catotocan received all of her
retirement benefits but she also applied and availed the LSQC's re-hiring policy of retirees.

29. UST vs. SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG UST

GR No. 184262, April 24, 2017
Facts:
A complaint for regularization and illegal dismissal was filed by respondents Samahang
Manggagawa ng UST and Pontesor, et al. (respondents) against petitioner before the NLRC.
Respondents alleged that on various periods spanning the years 1990-1999, petitioner repeatedly
hired Pontesor, et al. to perform various maintenance duties within its campus. Respondents
insisted that in view of Pontesor, et al.' s performance of such maintenance tasks throughout the
years, they should be deemed regular employees of petitioner. Respondents further argued that
for as long as petitioner continues to operate and exist as an educational institution, with rooms,
buildings, and facilities to maintain, the latter could not dispense with Pontesor, et al. 's services
which are necessary and desirable to the business of petitioner.
On the other hand, while petitioner admitted that it repeatedly hired Pontesor, et al. in
different capacities throughout the aforesaid years, it nevertheless maintained that they were
merely hired on a per-project basis, as evidenced by numerous Contractual Employee
Appointments (CEAs) signed by them. In this regard, petitioner pointed out that each of the
CEAs that Pontesor, et al. signed defined the nature and term of the project to which they are
assigned, and that each contract was renewable in the event the project remained unfinished upon
the expiration of the specified term. In accordance with the express provisions of said CEAs,
Pontesor, et al. 's project employment were automatically terminated: (a) upon the expiration of
the specific term specified in the CEA; (b) when the project is completed ahead of such
expiration; or (c) in cases when their employment was extended due to the non-completion of the
specific project for which they were hired, upon the completion of the said project. As such, the
termination of Pontesor, et al. 's employment with petitioner was validly made due to the
completion of the specific projects for which they were hired.
Issue: WON Respondent Pontesor is a regular employee thus rendering the dismissal invalid
Held:
YES. Pontesor should be considered regularized casual employees who enjoy security of
tenure. The law provides for two (2) types of regular employees, namely: (a) those who are
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer ; and (b) those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether
continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed. The primary
standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the
employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of work
performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also, if
the employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance is not
continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its
performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the
business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity
and while such activity exists

In the case at bar, a review of Pontesor, et al. 's respective CEAs reveal that petitioner
repeatedly rehired them for various positions in the nature of maintenance workers for various
periods spanning the years 1990-1999. Although nature of work are not necessary and desirable
to petitioner's usual business as an educational institution; nonetheless, it is clear that their
respective cumulative periods of employment as per their respective CEAs each exceed one (1)
year. Thus, Pontesor, et al. fall under the second category of regular employees under Article 295
of the Labor Code. Accordingly, they should be deemed as regular employees but only with
respect to the activities for which they were hired and for as long as such activities exist.

30. ZAMBRANO, ET. AL V. PHILIPPINE MARKET MANUFACTURING

CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 224099, June 21, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioners were terminated on the ground of cessation of operation due to serious business
losses. They allege that their dismissal was without just cause and in violation of due process
because the closure of Phil Carpet was a mere pretense to transfer its operations to Pacific
Carpet. They claimed that the job orders of some regular clients of Phil Carpet was transferred to
Pacific Carpet and that several machines were moved from Phil Carpet to Pacific Carpet.
Petitioners also alleged that their dismissal was constituted with unfair labor practice as it
involved mass dismissal of its union officers and members.
Respondent countered that it permanently closed and totally ceased its operations because there
had been a steady decline in the demand for its products due to global recession, stiffer
competition and the effects of a changing market. Respondent also faithfully complied with the
requisites for closure and cessation of business under the Labor Code.
LA dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. NLRC affirmed LA’s
ruling. CA ruled that the total cessation of Phil Carpet’s manufacturing operations was not made
in bad faith because the same was clearly due to economic necessity.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitioners were dismissed from employment for a lawful cause
2. Whether the petitioners’ termination from employment constitutes unfair labor practice
3. Whether Pacific Carpet may be held liable for Phil Carpet’s obligations
4. Whether the quitclaims signed by the petitioners are valid and binding
RULING:
1. YES. Petitioners were terminated for an authorized cause.
Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, three requirements are necessary for a valid
cessation of business operations: (a) service of a written notice to the employees and to
the DOLE at least one month before the intended date thereof; (b) the cessation of
business must be bona fide in character; and (c) payment to the employees of termination
pay amounting to one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher.
In this case, the LA's findings that Phil Carpet suffered from serious business losses
which resulted in its closure were affirmed in toto by the NLRC, and subsequently by the
CA. It is a rule that absent any showing that the findings of fact of the labor tribunals and
the appellate court are not supported by evidence on record or the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts, the Court shall not examine anew the evidence submitted by
the parties.
2. NO. The dismissal did not amount to unfair labor practice.
Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same.
The petitioners miserably failed to discharge the duty imposed upon them. They did not
identify the acts of Phil Carpet which, they claimed, constituted unfair labor practice.
They did not even point out the specific provisions which Phil Carpet violated. Thus, they
would have the Court pronounce that Phil Carpet committed unfair labor practice on the
ground that they were dismissed from employment simply because they were union
officers and members. The constitutional commitment to the policy of social justice,
 however, cannot be understood to mean that every labor dispute shall automatically be
decided in favor of labor.
In this case, as far as the pieces of evidence offered by the petitioners are concerned,
there is no showing that the closure of the company was an attempt at union-busting.
Hence, the charge that Phil Carpet is guilty of unfair labor practice must fail for lack of
merit.
3. NO. Pacific Carpet is not liable for Phil Carpet’s obligations.
This Court has declared that "mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself
sufficient ground for disregarding the separate corporate personality." It has likewise
ruled that the "existence of interlocking directors, corporate officers and shareholders is
not enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction in the absence of fraud or
other public policy considerations."
The petitioners failed to present substantial evidence to prove their allegation that Pacific
Carpet is a mere alter ego of Phil Carpet.
4. YES. The quitclaims were valid and binding upon the petitioners.
The contents of the quitclaims, which were in Filipino, were clear and simple, such that it
was unlikely that the petitioners did not understand what they were signing.

31. Sumifru Corp. v. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm

GR. No. 202091, June 7, 2017
FACTS:
Sumifru is a domestic corporation and is the surviving corporation after its merger with
Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC) in 2008. FBAC was engaged in the buying,
marketing, and exportation of Cavendish bananas. Respondent Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa
Suyapa Farm (NAMASUFA-NAFLU-KMU) (NAMASUFA) is a labor organization affiliated
with the National Federation of Labor Unions and Kilusang Mayo Uno.
Private respondent Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa filed a Petition for Certification
Election before the DOLE Regional Office in Davao City. NAMASUFA sought to represent all
rank-and-file employees, numbering around 140, of packing plant 90 of FBAC. NAMASUFA
claimed that there was no existing union in the aforementioned establishment. FBAC filed an
Opposition arguing that there exists no employer-employee relationship between it and the
workers involved as the members of NAMASUFA are actually employees of A2Y Contracting
Services (A2Y), a duly licensed independent contractor, as evidenced by the payroll records of
the latter. NAMASUFA countered that its members were former workers of Stanfilco before
FBAC took over its operations sometime in 2002. The said former employees were then required
to join the Compostela Banana Packing Plant Workers’ Cooperative (CBPPWC) before they
were hired and allowed to work at the Packing Plant of FBAC. It further alleged that the
members of NAMASUFA were working at PP 90 long before A2Y came.
ISSUE: WON the members of the Union are employees of SUmifru

HELD:
Yes. The Court affirmed the ruling of the Med Arbiter granting the Petition for
Certification Election of NAMASUFA and declared that Sumifru was the employer of the
workers concerned.
Based on the “four-fold test”, the elements to determine the existence of an employment
relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c)
the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control the employee’s conduct. The
most important element is the employer’s control of the employee’s conduct, not only as to the
result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it.
On the first factor, it is apparent that the staff of respondent FBAC advised those who are
interested to be hired in the Packing Plant to become members first of CBPPWC and get a
recommendation from it. On the second factor, while the respondent tried to impress upon us that
workers are paid by A2Y Contracting Services, this at best is but an administrative arrangement.
The payroll summary submitted does not contain the relevant information such as the employee’s
rate of pay, deductions made and the amount actually paid to the employee. On the third factor, it
is very clear that respondent FBAC is the authority that imposes disciplinary measures against
erring workers. This alone proves that it wields disciplinary authority over them. Finally, on the
fourth factor which is the control test, the fact that the respondent FBAC gives instructions to the
workers on how to go about their work is sufficient indication that it exercises control over their
movements. The workers are instructed as to what time they are supposed to report and what
time they are supposed to return. They were required to fill up monitoring sheets as they go
about their jobs and even the materials which they used in the packing plant were supplied by
FBAC.
 Viewed from the above circumstances, it is clear that respondent FBAC is the real
employer of the workers of Packing Plant 90. They are in truth and in fact the employees of the
respondent and its attempt to seek refuge on A2Y Contracting Services as the ostensible
employer was nothing but an elaborate scheme to deprive them their right to self-organization.

32. PANALIGAN v PHYVITA ENTERPRISES CORPORATION

G.R. No. 202086, June 21, 2017
Facts:
Phyvita Enterprises Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of health club
massage parlor, spa and other related services under the name and style of Starfleet Reflex Zone.
Panaligan et al were employees of Corporation assigned as Roomboys.
Sometime in Jan 2005, the Corporation discovered that the amount of 180,000 including some
receipts and payroll were missing. The Corporation conducted police investigation and while it
was pending, Panaligan et al with some employees filed a complaint before the DOLE against
Corporation for 1.underpayment of wages, 2.non payment of special and legal holidays, 3.5 days
service incentive leave, 4.night shift differential pay, 5.no pay slip, 6.signing of blank payroll. In
the interim, the Corporation accused the Panaligan et al of theft and stated that the latter were
responsible for the loss of the money and properties. Later, Corporation terminated the employer-
employee relationship between them and Panaligan et al based on loss of trust and
confidence. Also, the Corporation filed a criminal complaint of theft against the Pangilinan et al,
but the same was dismissed by the city prosecutor, there being no sufficient evidence.
Pangilinan et al filed a complaint with the LA alleging that they were illegally dismissed. The
Corporation, on their defense, stated that the dismissal was legal because the alleged criminal
complaint was enough evidence to produce a substantial evidence. LA ruled in favor of the
Corporation. NLRC reversed the decision of LA and decided in favor of Panaligan et al. CA
reversed the decision of NLRC.

Issue:
Whether or not, Panaligan et al. were illegally dismissed.

Held: Yes, Panaligan et al. were illegally dismissed.

ARTICLE 297. Termination by Employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any
of the following causes:(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;(b) Gross and
habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the
trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;(d) Commission of a
crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member
of his family or his duly authorized representative; and(e) Other causes analogous to the
foregoing.
Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct; it is the transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful
intent and not mere error in judgment. The misconduct, to be serious within the meaning of the
Labor Code, must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or
unimportant. Thus, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, (a) it
must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and (c) it must
show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.
On the other hand, loss of trust and confidence, as a just cause for termination of employment, is
premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position where greater trust is placed by
management and from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected. The betrayal
of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized.
Thus, it must be proved that the employees must be guilty of an actual and willful breach of trust
and that they committed a serious misconduct duly supported by substantial evidence. However,
in the case at hand, the Corporation failed to adduce evidence supporting the accusation. Hence a
Corporation dismissed criminal complaint does not tantamount to a ground for termination of
employment, the employees were illegally dismissed.
 33. IBON v. GENGHIS KHAN SECURITY SERVICES
G.R. No. 221085

FACTS:

Ravengar G. Ibon was employed as a security guard by Genghis Khan Security Services
sometime in June 2008. He was initially assigned to Mr. Solis in Quezon City. However, in June
2009, Ibon was transferred to the Aspen Tower Condominium until his last duty on October 4,
2010. Thereafter, respondent promised to provide him a new assignment, which, however, did
not happen.

On May 10, 2011, Ibon filed a complaint against respondent for illegal dismissal. He alleged that
he was no longer assigned to a new post after his last duty. Respondent denied that Ibon was
placed on a floating status for more than six (6) months. It claimed that Ibon was suspended on
October 4, 2010 for sleeping on the job. It also averred that Ibon was endorsed to another client
for re-assignment, but the client refused because Ibon’s license was due for renewal, and that
they sent a letter to Ibon requiring him to report back to work.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ibon was constructively dismissed

HELD:

YES. In Reyes v. RP Guardians Security Agency, it was held that temporary displacement or
temporary off-detail of security guard is, generally, allowed in a situation where a security
agency's client decided not to renew their service contract with the agency and no post is
available for the relieved security guard. Such situation does not normally result in a constructive
dismissal. Nonetheless, when the floating status lasts for more than six (6) months, the employee
may be considered to have been constructively dismissed. No less than the Constitution
guarantees the right of workers to security of tenure, thus, employees can only be dismissed for
just or authorized causes and after they have been afforded the due process of law.

In this case, aside from respondent's bare assertions that Ibon was suspended, which the latter
had denied, there was no evidence of the imposition of said penalty. Respondent could have
easily produced documents to support its contention that Ibon had been suspended, considering
that employers are required to observe due process in the discipline of employees. Respondent
could not rely on its letter requiring Ibon to report back to work to refute a finding of
constructive dismissal. The letters merely requested him to report back to work and to explain
why he failed to report to the office after inquiring about his posting status. More importantly,
there was no proof that Ibon had received the letters.

In Tatel v. JFLP Investigation, the court held that [1] an employer must assign the security guard
to another posting within six (6) months from his last deployment, otherwise, he would be
considered constructively dismissed; and [2] the security guard must be assigned to a specific or
particular client. A general return-to-work order does not suffice.

Applying the foregoing to the present controversy, respondent should have deployed petitioner to
a specific client within six (6) months from his last assignment. The correspondences allegedly
sent to petitioner merely required him to explain why he did not report to work. He was never
assigned to a particular client. Thus, even if petitioner actually received the letters of respondent,
he was still constructively dismissed because none of these letters indicated his reassignment to
another client.
 34. BRAVO vs. URIOS COLLEGE
G.R. No. 198066, June 7, 2017

FACTS:

Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher in 1988 by Urios College. In addition to his duties as
a part-time teacher, Bravo was designated as the school's comptroller from June 1, 2002 to May
31, 2002. Urios College organized a committee to formulate a new "ranking system for non-
academic employees for school year 2001-2002” where Bravo recommended that "the position
of Comptroller should be classified as a middle management position.

A committee to review the ranking system implemented during school year 2001-2002 was
formed and found out that the ranking system for school year 2001-2002 caused salary
distortions. There were also discrepancies in the salary adjustments of Bravo and of two (2)
other employees. The committee discovered that "the Comptroller's Office solely prepared and
implemented the [s]alary [a]djustment [s]chedule" without prior approval from the Human
Resources Department. The committee recommended that Bravo be administratively charged for
serious misconduct or willful breach of trust.

On March 16, 2005, Bravo received a show cause memo requiring him to explain in writing why
his services should not be terminated for his alleged acts of serious misconduct. A committee was
organized to investigate the matter. Hearings were conducted thereafter. Bravo was found guilty
of serious misconduct for which he was ordered to return the sum of ₱ 179,319.16, representing
overpayment of his monthly salary. On July 25, 2005, Urios College notified Bravo of its
decision to terminate his services for serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. Upon
receipt of the termination letter, Bravo immediately filed before Executive Labor Arbiter a
complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for the payment of separation pay, damages, and
attorney's fees.

The Executive Labor dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the National Labor
Relations Commission found that Bravo's dismissal from service was illegal. The Court of
Appeals reversed the National Labor Relations Commission's Resolution and reinstated the
decision of Executive Labor Arbiter Pelaez.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner's employment was terminated for a just cause; and
(2) Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of procedural due process

RULING:

(1) YES. Under Article 297 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of an
employee for “fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative”

Due to the nature of his occupation, petitioner's employment may be terminated for willful
breach of trust under Article 297(c), not Article 297(a), of the Labor Code. A dismissal based
on willful breach of trust or loss of trust and confidence under Article 297 of the Labor Code
entails the concurrence of two (2) conditions. First, the employee whose services are to be
terminated must occupy a position of trust and confidence. And that there must be the presence
of some basis for the loss of trust and confidence. This means that "the employer must establish
the existence of an act justifying the loss of trust and confidence." Otherwise, employees will be
left at the mercy of their employers. Different rules apply in determining whether loss of trust
and confidence may validly be used as a justification in termination cases.1âwphi1 Managerial
employees are treated differently than fiduciary rank-and-file employees.

[W]ith respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground for valid
dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere
uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not be sufficient. But, as regards
a managerial employee, mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached
the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. Hence, in the case of managerial
employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, it being sufficient that there is some
basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe
that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his
participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.

The Supreme Court holds that petitioner was validly dismissed based on loss of trust and
confidence. Petitioner was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. His position of responsibility
on delicate financial matters entailed a substantial amount of trust from respondent. It was
reasonable for the employer to trust that he had basis for his computations especially with respect
to his own compensation. Petitioner's act in assigning to himself a higher salary rate without
proper authorization is a clear breach of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Petitioner's
position made him accountable in ensuring that the Comptroller's Office observed the company's
established procedures. It was reasonable that he should be held liable by respondent on the basis
of command responsibility.

RULING:

(2) NO. Any meaningful opportunity for the employee to present evidence and address the
charges against him or her satisfies the requirement of ample opportunity to be heard.

In this case, respondent complied with all the requirements of procedural due process in
terminating petitioner's employment. Respondent furnished petitioner a show cause memo
stating the specific grounds for dismissal. The show cause memo also required petitioner to
answer the charges by submitting a written explanation. Respondent even informed petitioner
that he may avail the services of counsel. Respondent then conducted a thorough investigation.
Three (3) hearings were conducted on separate occasions. The findings of the investigation
committee were then sent to petitioner. Lastly, petitioner was given a notice of termination
containing respondent’s final decision. There was a just cause for terminating petitioner from
employment, there is no basis to award him separation pay and backwages.
 35. JAVINES VS. XLIBRIS
GR. No. 214301, June 7, 2007

Facts:

Javines was hired by respondent Xlibris as operations manager in September 2011. In July 2012,
Javines submitted meal receipts for reimbursement at the finance department of the company,
wherein falsification was discovered. A notice to explain was issued against him, charging him
with acts constituting dishonesty for allegedly tampering meal receipts from fast food chains
with the total amount of P811.00 to P10,821.00. He submitted his written explanation, denying
having tampered the receipts. He countered the allegations by explaining that it was the
supervisors who submitted the receipts to him; he merely prepared the reimbursement request,
and that he had no knowledge nor participation in the tampering of the receipts.
An administrative hearing was conducted. Javines failed to explain why and how the incident
transpired. He instead requested for further investigation because he cannot recall who submitted
the receipts to him. On the same day, notices to explain were sent to the supervisors under
Javines, who likewise denied participation in the tampering of the receipts. Xlibris terminated
Javines’ employment through an end of employment notice.
Javines then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter
who found that the dismissal was for a just cause and with due process. On appeal, NLRC
modified the decision, noting that while the dismissal was for a just cause, Javines was not
afforded due process in that no other hearing was called to afford him the opportunity to confront
the witnesses against him before he was dismissed. Thus, P10,000.00 worth of nominal damages
was awarded in his favor. Javines did not move for reconsideration; only Xlibris elevated the
case to CA on certiorari on the issue that NLRC abused its discretion by holding that Xlibris
failed to afford Javines due process. By way of comment, Javines reiterated that he was not
granted further investigation when he requested. CA granted the petition and held that Javines
was not given an opportunity to rebut the additional pieces of evidence secured by Xlibris.
However, CA reduced the nominal damages from P10,000.00 to P1,000.00 considering that the
altered meal receipts show a discrepancy of P10,000.00.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Javines was dismissed for a just cause
2. Whether or not the issue as to whether the requirements of procedural due process to constitute
a valid dismissal were complied with has been resolved with finality
Ruling:
1. Yes, Javines was dismissed for a just cause, as uniformly held by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC.
2. Yes, the issue has attained finality. For failure to file the requisite petition before CA, the
NLRC decision attained finality and had been placed beyond the appellate court’s power of
review. The appellate court is given broad discretionary powers to waive lack of proper
assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned in the following circumstances:
a) when the question affects jurisdiction over the subject matter;
b) matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law;
c) matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution
of the case, or in serving the interests of justice or avoiding dispensing piecemeal justice;
d) matters raised in the trial court and are of record having some bearing on the issue submitted
that the parties failed to raise or that the lower court ignored;
e) matters closely related to an error assigned; and
f) matters upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent.
None of the aforesaid instances exists in the instant case. Hence, CA cannot be faulted for not
discussing said issue in its decision as the same was already resolved with finality.

36. LUIS S. DOBLE, JR. v. ABB, INC.

G.R. No. 215627, June 5, 2017
Facts:

Doble, Jr., a duly licensed engineer, was hired by respondent ABB Inc. as Junior Design
Engineer on March 29, 1993. Doble rose through the ranks and was promoted up to Vice
President and Local Division Manager of Power System Division. However, on March 2, 2012,
Doble was called by Country Manager and President Nitin Desai, and was informed that his
performance rating for 2011 was 1, which is equivalent to unsatisfactory performance. Doble had
a meeting and during the meeting, President Desai explained to Doble that the Global and
Regional Management have demanded for a change in leadership due to the extent of losses and
level of discontent among the ranks of the PS Division. Desai then raised the option for Doble to
resign. Thereafter, HR manager Miranda told Doble that he would be paid separation pay
equivalent to 75% of his monthly salary for every year of service, provided he would submit a
letter of resignation, and gave him until 12:45 PM within which to decide. Shocked by the abrupt
decision of the management, Doble asked why he should be the one made to resign. Miranda
said that it was the decision of the management and left him alone in the conference room to
decide whether or not to resign. At this juncture, the parties gave contrasting accounts on the
ensuing events which led to the termination of Doble’s employment. Then, Doble filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages, other
monetary claims and damages. In a decision the LA held that Doble was illegally dismissed
because his resignation was involuntary, and ordered ABB Inc. to pay his backwages and
separation pay, since reinstatement is no longer feasible. The NLRC granted the appeal filed by
ABB Inc. and Desai, and dismissed the partial appeal of Doble. They found that the resignation
of Doble being voluntary, there can be no illegal dismissal and no basis for the award of other
monetary claims, damages and attorney’s fees. Dissatisfied with the NLRC decision and
resolution, Doble filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

Issues: Whether or not, Dolbe was illegally dismissed.

Held: No, Doble was not illegally dismissed.

In illegal dismissal cases, the fundamental rule is that when an employer interposes the defense
of resignation, the burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned necessarily
rests upon the employer. But, since Doble claims to have been forced to submit a resignation
letter, it is incumbent upon him to prove with clear and convincing evidence that his resignation
was not voluntary, but was actually a case of constructive dismissal.

Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting or cessation of work because continued employment

is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a
diminution of pay and other benefits. It exists if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or
disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could
foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. There is involuntary
resignation due to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. The test of
constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt
compelled to give up his employment/position under the circumstances.
On the other hand, "resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where
one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service,
and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal
pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office
accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt
act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be
considered in determining whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment."

In the case at bar, it appears that Doble was not coerced into submitting a resignation letter. He
is holding one of the top positions in the company and answerable only to the President, herein
Desai. He is a highly educated man. It is improbable that a man of his stature may be pressured
into doing something that he does not want to do. In fact, even if the option to resign originated
from the employer, what is important for resignation to be deemed voluntary is that the
employee's intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment. It was proved
by substantial evidence that Doble voluntarily resigned, as shown by the following documents
(1) the affidavit of ABB Inc.’s HR Manager Miranda; (2) the resignation letter; (3) the Employee
Clearance Sheet; (4) the Certificate of Employment; (5) photocopy of BPI’s manager’s check
representing the separation benefit; (6) Employee Final Pay Computation showing in the
payment of leave credits, rice subsidy and bonuses; and, (7) the Receipt, Release and Quitclaim.

37. United Polyresins Inc. v. Pinuela

G.R. No. 209555, July 31, 2017
FACTS:

United Polyresins, Inc. (UPI) is a registered domestic corporation while Ernesto Uy Soon, Jr. and
Julito Uy Soon are its corporate officers. Marcelino Pinuela was employed by UPI in 1987. He
was a member of the labor union, Polyresins Rank and File Association (PORFA), and was
elected President thereof. Under the existing CBA between UPI and PORFA, it was provided that
UPI shall grant to PORFA PHP 300,000 as the union’s capital for establishing a cooperative to
meet the needs of its members. The CBA also contained a union security clause which provided
that employees who cease to be PORFA members in good standing by reason of his resignation
or expulsion shall not be retained in the employ of UPI.

During Pinuela’s term as PORFA President, it appeared that UPI automatically deducted from the
respective salaries of PORFA members amounts representing union membership dues and loan
payments. These amounts, which totalled ₱2,402,533.43, were then regularly turned over by UPI
to PORFA in the form of fifty eight (58) crossed checks. Several days before the PHP 300,000
loan became due, the union officers and UPI met to discuss the proposed new CBA. However,
UPI told Pinuela that it will not discuss the proposed CBA until the loan is paid. Pinuela told UPI
that the union did not have the finances. Because of the recurring threat of failed CBA
negotiations and salary deductions as a means of recovering the amount of the loan, the union
members began to demand the holding of a special election of union officers. A special election
was held, and a new union President and set of officers were elected. When the new union
officers conducted an investigation and found that the union had no more funds as they were
utilized in the prosecution of cases during Pinuela’s incumbency. Pinuela also failed to make a
formal turnover of documents to the new President.

The officers held that these violations constituted an infringement if the union’s Constitution
which prohibit the misappropriation of union funds and property and give ground for the
impeachment and recall of union officers. Thus, PORFA wrote a letter communicating Pinuela’s
expulsion from the union. Eventually, UPI issued a letter of termination to Pinuela.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Pinuela was illegally dismissed

HELD:

Yes. The union and UPI claimed that the dismissal was based on the union security clause.
Pinuela’s expulsion from the union was based on the union’s constitution. However, these
provisions provides for the impeachment and recall of union officers, not expulsion from union
membership. Any officer found guilty of violating these provisions shall simply be removed,
impeached or recalled, from office, but not expelled or stripped of union membership. It was
therefore error on the part of PORFA and UPI to terminate Pinuela’s employment based on
Article XV, Section 1, paragraphs (e) and (f) of the union's Constitution. Such a ground does not
constitute just cause for termination.
In addition, the union may not insist on expelling Pinuela from PORFA and assist in his
dismissal from UPI without just cause, since it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
to "cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee, including
discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has
been denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions
under which membership or continuation of membership is made available to other members."

38. GENP ACT SERVICES, INC. v. FALCESO

[July 31, 2017, G.R. No. 227695]
FACTS:

Genp Act Services, Inc. is engaged in business process outsourcing, particularly servicing
various multinational clients, including Allstate Insurance Company.

On different dates spanning the years 2007 to 2011, Genpact hired respondents Maria Katrina
Santos-Falceso, Janice Ann M. Mendoza, and Jeffrey S. Mariano to various positions to service
its Allstate account. However, on April 19, 2012, Allstate ended its account with
Genpact, resulting in respondents being placed on floating status, and eventually, terminated
from service.

Respondents filed a complaint before the NLRC for illegal dismissal, non-payment of separation
pay, damages, and attorney's fees against Genpact and/or its Country Manager, Reyes. They
alleged that after Allstate terminated its contract with Genpact, they were initially placed on
"benching" status with pay, and after five (5) months, Genpact gave them the option to either
"voluntarily resign" or to "be involuntarily terminated on the ground of redundancy" with
severance pay of one-half (½) month basic salary for every year of service, in either case. Left
without the option to continue their employment with Genpact, respondents chose the latter
option and were made to sign quitclaims as a condition for receiving any and all forms of
monetary benefits.

Respondents argued that the termination of Genpact and Allstate's agreement neither amounted
to a closure of business nor justified their retrenchment.

In their defense, petitioners justified respondents' termination of employment on the ground of

closure or cessation of Allstate's account with Genpact as part of the former' s "[g]lobal
[d]ownsizing due to heavy losses caused by declining sales in North America." Further,
petitioners claimed that they incessantly pursued efforts to retain respondents within their
organization, but the same proved futile, thus, leaving them with no other choice but to provide
respondents with the option to either resign or be separated on account of redundancy - an option
which they reported to the DOLE and resorted to in the exercise of management prerogative with
utmost good faith. Lastly, petitioners pointed out that respondents were properly given separation
pay, as well as unpaid allowances and 13th month pay, thus, rendering the latter's monetary
claims bereft of merit.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed respondents' complaint for lack of merit. The LA found that
respondents' termination from service was due to the untimely cessation of the operations of
Genpact's client, Allstate, wherein respondents were assigned. In this regard, the LA pointed out
that Genpact tried to remedy respondents' situation by assigning them to other accounts, but such
efforts proved futile as respondents were hired specifically to match the needs of Allstate.
Furthermore, the LA took Genpact's act of paying respondents their separation pay computed at
one-half (½) month pay for every year of service as a sign of good faith. Thus, the LA concluded
that there was an authorized cause in terminating respondents' services, and that Gen pact
complied with DOLE's reportorial requirements in doing so.
NLRC affirmed the LA ruling. It held that Allstate's pullout from Gen pact does not mean an
automatic termination of the employees assigned to the Allstate account, such as respondents, but
purports that the employees assigned to the withdrawing client would be "benched" or placed on
floating status as contemplated in Article 286 (now Article 301) of the Labor Code, as amended.
In fact, the NLRC pointed out that Genpact recognized the applicability of the said provision in
the case of respondents, as well as other similarly-situated employees, considering that: (a) it
embarked on a Retention Effort Program which resulted in the redeployment of more or less 100
of its employees affected by Allstate's pullout; (b) it placed respondents and the other similarly-
situated employees on "benching" status with full pay; (c) it only resorted to termination after
alleged incessant efforts to find a suitable position for respondents proved unsuccessful; and
(d) such terminations were done during the six (6)-month period within which employees were
allowed to be placed on floating status. Thus, Genpact's acts of placing respondents on
"benching" or floating status, and thereafter, terminating their employment were made in the
exercise of its management prerogative in good faith and in accordance with internal hiring
procedures. As such, it cannot be said that respondents were illegally dismissed from service.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, which was partly granted by the NLRC ordering the
increase of respondents' entitlement to separation pay to one (1) month salary for every year of
service. In said Resolution, the NLRC held that since respondents' positions were rendered
superfluous by the closure of the Allstate account, then it follows that they were terminated on
account of redundancy pursuant to Article 286 (now Article 301), in relation to Article 283 (now
Article 298) of the Labor Code. As such, they should be paid separation pay amounting to one
(1) month salary for every year of service, instead of the one-half (½) month salary for every
year of service. Notably, the NLRC Resolution explicitly stated that "[n]o further motion of
similar import shall be entertained."

CA dismissed outright the petition for certiorari purely on procedural grounds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed outright the certiorari petition filed by petitioners
before it on procedural grounds.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious. (The case was remanded to the CA. The SC only ruled on the
procedural process of the case.)

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be
resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. It is adopted to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower
court or quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of such
court or agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Given the special and extraordinary nature of a Rule 65 petition, the general rule is that a motion
for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the prerequisite is
to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error
attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. This
notwithstanding, the foregoing rule admits of well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the
order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or
are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where,
under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (j) where, in
a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

A judicious review of the records reveals that the exceptions in items (d) and (e) are attendant in
this case.

The dispositive portion of the NLRC's June 30, 2014 Resolution, it explicitly warns the litigating
parties that the NLRC shall no longer entertain any further motions for reconsideration.
Irrefragably, this circumstance gave petitioners the impression that moving for reconsideration
before the NLRC would only be an exercise in futility in light of the tribunal's aforesaid warning.

The remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration may be availed of once by each party. In this
case, only respondents had filed a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC. Applying the
foregoing provision, petitioners also had an opportunity to file such motion in this case, should
they wish to do so. However, the tenor of such warning effectively deprived petitioners of such
opportunity, thus, constituting a violation of their right to due process.

All told, petitioners were completely justified in pursuing a direct recourse to the CA through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

CASE NO. 39
SONEDCO WORKERS FREE LABOR UNION (SWOFLU) vs. UNIVERSAL ROBINA
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 220383 July 5, 2017
FACTS:
In 2007, while there was no Collective Bargaining Agreement in effect, URC-SONEDCO offered, among other
benefits, a P16.00/day wage increase to their employees. To receive the benefits, employees had to sign a
waiver that said: "In the event that a subsequent [Collective Bargaining Agreement] is negotiated between
Management and Union, the new [Collective Bargaining Agreement] shall only be effective [on] January 1,
2008." Realizing that the waiver was an unfair labor practice, some members of SONEDCO Workers Free
Labor Union refused to sign. URC-SONEDCO offered the same arrangement in 2008. It extended an
additional P16.00/day wage increase to employees who would agree that any Collective Bargaining
Agreement negotiated for that year would only be effective on January 1, 2009. 6 Several members of
SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union again refused to waive their rights. Consequently, they did not receive
the wage increase which already amounted to a total of P32.00/day, beginning 2009.
On July 2, 2009, SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union and its members who refused to sign the 2007 and
2008 waivers filed a complaint for unfair labor practices against URC-SONEDCO. They argued that the
requirement of a waiver prior to the release of the wage increase constituted interference to the employees'
right to self-organization, collective bargaining, and concerted action. They asked that they be granted a
P16.00/day wage increase for 2007 and an additional P16.00/day wage increase for 2008. 8SONEDCO
Workers Free Labor Union also demanded a continuing wage increase of P32.00/day "from January 1, 2009
onwards." Both the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals found URC-SONEDCO not
guilty of unfair labor practice.10 Nonetheless, they ordered URC-SONEDCO to give petitioners the same
benefits their co-workers received in 2007 and 2008. However, SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union's claim
for the 2009 wage increase was denied. Since a new Collective Bargaining Agreement was already in effect
by 2009, this Collective Bargaining Agreement governed the relationship between the management and the
union.11 The Court of Appeals ruled: “As there was no provision in the existing CBA regarding wage increase
of [P]16.00 per day, the [National Labor Relations Commission] was correct in ruling that it cannot further
impose private respondents to pay petitioners the subject wage increase for the year 2009 and onwards.”

ISSUES:
Whether or not respondent Universal Robina Corp. –SONEDCO is guilty of unfair labor practice?
Whether or not petitioner SWOFLU is entitled to wage increase?

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that URC-SONEDCO is guilty of unfair labor practice for failing to bargain
with SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union in good faith. 13 URC-SONEDCO restricted SONEDCO Workers
Free Labor Union's bargaining power when it asked the rank-and-file employees to sign a waiver
foregoing Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiations in exchange for wage increases. 14 Thus, this
Court ordered URC-SONEDCO to grant the union members the 2007 and 2008 wage increases.
Nevertheless, this Court denied the claim for the 2009 wage increase and ruled that if SONEDCO
Workers Free Labor Union wished to continue receiving the additional wage after 2008, the proper
recourse was to include it in the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement. By reason of the unfair labor
practice on the party of respondent URC – SONEDCO, petitioner SWOFLU is entitled to a wage
increase of P16.00 for the years 2007 and 2008. The grant of the P32.00/day wage increase is not an
additional benefit outside the Collective Bargaining Agreement of 2009. By granting this increase to
petitioners, this Court is eliminating the discrimination against them, which was a result of
respondent's unfair labor practice. The wage increase was integrated in the salary of those who signed
the waivers. When the affiants waived their rights, respondent rewarded them with a P32.00/day
wage increase that continues to this day. The respondent company granted this benefit to its
employees to induce them to waive their collective bargaining rights. This Court has declared this an
unfair labor practice. Accordingly, it is illegal to continue denying the petitioners the wage increase
that was granted to employees who signed the waivers. To rule otherwise will perpetuate the
discrimination against petitioners. All the consequences of the unfair labor practice must be
addressed.

August 22, 2017 G.R. No. 178379 CASE NO. 40

CRISPIN S. FRONDOZO,* DANILO M. PEREZ, JOSE A. ZAFRA, ARTURO B. VITO, CESAR S. CRUZ, NAZARIO
C. DELA CRUZ, and LUISITO R. DILOY, Petitioners,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY,, Respondent.

A Notice of Strike filed by the MERALCO Employees and Workers Association (MEWA), on the ground of ULP. Then Acting
Secretary· of the DOLE certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, ordered all the striking workers to
return to work, and directed MERALCO to accept the striking workers back to work under the same terms and conditions
existing prior to the work stoppage.

MERALCO terminated the services of Petitioners for having committed unlawful acts and violence during the strike. Then
MEWA filed a second Notice of Strike on the ground of discrimination and union busting that resulted to the dismissal from
employment of 25 union officers and workers.

The labor dispute resulted to the filing of two complaints for illegal dismissal. The NLRC consolidated the two illegal dismissal
cases and rendered a Decision stating among others, that it upholds the dismissal of the workers in view of the illegal acts they
committed during the subject strike. However, the NLRC First Division subsequently modified said Decision and ruled that said
dismissal of employees was unjustified and ordered their reinstatement without loss of seniority rights.

From the two conflicting resolutions of the NLRC, two petitions for certiorari were filed before the Court of Appeals: 1. CA-
G.R. SP No. 72480 filed by MERALCO; and 2. CA-G.R. SP No. 72509 filed by the Petitioners. And from which the CA arrived
at 2 conflicting decisions as well.

The Petitioners moved for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the satisfaction of their accrued wages arising from the
recall of their payroll reinstatement which was granted by the Labor Arbiter. Subsequently, a Second Alias Writ of
Execution24 was issued directing the Sheriff to cause the reinstatement of the respondents and to collect the amount representing
backwages. MERALCO filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
directed against the Second Alias Writ of Execution, which the NLRC granted and was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Did the CA commit a grave abuse of discretion in affirming the NLRC’s Decision? From the conflicting decisions, which
should prevail?

Ruling: No. The situation in this case is analogous to a change in the situation of the parties making execution unjust or
inequitable. MERALCO's refusal to reinstate petitioners and to pay their backwages is justified by the Decision of the CA in the
1st petition filed before it. On the other hand, petitioners' insistence on the execution of judgment is anchored on the the CA’s
Decision in the 2nd petition filed by said Petitioners. Given this situation, we see no reversible error on the part of the Court of
Appeals in holding that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in suspending the proceedings. Grave abuse of
discretion implies that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the
exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 should prevail. This Court actually ruled on the merits of the assailed CA Decisions in G.R.
No. 161159 and G.R. No. 161311. The Court's Third Division denied the petition in G.R. No. 161159 on the ground that the
Petitioners failed to show that a reversible error had been committed by the Court of Appeals in rendering its Decision in CAG.R.
SP No. 72480 (in favor of MERALCO). The Court's Third Division also denied the petition in G.R. No. 161311 for failure of the
petitioners to show that a reversible error had been committed by the appellate court in the same case, CA-G.R. SP No. 72480.

In one case, 46 this Court explained that "[ w ]hen the Court does not find any reversible error in the decision of the CA and denies
the petition, there is no need for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it already means that it agrees with and adopts the
findings and conclusions of the CA". Hence, the Court's Third Division adopted the findings and conclusions reached by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 which dismissed petitioners from the service. Such decisions have already became
final and executory.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We REMAND this case to the NLRC for the execution of this Court's Decision in G.R.
Nos. 161159 and 161311.

Case 41
Pedro C. Perea
vs. Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc., et al.;
G.R. No. 206178; August 9, 2017
FACTS:
Perea entered into a Contract of Employment with Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc.
(Elburg) under its principal Augustea Atlantica SRL/Italy. Perea was hired as a fitter and was
deployed to work aboard MV Lemno.
While repairing apipe, Perea had difficulty breathing. The following day, he had chest pains
with palpitations. He was seen by a doctor that same afternoon and was advised to take
medication and to rest for three (3) consecutive days. However, he did not feel any better even
after resting and taking medications; thus, he asked to be repatriated.
A few days later, Perea was welding when the oxygen and acetylene torch he was holding
exploded. He hit his left shoulder and twisted his fingers in trying to avoid the explosion. He
took a pain reliever to ease the pain but three days later, he found that two of his fingers had
grown numb. He was sent to a medical facility in Tuzla, Turkey because of continued chest
pains. He was pronounced to have soft tissue trauma and was told to rest, avoid exertion, and
avoid using his right arm. The following day, he was transferred to SEMA Hospital where he
was declared to be suffering from “[C]ubital [T]unnel Syndrome, soft, tissue injury of the right
elbow.” The treatment proposed was to put his right arm in a sling and to rest for recovery for
10 days. He was soon repatriated to the Philippines.
After conducting laboratory examinations and other medical procedures on Perea, company-
designated physicians Dr. Karen Hao-Quan (Dr. Hao-Quan) and Dr. Robert D. Lim (Dr. Lim)
gave an initial impression, “To Consider Cubital Tunnel Syndrome, Right; Hypertension; Rule
Out Ischemic Heart Disease” and recommended that a Dipyridamole Thallium Scan be
conducted. In a letter to Elburg, Dr. Hao-Quan stated that the cause of hypertension was not
work-related and opined that Perea’s estimated length of treatment would be approximately
three to four months. Perea filed a complaint for underpayment of his sick leave pay,
permanent disability benefits, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees. Perea consulted Dr. Antonio C. Pascual (Dr. Pascual), an internist, cardiologist, and
echocardiographer, who diagnosed him with “Uncontrolled Hypertension [and] Coronary Artery
Disease.” Dr. Pascual found Perea to be medically unfit to work as a seafarer.
After a series of examinations, Dr. Hao-Quan and Dr. Lim certified that Perea was cleared of
the injuries that caused his repatriation. The parties met for mediation proceedings and a
possible compromise agreement but were unsuccessful They were then directed to submit their
respective position papers, together with their supporting evidence. The Labor Arbiter
dismissed Perea’s complaint for lack of merit.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that the Collective Bargaining Agreement could not apply to Perea’s
claim for disability benefits because its effectivity period was only from March 28, 2008 to
December 31, 2009. The Collective Bargaining Agreement had already lapsed by the time Perea
was repatriated to the Philippines by late May 2010.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that while Section 32-A of the POEA Contract provided that
hypertension may be compensable, this was applicable only if it caused “impairment of
function[s] of body organs like kidneys, heart and brain, resulting in permanent disability.” The
Labor Arbiter held that Perea’s hypertension did not impair the functions of his organs, as
evidenced by Dr. Hao-Quan and Dr. Lim’s medical reports. Between the findings of Dr. Hao-
Quan and Dr. Lim and those of Dr. Pascual, the Labor Arbiter gave more weight to the findings
of the company-designated physicians who concluded that Perea was not suffering from
coronary disease based on the results of a coronary angiogram.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the medical findings of company-designated physician who conducted extensive
examination prevail over private physician who examined the seafarer only once and did not
order medical tests?

HELD:

For an illness or injury to be compensable under the POEA Contract, it must have been work-related and
acquired during the term of the seafarer’s contract. Work-related illness is defined as “any sickness
resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this
Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied.
Hypertension classified as primary or essential is considered compensable if it causes impairment of
function[s] of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability; Provided,
that, the following documents substantiate it: (a) chest x-ray report, (b) ECG report, (c) blood chemistry
report, (d) funduscopy report, and (f) C-T scan.
As between the findings made by the company-designated physicians who conducted an extensive
examination on the petitioner and Dr. Pascual who saw petitioner on only one occasion and did not even
order that medical tests be done to support his declaration that petitioner is unfit to work as [a] seaman,
the company-designated physicians’ findings that petitioner has been cleared for work should prevail.
The court further held that the doctor who have had a personal knowledge of the actual medical condition,
having closely, meticulously and regularly monitored and actually treated the seafarer’s illness, is more
qualified to assess the seafarer’s disability.
 CASE NO. 42

WILLIAM R. WENCESLAO v. MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

Facts:

The case stemmed from a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and Monetary Claims filed by the petitioners against
private respondent Makati Development Corporation (MDC) before the Labor Arbiter.[4] Records show that the
petitioners were former construction workers of MDC.[5] In their complaint, the petitioners claimed that they were
regular employees of MDC and were illegally dismissed for refusing to apply and be transferred to another
contractor, Asiapro Multi-Purpose Cooperative. [6] In due course, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit. In affirming the status of the petitioners as project employees, the Labor Arbiter relied on the evidence of
MDC showing that the petitioners had worked in several of its other projects before being engaged in the West
Tower @ One Serendra Project and the North Triangle Building Project. [7] The Labor Arbiter ruled that repeated re-
employment does not make a project employee a regular employee. [8] The dispositive portion of the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal dismissal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Respondent Makati Development Corporation, however, is directed to pay the aggregate sum of ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTEEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FOURTEEN & 78/100 PESOS (P118,314.78) representing
complainants’ prorated 13th month pay for 2015, as follows:

All other claims, including those of complainants Virgilio B. Cristobal, Noel N. Damiasan, James M. Real, Vivencio
B. Rodrigo and Alfredo T. Visaya, are hereby denied for lack of merit. The computation hereto attached is made an
integral part hereof.[9]

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Fourth Division affirmed [10] in toto the decision[11] of
the Labor Arbiter. The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision dated 31 May 2016, states:

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the appeal filed by the 21 complainants is DENIED for lack of
merit.Accordingly, the decision rendered by Labor Arbiter Raymund M. Celino on 29 th February 2016 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[12]. Undaunted, the petitioners filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari alleging
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction of the NLRC for issuing the order affirming the
decision of the Labor Arbiter.

The CA dismissed the petition on two grounds:

(1) the petition is non-compliant with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and

(2) the petition, on its face, lacks merit for failing to illustrate public respondent’s grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in renderinthe assailed 31 May 2016 Decision and 26 July 2016
Resolution.[14]

Issue:

The threshold issue is whether the CA was justified in dismissing the petition for certiorari due to the failure of the
petitioners to attach the pertinent records of the case.

Ruling:

First, the matter concerning the nature of the petition.

While the pleading filed by the petitioners is denominated as “Petition for Review on Certiorari” pursuant to Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, its contents, however, particularly the ground raised and supporting arguments, assert grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the CA, an averment apposite in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The seeming inconsistency of the petition’s style and
substance must be resolved as its proper characterization, on whether it is pursued under Rule 45 or Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, would objectively determine its outright dismissal for being the wrong remedy.

Accordingly, if the petition is to be treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, then it should appropriately be
dismissed because there is a plain, adequate, and speedy remedy available under the circumstances. It is settled that
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [34] In this case, what the petitioners seek to be annulled
are the resolutions of the CA dismissing their petition for certiorari and the motion for reconsideration from such
dismissal being, without a doubt, a final order for the complete disposition of such petition. Consequently, the
petitioner’s right and available legal recourse to assail such resolutions is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
instead of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

Proceeding to the merits, we find that the CA did not err, much less commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or excess of jurisdiction, in dismissing the petition for certiorari due to procedural lapses and lack of
substantive merit of the said petition. The CA pointed to the petitioners’ failure to state the material dates and to
attach the certified true copies of the assailed decision and resolution of the NLRC as well as the other pertinent
documents referred to in the petition, such as the labor arbiter’s decision, the petitioner’s Appeal Memorandum and
Motion for Reconsideration. [37] The CA also determined that the petition, on its face, did not establish the whimsical
exercise of discretion which the NLRC supposedly had committed.[38]

While the CA invoked several grounds in dismissing the petition, the petitioners raised before this Court only the
issue on the necessity of attaching to the petition relevant portions of the case records.

Second, petitioner's entitlement to separation pay primarily hinges on their employment status. As earlier discussed,
petitioners merely offered a self-serving conclusion that they are "regular employees" based on the factual allegation
contained in the petition. Petitioners' allegation has no weight or persuasive effect upon this Court absent any
evidence to support the same.

To be circumspect, it is worth pointing out that a project employee may nevertheless receive separation pay. Under
Section 3.2 of DOLE Order No. 19, Series of 1993, project employee's entitlement to separation pay is qualified by
certain conditions, to wit:

3.2. Project employees not entitled to separation. - The project employees contemplated by paragraph 2.1. hereof are
not by law entitled to separation pay if their services are terminated as a result of the completion of the project or
any phase thereof in which they are employed. Likewise, project employees whose services are terminated because
they have no more work to do or their services are no longer needed in the particular phase of the project are not by
law entitled to separation pay.

3.3. Project employees entitled to separation pay. -

a) Project employees whose aggregate period of continuous employment in a construction company is at least one
year shall be considered regular employees, in the absence of a "day certain" agreed upon by the parties for the
termination of their relationship. Project employees who have become regular shall be entitled to separation pay.

x x x x

b) If the project or the phase of the project the employee is working on has not yet been completed and his services
are terminated without just cause or unauthorized cause and there is no showing that his services are unsatisfactory,
the project employee is entitled to reinstatement with backwages to his former position or substantially equivalent
position. If the reinstatement is no longer possible, the employee is entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion
of the agreement.

In the case at bench, the petitioners did not present any evidence, by way of contract of employment or other
relevant proof which would establish the facts pertaining to their tenure. Without basis to rule on the same, this
Court can only rely on the findings of public respondent adjudging them to be not entitled to separation pay.

It bears stressing that the factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, which are deemed to have
acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even
finality, and bind the Court when supported by substantial evidence. [47] (emphasis supplied)

The petitioners' argument that the CA should have proceeded in the resolution of the case must fail.

As noted, the dismissal by the CA of the petition for certiorari was not purely on a technicality but also on a ruling
on the substantive merits of the case. However, we will not dwell on the disquisition of the CA as to the nature of the
employment of the petitioners and their subsequent termination for two reasons: first, the only issue raised before
this Court concerns the failure to attach the material documents in the petition for certiorari; second, the
determination on whether the petitioners were project employees and whether they were illegally dismissed would
necessarily require us to inquire into the factual matters which the Court cannot do in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC,
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive upon the parties and binding on this Court. [48]

In fine, we find no compelling reason to set aside the dismissal by the CA of this petition for certiorari.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 10 April 2017, is DENIED.
The 23 August 2016 and 26 January 2017 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 147009 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
 Case 43
Read-Rite Philippines, Inc. Vs. Gina G. Francisco, et al
G.R. No. 195457, August 16, 2017

Facts:

In April 1999, Read-Rite began implementing a retrenchment program due to serious business
losses. About 200 employees were terminated and they were each given involuntary separation
benefits equivalent to one month pay per year of service. From this first batch of retrenched
employees, however, there were eight employees – who had rendered at least ten years of service
that apparently received additional voluntary separation benefits

All of the respondents received involuntary separation benefits equivalent to one month pay per
year of service. Accordingly, they each executed a Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim[10] (quitclaim), which stated, among others, that they had each received from Read-
Rite the full payment of all compensation due them and they will not undertake any action
against the company to demand further compensation.

Meanwhile in February 2002 and February 2003, respondents filed complaints against Read-
Rite.Respondents sought the payment of additional voluntary separation benefits, legal interest
thereon, and attorney’s fees. They argued that Read-Rite discriminated against them by not
granting the aforesaid benefits, the award of which had since become a company policy.

Issue:

WON were arbitrarily discriminated upon when they were not awarded additional voluntary
separation benefits despite being in Read-Rite’s employ for at least ten years.

Held:

In granting the claim of the first batch of retrenched BSSI employees, the Court found that “there
was impermissible discrimination against [them] in the payment of their separation benefits. The
law requires an employer to extend equal treatment to its employees. It may not, in the guise of
exercising management prerogatives, grant greater benefits to some and less to others.”[34]
However, in so ruling, the Court took into account the following findings of the NLRC:

“The respondent argued that the giving of more separation benefit to the second and third batches
of employees separated was their expression of gratitude and benevolence to the remaining
employees who have tried to save and make the company viable in the remaining days of
operations. This justification is not plausible. There are workers in the first batch who have
rendered more years of service and could even be said to be more efficient than those separated
subsequently, yet they did not receive the same recognition. Understandably, their being retained
longer in their job and be not included in the batch that was first terminated, was a concession
enough and may already be considered as favor granted by the respondents to the prejudice of
the complainants. As it happened, there are workers in the first batch who have rendered more
years in service but received lesser separation pay, because of that arrangement made by the
respondents in paying their termination benefits[.] x x x. [35] (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted.)”

Clearly, BSSI admitted that it purposely favored the second and third batches of retrenched
employees by giving them a higher separation pay and a mid-year bonus as a reward for their
efforts during the last days of the company. In contrast to the instant case, however, Read-Rite
made no such admission. Quite the opposite, Read-Rite has consistently claimed that the
payment of additional voluntary separation benefits to the eight retrenched employees in April
1999 was made by mistake and was no longer repeated in the next batches of retrenchment.
CASE NO. 44
Adtel Inc. vs. Valdez

Facts: Adtel, Inc. (Adtel) is a domestic corporation engaged in the distribution of telephone units,
gadgets, equipment, and allied products. On 9 September 1996, Adtel hired Marijoy A. Valdez
(respondent) to work as an accountant for the company. Adtel promoted respondent as the
company's purchasing and logistics supervisor. Adtel then entered into a dealership agreement with
4

respondent's husband, Angel Valdez (Mr. Valdez), to distribute Adtel's wideband VHF-UHF television
antem1as. The dealership agreement was for twelve (12) months and the agreement was extended
for another three (3) months. On 3 February 2006, Mr. Valdez filed a civil case against Adtel for
5

specific performance and damages for the execution of the terms of the dealership agreement. On 6

10 May 2006, Mr. Valdez also instituted a criminal complaint for libel against Adtel's chairman,
president, and officers.

On 22 May 2006, Adtel issued a memorandum directing respondent to show cause in writing why
8

she should not be terminated for conflict of interest and/or serious breach of trust and
confidence.The memorandum stated that the filing of cases by respondent's husband created a
conflict of interest since respondent had access to vital information that can be used against
Adtel.Respondent was placed under preventive suspension by Adtel. On 23 May 2006, respondent
denied the charges of Adtel. Respondent contended that the cases had nothing to do with her being
an employee of Adtel and had not affected her performance in the company.

On 29 May 2006, Adtel terminated respondent from the company. Respondent filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. In her Position Paper,respondent alleged that she did not
violate any company rule or policy; neither was she guilty of fraud, nor willful breach of trust.
Respondent contended that she was illegally dismissed without just cause and was entitled to
separation pay, backwages, and damages.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of Valdez was illegal.

Held:Yes.The NLRC held that Adtel failed to substantially prove the existence of an act or omission
personally attributable to the respondent to serve as a just cause to terminate her employment.The
CA denied the motion for extension and dismissed Adtel's petition for certiorari for being filed beyond
the reglementary period. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA.
CASE NO. 45
Sterling Paper Products Enterprises, INc. vs KMM – Katipunan and raymonf Esponga

Facts:

Petitioner hired respondent Raymond Esponga as a machine operator. June 2006, Sterling imposed a 20-day
suspension on several employees including Esponga, for allegedly participating in a wildcat strike. The Notice of
Disciplinary Action contained a warning that a repetition of a similar offense would compel the management to
impose the maximum penalty of termination of services. Sterling averred, their supervisor Mercy
Vinoya (Vinoya), found Esponga and his co-employees about to take a nap on the sheeter machine. She called their
attention and prohibited them from taking a nap thereon for safety reasons. Esponga and his co-employees then
transferred to the mango tree near the staff house. When Vinoya passed by the staff house, she heard Esponga
utter, "Huwag maingay, puro bawal. " She then confronted Esponga, who responded in a loud and disrespectful tone.
When Vinoya turned away, Esponga gave her the "dirty finger" sign in front of his co-employees. The incident was
witnessed by Mylene Pesimo (Pesimo), who executed a handwritten statement,. Esponga was found to have been not
working as the machine assigned to him was not running instead he was having a conversation with his co-
employees, Bobby Dolor and Ruel Bertulfo. Additionally, he failed to submit his daily reports.

Esponga submitted his written explanation denying the charges against him. He claimed that he did not argue with
Vinoya as he was not in the area where the incident reportedly took place. Esponga further reasoned that during the
time when he was not seen operating the machine assigned to him, he was at the Engineering Department and then
he proceeded to the comfort room.

Labor Arbiter’s ruling: Esponga was illegally dismissed. It held that Sterling failed to discharge the burden of proof
for failure to submit in evidence the company's code of conduct, which was used as basis to dismiss Esponga.

Appeal to the NLRC: NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling. It declared that Esponga's dismissal was valid.
The NLRC observed that as a result of incident, Esponga no longer performed his duties and simply spent the
remaining working hours talking with his co-workers

Issue: W/N the cause of Esponga’s dismissal amounts to serious misconduct

Ruling: YES. Accusatory and inflammatory language used by an employee towards his employer or superior can be
a ground for dismissal or termination. Esponga's assailed conduct was related to his work. Vinoya did not prohibit
him from taking a nap. She merely reminded him that he could not do so on the sheeter machine for safety reasons.
Esponga's acts reflect an unwillingness to comply with reasonable management directives.
CASE NO. 46
Yu v SR METALS, INC. (SRMI) G.R. No. 214249, September 25, 2017

The Facts

SR Metals, Inc. Workers Union - FFW Chapter (SRMIWU-FFW) is a legitimate labor

organization and certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file
employees of SR Metals, Inc. (SRMI). On the other hand, SRMI is a corporation duly organized
and existing under the Philippine laws and engaged in mining business at Agusan del Norte.

A. Illegal Dismissal Cases

Subject of this petition are the fifteen (15) groups of employees who filed cases for illegal
dismissal and money claims before the NLRC.

Executive Labor Arbiter (ELA) Noel Augusto S. Magbanua (Magbanua) issued separate rulings
on the 15 cases. Those regular employees of SRMI were found to have been illegally dismissed.
On the other hand, the labor arbiter did not find merit in the complaints for illegal dismissal of
those who were project or fixed-term employees; contractual employees; one whose services as
house helpers were not directly related to the mining business; those who lacked interest to
pursue the case for failure to submit Position Paper; and who was not an employee of SRMI but
of SAN R Mining & Const. Corp.

Both the aggrieved employees and the SRMI appealed to the NLRC

B. Unfair Labor Practice Case

Meantime, while the illegal dismissal cases were pending, Angat Kalawakang Hanapbuhay, Inc. -
Union of Filipino Workers (AKHSRMI-UFW) and SRMIWU-FFW — the two unions that were
organized within SRMI - agreed to a consent election, which was eventually conducted on
October 28, 2010. Upon opening and canvassing of the ballots, all 75 votes were for SRMIWU-
FFW. The Med-Arbiter rendered an Order proclaiming SRMIWU-FFW as the winner in the CE
and as the certified sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of SRMI.

SRMIWU-FFW demanded for the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) but
SRMI refused to bargain. SRMI countered that it does not recognize the legitimacy of the union,
which was organized only after the contracts of employment of its members ceased and only
after they filed illegal dismissal cases against SRMI. Hence, SRMIWU-FFW filed ULP against
SRMI for refusal to bargain.

Ruling of the NLRC

The NLRC held that there were valid fixed-term contracts that negated the regularity of
petitioners' employment. NLRC also ruled that SRMI did not commit ULP for refusal to
negotiate with SRMIWU-FFW. It was opined:
“Clearly, under the circumstances, the company would have cried foul, as it did, given that the
members thereof were already separated from employment. Added to this is the fact that at the
time the consent election was conducted and upon the certification of the Union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent, illegal dismissal cases were already on the wheels of arbitration.
Being the respondent in the copious illegal dismissal cases which covered the majority, if not the
entire, membership of the Union, SRMI cannot be expected to sit down and negotiate for a CBA
with a union whose members were already separated from the company due to expiration of
contracts or completion of the projects for which they were hired, lest SRMI be misconstrued to
have deserted its postulation on the validity of the separation from employment of the workers
involved.”

Ruling of the CA

The petition for certiorari was dismissed for failure to state the date of filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration before the NLRC and to indicate the serial number of the notary public's
commission in violation of Section 2 (b) and (d) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.

SC Ruling

The petition is partially granted.

In particular, there are three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought
under Rule 65: (a) the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received,
(b) the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration when one such was filed, and, (c)
the date when notice of the denial thereof was received. These dates should be reflected in the
petition to enable the reviewing court to determine if the petition was filed on time.

Nonetheless, procedural rules are designed to promote or secure, rather than frustrate or override,
substantial justice. The Court restated the reasons that may provide justification for a court to
suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d)
a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.2

In the case at bar, the procedural lapses cited by the CA do not affect the merits of the petition;
procedural rules should have been relaxed in order to serve substantial justice. What the CA
should have done was to require petitioners' counsel to submit the lacking information instead of
dismissing the case outright. Petitioners, who are merely rank-and-file employees and are mostly,
if not all, minimum wage earners, must not be penalized for the honest mistakes of their counsel.
They deserve to have their case properly ventilated at the appellate court since what is at stake is
their means of livelihood.

Hence, SC ruled that the case be remanded to the CA based on two grounds: First, the cases of
illegal dismissal and ULP involved matters that are not purely legal in nature. There are facts that
need to be ascertained, established, and resolved in relation to the legal issues raised.
Unfortunately for petitioners, this Court is not a trier of facts.37 And Second, based on the
records, the pleadings, and other evidence, the determinative facts are not yet complete, hence,
SC is not yet in a position to resolve the dispute with finality.
 47) Case Title: NYK-FIL Management, Inc.
vs. Gener G. Dabu
G.R. No. 225142
Sept. 13, 2017
Ponente: Peralta

Doctrines:

(a) Despite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, SC ruled that
the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision must be appealed before the Court of
Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision as provided in
the Labor Code.

(b) Rules of Court are "subordinate to the statute." In case of conflict

between the law and the Rules of Court, "the statute will prevail."

FACTS:

1. Petitioner NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc., a local manning agent, hired

respondent Gener G. Dabu to work as oiler for nine months on board the vessel
M/V Hojin with a monthly basic salary of US$584.00.

2. March 25, 2013 - Respondent underwent a pre-employment medical examination

(PEME) on where he disclosed that he has diabetes mellitus. The doctor who
conducted the PEME noted that respondent has diabetes mellitus type 2, controlled
with medications.

3. On April 10, 2013, respondent consulted a doctor in Sri Lanka who found him
with elevated blood sugar level and was suffering from diabetes mellitus, and
declared him unfit for sea duty.

4. April 12, 2013- Respondent was repatriated to Manila.

5. July 18, 2013- the company-designated physician declared that respondent's

diabetes mellitus is not work-related. However, respondent's treatment was
continued for a maximum period of 130 days. Respondent continued his follow-up
consultations as he still complained of body pains and weakness and was prescribed
medicines.

6. Respondent wrote letters to petitioner appealing for the continuation of his

treatment since his sickness was work-related taking into account his 23 years of
working in petitioner's various vessels.

7. Respondent then consulted Two (2) other doctors, Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo and Dr.
Czarina Sheherazade Mae A. Miguel, who both found that this ilness is work-
aggravated/ related.

8. Dabu sought payment of disability benefits, damages and attorney's fees from
petitioner, but was denied. Dabu then filed a notice to arbitrate with the National
Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB).

9. November 28, 2014- the NCMB-Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (PVA) ruled in

favor of Dabu, and ordered respondent to pay him $60,000

10. COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioner appeled the PVA’s decision, on September 15, 2015, the Court of Appeals
reversed the PVA Decision, and dismissed Dabu’s complaint. However, after Dabu
filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR), the CA amended its decision and granted
Dabu’s (MR).

CA dismissed petitioner's petition on the ground of being FILED OUT OF TIME.

11. Petitioner filed for review on the ground that the Court of Appeals committed a
serious error in redering the amended decision on the ground that it was allegedly
filed out of time.

ISSUE: WON the CA committed an error in rendering the amended decision.

HELD: SUPREME COURT HELD no merit in the petition.

The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

RATIO:

1) Art. 262-A of the Labor Code provides:

The award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators

shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the
award or decision by the parties.

2) Clearly, the decision of the voluntary arbitrator becomes final and executory
after 10 days from receipt thereof.

3) In Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) v. Court of Appeals:

It is true that Rule 43, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides for a 15-day
reglementary period for filing an appeal: Despite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day
period to appeal, SC ruled that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision must be
appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt
of the decision as provided in the Labor Code.

4) We ruled that Article 262-A of the Labor Code allows the appeal of
decisions rendered by Voluntary Arbitrators. Statute provides that the
Voluntary Arbitrator's decision "shall be final and executory after ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the
parties." Being provided in the statute, this 10-day period must be
complied with; otherwise, no appellate court will have jurisdiction over the
appeal. This absurd situation occurs when the decision is appealed on the
11th to 15th day from receipt as allowed under the Rules, but which
decision, under the law, has already become final and executory.

5) Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution provides, the SUPREME

COURT "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights" in
promulgating rules of procedure in courts. The 10-day period to appeal
under the Labor Code being a substantive right, this period cannot be
diminished, increased, or modified through the Rules of Court.

6) In Shioji v. Harvey, this court held that the "rules of court, promulgated
by authority of law, have the force and effect of law, if not in conflict with
positive law." Rules of Court are "subordinate to the statute." In case of
conflict between the law and the Rules of Court, "the statute will prevail."

7) The rule, therefore, is that a Voluntary Arbitrator's award or decision

shall be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 days from receipt
of the award or decision. Should the aggrieved party choose to file a motion for
reconsideration with the Voluntary Arbitrator, the motion must be filed within the
same 10-day period since a motion for reconsideration is filed "within the period for
taking an appeal."23

8) IN THIS CASE, petitioner received the PVA decision on February 9, 2015, and
filed the petition for review 15 days after receipt thereof, i.e., on February
24, 2015. The CA, upon respondent's motion for reconsideration, rendered its
Amended Decision dated March 3, 2016 dismissing the petition and vacating the
earlier decision it made granting the petition. The CA dismissed the petition for
being filed out of time, citing the PHILEC case above-quoted.
Case no.48

G.R. No. 185938, September 06, 2017

ALICIA M.L. COSETENG AND DILIMAN PREPARATORY SCHOOL, Petitioners, v. LETICIA P. PEREZ,
Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, JR., J.:

In the present petition for review on certiorari, Diliman Preparatory School (the School) and its former
President, Alicia M.L. Coseteng (Coseteng)1 (petitioners, for brevity), challenge the Decision2 dated July 29,
2008 and Resolution3 dated December 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 72706,
which held that Leticia P. Perez (Perez) was constructively dismissed from employment.

The Antecedent Facts

In 1972,4 Perez was hired by the School as a teacher for elementary students.In 1994, she was assigned to
teach Grade V Level students with working hours from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 noon. 6

Sometime in August 1994, several students reported that Perez collected payment from them for
subscription to Saranggola magazine, an educational publication endorsed by the School. However, they did
not receive their copies of the magazine, while students from other sections had already received theirs.

Thereafter, the School created a committee to conduct an investigation. Perez admitted she failed to remit
the subscription payment supposedly due to her busy schedule, but agreed to return the payment of the
students instead.
Based on the findings of the School's investigating committee, a case for misappropriation amounting to
estafa could allegedly be built against Perez. However, in view of her extensive service to the school, as well
as to give her the benefit of the doubt, the investigating committee reduced its findings to negligence and
recommended that Perez be suspended without pay for ten working days. 10 Accordingly, Perez was
suspended from work from April 10 to 25, 1995.11

. A co-teacher suspected that cheating occurred on January 26, 1995, during the Math quarterly
examinations of Grade V students proctored by Perez. Upon the teacher's inquiry, the student admitted she
cheated by copying the answers of another student with the consent and instruction of Perez. 12

Perez was suspended from work effective May 26, 1995 to June 11, 1995 with one week commutation. She
was then directed to report to work on June 13, 1995 for her assignment. 16 Perez correspondingly served
out her suspension.

Thereafter, nothing more was heard from Perez, until she filed a Complaint 19 for payment of separation
benefits with the Labor Arbiter (LA) on June 15, 1998. In her Position Paper, 20 Perez argued that she was
constructively dismissed from employment21 and prayed that she be granted separation pay in light of her
twenty-three (23) years of service to the School.22 Perez also submitted an Affidavit 23 executed by one
Teresita Limochin (Limochin), who attested that she received separation pay from the School following her
voluntary resignation.
The Decision of the Labor Arbiter

On April 24, 2000, the LA rendered a Decision34 granting Perez's claim for separation pay due to its
conclusion that the petitioners have, as a practice, given separation pay to its employees who resigned. 35
However, the LA decreed that Perez resigned voluntarily from work and was not constructively dismissed. 36

The complaint for constructive dismissal, damages and respondents' counterclaims are hereby dismissed for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.37
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners made a partial appeal on the LA Decision with tlie National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).

The Decision of the NLRC

On May 10, 2002, the NLRC promulgated its Decision38 modifying the LA ruling. While tlie NLRC affirmed the
grant of separation pay to Perez, it deemed Perez as constructively dismissed from employment because she
was placed on floating status.39 The NLRC also ruled that it was erroneous to hold Coseteng liable for Perez's
money claims as the former was neither a proper party to the case nor did she act with malice or bad faith. 40
The NLRC modified the LA judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 24 April 2000 is MODIFIED. The complaint against Alicia Coseteng is
dismissed and the award of attorney's fees is deleted.

All other findings are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.41
The Decision of the CA

In its Decision43 dated July 29, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition. It held that Perez's cause of action had
not prescribed since "an employee has four years within which to institute an action for illegal dismissal." 44
As with the NLRC, the CA ruled that Perez was constructively dismissed from employment, necessitating an
award for separation pay. The CA considered Perez's reassignment as a demotion amounting to additional
penalty for her infractions.
The decision of the public respondent Commission dated May 10, 2002 and its resolution dated June 21,
2002 are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for by the petitioners, being a mere adjunct in this petition, is perforce DENIED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.46
The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in its Resolution 47 dated December
17, 2008.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Issues

The petitioners maintain that, first, Perez's cause of action has already prescribed. Second, Perez failed to
discharge her burden of proving that her resignation was involuntary. Third, Perez was neither demoted nor
was she placed on floating status. Fourth, there is no basis for the CA's inference that the School has a
practice or policy of granting separation pay to resigned employees, nor can Perez claim separation pay
under the principle of social justice in view of her dishonest acts unbecoming of a teacher. 48

The Ruling of the Court

At the outset, the Court reiterates that only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. While it is true that factual findings made by quasi-judicial
and administrative tribunals, if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded great respect and even
finality by the courts, this general rule admits of exceptions. When there is a showing that a palpable and
demonstrable mistake that needs rectification has been committed or when the factual findings were arrived
at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, these findings may be examined by the courts. 52
The Court also clarifies that while the term "floating status" was used extensively in the pleadings, as well as
in the decisions of the labor tribunals and the CA, the petitioners aptly argued that Perez was not placed
under floating status in its legal sense. Under case law, 53 with reference to Article 28654 of the Labor Code,
floating status refers to a temporary lay-off or off-detail of an employee by reason of a bonafide suspension
of the operation of a business or undertaking which shall not exceed six months.
Perez was not constructively dismissed from employment

While Perez has enjoyed her position of having a regular teaching load and advisory class for years, and
may have to adjust to her temporary assignment, it is a recognized rule that "not every inconvenience,
disruption, difficulty, or disadvantage that an employee must endure results in a finding of constructive
dismissal."71 Having failed to prove that her transfer was a result of discrimination, bad faith or disdain by
the petitioners, Perez's claim of constructive dismissal must necessarily fail.

No separation pay may be granted to Perez

As a general rule, an employee who voluntarily resigns from employment is not entitled to separation pay,
except when it is stipulated in the employment contract or CBA, or it is sanctioned by established employer
practice or policy.72 To be considered as a regular company practice, the employee must prove by
substantial evidence that the giving of the benefit is done over a long period of time, and that it has been
made consistently and deliberately.73

In an effort to show that the School has a policy of granting separation pay to its employees who resigned,
Perez submitted an Affidavit 74 executed by Limochin, a co-teacher who received separation pay from the
School despite having resigned from work.

A scrutiny of Limochin's affidavit reveals that the School's grant of separation benefits or financial assistance
to her was an isolated act, not borne out by any established employer practice or policy. All in all, the Court
disagrees with the view of the labor tribunals and the CA relative to the award of separation benefits to
Perez. They clearly overlooked the lack of substantial evidence proving that the School grants separation
pay to all its employees who resigned; its one-time act of giving separation benefits or financial assistance
to an employee could hardly be considered as a practice done consistently and deliberately over a long
period of time. Having voluntarily resigned from work, Perez is not entitled to separation pay or financial
assistance. To reiterate, there is no evidence that payment of separation pay is stipulated in her
employment contract or is sanctioned by an established practice or policy of the School.

Petitioners are not entitled to damages and attorney's fees

Anent the petitioners' prayer for moral damages on account of the complaint filed by Perez, the Court denies
the same for the reason that moral damages are not automatically granted; "there must still be proof of the
existence of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to the defendants' acts." 77

With respect to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code states that, "[e]xemplary or corrective
damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages." Since the Court has adjudged the petitioners as not
entitled to moral damages, their plea for award of exemplary damages cannot be granted pursuant, to the
aforestated provision.

On the subject of attorney's fees, the Court holds that while the petitioners were compelled to engage the
services of a counsel and incurred litigation expenses to defend their interests, it appears that Perez was not
impelled by malice and bad faith in filing her complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 29, 2008 and Resolution
dated December 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72706 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint filed by respondent Leticia P. Perez for constructive dismissal, separation pay and
damages is DISMISSED.

However, petitioners Alicia M.L. Coseteng and Diliman Preparatory School's prayer for the award of moral
damages, exemplary and attorney's fees must be DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta,*Bersamin,**Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

Case No. 49
Fabricator Philippines, Inc. v. Estolas
G.R. Nos. 224308-09
September 27, 2017
Petitioner: Fabricator Philippines, Inc.
Respondent: Jeanie Rose Q. Estolas

CASE: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the CA Decision (September 14, 2015) and
Resolution (May 2, 2016) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 133794 and 133833, which, inter alia, ruled that petitioner
Fabricator Philippines, Inc. (petitioner) illegally dismissed respondent Jeanie Rose Q. Estolas
(respondent).

FACTS:
Petitioner Fabricator Philippines which is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of
motorcycle parts, with Victor Lim as its President hired Respondent Jeanie Rose Q. Estolas as a welder.

Before break time of July 2, 2011, while waiting for a replacement part she requested to be installed on
the welding machine she was using, respondent Estolas took a seat and rested. At that time, another
employee, Rosario Banayad, passed by and saw her sitting, then uttered "Ayos ka ha." The matter was
brought to the attention of Assembly Action Team Leader, Warlito Abaya, who confronted respondent
about the said incident. Thereafter, while Abaya and Banayad were talking to each other, respondent told
the latter in the vernacular "Ang kitid ng utak mo[.] [B]akit hindi mo muna ako tinanong kung bakit ako
nakaupo[?] [B]akit hindi mo muna tinanong kung ano [ang] nasa likod ng nakita mo?" Banayad retorted,
saying, "Matapang ka ha! Matapang ka!" Respondent replied, "Candy, ikaw pa naman ang nagdadasal
araw-araw, tapos ganyan ang ugali mo!"

Consequently, Abaya directed respondent to see Lim in his office. During their meeting, the latter
(Estolas) allegedly asked what she would feel if he would hit her ear, then proceeded to hit her ear.
Respondent reasoned out that she did not hit Banayad's ear and that it was the latter who provoked her.
However, Lim insisted that respondent was rude towards Banayad. Thus, on July 13, 2011, respondent
was issued a suspension order effective the following day for a period of days. While she was in the
locker area, the company guard on duty informed respondent to report for work the following day.

On November 28, 2011, Lim directed respondent to sign a paper, which she refused as it pertained to the
promotion of Banayad as Strategy and Control Group-Senior Assistant 1. On November 30, 2011,
respondent received a letter from Lim directing her to seek the assistance of a lawyer for the hearing on
December 7, 2011. At the scheduled hearing, respondent was required to sign the statements of Banayad
and other witnesses, which she refused to follow. Thereafter, on December 16, 2011, respondent was
served a notice of termination effective December 17, 2011, finding her guilty of serious misconduct.

Hence, Respondent Estolas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of respondent Estolas after finding that although the respondent
may have indeed committed acts of misconduct, the same were not willful and intentional in character. As
such, the penalty meted on respondent, i.e., dismissal, was not commensurate to the offense charged
against her.

Aggrieved, petitioner and Lim appealed to the NLRC which initially issued a Resolution dismissing the
appeal on technical grounds. Upon reconsideration, however, the NLRC modified LA ruling by deleting the
award of separation pay and backwages, and in lieu thereof, ordered respondent's reinstatement to her
former position without loss of seniority rights, opining it as the commensurate penalty for the latter's act
of professional misconduct.

Both parties moved for reconsideration, which were, however, denied in a NLRC Resolution. Dissatisfied,
they elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via their respective petitions for certiorari.
The CA reinstated the LA ruling with modifications: (a) ordering petitioner to pay respondent backwages
from the time she was illegally dismissed until finality of the ruling less her salary for 15 days
corresponding to her suspension, and separation pay computed from the time respondent was hired until
finality of the decision, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from finality of the decision until fully paid; (b)
absolving Lim from any personal liability arising from respondent's illegal dismissal; and (c) ordering the
LA to make a recomputation of the total monetary benefits awarded and due respondent.

Agreeing with the findings of the labor tribunals a quo, the CA held that respondent's acts did not amount
to gross misconduct that would have justified her termination from work. In this regard, it found that the
NLRC gravely abused its discretion in deleting the award of backwages, pointing out that respondent was
already suspended for 3 days for her misconduct, and thus, a second disciplinary proceeding, which
resulted in her dismissal, as well as the consequent filing of the instant case, was no longer warranted.
Nonetheless, the CA opined that respondent's infraction was minor, for which a 15-day suspension would
have sufficed.

Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution; hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed

HELD:
YES. Article 297 (formerly Article 282) 45 of the Labor Code, as amended, lists serious misconduct as
one of the just causes for an employee's dismissal from work, pertinent portions of which read:

Article 297 [282]. Termination by Employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employe e of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;

xxx xxx xxx

Misconduct is defined as an improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and

definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent
and not mere error in judgment. To constitute a valid cause for the dismissal within the text and meaning
of the foregoing provision, the following elements must concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it
must relate to the performance of the employee's duties, showing that the employee has become unfit to
continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent.

In this case, the tribunals a quo aptly observed that while respondent indeed committed some sort of
misconduct when she engaged in a verbal tussle with Banayad during work hours and in front of their
superior, Abaya, the same was not serious enough to warrant respondent's dismissal. Neither was it
shown that respondent performed such act of misconduct with wrongful intent nor did the same render
her unfit to continue working for petitioner. As such, the tribunals a quo correctly concluded that petitioner
illegally dismissed respondent. It is settled that "where the factual findings of the labor tribunals or
agencies conform to, and are affirmed by the CA, the same are accorded respect and finality and are
binding upon this Court," as in this case.

Moreover, it is well to stress that (July 13, 2011) petitioner already issued an order suspending
respondent for a period of 3 days on account of her misconduct. Thus, petitioner could no longer subject
respondent to another disciplinary proceeding based on the same act of misconduct. Clearly, respondent
could not have been validly terminated from work.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the CA Decision and Resolution in CA-
G.R. SP Nos. 133794 and 133833 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, deleting the deduction of
salary/wages for 15 days from the award of backwages in favor of respondent Jeanie Rose Q. Estolas.
The rest of the CA ruling STANDS.
CASE NO. 50
Allan John Uy Reyes vs Global Beer Below Zero, Inc.
G.R. No. 222816, October 4, 2017

Facts:

Petitioner Reyes was an employee of respondent Global as Operations Manager. On January 18, 2012, Reyes, in
accordance with his duties reported to the main office of respondent Global in Makati instead of going to the Pasig
warehouse in order to request for budget because there was a scheduled delivery in the following day. The following
day, Reyes ran late because according to him, his three-year-old son was sick. Around 10:30 a.m. of the same day,
respondent Global’s Vice-President for Operations, Vinson CO Say (Co Say), Reyes’ immediate and direct superior
at that time, called Reyes and asked him why he was not yet at the office. Reyes apologized and said that he was on
his way. According to Reyes, he tried to explain why he was late, but Co Say did not listen and the latter shouted at
the other end of the line and told Reyes not to report for work anymore. Reyes further claimed that Co Say angrily
retorted that he will talk to him the following week before Co Say hung up the phone. As instructed, Reyes did not
report for work on the following days and waited for further instructions from Co Say. On January 24, 2012, Reyes
received a text message from Co Say stating the following, “Allan, let’s meet thu, puno aka today, bukas.” Around
1:28 p.m. of January 26, 2012, Reyes received a text message from Co Say which says, “Allan, let’s meet in
Starbucks Waltermart around 3:00.” During the said meeting, Co Say told Reyes to no longer report for work and
insisted that he file a resignation letter which Reyes refused to do because he believed that he had not done anything
that would warrant his dismissal from the company. Thus, Reyes instituted a complaint for constructive dismissal on
February 22, 2012 and amended the same complaint on March 29, 2012, changing his cause of action to illegal
dismissal. Respondent Global, on the other hand, claimed that Reyes was not dismissed from service, but the latter
stopped reporting for work on his own volition after repeatedly violating company rules and regulations. He
committed a total of six (6) absences constituting those without filing leave of absence and not following the prior
notice rule. He also incurred a total balance of Php 7,977.10 for personal use of WAP services, and his absences
resulted in several work remaining undone. LA Ruling: The LA ruled in favor of complainant. According to the LA,
Reyes had no intention of quitting his job as seen from his filing of applications of leaves of absences days before he
supposedly abandoned his job and hist texting Co Say about is work on the day he supposedly abandoned his job. It
also found that the accusation that Reyes committed serious misconduct and was negligent in the performance of his
duty is more consistent with a finding that there was dismissal than with finding that there was an abandonment of
employment. The Labor Arbiter further ruled that the word “turnover” in Co Say’s last text message to Reyes
indicates that on the date that it was sent, the latter was already expected to turnovers duties to his replacement and
belies the claim of Co Say that he asked Reyes to return to work in order to possibly explain his numerous absences,
negligence in performing his duties and serious misconduct. NLRC Ruling: On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA.
The NLRC ruled that Reyes sufficiently alleged the surrounding circumstances of his dismissal and was able to
state, with the required particularities how he was terminated from his employment; thus, respondent Global should
have proven that it was legally done. According to the NLRC, respondent Global failed to disprove Reyes’ allegation
that he was verbally dismissed twice by Co Say, hence, there is no evidence showing that Reyes was dismissed from
his job for cause and that he was afforded procedural due process. Respondent filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. CA Ruling: The CA reversed the NLRC. In finding merit to respondent Global’s petition,
the CA ruled that the “text” messages allegedly sent by Co Say and Tet Manares to Reyes could hardly meet the
standard of clear, positive and convincing evidence to prove Reyes’ bare assertion that he was verbally terminated
from employment by Co Say, no corroborative and competent evidence was adduced by Reyes to substantiate his
claim that he was illegally dismissed. The CA, instead, found that there was no overt or positive act on the part of
respondent Global proving that it had dismissed Reyes. Hence, the present petition, after the denial of Reyes’ motion
for reconsideration.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the word “turnover” means dismissal from employment?

Whether or not unauthenticated text message can be given credence in a labor case?
Ruling:

The SC found merit in the petition. Verbal notice of termination can hardly be considered as valid or legal. To
constitute valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for a just or
authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. In
justifying that such verbal command not to report for work from respondent Global’s Vice President for Operations
Co Say as not enough to be construed as overt acts of dismissal, the CA cited the case of Noblejas v. Italian
Maritime Academy Phils., Inc. In the said case, an employee filed an illegal dismissal case after the secretary of the
company’s Managing Director told him, “No, you better pack up all your things now and go, you are now dismissed
and you are no longer part of this office -clearly, you are terminated from this day on.” There was no dismissal to
speak of because the secretary’s words were not enough to be construed as overt acts of dismissal. Be that as it may,
the factual antecedents of that case is different in this case. In the present case, the one who verbally directed Reyes
to no longer report for work was his immediate or direct supervisor, the VicePresident for Operations, who has the
capacity and authority to terminate Reyes’ services, while in Noblejas, the one who gave the instruction was merely
the secretary of the company’s Managing Director. Hence, in Noblejas, the Court found it necessary that the
employee should have clarified the statement of the secretary from his superiors before the same employee instituted
an illegal dismissal case. In the present case, Co Say’s verbal instruction, being Reyes’ immediate supervisor, was
authoritative, therefore, Reyes was not amiss in thinking that his employment has indeed already been terminated.
The text messages produced in a machine copy by Reyes tended to show that he was actually dismissed from his
work. The text message purportedly sent by respondent Co Say that: “Tet will contact you plus turnover” was clear
enough. A literal interpretation of said text message leaves no doubt that the complainant’s days with the respondent
company was numbered. The word “turnover” simply connotes “to transfer,” “to yield” or “to return.” In
employment parlance, the word “turnover” is associated with severance of employment. An employee makes proper
“turnover” of pending work before he leaves his employment. The text message of respondent Co Say was followed
by another message from Ms. Tet Manares which stated that: “Kuya, pianos ko na kay gen salary mo.” This is
consistent with the first message that Tel will contact the complainant. True enough, Ms. Tet Manares contacted the
complainant informing him that his salary was already being prepared. The two (2) text messages, when taken
together, support complainant’s insistence that he was actually dismissed from his work. Respondent Co Say’s text
message regarding “turnover” and Ms. Manares’ text message regarding the preparation of the complainant’s salary
were quite consistent with the complainant’s allegation that he was dismissed by respondent Co Say during their
telephone conversation and during their meeting at Starbucks Waltermart. Global’s assertion that the purported text
messages submitted by Reyes should not be given credence as he failed to authenticate the same in accordance with
the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration. In labor cases, the strict adherence to the rules of evidence may be
relaxed consistent with the higher interest of substantial justice. In labor cases, rules of procedure should not be
applied in a very rigid and technical sense. They are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and
where their strict application would result in the frustration rather than promotion of substantial justice,
technicalities must be avoided. It is well settled that the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to
serve the demands of substantial justice, particularly in labor cases. Thus, the “text” messages may be given
credence especially if they corroborate the other pieces of evidence presented. Again, while as a rule, the Court
strictly adheres to the rules of procedure, it may take exception to such general rule when a strict implementation of
the rules would cause substantial injustice to the parties. Having thus proven the fact of being dismissed, the burden
to prove that such dismissal was not done illegally is now shifted to the employer to show by substantial evidence
that the employee’s termination from service is for a just and valid cause. In this case, respondent Global asserts that
there was no dismissal; instead, there was abandonment of the part of Reyes of his employment. The Labor Arbiter,
however, found that on the days that Reyes supposedly abandoned his employment according to respondent Global,
no such indication was found as Reyes filed applications for leave and even sent “text” messages to his immediate or
direct superior regarding his work. Abandonment requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to
resume his employment, without any intention of returning. For abandonment to exist, two factors must be present:
(1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid of justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever
employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor being manifested by
some overt acts. In this case, no such abandonment was proven by respondent Global. In fact, Reyes would not have
filed a case for illegal dismissal if he really intended to abandon his work. Employees who take steps to protest their
dismissal cannot logically be said to have abandoned their work.