CD Crim Law Khitri-Villaocrta

Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines
“Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies. Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit but also by
means of fault. There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act
results from imprudence, negligence, lack of forethought, or lack of skill.”
KHITRI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 210192
FACTS:
 On January 25, 1991, in the City of Las Pinas, the petitioners, Rosalinda and Fernando Khitri
received P 400,000.00 from the complainants, Belen and Hiroshi Fukami. The money is the
complainants’ contribution for the construction of a two-storey garment factory in Cainta, Rizal, a
joint venture between the petitioners and the complainants.
 The complainants and the petitioners had a verbal agreement that the two-storey garment
factory will be erected on the lot of the petitioners in Cainta, Rizal. A two-door studio-type
apartment was built by the petitioners as opposed to the two-storey garment factory in which the
complainants have agreed to. In the petitioners’ defense, the two-door studio-type apartment is
still to be devoted for the operations of the garments factory, even though it’s not a two-storey
apartment, as what the complainants initially expected, proving their compliance with their joint
venture agreement.
 The complainants would like the petitioners to return the P 400,000.00 given to them as they did
not comply with the agreed plan of constructing a two-storey garment factory.
 The Regional Trial court rendered a decision finding the petitioners, Rosalinda Khitri and
Fernando Khitry, guity of the crime of Estafa.
 On appeal, the CA Affirmed in toto the RTC judgment.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the act performed was done with malicious and evil intent and should be considered as
intentional or culpable felony.
RULING:
 There is merit in the argument proffered by the petitioners that their compliance with their joint venture
agreement with the complainants is evident as the P 400,000.00 was used to construct an
establishment of which the sole purpose is for the operations of the garment factory, despite the
petitioners’ modification of the agreed plan.
 The elements of Estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (1) that the money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such
receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that
there is demand by the offended party to the offender. Only the first and the last elements are present
in the case at bar.
 The absence of the second element (that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt) is apparent in this case as the petitioners
did not, in any way, deny, misappropriated, and converted the P 400,000.00 given to them by the
complainants.
Sensitivity: Confidential
 The Court believes that the ends sought to be achieved by the money have not been rendered illusory
by the modification. In fact, after the construction, the private complainants sent five sewing machines
for use in the garments factory, but these were subsequently pulled out after two weeks for repairs.
 The element of intent, which is crucial in determining whether an act committed is felonious or
otherwise, is not present in the case of the petitioners.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated June 27, 2013 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
CR No. 33961, affirming the Decision rendered on December 9, 2009 by the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas
City, Branch 253, in Criminal Case No. 00-1023, is hereby REVERSED REVERSED and SET ASIDE SET
ASIDE. Rosalinda S. Khitri and Fernando S. Khitri are hereby ACQUITTED ACQUITTED of the crime of
Estafa. However, they are DIRECTED to REIMBURSE DIRECTED to REIMBURSE the private complainants,
Spouses Hiroshi and Belen Fukami, of the amount of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000.00),
subject to an annual interest of six percent (6%) from the finality of this Decision until full satisfaction thereof.
PRINCIPLE:
 Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus — that the act or omission be
done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice aforethought." The maxim is
actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea — a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing
the act complained of is innocent. As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of
malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
CALIMUTAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 152133 (February 9, 2006)
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS:
 February 4, 1996 - at around 10:00 am, the victim Cantre and witness Sañano, together with two other
companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar in Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate.
 The victim and witness proceeded to go home to their respective houses after the drinking session.
 Along the way, they crossed paths with petitioner Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao,
Calimutan’s househelper. Victim Cantre was harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting
Bulalacao as the one responsible for throwing stones at the Cantre’s house on a previous night.
 Upon seeing Bulalacao, Cantre suddenly punched him.
 When Bulalacao ran away, petitioner Calimutan picked up a stone (man’s fist), which he threw at
Cantre, hitting him at the LEFT side of his back.
 Witness Sañano accompanied victim Cantre to the latter’s house, and on the way, Cantre complained
of the pain in the left side of his back hit by the stone.
 Symptoms felt by Cantre that night: backache, stomachache, unable to eat, feeling alternately feeling
cold and warm, profusely sweating, entire body felt numb.
 February 5, 1996 - Cantre asked for some food, ate a little, later on vomited. He then again complained
about backache and stomachache and died thereafter.
 After death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer of
Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-Mortem Report and Death Certificate stated that the cause of death was
“cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning.
 Unsatisfied with the result, the Cantre family, through the help of Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogados
of the ABS-CBN Foundation, requested for an exhumation and autopsy of the body of Cantre by the
NBI.
 The autopsy of Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, a Senior Medico Legal Officer from NBI, revealed that the
cause of death was actually “traumatic injury of the abdomen”. Cantre suffered internal hemorrhage
and there was a massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to LECERATED SPLEEN.
 The laceration of the spleen can be caused by any blunt instrument, such as stone. Dr. Mendez
confirmed the possibility that the victim was stoned to death.
 To counter evidence, the defense presented the sole testimony of the accused Calimutan, to wit: victim
punched Bulalacao several times, victim refused to calm down, victim pulled out 8-inches Batangas
knife, stone was only 1-inch in diameter. Calimutan maintained that he had no personal grudge against
the victim.
 RTC essentially adopted the prosecution’s account of the incident. Petitioner was found guilty of
homicide beyond reasonable doubt.
 CA sustained the conviction of RTC. The prosecution has sufficiently established that the serious
internal injury sustained by the victim was caused by the stone thrown to him. The motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
 Petitioner Calimutan files a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the
RTC and CTA, convicting him of homicide, and his acquittal of the said crime based on reasonable
doubt.
ISSUE AND RULING:
1. Is there a proof beyond reasonable doubt to hold petitioner Calimutan liable?
YES. The report and testimony of Dr. Mendez before the RTC are vital pieces of evidence
against the petitioner. It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was presented by the prosecution as an
expert witness (with competency and academic qualification and background). As an expert, he is
presumed to possess sufficient knowledge of branches of medicine germane to the issue involved in a
case. His findings are not just mere speculations but may sufficiently establish the causal relationship
between the stone and the lacerated spleen.
The witnesses also said that the victim Cantre seemed to be physically fine. However, after
being hit by the stone, the victim Cantre had continuously complained of backache. Subsequently, his
physical condition rapidly deteriorated, until finally, he died. Other than being stoned by petitioner
Calimutan, there was no other instance when the victim Cantre may have been hit by another blunt
instrument which could have caused the laceration of his spleen.
Not even the postmortem report of Dr. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer who first examined
the body of the victim Cantre, can raise reasonable doubt as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre.
In her post-mortem report, she held back from making a categorical statement that the victim actually
died of food poisoning. There was no showing that further laboratory tests were indeed conducted to
confirm Dr. Ulanday’s suspicion that the victim Cantre suffered from food poisoning, and without such
confirmation, her suspicion as to the cause of death remains just that – a suspicion.
The difference in the two reports by the two doctors resulted from the EXTENT of the
examination. Dr. Ulanday only conducted a limited autopsy while Dr. Mendez conducted an exhaustive
autopsy. Therefore, the exhaustive autopsy must be given credence by the court.
2. Were the RTC and CA correct as to the determination of the appropriate crime or offense for
which the petitioner should have been convicted for?
NO. The petitioner did not have any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim canter.
In the absence of such intent, the Court finds petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable
felony of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide (Art. 365, RPC)
The prosecution did not establish that Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre with the
specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the victim Cantre. What is obvious to this Court
was petitioner Calimutan’s intention to drive away victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao
who was much younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre.
Petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to
a maximum period of 2 years and one day of prison correccional. Petitioner is ordered to pay the heirs
of the victim P50,000 as civil indemnity for the latter’s death and 50,000 as moral damages.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated
29 August 2001, affirming the Decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998, is
hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and is accordingly sentenced to
imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum period of two years and one
day of prision correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latter’s death and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
PRINCIPLES:
 An accused in a criminal case may only be convicted if his or her guilt is established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
 Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does not demand absolute certainty and the exclusion
of all possibility of error.
 Proximate cause is the cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
 Adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence, when not applicable
a. The suppression of not willful
b. The evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative
c. The evidence is at the disposal of both parties
d. The suppression is an exercise of a privilege
 Felonies, means by which they are committed (Art. 3, RPC)
a. Intentional felonies – act or omission is malicious, with deliberate intent
b. Culpable felonies – act or omission is not malicious, unintentional
EMERGENCY RECIT DIGEST:

Victim Cantre had a drinking spree. Going home, victim crossed paths with Bulalacao and petitioner
Calimutan. Believing that Bulalacao was the one responsible for throwing stones at Cantre’s house on a
previous night, Cantre punched Bulalacao. In order to defend Bulalacao, Calimutan threw at the victim a stone
(man’s fist) hitting the left side of the latter’s back. Due to the incident, Cantre complained of backache and
stomachache, then later on died. The RTC and CA affirmed that the petitioner committed homicide.
Considering the autopsy reports and witness testaments, the SC ruled that the petitioner was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, not of homicide, but of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
MANUEL, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
 A petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting the petitioner of bigamy.
 The accusation portion filed against the petitioner that:
 On or about the 22nd day of April, 1996 - In Baguio and within the jurisdiction of the Court, EDUARDO
P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract
a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know the
existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaña].
 July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati.
 Sometime in January 1996 Petitioner met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Bonuan,
Dagupan City.
 Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39.
 Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel
where, despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her.
 Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even
brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by them that their son
was still single.
 April 22, 1996 They were married before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of
Baguio City, Branch 61.
o It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."
 Starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a
year. Since, Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.
 Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, did not return, and he stopped giving
financial support.
 Sometime in August 2001, Tina made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila and
secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract. where she learned that Eduardo had been
previously married.
Petitioner’s Defense
1. Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest Relations
Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her.
2. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him.
3. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a "love-bite" on
her neck. He then abandoned her.
4. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because
he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid.
5. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before
marrying Tina.
6. Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to
commit suicide unless he did so.
7. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three
months and never saw her again.
8. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he
had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
RTC HELD:
July 2, 2002 Finds Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
 Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy
because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any
malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the
honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He posited that the trial court should have
taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code.
 OSG posited averred that Eduardo’s defense of good faith and reliance and contented what applicable
is Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was
void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the
marriage;
 OSG maintained, the private complainant’s knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief
since bigamy is an offense against the State and not just against the private complainant. However, the
OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous and sought
the affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.
C.A HELD:
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the
penalty of the accused because of
(1) It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy.
(2) Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant,
there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña’s presumptive death as the absent spouse
ISSUES:
1. Did the court of appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner’s first wife cannot
be legally presumed dead under article 390 of the civil code as there was no judicial declaration of
presumptive death as provided under article 41 of the family code
DISPOSITION of SC: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SC RULING:
Issue no 1: The petition is denied for lack of merit.
 The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is
misplaced.
 The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse
present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with
bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments of
eminent authorities on Criminal Law.
Issue no 2: The Court rules against the petitioner.
 Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
 Requirements for an award of moral damages.
(1) there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the
claimant;
(2) there must be culpable act or omission factually established;
(3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by
the claimant; and
(4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of
the Civil Code
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
PRINCIPLES:
1. For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo,
a. there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent
2. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea
a. the act does not make one guilty unless there is a criminal intent
People v. Gonzales
G.R. 80762, March 19, 1990
Facts:
 February 21, 1981
o At 9:00 in the evening, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla,
o Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales.
o Augosto informed Paja that his wife killed their landlord, Lloyd Penacerrada, and
o would like to surrender to the authorities.
o With the knife still in his hand and Fausta with her dress still smeared with blood,
o Paja immediately ordered his nephew to take the spouses to the police at the
o Municipal Hall.
o The nephew then informed the police what happened.
o Patrolman Salvador Centeno and the Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay
o Tipacla.
o Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the residence where the
o killing allegedly occurred. There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Penacerrada
o only in underwear, sprawled face down inside the bathroom.
o For an hour, Patrolman Centeno inspected the whole scene and started to make a
o rough sketch of the immediate surroundings.
o At 7:00 AM, Patrolman Centeno with the photographer went back to the scene.
o Fausta was brought back to the police sub-station.
o Further investigations were made. The autopsy of Lloyd Penacerrada stated that
o the cause of death is massive hemorrhage due to multiple lacerated, stabbed,
o incised and punctured wounds. He obtained 16 wounds which 5 of it were fatal.
o Augusto surrendered to the police saying that he has been involved in the killing.
o An information for murder was filed by the Provincial Fiscal against the spouses.
 September 16, 1981 – Augusto and Fausta pleaded not guilty.
 Before the trial, Jose Huntoria claimed to witness the killing therefore, a reinvestigation
 of the alleged killing was conducted, this time, presenting another accused, Custodio
 Gonzales, Sr., Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida. All the accused
 except Lanida pleaded not guilty.
 The prosecution’s case rested on Huntoria’s eyewitness account of the incident which he
 said that he saw all the accused stabbing and hacking the victim and said that he clearly
 recognized all the accused because of the bright moonlight. He claimed that he did not
 immediately report to the police authorities what he witnessed for fear of his life.
 Trial Court – they believed the testimony of Huntoria
 Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but found the penalty erroneous.
Issue:
Whether the accused-appellant Custodio Gonzales, Sr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Lloyd Penacerrada’s murder
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the DECISION of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de officio.
Ruling:
No. The appellant is not guilty of the crime of murder. To recollect, Huntoria testified that he
clearly saw the malefactors including the accused-appellant taking turns in stabbing the victim.
He saw it clearly because of the illuminating moonlight. But on cross-examination, Huntoria
admitted that he could not determine who among the six accused did the stabbing and/or the
hacking and what particular weapon was used by each of them.
It also bears stressing the there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals
which would categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct
participation, principal by inducement, or principal by indispensable cooperation.
The elements of felonies are:
a.) There must be an act or omission
b.) The act or omission must be punishable under the RPC
c.) The act is performed or the omission incurred by deceit or fault
*Please see Article 3 & 4 in relation to this
The trial court and the Court of Appeals lacked basis and proof to make the appellant guilty of
the murder charge. Huntoria’s testimony was also flawed and tarnished by the fact that he only
came out to testify eight long months after the incident. If the silence of an allegedly witness for
several weeks renders doubtful, the more it should be for the one mute for eight months. There
was also no showing that he was threatened by anybody.
Therefore, the SC agreed that the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
People of the Philippines vs Gervero
FACTS:
 Victims:
- Hernando Villegas
- Jose Villegas
- Benito Basug, Jr.
 Offenders/Accused:
- Esmael Gervero (deceased)
- Florencio Arbolonio
- Celso Solomon
- Danilo Castigador
- Eduardo Banes
 November 25, 1991 – the accused shoot and hit the victims with firearms inflicting them with numerous
gunshot wound which caused their deaths
 Different versions of the facts:
Prosecution Defense
(TESTIMONIES) (TESTIMONIES)
 6:30 pm - RODA was in the house of  6:00 pm – The accused were given oral
HERNANDO who was with JOSE and instructions to conduct tactical patrol and
BENITO. BANES, CASTIGADOR and combat operations against NPA. The
other 2 companions asked HERNANDO password is “Simoy” to which the
for money and gave them. Before leaving, response would be “Amoy”.
CASTIGADOR left a remark but
HERNANDO neglected it. HERNANDO,  8:00 pm – The accused positioned
JOSE, and BENITO prepared to go to the themselves near the river and noticed
wake of their CVO member’s wife. people approaching. They uttered the
word “Simoy” but instead of replying, the
 8:00 pm – DELIA saw her husband JOSE men fired back at the accused. The
together with HERNANDO and BENITO accused fired back/ GERVERO ordered
passed by their house. She told JOSE not his group to gather firearms of the slain
to stay long at the wake. The 3 CVO persons.
members walked towards the rice field,
laughing. Later, ISAAC and RODA  Later, they proceeded to the house of
passed by the house also. Later on, Barangay Captain Balinas and informed
DELIA, RODA, and ISAAC heard a burst him that they encountered a group of men
of gunfire in the rice field. They also whom they believed to be members of
witnessed the group of armed men NPA. They also turned over the
approach the victims whom they fired recovered firearms to the police and
upon at close range. reported the incident to Senior Inspector
Baldevinos.
 The same night, DELIA, RODA, and
ISAAC went to the house of Brgy. Captain
Balinas to complain. There they saw the
accused who already told the Barangay
Captain that they made a mistake in
shooting HERNANDO, JOSE, and
BENITO because they thought they were
the members of NPA. The Barangay
Captain asked if the victims were able to
shoot back, but the accused answered
no.
 RTC – found the accused guilty of murder.
- The testimonies of prosecution witnesses are straightforward, credible, and in accord with the
physical evidence.
- The accused exceeded in the performance of their duties by immediately firing successive shots
on the 3 UNSUSPECTING VICTIMS.
- Mistake of fact is UNBELIEVABLE because the accused already identified HERNANDO, JOSE,
and BENITO when they went to the house and asked for money to HERNANDO, 2 hours prior to
the shooting incident, indicating that they KNEW EACH OTHER.
 Court of Appeals – affirmed the conviction of RTC but modified the damages
 The accused pleaded not guilty of the charge.
ISSUE AND RULING:
 Is there a mistake of fact?
NO. The accused were given an alternative to take the facts, that is to check the identity of the 3
unsuspecting victims in an open area illuminated both by the moonlight and a light bulb before shooting them.
Moreover, the accused had seen the victims just a few hours before the shooting approached them, asked for
money and even, in the shooting incident, approached their bodies after they shoot them, so it is not
reasonable for them to say that they barely recognize their faces. It is also known that both the accused and
the victims reside in the same town which makes them to distinguish residents of that area from unknown
intruders or members of NPA. Even though the shooting has no evil intent, still, the accused HAVE TIME AND
OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE AN INQUIRY AND TO IDENTIFY THE IDENTITY OF THE VICTIMS before
shooting them. Also, the accused were NOT PRESSED BY CIRCUMSTANCES TO ACT IMMEDIATELY AND
SHOOT THE VICTIMS MERCILESSLY. Here, there is no true honesty in killing the victims continuously and
even sprayed them with bullets at close range. The accused then is culpable for such wrongful act and is made
in bad faith.
Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that the accused-appellants’ claim of mistake of fact are negated by
these circumstances and were guilty of murder qualified by treachery because the victims were not given any
chance to give their identity and defend themselves. The victims were caught off guard by an immediate
shooting while the accused positioned themselves in “ambush position” giving them without warning of killing,
thus treachery. The Court then ruled against the appeal of the accused.
DISPOSITION:
Wherefore, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants Danilo Castigador, Celso Solomon, and Eduardo Banes are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER for the killing of Hernando Villegas, Jose Villegas, and Benito
Basug, Jr. and hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
PRINCIPLES:
o Mistake of fact:
- Innocent when the act committed is without fault or carelessness because the accused had no
alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him and such acts justified his act of
killing.
- The accused have no time and opportunity to make an inquiry and being pressed by
circumstances to act immediately.
- Misapprehension of a fact
- The act committed has no sort of evil (no due negligence or bad faith)
- 3 requisites (Yapyuco vs Sandiganbayan):
a) Mistake is honest and reasonable
b) It be a matter of fact
c) Negate the culpability/mental state required to commit the crime
- Ignorantia facti excusat (legal maxim) – Ignorance/mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of
supposed offense, a sufficient excuse
o Fulfillment of duty:
- 2 requisites:
a) The offender acts in the performance of a duty or lawful exercise of a right
b) The injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of
such duty
o Murder:
- 4 elements:
a) A person was killed
b) The accused killed that person
c) The killing was affected by any qualifications in Art. 248 of RPC
d) The killing is not parricide/infanticide
o Treachery:
- Attack without giving the unsuspecting victim a chance to escape or defend himself
- 2 elements:
a) The method of execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive of the
victim and no opportunity is given to the victim to defend himself
b) The method of execution was deliberately adopted by the offender
YAPYUCO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012
Ponente: PERALTA, J:
Facts:
 These are petitions for review on certiorari assailing the June 30, 1995 Decision of the Sandiganbayan
for cases of murder, frustrated murder, and multiple counts of attempted murder.
 April 5, 1988 – There was a shooting incident in San Fernando, Pampanga that killed Leodevince
Licup and injured Noel Villanueva.
 Accused who are all charged with murder, multiple attempted murder, and frustrated murder were
the following:
 Members of the Integrated National Police (INP)
o Salvador Yapyuco, Jr.
o Generoso Cunanan, Jr.
o Ernesto Puno
 Barangay Captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen respectively
o Jose Pamintuan
o Mario Reyes
 Either member of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer
o Andres Reyes
o Virgilio Manguerra
o Carlos David
o Ruben Lugtu
o Moises Lacson
o Renato Yu
o Jaime Pabalan
 Criminal Case No. 16612:
o …with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with
deliberate intent to take the life of Leodevince Licup, attack the latter with automatic weapons
by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney riden by the victim inflicting multiple
gunshot wounds on the body of the victim that results to the immediate death
 Criminal Case No. 16613
intent to kill, attack Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V.
Panlican with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden
by said Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican,
having commenced the commission of murder directly by overt acts of execution which should
produce the murder by reason of some cause or accident other than their own spontaneous
desistance.
 Criminal Case No. 16614
intent of taking the life of Noel C. Villanueva, attack the latter with automatic weapons by
firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C. Villanueva and
inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal and having performed all the
acts which would have produced the crime of murder, but which did not, by reason of causes
independent of the defendants' will, namely, the able and timely medical assistance given to
said Noel C. Villanueva, which prevented his death.
 April 30, 1991 – the accused entered individual pleas of not guilty except Pabalan who died and
Yapyuco who was indisposed
 June 1991 – Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered and entered a negative plea
 May 10, 1991 – Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No. 16612 for Mario Reyes, AANdres
 Reyes, David Lugtu, Lacson, Yu, and Manguerra
 May 21, 1991 – Yapyuco was also granted bail
 November 21, 1991 – Pamintuan died therefore the charges against him were extinguished
 July 4, 1991 – Pre-trial conference started for the remaining accused
 Prosecution:
o Villanueva, Flores, Calma, DeVera, Panlican and Licup (victims) were at the residence of
Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The
company decided to leave at around 7:30p.m., shortly after the religious procession had
passed.
As they were all intoxicated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel,
to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and open canals on the road. With Licup in the
passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva
allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching
a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both
wounded and bleeding profusely.
o In open court, Flores executed a sketch depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney
on the road, the residence of Salangsang where they had come from and the house situated on
the right side of the road right after the curve where the jeepney had taken a left turn; he
identified said house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron where the gunmen allegedly took
post and opened fire at him and his companions. He could not tell how many firearms were
used.
He recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup and Villanueva were
wounded, jumped out of the jeepney when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging
from the yard of Naron’s house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced himself
and his companions to be employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan
corrected them for not stopping when flagged.
o At this point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to summon Salangsang
for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup were wounded. He dashed back to Salangsang’s house
as instructed and, returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and
o Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be taken to the hospital.
o This was corroborated by Villanueva who stated that as soon as the firing had ceased two
armed men, together with Pamintuan, approached them and transferred him and Licup to
another jeepney and taken to the nearby St. Francis Hospital.Flores claimed that all the
accused in the case had not been known to him prior to the incident, except for Pamintuan
whom he identified to be his wife’s uncle and with whom he denied having had any rift nor
with the other accused for that matter, which would have otherwise inspired ill motives. He
claimed the bullet holes on the Tamaraw jeepney were on the passenger side and that there
were no other bullet holes at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle.
 Defense which was only took by Yapyuco:
o According to him, his men were investigating a physical injuries case when Yu suddenly
received a summon for police assistance from David, who supposedly was instructed by
o Pamintuan, concerning a reported presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco
allegedly called on their main station in San Fernando for reinforcement but at the time no
additional men could be dispatched. Hence, he decided to respond and instructed his men to
put on their uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles with them.
o Regarding the firing of warning shots, they did that because they have identified the incoming
jeepney that it was the target vehicle.
o Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the time was
in bad shape, as in fact there were several law enforcement officers in the area who had been
ambushed supposedly by rebel elements and that he frequently patrolled the barangay on
account of reported sightings of unidentified armed men. That night, he said, his group which
responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all, comprised of Cunanan and Puno from the
o Sindalan Police Substation, the team composed of Pamintuan and his men, as well as the team
headed by Captain Mario Reyes.
o He denied that they had committed an ambuscade because otherwise, all the occupants of the
Tamaraw jeepney would have been killed.
o Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any one of the accused after the
incident because he was at the time very confused.
o Cunanan and Puno adopted the testimony of Yapyuco without presenting any additional
evidence.
 Decision of the Sandiganbayan:
o The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and which
brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners herein willfully under
the guise of maintaining peace and order.
o The acts performed by them preparatory to the shooting, which ensured the execution of their
evil plan without risk to themselves, demonstrate a clear intent to kill the occupants of the
subject vehicle.
o The fact they had by collective action deliberately and consciously intended to inflict harm and
injury and had voluntarily performed those acts negates their defense of lawful performance
of official duty.
o The theory of mistaken belief could not likewise benefit petitioners because there was
supposedly no showing that they had sufficient basis or probable cause to rely fully on
Pamintuan's report that the victims were armed NPA members, and they have not been able
by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or gross inexcusable negligence when they acted as
they did.
o There was insufficient or total absence of factual basis to assume that the occupants of the
jeepney were members of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and that the shooting incident
could not have been the product of a well-planned and well-coordinated police operation but
was the result of either a hidden agenda concocted by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and
Pamintuan, or a hasty and amateurish attempt to gain commendation.
Issues:
1. Whether the accused had acted in the regular and lawful performance of their duties in the
maintenance of peace and order either as barangay officials and as members of the police and the
CHDF and hence, could take shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code
2. Whether they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing them
Ruling:
1. No. The requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code do not obtain in this
case. Yapyuco, in his testimony — which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno — as well as Manguerra,
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes in their affidavits which had been offered in evidence by the
prosecution, explained that their presence at the scene was in response to the information relayed by
Pamintuan through David that armed rebel elements on board a vehicle described to be that occupied
by the victims were reportedly spotted in Barangay Quebiawan. It is on the basis of this suspicion that
petitioners now appeal to justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code and under the
concept of mistake of fact.
If the declarant or admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in this case,
during the trial and the other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, the
admission is admissible against both accused because then, it is transposed into a judicial admission.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or
office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that:
a. the accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right
or office, and
b. the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
The justification is based on the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused,
inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or with fault or
negligence. No objection is strong enough to defeat the claim that all of them — who were either police
and barangay officers or CHDF members tasked with the maintenance of peace and order — were
bound to, as they did, respond to information of a suspected rebel infiltration in the locality. Theirs,
therefore, is the specific duty to identify the occupants of their suspect vehicle and search for firearms
inside it to validate the information they had received; they may even effect a bloodless arrest should
they find cause to believe that their suspects had just committed, were committing or were bound to
commit a crime.
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and under
circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law
does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill (People v. Ulep).
United States v. Campo has laid down the rule that in the performance of his duty, an agent of the
authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked or is the
subject of resistance, and finds no other means to comply with his duty or cause himself to be
respected and obeyed by the offender. In case injury or death results from the exercise of such force,
the same could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the death of the offender if the officer
had used necessary force.
2. Yes. judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the firearms employed, the
likelihood of the passenger next to the driver — and in fact even the driver himself — of being hit and
injured or even killed is great to say the least, certain to be precise. The SC find it to be consistent with
the uniform claim of petitioners that the impulse to fire directly at the jeepney came when it occurred
to them that it was proceeding to evade their authority. And in instances like this, their natural and
logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing upon the tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver
and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners'
actuations leaned towards the latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was seated on the
passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel, together with all the consequences
arising from their deed. The circumstances of the shooting breed no other inference than that the
firing was deliberate and not attributable to sheer accident or mere lack of skill. The crimes committed
in these cases are not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In
criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being the incident of
another act performed without malice. Petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly
found by the Sandiganbayan, likewise militates against their claim of reckless imprudence.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 30, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614, the indeterminate sentence
is hereby modified to Two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as the maximum,
and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum.
b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Leodevince Licup in
the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 in moral damages, as well as Noel
Villanueva, in the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages, and P20,000.00
as moral damages.
*Modifications in the penalty are subject to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and there being
no aggravating
circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law which we will tackle in the latter part of RPC.
Diego v. Castillo
Facts
 January 9, 1965 – Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio Jr. It was solemnized before
the city mayor of Dagupan City. In the marriage contract, Lucena used and adopted the name
Crescencia Escoto, with a civil statues of single.
 Jorge de Perio Jr. filed a petition for a divorce at the Family District Court of Harris Country, Texas. The
divorced was granted and effective on February 15, 1978.
 June 4, 1987 – Crescencia Escoto contracted a marriage with the complainant’s brother, Manuel P.
Diego. It was solemnized before the parish priest of Dagupan City. In the marriage contract, Crescencia
use and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, with civil status of single.
 A criminal offense of bigamy was filed against Lucena. In Lucena’s defense, she thought that she was
able to marry again freely since she’s already divorced.
 The respondent judge ordered the acquittal of Lucena Escoto with costs de officio on the grounds of the
state’s failure to prove accused’s guilt beyond whisper of doubt.
 The charge filed against the accused is considered mala in se which requires the indispensable
presence of criminal intent/dolo.
 Based on these facts, an administrative charge was filed against the respondent RTC Judge Silverio Q.
Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgement in a criminal case and/or rendering
judgement in gross ignorance of the law.
Issue : Whether or not the respondent judge should be held administratively liable for allegedly knowingly
rendering an unjust judgement in a criminal case and/or rendering judgement in gross ignorance of the law.
Disposition : The RTC Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is hereby FINED in the amount of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Ruling :
 There had been several cases wherein a similar situation where the accused contends that he/she
acted on good faith which was the same principle used by the respondent judge that led to the acquittal
of Lucena Escoto. However, on the dispositions given on the precedent cases the accused were found
guilty because of the argument between mistake of fact and mistake of law which does not excused a
person, even a lay person from liability. (Cases used as basis for this ruling were People v. Bitdu and
People v. Schneckenburger)
 Knowingly rendering an unjust agreement is criminal offense penalized under Article 204 of the Revise
Penal Code. It was ruled that there’s no basis for this charge because even assuming that the judged
erred in acquitting the accused, he/she still cannot be administratively charged lacking the element of
bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose.(Alforte v. Santos)
 Although the respondent judge was absolved of any guilt for the charge of knowingly rendering an
unjust judgement, the Court still imposed sanctions since the respondent judge deserves to be
appropriately penalized for his regrettably erroneous action. The court has repeatedly stressed that a
judge must accordingly act at all times with great constancy and utmost probity.(Wingarts v. Mejia)
Principles :
1. If the accused is convicted, costs may be charged against him. Payment of costs rests upon the discretion of the
Court. If the accused is acquitted, the costs are de officio, which means, each party bears his own
expenses. There is no subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of costs.
2. Mala in se (the singular is malum in se) is a term that signifies crime that is considered wrong in and of
itself. The phrase is Latin and literally means wrong in itself. This class of crime is contrasted by crimes mala
prohibita, the Latin term for "wrong because they are prohibited."
The distinguishing characteristic of crimes mala in se is not their severity, but that the citizenry feels they are
morally wrong in and of themselves, and require no outside reasons to prove or justify their
wrongness.(https://www.upcounsel.com/lectl-crimes-mala-in-se-criminal-law-crime-classifications)
People v. Oanis
Facts:
 On Dec. 24, 1938, Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta received a telegram and an order to arrest a
notorious criminal and escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas and bailarina Irene. Orders were specifically
arrest him, if overpowered. get him dead or alive.
 Oanis was asked by the police chief if he knew a bailarina named Irene, he answered he knew a woman
with lose morals with the same name.
 The defendants arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping
banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry
also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour.
 Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his
back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45
caliber revolvers.
 Irene, who woke up due to the firing, saw her paramour wounded. Looking where the shots were coming
from, he saw the defendants still firing at him.
 The person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent
citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
 Oanis and Galanta admitted to shooting the deceased Tecson.
 Oanis and Galanta were found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and
were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two
months of prison correctional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment. The Appellants both a gave
different testimony.
 Galanta’s testimony: He and Oanis asked Brigada where Irene’s room was, and inquired the whereabouts
of Balagtas. She said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Galanta and Oanis went to the
aforementioned room. Oanis shouted "If you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson and Irene woke up and as
the former was about to sit up in bed, Oanis fired at him. The wounded Tecson leaned towards the door,
and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.
 Oanis’ testimony: Oanis stated that he opened the curtain covering the door and after having said, "if you
are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, while the was still lying on bed, and continued
firing until he had exhausted his bullets. After exhausting the bullets, Oanis entered the door and upon
seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and picking up something from the
floor, he fired at him.
 The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only because
they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are
materially contradictory.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability due to innocent mistake of fact in the
honest performance of their official duties.
2. Whether or not Oanis and Galanta incur criminal liability in the performance of their duty.
RULING:
1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar. “Ignorance facti excusat” applies only when
the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. The fact that the supposedly suspect was sleeping,
Oanis and Galanta could have checked whether it is the real Balagtas.
2. Yes. Although an officer making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force only when 1) when as is
reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, 2) overcome his resistance, 3) prevent his
escape, 4) recapture him if he escapes, and 5) protect himself from bodily harm. It is not justified in
resorting to unnecessary force due to the supposed Balagtas being killed in his sleep, without any
resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. Also, A person incurs no
criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There
are 2 requisites to justify this: (1) the offender acted in teh perfomance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of
a right or office, (2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In this case, only the first requisite is
present. Hence, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.
DISPOSITIVE: the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the
mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five
(5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and
to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.
PRINCIPLES:
 Homicide through reckless imprudence
 Mistake of Fact
 Alevosia - implies committing a crime in a manner that prevents the victim from defending himself,
ensuring both its consummation and that the perpetrator remains unharmed. may perhaps be more
accurately translated as “calculated impunity.”
Law(s) used:
According to Article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in
the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the
circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the
due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first
requisite is present — appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for
the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty
was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But
through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment
of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and
without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
***The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not
accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice. Also, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence, and where such unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in
the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence to support a plea of mitigated
liability. Since the victim was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia.
People vs De Fernando
Facts:
 Three Moro prisoners escaped from Penal Colony of San Ramon, Zamboanga. Fernando de Fernando
was a municipal policeman at that time. When passing in front of the house of Remigio Delgado,
Pacencia (daughter) invited him into their house then Remigio told him about the three suspicious men
who are circling the are of their house, when Pacencia and Fernando were talking a man approached
from the dark shouting “Nong Miong”, as Pacencia didn’t talk, Fernando asked who it was but the man
kept on advancing while carrying a bolo. Fernando fired a warning shot in the air, the unknown man
then ran towards Leon Torres’ house, after placing the bolo on a table, and expiring right there. The
bullet landed on the man’s lower neck that caused his death.
 Fernando was held guilty for the crime of murder. 20 years and 1000 peso fine. Fernando then
appealed that the trial court erred in their rulings: 1) In holding that the acts committed by the accused
constituted the crime of murder; (2) in not holding that the accused was exempt from criminal liability
and in not acquitting him.
Issue: Is Fernando liable to the charge of murder?

Ruling: No, Fernando committed homicide through reckless negligence. He cannot be held guilty, however, as
principal, with malicious intent, because he thought at the time that he was justified in acting as he did, and he
is guilty only because he failed to exercise the ordinary diligence which, under the circumstances, he should
have by investigating if the man was really who he thought he was. One year of prison correctional and 500
pesos fine to the heirs of the victim.
United States v. Ah Chong
Facts
 The defendant, Ah Chong was a cook and the deceased, Pascual Gualberto was a house boy. They
were both employed in the sam place and usually slept in the same room.
 On the night of August 14, 1908 about 10 pm - Ah Chong, a cook was suddenly awakened by some
trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He
heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by
someone bent upon forcing his way into the room.
 The defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you
enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the
chair (thought to be an unlawful aggression) which had been placed against the door. Seizing a
common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder
who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual who in the spirit of mischief was playing a
trick on him
 Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
 There had been several robberies not long prior to the date of the incident, one of which took place in a
house where he was employed as cook so he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
 The trial court held it as simple homicide.
Issue : Whether or not defendant can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the
facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to
be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of
the facts at the time when he committed the act.
Disposition : The judgement of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed,
and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and he is bail bond exonerated, with the
costs of both instances de oficio.
Ruling :
 The defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he
was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense.
 That had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal
liability on account of his act.
 That he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in
falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the
imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his
charge.
Legal Maxims/Principles :
Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea – the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so
Actus me invite factus non est meus actus – an act done by me against my will is not my act
Mabunot vs People
Facts:
 On Sept. 14, 2007, at around 11am, at the Butigue National High School (BNHS), the class, to which
both Shiva and the petitioner belonged, was doing its Technology Livelihood Education project. Shiva
and her group were sewing inside the classroom when the petitioner, who was under the influence of
alcohol, arrived.
 The petitioner twisted the arm of Michael, strangled James and boxed William. The rest of their
classmates ran away but the petitioner went after them and boxed Shiva on her left flank leaving her
with a fractured rib. Shiva passed out and was taken to the hospital where she stayed for two days.
 According to the testimonies of the defense witnesses, William threw an object at the petitioner’s back
to which he reacted by boxing William. When the petitioner stepped out of the room, Dennis followed
him and a fist fight ensued between the two. Shiva came to pacify them, but was shoved, causing her
to fall to the ground.
 In the appeal filed before the CA, the petitioner claimed that the injury inflicted on Shiva was not
intentional or deliberate. The petitioner insisted that he could not have adopted a deliberate design to
injure Shiva since he was trading punches with Dennis.
 According to CA, under R.A. No. 7610, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether
habitual or not. When the incident happened, Shiva was a child entitled to the protection extended by
R.A. No. 7610 and the act of the petitioner boxing Shiva falls squarely within this definition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed error in ruling that the injury inflicted on Shiva was intentional and
deliberate.
Ruling:
No. The Court affirms the conviction and the sentence by the CA.
The petitioner’s argument, that since he and Dennis were exchanging punches, he could not have
made a deliberate design to injure Shiva, is untenable (weak).
"When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are
punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other
elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed."
The petitioner was convicted of violation of R.A. No. 7610, a special law. However, physical abuse of a
child is inherently wrong, rendering the existence of a criminal intent on the part of the offender.
In the petitioner's case, even if the Court were to consider for argument's sake the petitioner's claim
that he had no design to harm Shiva, when he swung his arms, he was not performing a lawful act. He
clearly intended to injure another person. However, it was not Dennis but Shiva, who ended up with a
fractured rib. Nonetheless, the petitioner cannot escape liability for his error. Indeed, criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.
Laws and Principles
 Republic Act No. 7610 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST
CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
 Mala in se - is a term that signifies crime that is considered wrong in and of itself. The phrase is Latin and literally
means wrong in itself.
Dungo v People
FACTS:
 Villanueva, a UPLB student, was a neophyte member of Alpha Phi Omega- Theta Chapter (APO)
Fraternity, died during the course of their final initiation rites held in Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol,
Calmba Laguna.
 Dungo and Sibal, members of APO Fraternity, now petitioners, brought the lifeless body of Villanueva
to JP Rizal Hospital in Calamba, Laguna where Villanueva was pronounced dead.
 Petitioners were both declared guilty of violating Section 4 of RA 8049 or the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995,
and were both sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the RTC, which was also later affirmed by a decision
made by the CA.
 The petition at bar is for review on certiorari to reverse the decision made by the RTC and CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dungo and Sibal’s absence of proof of intent to kill Villanueva makes them not
criminally liable for the death of Villanueva and for violating R.A. No. 8049.
RULING:
NO. The Court has established that the (passage) of the Anti Hazing Law of 1995 is to prohibit the
commission of the crime hazing. Hazing, under RA 8049 is thus considered to be a crime malum
prohibitum. According to Senator Lina, one of the proponents of RA 8049, with the increasing number
of incident of deaths due to hazing, the main rationale is to send a strong signal that no group or
association should require acts of physical initiation before admitting a person into a group without
being held criminally liable. The purpose is to penalize the “initial innocent acts” of an organization for
the purpose of admitting one person into the group. Thus, the petitioner’s defense of consent (by
Villanueva) and of lack of intent to kill Villanueva is not valid.
The SC suggests that some amendments be done to RA No. 8049:
1.) Thre should be a penalty or liability for non-compliance of Section 2 (written notice requirement) and
of Section 3 (representation requirement); and
2.) Pnalties under Section 4 should also consider the psychological harm inflicted to the hazing victim.
PRINCIPLE:
Difference of mala in se and mala prohibita. Criminal law differentiates crimes that are wrong in
themselves (mala in se) from crimes that are wrong because there are statutes or positive laws that
prohibits them. The subject of inquiry in the former is whether or not intent governs in doing the crime,
and the latter asks whether or not a law has been violated.
The provisions of R.A. No. 8049 was framed to penalize the crime of hazing as a crime malum
prohibitum to discount criminal intent and to disallow the defense of good faith, while also taking into
consideration the different participants and contributors involved in the execution of hazing.
Ysidoro vs People of the Philippines
FACTS:
 This case is about a municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of food intended for those suffering
from malnutrition to the beneficiaries of reconsideration projects affecting the homes of victims of
calamities.
 Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since
she had already distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be given to the CSAP
beneficiaries.
 Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek his
approval. After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal
slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP.
 August 27, 2001- Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the present
complaint against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head, testified that the
subject SFP goods were intended for its target beneficiaries, Leyte’s malnourished children. She also
pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines for Local Government Units
governed the distribution of SFP goods.
 The evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolution
00-133 appropriating the annual general fund for 2001. This appropriation was based on the executive
budget which allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and
Integrated Delivery of Social Services which covers the CSAP housing projects.
 February 8, 2010 - the Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of technical
malversation. But, since his action caused no damage or embarrassment to public service, it only fined
him P1,698.00 or 50% of the sum misapplied.
 June 8, 2010 -Ysidoro appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision to the SC.
ISSUE 1:
Whether Ysidoro committed the crime of technical malversation when he approved the diversion of the subject
goods to a public purpose different from their originally intended purpose.
RULING 1:
Yes. The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code has three
elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds or property under
his administration to some public use; and c) that the public use for which such funds or property were applied
is different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.
The creation of the two items shows the Sanggunian’s intention to appropriate separate funds for SFP and the
CSAP in the annual budget.
Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods should be used for SFP’s
needs, observing the rules prescribed for identifying the qualified beneficiaries of its feeding programs. The
target clientele of the SFP according to its manual are: 1) the moderately and severely underweight pre-school
children aged 36 months to 72 months; and 2) the families of six members whose total monthly income is
P3,675.00 and below.
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to those providing free
labor for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical malversation.
> It can be seen here that the appropriation of the general funds were expressly meant for the 2 different
beneficiaries, and should not be construed to be a general appropriation of public funds interchangeably with
the two. No matter if the funds are used for a public purpose, it should be noted that these funds were explicitly
allocated for 2 very different purposes, which therefore clearly satisfies the 3rd element in technical
malversation.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not the goods he approved for diversion were in the nature of savings that could be used to
augment the other authorized expenditures of the municipality
RULING 2:
The subject goods could not be regarded as savings. The SFP is a continuing program that ran throughout the
year. Consequently, no one could say in mid-June 2001 that SFP had already finished its project, leaving funds
or goods that it no longer needed. The fact that Polinio had already distributed the food items needed by the
SFP beneficiaries for the second quarter of 2001 does not mean that the remaining food items in its storeroom
constituted unneeded savings. Since the requirements of hungry mouths are hard to predict to the last sack of
rice or can of sardines, the view that the subject goods were no longer needed for the remainder of the year
was quite premature.
ISSUE 3:
Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.
RULING 3:
Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public
property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The offense
is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense
because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience.
It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines
whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
 Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was President of the Philippines until January 20, 2001 when he was
forced to vacate the presidency by people power and then Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
succeeded him in office.
 He was charged, in eight cases filed with the Sandiganbayan, with various offenses committed while in
office, among them plunder, for allegedly having amassed ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P4.1 billion,
more or less.
 On 4 April 2001, Information for plunder was filed against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659
 Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by
R.A. No. 7659 substantially provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires
ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime
of plunder
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT PLUNDER AS DEFINED IN R.A. NO. 7080 IS A MALUM PROHIBITUM.
Ruling:
No. Plunder is a malum in se.
 Justice Mendoza, in his concurring opinion:
“Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea (criminal intent) must
be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the
crime ofplunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty
knowledge on the part of petitioner.”
 The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a
malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are
mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since
in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to
treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing
Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.
“…Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society
and the psyche of the populace.”
“…any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to
the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over.”
Article 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Criminal Liability (Art 4.) – Wrongful act different from that intended.
Evangeline Patulot vs. People of the Philippines
 FACTS:
At around 2:00 p.m. of November 14, 2012, as she was about to enter the house, CCC, after gathering
clothes from the clothesline outside her house, was surprised to see Patulot who was holding a
casserole. Without warning, Patulot poured the contents of the casserole – hot cooking oil – on her.
AAA and BBB, three (3) years old and two (2) months old, respectively, who were nearby, suddenly
cried because they were likewise hit by the hot cooking oil. CCC hurriedly brought AAA and BBB to her
three neighbors who volunteered to bring the children to the hospital, for treatment. She then went to
the barangay hall also at South Signal, Taguig City, to report the incident.
 Solely testifying in her defense, Patulot denied the allegations against her. She recounted that prior to
the alleged incident, she was on her way to the market to sell her merchandise when CCC bumped her
on the arm, uttering foul words against her. Due to the impact, Patulot's merchandise fell. Because of
this, she cursed CCC back who, in turn, merely laughed and repeated the invectives as she moved
away. Then, from 11:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. on November 14, 2012, she was repacking black pepper at
her house when she heard CCC taunt her in a loud voice, "Bakit hindi ka pa sumama sa asawa mo?
Dapat sumama ka na para pareha kayong paglamayan."
 The doctor, who examined and treated CCC and her children, testified that the injuries suffered by AAA
and BBB would heal for an average period of thirty (30) days. Next, DDD testified that he incurred
P7,440.00 in medical expenses for his wife and children.
 The Regional Trial Court found Patulot guilty of child abuse under R.A. 7610.
 The CA affirms Patulot’s conviction.
Aggrieved, Patulot elevated the case to the Supreme Court, invoking the following arguments:
 She (Patulot) can only be convicted of physical injuries and not child abuse. Citing the case, Bongalon
v. People, she submits that not every instance of laying hands on a child constitutes the crime of child
abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown to be
intended to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human
being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the RPC. Thus, in the
absence of such intention on the part of Patulot, her true intention being to pour hot oil only on CCC
with AAA and BBB being merely accidentally hit, she cannot be convicted of child abuse.
ISSUE:
Is there a need to prove that the acts were intended to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse?
RULING:
NO. Patulot contends that on the basis of our pronouncement in Bongalon, she cannot be convicted of child
abuse because it was not proven that she intended to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings. Her reliance on said ruling, however, is misplaced. In Bongalon, the
Information specifically charged George Bongalon, petitioner therein, of committing acts which “are prejudicial
to the child’s development and which demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as a human
being.”Thus, we ruled that he can only be held liable for slight physical injuries instead of child abuse in the
absence of proof that he intended to humiliate or “debase the ‘intrinsic worth and dignity'”of the victim.
A cursory review of the Informations in the instant case, however, reveals no similar allegation that Patulot’s
acts debased, degraded, or demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings.
Instead, they charged Patulot for willfully committing acts of child abuse on AAA and BBB “by throwing on them
boiling oil, thereby inflicting upon said victim-minor physical injuries, which acts are inimical and prejudicial to
the child’s normal growth and development.”
There are distinct acts punishable under R.A. No. 7610, to wit: (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child
exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development.
R.A. No. 7610 and its Rules and Regulations distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and
exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial to the
child’s development. Contrary to Patulot’s assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under
Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution
need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of
the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts.
Neither can Patulot argue that in the absence of intention on her part to harm AAA and BBB, she cannot be
convicted of child abuse because she merely intended on committing physical injuries against CCC.
“When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished
by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime;
otherwise, no crime is committed.”
The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, a special law. However,
physical abuse of a child is inherently wrong, rendering material the existence of a criminal intent on
the part of the offender.
Patulot’s criminal intent is not wanting for as she expressly admitted, she intended on pouring hot cooking oil
on CCC. As such, even granting that it was not her intention to harm AAA and BBB, she was performing an
unlawful act when she threw the hot oil from her casserole on CCC. She cannot, therefore, escape liability from
the same in view of the settled doctrine that a person incurs criminal liability although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended.
ANNOTATIONS:
In this case, we learned two (2) things:
1. There are four (4) distinct acts punished under 7610, namely:
(a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to
the child’s development
2. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have
resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different
from the former acts.
Therefore, if the accused is charged of Child Abuse, Child Cruelty, or Child Exploitation, there is no need to
prove that these acts are prejudicial to the development of the child. But if the Information charged the accused
of “acts prejudicial to the child’s development and which demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child
as a human being” (as in the case of Bongalon), then, there is a need for the prosecution to prove that, indeed,
the acts are prejudicial to the development of the child, otherwise, the accused could only be found guilty of the
lower offense of physical injury.
People v Buenamer
Facts:
 On October 20, 2009 in the City of Manila, Philippines, Stanley Buenamer y Mandane (Buenamer) and
his co-accused Jerome Lambada y Landero (Lambada) boarded a passenger FX taxi going to España
Blvd., Sampaloc, announced a hold up and pointed their guns to its passengers and the deceased
Ferrarie Tan y Oallesma (Tan) and divested from him his black bag containing a Sony PSP colored
black with casing and one (1) brown envelope with cash money in the amount of P5, 460.
 Ferrarie chased Buenamer who boarded a passenger jeepney in order to escape, but was boxed when
he held on the handle bar of the jeepney causing him to lose his grip and fall from the jeepney and
thereafter was ran over by the rear tire of said jeepney which caused his immediate death.
 On December 7, 2009 arraignment, both accused entered a negative plea.
 During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses:
1. Diana David y Pilar (David) – a passenger of the FX taxi and a victim herself of the robbery who
positively identified the two suspects.
2. James Mendez y Dones (Mendez) – a traffic enforcer who responded to the call for help of David
and saw Buenamer box or strike Ferrarie which resulted to his death.
 On May 18, 2010, the RTC rendered judgment finding Buenamer guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide and Lambada guilty of simple robbery.
 Dissatisfied with the RTC's disposition, Buenamer appealed to the CA, arguing that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt since his identity as the alleged perpetrator of the
crime was not sufficiently established and also contended that the mitigating circumstance under Article
13 (3) of the RPC should have been appreciated in his favor because he had no intention to kill Ferrarie
when he hit his arm.
 On June 7, 2012, the CA affirmed the RTC and ruled that Buenamer's appeal was without merit.
 From that Decision, Buenamer took the present appeal and in support thereof now contends that the
CA's Decision was contrary to the evidence, the law, and jurisprudence.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
since his identity as the alleged perpetrator of the crime was not sufficiently
established.
(2) Whether or not the mitigating circumstance under Article 13 (3) of the RPC should
have been appreciated in his favor because he had no intention to kill Ferrarie.
Dispositive Portion: The appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 7, 2012 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04881 is AFFIRMED
Ruling: The SC holds that both the RTC and the CA correctly found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the felony of robbery with homicide. They are satisfied that in this case the prosecution was able to
satisfactorily establish the elements of robbery with homicide, to wit:
(1) The taking of personal property is committed with violence or

intimidation against persons;
(2) The property taken belongs to another;
(3) The taking is with animo lucrandi; and
(4) By reason of the robbery, or on the occasion thereof,
homicide is committed.
All the elements mentioned above are present in this case. In point of fact, the prosecution succeeded in
showing that the primary aim or objective of the malefactors Buenamer and Lambada was to rob the
passengers of the FX taxi. Prosecution witness David, a passenger of the FX taxi in which the two robbers
staged the heinous felony, was herself a victim of the robbery. David positively identifed Buenamer as the very
perpetrator of the crime together with his co-accused Lambada.
Traffic enforcer Mendez saw Buenamer box or strike Ferrarie who, in consequence of such a blow, lost his grip
on the estribo (or the handle bar) of the moving vehicle, and fell off that vehicle, and was at once ran over by
the vehicle's right rear tire, resulting in Ferrarie's sustaining lacerated wounds, and numerous abrasions in
various parts of his body that ultimately led to his death.
The legal postulate enshrined under Article 3 of the RPC decrees that every person shall be held responsible
for all the natural and logical consequences of his felonious act. And, complementing this Article 3 is Article 4
of the same RPC, which provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony, although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." These two articles of
the RPC must thus apply with implacable force against appellant; he must be called to account for all the
natural and logical consequences of his felonious act; and hence must be deemed to have incurred criminal
liability, although the felonious act he committed might have been different from that which he intended.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ORLITO VILLACORTA
FACTS:
 On January 23, 2002 at 2:00 am in the morning, while Danilo Cruz was buying bread from the store of
Cristina Mendeja located in Navotas, Villacorta suddenly appeared out of nowhere, and without uttering
a word stabbed Cruz in the left side of his body using a sharpened bamboo stick, leaving the stick in his
body. Villacorta immediately fled thereafter. Mendeja chased Villacorta but failed to catch him. When
Mendeja returned to the store, her neighbor Aron was already tending to the wounds of Cruz, removing
the bamboo stick out of his body.
 Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center. Dr. Belandres said that Cruz sustained
the stab wound and was treated as an out-patient that day. Cruz was once again brought to the San
Lazaro Hospital on February 14, 2002 because of the symptoms of tetanus infection. He later died on
the next day.
 Dr. Belandres was able to determine that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.
 The RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery.
 On appeal, the CA Affirmed in toto the RTC judgment.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Cruz was wounded until his death
which would exculpate Villacorta from any liability for Cruz’s death.
RULING:
 There is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is found to have indeed
stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted
upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.
 We quote from the ratiocination of the Court in Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.
 We face similar doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the conviction of Villacorta for
murder. There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when
Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz
acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot
sooner than 22 days later.
 The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the
time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.
 However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of slight physical injuries
under Article 266(1) of the RTC for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. Although the charge in the
instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries may be made
considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former since the essential ingredients of
slight physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the offense of murder.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Orlito Villacorta guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
heirs of Danilo Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of said victim plus the costs of suit.
PRINCIPLE:
 Proximate cause has been defined as “that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.”

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Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines

KHITRI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

ISSUE AND RULING:

1. Is there a proof beyond reasonable doubt to hold petitioner Calimutan liable?

EMERGENCY RECIT DIGEST:

July 2, 2002 Finds Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

Issue no 1: The petition is denied for lack of merit.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

 Oanis and Galanta admitted to shooting the deceased Tecson.

Issue: Is Fernando liable to the charge of murder?

Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.

 Justice Mendoza, in his concurring opinion:

(1) The taking of personal property is committed with violence or

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