GERONIMO VS.

SANTOS

FACTS:

Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, the defendants, executed a document declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and
Caridad Geronimo. Consequently, they took possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their
names.

Karen Santos, on the other hand, claims to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. She filed a complaint for the
annulment of document and recovery of the possession against the defendants, brothers of his father. She alleged that with the death of
her parents, the property belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law of intestacy.

The defendant denied the allegation that the plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their brother stating that the deceased Rufino and
Caridad were childless and took in as their ward Karen, the child of Caridad’s sister. To strengthen their defense, they claimed that the
birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. The birth certificate had alterations as confirmed by an NSO representative.

They alleged that it is impossible for Rufino and Caridad to register the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they never lived or
sojourned in that place. Also, Caridad, an elementary teacher in Bulacan, never filed a maternity leave during the period of her service,
as supported by a certification from the Schools Division Superintendent.

The RTC ruled that the respondent is a legitimate child of the putative parents. The trial court found that respondent’s filiation was duly
established by the certificate of live birth which was presented in evidence. It dismissed the petitioners’ claim that the certificate was
tampered. It further stated that even granting arguendo that the birth certificate is questionable, the filiation of respondent has already
been sufficiently proven by evidence of her open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of the
Family Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that under Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either
of these two dates: the date the child was born to the mother during the marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was recorded
in the civil registry. The appellate court found no evidence or admission that Caridad indeed gave birth to respondent on a specific date.

It further resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case does not qualify as the valid registration of birth in the civil register
because it was not signed by the physician or midwife in attendance at the child’s birth or the parents of the newborn child, contrary to
what the law required. However, the CA ultimately ruled that the respondent was able to prove her filiation via open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child as supported by secondary evidence presented.

The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they
supported her and sent her to school paying for her tuition and other school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits
of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and property
of the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the introduction of secondary evidence and rendered judgement notwithstanding
the existence of primary evidence of birth certificate.

RULING:

NO! Secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action under Article 172 because the said provision of law is meant to be
instituted as a separate action, and proof of filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for
annulment of document and recovery of possession. However, this rule is applicable only to actions where the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child is at issue.

In the case at bar, filiation is not an issue. What petitioner alleges is that the respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses at all.
Thus, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly admitted secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Art. 172 of the
Family Code.

However, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court’s declaration that the respondent is a legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased
spouses is based on misapprehension of facts. The irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and the name
of the informant made the document questionable, as supported by the corroborating testimony of the NSO representative. In addition,
even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities. These irregularities and the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to the
respondent’s birth.

With the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or falsity ruled then the respondent is not the child of Rufino, and therefore not
entitled to inherit from the estate.

SSC VS. AZOTE

FACTS:

On June 19, 1992, Edna and Edgardo, a member of the SSS, were married in civil rites. On April 27, 1994, Edgardo submitted Form E-
4 to the SSS with Edna and their three older children as designated beneficiaries.

Thereafter, Edgardo submitted another Form E-4 to the SSS designating his three younger children as additional beneficiaries. On
January 13, 2005, Edgardo passed away. Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS as the wife of a
deceased-member.

It appeared, however, from the SSS records that Edgardo had earlier submitted another Form E-4 with a different set of beneficiaries,
namely: Rosemarie Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer Azote (Elmer),as dependent. Consequently, Edna’s claim was denied.
Her children were adjudged as beneficiaries and she was considered as the legal guardian of her minor children. Edna filed a petition
with the SSC to claim the death benefits, lump sum and monthly pension of Edgardo. She insisted that she was the legitimate wife of
Edgardo. In its answer, the SSS averred that there was a conflicting information in the forms submitted by the deceased. Summons was
published in a newspaper of general circulation directing Rosemarie to file her answer.

Despite the publication, no answer was filed and Rosemarie was subsequently declared in default. SSC dismissed Edna’s petition for
lack of merit. The SSC further wrote that the National Statistics Office (NSO) records revealed that the marriage of Edgardo to one
Rosemarie Teodora Sino was registered on July 28, 1982. Consequently, it opined that Edgardo’s marriage to Edna was not valid as
there was no showing that his first marriage had been annulled or dissolved.

ISSUE:

W/N Edna should be adjudged as the widow of the deceased, thus, entitled to the benefits

RULING:

NO! The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was RA 8282. Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the
legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits. In this case, there is a concrete proof
that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract. Edgardo even acknowledged
his married status when he filled out the 1982 Form E-4 designating Rosemarie as his spouse.

It is undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated at the time when the Family Code was already in force.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.

Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without doubt, failed to establish that there was no impediment or
that the impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Settled is the rule that "whoever
claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence." Edna could not adduce
evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s
presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of Edgardo. Considering that
Edna was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of a deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary
of the death benefits of Edgardo.

BARTOLOME VS. SSS

FACTS:

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the government’s Employees’
Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and
unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for
death benefits.

SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of John since the latter was legally adopted
by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. According to the records, Cornelio
died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the restoration of the parental authority to the biological
parents of the latter.

2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

RULING:
1. YES! The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our
consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left
to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the provisions of law on rescission of adoption
wherein if said petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor
or incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights
and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological
parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the
subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted
child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those
by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood
relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely
passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

When Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest
it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3)
years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.

To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission – If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological
parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal
rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.

2. YES! The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits
stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption
already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole
remaining beneficiary.

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the
entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.

Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984
of the New Civil Code, which provides: Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents
and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

From the provisions, it is clear that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject
of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child,
the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by
adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood
relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing
of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

Thus, the Court rules that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over
the adopted child.