GERONIMO VS.

SANTOS

FACTS:

Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, the defendants, executed a document declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and
Caridad Geronimo. Consequently, they took possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their
names.

Karen Santos, on the other hand, claims to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. She filed a complaint for the
annulment of document and recovery of the possession against the defendants, brothers of his father. She alleged that with the death of
her parents, the property belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law of intestacy.

The defendant denied the allegation that the plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their brother stating that the deceased Rufino and
Caridad were childless and took in as their ward Karen, the child of Caridad’s sister. To strengthen their defense, they claimed that the
birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. The birth certificate had alterations as confirmed by an NSO representative.

They alleged that it is impossible for Rufino and Caridad to register the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they never lived or
sojourned in that place. Also, Caridad, an elementary teacher in Bulacan, never filed a maternity leave during the period of her service,
as supported by a certification from the Schools Division Superintendent.

The RTC ruled that the respondent is a legitimate child of the putative parents. The trial court found that respondent’s filiation was duly
established by the certificate of live birth which was presented in evidence. It dismissed the petitioners’ claim that the certificate was
tampered. It further stated that even granting arguendo that the birth certificate is questionable, the filiation of respondent has already
been sufficiently proven by evidence of her open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of the
Family Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that under Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either
of these two dates: the date the child was born to the mother during the marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was recorded
in the civil registry. The appellate court found no evidence or admission that Caridad indeed gave birth to respondent on a specific date.

It further resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case does not qualify as the valid registration of birth in the civil register
because it was not signed by the physician or midwife in attendance at the child’s birth or the parents of the newborn child, contrary to
what the law required. However, the CA ultimately ruled that the respondent was able to prove her filiation via open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child as supported by secondary evidence presented.

The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they
supported her and sent her to school paying for her tuition and other school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits
of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and property
of the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the introduction of secondary evidence and rendered judgement notwithstanding
the existence of primary evidence of birth certificate.

RULING:

NO! Secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action under Article 172 because the said provision of law is meant to be
instituted as a separate action, and proof of filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for
annulment of document and recovery of possession. However, this rule is applicable only to actions where the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child is at issue.

In the case at bar, filiation is not an issue. What petitioner alleges is that the respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses at all.
Thus, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly admitted secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Art. 172 of the
Family Code.

However, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court’s declaration that the respondent is a legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased
spouses is based on misapprehension of facts. The irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and the name
of the informant made the document questionable, as supported by the corroborating testimony of the NSO representative. In addition,
even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities. These irregularities and the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to the
respondent’s birth.

With the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or falsity ruled then the respondent is not the child of Rufino, and therefore not
entitled to inherit from the estate.

SSC VS. AZOTE

FACTS:

On June 19, 1992, Edna and Edgardo, a member of the SSS, were married in civil rites. On April 27, 1994, Edgardo submitted Form E-
4 to the SSS with Edna and their three older children as designated beneficiaries.

Thereafter, Edgardo submitted another Form E-4 to the SSS designating his three younger children as additional beneficiaries. On
January 13, 2005, Edgardo passed away. Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS as the wife of a
deceased-member.

It appeared, however, from the SSS records that Edgardo had earlier submitted another Form E-4 with a different set of beneficiaries,
namely: Rosemarie Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer Azote (Elmer),as dependent. Consequently, Edna’s claim was denied.
Her children were adjudged as beneficiaries and she was considered as the legal guardian of her minor children. Edna filed a petition
with the SSC to claim the death benefits, lump sum and monthly pension of Edgardo. She insisted that she was the legitimate wife of
Edgardo. In its answer, the SSS averred that there was a conflicting information in the forms submitted by the deceased. Summons was
published in a newspaper of general circulation directing Rosemarie to file her answer.

Despite the publication, no answer was filed and Rosemarie was subsequently declared in default. SSC dismissed Edna’s petition for
lack of merit. The SSC further wrote that the National Statistics Office (NSO) records revealed that the marriage of Edgardo to one
Rosemarie Teodora Sino was registered on July 28, 1982. Consequently, it opined that Edgardo’s marriage to Edna was not valid as
there was no showing that his first marriage had been annulled or dissolved.

ISSUE:

W/N Edna should be adjudged as the widow of the deceased, thus, entitled to the benefits

RULING:

NO! The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was RA 8282. Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the
legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits. In this case, there is a concrete proof
that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract. Edgardo even acknowledged
his married status when he filled out the 1982 Form E-4 designating Rosemarie as his spouse.

It is undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated at the time when the Family Code was already in force.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.

Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without doubt, failed to establish that there was no impediment or
that the impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Settled is the rule that "whoever
claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence." Edna could not adduce
evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s
presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of Edgardo. Considering that
Edna was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of a deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary
of the death benefits of Edgardo.

BARTOLOME VS. SSS

FACTS:

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the government’s Employees’
Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and
unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for
death benefits.

SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of John since the latter was legally adopted
by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. According to the records, Cornelio
died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the restoration of the parental authority to the biological
parents of the latter.

2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

RULING:
1. YES! The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our
consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left
to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the provisions of law on rescission of adoption
wherein if said petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor
or incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights
and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological
parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the
subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted
child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those
by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood
relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely
passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

When Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest
it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3)
years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.

To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission – If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological
parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal
rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.

2. YES! The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits
stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption
already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole
remaining beneficiary.

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the
entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.

Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984
of the New Civil Code, which provides: Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents
and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

From the provisions, it is clear that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject
of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child,
the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by
adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood
relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing
of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

Thus, the Court rules that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over
the adopted child.

NOVERAS VS. NOVERAS

FACTS:

David and Leticia are US citizens who acquired properties and in the Philippines during the marriage. They have two children.

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.The California
court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple's properties in the USA.

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC-Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3
December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David's failure to comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer
all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3) the
declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia
from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of P50,000.00 and P100,000.00 litigation expenses.

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be
liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney's fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership.

David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the
Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties
in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal properties.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute
community of property should be granted.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the children are entitled to presupmtive legitimes upon the grant of judicial separation of absolute community of property.

RULING:

YES! Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half
of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The children are therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net
assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their respective
shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of
P410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes
therefrom.

HEIRS OF YPON VS. RICAFORTE

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent. In their
complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless, leaving behind parcels of land. Cla iming to be
the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso, Respondent executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the
aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s
collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.

In his Answer, Respondent alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2)
letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport. Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a)
petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by
the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.

The RTC issued an order, finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the
plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration, this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso
satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary evidence he
submitted.

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied.

Aggrieved, petitioners sought direct recourse to the SC through the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.

RULING:

YES! Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over
the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a court c annot
disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since
a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case
was altogether proper.

VITUG VS. CA

FACTS:

Spouses Dolores and Romarico Vitug entered into a survivorship agreement with the Bank of American National Trust and Savings
Association. The said agreement contained the following stipulations:

(1) All money deposited and to be deposited with the Bank in their joint savings current account shall be both their property and shall be
payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of them during their lifetime; and

(2) After the death of one of them, the same shall belong to and be the sole property of the surviving spouse and payable to and collectible
or withdrawable by such survivor

Dolores died naming Rowena Corona in her wills as executrix. Romarico later filed a motion asking authority to sell certain shares of
stock and real property belonging to the estate to cover his advances to the estate which he claimed were personal funds withdrawn from
their savings account. Rowena opposed on the ground that the same funds withdrawn from the savings account were conjugal partnership
properties and part of the estate. Hence, there should be no reimbursement. On the other hand, Romarico insists that the same are his
exclusive property acquired through the survivorship agreement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the funds of the savings account subject of the survivorship agreement were conjugal partnership properties and part of
the estate

RULING:

NO! The Court ruled that a Survivorship Agreement is neither a donation mortis causa nor a donation inter vivos. It is in the nature of an
aleatory contract whereby one or both of the parties reciprocally bind themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the
other shall give or do upon the happening of an event which is to occur at an indeterminate time or is uncertain, such as death.

The Court further ruled that a survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law and thus is valid unless its operation or effect may be
violative of a law such as in the following instances:

(1) it is used as a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation;

(2) it is used to transfer property in fraud of creditors; or
(3) it is used to defeat the legitime of a compulsory heir.

In the instant case, none of the foregoing instances were present. Consequently, the Court upheld the validity of the survivorship
agreement entered into by the spouses Vitug. As such, Romarico, being the surviving spouse, acquired a vested right over the amounts
under the savings account, which became his exclusive property upon the death of his wife pursuant to the survivorship agreement. Thus,
the funds of the savings account are not conjugal partnership properties and not part of the estate of the deceased Dolores.

ALMEDA VS. HEIRS OF ALMEDA

FACTS:

Spouses Venancio and Leonila Almeda were the parents of nine children: Ponciano, Rafael, Emerlina, Alodia, Leticia, Norma, Benjamin
Almeda and Severina and Rosalina Almeda-Tibi, Publio's deceased wife.

On May 19, 1976, a Power of Attorney was executed by the spouse, who were then 80 and 81 years old, granting Ponciano the authority
to sell the parcels of land in Tagaytay City, which Leonila inherited from her parents.

Venancio died at the age of 90 on February 27, 1985; Leonila died eight years later on April 3, 1993, aged 97.11 Within the year of
Leonila's death on April 17, 1993, Rafael, Emerlina, Alodia, Leticia and Norma filed a notice of adverse claim with the Register of Deeds
of Tagaytay City over their parents' properties.

On October 10, 1996, a Complaint for Nullity of Contracts, Partition of Properties and Reconveyance of Titles with Damages was filed
before the RTC of Tagaytay City by them against Ponciano and his wife Eufemia. Petitioners alleged that the parties were the only heirs
of the late spouses Venancio and Leonila who died without leaving any will and without any legal obligation.

In support of their Complaint, petitioners claimed that Ponciano, taking advantage of his being the eldest child and his close relationship
with their parents, caused the simulation and forgery of the documents.
In their Answer,27 Ponciano and his wife, Eufemia, denied that the 1978 Deed was simulated or forged, asserting its genuineness and
execution for valuable consideration from which some of the petitioners, including Rafael, received substantial pecuniary benefits.

Ponciano died on October 16, 1997 and was substituted by his wife and children.

On September 2, 2004, the RTC dismiised the case. The case was denied on appeal by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the spouses were competent when they executed the Deed in favor of Ponciano.

RULING:

YES! "The law presumes that every person is fully competent to enter into a contract until satisfactory proof to the contrary is presented."
The party claiming absence of capacity to contract has the burden of proof and discharging this burden requires that clear and convincing
evidence be adduced.

Petitioners assert that their parents were "uliyanin" or forgetful, of advanced age and "at times" sickly during the time of the execution of
the 1978 Deed in favor of Ponciano.71

Mere forgetfulness, however, without evidence that the same has removed from a person the ability to intelligently and firmly protect his
property rights, will not by itself incapacitate a person from entering into contracts.

In this case, petitioners' claim that Venancio and Leonila were forgetful and at times sickly was not even supported by medical evidence.
It was based solely on Emerlina's testimony, which failed to demonstrate that Venancio and Leonila's mental state had prevented them
from freely giving their consent to the 1978 Deed or from understanding the nature and effects of their disposition.

It is settled that a person is not incapacitated to enter into a contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities,
unless such age and infirmities impair his mental faculties to the extent that he is unable to properly, intelligently and fairly understand
the provisions of said contract, or to protect his property rights.74

Petitioners' reliance on the case of Domingo v. CA is misplaced. There, the Court declared a deed of sale null and void given that the
seller was already of advanced age and senile at the time of its execution, thus:

The unrebutted testimony of Zosima Domingo shows that at the time of the alleged execution of the deed, Paulina was already
incapacitated physically and mentally. She narrated that Paulina played with her waste and urinated in bed. Given these circumstances,
there is in our view sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to the sale of and the price for her parcels of land.

No similar circumstances, indicating senility and clear incapacity to contract, have been alleged or proved in the instant case.

"A person is presumed to be of sound mind at any particular time and the condition is presumed to exist, in the absence of proof to the
contrary."77 In this case, petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that their parents were
mentally incompetent to execute the 1978 Deed in favor of Ponciano.

PERALTA VS. HEIRS OF ABALON

FACTS:

The subject parcel of land, described as Lot 1679 of the Cadastral Survey of Legaspi, consisting of 8,571 square meters, was originally
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (O) 16 and registered in the name of Bernardina Abalon (Abalon). It appears that a
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed over the subject property in favor of Restituto M. Rellama (Rellama) on June 10, 1975. By virtue of
such conveyance OCT No. (O) 16 was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42108 was issued in the name
of Rellama. The subject property was then subdivided into three (3) portions: Lot 1679-A, Lot 1679-B, Lot 1679-C. Lot 1679-A was sold
to Spouses Dominador P. Peralta, Jr. and Ofelia M. Peralta (Spouses Peralta) for which reason TCT No. 42254 was issued in their
names. Lot 1679-B, on the other hand, was first sold to Eduardo Lotivio (Lotivio) who thereafter transferred his ownership thereto to
Marissa Andal, Arnel Andal, and Leonil Andal (the Andals) through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 9, 1995. On even date, TCT
No. 42482 was issued in the name of the Andals. The Andals likewise acquired Lot 1679-C as evidenced by the issuance of TCT No.
42821 in their favor on December 27, 1995.

Claiming that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Abalon in favor of Rellama was a forged document, and claiming further that they
acquired the subject property by succession, they being the nephew and niece of Abalon who died without issue, plaintiff-appellees
Mansueta Abalon and Amelia Abalon filed the case below against Rellama, Spouses Peralta, and the Andals, the herein defendants-
appellants and the Bank of the Philippines [sic] Islands which was later dropped as a party defendant.

It was alleged in their Complaint and subsequent Amended Complaint, under five separate causes of action, that Rellama was able to
cause the cancellation of OCT No. (O) 16, and in lieu thereof the issuance of TCT No. 42108 in his own name from which the defendants-
appellants derived their own titles, upon presentation of a xerox copy of the alleged forged deed of absolute sale and the order granting
the issuance of a second owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 in his favor in Miscellaneous Cadastral Case No. 10648, which he
had filed on the pretext that Lot 1679 covered by OCT No. (O) 16 was sold to him and that the owner's duplicate copy of the said title got
lost in 1976 after the same was delivered to him. They averred that the owner's duplicate copy of Oct NO. (O) 16 had always been with
Abalon and that upon her death, it was delivered to them. Likewise, they alleged that Abalon had always been in possession of the subject
property through her tenant Pedro Bellen who was thereafter succeeded by his wife, Ruperta Bellen, and then his son, Godofredo Bellen.
On the other hand, they said that Rellama had never set foot on the land he was claiming. They further alleged that after the ownership
over the subject property was transferred to them upon the death of Abalon, they took possession thereof and retained Godofredo as
their own tenant. However, they averred that in 1995 the defendants-appellants were able to wrest possession of the subject property
from Godofredo Bellen. They alleged that the defendants-appellants are not buyers in good faith as they were aware that the subject land
was in the possession of the plaintiffs-appellees at the time they made the purchase. They thus claim that the titles issued to the
defendants-appellants are null and void.

In his answer, Rellama alleged that the deed of absolute sale executed by Abalon is genuine and that the duplicate copy of OCT No. (O)
16 had been delivered to him upon the execution of the said deed of transfer.

As for Spouses Peralta and the Andals, who filed their separate answers to the complaint, they mainly alleged that they are buyers in
good faith and for value.

During the trial, Rellama passed away. He was substituted by his heirs.

After the plaintiffs-appellees rested their case, instead of presenting their own evidence, the defendants-appellants and the Heirs of
Restituto Rellama, on different occasions, filed a demurrer to evidence.

On April 14, 2005, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees and ordered the restoration of title in the name
of Abalon and the cancellation of the titles issued to the defendants-appellants.

Spouses Peralta and the Andals filed their separate Notices of Appeal and thereafter, upon approval, filed their respective Defendants-
Appellants' Briefs. The Heirs of Rellama, on the other hand, opted not to challenge the ruling of the lower court.[3]

The Andals and Spouses Peralta appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542 raised several issues, which the CA summarized as follows:

Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Abalon in favor of Rellama was spurious

Whether the Andals and Spouses Peralta were buyers in good faith and for value

Who among the parties were entitled to their claims for damages.[4]

On 30 May 2007, the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed judgment setting aside the RTC Decision.
The CA ruled that the circumstances surrounding the sale of the subject property showed badges of fraud or forgery against Rellama. It
found that Abalon had not parted with her ownership over the subject property despite the claim of Rellama that they both executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale. As proof, the CA pointed out the existence of a notarized contract of leasehold executed by Abalon with Ruperta
Bellen on 11 June 1976. The genuineness and due execution of the said leasehold agreement was uncontroverted by the parties. On
this basis, the appellate court concluded that Abalon could not have leased the subject parcel of land to Bellen if the former had parted
with her ownership thereof.[5]

The CA also found no evidence to show that Rellama exercised dominion over the subject property, because he had not introduced
improvements on the property, despite claiming to have acquired it in 1975.[6] Further, the CA noted that he did not cause the annotation
of the Deed of Sale, which he had executed with Abalon, on OCT No. (O) 16. It observed that when the original copy of OCT No. (O) 16
was allegedly lost in 1976, while Rellama was on his way to Legaspi City to register the title to his name, it took him almost 20 years to
take steps to judicially reconstitute a copy thereof. To the appellate court, these circumstances cast doubt on the veracity of Rellama's
claim of ownership over such a significant property, which was almost a hectare.[7]

The CA also ruled that the heirs of Bernardina Abalon had the legal standing to question the sale transaction between Rellama and their
predecessor-in-interest. It concluded that the heirs of Abalon had acquired the subject property by ordinary acquisitive prescription and
thus had every right to attack every document that intended to divest them of ownership thereof,[8] which in this case was the Deed of
Sale that Bernardina executed in favor of Rellama. Lastly, the appellate court considered the Spouses Peralta as buyers in bad faith for
relying on a mere photocopy of TCT No. 42108 when they bought the property from Rellama.[9] On the other hand, it accorded the Andals
the presumption of good faith, finding no evidence that would rebut this presumption.[10]

The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542 is as follows:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is SET ASIDE and a new judgment is rendered as follows:

1. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42482 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42821, both in the names of Andals, are held legal and valid.

2. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42254 registered in the names of Spouses Peralta is cancelled for being null and void. Hence, they are
ordered to vacate the land covered thereby and to surrender possession thereof in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees.

SO ORDERED.[11]
The heirs of Abalon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 May 2007 Decision, insofar as the CA declared the Andals to be buyers
in good faith of the subject property and, thus, that the land title issued in their favor was valid. Spouses Peralta, for their part, filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the said CA Decision pertaining to the portion that declared them as buyers in bad faith which
accordingly nullified the title issued to them.

On 10 June 2008, the CA denied the Motions for Partial Reconsideration of the movants for lack of merit.[12]

On 11 August 2008, Spouses Peralta filed with this Court a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the 30 May
2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542.[13] On the same day, the heirs of Bernardina Abalon, represented by Mansueto Abalon, filed
a similar Petition questioning the portion of the mentioned CA Decision declaring the validity of the title issued to the Andals, who were
adjudged by the appellate court as buyers in good faith.[14]

THE ISSUES

The Petition filed by Spouses Peralta, docketed as G.R. No. 183448, lists the following issues:

a) The case for annulment should have been dismissed because the purported Deed of Sale executed by Abalon and Rellama was not
introduced in evidence and thus, forgery was not proven.

b) The heirs of Abalon are not forced heirs of Bernardina Abalon; hence, they do not have the legal personality to file the action to annul
the subject Deed of Sale.

c) The heirs of Abalon failed to prove that they had inherited the subject property.

d) Spouses Peralta are buyers in good faith and, thus title to their portion of the subject property must be upheld[15]

As for the heirs of Abalon, their Petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183464, raises the following issues:

a) The Andals cannot be considered as buyers in good faith by simply applying the ordinary presumption in the absence of evidence
showing the contrary.

b) The CA erred in applying in favor of the Andals, the doctrine that a forged instrument may become the root of a valid title in the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value, because Abalon never parted with her possession of the valid and uncancelled title over the subject
property

c) The CA erred in declaring the validity of the title issued in the names of the Andals, because Rellama was bereft of any transmissible
right over the portion of the property he had sold to them.[16]

RULING:

We deny the Petitions and affirm the ruling of the CA.

The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether a forged instrument may become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, even if the true owner thereof has been in possession of the genuine title, which is valid and has not been cancelled.

It is well-settled that "a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land and put a stop
forever to any question as to the legality of the title."[17]

In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, [18] we explained the purpose of the Torrens system and its legal implications to third persons
dealing with registered land, as follows:

The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto
by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the
property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation
would be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system
would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every person dealing
with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go
beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.

The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of
land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of
land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual
after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded
and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership.
The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also
more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept
the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.

The Torrens system was intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration, but the system cannot
be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the registered land. The system merely confirms ownership and does not
create it. It cannot be used to divest lawful owners of their title for the purpose of transferring it to another one who has not acquired it by
any of the modes allowed or recognized by law. Thus, the Torrens system cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner or to
shield the commission of fraud or to enrich oneself at the expense of another.[19]

It is well-established in our laws and jurisprudence that a person who is dealing with a registered parcel of land need not go beyond the
face of the title. A person is only charged with notice of the burdens and claims that are annotated on the title.[20] This rule, however,
admits of exceptions, which we explained in Clemente v. Razo:[21]

Any buyer or mortgagee of realty covered by a Torrens certificate of title, in the absence of any suspicion, is not obligated to look beyond
the certificate to investigate the titles of the seller appearing on the face of the certificate. And, he is charged with notice only of such
burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.

We do acknowledge that the rule thus enunciated is not cast in stone. For, indeed, there are exceptions thereto. Thus, in Sandoval vs.
CA, we made clear the following:
The aforesaid principle admits of an unchallenged exception: that a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances
that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in
his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The
presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate
the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent
purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith; and hence does not merit the protection of the law.[22]

Thus, the determination whether one is a buyer in good faith or can be considered an innocent purchaser for value becomes imperative.
Section 55 of the Land Registration Act provides protection to an innocent purchaser for value[23] by allowing him to retain the parcel of
land bought and his title is considered valid. Otherwise, the title would be cancelled and the original owner of the parcel of land is allowed
to repossess it.

Jurisprudence has defined an innocent purchaser for value as one who buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest therein and who then pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase or before receiving a notice
of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. Buyers in good faith buy a property with the belief that the person from
whom they receive the thing is the owner who can convey title to the property. Such buyers do not close their eyes to facts that should
put a reasonable person on guard and still claim that they are acting in good faith.[24]

The assailed Decision of the CA held that the Andals were buyers in good faith, while Spouses Peralta were not. Despite its determination
that fraud marred the sale between Bernardina Abalon and Rellama, a fraudulent or forged document of sale may still give rise to a valid
title. The appellate court reasoned that if the certificate of title had already been transferred from the name of the true owner to that which
was indicated by the forger and remained as such, the land is considered to have been subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser,
whose title is thus considered valid.[25] The CA concluded that this was the case for the Andals.

The appellate court cited Fule v. Legare[26] as basis for its ruling. In the said case, the Court made an exception to the general rule that
a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title. A fraudulent document may then become the root of a valid title, as it held in
Fule:

Although the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare was fraudulent, the fact remains that he was able to secure a registered title to the
house and lot. It was this title which he subsequently conveyed to the herein petitioners. We have indeed ruled that a forged or fraudulent
deed is a nullity and conveys no title (Director of Lands vs. Addison, 49 Phil., 19). However, we have also laid down the doctrine that
there are instances when such a fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title. One such instance is where the certificate of
title was already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently
sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate (Inquimboy vs. Cruz, G.R.
No. L-13953, July 28, 1960).

We have been constrained to adopt the conclusion here set forth because under the Torrens system, "registration is the operative act
that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land (Secs. 50 and 51, Land Registration Act). Consequently, where there was
nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser
is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that
may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the
Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely be futile and nugatory. (Reynes vs. Barrera, 68 Phil., 656; De Lara and De Guzman vs.
Ayroso, 50 O.G. No 10, 4838). The public shall then be denied of its foremost motivation for respecting and observing the Land
Registration Act. In the end, the business community stands to be inconvenienced and prejudiced immeasurably.

Furthermore, when the Register of Deeds issued a certificate of title in the name of John W. Legare, and thereafter registered the same,
John W. Legare, insofar as third parties were concerned, acquired valid title to the house and lot here disputed. When, therefore, he
transferred this title to the herein petitioners, third persons, the entire transaction fell within the purview of Article 1434 of the Civil Code.
The registration in John W. Legare's name effectively operated to convey the properties to him.
After executing the Deed of Sale with Bernardina Abalon under fraudulent circumstances, Rellama succeeded in obtaining a title in his
name and selling a portion of the property to the Andals, who had no knowledge of the fraudulent circumstances involving the transfer
from Abalon to Rellama. In fact, the Decisions of the RTC and the CA show no factual findings or proof that would rebut the presumption
in favor of the Andals as buyers in good faith. Thus, the CA correctly considered them as buyers in good faith and upheld their title.

The Abalons counter this ruling and allege that the CA erred in relying on Fule to justify its assailed Decision. They argue that Torres v.
Court of Appeals[27] is the applicable ruling, because the facts therein are on all fours with the instant case.[28]

In Torres, the subject property was covered by TCT No. 53628 registered in the name of Mariano Torres. His brother-in-law Francisco
Fernandez, misrepresenting that the copy of the title had been lost, succeeded in obtaining a court Order for the issuance of another copy
of TCT No. 53628. He then forged a simulated deed of sale purportedly showing that Torres had sold the property to him and caused the
cancellation of TCT No. 53628, as well as the issuance of TCT No. 86018 in his name. Soon, Fernandez mortgaged the property to Mota.
Upon learning of the fraud committed by Fernandez, Torres caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the former's copy and
succeeded in having Fernandez's title declared null and void. Meanwhile, Mota was able to foreclose on Fernandez's real estate
mortgage, as well as to cause the cancellation of TCT No. 86018 and the issuance of a new one TCT No. 105953 in her name.

The issue to be resolved in Torres was whether Mota can be considered an innocent mortgagee for value, and whether her title can be
deemed valid. Ruling in the negative, the Court explained:

There is nothing on the records which shows that Torres performed any act or omission which could have jeopardized his peaceful
dominion over his realties. The decision under review, however, in considering Mota an innocent mortgagee protected under Section 65
of the Land Registration Law, held that Torres was bound by the mortgage. Inevitably, it pronounced that the foreclosure sale, where
Mota was the highest bidder, also bound Torres and concluded that the certificate of title issued in the name of Mota prevails over that of
Torres'. As correctly pointed out by Torres, however, his properties were sold on execution, and not on foreclosure sale, and hence, the
purchaser thereof was bound by his notice of adverse claim and lis pendens annotated at the back of Fernandez' TCT. Moreover, even
if We grant Mota the status of an innocent mortgagee, the doctrine relied upon by the appellate court that a forged instrument may become
the root of a valid title, cannot be applied where the owner still holds a valid and existing certificate of title covering the same interest in a
realty. The doctrine would apply rather when, as in the cases for example of De la Cruz v. Fabie, 35 Phil. 144 [1916], Fule v. De Legare,
No. L-17951, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 351, and Republic v. Umali, G.R. No. 80687, April 10, 1989, the forger thru insidious means
obtains the owner's duplicate certificate of title, converts it in his name, and subsequently sells or otherwise encumbers it to an innocent
holder for value, for in such a case the new certificate is binding upon the owner (Sec. 55, Act 496; Sec. 53, P.D. No. 1529). But if the
owner holds a valid and existing certificate of title, his would be indefeasible as against the whole world, and not that of the innocent
holder's. "Prior tempore potior jure" as We have said in Register of Deeds v. Philippine National Bank, No. L-17641, January 30, 1965,
13 SCRA 46, citing Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, Roman Catholic Bishop v. Philippine Railway, 49 Phil. 546, Reyes v. Borbon, 50
Phil. 791.[29] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

We do not agree with the contention of the Abalons that the ruling in Torres is controlling in this case. They quoted a portion in the said
case that is clearly an obiter. In Torres, it was shown that Mariano had annotated an adverse claim on the title procured by Fernandez
prior to the execution sale, in which Mota was the highest bidder. This Court declared her as a mortgagee in bad faith because, at the
back of Fernandez's title, Torres made an annotation of the adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens. The annotation of the adverse
claim was made while the forged document was still in the name of the forger, who in this case is Fernandez. That situation does not
obtain in the instant case.

The records of the RTC and the CA have a finding that when Rellama sold the properties to the Andals, it was still in his name; and there
was no annotation that would blight his clean title. To the Andals, there was no doubt that Rellama was the owner of the property being
sold to them, and that he had transmissible rights of ownership over the said property. Thus, they had every right to rely on the face of
his title alone.

The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot convey title, the exception thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the
Land Registration Act, denotes the registration of titles from the forger to the innocent purchaser for value. Thus, the qualifying point here
is that there must be a complete chain of registered titles. [30] This means that all the transfers starting from the original rightful owner to
the innocent holder for value and that includes the transfer to the forger must be duly registered, and the title must be properly issued to
the transferee.

Contrary to what the Abalons would like to impress on us, Fule and Torres do not present clashing views. In Fule, the original owner
relinquished physical possession of her title and thus enabled the perpetrator to commit the fraud, which resulted in the cancellation of
her title and the issuance of a new one. The forged instrument eventually became the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value. The new title under the name of the forger was registered and relied upon by the innocent purchaser for value.
Hence, it was clear that there was a complete chain of registered titles.

On the other hand in Torres, the original owner retained possession of the title, but through fraud, his brother-in-law secured a court order
for the issuance of a copy thereof. While the title was in the name of the forger, the original owner annotated the adverse claim on the
forged instrument. Thus, before the new title in the name of the forger could be transferred to a third person, a lien had already been
annotated on its back. The chain of registered titles was broken and sullied by the original owner's annotation of the adverse claim. By
this act, the mortgagee was shown to be in bad faith.

In the instant case, there is no evidence that the chain of registered titles was broken in the case of the Andals. Neither were they proven
to have knowledge of anything that would make them suspicious of the nature of Rellama's ownership over the subject parcel of land.
Hence, we sustain the CA's ruling that the Andals were buyers in good faith. Consequently, the validity of their title to the parcel of the
land bought from Rellama must be upheld.

As for Spouses Peralta, we sustain the ruling of the CA that they are indeed buyers in bad faith. The appellate court made a factual finding
that in purchasing the subject property, they merely relied on the photocopy of the title provided by Rellama. The CA concluded that a
mere photocopy of the title should have made Spouses Peralta suspicious that there was some flaw in the title of Rellama, because he
was not in possession of the original copy. This factual finding was supported by evidence.

The CA pointed out Spouses Peralta's Answer to the Complaint of the Abalons in Case No. 9243 in the RTC of Legaspi City, Branch 5.
In their Answer, they specifically alleged as follows:

2- These defendants [Spouses Peralta] acquired lot No. 1679-A by purchase in good faith and for value from Restituto Rellama under
Doc. No. 11212, page No. 26, Book No. 60, Series of 1996 of Notary Public Atty. Otilio Bongon, Legaspi City on March 2, 1995 copy of
which is attached as and made part of this answer as Exhibit "1;"

3- That these defendants were handed over by Rellama xerox [sic] copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42103 issued by the
Register of Deed of Legaspi City on the 2nd day of August 1995 copy attached and made integral part as Exhibit "1-A" and also Original
Certificate of Title No. (O) 16 as Exhibit "1-B"[31]

We have no reason to disturb this factual finding of the CA because it is supported by the evidence on record. Spouses Peralta filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, which allows only questions of law to be raised. It is a settled rule that questions of fact
are not reviewable in this kind of appeal. Under Rule 45, Section 1, "petitions for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth."[32] A question of fact arises when there is "as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when there is a need
to calibrate the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation."[33] It is further pointed out
that "the determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a factual issue, which generally is outside the province of this Court to
determine in a petition for review."[34]

Whether or not Spouses Peralta are buyers in good faith, is without a doubt, a factual issue. Although this rule admits of exceptions,[35]
none of these applies to their case. There is no conflict between the factual findings and legal conclusions of the RTC and those of the
CA, both of which found them to be buyers in bad faith. The fact that they did not participate in the proceedings before the lower court
does not help their case either.

On the issue of the legal standing of the Abalons to file this case, we find that the CA correctly upheld their standing as heirs of the
deceased Bernardina Abalon. The appellate court ruled that during her lifetime, Bernardina Abalon had promised her heirs siblings
Mansueto and Amelia that she would give them the subject property. A duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 was delivered to them upon
her death. Thus, the CA concluded that the two siblings acquired the subject property by ordinary prescription. Further, it deduced that
the mode of transmission of the property from Bernardina to her nephew and niece was a form of donation mortis causa, though without
the benefit of a will.[36] Despite this omission, it still held that Mansueto and Amelia acquired the subject property through ordinary
acquisitive prescription because, since the death of their aunt Bernardina, they had been in possession of the property for more than 10
years that ripened into full ownership.

Under Article 975[38] of the Civil Code, siblings Mansueto and Amelia Abalon are the legal heirs of Bernardina, the latter having had no
issue during her marriage. As such, they succeeded to her estate when she passed away. While we agree with the CA that the donation
mortis causa was invalid in the absence of a will, it erred in concluding that the heirs acquired the subject property through ordinary
acquisitive prescription. The subject parcel of land is a titled property; thus, acquisitive prescription is not applicable.[39] Upon the death
of Bernardina, Mansueto and Amelia, being her legal heirs, acquired the subject property by virtue of succession, and not by ordinary
acquisitive prescription.

ALUAD VS. ALUAD

FACTS:

Petitioner’s mother, Maria Aluad and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad. Crispin
was the owner of six lots of Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After his death, Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself and thereafter, she executed a
Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos in favor of Maria covering all the six lots. The Deed provided that such will become effective
upon the death of the Donor, but in the event that the Donee should die before the Donor, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded.
Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or
even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of the land.

Matilde sold one of the lots to Zenaido and subsequently, Matilde executed a last will and testament devising four (4) of the lots to Maria
and the remaining lot to Zenaido. Maria died a few months after Matilde’s death. Thereafter, Maria’s heirs (herein petitioners) filed before
the RTC a complaint for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of the two lots conveyed and donated to Zenaido, alleging
that no rights have been transmitted to the latter because such lots have been previously alienated to them to Maria via the Deed of
Donation. The lower court decided in favor of the petitioners however, CA reversed said decision upon appeal of Zenaido which held that
the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities
of a will. Due to the denial of the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the present Petition for Review has been filed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Donation is donation inter vivos and whether or not such deed is valid.

If so, whether or not Matilde Aluad has the right to convey the lots in question to Zenaido Aluad.

RULING:

The Court finds the donation to Maria Aluad (petitioner’s mother) one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:

It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor, or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor
should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable, by the transferor at will, ad nutum, but revocability may be
provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and

That the transfer should be void of the transferor should survive the transferee.

The phrase in the earlier-qouted Deed of Donation “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other interpretation
than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioner’s mother during the former’s lifetime. Further
the statement, “anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even
dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated,” means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the
right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership.
The phrase, “anyone of them who should survive” is out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon
the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor.

The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only
two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code. It is void and transmitted no right to petitioner’s mother. But even
assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to the two lots was transmitted to Maria. Matilde
thus validly disposed the lot to Zenaido by her last will and testament, subject to the qualification that her will must be probated. With
respect to the conveyed lot, the same had been validly sold by Matilde to Zenaido.

GANUELAS VS. CAWED

FACTS:

Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately operative even if the actual execution
may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the
donor-testator.

Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property in favor of petitioner Ursulina Ganuelas. The pertinent
portion of the Deed of Donation reads: ―That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE,
and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the former, the said DONOR does by these presents transfer and convey,
by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above, described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the
event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect.‖

However, more than a month before Celestina died, she executed a document revoking such donation. After her death, Ursulina claimed
ownership over the donated properties and refused to give private respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., niece of Celestina any share
in the produce of the properties despite repeated demands. Thus, prompting Flores, et al. to file a complaint before the San Fernando,
La Union Regional Trial Court (RTC), challenging the validity of the Deed of Donation. They alleged that such donation is void for failure
to comply with the formalities of wills and testaments, which is necessary in a disposition mortis causa.

On the other hand, Ursulina maintains that there is no need to comply with the formalities of wills and testaments because such donation
was inter vivos.

The RTC ruled that the Deed of Donation is a disposition mortis causa, thus, void for failure to comply with the formalities of wills and
testaments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa

RULING:

Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon
the execution of the deed. Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately operative
even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the
donee until the death of the donor-testator.
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor‘s death, meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass
to the donee only because of the donor‘s death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa
which should be embodied in a last will and testament.

But if the donation takes effect during the donor‘s lifetime or independently of the donor‘s death, meaning that the full or naked ownership
(nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the donee during the donor‘s lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of
the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos.

The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its
nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil
Code, except when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of
a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership.

The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly
by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;

3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any right, title or interest in the donated properties
was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. The phrase ―to become effective upon the death of the DONOR‖ admits
of no other interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during her
lifetime.

More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded
and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is a postmortem disposition.

As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered
void if the donor should survive the donee. More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis
causa: To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love and affection is erroneous. That the
donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the services rendered by the latter is of no particular significance
in determining whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have an identical motivation. In other
words, love and affection may also underline transfers mortis causa.

As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code should
have been complied with, failing which the donation is void and produces no effect.

MAGLASANG VS. CABATINGAN

FACTS:

On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of
Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering one-half (½) portion of the former's house and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu.
Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowing upon petitioners
Nicolas, Merly S. Cabatingan and Estela C. Maglasang for two parcels of land. One of the provisions in the deeds are as follows:

"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, the DONOR does hereby, by these presents,
transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements
existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should
die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect."

When Conchita died in May 9, 1995, and upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed an action to annul
the said four (4) deeds of donation. Respondents allege that petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking
advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void
for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations
mortis causa. Petitioners deny respondents' allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused
the preparation of the instruments.

RTC ruled that the donation was mortis causa thus void for not following the requisite forms.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the donation was mortis causa.

RULING:
Mortis Causa. In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive." In
determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account:

(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly
by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear
provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death
of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners
during her lifetime.

For a donation mortis causa to be valid it must conform with the following requisites:

ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid,
each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on
the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written , and the fact that the testator signed the will and every
page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses,
and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be
required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.

GARCIA-QUIAZON VS. BELEN

Facts:

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo, filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo's common-
law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her
children, Jenneth Quiazon and Maria Jennifer. Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise, represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before
RTC-Las Piñas.

Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated
to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of

Eliseo's marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter's marriage
with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters... of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth[4] signed by Eliseo as her father.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance
of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.[5] The petitioners asserted that as... shown by his Death
Certificate,[6] Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules of Court,[7] the petition for settlement of... decedent's estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las
Piñas City.

In a Decision[8] dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary
bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting... the position taken by
the petitioners that Eliseo's last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision[10] rendered by the Court of Appeals

In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able... to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up
to the time of Eliseo's death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement... of Eliseo's estate, the Court of Appeals upheld
the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.

ISSUES:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND
THEREFORE[,] THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE [RTC] OF LAS PIÑAS

THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION[.]

RULING:

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the
RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death

Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the... terms
are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."[15] In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood
in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or... place of abode.

As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person's actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for
the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime,... Eliseo
resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate
may be laid in the said city.

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners' contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of
Administration.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the... decedent
is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.[28]

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo's estate, is deemed to be an
interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners' pounding...
on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent's estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings
of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good... grounds. It is
founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied.[29]
Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo's estate as one of his natural... children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested
party within the purview of the law.

TIGGANGAY VS. WACAS

FACTS:

Before Us is a letter-complaint charging respondent Judge Marcelino K. Wacas (Judge Wacas) with Impropriety and Partiality for not
inhibiting himself, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, from hearing an electoral protest case pending before him and for attending
the victory party of a party-litigant in said electoral case.

Judge Wacas is the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25 in Tabuk City, Kalinga. Complainant Johnwell W.
Tiggangay (Tiggangay) was the losing protestant in an electoral protest case before the sala of Judge Wacas, docketed as Election Case
No. 40, entitled Johnwell W Tiggangay v. Rhustom L. Dagadag.

Tiggangay ran for the mayoralty position of Tanudan, Kalinga in the May 14, 2007 election but lost to Rhustom L. Dagadag (Dagadag)
by a slim margin of 158 votes. Following Dagadag's proclamation, Tiggangay filed an electoral protest which was raffled to the sala of
Judge Wacas.

On August 8, 2008, Judge Wacas rendered a Decision finding Dagadag to have won the protested election but at a reduced winning
margin of 97 votes. Tiggangay appealed the RTC Decision before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division which
dismissed the appeal through an Order issued on November 4, 2008. Tiggangay's motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC Second
Division's dismissal of his appeal was likewise rejected by the COMELEC En Banc on January 12, 2011 on the ground of mootness.
On July 31, 2009, Tiggangay filed his verified letter-complaint charging Judge Wacas with Impropriety and Partiality. Tiggangay alleged
that, during the course of the proceedings in Election Case No. 40, he learned that Judge Wacas is Dagadag's second cousin by affinity,
the former's aunt is married to an uncle of Dagadag. The relationship notwithstanding, Judge Wacas did not inhibit himself from hearing
said electoral case in violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, after ruling
in favor of Dagadag, so Tiggangay alleged, Judge Wacas and his wife attended the victory party of Dagadag held on August 23, 2008 at
Dagadag's ranch in Spring, Tabuk City. To bolster his allegation, Tiggangay submitted the affidavit of his driver, Fidel Gayudan
(Gayudan),1 who attested Judge Wacas and wife were fetched by a red Toyota Surf owned by Dagadag and were brought to the victory
party. Further, Tiggangay alleged citing the affidavit of Corazon Somera2 (Somera), an alleged close friend of Judge Wacas and his
spouse that Judge Wacas' sister-in-law, Rebecca Magwaki Alunday (Alunday), allegedly said in the presence of Somera and Judge
Wacas and wife that Tiggangay will win the protest if he has much money. Tiggangay stated that "Judge Wacas never bothered x x x to
rebuke his sister-in-law for such uncalled for statement, or to outrightly deny or affirm such statement x x x."3chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In his Comment, Judge Wacas denied being related by affinity to Dagadag, adding that Tiggangay made the allegation on the basis of
"some reliable sources," not from his personal knowledge. Moreover, Judge Wacas maintained, Tiggangay never moved for his inhibition
during the entire proceedings in Election Case No. 40 if, indeed, Tiggangay doubted his fairness, integrity and independence. Judge
Wacas vehemently denied his alleged attendance in the victory party of Dagadag on August 23, 2008 and asserted that he was with his
family in a clan gathering on that day in the house of Rafael Maduli at Purok 5, Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga, where he stayed from about
8:00 a.m. until about 3:00 p.m. Thus, he submitted the affidavits of Blezilda Maduli Palicpic4 (Palicpic) and Alunday5 attesting to such
fact aside from his own affidavit6 and the affidavit of his wife, Rosalina Magwaki Wacas (Mrs. Wacas).7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On June 13, 2011, acting on the recommendation8 of the Court Administrator, the Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA),
through Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting (Justice Inting), for investigation and report with appropriate recommendations.

Justice Inting held a preliminary conference on October 3, 2011, where the parties stipulated, inter alia, that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

11) During the proceedings of the protest case, complainant did not file a motion to inhibit Judge Marcelino Wacas.

12) No written Motion to Inhibit was filed in Court during the proceedings of the protest case.

13) The letter-complaint dated February 19, 2009 was filed only after the decision dated August 8, 2008 was rendered by the RTC and
after the Comelec in its Order dated November 4, 2008 dismissed the appeal.

14) That Fidel Gayudan, one of the witnesses, is a constant companion of the complainant.

15) That Corazon Somera is the sister of the mother of the complainant.9chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Thereafter, Justice Inting conducted hearings on December 9, 2011,10 January 27, 2012,11 March 2, 2012,12 and June 22, 2012.13 For
the prosecution of the instant case, only Tiggangay and Gayudan testified on December 9, 2011. As Somera did not appear to testify,
her affidavit appended to the complaint was expunged from the records. On the other hand, for the defense, Palicpic testified on March
12, 2012, while Sarado Aggal (Aggal), Mrs. Wacas and Judge Wacas testified on June 22, 2012.

Submission of Memoranda followed.

On October 18, 2012, Justice Inting transmitted to the Court her Report, recommending the dismissal of the instant complaint for lack of
substantial evidence.14chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

We adopt the findings of Justice Inting supportive of her recommendations and accordingly dismiss the instant administrative complaint.

When the issue is administrative liability, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.15 In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that
respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant.16 In the instant case, Tiggangay failed to present substantial
evidence to prove his allegations. One who alleges a fact has the burden of proof and mere allegation is not
evidence.17chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The supposed relationship between Judge Wacas and Dagadag, unsubstantiated as it were by the required substantial relevant evidence,
remains a mere allegation of Tiggangay. In his testimony on December 9, 2011, Tiggangay tried to assert that Judge Wacas and Dagadag
are related within the sixth degree by affinity in that the aunt of Judge Wacas is married to the uncle of Dagadag. Tiggangay even drew
a sketch to show the affinity. The fact, however, is that no substantial evidence was presented to prove the relationship angle.

We can grant arguendo that the aunt of Judge Wacas is married to the uncle of Dagadag. But such reality is not a ground for the mandatory
inhibition of a Judge as required under Sec. 118 of Rule 137, Revised Rules of Procedure, since there is actually no relation of affinity
between Judge Wacas and Dagadag.

Affinity denotes "the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse."19 It is a relationship by marriage or a familial
relation resulting from marriage. It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the institution of marriage and family
relations.20chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity, therefore, are those commonly
referred to as "in-laws," or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like.21chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Affinity may also be defined as "the relation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood relatives of the other. The connection
existing, in consequence of marriage between each of the married persons and the kindred of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows
out of the canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and wife one. The husband has the same relation by affinity to his wife's blood
relatives as she has by consanguinity and vice versa."22chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related by affinity
to his wife's brother, but not to the wife of his wife's brother. There is no affinity between the husband's brother and the wife's sister; this
is called affinitas affinitatis."23chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is related to his aunt by consanguinity in the third degree, it follows by virtue of the
marriage of his aunt to the uncle of Dagadag that Judge Wacas is the nephew-in-law of the uncle of Dagadag, i.e., a relationship by
affinity in the third degree. But Judge Wacas is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of the uncle of Dagadag as they are not his in-
laws and, thus, are not related in any way to Dagadag. In like manner, Dagadag is the nephew-in-law of the aunt of Judge Wacas but is
not related by affinity to the blood relatives of Judge Wacas' aunt, like Judge Wacas. In short, there is no relationship by affinity between
Judge Wacas and Dagadag as they are not in-laws of each other. Thus, Judge Wacas is not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to
hear Election Case No. 40.

It cannot be overemphasized that Tiggangay, for all his protestations against Judge Wacas' impartiality arising out of the perceived
relationship by affinity between Dagadag and Judge Wacas, never moved for the inhibition of Judge Wacas from hearing Election Case
No. 40. We view this fact as a belated attempt by Tiggangay to get back at Judge Wacas for the latter's adverse ruling in Tiggangay's
electoral protest. Besides, as aptly put by Justice Inting, "a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the court and to
raise objections only after an unfavorable decision has already been rendered."24chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

We find no reason to disturb Justice Inting's succinct observation that the affidavit and uncorroborated testimony of Tiggangay's driver,
Gayudan, is incredulous and not worthy of credence. Gayudan supposedly followed Judge Wacas and wife to the ranch of Dagadag
where the alleged victory party was celebrated on August 23, 2008 and observed for four hours the comings and goings of the people
attending the party. Yet, Gayudan could not even name one attendee, aside from Judge Wacas and his wife, despite admitting that the
people who allegedly attended the party are from his place.

Notably, the affidavit and testimony of Aggal belies and demolishes the affidavit and testimony of Gayudan. Aggal was the driver of
Congressman Tagayo from 2007 to 2011 and was staying in the place of said Congressman which is just beside the ranch of Dagadag
in Spring, Tabuk City, Kalinga. Aggal attested and testified that there was no party in the place of Dagadag on August 23, 2008. Besides,
the unrebutted testimony of Palicpic places the whereabouts of Judge Wacas and his wife on August 23, 2008 not in Dagadag's place
but in the place of their relative, .which is just walking distance from their residence, to attend a clan gathering.

In sum, We find nothing in the records to support a case of impropriety, much less manifest bias and partiality against Tiggangay.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against Judge Marcelino K. Wacas, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 25 in Tabuk
City, Kalinga, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

INING VS. VEGA

FACTS:

Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a... parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. (24071) RO-630[5] (OCT RO-630).

Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.

Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both
deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto
and Lenard Vega, the... substituted respondents.

Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children: petitioners Natividad Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores Ining-Rimon (Dolores),
Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and Amando. Natividad is survived by Edilberto Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha Ibea, Carmen Ibea, Amparo

Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is survived by Jesus Rimon, Cesaria Rimon Gonzales and Remedios Rimon
Cordero. Antipolo is survived by Manuel Villanueva, daughter Teodora Villanueva-Francisco (Teodora), Camilo Francisco (Camilo),
Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo),... Lucimo Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo Jr.), Milagros Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, and Herminigildo Francisco
(Herminigildo). Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa Tan Ining and Pedro Ining, Jr. Amando died without issue. As for Jose, it is not clear
from the records if he was made... party to the proceedings, or if he is alive at all.

In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria's grandchildren or
spouses thereof (Gregoria's heirs).

acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana's surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan... recovery of ownership and possession, with... damages, against Gregoria's heirs.
Leonardo alleged that on several occasions, he demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria's heirs refused to heed his demands...
that portions of the property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions must be collated and included as part of the... portion
to be awarded to Gregoria's heirs

Leonardo thus prayed that he be declared the owner of half of the subject property;... that the same be partitioned after collation and
determination of the portion to which he is entitled; that Gregoria's heirs be ordered to execute the necessary documents or agreements

Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have become
the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in... good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez),
who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact; that they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious
and exclusive possession of the property with a just title; that they have been paying the... taxes on the property; that Leonardo's claim
is barred by estoppel and laches

As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court commissioned Geodetic Engineer Rafael M. Escabarte to identify the metes and bounds of the
property.

the trial court rendered a Decision

Dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs' right of action has long prescribed under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code;

Declaring Lot 1786... to be the common property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining and by virtue whereof, OCT No. RO-630 (24071)
is ordered cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is directed to issue a transfer certificate... of title to the heirs of
Natividad Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Dolores Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Antipolo Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; and
Heirs of Pedro Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share.

trial court found... deeds of sale to be spurious. It concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never
sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of Leon's estate at the... time of his death in 1962. Leon's
siblings, Romana and Gregoria, thus inherited the subject property in equal shares. Leonardo and the respondents are entitled to
Romana's share as the latter's successors.

the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from Leon's death in 1962 or up to 1992 within which to file the partition case. Since
Leonardo instituted the partition suit only in 1997, the same was already barred by prescription

In addition, the trial court held that for his long inaction, Leonardo was... guilty of laches as well. Consequently, the property should go to
Gregoria's heirs exclusively.

Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA... the appeal questioned the propriety of the trial court's dismissal of Civil Case No.
5275, its application of Article 1141, and the award of the property to Gregoria's heirs exclusively.

this appeal is GRANTED

CA held that the trial court's declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of Enriquez and
Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was settled by petitioners' failure to appeal the same. Proceeding from the premise that no...
valid prior disposition of the property was made by its owner Leon and that the property which remained part of his estate at the time of
his death passed on by succession to his two siblings, Romana and Gregoria, which thus makes the parties herein who are Romana's
and

Gregoria's heirs co-owners of the property in equal shares, the appellate court held that only the issues of prescription and laches were
needed to be resolved.

CA declared that prescription began to run not from Leon's death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.'s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership
of Land in 1979,... which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of
Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-
heirs so long as he... expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership," the CA held that it was only when Lucimo Sr. executed the
Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979 and obtained a new tax declaration over the property (TD 16414) solely in his name that a
repudiation of his co-ownership with

Leonardo was made, which repudiation effectively commenced the running of the 30-year prescriptive period under Article 1141.

The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.'s sole possession of the property for more than 30 years to the exclusion of Leonardo and the
respondents as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership either, stating that his exclusive possession of the property and appropriation of
its fruits... even his continuous payment of the taxes thereon while adverse as against strangers, may not be deemed so as against
Leonardo in the absence of clear and conclusive evidence to the effect that the latter was ousted or deprived of his rights as co-owner
with the intention of... assuming exclusive ownership over the property, and absent a showing that this was effectively made known to
Leonardo.

CA granted respondents' prayer for partition, directing that the manner of partitioning the property shall be governed by the
Commissioner's Report and Sketch and the Supplementary Commissioner's Report which the parties did not... contest.
ISSUES:

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO REPUDIATED THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON
THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES

RULING:

The Court denies the Petition.

The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal.
Thus, the property remained part of Leon's estate.

The trial court, examining the two deeds of sale executed in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., found them to be spurious. It then concluded
that no such sale from

Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever took place. Despite this finding, petitioners did not appeal. Consequently, any doubts regarding this matter should
be considered settled. Thus, petitioners' insistence on Lucimo Sr.'s 1943 purchase of the property to reinforce their claim over the...
property must be ignored. Since no transfer from Leon to Lucimo Sr. took place, the subject property clearly remained part of Leon's
estate upon his passing in 1962.

Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.

Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares.

Gregoria's and Romana's heirs are co-owners of the subject property.

Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners and respondents became co-owners thereof. As
co-owners, they may use the property owned in common, provided they do so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and
in such a way as... not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights.

For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.

Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the...
co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.

it is clear that the trial court erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within which Leonardo may seek partition from the death of Leon in
1962. Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that prescription shall begin to run in... favor of a co-owner and against the
other co-owners only from the time he positively renounces the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation to the other co-owners.

What escaped the trial and appellate courts' notice, however, is that while it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be
characterized as a repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria;...
he is merely Antipolo's son-in-law, being married to Antipolo's daughter Teodora.

In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation
of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to
seek... a partition of the property has not been lost.

Leon remained the rightful owner of the land, and Lucimo Sr. knew this... very well, being married to Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a
nephew of Leon. More significantly, the property, which is registered under the Torrens system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leon's
name. Leon's ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his death when the property passed... on to his heirs by operation of law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

Principles:

One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent's
property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the... decedent's heirs.

Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the...
co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.

SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS

FACTS:

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province
of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
with whom he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death.

Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993,
she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.

Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. But
the trial court issued an order denying the two motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters
of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court
of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

RULING:

Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to
prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not necessary
that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proven.

Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from
her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It was also REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

MAYOR VS. TIU

FACTS:

On May 25, 2008, Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan (Rosario), the widow of the late Primo Villasin (Primo), passed away and left a
holographic Last Will and Testament,5 wherein she named her sister, Remedios Tiu (Remedios), and her niece, Manuela Azucena Mayor
(Manuela), as executors. Immediately thereafter, Remedios and Manuela filed a petition for the probate of Rosario's holographic will6
with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary (probate proceedings). The petition was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9,
Tacloban City (RTC-Br. 9) and docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-30. They averred that Rosario left properties valued at approximately
P2.5 million.

On May 29, 2008, respondent Damiana Charito Marty (Marty) claiming to be the adopted daughter of Rosario, filed a petition for letters
of administration before the RTC, Branch 34, Tacloban City (RTC-Br. 34), docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-32, but it was not given
due course because of the probate proceedings. Per records, this dismissal is subject of a separate proceeding filed by Marty with the
CA Cebu City, docketed as CA- G.R. SP No. 04003.7

On June 12, 2008, in its Order,8 the RTC-Br. 9 found the petition for probate of will filed by Remedios and Manuela as sufficient in form
and substance and set the case for hearing.

Consequently, Marty filed her Verified Urgent Manifestation and Motion,9 dated June 23, 2008, stating that Remedios kept the decedent
Rosario a virtual hostage for the past ten (10) years and her family was financially dependent on her which led to the wastage and disposal
of the properties owned by her and her husband, Primo. Marty averred that until the alleged will of the decedent could be probated and
admitted, Remedios

and her ten (10) children had no standing to either possess or control the properties comprising the estate of the Villasins. She prayed
for the probate court to: 1) order an immediate inventory of all the properties subject of the proceedings; 2) direct the tenants of the estate,
namely, Mercury Drug and Chowking, located at Primrose Hotel, to deposit their rentals with the court; 3) direct Metrobank, P. Burgos
Branch, to freeze the accounts in the name of Rosario, Primrose Development Corporation (Primrose) or Remedios; and 4) lock up the
Primrose Hotel in order to preserve the property until final disposition by the court.

On July 8, 2008, Remedios and Manuela filed their Comment/Opposition10 to the urgent manifestation averring that Marty was not an
adopted child of the Villasins based on a certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tacloban City, attesting that no record
of any adoption proceedings involving Marty existed in their records. They also argued that the probate court had no jurisdiction over the
properties mistakenly claimed by Marty as part of Rosario's estate because these properties were actually owned by, and titled in the
name of, Primrose. Anent the prayer to direct the tenants to deposit the rentals to the probate court, Remedios and Manuela countered
that the probate court had no jurisdiction over properties owned by third persons, particularly by Primrose, the latter having a separate
and distinct personality from the decedent's estate.

In her Reply,11 dated July 15, 2008, Marty cited an order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte (CFI Leyte) in SP No. 1239,12 claiming
that as early as March 3, 1981, the veil of corporate entity of Primrose was pierced on the ground that it was a closed family corporation
controlled by Rosario after Primo's death. Thus, Marty alleged that "piercing" was proper in the case of Rosario's estate because the
incorporation of Primrose was founded on a fraudulent consideration, having been done in contemplation of Primo's death.

Further, on July 22, 2008, in her Opposition to the Petition for the Approval of the Will of the Late Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan,13
Marty impugned the authenticity of her holographic will.

Meanwhile, Edwin Tiu (Edwin), a son of Remedios, also filed his Opposition,14 dated June 13, 2008.

After a protracted exchange of pleadings, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.

The January 14, 2009 Order

In its January 14, 2009 Order,15 the RTC-Br. 9 granted the motion of Marty and appointed the OIC Clerk of Court as special administrator
of the Estate. The Probate Court also ordered Mercury Drug and Chowking to deposit the rental income to the court and Metrobank to
freeze the bank accounts mentioned in the motion of Marty. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil was applied in the case considering
that Rosario had no other properties that comprised her estate other than Primrose. According to the probate court, for the best interest
of whoever would be adjudged as the legal heirs of the Estate, it was best to preserve the properties from dissipation.

On January 22, 2009, Remedios and Manuela filed their Motion for Inhibition16 on the ground of their loss of trust and confidence in RTC-
Br. 9 Presiding Judge Rogelio C. Sescon (Judge Sescon) to dispense justice. Later, they also filed their Motion for Reconsideration Ad
Cautelam,17 dated February 3, 2009, arguing that Rosario's estate consisted only of shares of stock in Primrose and not the corporation
itself. Thus, the probate court could not order the lessees of the corporation to remit the rentals to the Estate's administrator. With regard
to the appointment of a special administrator, Remedios and Manuela insisted that it be recalled. They claimed that if ever there was a
need to appoint one, it should be the two of them because it was the desire of the decedent in the will subject of the probation proceedings.

In its Order,18 dated March 27, 2009, the RTC-Br. 9 denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed its January 14,
2009 Order. The presiding judge, Judge Sescon, also granted the motion for inhibition and ordered that the records of the case be referred
to the RTC Executive Judge for reraffling. The case was later re-raffled to RTC-Br.6, Judge Alphinor C. Serrano, presiding judge.

Aggrieved by the denial of their motion for reconsideration, Remedios and Manuela filed a petition for certiorari with the CA in Cebu City,
docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No. 04254, assailing the January 14, 2009 and March 27, 2009 Orders of the RTC-Br. 9.19

Ruling of the CA

In its October 16, 2009 Decision,20 the CA reversed the assailed orders of the RTC Br. 9, except as to the appointment of a special
administrator insofar as this relates to properties specifically belonging to the "Estate." It held that Primrose had a personality separate
and distinct from the estate of the decedent and that the probate court had no jurisdiction to apply the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil.

According to the CA, nowhere in the assailed orders of the probate court was it stated that its determination of the title of the questioned
properties was only for the purpose of determining whether such properties ought to be included in the inventory. When the probate court
applied the doctrine of "piercing," in effect, it adjudicated with finality the ownership of the properties in favor of the Estate. The CA stated
that RTC-Br. 9 had no jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership of a property claimed by another based on adverse title; and that questions
like this must be submitted to a court of general jurisdiction and not to a probate court.

The CA added that assuming that the probate court's determination on the issue of ownership was merely intended to be provisional,
Marty's contentions still had no merit. The properties, which she claimed to be part of the estate of Rosario and over which she claimed
co-ownership, comprised of real properties registered under the Torrens system. As such, Primrose was considered the owner until the
titles to those properties were nullified in an appropriate ordinary action. The CA further stated that the RTC erroneously relied on the
order issued by the CFI Leyte in 1981, in the probate proceedings involving the estate of Primo. Whatever determination the CFI made
at the time regarding the title of the properties was merely provisional, hence, not conclusive as to the ownership.

By reason of the favorable decision by the CA, Remedios and Manuela filed their Motion to Partially Revoke the Writ of Execution
Enforcing the January 14, 2009 Order of the Honorable Court and Manifestation in Compliance with the October 21, 2009 Order (Ad
Cautelam),21 dated October 27, 2009.
In its Order,22 dated November 17, 2009, the RTC-Br. 6 partially granted the motion as it revoked the power of the special administrator
to oversee the day-to-day operations of Primrose. It also revoked the order with respect to Mercury Drug and Chowking, reasoning out
that the said establishments dealt with Primrose, which had a personality distinct and separate from the estate of the decedent. In the
said order, Atty. Blanche A. Sa1ino nominated by oppositors Marty and Edwin, was appointed special administrator to oversee the day-
to-day operations of the estate. The same order also upheld the January 14, 2009 Order, as to the conduct and inventory of all the
properties comprising the estate.

This order was not questioned or appealed by the parties.

Omnibus Motion

On September 24, 2010, or almost ten (10) months after the November 17, 2009 Order of the probate court was issued, Marty, together
with her new counsel, filed her Omnibus Motion,23 praying for the probate court to: 1) order Remedios and Manuela to render an
accounting of all the properties and assets comprising the estate of the decedent; 2) deposit or consign all rental payments or other
passive income derived from the properties comprising the estate; and 3) prohibit the disbursement of funds comprising the estate of the
decedent without formal motion and approval by the probate court.

Ruling of the RTC-Br. 6

In its January 20, 2011 Order, the RTC-Br. 6 granted Marty's Omnibus Motion. Although it agreed with the October 16, 2009 CA Decision
reversing the January 14, 2009 Order of the RTC-Br. 9, nonetheless, it acknowledged the urgency and necessity of appointing a special
administrator. According to the probate court, considering that there was clear evidence of a significant decrease of Rosario's shares in
the outstanding capital stock of Primrose,24 prudence dictated that an inquiry into the validity of the transfers should be made. A final
determination of this matter would be outside the limited jurisdiction of the probate court, but it was likewise settled that the power to
institute an action for the recovery of a property claimed to be part of the estate was normally lodged with the executor or administrator.
Thus, the probate court disposed:

WHEREFORE, for the reasons aforestated, and so as not to render moot any action that the special administrator, or the regular
administrator upon the latter's qualification and appointment, may deem appropriate to take on the matter (i.e. Whether or not to institute
in the name of the estate the appropriate action for the recovery of the shares of stock), this Court hereby GRANTS Oppositor Marty's
Omnibus Motion, dated September 24, 2010, and thus hereby:

1. DIRECTS petitioners, either individually or jointly, to: (a) RENDER AN ACCOUNTING of all the properties and assets comprising the
estate of the decedent that may have come into their possession; and, (b) DEPOSIT OR CONSIGN all the rentals payments or such
other passive incomes from the properties and assets registered in the name of Primrose Development Corporation, including all income
derived from the Primrose Hotel and the lease contracts with Mercury Drug and Chowking Restaurant, both within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of this Order;

2. DIRECTS the Special Administrator to take possession and charge of the properties comprising the decedent's estate, specially those
pertaining to the sharesholding of the decedent in Primrose Development Corporation, to determine whether or not action for the recovery
of the shares of stock supposedly transferred from the decedent to petitioners Remedios Tiu, Manuela Azucena Mayor should be instituted
in the name of the estate against the said transferees and to submit a Report on the foregoing matters to this Court, within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of this Order; and,

3. ORDERS that no funds comprising the estate of the decedent shall be disbursed without formal Motion therefor, with the conformity of
the Special Administrator, duly approved by this Court.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary25cralawred [Underscoring supplied]

The partial motion for reconsideration of the above order filed by Remedios and Manuela was denied in the other assailed order of the
RTC--Br. 6, dated June 10, 2011.26

Dissatisfied, Remedios and Manuela availed of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, and filed a petition before the CA.

Action by the CA

The CA, however, in its October 5, 2011 Resolution,27 dismissed the same based on the following infirmities: 1) there was no proper
proof of service of a copy of the petition on the respondents which was sent by registered mail; 2) petitioners failed to indicate on the
petition the material date when the motion for reconsideration was filed; 3) the copy of the assailed order was not certified true and correct
by the officer having custody of the original copy; and 4) the serial number of the commission of the notary public, the province-city where
he was commissioned, the office address of the notary public and the roll of attorney's number were not properly indicated on the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping.

Remedios and Manuela moved for reconsideration of the assailed CA resolution, but to no avail, as the appellate court denied the motion
in its September 24, 2012 Resolution.

Hence, this petition before the Court, filed only by Manuela as Remedios had also passed away, and anchored on the following
GROUNDS

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND
THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT MISAPPLIED SECTION 13, RULE 13 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND DECLARED
THAT THERE WAS NO PROPER PROOF OF SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND
THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT MISAPPLIED JURISPRUDENCE AND RULE 65 AND IT HELD THAT PETITIONER
MAYOR DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE MATERIAL DATE RULE.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND
THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONER MAYOR FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1, RULE 65 FOR FAILING TO ATTACH CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL
COURT.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND
THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONER MAYOR DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENT OF VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.

V.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND
THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT ALLOWED TECHNICALITIES TO BE USED TO DEFEAT SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF
THE PARTIES.

VI.

PETITIONERS HAVE GOOD CAUSE AND A MERITORIOUS CASE AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENTS AS PARAGRAPH 1(B) OF
THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE FIRST ASSAILED ORDER SHOULD HAVE BEEN REVERSED BECAUSE IT OVERTURNS
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED 16 OCTOBER 2009 WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY.28
Petitioner Manuela argued that:
1)
There was actual compliance with Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. The CA petition was accompanied by a notarized affidavit
of service and filing of registered mail. At the time the petition was filed, this was the best evidence of the service. The other registry
receipts for the other parties were also attached to the petition. Further, the available registry return card was furnished the CA in the
motion for reconsideration.29
2)
The failure of the petition to comply with the rule on a statement of material dates could be excused because the dates were evident from
the records.30
3)
The petitioner went to the RTC of Tacloban to secure certified true copies of the assailed orders. Only the stamped name of the Clerk of
Court, however, appeared thereon, because the particular branch had no stamp pad which had the phrase for certification. The branch
did not even have a typewriter in order to affix the phrase on the copies. These inadequacies could not be attributed to the petitioners.31
4)
The lack of information pertaining to the notary public in the verification and certification against forum-shopping should not invalidate the
same because, again, it was not attributable to the parties.32
5)
Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of a party.33
In its January 23, 2013 Resolution34 the Court ordered the respondents to file their respective comments. Marty, in her Comment, insisted
that the petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements as stated by the CA.35

In her Reply to Comment,36 petitioner Manuela clarified that the affidavit of service was executed on August 31, 2011, which was after
the petition was signed by the lawyers and after it was verified by the petitioner herself. After contesting Marty's arguments on the alleged
procedural infirmities of the petitions with the CA and this Court, Manuela asserted that the final and executory October 16, 2009 Decision
of the CA already held that Primrose had a personality separate and distinct from the estate of decedent Rosario.

Meanwhile, in his Manifestation,37 dated May 29, 2013, Edwin affirmed that he and Manuela decided to patch up their differences and
agreed to settle amicably. Accordingly, he manifested that he was withdrawing from the case pursuant to their agreement.

On June 18, 2014, Manuela filed her Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction38 on the
ground that a flurry of orders had been issued by the RTC-Br. 6 in the implementation of the assailed January 20, 2011 Order, such as
the Order,39 dated May 27, 2013, wherein the probate court vaguely ordered "the inventory of the exact extent of the 'decedent's estate.'"
Then another order was issued appointing an auditing firm to conduct an inventory/audit of the Estate including the rentals and earnings
derived from the lease of Mercury Drug and Chowking Restaurant, as tenants of Primrose.40 According to petitioner Manuela, although
an inventory of the assets of the decedent was proper, the probate court ordered an inventory of the assets of Primrose, a separate and
distinct entity. Manuela asserts that it was clearly in error.

In her Supplement to the Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,41 dated June 17, 2013,
Manuela informed the Court that the inventory and accounting of Primrose would already commence on June 19, 2013.

Marty filed her Opposition,42 dated July 3, 2013, stating that the petition of Manuela had been rendered moot and academic as the
probate court had declared her as the sole heir of Rosario and appointed her administrator of the estate. She argued that an injunctive
relief would work injustice to the estate because of the total assimilation by petitioner of the shareholdings of the decedent in Primrose
and her share in the corporation's income corresponding to her shareholdings.

Finding that the requisites for preliminary injunctive relief were present,43 the Court issued the TRO44 in favor of Manuela on October
14, 2013. At the outset, the Court was convinced that the rights of Primrose sought to be protected by the grant of injunctive relief were
material and substantial and the TRO was issued in order to prevent any irreparable damage to a corporate entity that could arise from
the conduct of an accounting by the court-appointed inventory.

The Court's Ruling

The Court now resolves the subject case by the issuance of a permanent injunction, as prayed for by petitioner Manuela. This position is
supported by law and jurisprudence, as follows:

First. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; and (2) a collection of property to
which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. This class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in
our law. Example is the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.45 From this pronouncement, it can be gleaned that the estate of the
deceased person is a juridical person separate and distinct from the person of the decedent and any other corporation. This status of an
estate comes about by operation of law. This is in consonance with the basic tenet under corporation law that a corporation has a separate
personality distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to which it may be connected.46

Second. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has no relevant application in this case. Under this doctrine, the court looks at the
corporation as a mere collection of individuals or an aggregation of persons undertaking business as a group, disregarding the separate
juridical personality of the corporation unifying the group. Another formulation of this doctrine is that when two business enterprises are
owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of third parties,
disregard the legal fiction that two corporations are distinct entities and treat them as identical or as one and the same.47 The purpose
behind piercing a corporation's identity is to remove the barrier between the corporation and the persons comprising it to thwart the
fraudulent and illegal schemes of those who use the corporate personality as a shield for undertaking certain proscribed activities.48

Here, instead of holding the decedent's interest in the corporation separately as a stockholder, the situation was reversed. Instead, the
probate court ordered the lessees of the corporation to remit rentals to the estate's administrator without taking note of the fact that the
decedent was not the absolute owner of Primrose but only an owner of shares thereof. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by
another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stocks of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of
separate corporate personalities.49 Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing cannot be
presumed, but must be clearly and convincingly established.50

Third. A probate court is not without limits in the determination of the scope of property covered in probate proceedings. In a litany of
cases, the Court had defined the parameters by which a probate court may extend its probing arms in the determination of the question
of title in probate proceedings. In Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,51 the Court explained that, as a rule, the question of ownership was
an extraneous matter which the probate court could not resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should, or should not, be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. It is a well-settled
rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be part of the estate but which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. It can only determine whether they should, or
should not, be included in the inventory or list of properties to be overseen by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but
if there is, then the parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.52

In this case, respondent Marty argues that the subject properties and the parcel of land on which these were erected should be included
in the inventory of Rosario's estate. More so, the arrears from the rental of these properties were later on ordered to be remitted to the
administrator of the estate grounded on the allegation that Rosario had no other properties other than her interests in Primrose. To the
Court's mind, this holding of the probate court was in utter disregard of the undisputed fact the subject land is registered under the Torrens
system in the name of Primrose, a third person who may be prejudiced by the orders of the probate court. In Valera vs. Inserto:53 the
Court stated:
x x x, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction,
and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the
decedent, unless the claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the
submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason
for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g. probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence
of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived.
xxxx

x x x These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedent's names but
in others, a situation on which this Court has already had occasion to rule.54 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Thus, the probate court should have recognized the incontestability accorded to the Torrens title of Primrose over Marty's arguments of
possible dissipation of properties. In fact, in the given setting, even evidence purporting to support a claim of ownership has to yield to
the incontestability of a Torrens title, until after the same has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself. In other words, the
existence of a Torrens title may not be discounted as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons. Put clearly, if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, "the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due
weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the
property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar,
possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title."55

Additionally, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152956 proscribes a collateral attack on a Torrens title:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
In Cuizon vs. Ramolete,57 the property subject of the controversy was duly registered under the Torrens system. To this, Court
categorically stated:
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a
transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent
administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such
third persons of their possession and ownership of the property.58 x x x [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
A perusal of the records of this case would show that that no compelling evidence was ever presented to substantiate the position of
Marty that Rosario and Primrose were one and the same, justifying the inclusion of the latter's properties in the inventory of the decedent's
properties. This has remained a vacant assertion. At most, what Rosario owned were shares of stock in Primrose. In turn, this boldly
underscores the fact that Primrose is a separate and distinct personality from the estate of the decedent. Inasmuch as the real properties
included in the inventory of the estate of Rosario are in the possession of, and are registered in the name of, Primrose, Marty's claims
are bereft of any logical reason and conclusion to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.

Fourth. The probate court in this case has not acquired jurisdiction over Primrose and its properties. Piercing the veil of corporate entity
applies to determination of liability not of jurisdiction; it is basically applied only to determine established liability. It is not available to
confer on the court a jurisdiction it has not acquired, in the first place, over a party not impleaded in a case.59 This is so because the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction comes to play only during the trial of the case after the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over the corporation. Hence, before this doctrine can be even applied, based on the evidence presented, it is imperative that
the court must first have jurisdiction over the corporation.60

Hence, a corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to the court's process of piercing the veil of its corporate fiction. Resultantly,
any proceedings taken against the corporation and its properties would infringe on its right to due process.

In the case at bench, the probate court applied the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil ratiocinating that Rosario had no other properties
that comprise her estate other than her shares in Primrose. Although the probate court's intention to protect the decedent's shares of
stock in Primrose from dissipation is laudable, it is still.an error to order the corporation's tenants to remit their rental payments to the
estate of Rosario.

Considering the above disquisition, the Court holds that a permanent and final injunction is in order in accordance with Section 9, Rule
58 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[i]f after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts
complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the
commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction." Undoubtedly, Primrose stands to suffer
an irreparable injury from the subject order of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

HACBANG VS. ALO

FACTS:

Facts:

A petition for the probate of Bishop Sofronio's will and the settlement of his estate was filed and was admitted thereafter to probate.
Petitioner however filed a petition to cancel the registration of the subject lot of the case because it was found out that it was registered
in the name of respondent.

The RTC dismissed the petition because the petitioners had no right to prosecute the case on the subject lot and noted that B ishop
Sofronio's will had already been admitted into probate; thus, the intrinsic validity of the will is no longer in question. Though the settlement
proceedings were archived, Bishop Sofronio already designated his heirs; thus, the petitioners, who are neither compulsory nor
testamentary heirs, are not real parties in interest.
The CA in turn, affirmed the RTC's order of dismissal and held that the admission of Bishop Sofronio's will to probate precluded intestate
succession unless the will was intrinsically invalid or failed to completely dispose of his estate. Contrary to the petitioners' contention, the
settlement proceedings were not dismissed but archived; the will did not lose its validity merely because the proceedings were archived,
undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. The CA denied the petitioners' claim to a right of inheritance by representation and
cannot represent those who are hot entitled to succeed, thus, the denial paved the way for the petitioners to file the present petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. WON the lower court erroneously applied the provision of the present civil code to the will and estate of Bishop Sofronio. - YES

2. WON Bishop Sofronio died intestate. - NO

RULING:

1. At the outset, this Court observes that the parties and even the lower courts erroneously applied the provisions of the present Civil
Code to the will and the estate of Bishop Sofronio. The law in force at the time of the decedent's death determines the applicable law
over the settlement of his estate. Bishop Sofronio died in 1937 before the enactment of the Civil Code in 1949. Therefore, the correct
applicable laws to the settlement of his estate are the 1889 Spanish Civil Code and the 1901 Code of Civil Procedure.

In any case, under both the Spanish Code and our Civil Code, successional rights are vested at the precise moment of the death of the
decedent. In any case, under both the Spanish Code and our Civil Code, successional rights are vested at the precise moment of the
death of the decedent. Section 657 of the Spanish code provides:

Art. 657. Los derechos a la sucesion de una persona se transmiten desde el momento de su muerte. (Rights to the estate of a person
are transmitted from the time of his death.

The inheritance vests immediately upon the decedent's death without a moment's interruption. This provision was later on translated and
adopted as Article 777 of our Civil Code.

As a consequence of this principle, ownership over the inheritance passes to the heirs at the precise moment of death - not at the time
the heirs are declared, nor at the time of the partition, nor at the distribution of the properties. There is no interruption between the end of
the decedent's ownership and the start of the heir/legatee/devisee's ownership.

2. Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. He left a will that was probated in 1937. He left half of his properties to his parents
and the remaining half to his sister Dolores Hacbang Alo. The admission of his will to probate is conclusive with respect to its due
execution and extrinsic validity.

Our jurisdiction has always respected a decedent's freedom to dispose of his estate, whether under the Spanish Civil Code or under the
present Civil Code.

This provision states that a person without compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate, either in part or in its entirety, in favor of anyone
capacitated to succeed him; if the testator has compulsory heirs, he can dispose of his property provided he does not impair their legitimes.
This provision was later translated and adopted as Article 842 of our Civil Code.

Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of disposition. Hence, testate succession has always been preferred over
intestacy. As much as possible, a testator's will is treated and interpreted in a way that would render all of its provisions operative. Hence,
there is no basis to apply the provisions on intestacy when testate succession evidently applies.

CALALANG-PARULAN VS. GARCIA

PRINCIPLE:

It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we
proclaimed the fundamental tenets of succession:

The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by other related articles.
Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same
moment (Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are
valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed
to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).

FACTS:

In a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property, the respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora
Calalang-Sabile, and Carlito S. Calalang asserted their ownership over a certain parcel of land against the petitioners Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang. The said lot was allegedly acquired by the respondents from their mother Encarnacion Silverio,
through succession as the latter’s compulsory heirs.
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The first marriage was with their
mother Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of this marriage, their parents acquired the above-mentioned parcel of land from
their maternal grandmother Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however, their parents failed to
register the same. On June 7, 1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion Silverio.

On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira B. Calalang who then gave birth to Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan and Rolando Calalang. According to the respondents, it was only during this time that Pedro Calalang filed an
application for free patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands.

On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
283321 was issued in the name of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan. On December 27, 1989,7 Pedro Calalang died.

The respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 arguing that the sale of the land was void because Pedro Calalang failed to
obtain the consent of the respondents who were co- owners of the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents were deprived of their respective shares by reason of the sale.

RULING:

NO! It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that
"[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we
proclaimed the fundamental tenets of succession:

The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by other related articles.
Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same
moment (Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are
valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed
to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).

Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling
them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not
yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly
supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious donation inter vivas), the respondents have no right to question the sale of
the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived them of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must be established
by clear and convincing evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.20 The Complaint for Annulment
of Sale and Reconveyance of Property must therefore be dismissed.

Bar-type Question:

A, is the child of B and C. During the subsistence of B and C’s marriage, they acquired a parcel of land from C’s mother. Despite enjoying
the continued possession of the said land, B and C failed to register the same until the marriage was dissolved by reason of C’s death.
After some time, B contracted a second marriage with D. It was only during this time that B filed an application for free patent over the
parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands. Thereafter, B sold the land to Z. A new TCT was issued by reason of the sale to Z. A now filed
a case for the annulment of sale and reconveyance of the said property on the ground that his father deprived him of his respective share.
If you are the judge, would you grant the petition?

Suggested Answer:

No. It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that
"[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we
proclaimed the fundamental tenets of succession:

The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by other related articles.
Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same
moment (Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are
valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed
to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).

Thus, it is only upon B’s death that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole
estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of B. And absent
clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious
donation inter vivos), A has no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived them of their
respective shares.

GARCIA-QUIAZON VS. BELEN

FACTS:

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are
Eliseo's common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom
Eliseo... was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition
for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.

Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated
to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of

Eliseo's marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter's marriage
with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters... of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth[4] signed by Eliseo as her father.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance
of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.[5] The petitioners asserted that as... shown by his Death
Certificate,[6] Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules of Court,[7] the petition for settlement of... decedent's estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las
Piñas City.

In a Decision[8] dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary
bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting... the position taken by
the petitioners that Eliseo's last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision[10] rendered by the Court of Appeals

In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able... to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up
to the time of Eliseo's death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement... of Eliseo's estate, the Court of Appeals upheld
the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.

ISSUES:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND
THEREFORE[,] THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE [RTC] OF LAS PIÑAS

THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION[.]

RULING:

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the
RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death

Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the... terms
are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."[15] In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood
in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or... place of abode.

As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person's actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for
the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime,... Eliseo
resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate
may be laid in the said city.

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners' contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of
Administration.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the... decedent
is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.[28]

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo's estate, is deemed to be an
interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners' pounding...
on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent's estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings
of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good... grounds. It is
founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied.[29]
Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo's estate as one of his natural... children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested
party within the purview of the law.

DE BELEN VDA. DE CABALU VS. TABU

FACTS:

Faustina Maslum (Faustina) was the original owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 16776. The land had a total area of 140,211
square meters. On December 8, 1941, Faustina died without any children. She left a holographic will, assigning and distributing her
property to her nephews and nieces. The said holographic will, however, was not probated.

Benjamin Laxamana was one of Faustinas heirs. He died in 1960. He had two heirs: his wife and his son, Domingo Laxamana (Domingo).
On March 5, 1975, Domingo executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Laureano Cabalu covering 9,000 square meters of the land inherited by
his father from Faustina.

On August 1, 1994, the legitimate heirs of Faustina executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Succession with Partition. The said deed imparted
9,000 square meters of the land covered by TCT No. 16776 to Domingo.

Thereafter, Domingo sold 4,500 square meters of the 9,000 square meters of the land to his nephew, Eleazar Tabamo. The remaining
portion was registered in Domingos name under TCT No. 281353.

On August 4, 1996, Domingo died. On October 8, 1996, or two (2) months after Domingos death, Domingo purportedly executed a Deed
of Sale of TCT No. 281353 in favor of Renato Tabu (Tabu). Tabu and his wife Dolores Laxamana subdivided the lot into two which
resulted to TCT Nos. 291338 and 291339.

Consequently, petitioners Milagros de Belen Vda. De Cabalu, Meliton Cabalu, Spouses Angela Cabalu and Rodolfo Talavera, and Patricio
Abus filed a complaint before the RTC seeking to declare TCT Nos. 291338 and 291339 as null and void. They averred that they were
the lawful owners of the subject property because it was sold to their father, Laureano Cabalu, by Domingo, through a Deed of Absolute
Sale, dated March 5, 1975.

The RTC declared the deeds dated March 5, 1975 and October 8, 1996 null and void. On appeal, the CA partially granted the petition
and deleted the RTCs decision declaring the October 8, 1996 null and void.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land covering the 9,000 square meter property executed by Domingo in favor
of Laureano Cabalu on March 5, 1975, is valid?
II. Whether or not the Deed of Sale dated October 8, 1996, covering the 4,500 square meter portion of the 9,000 square meter property,
executed by Domingo in favor of Renato Tabu, is null and void?

RULING:

Petition is partially granted.

CIVIL LAW: future inheritance; contractual capacity

FIRST ISSUE:

The CA did not err in declaring the March 5, 1975 Deed of Sale null and void.

Thus, and as correctly found by the RTC, even if Benjamin died sometime in 1960, Domingo in 1975 could not yet validly dispose of the
whole or even a portion thereof for the reason that he was not the sole heir of Benjamin, as his mother only died sometime in 1980.
Besides, under Article 1347 of the Civil Code, "No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law." Paragraph 2 of Article 1347, characterizes a contract entered into upon future inheritance as void. The law applies
when the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the contract forms part of the
inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.

In this case, at the time the deed was executed, Faustinas will was not yet probated; the object of the contract, the 9,000 square meter
property, still formed part of the inheritance of his father from the estate of Faustina; and Domingo had a mere inchoate hereditary right
therein.
Domingo became the owner of the said property only on August 1, 1994, the time of execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Succession
with Partition by the heirs of Faustina, when the 9,000 square meter lot was adjudicated to him.

SECOND ISSUE:

The CA erred in deleting that portion in the RTC decision declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated October 8, 1996, null and void.

Regarding the deed of sale covering the remaining 4,500 square meters of the subject property executed in favor of Renato Tabu, it is
evidently null and void.The document itself, the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated October 8, 1996, readily shows that it was executed on
August 4, 1996 more than two months after the death of Domingo. Contracting parties must be juristic entities at the time of the
consummation of the contract. Stated otherwise, to form a valid and legal agreement it is necessary that there be a party capable of
contracting and a party capable of being contracted with. Hence, if any one party to a supposed contract was already dead at the time of
its execution, such contract is undoubtedly simulated and false and, therefore, null and void by reason of its having been made after the
death of the party who appears as one of the contracting parties therein. The death of a person terminates contractual capacity.

The contract being null and void, the sale to Renato Tabu produced no legal effects and transmitted no rights whatsoever. Consequently,
TCT No. 286484 issued to Tabu by virtue of the October 8, 1996 Deed of Sale, as well as its derivative titles, TCT Nos. 291338 and
291339, both registered in the name of Rena to Tabu, married to Dolores Laxamana, are likewise void.

MEDINA VS. CA

FACTS:

A decision was rendered against Arles Castares (Arles), now deceased and represented by his heirs, to pay damages for running over
and causing injuries to four-year old Wenceslao Mahilum, Jr. Petitioner Jose Medina (Medina) was the representative of the victim in the
said case. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied Arles two parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1107 and Tax Declaration
No. 1106.

When the heirs of Arles failed to settle their obligation, the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 1107 was sold at public auction wherein
Medina emerged as the highest bidder. Medina applied for the registration of the said lot. However, Andres Castares (Andres), brother
of Arles and representing the heirs of the late Abundio Castares (Abundio), filed an opposition thereto. Andres claimed that after the death
of his father Abundio, Tax Declaration No. 1107 was cancelled and consequently, a tax declaration was issued in his favor. He insisted
that he is the rightful owner of the said portion of the land.

The RTC ruled in favor of Medina. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and it also noted that there has been no settlement yet of the
estate of Abundio and it was premature for Arles to have allocated unto himself a distinct portion of the lot as his share in the estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Abundios heirs have an actual right over the lot in dispute?

RULING:

The petition is denied.

CIVIL LAW: heirs right of ownership over the properties of the decedent; tax declaration not sufficient proof of ownership

The appellate court is correct in stating that there was no settlement of the estate of Abundio. There is no showing that Lot 224 has
already been partitioned despite the demise of Abundio. It has been held that an heirs right of ownership over the properties of the
decedent is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. This means that the impending heir has yet
no absolute dominion over any specific property in the decedents estate that could be specifically levied upon and sold at public auction.
Any encumbrance of attachment over the heirs interests in the estate, therefore, remains a mere probability, and cannot summarily be
satisfied without the final distribution of the properties in the estate. Therefore, the public auction sale of the property covered by Tax
Declaration No. 1107 is void because the subject property is still covered by the Estate of Abundio, which up to now, remains
unpartitioned. Arles was not proven to be the owner of the lot under Tax Declaration No. 1107. It may not be amiss to state that a tax
declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership.

CRUZ VS. CRUZ

FACTS:

On October 18, 1993, Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the Regional Trial Court in Manila a Complaint against her son, defendant-appellee
Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for "Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages."

Memoracion claimed that during her union with her common-law husband (deceased) Architect Guido M. Cruz, she acquired a parcel of
land located at Tabora corner Limay Streets, Bo. Obrero, Tondo Manila; that sometime in July 1992, she discovered that the title to the
said property was transferred by appellee and the latter's wife in their names in August 1991 by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated February
12, 1973; that the said deed was executed through fraud, forgery, misrepresentation and simulation, hence, null and void.
After Memoracion x x x finished presenting her evidence in chief, she died on October 30, 1996. Through a Manifestation, Memoracion's
counsel, Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court on January 13, 1997 of the fact of such death, evidenced by a certificate thereof.

For his part, appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff's reconveyance action is a personal action which does
not survive a party's death, pursuant to Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, and (2) to allow the case to continue would
result in legal absurdity whereby one heir is representing the defendant [and is a] co-plaintiff in this case.

On June 2, 1997, the trial court dismissed the case. The appeal of Memoracion, represented by Edgardo, was denied by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Memoracion Z. Cruz's Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance and
Damages is a purely personal action which did not survive her death; and

RULING:

NO! The Petition for Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages survived the death of petitioner.

The criterion for determining whether an action survives the death of a petitioner was elucidated in Bonilla v. Barcena,[7] to wit:

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of
action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person
being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and
rights of property affected being incidental.[8]

If the case affects primarily and principally property and property rights, then it survives the death of the plaintiff or petitioner. In Sumaljag
v. Literato,[9] we held that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale of Real Property is one relating to property and property
rights, and therefore, survives the death of the petitioner. Accordingly, the instant case for annulment of sale of real property merits
survival despite the death of petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz.

When a party dies during the pendency of a case, Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily applies:

Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall
be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address
of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days
from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified
period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the
estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.

x x x Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."
From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations
of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is
the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the
heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate
proceedings. When [plaintiff], therefore, died[,] her claim or right to the parcels of land x x x was not extinguished by her death but was
transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest
in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased
plaintiff.[10]

If no legal representative is named by the counsel of the deceased, or the legal representative fails to appear within a specified period, it
is the duty of the court where the case is pending to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator
for the estate of the deceased. The reason for this rule is to protect all concerned who may be affected by the intervening death,
particularly the deceased and his estate.

BALUS VS. BALUS

FACTS:

Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978,
while Rufo died on July 6, 1984.
On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo,
Lanao del Norte (Bank). The said property was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-439(788)

Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder
at a public auction held for that purpose. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale[3] was executed by the sheriff in... favor of the
Bank. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984,
the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale[4] in the Bank's favor. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the... name of the Bank.

On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate[5] adjudicating to each of them a
specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also... contained
provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they
intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.

Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. On October
12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land[6] was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-39,484 was issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.

On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they had
already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still... refused to surrender
possession of the same to them.

The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by the
provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from
the Bank.

The CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision, reversing and setting aside the Decision of the RTC and ordering petitioner to
immediately surrender possession of the subject property to the respondents. The CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did...
not redeem the subject property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title
in the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished.

ISSUES:

Whether or not co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject property persisted even after the lot was purchased by the Bank
and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank.

RULING:

The Court is not persuaded.

Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at the time of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject
property formed part of the estate of their deceased father to which they may lay claim as his heirs.

At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by
petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing...
conducted by the trial court on October 28, 1996.[12] Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale[13] was issued in favor of the Bank
on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a new... title was issued in the Bank's name
before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the
lifetime of Rufo.

The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death.[14] In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of
the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have... accrued thereto since
the opening of the succession.[15] In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows
that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his... estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated
differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.

Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising
from the supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the...
disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in time.

there is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial Settlement to indicate any express stipulation for petitioner and respondents to continue with
their supposed co-ownership of the contested lot.

On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement would not, in any way, support petitioner's contention
that it was his and his sibling's intention to buy the subject property from the Bank and continue what they believed to be co-ownership...
thereof.
For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an agreement between him and his siblings to continue what they thought was
their ownership of the subject property, even after the same had been bought by the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of the said
Extrajudicial Settlement too far.

In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk about and no property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed
part of the estate of their deceased father.

Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of his and respondents' intention of continuing with their supposed co-ownership is negated by no
less than his assertions in the present petition that on several occasions he had the chance to purchase the subject property back, but
he refused to do so. In fact, he claims that after the Bank acquired the disputed lot, it offered to re-sell the same to him but he ignored
such offer.

In addition, it appears from the recitals in the Extrajudicial Settlement that, at the time of the execution thereof, the parties were not yet
aware that the subject property was already exclusively owned by the Bank. Nonetheless, the lack of knowledge on the part of petitioner...
and respondents that the mortgage was already foreclosed and title to the property was already transferred to the Bank does not give
them the right or the authority to unilaterally declare themselves as co-owners of the disputed property

Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property
contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject
property... divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls
for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual
interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate
without supervision or interference from the other. In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective
which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.

CARLOS VS. SANDOVAL

FACTS:

Spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner
Juan De Dios Carlos. Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Upon Teofilo’s death, 2
parcel of land were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II.

An action was instituted by the petitioner against respondents regarding the shares of the land which lead to compromise agreements in
relation to the divisions of proceeds in the sale of the lands.

Subsequently, in 1995, petitioner commenced an action against respondents before the RTC for, among others, declaration of nullity of
marriage of his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad in view of the absence of the required marriage license. The reason for the
action is that petitioner alleges that the marriage is null and void, thus the lands should be reconveyed to him.

Respondents contended in their answer that the lack of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad’s
marriage to Teofilo. They prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over
subject matter.

RTC rendered judgment, granting petitioner’s counter motion for summary judgment. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad
Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license.

In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment
annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling. Basis: The Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage
upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos is a real party interest in the annulment of the marriage between his brother Teofilo and
Felicidad.

RULING:

NO! Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
which became effective on March 15, 2003, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside
of the marriage. Exceptions:

1. Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (or before March 15, 2003); and
2. Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on
May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988, the applicable law
is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.

But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an
action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

SC responded in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute
a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that
every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case,
as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible
on the ground of lack of cause of action.

DBP VS. GAGARANI

FACTS:

The spouses Dionesio and Matea S. Asok owned several parcels of land. Upon their death on September 14, 1973 and February 22,
1982, respectively, their eleven children inherited the properties. One of the lands inherited was a lot covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. P-4272, a free patent issued on July 19, 1967, located at Pagawan, Manticao, Misamis Oriental with an area of 39,552
sq. m.4

Pursuant to the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with quitclaim executed by the spouses' children, the subject property was inherited
by Denison Asok (Asok). As a result, OCT No. P-4272 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-9626 was issued and
registered in his name on November 17, 1987.5

On August 31, 1989, Asok and his wife, respondent Ella Gagarani Asok, borrowed P100,000 from petitioner Development Bank of the
Philippines, a government financial institution created and operating under EO 81,6 as amended by RA 8523. They mortgaged the subject
lot as collateral to guarantee payment of the loan. On due date, however, they failed to pay the loan and the mortgage was extrajudicially
foreclosed pursuant to Act 3135.7 Petitioner emerged as the highest bidder with a bid of P163,297.8

On November 28, 1991, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioner. This was registered on December 24, 1992.9 On March 25,
1998, petitioner's ownership over the property was consolidated and TCT No. T-27172 was issued in its name.10

Meanwhile, Asok died on October 24, 1993 and was succeeded by his surviving spouse and children (respondents).11

On May 15, 1998, respondents filed a complaint for repurchase against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Initao, Misamis
Oriental, Branch 44, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-68. On July 3, 1998, they filed an amended complaint on learning that TCT No. T-
9626 had been cancelled by TCT No. T-27172 issued in the name of petitioner. They invoked their right to repurchase the property under
Sec. 119 of CA 141, as amended:12
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase
by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from date of the conveyance.
In a decision dated January 7, 1999, the RTC dismissed the complaint. Reconsideration was denied on February 3, 1999.13 It ruled that
the one-year period for redemption should be reckoned from the date of sale, i.e., November 28, 1991. Then the five-year period provided
under Sec. 119 of CA 141 should be counted from the expiration of the redemption period, i.e., November 28, 1992. Therefore,
respondents had until November 28, 1997 to exercise their right to repurchase. However, the complaint was filed on May 15, 1998 which
was beyond the prescribed period.14

Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA. In a decision dated December 14, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision.
Reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated March 28, 2006. It held that the period of redemption started from the date of registration
of the certificate of sale, i.e., December 24, 1992, and not from the date of sale. Thus, respondents had until December 24, 1998 to
repurchase the property and the complaint was seasonably filed.15

Hence this petition.

Petitioner raises the following issues: (1) whether Sec. 119 of CA 141 is applicable in this case; (2) whether respondents are the legal
heirs of the patentees and (3) whether the right to repurchase has already prescribed.

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioner contends that respondents cannot claim the right under Sec. 119 which covers homesteads and free patents because the free
patent issued to Asok's parents had already been cancelled and a new TCT had in fact been issued to him. Thus, the property mortgaged
to it was no longer covered by a free patent but by a TCT.16

This contention deserves scant consideration.

The plain intent of Sec. 119 is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve and keep in the family the land that the
State has gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in cleaning, developing and cultivating it.17 Hence, the fact that the land had
been inherited by the patentees' son (and a new title in his name issued) does not bring it outside the purview of Sec. 119. In fact, the
policy behind the law is fulfilled because the land remains in the family of the patentee. As we explained in Ferrer v. Mangente:18
The applicant for a homestead is to be given all the inducement that the law offers and is entitled to its full protection. Its blessings,
however, do not stop with him. This is particularly so in this case as the appellee is the son of the deceased. There is no question then
as to his status of being a legal heir. The policy of the law is not difficult to understand. The incentive for a pioneer to venture into
developing virgin land becomes more attractive if he is assured that his effort will not go for naught should perchance his life be cut short.
This is merely a recognition of how closely bound parents and children are in a Filipino family. Logic, the sense of fitness and of right, as
well as pragmatic considerations thus call for continued adherence to the policy that not the individual applicant alone but those so closely
related to him as are entitled to legal succession may take full advantage of the benefits the law confers.19
Having ruled that Sec. 119 is applicable to this case, we now go to the next issue: are respondents the "legal heirs" contemplated in the
provision?

Petitioner argues that respondents are not the legal heirs of the patentees because respondents are merely their daughter-in-law and
grandchildren.

We disagree. In line with the rationale behind Sec. 119, we reject a restricted definition of legal heirs. It is used in a broad sense and the
law makes no distinctions.20 In Madarcos v. de la Merced,21we held that:
The term "legal heirs" is used in Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the succession
either by provision of a will or by operation of law. Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether
succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but they may be so if the law reserves
a legitime for them.

xxx xxx xxx

Verily, petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed under the rules on intestacy as entitled to succeed to the estate of the Catain
spouses due to the absence of compulsory heirs, they now step into the shoes of the decedents. They should be considered as among
the legal heirs contemplated by Section 119 as entitled to redeem the homestead.

The above interpretation of "legal heirs" as contra-distinguished from the restrictive construction given it by the lower court is more in
keeping with the salutary purpose behind the enactment of Section 119 and the jurisprudence laid down on the matter. Indeed, it is not
far-fetched to arrive at a more liberal conclusion if the section is analyzed in accordance with its purpose xxxx22
Respondents inherited the property from Asok, their husband and father, who in turn inherited it from his parents. Respondent Ella
Gagarani Asok, as daughter-in-law of the patentees, can be considered as among the legal heirs who can repurchase the land in
accordance with Salenillas v. CA.23 In that case, we allowed the daughter and son-in-law of the patentees to repurchase the property
because this would be "more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory interpretations,
that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail"24 Furthermore, the law must be liberally construed in order to carry out
its purpose.25

Finally, petitioner asserts that even if respondents could be considered as being entitled to the right under Sec. 119, this had already
prescribed because the period should be counted from the date of conveyance which means the date of sale and not the date of
registration of the certificate of sale.

This argument lacks merit.

This is far from a novel issue. It was already resolved in Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. CA:26
Thus, the rules on redemption in the case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of land acquired under free patent or homestead statutes may
be summarized as follows: xxx If the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks, the mortgagor may redeem the property within
one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No. 3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs may repurchase
the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the redemption period also pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act.27
There is no dispute that in extrajudicial foreclosures under Act 3135, the debtor or his or her successors-in-interest may redeem the
property within one year. This redemption period should be reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of sale.28 The five-
year period fixed in Sec. 119 begins to run from the expiration of the one-year redemption period.29 Here, the certificate of sale was
registered on December 24, 1992 and the one-year redemption period expired on December 24, 1993. Reckoned from that day,
respondents had a five-year period, or until December 24, 1998, to exercise their right to repurchase under Sec. 119 of CA 141.
Consequently, the CA was correct in holding that the complaint filed on May 15, 1998 was on time.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SUMALJAG VS. LITERATO

FACTS:

On November 16, 1993, Josefa D. Maglasang ("Josefa") filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte a
complaint3 (docketed as Civil Case No. B-1239) for the nullity of the deed of sale of real property purportedly executed between her as
vendor and the spouses Diosdidit and Menendez Literato (the "respondent spouses") as vendees. The complaint alleged that this deed
of sale dated October 15, 1971 of Lot 1220-D is spurious. Josefa was the sister of Menendez Maglasang Literato ("Menendez"). They
were two (2) of the six (6) heirs who inherited equal parts of a 6.3906-hectare property (Lot 1220) passed on to them by their parents
Cristito and Inecita Diano Maglasang.4 Lot 1220-D was partitioned to Josefa, while Lot 1220-E was given to Menendez.

The respondent spouses' response to the complaint was an amended answer with counterclaim5 denying that the deed of sale was
falsified. They impleaded the petitioner with Josefa as counterclaim defendant on the allegation that the petitioner, at the instance of
Josefa, occupied Lot 1220-D and Lot 1220-E without their (the respondent spouses') authority; Lot 1220-E is theirs by inheritance while
1220-D had been sold to them by Josefa. They also alleged that the petitioner acted in bad faith in acquiring the two (2) lots because he
prepared and notarized on September 26, 1986 the contract of lease over the whole of Lot 1220 between all the Maglasang heirs (but
excluding Josefa) and Vicente Tolo, with the lease running from 1986 to 1991; thus, the petitioner then knew that Josefa no longer owned
Lot 1220-D.

Civil Case No. 12816 is a complaint that Menendez filed on April 4, 1996 with the RTC for the declaration of the inexistence of lease
contract, recovery of possession of land, and damages against the petitioner and Josefa after the RTC dismissed the respondent spouses'
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1239. The complaint alleged that Josefa, who had previously sold Lot 1220-D to Menendez, leased it,
together with Lot 1220-E, to the petitioner. Menendez further averred that the petitioner and Josefa were in bad faith in entering their
contract of lease as they both knew that Josefa did not own the leased lots. Menendez prayed, among others, that this lease contract
between Josefa and the petitioner be declared null and void.

Josefa died on May 3, 1999 during the pendency of Civil Case Nos. B-1239 and B-1281.

On August 13, 1999, Atty. Zenen A. Puray ("Atty. Puray") - the petitioner's and Josefa's common counsel - asked the RTC in Civil Case
No. 1239 that he be given an extended period or up to September 10, 1999 within which to file a formal notice of death and su bstitution
of party.

The RTC granted the motion in an order dated August 13, 1999.7 On August 26, 1999, Atty. Puray filed with the RTC a notice of death
and substitution of party,8 praying that Josefa - in his capacity as plaintiff and third party counterclaim defendant - be substituted by the
petitioner. The submission alleged that prior to Josefa's death, she executed a Quitclaim Deed9 over Lot 1220-D in favor of Remismundo
D. Maglasang10 who in turn sold this property to the petitioner.

Menendez, through counsel, objected to the proposed substitution, alleging that Atty. Puray filed the notice of death and substitution of
party beyond the thirty-day period provided under Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. She
recommended instead that Josefa be substituted by the latter's full-blood sister, Michaeles Maglasang Rodrigo ("Michaeles").

The RTC denied Atty. Puray's motion for substitution and instead ordered the appearance of Michaeles as representative of the deceased
Josefa. This Order provides:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and instead order the appearance of Mrs. Mechailes
Maglasang-Rodrigo of Brgy. Binulho, Albuera, Leyte, as representative of the deceased Josefa Maglasang.

SO ORDERED.11

The RTC subsequently denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an order12 dated May 25, 2000.

The petitioner went to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59712) to question the above interlocutory orders.
In a Decision13 dated June 26, 2001, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The appellate court similarly denied the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration in its Resolution14 dated September 4, 2001.

The present petition essentially claims that the CA erred in dismissing CA-G.R. No. SP 59712 since: (a) the property under litigation was
no longer part of Josefa's estate since she was no longer its owner at the time of her death; (b) the petitioner had effectively been
subrogated to the rights of Josefa over the property under litigation at the time she died; (c) without an estate, the heir who was appointed
by the lower court no longer had any interest to represent; (d) the notice of death was seasonably submitted by the counsel of Josefa to
the RTC within the extended period granted; and (e) the petitioner is a transferee pendente lite who the courts should recognize pursuant
to Rule 3, Section 20 of the Rules of Court.

THE COURT'S RULING

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.

The Governing Rule.

The rule on substitution in case of death of a party is governed by Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
which provides:

Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel. -Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it
shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days
from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified
period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the
estate of the deceased, and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. (Emphasis ours)

The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to the litigation who may be affected by the
intervening death. The deceased litigant is herself or himself protected as he/she continues to be properly represented in the suit through
the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.15

Application of the Governing Rule.

A. Survival of the pending action

A question preliminary to the application of the above provision is whether Civil Case Nos. B-1239 and B-1281 are actions that survive
the death of Josefa. We said in Gonzalez v. Pagcor:16

"The criteria for determining whether an action survives the death of a plaintiff or petitioner was elucidated upon in Bonilla v. Barcena (71
SCRA 491 (1976). as follows:

. . . The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of
action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person
being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and
rights of property affected being incidental. . . .

Since the question involved in these cases relate to property and property rights, then we are dealing with actions that survive so that
Section 16, Rule 3 must necessarily apply.

b. Duty of Counsel under the Rule.

The duty of counsel under the aforecited provision is to inform the court within thirty (30) days after the death of his client of the fact of
death, and to give the name and address of the deceased's legal representative or representatives. Incidentally, this is the only
representation that counsel can undertake after the death of a client as the fact of death terminated any further lawyer-client
relationship.17

In the present case, it is undisputed that the counsel for Josefa did in fact notify the lower court, although belatedly, of the fact of her
death.18 However, he did as well inform the lower court that -

"2. That before she died she executed a QUITCLAIM DEED in favor of REMISMUNDO D. MAGLASANG over the land in question (Lot
No. 1220-D of Benolho, Albuera, Leyte), evidenced by a QUITCLAIM DEED, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B" who in turn
sold it in favor of JUDGE ANTONIO SUMALJAG, evidenced by a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE, copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex "C"."

Further, counsel asked that "the deceased Josefa Maglasang in her capacity as plaintiff and as Third Party Counterclaim Defendant be
substituted in the case at bar by JUDGE ANTONIO SUMALJAG whose address is 38 Osmena Street, Ormoc City" pursuant to "Section
16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure".

This notification, although filed late, effectively informed the lower court of the death of litigant Josefa Maglasang so as to free her counsel
of any liability for failure to make a report of death under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. In our view, counsel satisfactorily
explained to the lower court the circumstances of the late reporting, and the latter in fact granted counsel an extended period. The
timeliness of the report is therefore a non-issue.

The reporting issue that goes into the core of this case is whether counsel properly gave the court the name and address of the legal
representative of the deceased that Section 16, Rule 3 specifies. We rule that he did not. The "legal representatives" that the provision
speaks of, refer to those authorized by law - the administrator, executor or guardian19 who, under the rule on settlement of estate of
deceased persons,20 is constituted to take over the estate of the deceased. Section 16, Rule 3 likewise expressly provides that "the heirs
of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator . .
.". Significantly, the person - now the present petitioner - that counsel gave as substitute was not one of those mentioned under Section
16, Rule 3. Rather, he is a counterclaim co-defendant of the deceased whose proferred justification for the requested substitution is the
transfer to him of the interests of the deceased in the litigation prior to her death.

Under the circumstances, both the lower court and the CA were legally correct in not giving effect to counsel's suggested substitute.

First, the petitioner is not one of those allowed by the Rules to be a substitute. Section 16, Rule 3 speaks for itself in this respect.
Second, as already mentioned above, the reason for the Rule is to protect all concerned who may be affected by the intervening death,
particularly the deceased and her estate. We note in this respect that the Notice that counsel filed in fact reflects a claim against the
interest of the deceased through the transfer of her remaining interest in the litigation to another party. Interestingly, the transfer is in favor
of the very same person who is suggested to the court as the substitute. To state the obvious, the suggested substitution effectively
brings to naught the protection that the Rules intend; plain common sense tells us that the transferee who has his own interest to protect,
cannot at the same time represent and fully protect the interest of the deceased transferor.

Third, counsel has every authority to manifest to the court changes in interest that transpire in the course of litigation. Thus, counsel could
have validly manifested to the court the transfer of Josefa's interests in the subject matter of litigation pursuant to Section 19, Rule 3.21
But this can happen only while the client-transferor was alive and while the manifesting counsel was still the effective and authorized
counsel for the client-transferor, not after the death of the client when the lawyer-client relationship has terminated. The fact that the
alleged transfer may have actually taken place is immaterial to this conclusion, if only for the reason that it is not for counsel, after the
death of his client, to make such manifestation because he then has lost the authority to speak for and bind his client. Thus, at most, the
petitioner can be said to be a transferee pendente lite whose status is pending with the lower court.

Lastly, a close examination of the documents attached to the records disclose that the subject matter of the Quitclaim allegedly executed
by Josefa in favor of Remismundo is Lot 1220-E, while the subject matter of the deed of sale executed by Remismundo in the petitioner's
favor is Lot 1220-D. This circumstance alone raises the possibility that there is more than meets the eye in the transactions related to this
case.

c. The Heirs as Legal Representatives.

The CA correctly harked back to the plain terms of Section 16, Rule 3 in determining who the appropriate legal representative/s should
be in the absence of an executor or administrator. The second paragraph of the Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as
amended, is clear - the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator. Our decisions on this matter have been clear and unequivocal. In San Juan, Jr. v. Cruz, this Court held:

The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals x x x that priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased (the
executor or administrator) and that it is only in case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases
where the heirs resort to an extra-judicial settlement of the estate that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the
deceased to be substituted for the deceased, is no longer true.22 (Emphasis ours)

We likewise said in Gochan v. Young: 23

For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances recognized the heirs as proper representatives of
the decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed by the court. When no administrator has been appointed, as in this
case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased.

Josefa's death certificate24 shows that she was single at the time of her death. The records do not show that she left a will. Therefore,
as correctly held by the CA, in applying Section 16, Rule 3, her heirs are her surviving sisters (Michaelis, Maria, Zosima, and Consolacion)
and the children of her deceased sister, Lourdes (Manuel, Cesar, Huros and Regulo) who should be her legal representatives. Menendez,
although also a sister, should be excluded for being one of the adverse parties in the cases before the RTC.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.

REYES VS. ENRIQUEZ

FACTS:

The subject matter of the present case is a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1851 Flr-133 with an aggregate area of 2,017 square meters
located in Talisay, Cebu.2

According to petitioners Faustino Reyes, Esperidion Reyes, Julieta C. Rivera, and Eutiquio Dico, Jr., they are the lawful heirs of Dionisia
Reyes who co-owned the subject parcel of land with Anacleto Cabrera as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-3551
(T-8070). On April 17, 1996, petitioners executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes (the Extra Judicial
Settlement) involving a portion of the subject parcel of land. On March 21, 1997, the petitioners and the known heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
executed a Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale (the Segregation and Confirmation) over the same property. By virtue
of the aforestated documents, TCT No. RT-35551 (T-8070) was cancelled and new TCTs were issued: (1) TCT No. T-98576 in the name
of Anacleto Cabrera covering Lot 1851-A; (2) TCT No. T-98577 covering Lot 1851-B in the name of petitioner Eutiquio Dico, Jr.; (3) TCT
No. T-98578 covering Lot 1851-C in the name of petitioner Faustino Reyes; (4) TCT No. T-98579 covering Lot 1851-D in the name of
petitioner Esperidion Reyes; (5) TCT No. T-98580 covering Lot 1851-E in the name of petitioner Julieta G. Rivera; (6) TCT No. T-98581
covering Lot 1851-F in the name of Felipe Dico; and (7) TCT No. T-98582 covering Lot 1851-G in the name of Archimedes C. Villaluz.3

Respondents Peter B. Enriquez (Peter) for himself and on behalf of his minor daughter Deborah Ann C. Enriquez (Deborah Ann), also
known as Dina Abdullah Enriquez Alsagoff, on the other hand, alleges that their predecessor-in-interest Anacleto Cabrera and his wife
Patricia Seguera Cabrera (collectively the Spouses Cabrera) owned - pro-indiviso share in the subject parcel of land or 1051 sq. m. They
further allege that Spouses Cabrera were survived by two daughters - Graciana, who died single and without issue, and Etta, the wife of
respondent Peter and mother of respondent Deborah Ann - who succeeded their parents' rights and took possession of the 1051 sq. m.
of the subject parcel of land. During her lifetime, Graciana sold her share over the land to Etta. Thus, making the latter the sole owner of
the one-half share of the subject parcel of land. Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed on to petitioners Peter and Deborah
Ann by virtue of an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate. On June 19, 1999, petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann sold 200 sq. m. out of the
1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to Spouses Dionisio and Catalina Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also their co-respondents in the case
at bar. After the sale, Spouses Fernandez took possession of the said area in the subject parcel of land.4

When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject land, they discovered that certain documents prevent them from
doing so: (1) Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating that his share in Lot No. 1851, the subject property, is
approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by Dionisia Reyes dated July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only owned - of Lot No. 1851, while
302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia and the rest of the property is co-owned by Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and
Maximiano Dico; (3) Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes dated April 17, 1996; (4) certificates of title in the
name of the herein petitioners; and (5) Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale dated March 21, 1997 executed by
the alleged heirs of Dionisia Reyes and Anacleto Cabrera. Alleging that the foregoing documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the
respondents filed a complaint for annulment or nullification of the aforementioned documents and for damages.5 They likewise prayed
for the "repartition and resubdivision" of the subject property.6

The RTC, upon motion of the herein petitioners, dismissed the case on the ground that the respondents-plaintiffs were actually seeking
first and foremost to be declared heirs of Anacleto Cabrera since they can not demand the partition of the real property without first being
declared as legal heirs and such may not be done in an ordinary civil action, as in this case, but through a special proceeding specifically
instituted for the purpose.7

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC and directed the trial court to proceed with the hearing of the case.8 The Motion
for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners was similarly denied.9

Hence this petition.

The primary issue in this case is whether or not the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs
of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the Extra-
Judicial Settlement with the Sale of Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale
executed by the heirs of Dionisia Reyes and the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new transfer certificates of title issued
by virtue of the above-questioned documents.

We answer in the affirmative.

An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.10 A special proceeding, on the other hand, is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.11

The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and defend an action in court.12 A real party in interest
is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof.13 Such interest, to
be considered a real interest, must be one which is present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future,
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.14 A plaintiff is a real party in interest when he is the one who has a legal right to enforce
or protect, while a defendant is a real party in interest when he is the one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done
to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant's act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former.15 The purpose of the rule is
to protect persons against undue and unnecessary litigation.16 It likewise ensures that the court will have the benefit of having before it
the real adverse parties in the consideration of a case.17 Thus, a plaintiff's right to institute an ordinary civil action should be based on
his own right to the relief sought.

In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was registered sue to recover the said property through the
institution of an ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and partition,18 or nullification of transfer certificate of titles
and other deeds or documents related thereto,19 this Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper in an ordinary
civil action since the matter is "within the exclusive competence of the court in a special proceeding." 20 In the recent case of Portugal v.
Portugal-Beltran,21 the Court had the occasion to clarify its ruling on the issue at hand, to wit:

The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to
the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but
there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised
and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated,
however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask
for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition
or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.22

In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action for the "Declaration of Non-Existency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and
Cancellation of Certificates of Title, etc.," a review of the allegations therein reveals that the right being asserted by the respondents are
their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who they claim co-owned one-half of the subject property and not merely one-fourth as stated in
the documents the respondents sought to annul. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the ruling in the case of Heirs of Guido
Yaptinchay v. Hon. Roy del Rosario23 is applicable in the case at bar. In the said case, the petitioners therein, claiming to be the legal
heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay filed for annulment of the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Golden Bay
Realty Corporation on the ground that the subject properties rightfully belong to the petitioners' predecessor and by virtue of succession
have passed on to them. In affirming the trial court therein, this Court ruled:
...(T)he plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance
of it - except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays - that they have been declared the legal heirs
of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for
reconveyance.24

In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their allegations, have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither is there anything in the records of this case which would show that a
special proceeding to have themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been instituted. As such, the trial court correctly
dismissed the case for there is a lack of cause of action when a case is instituted by parties who are not real parties in interest. While a
declaration of heirship was not prayed for in the complaint, it is clear from the allegations therein that the right the respondents sought to
protect or enforce is that of an heir of one of the registered co-owners of the property prior to the issuance of the new transfer certificates
of title that they seek to cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as such heirs in the proper forum.

Furthermore, in Portugal,25 the Court held that it would be superfluous to still subject the estate to administration proceedings since a
determination of the parties' status as heirs could be achieved in the ordinary civil case filed because it appeared from the records of the
case that the only property left by the decedent was the subject matter of the case and that the parties have already presented evidence
to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. In the present case, however, nothing in the records of this case shows that the only
property left by the deceased Anacleto Cabrera is the subject lot, and neither had respondents Peter and Deborah Ann presented any
evidence to establish their rights as heirs, considering especially that it appears that there are other heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are
not parties in this case that had signed one of the questioned documents. Hence, under the circumstances in this case, this Court finds
that a determination of the rights of respondents Peter and Deborah Ann as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera in a special proceeding is
necessary.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED.

DKC HOLDINGS CORP. VS. CA

FACTS:

The subject of the controversy is a 14,021 square meter parcel of land located in Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila which was originally
owned by private respondent Victor U. Bartolome’s deceased mother, Encarnacion Bartolome, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-
37615 of the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III. This lot was in front of one of the textile plants of petitioner and, as such, was
seen by the latter as a potential warehouse site.

March 16, 1988. DKC entered a contract of lease with option to buy with Encarnacion Bartolome (Victor’s deceased mom). DKC was
given the option to lease or lease with purchase the subject land, which option must be exercised within a period of two years counted
from the signing of the Contract. In turn, DKC undertook to pay P3,000.00 a month as consideration for the reservation of its option.
Within the two-year period, DKC shall serve formal written notice upon the lessor Encarnacion Bartolome of its desire to exercise its
option. The contract also provided that in case DKC chose to lease the property, it may take actual possession of the premises. In such
an event, the lease shall be for a period of six years, renewable for another six years, and the monthly rental fee shall be P15,000.00 for
the first six years and P18,000.00 for the next six years, in case of renewal.

DKC regularly paid Encarnacion until her death in January 1990. DKC then directed its payment to the son of Enacarnacion who is the
sole heir but Victor (Encarnacion’s son) refused the payment.

January 10, 1990. Victor executed an affidavit of Self Adjudication all over her deceased mom’s properties, including the subject lot.
Victor the dick then cancelled the deed of transfer of DKC and then issued a transfer certificate under his name, what a dick.

March 14, 1990. DKC sent a notice to Victor the royal douche, stating that they are going to exercise their option to lease, tendering the
amount of P15,000 as rent. Victor the douche, being a dick as he is, refused payment.

DKC then opened a saving account with the China Banking Corp. under the name of Victor and deposited the P15,000 as rental fee while
also adding another P6000 for reservation fees

DKC also tried to register and annotate the Contract on the title of Victor the dick to the property. Although respondent Register of Deeds
accepted the required fees, he nevertheless refused to register or annotate the same or even enter it in the day book or primary register.

April 23, 1990. DKC filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Victor and the Register of Deeds. DKC prayed for
the surrender and delivery of possession of the subject land in accordance with the Contract terms; the surrender of title for registration
and annotation thereon of the Contract; and the payment of P500,000.00 as actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages,
P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and P300,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

During the May of 1990, some guy named Andres Lonzano filed a motion for intervention with motion to dismiss for he was a tenant-tiller
of the subject property, dude is under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the motion was denied by the court, poor guy.

The lower court then rendered its decision, it dismissed the complaint and ordered DKC to pay Victor for P30,000 as attorney’s fee. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the lower court
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy entered into by the late Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner was terminated
upon her death or whether it binds her sole heir, Victor, even after her demise.

RULING:

NO! Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides, as follows-

"ART. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable... beyond the
value of the property he received from the decedent.

The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and
obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law.

In the case at bar, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the rights and obligations under the contract
intransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein are, by their nature, transmissible.

"Among contracts which are intransmissible are those which are purely personal, either by provision of law, such as in cases of
partnerships and agency, or by the very nature of the obligations arising therefrom, such as those requiring special personal...
qualifications of the obligor. It may also be stated that contracts for the payment of money debts are not transmitted to the heirs of a party,
but constitute a charge against his estate. Thus, where the client in a contract for professional services of a lawyer died, leaving... minor
heirs, and the lawyer, instead of presenting his claim for professional services under the contract to the probate court, substituted the
minors as parties for his client, it was held that the contract could not be enforced against the minors; the lawyer was limited to a...
recovery on the basis of quantum meruit."

In the case at bar, there is no personal act required from the late Encarnacion Bartolome. Rather, the obligation of Encarnacion in the
contract to deliver possession of the subject property to petitioner upon the exercise by the latter of its option to lease the same may very
well be performed by her heir Victor.

Under both Article 1311 of the Civil Code and jurisprudence, therefore, Victor is bound by the subject Contract of Lease with Option to
Buy.

VENTURA VS. MILITANTE

FACTS:

Private respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money and Damages against petitioner. However, petitioner moved to dismiss the
foregoing complaint on the ground that “the estate of Carlos Ngo has no legal personality,” the same being “neither a natural nor legal
person in contemption of law.”

The petitioner then filed an opposition to private respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The public respondent then gave private respondent 15
days to make the amendment of the complaint. Petitioner filed a MR of the order of public respondent. First, she argued that the action
instituted by the private respondent to recover P48, 889.70, representing the unpaid price of the automotive spare parts purchased by
her deceased husband during his lifetime, is a money claim which, under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, does not
survive, the same having been filed after Carlos Ngo had already died. Second, she claimed that the public respondent never acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case which, being an action to recover a sum of money from a deceased person, may only be
heard by a probate court. Private respondent opposed the foregoing motion.

Public respondent then issued an Order giving private respondent 24 hours to file his amended complaint. Private respondent then filed
his amended complaint. Petitioner then filed a Comment to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Private respondent then filed A Rejoinder to
Defendant’s Comment. Public respondent then issued the herein assailed order. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari assailing the
said Order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dead person or his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action.

RULING:

NO! Firstly, neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A deceased person does not have such legal
entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An action begun
by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a legal entity; such an ac tion is a
nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to amend. Considering that
capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may
not be named a party defendant in a court action.
Secondly, It is clear that the original complaint of private respondent against the estate of Carlos Ngo was a suit against Carlos Ngo
himself who was already dead at the time of the filing of said complaint. At that time, and this private respondent admitted, no special
proceeding to settle his estate had been filed in court. As such, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over either the deceased Carlos
Ngo or his estate. It is true that amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every case may so
far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of causes or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary
expense.

But amendments cannot be allowed so as to confer jurisdiction upon a court that never acquired it in the first place. When it is evident
that the court has no jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter and that the pleading is so fatally defective as not to be susceptible
of amendment, or that to permit such amendment would radically alter the theory and the nature of the action, then the court should
refuse the amendment of the defective pleading and order the dismissal of the case.

ACAP VS. CA

FACTS:

Felixberto Oruma sold his inherited land to Cosme Pido, which land is rented by petitioner Teodoro Acap. When Cosme died intestate,
his heirs executed a “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights” in favor of private respondent Edy delos Reyes. Respondent informed
petitioner of his claim over the land, and petitioner paid the rental to him in 1982.

However in subsequent years, petitioner refused to pay the rental, which prompted respondent to file a complaint for the recovery of
possession and damages. Petitioner averred that he continues to recognize Pido as the owner of the land, and that he will pay the
accumulated rentals to Pido’s widow upon her return from abroad. The lower court ruled in favor of private respondent.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights” is a recognized mode of acquiring ownership by private respondent

(2) Whether the said document can be considered a deed of sale in favor of private respondent

RULING:

An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to
give rise to ownership over the res. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership
and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process
of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question.

In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and
the other party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights
operates as a public instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by
the decedent among themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court. Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights.

The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second is, technically speaking, a mode of
extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and
intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession.

Private respondent, being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on
the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any other derivative mode of
acquiring ownership.

A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the registered owner, the validity of which is yet to be established
in court at some future date, and is no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already pending in court. It is to be
noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly proven, there is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed
between Cosme Pido's heirs and private respondent transferring the rights of Pido's heirs to the land in favor of private respondent.

Private respondent's right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel
the OCT to the land and title the same in private respondent's name. Consequently, while the transaction between Pido's heirs and private
respondent may be binding on both parties, the right of petitioner as a registered tenant to the land cannot be perfunctorily forfeited on a
mere allegation of private respondent's ownership without the corresponding proof thereof.

BONILLA VS. BARCENA

FACTS:

On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a
civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.chanrobles virtual law library
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the counsel
for the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in order to include certain allegations therein. The motion to amend the complaint was
granted and on July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint.chanrobles virtual law library

On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and,
therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff
confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but
the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has
no legal personality to sue.chanrobles virtual law library

On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the order dismissing the complaint and on August 23, 1975, he moved to
set aside the order of the dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 2

On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the plaintiff for lack of merit. On September 1,
1975, counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed
to substitute their deceased mother, but the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for the deceased
plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint claiming that the same is in violation of Sections
16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court but the same was denied.chanrobles virtual law library

Hence, this petition for review.

The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 and its orders denying
the motion for reconsideration of said order of dismissal.

While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its
completion. The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed
on March 31, 1975.

This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired
jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the
pendency of the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies
... it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he
manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in
the case.

The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no
legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his
property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods
provided for by law. 3 The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether
such right be pure or contingent. 4 The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of
their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings.

When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished
by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and
became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in
interest for the deceased plaintiff.chanrobles virtual law library

Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon
proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be granted
... ." The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for.

In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to
the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the
property and rights of property affected being incidental. 7 Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an
action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one
that survives even after her death.

It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted
for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to
dismiss the complaint. This should not have been done for under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of
the court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of
the deceased.

In the instant case the respondent Court did not have to bother ordering the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased because her counsel has not only asked that the minor children be substituted for her but also suggested
that their uncle be appointed as guardian ad litem for them because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for the family. But the
respondent Court refused the request for substitution on the ground that the children were still minors and cannot sue in court. This is
another grave error because the respondent Court ought to have known that under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

Precisely in the instant case, the counsel for the deceased plaintiff has suggested to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors
be appointed to act as guardian ad litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying
with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution
of parties in the case.

BUOT VS. DUJALI

FACTS:

Buot filed before the RTC a petition4 for letters of administration of the estate of deceased Gregorio Dujali (Gregorio). In her petition, Buot
alleged that she was a surviving heir, along with Roque Dujali, Constancia Dujali-Tiongson, Concepcion Dujali-Satiembre, Marilou Sales-
Dujali, Marietonete Dujali, Georgeton Dujali, Jr. and Geomar Dujali, of Gregorio who died intestate.5 Buot annexed6 to her petition a list
of Gregorio's properties that are allegedly publicly known. She claimed that since Gregorio's death, there had been no effort to settle his
estate. Roque Dujali (Dujali) purportedly continued to manage and control the properties to the exclusion of all the other heirs. Buot further
alleged that Dujali for no justifiable reason denied her request to settle the estate.7 Thus, Buot asked that: (1) an administrator be
appointed to preserve Gregorio's estate; (2) a final inventory of the properties be made; (3) the heirs be established; and (4) the net estate
be ordered distributed in accordance with law among the legal heirs.8

Dujali filed an opposition with motion to dismiss,9 arguing that Buot had no legal capacity to institute the proceedings. He asserted that
despite Buot's claim that she was Gregorio's child with his first wife Sitjar Escalona, she failed to attach any document, such as a certificate
of live birth or a marriage certificate, to prove her filiation. Dujali, on the other hand, attached a certificate of marriage between Gregorio
and his mother Yolanda Rasay. This certificate also indicated that Gregorio had never been previously married to a certain Sitjar Escalona.
Thus, as Buot failed to prove that she is an heir, Dujali prayed that her petition be dismissed outright.

Buot filed her comment10 to Dujali's opposition with motion to dismiss. She argued that under the Rules of Court, only ultimate facts
should be included in an initiatory pleading. The marriage certificate and certificate of live birth which Dujali demands are evidentiary
matters that ought to be tackled during trial. Nevertheless, to answer Dujali's allegations, Buot attached to her comment a copy of the
necrological services program11 where she was listed as one of Gregorio's heirs, a certification12 from the municipal mayor that she is
Gregorio's child, and a copy of the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement13 dated July 4, 2001 which includes both Buot and Dujali as
Gregorio's heirs. Notably, this Amended Extrajudicial Settlement pertained to parcels of land not included in the list of properties annexed
in Buot's petition.

On May 3, 2011, the RTC denied Dujali's motion to dismiss. It agreed with Buot that the issues raised by Dujali are evidentiary matters
that should be addressed during trial.14

Dujali filed a motion for reconsideration.15 He argued that under the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence, a party's lack of legal
capacity to sue should be raised in a motion to dismiss. Further, he took issue with the existence of the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement.
According to him, when an estate has no debts, recourse to administration proceedings is allowed only when there are good and
compelling reasons. Where an action for partition (whether in or out of court) is possible, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding.

The RTC, in its Order dated September 19, 2011, granted Dujali's motion for reconsideration. It held that under the law, there are only
two exceptions to the requirement that the settlement of a deceased's estate should be judicially administered—extrajudicial settlement
and summary settlement of an estate of small value.16 According to the RTC, in the case of Buot's petition, administration has been
barred by the fact that Gregorio's estate has already been settled extrajudicially as evidenced by the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement.
It also noted that Gregorio had no creditors since Buot failed to allege it in her petition.17 Since recourse to judicial administration of an
estate that has no debt is allowed only when there are good reasons for not resorting to extrajudicial settlement or action for partition, the
RTC dismissed Buot's petition. Buot filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied in its Order dated December 8, 2011.
According to the RTC, not only was Buot's motion a second motion for reconsideration prohibited under the Rules, there was also no
sufficient reason to reverse its earlier dismissal of the petition.18

Buot filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the RTC's Orders on pure questions of law.
In her petition, Buot argues that her motion for reconsideration is not a prohibited second motion for reconsideration. Section 2 of Rule
52 of the Rules of Court states that a prohibited second motion for reconsideration is one filed by the same party. In this case, Buot's
motion for reconsideration was her first, since the motion for reconsideration subject of the Order dated September 19, 2011 was filed by
Dujali. She also argued that the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement did not cover all of Gregorio's properties.19

Further, Buot maintains that heirs are not precluded from instituting a petition for administration if they do not, for good reason, wish to
pursue an ordinary action for partition. In her case, she claims that there are good reasons justifying her recourse to administration
proceedings: (1) the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement did not cover the entire estate; (2) there has been no effort to partition the property;
(3) Dujali seeks to challenge Buot's status as an heir; (4) other heirs have been deprived of the properties of the estate; and (5) other
heirs, particularly Constancia Dujali and Marilou Dujali, have already manifested that they are amenable to the appointment of an
administrator.20

In his comment,21 Dujali argues that Buot is not an interested person allowed to file a petition for administration of the estate. While she
claims to be Gregorio's heir, public documents, such as Buot's certificate of live birth and the certificate of marriage between Gregorio
and Yolanda Rasay, reveal otherwise. Dujali also attached to his comment certain documents that appear to show that there has been
an extrajudicial settlement of some of the properties of the estate and that Buot has already received her share from the proceeds of the
sale of these properties by the true heirs.22 Further, he explains that Buot was only allowed to participate in the Amended Extrajudicial
Settlement by Gregorio's legitimate heirs out of humanitarian considerations, not because she is a true heir. All these, Dujali argues,
clearly indicate that there is no good and compelling reason to grant Buot's petition for administration.23

In her reply,24 Buot contends that the issue of whether she is a person interested in the estate is a matter that should be raised during
the trial by the RTC of her petition for administration.

We deny the petition.

First, we must emphasize that this is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This recourse to the Court
covers only a review of questions of law. In this case, the question of law presented before us is whether the RTC properly dismissed the
petition for administration on the ground that there has already been an extrajudicial settlement of certain properties of the estate. An
additional question of procedure raised here is whether the RTC was correct in holding that Buot's motion for reconsideration should be
denied as it is a prohibited second motion for reconsideration.

All other issues raised in the pleadings before us are questions of fact that we cannot resolve at this time. As we shall shortly explain in
this Decision, these questions of fact ought to be resolved by a trial court in the appropriate proceeding.

We will first rule on the procedural issue raised in the petition. In its Order dated September 19, 2011, the RTC held that Buot's motion
for reconsideration is a second motion for reconsideration prohibited under the Rules of Court. Thus, the motion was denied. We reviewed
the motions filed by the parties before the RTC and rule that the RTC erred in its finding.

When Buot filed her petition for administration, Dujali filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss. When the RTC denied his motion to
dismiss, Dujali filed a motion for reconsideration. This led to the RTC's issuance of the Order of September 19, 2011 granting Dujali's
motion for reconsideration and holding that Buot's petition for administration should be dismissed. It was only at this point that Buot filed,
for the first time, a motion seeking for reconsideration of the Order which declared the dismissal of her petition for administration. Clearly,
this is not the motion for reconsideration contemplated in Section 2 of Rule 52 of the Rules of Court which states:

Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. - No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party
shall be entertained.
Section 2 of Rule 52 is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. What it prohibits is a second motion for reconsideration filed by the
same party involving the same judgment or final resolution. In the present case, Buot's motion for reconsideration was only her first motion
challenging the Order dismissing her petition for administration of Gregorio's estate. The RTC clearly erred in denying her motion on the
ground that it is a second motion for reconsideration prohibited under the Rules.

Nevertheless, we rule that the RTC properly ordered the dismissal of Buot's petition for administration.

When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to judicial administration proceedings. There are, however,
several exceptions. One such exception is provided for in Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. This Section states:
Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters
of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of
deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself
the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by
public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means
of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action
for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the
value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just
claim that may be filed under Section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for
letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided
in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had
no notice thereof.
According to this provision, when the deceased left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate
among themselves without judicial administration. The heirs may do so extrajudicially through a public instrument filed in the office of the
Register of Deeds. In case of disagreement, they also have the option to file an action for partition.

Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent the heirs from instituting administration proceedings if they have good reasons for
choosing not to file an action for partition. In Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, etc. and Rodriguez,26 we said:
[S]ection 1 [of Rule 74] does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or
obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the
estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they have
good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made
therein of the word may. If the intention were otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the word shall as was done in other
provisions that are mandatory in character. x x x.27 (Italics in the original.)
Since such proceedings are always "long," "costly," "superfluous and unnecessary,"28 resort to judicial administration of cases f alling
under Section 1, Rule 74 appears to have become the exception rather than the rule. Cases subsequent to Rodriguez emphasized that
"[w]here partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good
and compelling reasons."29

In Pereira v. Court of Appeals30 we had the opportunity to explain what the "good reason exception" means. What constitutes good
reason depends on the circumstances of each case. We said:
"Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the manner
of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the
hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is unconvincing, because,
as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly
be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir."
In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the
heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved in
an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administration. In still another case, We did not find so powerful
a reason the argument that the appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is
necessary in order for him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since he may just
adduce proof of his being a forced heir in 2 intestate proceedings of the latter.31 (Citations omitted.)
Thus, in Pereira, we refused to allow administration proceedings where the only reason why the appointment of an administrator was
sought so that one heir can take possession of the estate from the other heir. We held that this was not a compelling reason to order
judicial administration. We added that in cases like this, "the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be
properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event."32

We have reviewed the reasons which Buot proffers to warrant the grant of her petition for letters of administration and rule that these do
not suffice to warrant the submission of Gregorio's estate to administration proceedings. That the extrajudicial settlement in this case did
not cover Gregorio's entire estate is, by no means, a sufficient reason to order the administration of the estate. Whether the extrajudicial
settlement did in fact cover the entire estate and whether an extrajudicial settlement that does not cover the entire estate may be
considered valid do not automatically create a compelling reason to order the administration of the estate. Parties seeking to challenge
an extrajudicial settlement of estate possess sufficient remedies under the law and procedural rules.

As to Buot's other allegations that: (1) there has been no effort to partition the estate; (2) that Dujali challenges her status as an heir; (3)
that other heirs have been deprived of the estate; and (4) these heirs are amenable to the appointment of an administrator, we find that
none of these allegations actually prevent the filing of an ordinary action for partition. In fact, if it is indeed true that there has been no
effort to partition Gregorio's entire estate, the filing of an action for partition before the proper court will leave his heirs with no choice but
to proceed. An action for partition is also the proper venue to ascertain Buot's entitlement to participate in the proceedings as an heir.33
Not only would it allow for the full ventilation of the issues as to the properties that ought to be included in the partition and the true heirs
entitled to receive their portions of the estate, it is also the appropriate forum to litigate questions of fact that may be necessary to ascertain
if partition is proper and who may participate in the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, this petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

CAPABLANCA VS. HEIRS OF PEDRO BAS

FACTS:

The subject matter of this case is Lot 2535 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Land's Estate located in "Biasong, Dumlog, Talisay, Cebu"

Andres Bas (Andres) and Pedro Bas (Pedro) acquired Lot 2535, "and Patent No. 1724 was issued in their names on May 12, 1937."[7]

Pedro sold to Faustina Manreal (Faustina), married to Juan Balorio, his portion of Lot 2535 "with a seeding capacity of four (4) chupas of
com."[8] The sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale

After the death of Faustina and her husband, their heirs executed a notarized Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Absolute
Sale

Lot 2535 consisting of "1,000 square meters, more or less," was conveyed to one (1) of their heirs, Alejandra Balorio (Alejandra).

Alejandra sold the land... to Edith N. Deen, who in turn sold it to Atty. Eddy A. Deen (Atty. Deen)

Upon Atty. Deen's death on December 18, 1978, an extra-judicial settlement of estate, which did not include Lot 2535, was executed by
his heirs. Later, or on March 30, 1988, they executed an Additional Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Deed of Sale, which sold the
land for P10,000.00 to Norberto B. Bas (Norberto), who took possession of and built a house on it.

Norberto died without a will and was succeeded by his niece and only heir, Lolita Bas Capablanca (Lolita).

Subsequently, Lolita learned that a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-96676 dated June 6, 1996 was issued in the names of Andres
and Pedro on the basis of a reconstituted Deed of Conveyance No. 96-00004.
Josefina Bas Espinosa (Josefina) represented the Heirs of Pedro Bas to file a complaint for Clarification of Ownership of Lot 2535 against
Lolita before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Biasong, Talisay, Cebu.

a notarized Partition Agreement of Real Property, Quitclaim and Waiver of Rights was executed between the heirs of Andres and Lolita,
representing Norberto, whereby they partitioned Lot 2535 among themselves.

Lolita sought to register her portion in Lot 2535 but was denied by the Register of Deeds of Cebu, citing the need for a court order.

TCT No. T-96676 had been partially cancelled and TCT Nos. T-100181, T-100182, T-100183, and T-100185 had been issued in the
name of the Heirs of Pedro Bas, represented by Josefina

Lolita filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for the cancellation of the titles

Regional Trial Court... in favor of Lolita

Lolita had been in long possession of the lot under a claim of ownership as the heir of Norberto and that it was not necessary for her to
be first declared as his heir before filing the complaint.

to dismiss the case on the ground that Lolita should first be declared an heir would be too late as the Heirs of Pedro Bas did not raise the
issue in a motion to dismiss or as an affirmative defense in their complaint.

validity of the 1939 Deed of Sale executed by Pedro in favor of Faustina.

Norberto acquired the entire share of Pedro in Lot 2535, which was found only after survey in 1996,[29] to actually consist of 3,060 square
meters and not 1,000 square meters as insisted by the Heirs of Pedro Bas.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court Decision and dismissed the complaint.

Issues:

Petitioner argues that the 1999 case of the Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario... does not apply... her interest over the property is derived
from a series of transactions starting from the sale executed by Pedro.

Ruling:

This Court grants the petition.

this Court finds no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of heirship in order to resolve petitioner's action for cancellation of
titles of the property.

The dispute in this case is not about the heirship of petitioner to Norberto but the validity of the sale of the property in 1939 from Pedro to
Faustina, from which followed a series of transfer transactions that culminated in the sale of the property to Norberto. For with Pedro's
sale of the property in 1939, it follows that there would be no more ownership or right to property that would have been transmitted to his
heirs.

Petitioner's claim is anchored on a sale of the property to her predecessor-in-interest and not on any filiation with the original owner. What
petitioner is pursuing is Norberta's right of ownership over the property which was passed to her upon the latter's death.

no judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may assert his or her right to the property of the deceased.

The right to assert a cause of action as an heir, although he has not been judicially declared to be so, if duly proven, is well settled in this
jurisdiction. This is upon the theory that the property of a deceased person, both real and personal, becomes the property of the heir by
the mere fact of death of his predecessor in interest, and as such he can deal with it in precisely the same way in which the deceased
could have dealt, subject only to the limitations which by law or by contract may be imposed upon the deceased himself.

Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario[50] was misplaced

In that case, the motion to dismiss was filed immediately after the second Amended Complaint was filed.

the pronouncement in the Heirs of Yaptinchay that a declaration of heirship must be made only in a special proceeding and not in an
ordinary civil action for reconveyance of property was based on Litam, etc., et al. v. Rivera[55] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[56] which
involved different factual milieus.

Here, as stated, the main issue is the annulment of title to property, which ultimately hinges on the validity of the sale from Pedro to
Faustina. Petitioner does not claim any filiation with Pedro or seek to establish her right as his heir as against the respondents. Rather,
petitioner seeks to enforce her right over the property which has been allegedly violated by the fraudulent acts of respondents.

ALCANTARA VS. BELEN

FACTS:

In 2005, Spouses Alcantara filed before the RTC a Complaint4 against Spouses Belen for the quieting of title, reconveyance of
possession, and accounting of harvest with damages. Petitioners argued that their neighbors, respondents herein, had extended the
latter's possession up to the land titled to Spouses Alcantara, and usurped the harvests therefrom.

Spouses Alcantara claimed that they were the registered owners of Lot No. 16932 - a 3,887-square-meter parcel of land planted with
trees and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-36252.5 Elvira Alcantara traced her ownership of the property to her
inheritance from her mother, Asuncion Alimon. By virtue of an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated 24 March 1993,6 Free Patent No. (IV-
5)-3535 dated 28 August 1974 and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-5127 issued on 17 January 1975 were cancelled, and, in lieu
thereof, TCT No. T-36252 was issued in the name of Elvira Alcantara.

In addition to the certificate of title, Spouses Alcantara submitted as evidence the Tax Declarations of the property registered to them and
their predecessors-in-interest, receipts8 of their payments for real property taxes, and a Sketch/Special Plan9 of Lot No. 16932 prepared
by Geodetic Engineer Augusto C. Rivera.

On the strength of a sales agreement called Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa,10 respondents countered Spouses Alcantara's
claims over the property. Spouses Belen alleged that they bought the property from its prior owners. Even though respondents did not
have any certificate of title over the property, they supported their claim of ownership with various Tax Declarations under the name of
their predecessors-in-interest. Spouses Belen also submitted a Sketch/Special Plan11 of Lot No. 16932 prepared by Geodetic Engineer
Hector C. Santos.

Furthermore, Spouses Belen attacked the OCT of Asuncion Alimon. They claimed that fraud attended the issuance of a Free Patent to
her, considering that the Belens had occupied the property ever since. According to respondents, they already protested her title still
pending before the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).12

In its Decision dated 9 February 2009, the RTC gave more weight to the certificate of title and Tax Declarations presented by petitioners,
declaring them the absolute owners of Lot No. 16932. The trial court further dislodged the use of the Tax Declarations registered under
the names of Spouses Belen and their predecessors-in-interest, because these documents did not have the technical description of the
land and its boundaries; and in contrast, the TCT of Spouses Alcantara defined the subject property by metes and bounds, with a technical
description approved by the Land Management Bureau.

The RTC went on to conclude that respondents were claiming Lot No. 16931, a property different from Lot No. 16932, viz:13
There is clear evidence that what the plaintiffs are claiming based on their title is Lot No. 16932, and what the defendants are claiming to
have bought from their predecessors-in-interest, is a different lot with different boundaries and technical descriptions to that of Lot No.
16932. The land covered by the plaintiffs title has an area of 3,887 square meters only and its boundaries consist of the following "NW-
by Lot 1691 6; NE & SE-by Lot 16934; S-by Lot 16930; and SW-by Lot 16931." On the other hand, the lot bought by the defendants has
4,368 square meters with the following boundaries: "N-Paulino Velasco; E-by Felix Velasco; South--Cipriano Dayo and Crisanto Delos
Reyes; and W-by Casiano Meraña." The difference is made more manifest by the survey plan (Exhibit "E''; Records, p. 213) prepared by
Geodetic Engineer Augusto C. Rivera which is part of the Cadastral Lot survey for San Pablo City, showing that the defendants' propet1y
which they bought is Lot No. 16931, not Lot 16932, covered by the title of the plaintiffs. x x x

xxxx

The evidence of the defendants consisting of tax declarations (Exhibit "4"; Records, p. 278) show that what is tax declared in their names
is Lot No. 16931, not Lot No. 16932.

x x x. The evidence also shows that while the lot purchased by the defendants from their predecessors-in-interest has been tax declared
since 1948, Lot No. 16932 covered by plaintiffs title was only tax declared in 1983 in the name of the plaintiffs mother Asuncion Alimon.
This simply goes to show that if indeed what was purchased by the defendants is Lot No. 16932, the said lot should have been covered
by the tax declarations issued to their predecessors-in-interest as early as 1948. Yet it clearly appears that Lot 16932 was declared only
in 1983. (Emphasis supplied)
Spouses Belen successfully appealed before the CA. The appellate court found that respondents had presented their claims of ownership
over Lot No. 16932, and not Lot No. 16931.

The CA then declared that Asuncion Alimon was not a possessor or cultivator of the subject land, a fact that voided the Free Patent
issued to her, as well as the resulting OCT and TCT. The appellate court additionally held that Elvira Alcantara was not a legal heir of
Asuncion Alimon.

Since petitioners failed to show their legal entitlement to Lot No. 16932, the CA went on to declare respondents the owners of that
property. Moreover, it ordered the cancellation of OCT No. P-512 and TCT No. T-36252.

Spouses Alcantara moved for reconsideration,14 but to no avail. Before this Court, petitioners bewail the conclusions of the CA that
respondents own Lot No. 16932 and that petitioners' title to the realty is void. Petitioners assert that the Tax Declarations and the
Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa submitted by Spouses Belen pertain to Lot No. 16931. Spouses Alcantara further posit that the
Free Patent granted to Asuncion Alimon can only be litigated in reversion proceedings. Moreover, they allege that respondents cannot
properly assail, for the first time on appeal, the right of Elvira Alcantara to succeed Asuncion Alimon.
In their Comment,15 respondents do not deny that Lot No. 16932 is different from Lot No. 16931.16 They nevertheless assert ownership
over Lot No. 16932, alleging that their exhibits - the Tax Declarations and the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa - showed their
superior right over the realty. They also maintain that the CA correctly cancelled the Free Patent of Asuncion Alimon and declared Elvira
Alcantara a mere adoptee of Alimon.

ISSUE:

The nature of the action filed by petitioners below is for the quieting of title and the recovery of possession against the occupants of the
property, Spouses Belen. To quiet title, Article 477 of the Civil Code requires that the claimants must have a legal or an equitable title to
or interest in the real property that is the subject matter of the action.17

As for the recovery of possession, Spouses Alcantara pray for the possession and use of the subject lot and the right to harvest from it,
which are the reliefs granted in an accion reivindicatoria.18 In this judicial remedy, a party claims ownership over a parcel of land and
seeks recovery of its full possession.19

Therefore, in these proceedings, the Court is tasked to review whether the CA committed errors of law in concluding the legal issue of
ownership in favor of respondents on the basis of their Tax Declarations and the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa notwithstanding
the TCT of Spouses Alcantara. In other words, we are presented with the question of whether a certificate of title may be sufficiently
defeated by tax declarations and deeds of sale. Before us is thus a question of law as elucidated in Gaerlan v. Republic:20
The distinction between a "question of law" and a "question of fact" is settled. x x x. In Republic v. Vega, the Court held that when petitioner
asks for a review of the decision made by a lower court based on the evidence presented, without delving into their probative value but
simply on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a question of law is raised.

In the present case, there seems to be no dispute as to the facts, and the question presented before us calls for a review of the CA's
conclusion that the documents and evidence presented by petitioner are insufficient to support her application for registration of title.
Hence, the petition is properly filed.
RULING OF THE COURT

The appellate court held that the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa and the Tax Declaration submitted by respondents pertained to
the lot in litigation and reasoned that the "description of the property as shown by the statement of the boundaries in the tax declaration
bespeaks of the lot in litigation as described in the Deed of Sale submitted in evidence by the appellants."21 Based on these documents,
the CA adjudged Spouses Belen the lawful owners of Lot No. 16932.

However, in the first place, these exhibits do not involve Lot No. 16932. As correctly assessed by the RTC, the parcel of land described
in the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa does not correspond to the description of Lot No. 16932 as contained in the realty's
certificate of title claimed by petitioners. TCT No. T-36252 reads:22
Beginning at a point marked "1" of lot 16932, Cad-438-D, being N. 46-17 W., 5367.86 m. from BLLM No. 1, Cad-438-D, San Pablo City
Cad.; thence N. 65-45 E., 63.74 m. to point 2 S. 20-56 E., 68.88 m. to point 3; S. 76-30 W. 28.67 m. to point 4; S. 76-47 W., 31.59 m. to
point 5; N. 24-50 W., 57.36 m. to point 1; point of beginning. Containing an area of THREE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY
SEVEN (3,887) SQUARE METERS. x x x.
On the other hand, the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa pertains to the following:23
Isang (1) lagay na lupang niyugan na natatayo sa Nayon ng San Marcos, Lungsod ng San Pablo. Ang kabalantay sa HILAGA ay Paulino
Velasco; sa SILANGAN ay, Felix Velasco; sa TIMOG ay Cipriano Dayo at Crisanto Meraña Reyes; at sa KANLURAN - ay Casiano
Meraña; may lawak na 4,368 metros parisukat, humigit-kumulang, x x x ayon sa Boja Declaratoria Blg. 23949. x x x.
A cursory reading of the above excerpts clearly shows that the lot claimed by petitioners is not the property conveyed in the deed of sale
presented by respondents. Aside from their difference in size, the two properties have distinctive boundaries. Therefore, on the face of
the documents, the CA incorrectly ruled that these pertained to Lot No. 16932.

The ruling of the CA that respondents own Lot No. 16932 based on their Tax Declarations is likewise erroneous. Tracing the history of
the Tax Declarations registered under the names of respondents to those of their predecessors-in-interest, we find that none of these
refers to Lot No. 16932.

The oldest Tax Declaration exhibited by respondents is No. 390224 issued to Martin Belen in 1948. It covers a 4,368-square-meter lot
with the same boundaries as those indicated in the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa. This document was followed by the following
Tax Declarations covering the same property and registered to respondents' predecessors-in-interest: (1) No. 12041;25 (2) No. 34046;26
(3) No. 20303;27 (4) No. 51502;28 (5) No. 2343929 (which is the subject of the Kasulatang Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa); (6) No. 63-914;30
(7) ARP No. 91-06422;31 and (8) the present Tax Declaration, ARP No. 94-059-018.32

The last three Tax Declarations were already registered to Spouses Belen. Indicated on the dorsal portion of these documents are the
following: the parcel of land, area, and boundaries covered by the Tax Declaration. Through all of these details, we read that the exhibits
presented by respondents refer to Lot No. 16931, having an area of around 4,368 square meters33 and delineated by metes and bounds
different from those described in TCT No. T-36252. Hence, the RTC accurately ruled that the evidence of respondents "consisting of tax
declarations x x x shows that what is tax declared in their names is Lot No. 16931, not Lot No. 16932."34

Even assuming that the Tax Declarations of respondents pertain to the subject property, this Court finds that the CA incorrectly applied
the law on land titles. The appellate court should not have set aside the RTC's appreciation of the certificate of title registered to Spouses
Alcantara just because Spouses Belen presented their Tax Declarations.
Based on established jurisprudence,35 we rule that the certificate of title of petitioners is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of their
ownership of the property. The irrelevant Tax Declarations of Spouses Belen cannot defeat TCT No. T-36252 of Spouses Alcantara, as
it is binding and conclusive upon the whole world.36Cureg v. Intermediate Appellate Court37 explains:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[A]s against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof
of the area covered therein, an original certificate of title indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed
premises. Petitioners' OCT No. P-19093 should be accorded greater weight as against the tax declarations x x x offered by private
respondents in support of their claim x x x.
Aside from presenting a certificate of title to the claimed property, petitioners submit as evidence the Tax Declarations registered to them
and to their predecessors-in-interest. The earliest Tax Declaration on record is No. 5876038 registered to Asuncion Alimon in 1983.
Subsequent to that issuance are the following Tax Declarations: (1) No. 59-992;39 (2) ARP No. 91-48014;40 (3) ARP No. 94-059-0019;41
and (4) the present Tax Declaration, 99-059-00795.42 The back pages of all these Tax Declarations exhibited by petitioners uniformly
refer to Lot No. 16932, having an area of 3,887 square meters with boundaries as described in TCT No. T-36252.

These Tax Declarations,43 together with the certificate of title44 presented by petitioners, support their claims over Lot No. 16932.
Therefore, the CA incorrectly disposed of the property in favor of respondents, considering the indefeasibility of the Torrens title submitted
as evidence by petitioners. In Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp. v. Heirs of Coronado,45 we discussed the instant legal issue as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Indubitably, a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet title to land and put stop forever to any
question as to the legality of the title.
In the same assailed ruling, the CA went beyond the contents of the TCT and concluded that its issuance was a nullity. It went on to
declare the Free Patent issued to Asuncion Alimon void and ruled that Elvira Alcantara was not a lawful heir of Asuncion Alimon.

In declaring the nullity of the Free Patent, the CA held thus:46

A Free Patent cannot be issued to Alimon because it cannot be issued to a person who is not a possessor or cultivator of the land or is
not paying taxes that will justify segregation from the public land of the land applied for. Alimon intentionally applied for a Free Patent
absent the foregoing requirements.
Noticeably, the CA failed to cite any specific exhibit on record showing that Asuncion Alimon did not possess the land when she applied
for the patent. In effect, it jumped to conclusions without any sufficient basis for its premise. This form of adjudication is flawed, as no less
than the Constitution mandates that a court decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.47

Anent the legal status of Elvira Alcantara, the CA stated:48

On the other hand, appellee Elvira Alcantara is just a "Palake" of Alimon who had transferred the land to themselves. Appellee is not a
legal heir of Alimon. Margarito Belarmino, who testified for the appellees, admitted in court during cross-examination that appellee Elvira
Alcantara is just a "Palake" or adopted.
In Bagayas v. Bagayas,49 this Court reiterated that courts must refrain from making a declaration of heirship in an ordinary civil action
because "matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the
purpose of determining such rights."50 Straightforwardly, the CA is precluded from determining the issue of filiation in a proceeding for
the quieting of title and accion reivindicatoria.

While there are exceptions to this rule, none obtains in this case.51 There is no allegation on record that, as regards the parties, a special
proceeding was instituted but was finally closed and terminated. In the proceedings before the RTC, none of the parties exhaustively
presented evidence regarding the issue of filiation, save for the above-cited testimony of Margarito Belarmino. Neither did the trial court
make any pronouncement as regards that issue. Given, therefore, the dearth of evidence and discussion on filiation a quo, the CA should
not have adjudicated the status of Elvira Alcantara as a legitimate daughter or an adopted child in succeeding to the rights of Asuncion
Alimon.

All told, we find that the CA committed an error of law in giving precedence to the Tax Declarations and irrelevant deed of sale of Spouses
Belen over a Torrens title to Lot No. 16932 registered to Spouses Alcantara. The appellate court likewise erred in nullifying the title of
petitioners over the realty, because it did not provide any basis for invalidating the Free Patent of Asuncion Alimon. Finally, we find fault
on the part of the CA in improperly declaring Elvira Alcantara an adopted child outside the confines of a special proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Spouses Elvira Alcantara and Edwin Alcantara is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated 26 August 2011 and Resolution dated 12 January 2012 in CA-G.R. CV No. 94638 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

REBUSQUILLO VS. GUALVEZ

FACTS:

Petitioner Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio who died intestate. On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in
Legazpi City.

In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two documents by her daughter Emelinda and her son-in-law Domingo, respondents in
this case, on the pretext that the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of the lot. It was only in 2003, so petitioners claim, that
Avelina realized that what she signed was an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents.

Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment and revocation of an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale. After trial,
RTC held the annulment of the subject documents. CA reversed RTC’s decision. CA held that the RTC erred in annulling the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication simply on petitioners’ allegation of the existence of the heirs of Eulalio, considering that issues on heirship must be
made in administration or intestate proceedings, not in an ordinary civil action. Further, the appellate court observed that the Deed of
Absolute Sale cannot be nullified as it is a notarized document that has in its favor the presumption of regularity and is entitled to full faith
and credit upon its face.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the issue on heirship in this case must be raised in a separate administration or intestate proceedings.
Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale can be nullified.

RULING:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that this case falls under the exception of the rule on separate intestate proceedings.

The general rule is that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However,
the Court also ruled that recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a good and
compelling reason for such recourse.

The Court had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented
their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the
pre-trial.

Similar to the case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the
contending parties as the inheritance from Eulalio.

It would be more practical, as Portugal teaches, to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of
petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses Gualvez admitted in court that they knew
for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs with rights
over the subject land.

Accordingly, the court a quo had properly rendered judgment on the validity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Avelina. As
pointed out by the trial court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that it is apparent from the admissions of respondents and the records of this case that Avelina had no intention to transfer
the ownership, of whatever extent, over the property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing more than a simulated
contract.

Heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato Ureta: In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the
parties have no intention to be bound by it. The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really
desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or
fictitious contract is void, and the parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the contract.

In the present case, the true intention of the parties in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale is simply to “facilitate the titling of the
subject property,” not to transfer the ownership of the lot to them. Furthermore, respondents concede that petitioner Salvador remains in
possession of the property and that there is no indication that respondents ever took possession of the subject property after its supposed
purchase. Such failure to take exclusive possession of the subject property or, in the alternative, to collect rentals from its possessor, is
contrary to the principle of ownership and is a clear badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void.

URETA VS. URETA

FACTS:

In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta (Alfonso) begot 14 children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Narciso, Prudencia, Vicente, Francisco, Inocensio,
Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda, Benedicto, Jorge, and Andres. The children of Policronio (Heirs of Policronio), are... opposed to the
rest of Alfonso's children and their descendants (Heirs of Alfonso).

Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He owned several fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari store, a passenger jeep, and was
engaged in the buying and selling of copra. Policronio, the eldest, was the only child of Alfonso who failed to finish schooling and instead...
worked on his father's lands.

Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four of his children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and Francisco, met at the house of
Liberato. Francisco, who was then a municipal judge, suggested that in order to reduce the inheritance taxes, their father should make
it... appear that he had sold some of his lands to his children. Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several
parcels of land in favor of Policronio,[4] Liberato,[5] Prudencia,[6] and his... common-law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz.[7] The Deed of Sale
executed on October 25, 1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which are the properties in dispute in this case.
Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and
enjoy the lands and their produce.

Policronio died on November 22, 1974. Except for the said portion of parcel 5, neither Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of
the subject lands.

On April 19, 1989, Alfonso's heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition

Conrado, Policronio's eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs.

After their father's death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name covering the six parcels of land. On June 15, 1995,
they obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969 by Alfonso in favor of Policronio.

Not long after, on July 30, 1995, the Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition involving Alfonso's
estate when it was published in the July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan Reporter.

Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father, and as such, excluded from the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the
Heirs of Policronio sought to amicably settle the matter with the Heirs of Alfonso. Earnest efforts proving futile, the Heirs of Policronio...
filed a Complaint for Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of Documents, Partition, and Damages[9] against
the Heirs of Alfonso before the RTC on November 17, 1995

On April 26, 2001, the RTC dismissed the Complaint of the Heirs of Policronio and ruled in favor of the Heirs of Alfonso in a decision

The RTC found that the Heirs of Alfonso clearly established that the Deed of Sale was null and void.

The RTC further found that there was no money involved in the sale. Even granting that there was, as claimed by the Heirs of Policronio,
?2,000.00 for six parcels of land, the amount was grossly inadequat

Aggrieved, the Heirs of Policronio appealed before the CA. Aggrieved, the Heirs appealed before the CAwhich was partially granted.

ISSUES:

whether or not the Deed of Sale was valid; (2) whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid; and (3) who between the
parties was entitled to damages.

RULING:

Validity of the Deed of Sale

Two veritable legal presumptions bear on the validity of the Deed of Sale: (1) that there was sufficient consideration for the contract; and
(2) that it was the result of a fair and regular private transaction.

First, the Deed of Sale was not the result of a fair and regular private transaction because it was absolutely simulated.

The Heirs of Policronio posited that his loyal services to his father and his being the eldest among Alfonso's children, might have prompted
the old man to sell the subject lands to him at a very low price as an advance inheritance.

They explained that Policronio's failure to... take possession of the subject lands and to claim their produce manifests a Filipino family
practice wherein a child would take possession and enjoy the fruits of the land sold by a parent only after the latter's death.

They contended that Policronio's failure to take actual possession of the lands did not prove that he was not the owner as he was... merely
exercising his right to dispose of them.

The Court disagrees.

The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the finding of the CA that the Deed of Sale is null and void for being absolutely simulated.
The Civil Code provides:

Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the parties do not intend to be bound at all;
the latter, when the parties conceal their true agreement.

Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person and is not
intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their real... agreement.

The Heirs of Alfonso established by a preponderance of evidence[17] that the Deed of Sale was one of the four (4) absolutely simulated
Deeds of Sale which involved no actual monetary consideration, executed by Alfonso in favor of his children, Policronio,... Liberato, and
Prudencia, and his second wife, Valeriana, for taxation purposes.
Considering that the Deed of Sale has been found void and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition valid, with the consent of all the Heirs of
Policronio duly given, there is no need to remand the case to the court of origin for partition.

GUY VS. CA

FACTS:

On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes,
filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138.

Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on
October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving
spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the
appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei’s estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime,
petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Attached to private respondents’
petition was a Certification Against Forum Shopping signed by their counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez.

In his Comment/Opposition, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that
his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued
that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article
175 of the Family Code.

In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss, petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents’ claim
had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios’ June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating
that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the
estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation

RULING:

NO! In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their
status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his
co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such
right. Hence, petitioner’s invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.

Anent the issue on private respondents’ filiation, the Court agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the same would be premature
considering that private respondents have yet to present evidence. As regards Remedios’ Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does
not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver
may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.

In this case, the Supreme Court find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with
clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters
“by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind against the estate of the late
Rufino Guy Susim.” Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents’ hereditary share in the estate of
Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.

Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter’s
claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:

ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance.

Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may
repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.

LAVADIA VS. HEIRS OF LUNA

FACTS:

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property
between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a... foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.

ATTY. LUNA... was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices
at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(EUGENIA), whom he initially married in a civil ceremony

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of
the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic,
on the same... date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD
returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein
were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA's son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of
the... condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la
Cruz & Associates.

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,[9] holding and ruling:

EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter's death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree
obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between

Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x[10]

ISSUES:

The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indiviso share in the
condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court
Reports).

RULING:

Atty. Luna's first marriage with Eugenia... subsisted up to the time of his death

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law
in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to...
follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.[15] Pursuant to the... nationality rule, Philippine laws
governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997
terminated their marriage.

From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses
has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the
Family

Code,[16] even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.[17] Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our
laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such... defective marriages have been limited to the
declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.

Atty. Luna's marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,... was void; properties acquired during their marriage... were governed by the rules
on co-ownership

The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna's subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous,[22] on
the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI... of
Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but... n the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article
71 of the Civil Code clearly states:

Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as... determined by
Philippine law.

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.[23] A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.[24]

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed...
by the rules on co-ownership.(n)

SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds were used to buy the law office
condominium and the law books subject matter in contention in this case proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code
and Article
148 of the Family Code to apply as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife
but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would...
govern. But this was not readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied only if the parties were
not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where
there... still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon
adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of... money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares were prima facie presumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual
contribution was... required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the
parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such... valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited
in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith.

VALINO VS. ADRIANO

FACTS:

Atty. Adriano Adriano, a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law Office, married respondent Rosario Adriano in 1955. The couple
had two (2) sons, Florante and Ruben Adriano; three (3) daughters, Rosario, Victoria and Maria Teresa; and one (1) adopted daughter,
Leah Antonette.

The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually separated -in -fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano
courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to
provide financial support to Rosario and their children.

In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United States spending Christmas with her children. As
none of the family members was around, Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano.

When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a
few days but her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at
the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.

RTC – Quezon City. Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried and that
his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be
indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and
transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.

In her defense, Valino contended that, unlike Rosario, she took good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses when he
got seriously ill. She also claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and dying, Rosario still left for the United States.
According to Valino, it was Atty. Adriano’s last wish that his remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the Manila Memorial
Park.

Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit brought by respondents. Thus, she prayed that she be awarded
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the counterclaim of Valino after it found them to have not
been sufficiently proven. The RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long time, she knew very well that it was
his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park. Taking into consideration the fact that Rosario left for the United States at the time that
he was fighting his illness, the trial court concluded that Rosario did not show love and care for him. Considering also that it was Valino
who performed all the duties and responsibilities of a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably presumed that he wished to be
buried in the Valino family mausoleum.

Court of Appels. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains of Atty. Adriano
exhumed at the expense of respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer, transport and inter the remains of
the decedent in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City.

ISSUE:

Who between Rosario (the legal wife) and Valino (common-law wife) is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano. The legal wife Rosario.

RULING:

Art. 305 (NCC). The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order established
for support, under Article 294 (now 199 of FC). In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be
preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.

Art. 307(NCC). The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his
religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person
obliged to make arrangements for the same, after consulting the other members of the family.
Art. 308 (NCC). No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in
Articles 294 (now 199 of FC) and 305.

Art. 199 (FC). Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the
order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)

Section 1103 (RAC). Persons charged with the duty of burial.—The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless
of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the surviving spouse if he or she possesses
sufficient means to pay the necessary expenses;

From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the
members of the family to the exclusion of one’s common law partner.

It is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano.
The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To
say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of
her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having
been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.

While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that
human compassion, more often than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator.

Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valino’s
own testimony that it was Atty. Adriano’s wish to be buried in their family plot is being relied upon heavily.

It should be noted, however, that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other
evidence was presented to corroborate such claim. Considering that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in the
Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish of Atty. Adriano was unclear and undefinite.

Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the law favors the legitimate family.

Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in the Valino family plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the
result remains the same.

From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the “form of the funeral rites” that should govern in the burial of
the deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article
305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code.

Even if Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the place of burial among those on which the wishes of the deceased shall be followed,
Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, an eminent authority on civil law, commented that it is generally recognized that any inferences as to the wishes
of the deceased should be established by some form of testamentary disposition.

At any rate, it should be remembered that the wishes of the decedent with respect to his funeral are not absolute.

As Dr. Tolentino further wrote: The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not be contrary to law. They
must not violate the legal and reglamentary provisions concerning funerals and the disposition of the remains, whether as regards the
time and manner of disposition, or the place of burial, or the ceremony to be observed.

In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited by Article 305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of
the Family Code, and subject the same to those charged with the right and duty to make the proper arrangements to bury the remains of
their loved one.

ARRIOLA VS. ARRIOLA

FACTS:

John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action No. 03-0010 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Piñas City (RTC)
against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola (petitioners) for judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola (the
decedent Fidel). Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of
decedent Fidel with his second wife, petitioner Vilma.

On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S.
Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3)
each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any;

2. Attorney's fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS is hereby awarded to be reimbursed by the defendants to the
plaintiff;

3. Costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.3

The decision became final on March 15, 2004.4

As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land covered by TCT No. 383714 (subject land), respondent sought its
sale through public auction, and petitioners acceded to it.5 Accordingly, the RTC ordered the public auction of the subject land.6 The
public auction sale was scheduled on May 31, 2003 but it had to be reset when petitioners refused to include in the auction the house
(subject house) standing on the subject land.7 This prompted respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for
Contempt of Court,8 praying that petitioners be declared in contempt.

The RTC denied the motion in an Order9 dated August 30, 2005, for the reason that petitioners were justified in refusing to have the
subject house included in the auction, thus:

The defendants [petitioners] are correct in holding that the house or improvement erected on the property should not be included in the
auction sale.

A cursory reading of the aforementioned Decision and of the evidence adduced during the ex-parte hearing clearly show that nothing was
mentioned about the house existing on the land subject matter of the case. In fact, even plaintiff's [respondent's] initiatory Complaint
likewise did not mention anything about the house. Undoubtedly therefore, the Court did not include the house in its adjudication of the
subject land because it was plaintiff himself who failed to allege the same. It is a well-settled rule that the court can not give a relief to that
which is not alleged and prayed for in the complaint.

To hold, as plaintiff argued, that the house is considered accessory to the land on which it is built is in effect to add to plaintiff's [a] right
which has never been considered or passed upon during the trial on the merits.

In the absence of any other declaration, obvious or otherwise, only the land should be partitioned in accordance to[sic] the aforementioned
Decision as the house can not be said to have been necessarily adjudicated therein. Thus, plaintiff can not be declared as a co-owner of
the same house without evidence thereof and due hearing thereon.

The Decision of the Court having attained its finality, as correctly pointed out, judgment must stand even at the risk that it might be
erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court filed by plaintiff is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.10

The RTC, in its Order dated January 3, 2006, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.11

Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari12 where he sought to have the RTC Orders set aside, and prayed that he be allowed
to proceed with the auction of the subject land including the subject house.

In its November 30, 2006 Decision, the CA granted the Petition for Certiorari, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders dated August 30, 2005 and January 3, 2006 issued by the RTC, in Civil
Case No. SCA 03-0010, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the sheriff is ordered to proceed with the public auction sale of the subject
lot covered by TCT No. 383714, including the house constructed thereon.

SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its Resolution14 of April 30, 2007.

Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the CA erred in holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
the motion for contempt of court.

The assailed CA Decision and Resolution must be modified for reasons other than those advanced by petitioners.

The contempt proceeding initiated by respondent was one for indirect contempt. Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court prescribes the
procedure for the institution of proceedings for indirect contempt, viz:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the
contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true
copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil
actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition
for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion
orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphases supplied.)

Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the requirements for initiating an indirect contempt proceeding are a) that it be
initiated by way of a verified petition and b) that it should fully comply with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions.
In Regalado v. Go,15 we held:

As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado, the filing of a verified petition that has complied with the requirements for the filing of initiatory
pleading, is mandatory x x x:

This new provision clarifies with a regularity norm the proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While such proceeding
has been classified as special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogenous practice tolerated by the courts, has been for any
party to file a motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefore and without complying with the requirements for initiatory
pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of this amended section.

xxxx

Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu propio by order of or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges
shall be commenced by a verified petition with full compliance with the requirements therefore and shall be disposed in accordance with
the second paragraph of this section.

xxxx

Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which the court already acquired jurisdiction, the rules direct that
the petition for contempt be treated independently of the principal action. Consequently, the necessary prerequisites for the filing of
initiatory pleadings, such as the filing of a verified petition, attachment of a certification on non-forum shopping, and the payment of the
necessary docket fees, must be faithfully observed.

xxxx

The provisions of the Rules are worded in very clear and categorical language. In case where the indirect contempt charge is not initiated
by the courts, the filing of a verified petition which fulfills the requirements on initiatory pleadings is a prerequisite. Beyond question now
is the mandatory requirement of a verified petition in initiating an indirect contempt proceeding. Truly, prior to the amendment of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, mere motion without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings was tolerated by the courts. At the
onset of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, such practice can no longer be countenanced.16 (Emphasis ours.)

The RTC erred in taking jurisdiction over the indirect contempt proceeding initiated by respondent. The latter did not comply with any of
the mandatory requirements of Section 4, Rule 71. He filed a mere Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, and not a
verified petition. He likewise did not conform with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleadings such as the submission of a
certification against forum shopping and the payment of docket fees. Thus, his unverified motion should have been dismissed outright by
the RTC.

It is noted though that, while at first the RTC overlooked the infirmities in respondent's unverified motion for contempt, in the end, it
dismissed the motion, albeit on substantive grounds. The trouble is that, in the CA decision assailed herein, the appellate court committed
the same oversight by delving into the merits of respondent's unverified motion and granting the relief sought therein. Thus, strictly
speaking, the proper disposition of the present petition ought to be the reversal of the CA decision and the dismissal of respondent's
unverified motion for contempt filed in the RTC for being in contravention of Section 4, Rule 71.

However, such simplistic disposition will not put an end to the dispute between the parties. A seed of litigation has already been sown
that will likely sprout into another case between them at a later time. We refer to the question of whether the subject house should be
included in the public auction of the subject land. Until this question is finally resolved, there will be no end to litigation between the parties.
We must therefore deal with it squarely, here and now.

The RTC and the CA differed in their views on whether the public auction should include the subject house. The RTC excluded the subject
house because respondent never alleged its existence in his complaint for partition or established his co-ownership thereof.17 On the
other hand, citing Articles 440,18 44519 and 44620 of the Civil Code, the CA held that as the deceased owned the subject land, he also
owned the subject house which is a mere accessory to the land. Both properties form part of the estate of the deceased and are held in
co-ownership by his heirs, the parties herein. Hence, the CA concludes that any decision in the action for partition of said estate should
cover not just the subject land but also the subject house.21 The CA further pointed out that petitioners themselves implicitly recognized
the inclusion of the subject house in the partition of the subject land when they proposed in their letter of August 5, 2004, the following
swapping-arrangement:
Sir:

Thank you very much for accommodating us even if we are only poor and simple people. We are very much pleased with the decision of
Presiding Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., RTC Br. 254, Las Piñas, on the sharing of one-third (1/3) each of a land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) in Las Piñas City.

However, to preserve the sanctity of our house which is our residence for more than twenty (20) years, we wish to request that the 1/3
share of John Nabor C. Arriola be paid by the defendants depending on the choice of the plaintiff between item (1) or item (2), detailed
as follows:

(1) Swap with a 500-square meters [sic] lot located at Baras Rizal x x x.

(2) Cash of P205,700.00 x x x.

x x x x.22

We agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition for reasons postulated by the CA. We qualify, however, that this
ruling does not necessarily countenance the immediate and actual partition of the subject house by way of public auction in view of the
suspensive proscription imposed under Article 159 of The Family Code which will be discussed forthwith.

It is true that the existence of the subject house was not specifically alleged in the complaint for partition. Such omission notwithstanding,
the subject house is deemed part of the judgment of partition for two compelling reasons.

First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the subject house is deemed part of the subject land. The Court
quotes with approval the ruling of the CA, to wit:

The RTC, in the assailed Order dated August 30, 2005 ratiocinated that since the house constructed on the subject lot was not alleged
in the complaint and its ownership was not passed upon during the trial on the merits, the court cannot include the house in its adjudication
of the subject lot. The court further stated that it cannot give a relief to[sic] which is not alleged and prayed for in the complaint.

We are not persuaded.

To follow the foregoing reasoning of the RTC will in effect render meaningless the pertinent rule on accession. In general, the right to
accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior act on the part of the owner or the principal. So that even if the improvements
including the house were not alleged in the complaint for partition, they are deemed included in the lot on which they stand, following the
principle of accession. Consequently, the lot subject of judicial partition in this case includes the house which is permanently attached
thereto, otherwise, it would be absurd to divide the principal, i.e., the lot, without dividing the house which is permanently attached
thereto.23 (Emphasis supplied)

Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house was built by the deceased.24 Petitioners never controverted such
claim. There is then no dispute that the subject house is part of the estate of the deceased; as such, it is owned in common by the latter's
heirs, the parties herein,25 any one of whom, under Article 49426 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of the subject
house.27 Therefore, respondent's recourse to the partition of the subject house cannot be hindered, least of all by the mere technical
omission of said common property from the complaint for partition.

That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we treat the subject house as part of the co-ownership of the parties, we stop
short of authorizing its actual partition by public auction at this time. It bears emphasis that an action for partition involves two phases:
first, the declaration of the existence of a state of co-ownership; and second, the actual termination of that state of co-ownership through
the segregation of the common property.28 What is settled thus far is only the fact that the subject house is under the co-ownership of
the parties, and therefore susceptible of partition among them.

Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by the RTC is an entirely different matter, depending on the exact
nature of the subject house.

Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive property.29 Petitioners add that said house has
been their residence for 20 years.30 Taken together, these averments on record establish that the subject house is a family home within
the contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code, particularly:

Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwe lling house
where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.

Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time
of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.)

One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation
as a family residence, without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of
the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home
not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these c oncepts, the
subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the
deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back.31

It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same
is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz:

Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period
of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. (Emphasis supplied.)

The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the
family home as the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first, that the
heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it
during the aforesaid periods unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged by the parties;
nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family home, either by physical segregation or assignment to
any of the heirs or through auction sale as suggested by the parties.

More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership.
This signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of
them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law.
The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries
of the family home.

Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at
this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003.32 Thus, for
10 years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home
he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and
order the partition of the property.

The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals33 that a claim for exception from execution or forced sale under Article 153 should be
set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of the
subject house although for a different reason.

To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the subject house is part of the judgment of co-ownership and partition.
The same evidence also establishes that the subject house and the portion of the subject land on which it is standing have been
constituted as the family home of decedent Fidel and his heirs. Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot be sanctioned
until the lapse of a period of 10 years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013.

It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to the immediate public auction of the portion of the subject land
covered by TCT No. 383714, which falls outside the specific area of the family home.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED

ROMERO VS. CA

FACTS:

Petitioners allege that upon their father’s death, their mother, respondent Aurora, was appointed as legal guardian who held several real
and personal properties in trust for her children comprising the estate of her late husband. Petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that
several Deeds of Sale in favor of their brother, Vittorio, were registered over parcels of land that are purportedly conjugal properties of
their parents.

Petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Nullification of Title, and Conveyance of Title (Amended) against private respondents
Aurora and Vittorio. Respondents filed their Answer, arguing that the properties in question were acquired long after the death of their
father, Judge Dante Romero; hence, the properties cannot be considered conjugal, that they were paraphernal properties of Aurora which
she had mortgaged. Vittorio purportedly had to shell out substantial amounts in order to redeem them. The lots covered by TCT Nos.
77223, 77224, and 77225 were sold by Aurora herself as attorney-in-fact of her children on 23 November 2006, since her authority to do
so had never been revoked or modified.

The RTC dismissed the petitioners’ complaint since the case under Special Proceedings for the intestate distribution and partition of the
estate of their deceased father is still pending. The RTC denied their Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule
65 with the CA but was dismissed. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners in this case may file a separate civil action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of title, despite the pendency
of the settlement proceedings for the estate of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero.
RULING:

NO! In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved — whether
they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court
which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed
among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings.

In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject of the allegedly illegal sale are conjugal and constitute part of their
share in the estate. To date, there has been no final inventory of the estate or final order adjudicating the shares of the heirs. Thus, only
the probate court can competently rule on whether the properties are conjugal and form part of the estate. It is only the probate court that
can liquidate the conjugal partnership and distribute the same to the heirs, after the debts of the estate have been paid.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED.

PUNO VS. PUNO ENTERPRISES

FACTS:

Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises, Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner
Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner
averred that he is the son of the deceased with the latter’s common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to
the rights and privileges of his late father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus prayed that respondent allow petitioner to
inspect its corporate book, render an accounting of all the transactions it entered into from 1962, and give petitioner all the profits,
earnings, dividends, or income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno.2

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not have the legal personality to sue because his birth certificate
names him as "Joselito Musni Muno." Apropos, there was yet a need for a judicial declaration that "Joselito Musni Puno" and "Joselito
Musni Muno" were one and the same.

The court ordered that the proceedings be held in abeyance, ratiocinating that petitioner’s certificate of live birth was no proof of his
paternity and relation to Carlos L. Puno.

Petitioner submitted the corrected birth certificate with the name "Joselito M. Puno," certified by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila,
and the Certificate of Finality thereof. To hasten the disposition of the case, the court conditionally admitted the corrected birth certificate
as genuine and authentic and ordered respondent to file its answer within fifteen days from the order and set the case for pretrial.3

On October 11, 2005, the court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Jesusa Puno and/or Felicidad Fermin to allow the plaintiff to inspect the corporate
books and records of the company from 1962 up to the present including the financial statements of the corporation.

The costs of copying shall be shouldered by the plaintiff. Any expenses to be incurred by the defendant to be able to comply with this
order shall be the subject of a bill of costs.

SO ORDERED.4

On appeal, the CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint in its Decision dated October 11, 2006. According to the CA, petitioner was not
able to establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno since his birth certificate was prepared without the intervention of and
the participatory acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos L. Puno. Accordingly, the CA said that petitioner had no right to demand that he
be allowed to examine respondent’s books. Moreover, petitioner was not a stockholder of the corporation but was merely claiming rights
as an heir of Carlos L. Puno, an incorporator of the corporation. His action for specific performance therefore appeared to be premature;
the proper action to be taken was to prove the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno in a petition for the settlement of the estate
of the latter.5

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution6 dated March 6, 2007.

In this petition, petitioner raises the following issues:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE JOSELITO PUNO IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS
DEMANDED HE BEING THE HEIR OF THE LATE CARLOS PUNO, ONE OF THE INCORPORATORS [OF] RESPONDENT
CORPORATION.

II. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT FILIATION OF JOSELITO PUNO, THE PETITIONER[,] IS NOT DULY
PROVEN OR ESTABLISHED.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT JOSELITO MUNO AND JOSELITO PUNO REFERS TO THE ONE AND
THE SAME PERSON.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT WHAT RESPONDENT MERELY DISPUTES IS THE
SURNAME OF THE PETITIONER WHICH WAS MISSPELLED AND THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION E.G. RIGHTS OF PETITIONER AS
HEIR OF CARLOS PUNO ARE DEEMED ADMITTED HYPOTHETICALLY IN THE RESPONDENT[’S] MOTION TO DISMISS.

V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THEREFORE ERRED I[N] DECREEING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO
INSPECT THE CORPORATE BOOKS OF DEFENDANT CORPORATION.7

The petition is without merit. Petitioner failed to establish the right to inspect respondent corporation’s books and receive dividends on
the stocks owned by Carlos L. Puno.

Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the deceased stockholder. However, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner
was not able to prove satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased stockholder; thus, the former cannot claim to be an heir of the latter.

Incessantly, we have declared that factual findings of the CA supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding.8 In an
appeal via certiorari, the Court may not review the factual findings of the CA. It is not the Court’s function under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented.9

A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that
the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person.10 As correctly observed by the CA, only petitioner’s mother supplied the data in the
birth certificate and signed the same. There was no evidence that Carlos L. Puno acknowledged petitioner as his son.

As for the baptismal certificate, we have already decreed that it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the
date specified but not of the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity.11

In any case, Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code enumerate the persons who are entitled to the inspection of corporate books,
thus —

Sec. 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer agent. — x x x.

The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any meeting shall be open to the inspection of any director,
trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation at reasonable hours on business days and he may demand, in writing, for a copy of
excerpts from said records or minutes, at his expense.

xxxx

Sec. 75. Right to financial statements. — Within ten (10) days from receipt of a written request of any stockholder or member, the
corporation shall furnish to him its most recent financial statement, which shall include a balance sheet as of the end of the last taxable
year and a profit or loss of statement for said taxable year, showing in reasonable detail its assets and liabilities and the result of its
operations.12

The stockholder’s right of inspection of the corporation’s books and records is based upon his ownership of shares in the corporation and
the necessity for self-protection. After all, a shareholder has the right to be intelligently informed about corporate affairs.13 Such right
rests upon the stockholder’s underlying ownership of the corporation’s assets and property.14

Similarly, only stockholders of record are entitled to receive dividends declared by the corporation, a right inherent in the ownership of
the shares.151avvphi1

Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and
privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and
the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no transfer
shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation.16 During such interim period,
the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with the
legal title to the stock.17 Until a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the administrator
or executor.18 Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased
as stockholder.

Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be
allowed to inspect respondent’s books and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book that
some of the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only be possible if petitioner has been recognized as
an heir and has participated in the settlement of the estate of the deceased.

Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person,
is an heir of the deceased must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of the latter.
The status of an illegitimate child who claims to be an heir to a decedent’s estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, as in
a case for the recovery of property.19 The doctrine applies to the instant case, which is one for specific performance — to direct
respondent corporation to allow petitioner to exercise rights that pertain only to the deceased and his representatives.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated October 11, 2006 and Resolution
dated March 6, 2007 are AFFIRMED.

REYES VS. RTC-MAKATI

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent were siblings together with two others, namely Pedro and Anastacia, in a family business established
as Zenith Insurance Corporation (Zenith), from which they owned shares of stocks. The Pedro and Anastacia subsequently died. The
former had his estate judicially partitioned among his heirs, but the latter had not made the same in her shareholding in Zenith.

Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against petitioner (1) a derivative suit to obtain
accounting of funds and assets of Zenith, and (2) to determine the shares of stock of deceased Pedro and Anastacia that were arbitrarily
and fraudulently appropriated [by Oscar, and were unaccounted for]. In his answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied the illegality of
the acquisition of shares of Anastacia and questioned the jurisdiction of SEC to entertain the complaint because it pertains to settlement
of [Anastacia’s] estate.

The case was transferred to. Petitioner filed Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit and must be dismissed. RTC
denied the motion. The motion was elevated to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, but was
again denied.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the trial court, sitting as a special commercial court, has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Rodrigo's complaint.

RULING:

The existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations was sufficient to confer jurisdiction to the SEC, regardless of the subject matter
of the dispute. This came to be known as the relationship test.

Under the nature of the controversy test, the incidents of that relationship must also be considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether
the controversy itself is intra-corporate.

Controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the
parties' correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the
corporation.

Court then combined the two tests, that jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or relationship of the parties,
but also the nature of the question under controversy.

Rodrigo's bare claim that the complaint is a derivative suit will not suffice to confer jurisdiction on the RTC (as a special commercial court)
if he cannot comply with the requisites for the existence of a derivative suit.

The allegations of the present complaint do not amount to a derivative suit.

Rodrigo is not a shareholder with respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia; he only stands as a transferee-heir
whose rights to the share are inchoate and unrecorded.

Rodrigo has not alleged any individual cause or basis as a shareholder on record to proceed against Oscar.

he must allege with some particularity in his complaint that he has exhausted his remedies within the corporation by making a sufficient
demand upon the directors or other... officers for appropriate relief with the expressed intent to sue if relief is denied hardly satisfies this
requirement since what the rule contemplates is the exhaustion of remedies within the corporate setting.

As members of the same family, complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes has resorted [to] and exhausted all legal means of resolving the dispute
with the end view of amicably settling the case, we find no injury, actual or threatened, alleged to have been done to the corporation due
to Oscar's acts.

If indeed he illegally and fraudulently transferred Anastacia's shares in his own name, then the damage is not to the corporation but to
his co-heirs did not affect the capital stock or the assets of Zenith, neither has Rodrigo alleged any particular cause or wrongdoing against
the corporation that he can champion in his capacity as a shareholder on record.

Whether as an individual or as a derivative suit, the RTC - sitting as special commercial court - has no jurisdiction to hear Rodrigo's
complaint since what is involved is the determination and distribution of successional rights to the shareholdings of Anastacia Reyes.

MITRA VS. SABLAN-GUEVARRA

On June 26, 2006, Margie Santos Mitra (petitioner) filed a petition for the probate of the notarial will of Remedios Legaspi y Reyes
(Legaspi) with prayer for issuance of letters testamentary before the RTC. It was alleged that the petitioner is the de facto adopted
daughter of Legaspi; that Legaspi, single, died on December 22, 2004 in Caloocan City; that Legaspi left a notarial will, ins tituting the
petitioner, Orlando Castro, Perpetua Sablan Guevarra, and Remigio Legaspi Sablan, as her heirs, legatees and devisees; that Legaspi
left real and personal properties with the approximate total value of One Million Thirty-Two Thousand and Two Hundred Thirty Seven
Pesos (P1,032,237.00); and that Legaspi named Mary Ann Castro as the executor of the will.5

Perpetua L. Sablan-Guevarra and Remegio L. Sablan (respondents), who claim to be Legaspi's legal heirs, opposed the petition. They
aver that the will was not executed in accordance with the formalities required by law; that since the last page of the will, which contained
the Acknowledgement, was not signed by Legaspi and her instrumental witnesses, the will should be declared invalid; that the attestation
clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was written; and that the will was executed under undue and improper
pressure, thus, Legaspi could not have intended the document to be her last will and testament.6

THE RULING OF THE RTC

On February 23, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision7 admitting Legaspi's will to probate. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court having been satisfied that the will was duly executed, and that the testator at the time of
its execution was of sound and disposing mind, and not acting under duress, menace and undue influence, or fraud, the petition for the
probate of the Huling Habilin at Pagpapatunay of the testator Remedios Legaspi is hereby granted.

The Huling Habilin at Pagpapatunay of the testator Remedios Legaspi dated September 27, 2004 is hereby allowed.

In the meantime, the hearing on the issuance of [the] letters testamentary to the named executor Mary Ann Castro is hereby set on April
23, 2009.

SO ORDERED.8
The probate court explained that the last page of the will is but a mere continuation of the Acknowledgement portion, which the testator
and the witnesses are not required to sign.9 Also, it held that inasmuch as the number of pages upon which the will was written was
stated in the Acknowledgement, the will must be admitted to probate.10 The respondents' allegation of undue influence or improper
pressure exerted upon Legaspi was disregarded for failure on their part to adduce evidence proving the existence thereof.11

Aggrieved, the respondents appealed to the CA.

THE RULING OF THE CA

In its assailed Decision12 dated May 22, 2013, the CA reversed the judgment of the RTC, as the CA adhered to the view of strictly
complying with the requirement of stating the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause. Moreover, the CA detected another
supposed fatal defect in the will: the photocopy of the will submitted by the respondents on appeal did not contain the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses on each and every page thereof. Thus, the CA disposed of the appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated February 23, 2009 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 128 of Caloocan City in
Special Proceeding Case No. C-3450 for probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Remedios Legaspi y Reyes is REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.13
The respondents filed their motion for reconsideration a day late. Thus, the CA denied the same in a Resolution14 dated August 15,
2014.

ISSUES

Whether the CA erred in finding that the instrumental witnesses to the will failed to sign on each and every page thereof on the left margin,
except the last, as required under Article 805 of the Civil Code

Whether the CA erred in ruling that the failure to state the number of pages comprising the will on the attestation clause renders such will
defective

THE RULING OF THE COURT

To begin with, the importance of complying with procedural rules can not be over emphasized these are tools designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases.15 These are set in place to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality in the administration of justice.16
Nevertheless, if a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must
yield to the latter.17 "Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities."18

In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,19 the Court allowed the perfection of the appeal of the Republic, despite the delay of six (6) days, since
the Republic stands to lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its name. This was done in order to prevent a gross miscarriage
of justice. Also, in Barnes vs. Padilla,20 the Court suspended the rule that a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration
in the CA does not toll the fifteen-day period to appeal. The Court held that the procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to the
fault of the petitioner and there was lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory. Similarly, in Philippine
Bank of Communications vs. Yeung,21 the Court permitted the delay of seven (7) days in the filing of the motion for reconsideration in
view of the CA's erroneous application of legal principles to prevent the resulting inequity that might arise from the outright denial of the
petition.
In the present case, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA decision was indeed filed a day late. However, taking into account
the substantive merit of the case, and also, the conflicting rulings of the RTC and CA, a relaxation of the rules becomes imperative to
prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Verily, a rigid application of the rules would inevitably lead to the automatic defeasance of
Legaspi's last will and testament- an unjust result that is not commensurate with the petitioner's failure to comply with the required
procedure.

One of the issues raised by the petitioner entails an examination of the records of the case, as it pertains to the factual findings of the CA.
As a general rule, a petition for review on certiorari may only raise questions of law, as provided under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Nevertheless, the Court will not hesitate to set aside the general rule when circumstances exist warranting the same, such as
in the present case, where the findings of fact of the probate court and CA are conflicting. Additionally, it appears that the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.22

According to the CA, while Legaspi signed on the left margin of each and every page of her will, the instrumental witnesses failed to do
the same, in blatant violation of Article 805 of the Civil Code which states:
Article 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's
name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid,
each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on
the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every
page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses,
and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner, in assailing the findings of the CA, argues that in the original copy23 of the will that was offered before the probate court
as Exhibit "L," it is clear that the instrumental witnesses signed on the left margin of every page of the will except the last, as did Legaspi.24
The petitioner advances that the confusion arose when the respondents, in their record of appeal, submitted an altered photocopy25 of
the will to the CA, in which the signatures of the instrumental witnesses were covered when photocopied, to make it appear that the
witnesses did not sign on every page. This misled the CA to rule that the will was defective for the lack of signatures.26

For their part, the respondents do not deny that the original copy of the will, as opposed to its photocopy, bore the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses on every page thereof, except the last.27 However, they submit that they did not cause any alteration to the
photocopied version. They explain that since the folder holding the records of the case was bound on the left margin and the pages may
not be detached therefrom, the left portion of the will must have been unintentionally excluded or cut-off in the process of photocopying.28

In any event, it is uncontested and can be readily gleaned that the instrumental witnesses signed on each and every page of the will,
except the last page. Such being the case, the CA erred in concluding otherwise. There is no doubt that the requirement under the Article
805 of the Civil Code, which calls for the signature of the testator and of the instrumental witnesses on each and every page of the will
on the left margin, except the last, was complied with.

It should also be mentioned that the respondents take a skewed stance in insisting that the testator Legaspi and the instrumental
witnesses should have signed on the last page of the subject will. When Article 805 of the Civil Code requires the testator to subscribe at
the end of the will, it necessarily refers to the logical end thereof, which is where the last testamentary disposition ends.29 As the probate
court correctly appreciated, the last page of the will does not contain any testamentary disposition; it is but a mere continuation of the
Acknowledgment.30

As to whether the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause renders such will defective, the CA, citing Uy
Coque vs. Naves Sioca31 and In re: Will of Andrada, perceived such omission as a fatal flaw.32 In Uy Coque, one of the defects in the
will that led to its disallowance is the failure to declare the number of its pages in the attestation clause. The Court elucidated that the
purpose of requiring the number of pages to be stated in the attestation clause is to make the falsification of a will more difficult. In In re:
Will of Andrada, the Court deemed the failure to state the number of pages in the attestation clause, fatal. Both pronouncements were,
however, made prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code on August 30, 1950.

Subsequently, in Singson vs. Florentino,33 the Court adopted a more liberal approach and allowed probate, even if the number of pages
of the will was mentioned in the last part of the body of the will and not in the attestation clause. This is to prevent the will of the testator
from being defeated by purely technical considerations.34

The substantial compliance rule is embodied in the Civil Code as Article 809 thereof, which provides that:
Article 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the
form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and
attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.
Thus, in Taboada vs. Hon. Rosal,35 the Court allowed the probate of a will notwithstanding that the number of pages was stated not in
the attestation clause, but in the Acknowledgment. In Azuela vs. CA,36 the Court ruled that there is substantial compliance with the
requirement, if it is stated elsewhere in the will how many pages it is comprised of.
What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the existence of omissions is that such omissions must be supplied by an examination
of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence. "However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by
evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself."37

An examination of the will in question reveals that the attestation clause indeed failed to state the number of pages comprising the will.
However, as was the situation in Taboada, this omission was supplied in the Acknowledgment. It was specified therein that the will is
composed of four pages, the Acknowledgment included. As with the will, the Acknowledgment38 is written in Filipino, quoted in part
below:
xxxx

Ang HULING HABILlNG ito ay binubuo ng apat (4) na dahon, kasama ang dahong kinaroroonan ng Pagpapatunay at Pagpapatotoong
ito.

x x x x39
In sum, Legaspi's last will and testament has substantially complied with all the formalities required of a notarial will. It has been proven
that Legaspi and the instrumental witnesses signed on every page of the will, except on the last, which refers to the Acknowl edgment
page. With regard to the omission of the number of pages in the attestation clause, this was supplied by the Acknowledgment portion of
the will itself without the need to resort to extrinsic evidence. Contrary to the CA conclusion, such omission does not in any way serve as
hindrance to probate.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.

LOPEZ VS. LOPEZ

DOCTRINE:

The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to
safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.

FACTS:

Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez (Lopez), and their four legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard,
Diana, Marybeth and Victoria as compulsory heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a Last Will and Testament and constituted
Richard as his executor and administrator.

Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and Testament before the RTC with prayer for the issuance of letters
testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition contending that the purported last will and testament was not executed and
attested as required by law, and that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of Richard. Victoria also
adopted the said opposition.

After submitting proofs of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, Richard presented the attesting witnesses, namely: Reynaldo
Maneja; Romulo Monteiro; Ana Maria Lourdes Manalo (Manalo); and the notary public who notarized the will, Atty. Perfecto Nolasco
(Atty. Nolasco). The instrumental witnesses testified that after the late Enrique read and signed the will on each and every page, they
also read and signed the same in the latter's presence and of one another. Photographs of the incident were taken and presented during
trial. Manalo further testified that she was the one who prepared the drafts and revisions from Enrique before the final copy of the will was
made.

Likewise, Atty. Nolasco claimed that Enrique had been his client for more than 20 years. The latter consulted him in the preparation of
the subject will and furnished him the list of his properties for distribution among his children. He prepared the will in accordance with
Enrique's instruction and that before the latter and the attesting witnesses signed it in the presence of one another, he translated the will,
which was written in English to Filipino and added that Enrique was in good health and of sound mind at that time.

RTC: disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which requires a statement in the attestation
clause of the number of pages used upon which the will is written. It held that while Article 809 of the same Code requires mere substantial
compliance of the form laid down in Article 805 thereof, the rule only applies if the number of pages is reflected somewhere else in the
will with no evidence aliunde or extrinsic evidence required. While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages
including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC observed that it has 8 pages including the
acknowledgment portion. As such, it disallowed the will for not having been executed and attested in accordance with law.

CA: found no valid reason to deviate from the findings of the RTC that the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation
clause was fatal. It noted that while Article 809 of the Civil Code sanctions mere substantial compliance with the formal requirements set
forth in Article 805 thereof, there was a total omission of such fact in the attestation clause. Moreover, while the acknowledgment of the
will made mention of "7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written," the will had actually 8 pages
including the acknowledgment portion thus, necessitating the presentation of evidence aliunde to explain the discrepancy.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision to disallow the probate of will.

RULING:

The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles 805 and 809 of the Civil Code provide:

ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid,
each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on
the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every
page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses,
and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

ART. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the
form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and
attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.

While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect.
The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on
which the ratification and acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages
including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation
of evidence aliunde.

The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are
consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will
was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause
can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other
must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.

Hence, the CA properly sustained the disallowance of the will.

BALTAZAR VS. LAXA

FACTS:

Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and testament in the Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed
in the house of retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page
3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon
Laza and their children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo
came to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother.

Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia left for USA. There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her
death on Jan. 4, 1996. In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.

More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the
probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.

On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject
of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to
Lorenzo. Also, one of the petitioners, Rosie Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of being “mangulyan” or forgetful making her
unfit for executing a will and that the execution of the will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence.

Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualifi ed to be
appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor
of Antonio.

RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when Paciencia signed the will, she was no longer possessed of the
sufficient reason or strength of mind to have the testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the
probate of the will. The petitioner went up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:

Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate.

RULING:

YES! A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the
testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation
clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the
presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be
authentic although they question of her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.
The SC agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to
render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of the NCC states: “To be
of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to
know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.”

ECHAVEZ VS. DOZEN CONSTRUCTION

FACTS:

Vicente Echavez was the absolute owner of several lots in Cebu City. 1985, Vicente donated some lots to Manuel Echavez through a
deed of donation Mortis Causa, which was accepted by Manuel.

In March 1986, Vicente executed a contract to sell the same lots in favor of Dozen Corp. In October 1986, they executed two deeds of
absolute sale covering the lots in the contract to sell.

November 1986, Vicente died. Cabanig, Vicente's nephew filed a petition for the settlement of Vicente's intestate estate. Manuel then
filed a petition to approve the donation mortis causa and to annul the contract of sale between Vicente and Dozen Corp.

The RTC dismissed Manuel's petition. The RTC found that the execution of a Contract to Sell in favor of Dozen Corporation, after Vicente
had donated the lots to Manuel, was an equivocal act that revoked the donation.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s decision. The CA held that since the donation in favor of Manuel was a donation mortis
causa, compliance with the formalities for the validity of wills should have been observed. The CA found that the deed of donation did
not contain an attestation clause and was therefore void.

Manuel claims that the CA should have applied the rule on substantial compliance in the construction of a will to Vicente’s donation mortis
causa. He insists that the strict construction of a will was not warranted in the absence of any indication of bad faith, fraud, or substitution
in the execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. He argues that the CA ignored the Acknowledgment portion of the deed of
donation, which contains the “import and purpose” of the attestation clause required in the execution of wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will is valid.

RULING:

NO! Donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities prescribed by law for the validity of wills, “otherwise, the donation is void and
would produce no effect.” The Acknowledgment portion does not contain the number of pages on which the deed was written.

Also, there was no attestation clause in the will. That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate
provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806, respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that serve different
purposes. An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of Article 805 requires.

An acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed, declaring before a competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own. On
the other hand, the attestation of a will refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the
instrument before them and to the manner of its execution.

In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in the
Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.

CELADA VS. ABENA

TOPIC:
Presumption of sound mind, failure to establish evidence to contrary; Error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation
clause is not material to invalidate the subject will; compulsory heirs under Art. 887, NCC

FACTS:

Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent Margarita S. Mayores (Margarita) while respondent was the decedent’s
lifelong companion since 1929. Sometime in 1987, Margarita died single and without any neither ascending nor descending heirs as her
parents, grandparents and siblings predeceased her and were survived by her first cousins who included petitioner.

Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament where she bequeathed one-half of her undivided shares of a real property
to respondent, Norma Pahingalo, and Florentino Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each; bequeathed also one-half of her
undivided shares of a real property to respondent, Isabelo Abena, and Amanda Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each. Margarita
also left all her personal properties to respondent whom she likewise designated as sole executor of her will.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of Margarita a month later respondent filed a petition for
probate of the will of Margarita. On 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of Margarita probated and
respondent as the executor of the will. Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appealswhich was however affirmed in toto
the RTC ruling.

ISSUE:

1. WON the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the will invalid for failure to comply with the formalities required by law. - NO

2. WON said court erred in not declaring the will invalid because it was procured through undue influence and pressure, and – NO

3. WON it erred in not declaring petitioner and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita, and in not issuing letters of administration to
petitioner. – NO

RULING:

1. With [regard] to the contention of the oppositors was not mentally capable of making a will at the time of the execution thereof, the
same is without merit. The oppositors failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, said allegation and contradict the presumption
that the testator was of sound mind (See Article 800 of the Civil Code). In fact, witness for the oppositors, Dr. Ramon Lamberte, who, in
some occasions, attended to the testator months before her death, testified that Margarita Mayores could engage in a normal conversation
and he even stated that the illness of the testator does not warrant hospitalization. Not one of the oppositors witnesses has mentioned
any instance that they observed act/s of the testator during her lifetime that could be construed as a manifestation of mental incapacity.
The testator may be admitted to be physically weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound mind. [The] testimonies
of contestant witnesses are pure aforethought.

Anent the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its attestation clause states that the will is composed
of three (3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only because the attestation is not a part of the notarial will,
the same is not accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining the totality of the
will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate
the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard
from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the
whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The position of the court is
in consonance with the doctrine of liberal interpretation enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads:

In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of
attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.

2. Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue influence was exerted on the testator to execute the subject will. In fact, the picture
reveals that the testator was in a good mood and smiling with the other witnesses while executing the subject will.

In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally capable of making the will at the time of its execution, that the notarial will presented
to the court is the same notarial will that was executed and that all the formal requirements (See Article 805 of the Civil Code) in the
execution of a will have been substantially complied with in the subject notarial will.

3. Since, petitioner and her siblings are not compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 887 of the Civil Code and as the decedent
validly disposed of her properties in a will duly executed and probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim any part of the decedent’s
estate.

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent
established by this Code.

LEE VS. TAMBAGO

FACTS:

Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal
profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente
Lee Sr. and two other witnesses. In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save
for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.

The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965.Complainant, however, pointed out that the
residence certificateof the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.Furthermore, the signature of the
testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donationwhich supposedly contained his purported signature.
Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed of donation were “in any way entirely and
diametrically opposed from one another in all angle[s].”

Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He
alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective voters’ affidavits.

Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives division of the Records Management and
Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will is spurious?

RULING:

YES! Tambago violated the Notarial Law and the ethics of legal profession.

The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution
of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.

A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition,
it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The will in
question was attested by only two witnesses.

On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions
of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. The Civil Code likewise requires that a
will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.

An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his
act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her
own free act and deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testator’s wishes long after his
demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.

A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular requirement was neither strictly nor
substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial
witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testator’s old residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.

As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of
notarization. These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded.

GUERRERO VS. BIHIS

FACTS:

Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died... petitioner filed a
petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the decedent

The petition alleged the following: petitioner was named as executrix in the decedent's will and she was legally qualified to act as such
Respondent opposed her elder sister's petition on the following grounds: the will was not executed and attested as required by law... the
trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was "acknowledged"
by the testatrix... and the witnesses at the testatrix's, residence... at

Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the resolution of the trial
court.

ISSUES:

Did the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place of his
commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code?

RULING:

Article 806 of the Civil Code provides

Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.

An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer and declaring it to be his act or
deed.

Acknowledgment can only be made before a competent officer, that is, a lawyer duly commissioned as a notary public.

A notary public's commission is the grant of authority in his favor to perform notarial acts.

It is issued "within and for" a particular territorial jurisdiction and the notary public's authority is co-extensive with it. In other words, a
notary public... is authorized to perform notarial acts, including the taking of acknowledgments, within that territorial jurisdiction only.
Outside the place of his commission, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial act outside...
the limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect.

Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City, he lacked the authority to take the acknowledgment of
the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses.

AZUELA VS. CA

FACTS:

Petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo. However, this was opposed by Geralda Castillo,
who was the attorney-in-fact of “the 12 legitimate heirs” of the decedent. According to her, the will was forged, and imbued with several
fatal defects. Particularly, the issue relevant in this subject is that the will was not properly acknowledged. The notary public, Petronio Y.
Bautista, only wrote “Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will is fatally defective as it was not properly acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses
as required by Article 806 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

YES! The will is fatally defective. By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an acknowledgment.

An acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be
his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signore actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document
has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.

It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of
an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.

Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express
requirement of Article 806 is that the will be “acknowledged,” and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any
textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free
act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made
beyond the free consent of the testator.

ALVARADO VS. GAVIOLA JR.

FACTS:

On 5 November 1977, 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled “Huling Habilin” wherein he disinherited an illegitimate
son, petitioner Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before the RTC
of Laguna.

According to Bayani Ma. Rino, private respondent, he was present when the said notarial will was executed, together with three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, where the testator did not read the will himself, suffering as he did from glaucoma.

Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document and read the same aloud before the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the
notary public, the latter four following the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them.

Thereafter, a codicil entitled “Kasulatan ng Pagbabago ng Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa Nobiembre
5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado” was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator’s eye operation.
Said codicil was likewise not read by Brigido Alvarado and was read in the same manner as with the previously executed will.

When the notarial will was submitted to the court for probate, Cesar Alvarado filed his opposition as he said that the will was not executed
and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or mentally incapacitated due to senility and old age; that the will was
executed under duress, or influence of fear or threats; that it was procured by undue pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary;
and that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.

ISSUE:

W/N notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be admitted to probate despite allegations of defects in the execution and attestation thereof
as testator was allegedly blind at the time of execution and the double-reading requirement under Art. 808 of the NCC was not complied
with.

RULING:

YES! The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial
requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not
affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator’s will.

Cesar Alvardo was correct in asserting that his father was not totally blind (of counting fingers at 3 feet) when the will and codicil were
executed, but he can be so considered for purposes of Art. 808.

That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil.

However, in the case at bar, there was substantial compliance where the purpose of the law has been satisfied: that of making the
provisions known to the testator who is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) and enabling him to object
if they do not accord with his wishes.

Rino read the testator’s will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior
and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions.

Only then did the signing and acknowledgment take place. There is no evidence that the contents of the will and the codicil were not
sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator.

With four persons, mostly known to the testator, following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that
the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will to himself (as when
he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his
wishes.

Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal
imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the
testator’s will.

CANEDA VS. CA

FACTS:

On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight years of his life, executed a last will
and testament at his residence before 3 witnesses.

He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad.

In the will, it was declared that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to several people
all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator.
4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case seeking the probate of his last will and testament, but numerous postponements
pushed back the initial hearing of the probate court regarding the will.

On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court.

Thereafter one of the legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought his appointment as special administrator of the testator’s estate.

Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition for intestate proceedings. They
also opposed the probate of the testator’s will and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate.

Benoni Cabrera died and was replaced by William Cabrera as special administrator and gave an order that the testate proceedings for
the probate of the will had to be heard and resolved first.

In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the allowance of the testator’s will on the ground that on the alleged date of its
execution, the testator was already in poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Also the genuineness
of the signature of the testator is in doubt.

On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the notary public testified that the testator executed the will in question in their
presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that the testator was in good health and was not unduly influenced in any way
in the execution of his will.

Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero.

CA affirmed the probate court’s decision stating that it substantially complies with Article 805. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

W/N the attestation clause in the will of the testator is fatally defective or can be cured under the art. 809.

RULING:

NO! It does not comply with the provisions of the law.

Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Arts. 804 to 809. The will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
attesting witnesses. The attestation clause need not be written in a language known to the testator or even to the attesting witnesses.

It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses it g ives
affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed.

The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof.

It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in the will failed to specifically state the fact that the attesting witnesses witnessed
the testator sign the will and all its pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page thereof
in the presence of the testator and of each other. And the Court agrees.

The attestation clause does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to
the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.

The phrase, “and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the space provided for his signature and on the left hand margin,”
obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words” as his last will and
testament.”

Clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another. That the absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the
disallowance of the will that is here sought to be probated.

Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed
each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The defect in this case is not only with respect to the
form or the language of the attestation clause. The defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself which is
clearly lacking in this case.

Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case for the intestate proceedings shall be revived.

Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it does not pertain to the form or language of the will. This is because there
is not substantial compliance with Article 805.

SUROZA VS. HONRADO

FACTS:

Spouses Mauro Suroza and Marcelina Salvador, who were childless, reared a boy named Agapito. Agapito and his wife Nenita de Vera
had a daughter named Lilia. Nenita became Agapito’s guardian when he became disabled. A certain Arsenia de la Cruz also wanted to
be his guardian in another proceeding but it was dismissed. Arsenia then delivered a child named Marilyn Sy to Marcelina who brought
her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito. Marilyn used the surname Suroza although not legally adopted by Agapito. When Marcelina
(who was an illiterate) was 73 years old, she supposedly executed a notarial will which was in English and thumbmarked by her. In the
will, she allegedly bequeathed all her properties to Marilyn. She also named as executrix her laundrywoman, Marina Paje. Paje filed a
petition for probate of Marcelina’s will. Judge Honrado appointed Paje as administratrix and issued orders allowing the latter to withdraw
money from the savings account of Marcelina and Marilyn, and instructing the sheriff to eject the occupants of testatrix’s house, among
whom was Nenita. She and the other occupants filed a motion to set aside the order ejecting them, alleging that Agapito was the sole
heir of the deceased, and that Marilyn was not the decedent’s granddaughter. Despite this, Judge Honrado issued an order probating
Marcelina’s will.

Nenita filed an omnibus petition to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with counter-petition for administration and preliminary
injunction, and an opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition for letters of administration, which were dismissed by Judge
Honrado. Instead of appealing, Nenita filed a case to annul the probate proceedings but Judge Honrado dismissed it. The judge then
closed the testamentary proceeding after noting that the executrix had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been
paid.

Ten months later, Nenita filed a complaint before the SC, charging Judge Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina.
She reiterated her contention that the testatrix was illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed her thumbmark to the will and that she
did not know English, the language in which the will was written. She further alleged that Judge Honrado did not take into account the
consequences of the preterition of testatrix’s son, Agapito. Judge Honrado in his comment did not deal specifically with the allegations
but merely pointed to the fact that Nenita did not appeal from the decree of probate and that in a motion, she asked for a thirty day period
within which to vacate the house of the testatrix. Nenita subsequently filed in the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition against Judge
Honrado wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings in the probate case be declared void. The CA
dismissed the petition because Nenita’s remedy was an appeal and her failure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil
action of certiorari. Relying on that decision, Judge Honrado filed a MTD the administrative case for having allegedly become moot and
academic.

ISSUE:

W/N disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to probate a will, which on its face is void because it is
written in English, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the attesting
witnesses did not appear before the notary as admitted by the notary himself.

RULING:

YES! Respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate
testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language
“understood and known” to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix “and translated
into Filipino language”.

That could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the
mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.

The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is
repeatedly referred to as the “testator” instead of “testatrix”. Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not
only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as
sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive.

Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by the deputy clerk of court, respondent judge could have noticed that the notary was not
presented as a witness. In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted the hearing on the
probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly executed.

JAVELLANA VS. LEDESMA

The CFI of Iloilo admitted to probate a will and codicil executed by the deceased Apolinaria Ledesma in July 1953. This testament was
deemed executed on May 1950 and May 1952. The contestant was the sister and nearest surviving relative of the deceased. She
appealed from this decision alleging that the will were not executed in accordance with law.

The testament was executed at the house of the testatrix. One the other hand, the codicil was executed after the enactment of the New
Civil Code (NCC), and therefore had to be acknowledged before a notary public. Now, the contestant, who happens to be one of the
instrumental witnesses asserted that after the codicil was signed and attested at the San Pablo hospital, that Gimotea (the notary) signed
and sealed it on the same occasion. Gimotea, however, said that he did not do so, and that the act of signing and sealing was done
afterwards.
One of the allegations was that the certificate of acknowledgement to the codicil was signed somewhere else or in the office of the notary.
The ix and the witnesses at the hospital, was signed and sealed by the notary only when he brought it in his office.

Well, one clear allegation was that the certificate of acknowledgement (were talking about the notarial act) to the codicil was signed
elsewhere, most probably in the office of the notary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the signing and sealing of the codicil by notary public in the absence of the testator and witnesses affects the validity of
the will.

RULING:

NO! Court held that unlike in the Old Civil Code of 1899, the NCC does not require that the signing of the testator, the witnesses and the
notary be accomplished in one single act. All that is required is that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and witnesses.

The subsequent signing and sealing is not part of the acknowledgement itself nor of the testamentary act. Their separate execution out
of the presence of the testator and the witnesses cannot be a violation of the rule that testaments should be completed without interruption.

Alright let me get that straight: Let's do some differentiation here to somehow clear things up (I hope) and somehow make this post a
reference:

NOTARIZATION vs. ATTESTATION

It’s a common assumption that “notarization” and “attestation” refer to the same type of act. But you see, while a public notary can only
perform notarial acts, attestations are required for certain documents.

The act of notarization the signatures on a document can only by a legal public notary. it usually involves paying a fee, taking an oath,
and being sworn in by the attesting authority.

Attestations, on the other hand, can be performed by anyone, regardless as to whether or not the individual is a public notary. It's common
for public documents to require witness attestations, which basically means that a 3rd party must bear witness to the document’s signing.
You see this 3rd party attests that the document was signed by the said person. So basically it is used in the context of validating the
contents of a document.

Another key difference between notarial acts and attestations involves the way in which they are executed. When a notarial act is being
performed, the public notary is usually required to place his or her official stamp or seal and recording log numbers on the document.

Someone who’s attesting the signatures on a document and/or its contents, on the other hand, are not required to place a stamp or seal
on the document.

ATTESTATION vs. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

An attestation however is different from an acknowledgement. Attestation is done by a witness. An acknowledgement is done by the party
concerned.

You will also come across the word “Subscribe” in legal documents. Strictly speaking, the word “Subscribe” does not impute personal
knowledge of the matter in consideration and is more in the nature of appending the names of signatures in a mechanical manner.

The term attested, when used in relation to a deed or document, means that the deed or document concerned is attested by two or more
witnesses. So it is imperative that each of the witnesses should have seen the Testator (who is the executor of the document) sign the
document. And each of them (3 or more Witnesses as in the case of a notarial will) should have signed as a witness in the presence of
the Testator and all other Witnesses.

By the way, In the US their succession laws carries no specific or particular form prescribed for attestations. It is not necessary that the
witnesses should sign in the presence of each other. It is only required that each of the witness has direct knowledge that the document
had been signed by the Executor (which they refer to as Executant for that matter). Here in the Philippines on the other hand, our
succession laws requires stricter application. Witnesses are expected to sign the notarial will as attestation in the presence of the Testator
and other Witnesses.

Such in the case of Nera vs. Rimando two rooms were blocked by a curtain. One of the witnesses was in a the other room while the other
witness was attaching his signature to the instrument in front of the testator. The lower court did not consider the position of the witnesses
at the time of signing of vital importance. This lower court decision was based on an earlier ruling called the Jabonetta Case (Jabonetta
vs. Gustillo) where it was held that it was not sufficient to invalidate execution of will. The CA affirmed this decision but when it reached
the highest court the decision was overturned. The court said the line of vision of witness to the testator and other witnesses was blocked,
I think in hindsight, the highest court was telling the lower court, 'You've used the right citational jurisprudence but you've misapplied the
doctrine' Don't verbatim quote me on that. This is just my interpretation. You see the doctrine of the Jabonetta Case states that "True
test of presence is not whether or not they saw each other sign but WHETHER THEY MIGHT HAVE SEEN EACH OTHER SIGN IF THEY
CHOSE TO DO SO, considering their physical, mental condition and position in relation to each other at the moment of signing."

So as if the SC was saying 'If the curtain wasn't there and nothing is blocking the winess' vision even if he is positioned in the other room
it might have been considered. But the curtain was there what can we do, the Jabonetta Case had provided the standard' Again don't
quote me on that. I just can't stop my creative juices coming out. So the bottom-line is they should see each other sign.

More on ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:

You know at times, a person may sign his or her name in a deed or document for identifying an Executor. The purpose of this i s only to
confirm the identity and such. The identifier does not become an Attestor for the execution of deed or document concerned.

The term “Sign” generally mean affixing the signature or otherwise affixing the name or a mark to represent the name of a person. The
“signing” should be such that it would bind the person concerned as relating to the aspect of signing. Even the insertion of a name, done
in the manner required, may amount to signing, authentication or attestation as the case may be.

JURAT vs. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Now, Acknowledgement and Jurat are the two most common notarial acts. Actually there is confusion among law students about the
difference between these two.

A jurat is used when the signer is swearing to the content of the document. The notary must administer an oath or affirmation to the
signer in order to complete the jurat. A jurat also requires that the signer signs in the presence of the notary. it's quite easy to identify a
Jurat in a legal document. Just find the portion that states “Subscribed and sworn to before me…” – subscribed meaning “signed” and
sworn meaning that an oral oath or affirmation was given. “Before me” means that both were done in the presence of the notary public.

In Acknowledgements however, acknowledgement portion is used to verify the identity of the signer and to confirm that they signed the
document. They are not swearing to the truthfulness or validity of the document, they are simply acknowledging that they signed the
document.

An acknowledgment certificate indicates that the signer:

1. personally appeared before the Notary,

2. was identified by the Notary, and
3. acknowledged to the Notary that the document was freely signed.

Acknowledgments do not need to be signed in the notary’s presence although it would be highly preferred whenever possible. For this
matter I think the confusion lies from the fact that the signer must appear before the Notary at the time of notarization to acknowledge
that he or she freely signed for the purposes stated in the document.

But take note of this, documents requiring a Jurat must be signed in the Notary’s presence, as dictated by the typical jurat wording,
“Subscribed (signed) and sworn to before me…” okay? So in theory, it is imperative that it is the executor who was presenting the
document to the notary. But in practice, sometimes if not, then must be duly identified.

In executing a Jurat, a notary guarantees that the signer:

1. personally appeared before the notary,

2. was given an oath or affirmation by the notary, and finally
3. signed in the Notary Public’s presence.

To summarize, the key difference between a JURAT vs ACKNOWLEDGMENT is that the former (Jurat) is used primarily when dealing
with sworn statements and the latter (Acknowledgment) typically applies to documents that must be signed in front of an unbiased
independent witness.

CRUZ VS. VILLASOR

FACTS:

The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of Valente Z. Cruz’s last will and testament. His surviving spouse, Agapita Cruz, opposed the
allowance of the will alleging it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was
execute without the testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and
that the supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law. Agapita appealed the allowance of the will by certiorari.

ISSUE:
W/N the will was executed in accordance with law (particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the NCC, the first requiring at least three credible
witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a
notary public.).

RULING:

NO! Of the three instrumental witnesses to the will, one of them (Atty. Teves) is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will
was supposed to have been acknowledged. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow
(Javellana v. Ledesma; Castro v. Castro); to own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and “before” means in front or preceding in space or
ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the
will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to
acknowledge his participation in the making of the will.

To permit such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity. Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others,
to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement (Balinon v. De Leon). That function would defeated if the notary public were one of
the attesting instrumental witnesses. It would place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to
minimize fraud, would be thwarted.

Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary public may, in addition, act as a witness to the executive of the document
he has notarized. There are others holding that his signing merely as notary in a will nonetheless makes him a witness thereon. But these
authorities do not serve the purpose of the law in this jurisdiction or are not decisive of the issue herein because the notaries public and
witnesses referred to in these cases merely acted as instrumental, subscribing attesting witnesses, and not as acknowledging witnesses.

Here, the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805-06.
Probate of will set aside.

ABANGAN VS. ABANGAN

FACTS:

On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From this
decision the opponents appealed.

Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, i' consists of two sheets, the first of which contains all of the disposition of the
testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The
following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets
is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these omissions, according to appellants'
contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied. We are of the opinion that the will was duly admitted to
probate.

In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the
presence of each other, Act No. 2645 (which is the one applicable in the case) evidently has for its object (referring to the body of the will
itself) to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator's dispositions. ^ But when these dispositions are wholly
written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin
of said sheet would be completely purposeless. In requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took into consideration, undoubtedly,
the case of a will written on several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do not have to sign
at the bottom. A different interpretation would assume that the statute requires that this sheet, already signed at the bottom, be signed
twice. We cannot attribute to the statute such an intention. As these signatures must be written by the testator and the witnesses in the
presence of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the bottom of the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another signature on its left
margin would be unnecessary; and if they d.o not guaranty, same signatures, affixed on another part of same sheet, would add nothing.
We cannot assume that the statute regards of such importance the place where the testator and the witnesses must sign on the sheet
that it would consider that their signatures written on the bottom do not guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the
margin, give sufficient security.

In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise
clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a
will! are written x>n one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although Unnumbered,
cannot be hidden.

What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore, without considering whether or not this clause is an essential
part of the will, we hold that in the one accompanying the will in question, the signatures of the testatrix and of the three witnesses on the
margin and the numbering of the pages of the sheet are fprmalities not required by the statute. Moreover, referring specially to the
signature of the testatrix, we can add that same is not necessary in the attestation clause because this, as its name implies, appertains
only to the witnesses and not to the testator since the latter does not attest, but executes, the will.

Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is
signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the
bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses,
or be paged.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of
wills and testaments and to guaranty their "truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way
as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's
last will, must be disregarded.

As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that the testatrix knew the dialect in which the will is written. But
the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix
was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which this will is written.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

GARCIA VS. VASQUEZ

FACTS:

This is a petition for appeal from the CFI of Manila admitting to probate the will of Gliceria Avelino del Rosario (“Gliceria”) executed in
1960. Likewise, this is also an appeal to remove the current administrator, Consuelo Gonzales-Precilla( “Consuelo”) as special
administratrix of the estate on the ground of Consuelo possesses interest adverse to the estate and to order the RD of Manila to annotate
on the registered lands a notice of Lis Pendens.

When Gliceria died she had no descendants, ascendants, bros or sisses and 90 yrs old. After which, her niece, Consuelo petitioned the
court to be the administratrix of the properties. The court approved this because Consuelo has been was already managing the properties
of the deceased during her lifetime. What the respondents allege is that in the last years of the deceased, Consuelo sought the transfer
of certain parcels of land valued at 300k for a sale price of 30k to her husband Alfonso through fraud and intimidation. In a ddition, the
oppositors presented evidence that Consuelo asked the court to issue new Certificates of Titles to certain parcels of land for the purpose
of preparing the inventory to be used in the probate. Also shown was that NEW TCTs were issued by the RD for certain lands of the
deceased after Consuelo asked for the old TCTs.

At the end of the probate proceedings, the court ruled that Counsuelo should be made the administrator, and that the will was duly
executed because of these reasons: NO EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PRESENTED to establish that the deceased was not of sound mind,
that eventough the allegations state that the deceased prepared another will in 1956 (12pages), the latter is not prevented from executing
another will in 1960 (1page), and that inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses prove their truthfulness.

ISSUE:

Was the will in 1960 (1 page) duly/properly executed?

RULING:

NO! Provision of Article 808 mandatory. Therefore, For all intents and purposes of the rules on probate, the testatrix was like a blind
testator, and the due execution of her will would have required observance of Article 808. The rationale behind the requirement of reading
the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) , is to make the provisions thereof
known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. Likewise, the 1970 will was done in Tagalog
which the deceased is not well versed but in Spanish. This creates doubt as to the due execution of the will and as well as the typographical
errors contain therein which show the haste in preparing the 1 page will as compared to the 12 page will created in 1956 written in
Spanish. ALSO, as to the blindness, there was proof given by the testimony of the doctor that the deceased could not read at near
distances because of cataracts. (Testatrix’s vision was mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading print.) Since there is no proof
that it was read to the deceased twice, the will was NOT duly executed.

ALSO, Consuelo should be removed as administrator because she is not expected to sue her own husband to reconvey the lands to the
estate alleged to have been transferred by the deceased to her own husband.

The notice of lis pendens is also not proper where the issue is not an action in rem, affecting real property or the title thereto.

CODOY VS. CALUGAY

FACTS:

On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the
deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the said will. They attested to the genuineness and due execution
of the will on 30 August 1978.
Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible.
They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on the will after every disposition, calling the same out of the ordinary. If the will
was in the handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly procured.

Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence.

The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the records of the case bearing the signature of
the deceased.

The second witness was election registrar who was made to produce and identify the voter’s affidavit, but failed to as the same was
already destroyed and no longer available.

The third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the deceased’s signature and handwriting as she used to
accompany her in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued receipts. The niece
also testified that the deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by said deceased.

The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said that the signature on
the will was similar to that of the deceased but that he can not be sure.

The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the signature of the deceased which appeared in the
latter’s application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived with the deceased since birth
where she had become familiar with her signature and that the one appearing on the will was genuine.

Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the Court of Appeals which
granted the probate.

ISSUE:

1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in a contested will as the
genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory.

2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the deceased’s holographic will.

RULING:

1. YES! The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory.

In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the
possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.

The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased.

2. NO! We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic will was that of the deceased.

The election registrar was not able to produce the voter’s affidavit for verification as it was no longer available.

The deceased’s niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased and did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a
document or write a note.

The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of the said niece, who kept the fact about
the will from the children of the deceased, putting in issue her motive.

Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased write a note or sign a document.

The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.

(As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was not complied with.)

A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the
testator.

The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support of their opposition.

The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills
and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to
attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain
and curtail the exercise the right to make a will.

However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic
will is contested, the law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: “In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will
is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.”

The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory.

AJERO VS. CA

FACTS:

The holographic will of Annie San was submitted for probate.

Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament’s body nor the signature therein was in decedent’s
handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners
through improper pressure and undue influence.

The petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero with respect to the disposition in the will of a house and lot. He claimed that said property
could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.

However, the trial court still admitted the decedent’s holographic will to probate.
The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of the identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity
of the testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack
of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.

On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision holding that the decedent did not comply with Articles 313 and 314 of the NCC. It found that
certain dispositions in the will were either unsigned or undated, or signed by not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and
cancellations made had not been authenticated by decedent.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in holding that Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC were not complies with.

HELD:

YES. A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not
its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such
failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814.

Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator’s signature,
their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.

It is also proper to note that he requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions
(Article 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810).

This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of the NCC – and not those
found in Articles 813 and 814 – are essential to the probate of a holographic will.

Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Article 839 of the Civil Code enumerate the grounds for disallowance of wills. These lists are
exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.

In a petition to admit a holographic will, the only issues to be resolved are:

1 .whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent’s last will and testament;
2. whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law;
3. whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and
4. whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud; accordingly, laws on this
subject should be interpreted to attain these primordial ends.
In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally authographic or handwritt en by the
testator himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will no result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionable
handwritten by the testator.