Republic vs. Pangasinan, G.R. No.

214077, August 10, 2016 (Article 36, FC)

Facts:
After thirty years of marriage, Respondent Danilo Pangasinan filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage to Josephine
Pangasinan on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. According to Danilo, Josephine exhibited negative traits at the onset of their
relationship, such as being competitive, domineering, headstrong, and exaggerated sense of
self-importance and sense of entitlement. Also, Danilo and Josephine have disagreements
over financial and trivial matters, which usually end up in fights. This claim was supported
by the Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan) who concluded
that Josephine and Danilo were psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their essential marital
obligations.
The RTC declared the marriage of Danilo and Josephine void from the beginning, noting that
the totality of evidence presented show that they failed to establish a functional family. The
RTC also gave credence to the evaluation report of Dr. Dayan. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the RTC’s decision upon review. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants the declaration of
nullity of marriage of Danilo and Josephine based on their psychological incapacity under Art.
36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It held that Danilo failed to establish
the totality of evidence to establish psychological incapacity of the parties. As declared
by the Court in Santos v. CA, psychological incapacity must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Further, a person’s psychological
incapacity to comply with his/her marital obligations must be rooted on a medically or
clinically identifiable illness that is incurable and shown to have existed at the time of
the marriage, although manifestation of which may only be evident after marriage.
In the present case, the Court found that there is no reliable and independent evidence
establishing Josephine’s psychological condition and its association in her early life.
Aside from what Danilo relayed to Dr. Dayan, no other evidence supports his claims.
Further, Dr. Dayan’s testimony is inadequate to establish the correlation between
Josephine’s personality and her inability to comply with her marital obligations to
Danilo. At most, it only establishes that their personalities are different and that their
frequent arguments in handling finances and managing their business affairs are
money-related. Thus, the Court held that Mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity nor does
failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons.
 PATERNITY AND FILIATION
Ara v. Pizarro G.R. No. 187273, February 15, 2017

FACTS
Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia (petitioners), and Dra. Fely S. Pizarro and Henry A. Rossi
(respondents) all claimed to be children of the late Josefa A. Ara (Josefa), who died on November 18,
2002.Petitioners assert that Fely S. Pizarro (Pizarro) was born to Josefa and her then husband, Vicente
Salgado (Salgado), who died during World War II. At some point toward the end of the war, Josefa
met and lived with an American soldier by the name of Darwin Gray (Gray). Romeo F. Ara (Ara) was
born from this relationship. Josefa later met a certain Alfredo Garcia (Alfredo), and, from this
relationship, gave birth to sons Ramon Garcia (Ramon) and William A. Garcia (Garcia). Josefa and
Alfredo married on January 24, 1952. After Alfredo passed away, Josefa met an Italian missionary
named Frank Rossi, who allegedly fathered Henry Rossi (Rossi).

The RTC rendered a decision finding petitioners Ara and Garcia to be children of Josefa, and
including them in the partition of properties. The Court of Appeals omitted petitioners from the
enumeration of Josefa's descendants. The Court of Appeals found that the Trial Court erred in
allowing petitioners to prove their status as illegitimate sons of Josefa after her death.

Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erroneously applied Article 285 of the Civil Code, which
requires that an action for the recognition of natural children be brought during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, subject to certain exceptions. Petitioners assert that during Josefa's lifetime, Josefa
acknowledged all of them as her children directly, continuously, spontaneously, and without
concealment.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners may prove their filiation to Josefa through their open and continuous
possession of the status of illegitimate children, found in the second paragraph of Article 172 of the
Family Code

RULING
No. If filiation is sought to be proved under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code,
the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. An alleged parent is the best
person to affirm or deny a putative descendant's filiation. Absent a record of birth appearing in a civil
register or a final judgment, an express admission of filiation in a public document, or a handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned, a deceased person will have no opportunity to contest a
claim of filiation.

Josefa passed away in 2002. After her death, petitioners could no longer be allowed to introduce
evidence of open and continuous illegitimate filiation to Josefa. The only evidence allowed under the
law would be a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private signed, handwritten instruction by Josefa.
 BARCELOTE vs. REPUBLIC, GR No. 222095, 07 August 2017

FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that she bore a child out of wedlock with a married man named Ricky O. Tinitigan
in her relative's residence in Sibulan, Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur. She was not able to register the birth
of their child, whom she named Yohan Grace Barcelote, because she did not give birth in a hospital.
To hide her relationship with Tinitigan, she remained in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur while Tinitigan
lived with his legitimate family in Davao City and would only visit her. On 24 August 2011, she bore
another child with Tinitigan, whom she named as Joshua Miguel Barcelote. Again, she did not
register his birth to avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible criminal charges. Thereafter, she lost
contact with Tinitigan and she returned to Davao City. When her first child needed a certificate of live
birth for school admission, Barcelote finally decided to register the births of both children. However,
upon submission of the copies of the late registration of the births to the NSO, Barcelote was
informed that there were two certificates of live birth (subject birth certificates) with the same name
of the mother and the years of birth of the children in their office. Thus, Barcelote filed a petition with
the RTC for the cancellation of the subject birth certificates registered by Tinitigan without her
knowledge and participation, and for containing erroneous entries. RTC ruled in favour of Barcelote.
CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. It ruled that the registrations of the children's
births, caused by Tinitigan and certified by a registered midwife, Erlinda Padilla, were valid under
Act No. 3753, and such registrations did not require the consent of Barcelote. The CA further ruled
that the children can legally and validly use the surname of Tinitigan, since RA 9255, amending
Article 176 of the Family Code, allows illegitimate children to use the surname of their father if the
latter had expressly recognized them through the record of birth appearing in the civil register.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in not cancelling the certificates of live birth.
RULING:
Yes. Upon the effectivity of RA 9255, the provision that illegitimate children shall use the surname
and shall be under the parental authority of their mother was retained, with an added provision that
they may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father.
The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. The use of the word "shall" underscores its mandatory character. The
discretion on the part of the illegitimate child to use the surname of the father is conditional upon
proof of compliance with RA 9255 and its IRR. Since the undisputed facts show that the children
were born outside a valid marriage after 3 August 1988, specifically in June 2008 and August 2011,
respectively, then they are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and Barcelote. The children shall use
the surname of their mother, Barcelote. The entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname of
the children is therefore incorrect; their surname should have been "Barcelote" and not "Tinitigan.” It
is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificate of her child in all cases,
irrespective of whether the father recognizes the child as his or not. The only legally known parent of
an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who conclusively carries the
blood of the mother. Thus, this provision ensures that individuals are not falsely named as parents.
Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed consistent with the provisions of the law
respecting the registration of birth of illegitimate children. Aside from the fact that the entry in the
subject birth certificates as to the surname of the children is incorrect since it should have been that of
the mother, the subject birth certificates are also incomplete as they lacked the signature of the
mother.
 Abella vs. Cabañero, GR No. 206647, 09 August 2017

FACTS:
Petitioner Richelle alleged that while she was still a minor in the years 2000 to 2002, she was
repeatedly sexually abused by respondent Cabañero inside his rest house at Barangay Masayo, Tobias
Fornier, Antique. 9 As a result, she allegedly gave birth to a child on August 21, 2002. Richelle added
that on February 27, 2002, she initiated a criminal case for rape against Cabañero, This, however, was
dismissed. Later, she initiated another criminal case, this time for child abuse under Republic Act No.
7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. This,
too, was dismissed. Richelle prayed for the child's monthly allowance in the amount of P3,000.00.

RTC dismissed Richelle’s Complaint without prejudice, on account of her failure to implead her
minor child, Jhorylle, as plaintiff. CA sustained. It ruled that filiation proceedings should have first
been separately instituted to ascertain the minor child’s paternity and that without these proceedings
having first resolved in favour of the child’s paternity claim, petitioner’s action for support could not
prosper.

ISSUE:
Whether CA erred in ruling that filiation proceedings should have first been separately instituted to
ascertain the minor child’s paternity and that without these proceedings having first resolved in favour
of the child’s paternity claim, petitioner’s action for support could not prosper.

RULING:
Yes. While it is true that the grant of support was contingent on ascertaining paternal relations
between respondent and petitioner's daughter, Jhorylle, it was unnecessary for petitioner's action for
support to have been dismissed and terminated by the Court of Appeals in the manner that it did.
Instead of dismissing the case, the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to the Regional
Trial Court.

There, petitioner and her daughter should have been enabled to present evidence to establish their
cause of action — inclusive of their underlying claim of paternal relations — against respondent.

Indeed, an integrated determination of filiation is "entirely appropriate" to the action for support filed
by petitioner Richelle for her child. An action for support may very well resolve that ineluctable issue
of paternity if it involves the same parties, is brought before a court with the proper jurisdiction, prays
to impel recognition of paternal relations, and invokes judicial intervention to do so. This does not run
afoul of any rule. To the contrary, and consistent with Briz v. Briz, this is in keeping with the rules on
proper joinder of causes of action. This also serves the interest of judicial economy — avoiding
multiplicity of suits and cushioning litigants from the vexation and costs of a protracted pleading of
their cause.
 Republic vs. Quiñonez, G.R. No. 237412, January 06, 2020

Facts:
Petitioner Remar A. Quinonez (Remar) and his wife Lovelyn met in [Gamaon6], Mangagoy, Bislig
City when Remar was in college [and] staying at his aunt's house. After eight months [of being] in a
relationship, they got married on August 16, 1997 at the Saint Vincent de Paul Parish in Mangagoy,
Bislig City. The wedding was officiated by Rev. Fr. Ivan Novo, as shown in their Marriage
Certificate. After their wedding, the couple stayed at the house of Lovelyn's parents and they begot
two (2) children [namely], Emar A. Quiñonez born on January 20, 1998 and Diana Love Quiñonez
born on December 15, 1999. To support his family, Remar started working as a security guard at the
National Food Authority Warehouse in October 1997, although later on, he transferred to Cebu City
for an opportunity to earn a bigger salary.
On November 2003, Remar's uncle informed him that Lovelyn was in Bislig City to visit their
children. Remar filed for an emergency leave of absence from his work and left for Bislig City only to
be told that his wife had already left for Lingig, Surigao del Sur. He went after her in Lingig, yet upon
arrival, he was told that Lovelyn stayed only for a day and returned to Bislig. He was then constrained
to go back to Surigao City, without seeing his wife.
In the summer of 2004, Remar filed for a leave from work to look for his wife in Manila. [Remar
also] went to Batangas along with his aunt, Evelyn Pachico, as well as to Cavite with Lovelyn's aunt,
Leonora Aguilar, yet they were not able to find her.

Issue:
Whether or not the standard of “well-founded belief” was met in order to declare the absent spouse
presumptively dead.

Held:
No. Article 41 of the Family Code provides the requirements for a declaration of presumptive death,
thus: ART. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).
 Cynthia Galapon vs. Republic, G.R. No. 243722, January 22, 2020

Facts:
Cynthia, a Filipina, and Park, a South Korean national, got married and ended with a divorce by
mutual agreement in South Korea. After the divorce was confirmed by the Cheongju Local Court,
Cynthia filed before the RTC a Petition for the Judicial Recognition of a Foreign Divorce
[(Recognition Petition)].
The RTC, finding the Recognition Petition sufficient in form and substance, issued an Order setting
the case for hearing. During the presentation of evidence, Abigail Galapon, Cynthia's sister and
attorney-in-fact, testified in court. Abigail averred that Cynthia could not personally testify because
the latter's Korean visa expired upon her divorce with Park. Nevertheless, Abigail alleged that she has
personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the Recognition Petition and claimed, among other things,
that Park intended to marry his former girlfriend and that Cynthia was forced to agree to the divorce
because Park made a threat to her life. The CA held that the divorce decree in question cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction insofar as Cynthia is concerned since it was obtained by mutual
agreement. Clearly, since the divorce under consideration was jointly applied for and obtained by a
Filipino and a foreigner spouse, it was incorrect for the RTC to apply the provision of the second
(2nd) paragraph, Article 26 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in denying the recognition of the divorce decree obtained by Cynthia and her
foreign spouse, Park.

Held:
Yes. The controversy is centered on the interpretation of Article 26 (2) as applied to divorce decrees
obtained jointly by the foreign spouse and Filipino citizen. According to the CA, the fact that the
divorce decree had been obtained by mutual agreement of Cynthia and Park precludes the application
of Article 26 (2), since the language of the provision requires that the divorce decree be obtained
solely by the foreign spouse. The CA is mistaken. In the recent case of Manalo, the Court en banc
extended the scope of Article 26 (2) to even cover instances where the divorce decree is obtained
solely by the Filipino spouse.
Based on the records, Cynthia and Park obtained a divorce decree by mutual agreement under the
laws of South Korea. The sufficiency of the evidence presented by Cynthia to prove the issuance of
said divorce decree and the governing national law of her husband Park was not put in issue. In fact,
the CA considered said evidence sufficient to establish the authenticity and validity of the divorce in
question. Thus, as confirmed by Manalo, the divorce decree obtained by Park, with or without
Cynthia's conformity, falls within the scope of Article 26 (2) and merits recognition in this
jurisdiction.
 Rodolfo Caranto vs. Anita Agra Caranto, G.R. No. 202889, March 2, 2020

Facts:
Respondent Anita Agra Caranto (Anita) is the registered owner of a 347-square-meter parcel of land
situated in Mandaluyong City (TCT 7884). Rodolfo filed a complaint for reconveyance and
cancellation of TCT alleging that he is the brother of Juan, the husband of Anita. In 1972, Juan
executed an SPA in favor of Rizalina (sister) authorizing her to execute Deed of Extra judicial
settlement whereby, a property is adjudicated to Juan (TCT 277297). Juan died intestate in 1983. In
1993, Anita executed an Affidavit of self-adjudication adjudicating said property to herself as sole
heir of Juan. As a result, TCT 7884 was issued. Upon learning, Rodolfo filed Notice of Adverse
Claim and a criminal complaint for Falsification of Public Documents. Rodolfo argued that Anita is
not the sole heir because there are other collateral relatives, himself and Rizalina. Since Rizalina
executed Deed of waiver, Rodolfo claimed he has ½ share of the said property. Anita denied the
allegations stating that Rodolfo’s claim is barred by prescription, that the property is exclusive
property having bought it using her own money and that Rodolfo is not a legitimate brother of Juan.
RTC denied the complaint because Rodolfo failed to produce Birth Certificate which would disprove
testimonies of witness against his claim. The CA also agreed with RTC that Rodolfo failed to prove
that he is the brother of Juan.

Issue:
Whether or not Rodolfo was able to prove his filiation with Juan to warrant an action for
reconveyance.

Held:
No. The allegations of Rodolfo are a mere rehash of his arguments before the CA and essentially raise
questions of fact as to be beyond the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court lays down the rule that only questions of law should be
raised in petitions filed under the said rule since factual questions are not the proper subject of an
appeal by certiorari. The Court will thus not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the
appellate court are considered final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon this Court
especially when supported by substantial evidence. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the question must not involve
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of
fact.
Suzuki vs. OSG, G.R. No. 212302, September 02, 2020 (Adoption Case)
Facts:
Petitioner's parents were married on December 29, 1987. Based on Identification Certificate
issued by the Bureau of Immigration, petitioner is a Filipino citizen. On June 12, 1997, petitioner's
parents divorced. On December 6, 2002, Lorlie married another Japanese national, Mr. Hikaru
Hayashi, in San Juan City, Metro Manila. On November 9, 2004, petitioner, then 16 years old, was
adopted by Hayashi based on Japanese law. This was reflected in Hayashi's Koseki or Family
Register. The Koseki and its English translation were both authenticated at the Philippine Consulate
General on May 15, 2007. At 24 years old, petitioner sought to be recognized in the Philippines his
adoption by Hayashi under Japanese law. Thus, on May 24, 2013, he filed a Petition for Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Adoption Decree before the RTC of Marikina City.
The Office of Solicitor’s General argued that the Family Code provides limits on who are allowed to
adopt Filipino citizens. It claimed that an adoption is only valid if made within the legal framework on
adoption as enunciated in Republic Act No. (RA) 8043 known as the Inter- Country Adoption Act of
1995, and RA 8552 known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. The RTC issued the assailed Order
dismissing the petition for being contrary to law and public policy.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in ruling that under the Philippine jurisdiction a judicial
declaration of a foreign decree of adoption is not allowed.
Ruling:
Yes. Owing to the nationality principle, the Philippine laws on adoption are thus binding on
petitioner. However, with respect to the case of Hayashi, who is a Japanese citizen, it bears stressing
that the Philippine courts are: precluded from deciding on his "family rights and duties, or on his
status, condition and legal capacity" concerning the foreign judgment to which he is a party.
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt: (1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the
approval of the final accounts rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation; (2) Any
person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;(3) An alien, except: (a) A
former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks
to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Based on Article 184 of the Family Code, Hayashi falls under exception (b) of item (3). He is a
Japanese citizen married to Lorlie, a Filipino. Under the Philippine law, it is therefore valid and legal
for Hayashi to adopt petitioner, the legitimate child of Lorlie. Further, the rules on inter-country
adoptions of Filipino children in the last paragraph of Article 184 do not apply to him.
Paterno vs. Paterno, G.R. No. 213687, January 08, 2020 (Property Relation Case)
Facts:
The petitioner and the respondent were married on December 27, 1987. After living together
for about a decade, the petitioner left the family abode in June 1998. On June 9, 2000, petitioner filed
a petition before the RTC seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage to the respondent on the
ground of the latter's psychological incapacity. This was granted by the RTC Branch 144 where both
parties were adjudged to be psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations to each
other. The March 11, 2005 Decision had attained finality. However, the proceedings for the
liquidation, partition, distribution of the common properties and the delivery of their children's
presumptive legitimes remain pending before Branch 144.
The following are the properties which the respondent alleged were admitted by both parties to be co-
owned by them: (1) House and lot in Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City; (2) Condominium unit
in Rockwell, Makati City; (3) Club membership at the Riviera Gold and Country Club; (4) Shares of
stock in Little Gym; (5) Shares of stock in Mamita Realty; (6) Dodge Caravan; (7) Paintings by
various known artists; (8) Pieces of accent furniture; and (9) Collection of books by various known
authors.
Issue:
How these properties should be partitioned between the parties?
Ruling:
The property relations of parties to a void marriage is governed either by Article 147 or 148
of the Family Code. Since the petitioner and the respondent suffer no legal impediment and
exclusively lived with each other under a void marriage, their property relation is one of co-ownership
under Article 147 of the Family Code. The said provision finds application in this case even if the
parties were married before the Family Code took effect by express provision of the Family Code on
its retroactive effect for as long as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The presumption that the properties are co-owned and thus must be shared equally is not
conclusive but merely disputable. The petitioner may rebut the presumption by presenting proof that
the properties, although acquired during the period of their cohabitation, were not obtained through
their joint efforts, work and industry. In such a case, the properties shall belong solely to the
petitioner. If the respondent is able to present proof that she contributed through her salary, income,
work or industry in the acquisition of the properties, the parties' share shall be in proportion to their
contributions. In the event that the respondent had not been able to contribute through her salary,
income, work or industry, but was able to show that she cared for and maintained the family and the
household, her efforts shall be deemed the equivalent of the contributions made by the petitioner.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOCELYN ASUSANO KIKUCHI
G.R. No. 243646, June 22, 2022

FACTS: Respondent Jocelyn Kikuchi, through her attorney-in-fact, Edwin Asusano, filed before the
trial court a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce. She alleged that she was married to
Fumio in 1993, and in 2007, they jointly filed for divorce before the City Hall of Sakado City,
Saitama Prefecture. When the case was set for hearing, the OSG authorized the City Prosecutor to
appear on its behalf with "only notices or orders, resolutions and decisions served on it (OSG) will
bind the party represented.”
During the presentation of evidence, the following documents, among others, were presented:
(1) the Acceptance Certificate issued by the Mayor of Sakado City, Saitama Prefecture, Japan; (2) an
Authentication from the Vice Consul of Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan; and (3) a photocopy of
the Civil Code of Japan in English text. The Republic, through the OCP, did not object to the
presentation and offer of such evidence and manifested that it will not be adducing controverting
evidence.
The RTC granted the petition, prompting the OSG to appeal the case to the CA. The appellate
court affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Aggrieved, the OSG appealed (Rule 45) the case to the SC. The
OSG raised the following arguments: 1) Kikuchi failed to comply with the requirements of
authentication and proof of documents concerning the Acceptance Certificate, and the Authentication
by the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan; 3) that Edwin's testimony as to the fact of divorce should
have been excluded for being hearsay; 4) and that the foreign law had not been proven.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce will prosper.

RULING: NO, the case is remanded to the court of origin. Jocelyn failed to establish the law of Japan
on divorce. For a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce to prosper, the party pleading it
must prove the fact of divorce and the national law of the foreign spouse. In this case, in order to
sufficiently establish the fact of divorce, the pieces of evidence presented by the respondent should be
assessed.
To this end, the following were duly established: 1) The Acceptance Certificate issued by
Mayor of Sakado City, Saitama Prefecture is equivalent to foreign judgment of divorce, the only
difference is that, the Acceptance Certificate is issued by the Mayor while the foreign judgment is
issued by the court. 2) The Authentication (issued by the Embassy of the Philippines in Tokyo,
Japan)accompanying the Acceptance Certificate complies with the rules on authentication because it
(Authentication) certifies that the Acceptance Certificate was signed by the official of the Consular
Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan; that said official is authorized to sign the same;
and that, his signature is genuine. Ergo, these facts contained in the Authentication sufficiently
renders it admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce in compliance with Rule 132, Section 24 of the
Rules of Court. 3) Edwin’s testimony, although hearsay, is admissible for failure of the Republic to
object to the offer of evidence 4) Jocelyn was unable to establish the law of Japan on divorce because
the translations by Eibun Horei-Sha, Inc. (the publisher of the document submitted by Jocelyn) are not
advertised as asource of official translations of Japanese laws. Given that Jocelyn was able to prove
the fact of divorce but not the Japanese law on divorce, a remand of the case rather than its outright
dismissal is proper. This is consistent with the policy of liberality that the Court has adopted in cases
involving the recognition of foreign decrees to Filipinos in mixed marriages.
LUISITO G. PULIDO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021

FACTS: Petitioner, then 16-yr.old Luisito G. Pulido, married his teacher then 22, Nora S. Arcon on
September 5, 1983 in a civil ceremony solemnized by the Mayor. The couple lived together until 2007
when Pulido stopped going home to their conjugal dwelling. When confronted by Arcon, Pulido
admitted to his affair with Baleda. Arcon likewise learned that Pulido and Baleda entered into
marriage on July 31, 1995 solemnized by Rev. Conrado P. Ramos. Their Marriage Certificate
indicated Pulido’s civil status as single.
Arcon charged Pulido and Baleda with Bigamy on Dec. 4, 2007. In his defense, Pulido
insisted that he could not be held criminally liable for bigamy because both his marriages were null
and void. He claimed that his marriage with Arcon in 1983 was null and void for lack of a valid
marriage license while his marriage with Baleda is null and void for lack of a marriageceremony.
Baleda, on the other hand, claimed that she only knew of Pulido’s prior marriage with Arcon
sometime in April 2007. She alleged that even prior to the filing of the bigamy case, she already filed
a Petition to Annul her marriage with Pulido before the RTC. RTC declared her marriage with Pulido
as null and void for being bigamous in nature. This ruling attained finality, there being no appeal filed
thereto.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code applies to the instant case, considering that
Pulido's first marriage was contracted during the Civil Code and his second marriage was celebrated
during the effectivity of the Family Code.

RULING: NO, since this is a bigamy case, Pulido doesn’t need a judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage. Art. 40 is applied only for purposes of remarriage. Article 40 of the Family Code
applies retroactively on marriages celebrated before the Family Code insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights. Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage having been
obtained, the second marriage is rendered void ab initio even though the first marriage is also
considered void ab initio. The only basis for establishing the validity of the second marriage is the
judicial decree of nullity of the first marriage.
In this case, Pulido's marriage with Arcon was celebrated when the Civil Code was in effect
while his subsequent marriage with Baleda was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code.
Hence, Pulido is required to obtain a judicial decree of absolute nullity of his prior void ab initio
marriage but only for purposes of remarriage. As regards the bigamy case, however, Pulido may raise
the defense of a void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity. While Pulido and Arcon's Marriage Contract bears a marriage license number issued on
September 5, 1983, there is doubt as to the fact of its existence and issuance as per Certification dated
December 8, 2008, which essentially affects the validity of their marriage. Thus, there exists a
reasonable doubt whether indeed Pulido and Arcon had a marriage license when they entered into
marriage on September 5, 1983. The Registrar found no entry of its date of issuance and license
number in its record book, which will likely explain why the original document of the marriage
license could not be found in its custody. With the absence of a valid marriage license, a reasonable
doubt arises as to existence of a prior valid marriage, i.e. Pulido's first marriage with Arcon, which is
one of the elements of bigamy
 SPOUSES JOON HYUNG PARK AND KYUNG AH LEE vs. HON. RICO SEBASTIAN D.
LIWANAG G.R. No. 248035, November 27, 2019

FACTS: Petitioners Spouses Joon Hyung Park and Kyung Ah Lee (petitioners) are American
citizens residing in the Philippines since 2007 (in the case of petitioner Park) and since 2009 (in the
case of petitioner Lee). They have been gainfully employed in the Philippines for almost the same
length of time that they have been residing in the country. They previously adopted a child named
Hannah which was granted by RTC-Makati City through domestic adoption. The spouse filed A
Petition for Adoption with Change of Name of the minor "Mayca Alegado"
a.k.a. "Innah Alegado" (Innah) before the RTC of Makati City and raffled to Respondent
Liwanag. In an Order dated September 11, 2017, respondent Judge found that since petitioners
are both foreigners, then the Petition for Adoption with Change of Name of the minor Innah presented
a proper case of inter-country adoption, instead of considering said petition as being appropriately filed
under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. Thus, pursuant to Section 32 of the Rule on Adoption and
Section 30 of the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations on Inter-Country Adoption, the trial
court directed the transmittal of a copy of the petition and its annexes to the Inter-Country Adoption
Board (ICAB) for appropriate action. On October 6, 2017, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (First Motion for Reconsideration) praying for respondent Judge to: (a) reconsider
and set aside the Order dated September 11, 2017; (b) give petitioners time to confer with the ICAB
and submit a best interest assessment; and (c) allow the Deposition through Written Interrogatories to
proceed. Said Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in its Order dated June 19,
2018. Petitioners received a copy of said Order on July 2, 2018. On July 4, 2018, petitioners filed a
Manifestation and Second Motion for Reconsideration. In an Order dated July 10, 2018, respondent
Judge denied the foregoing Manifestation and Second Motion for Reconsideration for being a
prohibited pleading. Petitioners received a copy of said Order on July 19, 2018. Petitioners pointed out
that they have 60 days from receipt of the Order, or until September
17, 2018, to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with the CA.
On September 12, 2018, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with the CA, which assailed respondent Judge's Orders dated September 11, 2017, June 19,
2018, and July 10, 2018. CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari for being filed out of time. The CA
reasoned that the 60-day period should have been counted from the denial of petitioners' First Motion
for Reconsideration, not the second. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the appellate
court denied the motion. They argued that the transmittal of the copies of the records of the case to the
ICAB was in the nature of an interlocutory order, and not a final decision; and as such, a second
Motion for Reconsideration was permissible. However, in the CA Resolution dated June 19, 2019, it
denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Domestic Adoption Act is applicable in this case.

RULING: YES, the Court finds that petitioners' Petition for Adoption was appropriately filed under
the Domestic Adoption Act in order for the appropriate Family Court or RTC to take cognizance
thereof. Petitioners, who are both American citizens, have been residing and have been gainfully
employed in the Philippines since the year 2007 (in the case of petitioner Park) and since 2009 (in the
case of petitioner Lee), and are thus living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior
to the filing of the petition for adoption, as required by the Domestic Adoption Act.
 Calimag v. Macapaz G.R. No. 191936, June 1, 2016
FACTS: This case pertains to an action for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of title with
damages. Petitioner Virginia D. Calimag co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with
Silvestra N. Macapaz. On the other hand, Respondents Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. and Alicia
Macapaz-Ritua are the children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. and Fidela O. Poblete
Vda. de Macapaz. The subject property was duly registered in the names of petitioner Calimag and
Silvestra under TCT No. 183088. In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry No. 02671 is an
annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of the said
property. On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT No. 183088 was
cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466, was issued in the name of the petitioner by
virtue of a Deed of Sale dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq-m portion
to the petitioner. On September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away.
Petitioner averred in her Answer that the respondents have no legal capacity to institute said
civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no
right over Silvestra's estate pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate
children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father and mother.
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the respondents, which the CA sustained. Both RTC and CA
ruled that the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the issuance of TCT No. 221466 in the name of the
petitioner were obtained through forgery. As to the legal capacity of the respodents, both courts ruled
that the best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract. In this case, a certificate
of marriage as well as a copy of the marriage contract were duly submitted in evidence by the
respondents to prove that they are legal heirs of Silvestra and thus have the legal capacity to institute
the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra.
RULING: Yes, while it is true that a person’s legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, as held in Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al., 559 SCRA 186
(2008), this Court however deems it necessary to pass upon the respondents’ relationship to Silvestra
so as to determine their legal rights to the subject property. Besides, the question of whether the
respondents have the legal capacity to sue as alleged heirs of Silvestra was among the issues agreed
upon by the parties in the pretrial.
It is well-settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized
marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents. Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the
respondents presented their respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics
Office where Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.
 Castillo v. Castillo G.R. No. 189607 G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016
FACTS: On May 25, 1972, respondent Lea De Leon Castillo (Respondent) married Benjamin
Bautista (Benjamin). However, the marriage lacked a marriage license. On January 6, 1979,
respondent married again, this time to the petitioner Renato Castillo (Renato).
On May 28, 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to
Benjamin and her psychological incapacity. On January 3, 2002, respondent filed an action to declare
her first marriage to Benjamin void.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage between Renato and petitioner null and void
ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code holding
that the fact that Lea’s marriage to Benjamin was subsisting when she married Renato.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the lower court and upheld the
validity of the marriage of respondent and Renato. They ruled that since both marriages were
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code, the Civil Code is the applicable law. In
addition, the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Renato and the respondent is void ab initio.
RULING: No, the validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with
the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time respondent
contracted both marriages were the Civil Code.
While it is true that under the Family Code, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage is required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the same cannot be said with the Civil Code. The requirement of a judicial decree of
nullity does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code.
 Republic of the Philippines v. Sareñogon Jr., G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016
FACTS: On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition5 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamiz City-Branch 15 the declaration of presumptive death of his
wife, Netchie S.Sareñogon (Netchie). In an Amended Order dated Februrary 11, 2009, the RTC set
the Petition for initial hearing on April 16, 2009. It likewise directed the publication of said Order in a
newspaper of general circulation in the cities of Tangub, Ozamiz and Oroquieta, all in the province of
Misamis Occidental. Nobody opposed the Petition.
Trial then followed. Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991,
They later became sweethearts and on August 10,1996, they got married in civil rights at the Manila
City Hall. However, they lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to work
as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For three months, he did not
receive any communication from Netchie. He likewise had no idea about her whereabouts. While still
abroad, he tried to contact Netchie's parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis
Occidental.
He returned home after his contract expired. He then inquired from Netchie's relatives and friends
about her whereabouts, but they also did not know where she was. Because of these, he had to
presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could
contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC found that Netchie had
disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed
already dead.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged efforts of respondent in locating his missing wife do not
sufficiently support a "well-founded belief" that respondent's absent wife x x x is probably dead.
RULING: No, the "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is complied
with only upon a showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to ascertain
whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Article 41 of the Family Code pertinently
provides that:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set
forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
 Republic vs Tampus G.R 214243 September 04, 2016

Facts of the case:

Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975.
Three days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the AFP, left respondent, and
went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no children. Since then, Nilda heard no
news from Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts proved futile. On April 14, 2009,
she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of
remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three
(33) years without any kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.
Issue of the case:
Whether or Not Dante should be declared presumptively dead

Holding of the case:

NO. The Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites
for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4)
consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse
wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
(4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that
his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that
based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one.

In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making
inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also
did not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further
efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request
information about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the authorities or
the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on
a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP
on the status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To the
Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported
earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict
standard and degree of diligence required to create a "well-founded belief of his death.
 JDIAZ-SALGADO vs. ANSON G.R. No. 204494 July 27, 2016

Facts of the case:

Luis Anson filed a Complaint against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado and Gerard Salgado (Spouses
Salgado) seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale and the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis.
Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-
Anson. They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their
marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is
Severina’s daughter from a previous relationship.
During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties, because there
was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the above-listed properties pertain to their
conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three separate
Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring the properties in favor of Jo- Ann, who secured new certificates
of title over the said properties.When Severina died Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis adjudicating herself as Severina’s sole heir. She
secured new TCTs over the properties.
Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the
inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina.
Issue of the Case:
Is the marriage celebrated prior the effectivity of the FC valid in the absence of marriage license?
Holding of the case:
No. A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no
marriage license number was indicated therein. It pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the
purpose of ratifying a marriage which was solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage
already exists; the subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious practices. Thus,
the parties are exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the
subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non
that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance
with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.
Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to
each other prior to the civil ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 – the only date of marriage
appearing on the records. Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage
ceremony between the parties and this was not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite,
practice or regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, this marriage does not fall under the
purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code. It is evident that the twin requirements of the provision,
which are: prior civil marriage between the parties and a ratifying religious ceremony, were not
complied with. There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional
character and a marriage license is required for Luis and Severina’s marriage to be valid.
 RAQUEL KHO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 187462, 01 June
2016
Facts of the Case:
Raquel Kho (Raquel) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage to Respondent Veronica Kho (Veronica) on the ground that their marriage was
solemnized without the requisite marriage license. According to Raquel, his parents summoned one
Eusebio Colongon to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers required for the marriage of
Raquel and Veronica. The couple thereafter exchanged vows. Nevertheless, Raquel alleges that he
never went to the Local Civil Registrar (MCR) to apply for a marriage license and had not seen any
documents in connection thereto. Thus, their marriage is void ab initio. Raquel presented as evidence
a Certification from the LCR that there is neither record nor copy of the marriage license issued to
Raquel and Veronica. Veronica opposed Raquel’s allegations by claiming that their marriage was
celebrated with a marriage license, though she cannot present any evidence to support her claim.
The RTC rendered its decision granting the petition, finding Raquel to have sufficiently
established the absence of the requisite marriage license when his marriage to Veronica took place.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s decision, holding that there is a
presumption a marriage license was issued in the absence of any indication in the marriage certificate
on the contrary.
Issue of the Case:
Whether or not the petition for nullity of marriage must be granted.
Holding of the Case:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Under the Civil Code, which is the applicable
law in the present case, provides that a marriage license is one of the requisites to be complied with in
order for a marriage to be validly solemnized, except for some instances of marriages of exceptional
character. Now, for a marriage to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license,
the law requires that its absence must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at least, supported by a
certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage was issued to the parties.
In the present case, aside from the fact that Veronica failed to adduce any evidence to show
that there was a valid marriage license at the time of the celebration of the marriage, Raquel was able
to present a Certification issued by the LCR attesting that neither a record nor a copy of any marriage
license was ever issued in favor of Raquel and Veronica. Thus, on the basis of such certification, the
presumed validity of the marriage of Raquel and Veronica has been overcome and it becomes the
burden of Veronica to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such validity.
 MARY ELIZABETH MERCADO, VS. RENE V. ONGPIN, September 30, 2020

Facts: Ongpin married Alma D. Mantaring (Mantaring) in Quezon City on February 5, 1972.
Mantaring later got a divorce decree from the District Court of Clark County, Nevada, USA. Ongpin
married Mercado in Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America on April 21, 1989, believing he
was divorced from Mantaring. However, the two became estranged. Ongpin later secured a judicial
declaration declaring his marriage to Mantaring null and void. On January 8, 2006, Ongpin
petitioned the Bacoor, Cavite RTC for a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Mercado. The
petition was founded on Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Mercado, on the other hand, maintained
that because she was a US citizen at the time, their marriage was legitimate under Article 26 of the
Family Code and not prohibited by Article
35(4). She further claimed that the petition was Ongpin's strategy to avoid culpability in a separate
civil lawsuit for property separation she filed in 2002 over properties acquired during their marriage
that Ongpin was allegedly concealing or disposing of with intent to deprive her of her part. The RTC
rendered a Decision pronouncing Ongpin and Mercado's marriage null and void. It determined that
Ongpin was incapable of marrying at the time he married Mercado, rendering their marriage null and
void under Article 35(4). Furthermore, the RTC determined that Ongpin was liable for moral
damages under Article 2219 in regard to Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The trial court
ruled that Ongpin's act of entering into a second marriage despite the fact that his first marriage had
not yet been annulled damaged the family as a social institution and went against good morality, as
well as the interests and general welfare of society. Because his conducts were tainted with bad faith,
Ongpin was also held accountable for exemplary damages. Finally, he was ordered to pay attorney's
fees because Mercado had been forced to expend legal costs in order to preserve her interests.
Ongpin filed an appeal against the award of damages and attorneys' fees. The appeal is granted by
the CA. Mercado's motion for reconsideration was refused. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Is Mary Elizabeth Mercado entitled to moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees?
Ruling: In Manuel v. People, this Court awarded moral damages to the innocent spouse upon finding
that the bigamous spouse acted deceitfully and fraudulently when he contracted his second marriage.
There, this Court found that the bigamous spouse’s continuous and collective acts of fraud before,
during, and after his marriage were willful, deliberate, and malicious, causing injury to the innocent
spouse. It was the bigamous spouse’s continuing bad faith that disregarded public policy, undermined
and subverted the family as a social institution and went against good morals and the interest and
general welfare of society. Thus, the Regional Trial Court was in error when it held that the mere
contracting of a second marriage despite the existence of a first marriage is, by itself, a ground for
damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 20 or Article 21. As correctly stressed by the Court of
Appeals, the bad faith, or deliberate intent to do a wrongful act, of the bigamous spouse must be
established. Petitioner has not been able to prove that, at the time she and respondent married,
respondent knew that his divorce from his first spouse was invalid. There is no proof that, upon the
first spouse's confirmation of her Philippine citizenship at the time she obtained the divorce decree,
respondent concealed this knowledge from petitioner or allowed her to continue believing that their
marriage was valid. The malice or bad faith necessary to sustain an action based on Article 19 of the
Civil Code has not been shown in this case. There being no entitlement to moral damages, no
exemplary damages can likewise be awarded to the petitioner. Consequently, the award of attorney's
fees must also be deleted.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSEPHINE PONCE-PILAPIL, Nov. 25, 2020

Doctrine: A declaration of presumptive death must be predicated upon a well-founded fact of death.
The fact that the absent spouse is merely missing, no matter how certain and undisputed, will never
yield a judicial presumption of the absent spouse’s death remain to be seen, the Court cannot consider
Josephine’s civil status that of a widow.

Facts: Josephine Ponce Pilapil sought to declare her husband, Agapito Pilapil, Jr. presumptively
dead in a petition filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55 of Mandaue City (RTC). The RTC
set the case for initial hearing and ordered the publication of the petition in a newspaper of general
circulation in the cities and province of Cebu. At the initial hearing, petitioner established the
jurisdictional facts of the petition, and no opposition thereto was registered.

The RTC declared Agapito presumptively dead based on evidence presented by Josephine, pursuant
to Article 41 of the Family Code in relation to Article 253 of the Civil Code, Josephine was found to
have established the fact that Agapito has been absent for 6 years with his whereabouts unknown.

The Republic of the Philippines through the office of the Solicitor General elevated its cause to the
appellate court through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The CA ruled
against the Republic. It found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.

The Republic maintains that Josephine failed to prove that she had a well-founded belief that Agapito
was already dead, and that she exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for her missing
husband. Despite this and over prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, the RTC granted Josephine’s
petition for declaration of presumptive death. This was allegedly indicative of caprice and
arbitrariness on the part of the trial court which, the OSJ claims, the CA should have reversed on
certiorari.

Issue: Is there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC and in
affirming the RTC Order that granted Josephine’s petition for declaration of presumptive death of
Agapito?

Ruling:
Yes. The respondent failed to demonstrate full compliance with Article 41 of the Family Code.
Jurisprudence sets out four requisites for a grant of a petition for declaration of presumptive death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code : First, the absent spouse has been missing for 4 consecutive
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391of the Civil Code; second, the present spouse wishes to
remarry; third, the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead ; and fourth, the
present spouse files for a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.

A declaration of presumptive death must be predicated upon a well-founded fact of death. The fact
that the absent spouse is merely missing, no matter how certain and undisputed, will never yield a
judicial presumption of the absent spouse’s death remain to be seen, the Court cannot consider
Josephine’s civil status that of a widow.
 Alanis III v. Court of Appeals November 11, 2020

FACTS:

Alanis III filed a Petition before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 12,
to change his name. He alleged that he was born to Mario Alanis y Cimafranca and Jarmila Imelda
Ballaho y Al-Raschid, and that the name on his birth certificate was “Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III.”
However, he wished to remove his father’s surname “Alanis III,” and instead use his mother’s
maiden name “Ballaho,” as it was what he has been using since childhood and indicated in his
school records. He likewise wished to change his first name from “Anacleto” to “Abdulhamid” for
the same reasons. During the trial, Alanis III testified that his parents separated when he was five
years old. His mother testified that she single-handedly raised Alanis III and his siblings.

The Regional Trial Court denied the Petition, holding that the petitioner failed to prove any
of the grounds to warrant a change of name. It noted that the mere fact that the petitioner has been
using a different name and has become known by it is not a valid ground for a change of name. It
also held that to allow him to drop his last name was to disregard the surname of his natural and
legitimate father, in violation of the Family Code and Civil Code, which provide that a legitimate
child shall principally use their father’s surname.

ISSUE: Whether or not legitimate children have the right to use their mother's surname as their
surname

RULING: YES. Courts, like all other government departments and agencies, must ensure the
fundamental equality of women and men before the law. Accordingly, where the text of law allows
for an interpretation that treats women and men more equally, that is the correct interpretation.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court gravely erred when it held that legitimate children cannot use their
mothers’ surnames. Contrary to the State policy, the trial court treated the surnames of the
petitioner’s mother and father unequally.

The Regional Trial Court’s application of Article 364 of the Civil Code is incorrect.
Indeed, the provision states that legitimate children shall “principally” use the surname of the
father, but “principally” does not mean “exclusively.” This gives ample room to incorporate into
Article 364 the State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality of women and men before the
law, and no discernible reason to ignore it.
 ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL vs. MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL
G.R. No. 196359 May 11, 2021
FACTS:

In 1995, Rosanna Tan and Mario Victor Andal married each other. They were blessed with one child.
However, even before their marriage, Rosanna already observed Mario to be extremely irritable and
moody. Earlier in their marriage, Rosanna also observed Mario to be emotionally immature,
irresponsible, irritable, and psychologically imbalanced. Rosanna later learned that Mario was a drug
addict. Due to his erratic behavior, Rosanna caused Mario to be confined in a drug rehab center twice.
Mario’s irresponsibility even caused the closure of their family business. Mario also exposed their
daughter to his drug use. In December 2000, fed up with Mario, Rosanna chose to live separately from
him. In August 2003, Rosanna filed a petition to have her marriage with Mario be declared void on
the ground that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

To prove her case, she presented a psychologist (Dr. Fonso Garcia) who, after interviewing Rosanna,
Rosanna’s daughter, and Rosanna’s sister, concluded that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to
perform essential marital obligations. Dr. Garcia did not interview Mario as the latter, despite
invitation, refused an interview. In her assessment, Dr. Garcia found Mario to be suffering from
Narcissistic Antisocial Personality Disorder.

In May 2007, the trial court voided the marriage between Rosanna and Mario as it ruled that Rosanna
was able to prove her case. The Court of Appeals however reversed the trial court on the ground that
the findings of Dr. Garcia was unscientific and unreliable because she diagnosed Mario without
interviewing him.

On appeal, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to revisit the Molina Guidelines and the other
nullity cases decided by the Supreme Court after Molina.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between Rosanna and Mario is void.

HELD:

Yes. Dr. Garcia’s expert testimony is given due weight. HOWEVER, the SupremeCourt declared,
among others, that in psychological incapacity cases, expert testimony is NOT a requirement.
 LUISITO G. PULIDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 27 July 2021

FACTS
In 1983, Luisito Pulido (Pulido) married Nora Arcon (Arcon) in a civil ceremony in Cavite,
and they lived together until 2007 when Pulido stopped going home to their conjugal dwelling. Pulido
admitted that he was having an affair with Rowena Baleda (Baleda). Arcon also learned that Pulido
and Baleda entered into a marriage in 1995. Thus, Arcon charged Pulido and Baleda with Bigamy.

In their defense, Pulido insisted that he cannot be held criminally liable for bigamy because
both his marriages were null and void. He claimed that his marriage with Arcon in 1983 is null and
void for lack of a valid marriage license, while his marriage with Baleda is null and void for lack of a
marriage ceremony. Meanwhile, Baleda countered that she only knew of Pulido’s prior marriage in
April 2007; that before the filing of the bigamy case, she had already filed a petition to annul her
marriage with Pulido; and that in a decision the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared her marriage
with Pulido null and void for being bigamous.

The RTC convicted Pulido of bigamy and acquitted Baleda. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed
the RTC Decision. The CA held that all the elements of bigamy were present since Pulido entered into
a second marriage with Baleda while his prior marriage with Arcon was subsisting and without first
having obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the prior marriage with Arcon. The CA
anchored its ruling on Article 40 of the Family Code which requires one to first secure a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage. It held that Article 40
applies even if the marriage of Pulido with Arcon was governed by the Civil Code. The CA also ruled
that the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not
bar the prosecution of Pulido for the crime of bigamy as jurisprudence dictates that one may still be
charged with bigamy even if the second marriage is subsequently declared as null and void so long as
the first marriage was still subsisting during the celebration of the second marriage.

ISSUES
Does the subsequent declaration of nullity of the first and second marriage constitute a valid defense
in bigamy?

RULING
YES. The Court abandoned its earlier rulings that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
the first and/or second marriages cannot be raised as a defense by the accused in a criminal
prosecution for bigamy. The Court held that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not necessary
to prove a void ab initio prior and subsequent marriages in a bigamy case. Consequently, a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or second marriages presented by the accused in the
prosecution for bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the time within which they are secured.
 GO-YU VS YU, G.R. NO. 230443, APRIL 3, 2019

FACTS:
On October 21, 2009, herein petitioner filed with the RTC of Davao City, Branch 12, a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution of the Absolute Community of
Property against herein respondent. Respondent denied the material allegations of petitioner's Petition
and contended that: he offers his love and affection for petitioner and he desires for them to reconcile
and save their marriage in the spirit of love, forgiveness and Christian values on marriage; and
petitioner is not suffering from psychological incapacity and personality disorder, instead, her
problem is behavioral in the sense that she has difficulty adjusting to married life and in dealing with
respondent's relatives, especially his mother incapacitated her from complying with her essential
marital obligations

ISSUE:
whether or not petitioner's evidence is patently and utterly insufficient to prove her petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage

RULING:
The Court agrees with the CA that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
the respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence because the petitioner was unable to present sufficient
evidence to show that she has the right to the relief she seeks. The psychological report in this case is
wanting material facts, acceptable discussion, and analysis, to support the supposed expert opinion of
the psychiatrist that one of the parties is suffering from a narcissistic personality disorder.

As ruled in Suazo v. Suazo case, the methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the
required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be
suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court
can rely on as a basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists. What makes matters
worse is the fact that it is the herein petitioner Go-Yu herself who claims to be the person
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations. Hence, whatever she had to say was
inherently self-serving and should be held to the strictest standard of scrutiny. Towards this end,
herein petitioner miserably failed.”
 NULLADA VS THE CIVIL REGSITRAR OF MANILA, G.R. NO. 224548, JANUARY 23,
2019

FACTS:
On July 29, 1997, Marlyn and Akira got married in Katsushika-Ku, Tokyo, Japan, as
evidenced by a Report of Marriage that was issued by the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. The
document was registered with both the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Manila and the then
National Statistics Office. The union of Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin Ito.
Their relationship, however, eventually turned sour and so they later decided to obtain a divorce by
mutual agreement.
In 2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan. The Divorce Certificate was
issued by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines. Marlyn and Akira’s acceptance of the notification
of divorce by agreement was supported by an Acceptance Certificate which forms part of the records.
As she sought a recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines, Marlyn filed with the RTC the
Petition for registration and/or recognition of foreign divorce decree and cancellation of entry of
marriage that was filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition. The fact that Marlyn also agreed to the
divorce and jointly filed for it with Akira barred the application of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, which would have otherwise allowed a Filipino spouse to remarry after the alien
spouse had validly obtained a divorce. Marlyn moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied
by the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a divorce was mutually agreed upon by the spouses is enforceable in the
Philippines

RULING:
YES. The dismissal of Marlyn’s petition based on the trial court’s interpretation of Article 26
of the Family Code is erroneous in light of the Court’s disposition in Manalo. The fact that the divorce
was by the mutual agreement of Marlyn and Akira was not sufficient ground to reject the decree in
this jurisdiction.

Under prevailing rules and jurisprudence, the submission of the decree should come with
adequate proof of the foreign law that allows it. The Japanese law on divorce must then be sufficiently
proved. Marlyn failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. The records only include a photocopy of
excerpts of The Civil Code of Japan, merely stamped LIBRARY, Japan Information and Culture
Center. This clearly does not constitute sufficient compliance with the rules on proof of Japan’s law
on divorce.
 KONDO VS. CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL
G.R. NO. 223628, March 4, 2020

Facts: On March 15, 1991, Edna S. Kondo and Katsuhiro Kondo, a Filipina and Japanese national,
respectively, were married before the Head of Hirano Ward in Japan. But on July 3, 2000, after
around nine (9) years of marriage, they obtained a divorce by agreement in Japan for which they were
issued a Report of Divorce. On November 7, 2012, Edna, through her sister and attorney-in-Fact
Luzviminda S. Pineda, filed a petition for judicial recognition of the divorce decree, citing Article 26
(2) of the Family Code. The trial court denied the petition and noted that under Article 26 (2) of the
Family Code, the foreign divorce should have been obtained by the alien spouse, not by mutual
agreement, as here. Moreover, the provisions of the Japanese Civil Code, as presented to the trial
court, did not show that Katsuhiro was allowed to remarry upon obtaining a divorce. On May 20,
2014, Edna filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging she had newly discovered evidence which could
alter the result of the case- a coy of Katsuhiro’s Report of Divorce, allegedly indicating that he had
already married a certain Tsukiko Umegaki. The trial court denied Edna’s Motion for New Trial.
Aggrieved, Edna assailed the trial court’s Resolution before the Court of Appeals but the Court of
Appeals affirmed the resolution of the trial court. Hence, she filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner-wife should be granted the opportunity to present evidence of
husband’s capacity to remarry.

Ruling: Yes. The court ruled that the Divorce Report was not newly discovered evidence. Edna
herself did not deny, as she in fact admitted that the second Divorce Report was already existing
during the proceedings below. To be sure, Katsuhiro allegedly married Tsukiko as early as May 30,
2001. If this were true, she should have promptly secured and presented a copy of the document
during the trial. The Divorce Report could not therefore be deemed as newly discovered evidence.
More so, since the trial court gave her an additional opportunity to present evidence through its Order
dated December 3, 2013, but she still failed to present the second Divorce Report.

However, the Court added that considering the recent jurisprudence or mixed marriages under Article
26 of the Family Code, the trial court should have been more circumspect in strictly adhering to
procedural rules. For these rules are meant to facilitate administration of fairness and may be relaxed
when a rigid application hinders substantial justice.

The Court cited the cases of Republic vs. Manalo, Racho vs. Tanaka, Moraña vs. Republic of the
Philippines, and Garcia vs. Recio to note that it has time and again granted liberality in cases
involving the recognition of foreign decrees to Filipinos in mixed marriages and free them from a
marriage in which they are the sole remaining party. In the abovementioned cases, the Court has
emphasized that procedural rules are designed to secure and not override substantial justice, especially
here where what is involved is a matter affecting lives of families. The Court saw no reason why the
same treatment should not be applied in this case so it relaxed the procedural rules and granted the
petition for Edna to present evidence.
 JEFFREY CALMA VS. MARI KRIS CALMA
G.R. NO. 242070, August 24, 2020

Facts: Kris got pregnant and they decided to get married despite incapability to raise family Jeffrey
went abroad as an OFW and Kris kept on asking more money Kris’ requests for money kept
increasing which Jeffrey observed. Krish changed her phone numbers several times in a row 2008,
which made Jeffrey concerned. Jeffrey after arriving in the Philippines, decided to see Kris and their
son, however, Kris’ parents informed Jeffrey that she’s cohabiting with another man and expecting a
child, Jeffrey considered having his marriage to Kris declared null and void. After then, efforts were
made to locate Kris. Kris, according to Dr. Manrique, had schizoid personality disorder, displayed
maladaptive behavioral patterns, and was psychologically debilitated to the point of being incapable
of performing marital commitment.

Issue: Whether or not the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of Kris’ psychological
capacity that has been shown would justify the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Jeffrey.

Ruling: Yes. Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence. Consistent with how the totality of evidence, should ultimately
inform anu determination of whether a marriage should be declared vid pursuant to article 36 of the
Family Code, as well as with judicial wisdom expressed in contemporary jurisprudence that has more
keenly and openly understood thy myriad manifestations of psychological incapacity, this Court finds
that petitioner successfully discharged his burden of demonstrating respondent’s psychological
incapacity.
 ANACLETO ALANIS III VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 216425, November 11, 2020

Facts: Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III was born to Mario Cimafranca Alanis (father) and Jarmila Imelda
Al-Raschid Ballaho (mother). His parents separated when he was 5 years old. As such, he and his
siblings were raised alone by his mother. Subsequently, he filed a petition before the RTC of
Zamboanga City to change his name to Abdulhamid Ballaho, for two reasons: (a) he wanted to
remove the name of his father; and (b) he has always been known as Abdulhamid Ballaho, as
evidenced by his yearbook, campus newspaper, non-professional driver's license, and community tax
certificate, among others.
RTC: Denied petition on the ground that petitioner failed to prove any of the grounds to warrant a
change of name. The RTC also held that to allow him to drop his last name was to disregard the
surname of his natural and legitimate father, in violation of the Family Code and Civil Code, which
provide that legitimate children shall principally use their fathers' surnames.

CA denied petitioner's Petition for Certiorari based on procedural lapses. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not legitimate children have the right to use their mothers' surnames as their
surnames.

Held: YES. On using the last name of the mother by a legitimate child: The RTC's application
of Article 364 of the Civil Code is incorrect. Indeed, the provision states that legitimate children shall
"principally" use the surname of the father, but "principally" does not mean "exclusively." This gives
ample room to incorporate into Article 364 the State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality of
women and men before the law, and no discernible reason to ignore it. This Court has explicitly
recognized such interpretation in Alfon v. Republic. Reading Article 364 of the Civil Code together
with the State's declared policy to ensure the fundamental equality of women and men before the law,
a legitimate child is entitled to use the surname of either parent as a last name.
On the change of name to avoid confusion: Further, the SC granted petitioner's request to change
name in order to avoid confusion. Whether people inquire deeper into petitioner's parentage or
paternity because of a name is inconsequential here, and seems to be more a matter of intrigue and
gossip than an issue for courts to consider. Regardless of which name petitioner uses, his father's
identity still appears in his birth certificate, where it will always be written, and which can be referred
to in cases where paternity is relevant.

Patriarchy becomes encoded in our culture when it is normalized. The more it pervades our culture,
the more its chances to infect this and future generations. The trial court's reasoning further encoded
patriarchy into our system. If a surname is significant for identifying a person's ancestry, interpreting
the laws to mean that a marital child's surname must identify only the paternal line renders the mother
and her family invisible. This, in turn, entrenches the patriarchy and with it, antiquated gender roles:
the father, as dominant, in public; and the mother, as a supporter, in private.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner -versus- VENANCIO REYES, JR., respondent
(G.R. No. 212483, SECOND DIVISION, October 5, 2016, LEONEN, J. )

FACTS:

Venancio married Lilia in 1973. They purchased 3 lots in Bulacan, which were later mortgaged to
petitioner bank to secure a loan. When the spouses failed to pay their loan, petitioner foreclosed the 3
properties. Venancio filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and real estate mortgage
against petitioner, Lilia and the Sheriff of Bulacan. He claimed that the mortgage constituted over the
properties was void because Lilia undertook the loan and mortgage without his consent and falsified
his signature on the promissory notes. The RTC ordered the annulment of the mortgage and directed
Lilia to reimburse petitioner the loan amount with interest. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether the conjugal partnership can be held liable for the loan contracted unilaterally by Lilia.

Ruling:

YES.

The conjugal partnership can be held liable for the loan. There are two scenarios considered: one is
when the husband, or in this case, the wife, contracts a loan to be used for the family business and the
other is when she acts as a surety or guarantor. If she is a mere surety or guarantor, evidence that the
family benefited from the loan need to be presented before the conjugal partnership can be held
liable. On the other hand, if the loan was taken out to be used for the family business, there is no need
to prove actual benefit. The law presumes the family benefited from the loan and the conjugal
partnership is held liable.

Here, the loan was used as additional working capital for respondent's printing business. There is thus
a presumption that it redounded to the benefit of the family; hence, the conjugal partnership may be
held liable for the loan amount. There is no need to prove actual benefit to the family. Further, what
the lower courts declared void was the real estate mortgage attached to the conjugal property of the
Reyes Spouses. A mortgage is merely an accessory agreement and does not affect the
principal contract of loan. Here, the real estate mortgage is void and legally inexistent because it was
an encumbrance attached to a conjugal property without the consent of the other spouse. Although
petitioner cannot foreclose the mortgage over the conjugal property in question, it can still recover the
loan amount from the conjugal partnership. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the
liability, the husband is solidarily liable with the wife for the unpaid balance. Petitioner can recover
the remaining unpaid balance from the separate properties of either respondent or his wife Lilia.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,v. JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, JR.,
(G.R. No. 199194, SECOND DIVISION, February 10, 2016, DEL CASTILLO, J.: )

FACTS:

On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition5 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamiz City-Branch 15 the declaration of presumptive death of his wife,
Netchie S.Sareñogon (Netchie). In an Amended Order dated Februrary 11, 2009, the RTC set the
Petition for initial hearing on April 16, 2009. It likewise directed the publication of said Order in a
newspaper of general circulation in the cities of Tangub, Ozamiz and Oroquieta, all in the province of
Misamis Occidental. Nobody opposed the Petition. Trial then followed. Jose testified that he first met
Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991, They later became sweethearts and on August
10,1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall. However, they lived together as
husband and wife for a month only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to
Hongkong as a domestic helper. For three months, he did not receive any communication from
Netchie. He likewise had no idea about her whereabouts. While still abroad, he tried to contact
Netchie''s parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental. He returned
home after his contract expired. He then inquired from Netchie''s relatives and friends about her
whereabouts, but they also did not know where she was. Because of these, he had to presume that his
wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract another
marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.

The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to
conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged efforts of respondent in locating his missing wife do not sufficiently
support a "well-founded belief" that respondent''s absent wife x x x is probably dead.

RULING:
NO.The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is complied with only
upon a showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed been made to ascertain whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Article 41 of the Family Code pertinently provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
LUISITO G. PULIDO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 220149 | July 27, 2021

FACTS:
On September 5, 1983, then 16-year old Luisito G. Pulido (Pulido), married his teacher, then
22-year old Nora S. Arcon (Arcon) in a civil ceremony. Their marriage was blessed with a child born
in 1984. The couple lived together until 2007 when Pulido stopped going home to their conjugal
dwelling. When confronted by Arcon, Pulido admitted to his affair with Rowena
U. Baleda (Baleda). Arcon likewise learned that Pulido and Baleda entered into marriage on July 31,
1995 where their Marriage Certificate indicated Pulido’s civil status as single.
Arcon charged Pulido and Baleda with Bigamy on December 4, 2007. In his defense, Pulido
insisted that he could not be held criminally liable for Bigamy because both his marriages were null
and void. He claimed that his marriage with Arcon in 1983 is null and void for lack of a valid
marriage license while his marriage with Baleda is null and void for lack of a marriage ceremony.
Baleda, on the other hand, claimed that she only knew of Pulido’s prior marriage with Arcon
sometime in April 2007. She alleged that even prior to the filing of the bigamy case, she already filed
a Petition to Annul her marriage with Pulido and on October 25, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of
Imus, Cavite (RTC) declared her marriage with Pulido as null and void for being bigamous in nature.
On June 22, 2009, the RTC convicted Pulido of Bigamy and acquitted Baledo. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision with modification only as to the penalty imposed. The CA
found that all the elements of bigamy were present since Pulido entered into a second marriage
without first having obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the prior marriage with Arcon. The
CA anchored its ruling on Article 40 of the Family Code which requires one to first secure a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage. Pulido filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the CA. Hence, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45. Meanwhile, the RTC declared Pulido’s marriage to Arcon void from the beginning and on
June 29, 2016, a Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage confirming the absolute nullity of marriage
between Pulido and Arcon was issued.
Since Pulido’s first marriage was contracted in 1983 or before the effectivity of the Family
Code while his second marriage was celebrated in 1995, during the effectivity of the said law, Pulido
assails the retroactive application of Article 40 of the Family Code on his case which requires him to
obtain a judicial declaration of absolute nullity before he can contract another marriage.
ISSUE:
May a void ab initio marriage be raised as a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy even
without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity?
RULING:
YES. A void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy even without
a judicial declaration of absolute nullity.

Prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988), a void ab initio marriage can be raised as
a defense in a Bigamy case even without a judicial declaration of its nullity. The validity of the second
marriage is a prejudicial question to the criminal prosecution for Bigamy. Thus, when both the prior
and subsequent marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, a void ab initio
marriage can be raised as a defense in a Bigamy case even without a judicial declaration of its nullity.
JUANITA E. CAHAPISAN-SANTIAGO v. JAMES PAUL A. SANTIAGO, G.R. No. 241144,
June 26, 2019

FACTS:
On March 31, 2000, Juanita and James got married before the Mayor of Pangil, Laguna.
During their marriage, however, instead of experiencing marital bliss, their relationship was fraught
with quarrels. James averred that Juanita was domineering, considering that she was the one earning
and he was a high school drop-out. Sometime in 2005, Juanita and James separated because they
could no longer stand each other. After eleven (11) years of living apart, James filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the RTC. In support of his petition, he presented the report
of an expert clinical psychologist, Ms. Shiela Marie 0. Montefalcon, who assessed him to be suffering
from Dependent Personality Disorder (DPD), and Juanita from Narcissistic Personality Disorder
(NPD). As both parties were found to be psychologically incapacitated to perform their essential
marital obligations, Ms. Montefalcon, therefore, recommended that their marriage be declared null
and void. For her part, Juanita contended that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated, but
was merely immature and lacked a sense of responsibility.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the parties' marriage should be nullified on the ground of respondent's
psychological incapacity.

RULING:
No. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, psychological incapacity is a valid
ground to nullify a marriage. However, in deference to the State's policy on marriage, psychological
incapacity does not merely pertain to any psychological condition; otherwise, it would be fairly easy
to circumvent our laws on marriage so much so that we would be practically condoning a legal
subterfuge for divorce. According to case law, psychological incapacity should be confined to the
most serious cases of personality disorders that clearly manifest utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. It should refer to no less than a mental-not merely physical
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. In this accord,
psychological incapacity must therefore be characterized by three (3) traits: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be
grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in a marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability,
i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved. Applying the foregoing guidelines, the Court finds that contrary to the rulings of the
courts a quo the totality of evidence presented failed to sufficiently establish respondent's
psychological incapacity based on his DPD.
 GERARDO A. ELISCUPIDEZ v. GLENDA C. ELISCUPIDEZ, G.R. No. 226907, July 22,
2019

FACTS:
Gerardo and Glenda were married on November 20, 1990, and begot two (2) children. Their
marriage was plagued with fights and numerous and unreasonable demands from Glenda. Gerard then
decided to file a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
He presented himself, his sister Viernes, and their household helper Irene, as witnesses. He also
presented a medical report prepared by Dr. Tayag. The RTC ruled in favor of Gerardo and held that
their marriage is void ab initio on the ground of respondent's psychological incapacity. The CA
reversed the RTC and found that the data gathered by Dr. Tayag was was not comprehensive enough
to establish the conclusion that Glenda is psychologically incapacitated. This is because the report was
grounded on information supplied by the witnesses, which the CA felt was not competent enough to
establish factors in Glenda’s early life that would show or lead to her incapacity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented by Gerardo was able to prove that the
wife was suffering from psychological incapacity.

RULING:
No, In this case, the Court ruled that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner
failed to prove psychological incapacity of the respondent to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. The root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven
by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. In the present case,
however, the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner fails to convince the Court that
respondent suffered from a psychological incapacity that is permanent or incurable, and that has
existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Although respondent was said to have exhibited
"dramatic, extroverted behavior" who was "prone to insecurities and aggressive outbursts of
emotions," these characterizations fell short of proving that she was psychologically incapacitated to
assume her marital responsibilities. Thus, while the Court commiserates with petitioner's predicament,
the evidence on record does not square with the existence of psychological incapacity as contemplated
by law and jurisprudence. Petitioner and respondent's marriage cannot therefore be declared null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
 JULIET RENDORA MORAÑA v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 227605,
December 05, 2019

FACTS:
Moraña and Minoru Takahashi got married sometime on 24 June 2002 in San Juan, Manila.
They then lived in Japan where they had two (2) children named as follows: Haruna Takhashi and
Nanami Takahashi. Later, after ten (10) years together, their marriage turned sour. According to the
petitioner, her husband failed to perform his marital obligations to her and he also refused to give
support to their two (2) children. She also alleged that her husband cohabited with another woman.
Because they can no longer amend their relationship, and the petitioner kept on demanding for
financial support, they finally agreed to divorce. Hence this case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce obtained in Japan may be enforced in the Philippines even if there
was no divorce decree but merely a divorce report .

RULING:
Yes. Records show that the Divorce Report is what the Government of Japan issued to
petitioner and her husband when they applied for divorce. There was no "divorce judgment" to speak
of because the divorce proceeding was not coursed through Japanese courts but through the Office of
the Mayor of Fukuyama City in Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan. In any event, since the Divorce Report
was issued by the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City, the same is deemed an act of an official
body in Japan. By whatever name it is called, the Divorce Report is clearly the equivalent of the
"Divorce Decree" in Japan, hence, the best evidence of the fact of divorce obtained by petitioner and
her former husband.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION vs. EDNA A. AZOTE G.R. No. 209741, April 15, 2015

FACTS
On June 19, 1992, respondent Edna and Edgardo, a member of the Social Security System
(SSS), were married in civil rites. Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their three
older children as designated beneficiaries. Thereafter or on September 7, 2001, Edgardo submitted
another Form E-4 to the SSS designating his three younger children as additional beneficiaries.
OnJanuary13,2005,Edgardo Passed Away. Shortly Thereafter,Edna Filedherclaimfor Death
Benefits with the SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. It appeared, however, from the SSS records
that Edgardo had earlier submitted another Form E-4 on November 5, 1982 with a different set of
beneficiaries, namely: Rosemarie Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer Azote (Elmer), as
dependent, born on October 9, 1982. Consequently, Edna’s claim was denied. Her children were
adjudged as beneficiaries and she was considered as the legal guardian of her minor children. The
benefits, however, would be stopped once a child would attain the age of 21.
On March 13, 2007, Edna filed a petition with the SSC to claim the death benefits, lump sum
and monthly pension of Edgardo. She insisted that she was the legitimate wife of Edgardo. In its
answer, the SSS averred that there was a conflicting information in the forms submitted by the
deceased. Summons was published in a newspaper of general circulation directing Rosemarie to file
her answer. Despite the publication, no answer was filed and Rosemarie was subsequently declared in
default.
In the Resolution,datedDecember8,2010,theSSCdismissedEdna’spetitionforlackofmerit. Citing
Section 24(c) of the SS Law, it explained that although Edgardo filed the Form E-4 designating Edna
and their six children as beneficiaries, he did not revoke the designation of Rosemarie as his wife-
beneficiary, and Rosemarie was still presumed to be his legal wife.

ISSUE
Whether petitioner is entitled to claim benefits as the deceased’s wife (NO)

RULING
It is undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated at the time
when the Family Code was already in force. Article 41 of the Family Code expressly states:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well- founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
 KALAW vs. FERNANDEZ G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
FACTS:
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in
1973, maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong and subsequently had four
children. Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn
Quejano who gave birth to a son. In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children
with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children. In
1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children
from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver.
Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the time
of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was
manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-
habitation Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law
expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates
explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity,
habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic
personality disorder (NPD). The trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The CA reversed the
trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological
incapacity.
RULING:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial courts
Decision for lack of legal and factual basis. A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the
plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior,
suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave,
must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
 Geronimo vs. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015

Facts:
Plaintiff Santos claimed to be the only child of the deceased spouses Rufino
and Caridad Geronimo. She filed a complaint for annulment of document (
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman) and recovery of a parcel of land against the
defendants who were the brothers of Rufino. She alleged that the said document declared
the defendants as the sole heirs of spouses. Also, upon the death of her parents, all their
properties should be passed down to her and not to the defendants. The defendants denied the
allegations and said that Santos was an adopted child of the spouses and was a daughter of
caridad’s sister. They also presented the birth certificate of the plaintiff and contended the
irregularity of the document due to tampered markings. RTC Ruled in favor of the
plaintiff. The court declared the document null and void and ordered the return of the land to
Santos, who was declared as legitimate child of the spouses based on the birth certificate
presented and the open and continuous possession of the status as legitimate child which
established her filiation. CA AFFIRMED RTC’s Decision

ISSUE:
WON the filiation of the plaintiff was duly established based on the grounds provided
by law.

HELD:
NO. The SC disagrees with both courts and rule that the confluence of the
circumstances and proofs presented in this case do not lead to the conclusion that the
respondent is a child of the deceased. Both courts misapprehended the facts: The RTC relying
on the questionable BC and the appellate court affirming the trial court’s decision based on
the continuous possession of status by Santos did not adequately establish the filiation of
plaintiff. It was evident that the BC was tampered with questionable markings. A
representative from NSO confirmed this and the fact that Karen did not even offer evidence
to explain such irregularity are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy.The
secondary evidence did not sufficiently establish that the plaintiff was indeed the child of the
spouse. In a similar jurisprudence, the court ruled that the presence of a similar set of
circumstances which were relied upon as secondary proof by both courts a quo in the case at
bar does not establish that one is a child of the putative parents. The mere registration of a
child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption,
does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such
child.
 CARMELITA T. BORLONGAN v. BANCO DE
ORO GR No. 217617
April 05, 2017

FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Eliseo and Carmelita Borlongan acquired real property in Pasig City, only to find
out that the property was subject of an execution sale in a pending civil case (CC 03- 0713) in the
Makati RTC. The appellant for the pending civil case is the respondent Banco De Oro (formerly
Equitable PCI Bank) who filed for a complaint for sum against the Tancho Corporation, who
had the petitioner Carmelita Borlongan as one of several guarantors for the debt incurred. Over the
course of the CC 03-0713, the respondent consolidated ownership over the subject property in
satisfaction of the Tancho Corporation’s debt, which was through an ex-parte motion that the Makata
RTC granted. Finally, the Makati RTC issued a writ of execution in the pending civil case in favor
of the respondent BDO, stating that in the occasion that the sum ofP32,432,856.33 plus
12% interest per annum is not paid, the amount shall be levied upon the properties of the defendants.
This included the petitioner Carmelita Borlongan, who was a guarantor of the defendants. BDO
then auctioned the property and acquired it as its highest bidder.

ISSUE:
WON the non-debtor spouse can move to annul the levy of conjugal property of the other spouse.

RULING:
The primary contention of the respondent with the petitioner Eliseo’s action was that he can no longer
file for the annulment of the levy with the Pasig RTC. The Supreme Court clarifies, that according to
Rule 39, Sec. 14 of the Rules of Court, third-party claimants still have the right to vindicate his or her
claim to a property in a separate action with different court of law, but such aright is only reserved for
strangers and unrelated parties in an ongoing case citing Buado v Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court reiterated that “conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted
by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal
partnership.” The Supreme Court holds that if no advantage or benefit was not added to the conjugal
partnership, then the husband whose property was levied to satisfy the contract he was not a part of
can be considered a “stranger”. The respondent was not able to prove that benefit to the conjugal
partnership was ever added by Carmelita’s surety agreement, validating Eliseo’s claim to the property
with the Pasig RTC. The Supreme Court grants the petition and reverses the CA decision, ruling in
favor of the spouse.
 RAFAEL C. UY (CABANGBANG STORE) V. ESTATE OF VIPA FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 200612
April 05, 2017

FACTS:
Levi and Vipa were married on March 24, 1961. Vipa is the registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. T-26576 (subject property). Sometime in 1990, a contract of lease was executed
between Vipa and Uy over the subject property. In 1994, Vipa died and her daughter became the de
facto administrator of the estate. For failure to pay rent, the daughter instituted a case for unlawful
detainer. Uy insists, however that he already purchased Levi's one-half share in the subject property in
consideration ofP500,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Sale in 2005. Hence, the case must be
dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Uy validly bought Levi’s one-half share of the property.

RULING:
Yes. Rafael bought Levi's one-half share in the subject property in consideration of P500,000.00 as
evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated December 29, 2005. At that time, the conjugal partnership
properties of Levi and Vipa were not yet liquidated. However, such disposition, notwithstanding the
absence of liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, is not necessarily void. Thus, upon the
termination of the conjugal partnership of gains due to the death of either spouse, the surviving spouse
has an actual and vested one-half undivided share of the properties, which does not consist of
determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and partition of the conjugal partnership. With
respect, however, to the deceased spouse's share in the conjugal partnership properties, an implied
ordinary co-ownership ensues among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.
Although Levi became a co-owner of the conjugal partnership properties with the heirs, he could not
yet assert or claim title to any specific portion thereof without an actual partition of the property being
first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Before the partition of a land or thing held in
common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-
owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing. Nevertheless,
a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Levi had the right to freely sell and dispose of his
undivided interest. Thus, the sale by Levi of his one-half undivided share in the subject property was
not necessarily void, for his right as a co-owner thereof was effectively transferred, making the buyer,
Rafael, a co-owner of the subject property. It must be stressed that the binding force of a contract must
be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.
 HEIRS OF GILBERTO ROLDAN v. HEIRS OF SILVELA ROLDAN
G.R. No. 202578
September 27 2017

FACTS:
Natalia Magtulis owned Lot No. 4696, an agricultural land in Kalibo, Aklan, which had an area of
21,739 square meters, and was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-7711. Her heirs included
Gilberto Roldan and Silvela Roldan, her two children by her first marriage; and, allegedly, Leopolda
Magtulis her child with another man named Juan Aguirre. After her death in 1961, Natalia left the lot
to her children. However, Gilberta and his heirs took possession of the property to the exclusion of
respondents. On 19 May 2003, respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for Partition and
Damages against petitioners. The latter refused to yield the property on these grounds: (1) respondent
heirs of Silvela had already sold her share to Gilberto; and (2) respondent heirs of Leopolda had no
cause of action, given that he was not a child of Natalia. During trial, petitioners failed to show any
document evidencing the sale of Silvela's share to Gilberto. Thus, in its Decision dated 14 December
2007, the RTC ruled that the heirs of Silvela remained co-owners of the property they had inherited
from Natalia. As regards Leopoldo Magtulis, the trial court concluded that he was a son of Natalia
based on his Certificate of Baptism and Marriage Contract.

ISSUE:
Whether the courts a quo correctly appreciated Leopoldo to be the son of Natalia based on his
baptismal and marriage certificates.

RULING:
Yes. In resolving the issue of filiation, the RTC and the CA referred to Articles 172 and 175 of the
Family Code, viz.:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent. The parties concede that there is no record of Leopolda's birth in either
the National Statistics Office or in the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan. The RTC
and the CA then referred to other means to prove the status of Leopoldo: his Certificate of Baptism
and his Marriage Contract. Gilberto and heirs of Silvela.
 NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016

FACTS:
In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged Norberto
with bigamy. According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo
at the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3) children. After some time,
Alice "began hearing rumors that her husband was previously married to another woman. She
eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan on July 17,
1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National Statistics Office.

Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto. On the other hand,
Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime in 1987. "After much
prodding by their friends and relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get married in 1994.”Before
finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake marriage"with
his college girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan. Nevertheless, despite Norberto's revelation, Alice
convinced him that they proceed with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice were married on
December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three children.

Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting valid marriage
with Gina, RTC of Manila convicted Norberto of bigamy. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained
the guilty verdict against Norberto. Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this
court. Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. He presents as evidence a
Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no
record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that
with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the
prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage. In addition, Norberto claims that the
legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy. According to
Norberto, nothing in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code that punishes bigamy mentions that
requirement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of Norberto for bigamy was proper.

RULING:
Contrary to petitioner's claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still
legally married to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the
crime charged.

Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner's first marriage was solemnized on
July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code of the Philippines became effective on August 3,
1988. Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines govern the validity of his first
marriage. Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage
contract between him and his first wife, Gina. The marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a
positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner's first marriage. This "should be given
greater credence than documents testifying merely as to the absence of any record of the marriage.
 Doreen Grace Parilla- Medina v. Michiyuki Koike G.R. No. 215723 July 27, 2016
FACTS:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike
(Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines. Their
union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was
born on April 4, 2007.
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on file with the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code before the RTC.
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. On the other hand, Doreen presented several
foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/ Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce" and
"Family Register of Michiyuki Koike" both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly
authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a
certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul for the
Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of the Foreign Affairs, as
well as a Certification issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said
divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office.
In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English translation, as
well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009"
were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce. RTC denied Doreen's
petition, ruling that in an action for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the
Family Code, the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien recognizing his or her
capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 2420 and 2521 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
The RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009,"
presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by Sections 24
and 25 of the said Rules. Doreen's motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce decree is should be recognized in the Philippines
RULING:
The Court held that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,29 it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien
spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according
to the national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the
alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence
requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like
any other fact. Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as
well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-
evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is
obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.
 Candelario vs. Candelario and the Office of the SolGen, G.R. 222068. July 25, 2023
Facts:
In 2009, Candelario filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
Candelario prayed that his marriage to Marlene E. Candelario (Marlene), contracted in a civil
ceremony on June 11, 1984, be declared void ab initio due to his psychological incapacity to comply
with his marital obligations, a ground for nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The RTC denied Candelario’s petition, ruling that while his psychological incapacity has been
established, the marriage still cannot be nullified under Article 36 of the Family Code as the law only
became effective on August 3, 1988, while the marriage was celebrated on June 11, 1984. The RTC
held that the applicable law that was in effect during the celebration of Candelario’s marriage was the
Civil Code, which did not contain any provision similar to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the Family Code applies to Candelario’s marriage.
Ruling:
The Family Code, including its concept of psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify
marriage, shall be given retroactive effect, so long as no vested or acquired rights under relevant laws
will be prejudiced or impaired.
The Court cited Article 256, which states that the Family Code “shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws.”
Thus, it is explicitly stated in the Family Code that the law, including its concept of
psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify marriage, shall apply retroactively, so long as no
vested or acquired rights under relevant laws will be prejudiced or impaired, stressed the Court.
The Court also noted that while the original text of Article 39 of the Family Code made a
distinction between marriages solemnized before and after the effectivity of the law, this provision has
already been repealed by Republic Act No. 8533. Hence, Article 39 now reads: “The action or defense
for the declaration of nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.”
A review of the law further shows that nowhere does it state that Article 36, which provides
that one’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall be a
ground for nullity of the marriage, cannot be retroactively applied to marriages celebrated prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code.
 RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO vs. JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO and COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 222541 February 15, 2017
Facts:
Petitioner, then 15 years old, met the respondent then 17 years old in December 1983 and
became romantically involved. Thereafter, in 1988, the two got married and the petitioner went back
to Hong Kong to work as a domestic helper/caregiver, only returning to the Philippines once a year. In
September 2011, petitioner filed for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, alleging that
the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations.
According to respondent, her husband was hot tempered and violent stating instances like
punching her in the shoulder a few days before their wedding, hitting his own father with a pipe, and
locking her out of their house in the middle of the night sometime in December 2007 when she
fetched her relatives, which he refused to perform. Also, respondent has been representing himself as
single, would flirt openly, and had an extramarital affair. Petitioner admitted that it was only later in
their married life that Jose started frequenting bars and engaging in drinking sessions.
Issue:
Whether or not psychological incapacity can be declared upon the respondent.
Ruling:
No. In sum, the psychological assessment, even when taken together with the various
testimonies, failed to show the respondent’s immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the
level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties’ marriage. To
reiterate and emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or
“neglect” in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the
other failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person. There must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person which must be linked with the manifestations of the
psychological incapacity.
 MIRASOL CASTILLO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FELIPE IMPAS
G.R. No. 214064 February 6, 2017
Facts:
Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then, eventually, became sweethearts. During their
courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with his former girlfriend. The couple’s
relationship turned tumultuous after the revelation. With the intervention of their parents, they
reconciled. They got married and were blessed with two children. However, after thirteen years of
marriage, Felipe resumed philandering. Tired of her husband’s infidelity, she left the conjugal
dwelling and stopped any communication with him. Felipe’s irresponsible acts like cohabiting with
another woman, not communicating with her, and not supporting their children for a period of not less
than ten years without any reason, constitute a severe psychological disorder. Mirasol filed a
Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage which was granted by the trial court.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants, as the RTC determined, the
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the
respondent’s unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality,
completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the marital state;
there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with the obligation to be faithful to his spouse.
It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. As discussed, the
findings on Felipe’s personality profile did not emanate from a personal interview with the subject
himself. Apart from the psychologist’s opinion and petitioner’s allegations, no other reliable evidence
was cited to prove that Felipe’s sexual infidelity was a manifestation of his alleged personality
disorder, which is grave, deeply rooted, and incurable.
 CARULLO -PADUA VS PADUA
G.R. No. 208258. April 27, 2022
FACTS:
This case seeks to establish whether there is sufficient basis for nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, between the marriage of
petitioner Maria and respondent Joselito. According to Maria, Joselito is psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations in that he exhibited excessive sexual desire and forced
her to do unconventional sexual performances with him, specifically oral and anal sex. Maria also
claimed that Joselito insulted her for religious belief, attempted to kill her, failed to provide financial
support for their son, never bothered to share household expenses; among others.
During trial, Maria presented Dr. Villegas, a psychiatrist, as witness, testifying that Joselito had a
personality disorder of a sexual deviant or perversion based on Maria’s narrations. Further, the report
mentioned Joselito’s personality disorder as traceable from his childhood for having a cruel father and
a very protective mother which developed emotional confusion in him. That as a result, his sexual
development failed to mature.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was sufficient basis to render their marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, based on sexual infidelity and
abandonment.
2. Whether or not there was sufficient basis to render their marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, based on their irreconcilable
differences.

RULING:
1. None. Article 36 contemplates incapability or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic
marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will. This incapability consists of one’s true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of the marriage which consists of the essential obligations, the conjugal act, the community
of life and love, rendering of mutual help, procreation and education of offspring; and that such
inability must be tantamount to psychological abnormality. It is not enough that a spouse failed to
meet his or her responsibilities as a married person, but such incapacity must be so enduring and
persistent with respect to a specific partner, that the only result of the union would be the inevitable
and irreparable breakdown of marriage.

2. None. Joselito’s inability to sexually satisfy his wife Maria because he prefers the unconventional
way of coitus could not be taken to mean that Joselito is psychologically incapacitated. Sexual
incompatibility is not a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage.
 PUGOY-SOLIDUM VS REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 213954. April 20, 2022

FACTS:
Hannamer filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on January 03, 2010 under
Article 36 of the Family Code before the RTC of Tagaytay City. She averred that Grant showed
complete lack of understanding of his duties and responsibilities as husband and father during the
marriage. He never worked and only depended on his older sibling for financial support. Despite not
earning, Grant spent most of his time and money on gambling and going to cockfights, instead of
taking care of his family.
Dra. Revita testified that she diagnosed Grant with narcissistic personality disorder and that
such disorder was considered grave and incurable. Dra. Revita traced back the root of Grant’s disorder
to his childhood and his exposure to a tolerant and dysfunctional and permissive family set up
contributed to the development of a faulty value system. Dra. Revita also testified that she was not
able to personally examine grant due to Grant’s failure to respond to her request for psychological
evaluation.
RTC granted Hannamer’s petition and declared their marriage void ab initio. The Republic,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed. OSG argued that Hannamer failed to prove
Grant’s psychological incapacity.
Grant’s alleged irresponsible ways and addiction to gambling and cockfighting were not established
as manifestations of his personality disorder that rendered him incapable of fulfilling his marital
obligations. She also failed to identify and prove the root cause of Grant’s psychological incapacity or
that such incapacity existed prior to their marriage. OSG also pointed out that Dra. Revita did not
personally examine Grant, and only relied on the partial and biased narrations of Hannamer. CA
granted OSG’S appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Psychological Incapacity was properly established.
HELD: No. Apart from Hannamer, Dra. Revita, and the psychological report, there is no other
evidence presented to support the allegation of Grant’s psychological incapacity. In the case at bar,
Court finds that Hannamer failed to sufficiently prove Grant’s psychological incapacity. The
psychological report is bereft of any factual basis proving Grant’s psychological incapacity. It fails to
prove the enduring aspects of Grant’s personality called “personality structure” that manifest itself
clear acts of dysfunctionality.There is also no evidence proving that the alleged psychological
incapacity existed prior to their marriage. Dra. Revita’s findings were very general and are lacking
data as to Grant’s personality structure and how it incapacitates him. Neither does it prove that
psychological incapacity was due to genuine psychic cause.
In any case, the Court emphasizes that Tan-Andal dispensed with the need for a psychological report.
A psychological incapacitated person need not be shamed and pathologized for what could have been
a simple mistake in one’s choice of intimate partner, a mistake too easy to make as when one sees
through rose-coloured glasses. There is no need to label a person as having a mental disorder just to
obtain a decree of nullity because it could very well be that he or she did not know that the incapacity
existed in the first place.
 SANTOS MACABATA vs. MACABATA
G.R. NO. 237524. APRIL 06, 2022

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent dating after they were introduced to each other and got married.
The couple began to quarrel encountering difficulties in supporting their family. In February 2000,
respondent eventually found work as an entertainer in Japan. Petitioner was shocked to learn that
respondent indicated his civil statues as “ single” in his passport. Respondent would then proceed to
work in Japan and send money to petitioner. After two years of no communication with respondent,
petitioner was able to talk to respondent after he called his sister to tell petitioner that he was no
longer coming back to her, and that he was already living with another woman.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for nullity of her marriage to respondent
on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. Respondent did not file any responsive
pleading. OSG entered its appearance. Conduct its investigation and confirm therein that no collusion
exist between the parties. Petitioner submitted as evidence, among others, report on the psychological
condition of petitioner and respondent, conducted by clinical psychologist Dr. H. Nedy L. Tayag
concluded in her report that respondent suffered from antisocial personality disorder stemming from
his childhood years, and “ being afflicted with said disorder, respondent lacked depth when it
concerned his marital duties and obligations.” RTC granted the petition declaring the marriage of the
parties null and void ab initio. OSG filed an MR asserted that the petitioner failed o satisfactorily
discharge the burden of proving that the respondent was truly incapable of complying with his marital
obligations due to a serious for of psychological disorder. CA reversed the RTC Decision, and held
that the RTC erred in declaring the marriage of the parties null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred when it reversed the Decision of the RTC and issued a
Decision finding that petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
RULING:
No. Indeed, the respondent has clearly failed to fulfil his essential obligations to his wife and
children when he abandoned his family. However, the totality of evidence does not show that such
failure to fulfil his essential marital obligations is caused by a genuinely serious and incurable psychic
cause which exists prior to or at the time of celebration of the marriage of the parties.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that there are inconsistencies in the information provided in the
report, and the conclusion of the clinical psychologist therein. A thorough reading of the report would
show that the conclusion therein is grounded on general observations nitpicked from certain aspects of
respondent’s life and based primarily on petitioner’s assessment of his upbringing, none of which are
fully supported by the information provided by respondent’s younger brother who grew up with the
respondent. Hence, there is doubt as to whether the report is sufficient evidence to show that the acts
of respondents are manifestations of a certain form of psychological incapacity, and that the alleged
psychological incapacity of the respondent exists prior to, or at the time of, celebration of the marriage
of the parties.
For failure to show by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is incapable of fulfilling his
essential marital obligations due to a genuinely serious and incurable psychic cause which exists prior
to or at the time of celebration of the marriage of the parties, the Court is compelled to deny the
petition.
 Nixon Treyes vs. Antonio Larlar, G.R. No. 232579, September 08, 2020
FACTS:

G.R. No. 232579 – Remedial Law – Special Proceedings – Settlement of Estate –

Jurisdiction of Probate Courts; Successional rights may be enforced by an heir even without
undergoing special proceedings; Abandonment/clarification of the doctrine laid down in the
cases of Heirs of Ypon vs. Gaudioso Ricafrente and Heirs of Gabatan vs. CA
Nixon Treyes and Rosie Treyes were husband and wife who have accumulated several real properties
in various parts of the Philippines. They have no children. In 2008, Rosie died. She was survived by
Nixon and seven siblings (Antonio Larlar et al.).

After the death of Rosie, Nixon executed two affidavits of self-adjudication and he was able to
consolidate Rosie’s estate under his name. In 2012, Antonio et al. found out about what Nixon did and
they filed a civil action for cancellation of titles and recovery of properties against Nixon on the
ground that under the Civil Code, when the brothers and sisters of a deceased married sister survive
with her widower, the latter shall be entitled by law to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters to the other half.

Nixon sought for the dismissal of the civil action on the ground that under the cases of Ypon and
Gabatan, Antonio et al. must first file for a special proceeding for them to be declared as heirs before
they can file a civil action asserting the rights of an heir.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nixon is right.

HELD: No. Ypon and Gabatan and other similar cases were abandoned.

Antonio et al. are not seeking to establish a status or a right. They are not seeking to be declared as
heirs. Hence, they are not expected to file a special proceedings case to be declared as heirs of Rosie,
their sister. They are heirs by operation of law. Under the law, successional rights arise the moment
the predecessor-in-interest dies.

The doctrine in Ypon and Gabatan and other similar cases which declared that a prior determination
of heirship in a separate special proceeding as a prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil
action to enforce ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, is abandoned.

From now on, the rule is: unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the
decedent’s estate or for the determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may
commence an ordinary civil action to declare the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of
property, or any other action in the enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue of
succession, without the necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration of their status as such.
The ruling of the trial court shall only be in relation to the cause of action of the ordinary civil action,
i.e., the nullification of a deed or instrument, and recovery or reconveyance of property, which ruling
is binding only between and among the parties.

NOTE: The doctrine established in this case is very contentious. There were several Justices who
dissented.
EDNA S. KONDO, Represented by Attorney-In-Fact, LUZVIMINDA S. PINEDA, vs. CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL [G.R. No. 223628. Mar. 4, 2020]

FACTS

After nine years of marriage, petitioner Edna S. Kondo, a Filipina, and Katsuhiro Kondo, a Japanese
national obtained a divorce decree in Japan. Edna filed a petition for judicial recognition of the
divorce decree. The trial court denied the petition on the ground that under Article 26 (2) of the
Family Code, the foreign divorce should have been obtained by the alien spouse, not by mutual
agreement.

Moreover, the provisions of the Japanese Civil Code, as presented before the trial court, did not show
that Katsuhiro was allowed to remarry upon obtaining a divorce. This was later affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, emphasizing further that Rule 37, Section 2 (2) of the Rules of Court requires supporting
evidence by way of affidavits of witnesses or duly authenticated documents to be presented.

In granting the petition, the Supreme Court employed the liberal application of its rules for cases
involving the recognition of foreign decrees to Filipinos in mixed marriages and it further found that
petitioner has actually presented certified documents establishing the fact of divorce.

RULING

We grant the petition. The Court has time and again granted liberality in cases involving the
recognition of foreign decrees to Filipinos in mixed marriages and free them from a marriage in which
they are the sole remaining party. In previous cases, the Court has emphasized that procedural rules
are designed to secure and not override substantial justice, especially here where what is involved is a
matter affecting lives of families.

The Court sees no reason why the same treatment should not be applied here. Consider: First. Edna
presented an Authenticated Report of Divorce in Japanese Language; an English translation of the
Report of Divorce; and an Authenticated Original copy of the Family Register of Katsuhiro. Too, she
actively participated throughout the proceedings through her sister and attorney-in-fact, Luzviminda,
despite financial and logistical constraints. She also showed willingness to provide the final document
the trial court needed to prove Katsuhiro's capacity to remarry.

Second. As the OSG noted, the present case concerns Edna's status. Hence, res judicata shall not
apply and Edna could simply refile the case if dismissed. This process though would be a waste of
time and resources, not just for both parties, but the trial court as well. In RCBC
v. Magwin Marketing Corp., the Court surmised that there was no substantial policy upheld had it
simply dismissed the case and

required petitioner to pay the docket fees again, file the same pleadings as it did in the proceedings
with the trial court, and repeat the belabored process. This reenactment would have been a waste of
judicial time, capital, and energy.
 Picardal v. People
G.R. No. 235949

June 19, 2019

FACTS:

The RTC and CA convicted Ramon Picardal y Baluyot for the crime of Qualified
Illegal Possession of Firearms. Police Officer (PO) 1 Mark Anthony Peniano is a regular member of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned at Ermita Police Station located at Baseco PNP
Compound, Port Area, Manila. On March 27, 2014, at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, together
with his companion POI William Cristobal and PO 1 Rodrigo Co, while they were on a beat patrol
back to the station, they chanced upon a person urinating against the wall. The police officers
approached said person who was later identified as accused-appellant Ramon Picardal. The place is
well-lighted since it is within the main road. PO 1 Peniano told accused-appellant that it is forbidden
to urinate in public. In view of said violation, they invited accused-appellant to go with them to the
precinct. When PO 1 Peniano is about to handcuff him, accused-appellant attempted to run. His
attempt failed since PO 1 Peniano was able to get hold of his hand. Once caught, PO 1 Peniano
frisked accused-appellant and was able to recover a caliber .38 revolver from his waist. The rusty
[pistol] with a handle made of wood contained five (5) live ammunitions. Accused-appellant was
brought to the police station, after POI Cristobal apprised him of his constitutional rights. At the
police station, PO 1 Peniano referred accused-appellant to the officers in-charge for the purpose of
medical examination and the recovered items were surrendered to P/Chief Insp. William Santos for
safekeeping. The following morning, the items were retrieved back by POI Peniano and gave the
same to the assigned investigator, PO3 Anthony Navarro, for proper marking. PO 1 Peniano had the
confiscated firearm checked with the Firearm and Explosive Division (FED) of the PNP and it was
discovered that the same is a loose firearm. The FED was issued a certification stating that accused-
appellant is not licensed or registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber.

ISSUE:Whether or not the CA erred in convicting Picardal.

HELD:

Yes. At the outset, it is well to emphasize that the factual findings of the CA, affirming that of the
trial court, are generally final and conclusive on the Court. The foregoing rule, however, is subject to
the following exceptions: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2)
the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; ( 4)
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; ( 6) there
is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of absence
of fact are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary
to those of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond
the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
 Gloria Zoleta-San Agustin v. Ernesto Sales, G.R. No. 189289 August 31, 2016
Ponente: Reyes, J.

FACTS:

The plaintiffs, having no knowledge of any relatives of Spouses Fernandez, directed the action against
unknown defendants. However, on May 30, 1994, the petitioner raised her opposition. She alleged in
her Amended Answer filed on July 26, 1994 that she is the niece of Louis and that the Spouses
Fernandez informally adopted her as their child when she was only 2 years old. She insisted that the
father of the plaintiffs is Corpus Micabalo (Corpus), the former houseboy of the Fernandez household.
One of the principal allegations in the amended answer of the petitioner is that the documents
presented by the plaintiffs to sustain the complaint were spurious. RTC issued an order denying the
admission of the photographs presented by the petitioner seeking to prove that she was 'treated by the
Spouses Fernandez as their own child. the RTC in a Decision14 dated July 12, 2007 ruled in favor of
the recognition of the plaintiffs as the illegitimate children of Louis.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documents executed by Louis are valid to acknowledge voluntary
recognition of Teodoro and Ernesto as his illegitimate children

RULING:

The Court held that the legitimate filiation of a child may be established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the present concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proven by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

These requirements likewise apply to establish the filiation of illegitimate children. In order to cast
doubt as to the · authenticity of the documentary evidence presented by Ernesto, the petitioner
purported that the circumstances surrounding the execution and notarization of the said documents are
highly suspicious thereby warranting the overturn of the presumption of regularity in favor of these
documents.
The petitioner claimed that during the execution and notarization of the documents, Louis could still
write, rendering incredible the mere affixing of his thumbprints to the contested documents. However,
Ernesto testified before the RTC that Louis was no longer capable of writing his name as he was
already blind and bedridden at the time he affixed his thumb mark to the document dated November
11, 1980. The witnesses to the document were Margarita Almeda, the hairdresser of Louis' sister, and
Romeo Gadones, Teodoro's acquaintance. A thumb mark has been repeatedly considered as a valid
mode of signature. The other inconsistencies cited by the petitioner are of no importance and
insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity in favor of the notarized documents.
With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of the crime
charged.
 AAA vs BBB, GR No. 212448

Facts: On August 1, 2006, AAA and BBB were married. Their union was blessed with two children,
CCC and DDD. When BBB worked in Singapore, he acquired permanent resident status in September
2008. AAA claimed that BBB sent little to no financial support. There are also allegations of virtual
abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make
matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok
with whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore. AAA and the kids visited BBB in Singapore.
However, a violent altercation happened in their hotel room. This prompt AAA to file a complaint.

The investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and
emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity. Accordingly, an Information was filed
against BBB for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262.On November 6, 2013, counsel of accused
filed on behalf of BBB an Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure
Order and Warrant of Arrest. The RTC granted the motion to quash on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and thereby dismissed the case. The RTC ruled that since BBB’s acts complained of had
occurred in Singapore, said Court enjoys no jurisdiction over the offense charged, it having transpired
outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

Issue: Whether a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may be filed within the
Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad.

Held: Yes. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 provides that the law contemplates that acts of violence
against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some
acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or
territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential
and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that
the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a
continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense
was in part committed.

Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB's
marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the husband,
and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It likewise remains
imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns itself is simply whether
or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even be filed within the
Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that even if the alleged extra-marital
affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does
not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.
 Espina-Dan vs. Dan, GR No. 209031

Facts: Abigael An Espina-Dan and Marco Dan – an Italian National – were chatmates. Soon, they
exchange letters which led Marco to propose marriage with Abigael. Subsequently, they got married
in the Philippines on January 23, 2006. Abigael noticed that Marco is not circumcised. Abigael also
notices that Marco is displaying different attitudes. He was also dependent on his mother and he has
poor hygiene. He would only give her money for food and spent most of his income for video games.
On September 14, 2007, Abigael filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Marco. Psychologist Nedy Tayag testified that she examined Abigael and she made a conclusion that
Abigael was not suffering from any psychological incapacity while Marco, based on Abigael’s
description, is suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder with underlying Anti-Social Trait. The
Solicitor General opposed the petition. The petition was dismissed for inadequate evidence for
Marco’s psychological incapacity.

Issue: Whether there is adequate evidence establishing psychological incapacity of Marco and thus
annul the marriage of Abigael and Marco.

Held: No. Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of her judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial
affidavits and testimonies of her mother and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological, evaluation
report on the psychological condition of both petitioner and respondent. The determination of
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was based solely on petitioner's account and that of her
mother, since respondent was presumably in Italy and did not participate in the proceedings.

The Court held that it is insufficient.

"What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological
condition." "The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage" such that "if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."

To reiterate, psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. "The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved." Finally, the burden of proving psychological incapacity is
on the petitioner.
 REPUBLIC vs COTE, G.R. No. 212860, March 14, 2018,

Facts: Rhomel Gagarin Cote (Rhomel) and respondent Florie Grace Manongdo-Cote (Florie) were
married in Quezon City. On August 23, 2002, Rhomel filed a Petition for Divorce before the Family
Court of the First Circuit of Hawaii on the ground that their marriage was irretrievably broken. This
was granted on August 23, 2002 by the issuance of a decree. Florie commenced a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment granting the divorce before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Florie
also prayed for the cancellation of her marriage contract, hence, she also impleaded the Civil Registry
of Quezon City and the National Statistics Office (NSO).

RTC granted the petition and declared Florie to be capacitated to remarry. The RTC ruled, inter alia,
that Rhomel was already an American citizen when he obtained the divorce decree. Petitioner filed a
Notice of Appeal on May 17, 2011. However, the RTC, believing that the petition was covered by
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, applied Section 20 of said Rule and denied the appeal because the
notice was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA claiming that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. In a Decision dated January
21, 2014, the CA denied the petition.

Issue: Whether the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies in a case involving recognition of a
foreign decree of divorce.

Held: No. The CA is correct when it ruled that the trial court misapplied Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC.

A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different from annulment as defined by our family
laws. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only covers void and voidable marriages that are specifically cited and
enumerated in the Family Code of the Philippines. Void and voidable marriages contemplate a
situation wherein the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the marriage. It treats the marriage as if it never existed. Divorce, on the
other hand, ends a legally valid marriage and is usually due to circumstances
arising after the marriage.

It was error for the RTC to use as basis for denial of petitioner's appeal Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC. Since Florie followed the procedure for cancellation of entry in the civil registry, a special
proceeding governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, an appeal from the RTC decision should be
governed by Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Although the
Court agrees with petitioner that the RTC erroneously misapplied
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, such error does not automatically equate to grave abuse of discretion.
 GLENN VIÑAS v. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS,G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015
FACTS:
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace got married. Mary Grace was already pregnant
then. The infant, however, died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment. Glenn alleged that the
infant's death was caused by Mary Grace's heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy.
Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn. Glenn
subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai.
Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. He
alleged that Mary Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly resorting to
any pretext to be able to leave the house. She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked
heavily even when she was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused to perform even the most essential
household chores of cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn. Mary Grace had not exhibited the
foregoing traits and behavior during their whirlwind courtship.
Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace's personality through the data she had gathered from Glenn
and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo , who knew Mary Grace way back in college. Dr. Tayag diagnosed
Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Hence, Dr.
Tayag recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple's marriage.
The RTC rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as null
and void on account of the latter's psychological incapacity. On appeal before the Court of Appeals,
the OSG claimed that no competent evidence exists proving that Mary Grace indeed suffers from a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her marital obligations. The
Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace
as valid and subsisting.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Glenn failed to prove the psychological incapacity of Mary Grace warranting
the dissolution of their marriage.
HELD
Yes: the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary
evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary Grace's
condition. The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong- willed and not inclined to
perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai and is romantically-involved with
another man. She has not been maintaining lines of communication with Glenn at the time the latter
filed the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand, is conservative, family-oriented and is the
exact opposite of Mary Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible personalities, the
latter's acts and traits do not necessarily indicate psychological incapacity.
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital
obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some
psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.
 VIRGINIA OCAMPO v. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO
G.R. No. 198908, August 3, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with
Deogracio Ocampo before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The decision became final, since no party appealed the judgment annulling the marriage.
The trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried
properties, and if they failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the factual issues with regard to said
properties. Having failed to agree on a project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued
where the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective stand.
The trial court rendered the assailed Order stating that the properties declared by the parties
belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of
gains by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.

HELD:

No. The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either
by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate,
the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other;
(2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of
marriage or their marriage is void, as in the instant case.
Virginia and Deogracio lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However,
their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity. From the foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their work
and industry should, therefore, be governed by the rules on equal co- ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima face presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
The certificates of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the
presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code. All properties acquired by the spouses during the
marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are registered, are presumed conjugal unless
proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the
property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses only. Article 116 expressly
provides that the presumption remains even if the property is "registered in the name of one or both of
the spouses."
Thus, the failure of Virginia to rebut this presumption, said properties were obtained by the
spouses' joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares
Accordingly, the partition of the former spouses' properties on the basis of co-ownership, as ordered
by the RTC and the appellate court, should be affirmed, and not on the regime conjugal partnership of
gains.
 ROBERT F. MALLILIN vs. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015
FACTS:
Robert Malilin and Luz Jamesolamin were married on September 6, 1972 and begot three
children. Robert Mallilin filed a complaint for nullity of marriage on the grounds that Luz allegedly
suffered from psychological and mental incapacity at the time of the marriage celebration,
unpreparedness to enter such marital life and to comply with its essential obligations and
responsibilities. Such incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz
exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational
judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.
Robert testified that Luz was already living in California, USA, and married an american.
While they were still together, Robert disclosed that respondent did not perform responsibilities of
being a housewife like keeping the house in order, preparing meals, washing clothes and taking care
of the children. He also stated that she dated several men and contracted loans without his knowledge.
In turn Luz filed her answer with a counterclaim, averring that it was Robert who manifested
psychological incapacity.
The Regional Trial Court had rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with the essential
marital obligations. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The petition is denied. The Supreme Court held that Robert’s evidence failed to establish the
psychological incapacity of Luz. Other than his self-serving testimony, no other witness corroborated
his allegations on her behavior. As the Court has repeatedly stressed, psychological incapacity
contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations." not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty much less ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity.
(b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only emerge
after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved
There was also nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz had either been
interviewed or was subjected to a psychological examination. The interpretations given by the NAMT
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines are given great respect of our courts, but they are neither
controlling nor decisive.
On petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the
parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and
serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold
the indissolubility of the marital tie. The petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals and
its Resolution are hereby affirmed.
 ROSANNA L. TAN-AND AL vs. MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL; G.R. No. 196359; 11 May
2021
FACTS:
In 1995, Rosanna Tan and Mario Victor Andal married each other. However, Rosanna filed a
petition to have her marriage with Mario be declared void on the ground that Mario was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
To prove her case, she presented a psychologist (Dr. Fonso Garcia) who, after interviewing Rosanna,
Rosanna’s daughter, and Rosanna’s sister, concluded that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to
perform essential marital obligations. Dr. Garcia did not interview Mario as the latter, despite
invitation, refused an interview. In her assessment, Dr. Garcia found Mario to be suffering from
Narcissistic Antisocial Personality Disorder.

In May 2007, the trial court voided the marriage between Rosanna and Mario as it ruled that Rosanna
was able to prove her case. The Court of Appeals however reversed the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Rosanna and Mario is void.
HELD: Yes. Dr. Garcia’s expert testimony is given due weight. HOWEVER, the Supreme Court
declared, among others, that in psychological incapacity cases, expert testimony is NOT a
requirement.
Below is the Supreme Court’s new set of guidelines in determining the existence of psychological
incapacity:
1. The burden of proof in proving psychological incapacity is still on the plaintiff. The Supreme Court
however clarified that the quantum of proof required in nullity cases is clear and convincing evidence.
2. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be
proven through expert testimony. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of
a person’s personality, called “personality structure,” which manifests itself through clear acts of
dysfunctionality that undermines the family.
3. Incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense; incurable as to the partner. Psychological
incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation
where the couple’s respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only
result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage.

4. As to gravity, it must be shown that the incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause.
It is not necessary that it must be shown that the psychological incapacity is a serious or dangerous
illness BUT that “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts”
are excluded. The psychological incapacity cannot be mere “refusal, neglect, or difficulty, much less
ill will.”

5. Juridical antecedence. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
 QUILPAN VS. QUILPAN G.R. No. 248254. July 14, 2021
Facts:
In 1985, Beverly (Petitioner) met Johnny (Respondent). The respondent courted the
petitioner for a year. In 1987, the parties got married and had two children. Not long after the
marriage, the petitioner discovered that the respondent was " a gambler, a jealous husband, and a
womanizer.". The Petitioner gave the respondent money to buy a fishing boat. The respondent
performed poorly at his job as a fishing man and had to sell the fishing boat. In 1994, the respondent
disappeared. The petitioner's and the respondent's family's attempts to find the respondent were futile.
This led the petitioner to believe that the respondent was summarily executed. The petitioner raised
their children by herself. In 2003, she was able to buy a parcel of land in Quezon City. In 2007, the
respondent reappeared. The respondent, during his disappearance, married another woman and had
four children with the latter. In 2016, the petitioner filed a case to nullify her marriage with the
respondent and declare the property in Quezon City as her exclusive property. The Petition attached
her Judicial Affidavit, a Psychiatric Evaluation of the Spouses conducted by Dr. Valentina del Fonso
Garcia (Dr. Garcia), and Dr. Garcia's Judicial Affidavit. The RTC denied the petition for the nullity of
marriage was denied because the respondent's eccentric and atypical behavior (i.e., excessive
drinking, gambling, and womanizing) was based solely on Beverly's testimony. No standardized tests
were administered by Dr. Garcia to establish the reliability of Beverly's story. The RTC did declare
that the petitioner was the exclusive owner of the property. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
Issue: Is the evidence presented by the petitioner sufficient to justify a declaration of nullity of
marriage?
Ruling:
Yes, the evidence presented by the petitioner is sufficient to justify a declaration of nullity of
marriage.
The Court finds that the totality of evidence presented clearly and convincingly showed Johnny's
psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital obligations to Beverly and his parental obligations to
their children. From the beginning of the marriage, Johnny has not contributed
- emotionally or financially - to their marriage. It is undisputed that "Johnny was a gambler, a jealous
husband, and a womanizer." Although Beverly sought for a loan to help Johnny with his income as a
fisherman, Johnny merely delegated his fishing business to friends. This resulted in further debt to the
family and the inevitable sale of the boat within six months from its purchase. While Beverly was in
Hong Kong, working tirelessly and remitting her earnings to sustain their family, Johnny would
continue gallivanting and even brought home another woman to sleep at the house of Beverly's
mother - in the presence of their children.
When Johnny, Stephen, and Sheena were forced to move to Quezon City, his income as a security
guard in Divisoria were spent on his vices. He even had the audacity to bring his son with him, only to
have his son sleep under the staircase of an abandoned building while Johnny continued drinking with
his friends.
As if his incorrigible personality were not enough, he suddenly disappeared in 1994 without word to
Beverly, his children, or even his parents and siblings. He simply reappeared in 2007 "with a second
wife, Prem Rose (through a bigamous marriage) and his four children with Prem Rose. To date,
Johnny continues to live with Prem Rose and their children and has never showed up for Stephen and
Sheena all these years.
 LUISITO G. PULIDO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G. R. NO. 220149. JULY 27,
2021
Facts:
Pulido and Rowena U. Baleda were charged with bigamy. Pulido married his teacher
Nora S. Arcon in 1983 and had a child in 1984. In 2007, Pulido stopped going home and admitted to
having an affair with Baleda. They got married in 1995 and indicated Pulido’s civil status as single.
Arcon charged them with bigamy in 2007. Pulido claimed both marriages were null and void, while
Baleda claimed she only knew of Pulido’s prior marriage in April 2007 and filed a petition to annul
her marriage with Pulido. The RTC declared their marriage null and void for being bigamous. The
trial court convicted Pulido of bigamy and acquitted Baleda. The RTC dismissed Pulido’s claim that
both his marriages are void and upheld the validity of his marriage with Arcon.
Issue:
Whether a Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is necessary to establish the invalidity
of a void ab initio marriage in a bigamy case.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 40 has retroactive application on marriages contracted prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code but only for the purpose of remarriage, as the parties are not permitted to judge for
themselves the nullity of their marriage. In other words, in order to remarry, a judicial declaration of
nullity is required for prior marriages contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code. Without a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage having been obtained, the second marriage
is rendered void ab initio even though the first marriage is also considered void ab initio. The only
basis for establishing the validity of the second marriage is the judicial decree of nullity of the first
marriage.
However, in a criminal prosecution for bigamy, the parties may still raise the defense of a void ab
initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial declaration of absolute nullity if the first marriage
was celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code. Such is still governed by the rulings in
Mendoza, Aragon and Odayat which are more in line with the rule that procedural rules are only
given retroactive effect insofar as they do not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.
In this case, Pulido’s marriage with Arcon was celebrated when the Civil Code was in effect while his
subsequent marriage with Baleda was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence,
Pulido is required to obtain a judicial decree of absolute nullity of his prior void ab initio marriage but
only for purposes of remarriage. As regards the bigamy case, however, Pulido may raise the defense
of a void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial declaration of absolute nullity.
 DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, v. MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR
AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE
(G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016)

FACTS:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike
(Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines. Their
union bore two children.

On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce before the
Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in
the Divorce Certificate and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki
Koike. Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on file
with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code.

At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. On the other hand, Doreen presented several
foreign documents to support the petition. However RTC denied Doreen's petition. Doreen's motion
for reconsideration was denied as well, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.

RULING:

YES. It bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. In one of the jurisprudence it
was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our
jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained
the divorce must be proven. Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment,
our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven like any other fact.
RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner, -versus- LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 189607, FIRST DIVISION, April 18, 2016, SERENO,J.

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in
effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time respondent contracted both
marriages was the Civil Code. The requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to
marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code.

FACTS:

On May 25, 1972, respondent Lea De Leon Castillo (Respondent) married Benjamin Bautista
(Benjamin). However, the marriage lacked a marriage license. On January 6, 1979, respondent
married again, this time to the petitioner Renato Castillo (Renato). On May 28, 2001, Renato filed
before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be
declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Benjamin and her psychological incapacity. On
January 3, 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to Benjamin void. The
Regional Trial Court declared the marriage between Renato and petitioner null and void ab initio on
the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code holding that the fact
that Lea’s marriage to Benjamin was subsisting when she married Renato. The Court of Appeals,
however, reversed the decision of the lower court and upheld the validity of the marriage of
respondent and Renato. They ruled that since both marriages were solemnized before the effectivity of
the Family Code, the Civil Code is the applicable law. In addition, the Civil Code does not state that a
judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between Renato and the respondent is void ab initio (NO)

RULING:

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law
in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time respondent contracted
both marriages was the Civil Code. While it is true that under the Family Code, a judicial declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage is required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the same cannot be said with the Civil Code. The
requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the
effectivity of the Family Code.
 MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, Petitioner, -versus- RODOLFO DE LA
FUENTE, JR., Respondents. G.R. No. 188400, SECOND DIVISION, March 8, 2017,
LEONEN, J.

FACTS:

Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña. He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in
Dagupan City. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina’s
resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several
occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet
Tina’s parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single. Tina finally agreed to marry
Eduardo. They got married; It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single." The
couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they
were able to build their home. However, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their
house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he
would slap her. Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving
financial support. Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the
National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously
married. She secured an NSOcertified copy of the marriage contract. She was so embarrassed and
humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own
vows. The court rendered judgment finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
Eduardo further testified that he declared he was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because
he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court
to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. Eduardo further claimed that he
was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Eduardo is guilty of bigamy. (YES)

RULING:

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony:
(a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former
marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the
first marriage. In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in
1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to
subsist. The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long
after the effectivity of the Family Code. It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that
when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first
wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should
have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first
wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family
Code. With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the first paragraph of
Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years.
 SPS. CRISTINO & EDNA CARBONELL v. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY G.R. No. 178467, April 26, 2017, BERSAMIN, J.:

There can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of
a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnumabsqueinjuria.

FACTS: An action for damages was filed by Sps. Carbonell alleging that they had experienced
emotional shock, mental anguish, public ridicule, humiliation, insults and embarrassment during their
trip to Thailand because of the respondent's release to them of five US$ 100 bills that later on turned
out to be counterfeit. They claimed that they had travelled to Bangkok, Thailand after withdrawing
US$ l ,000.00 in US$ 100 notes from their dollar account at the respondent's Pateros branch; that
while in Bangkok, they had exchanged five US$ 100 bills into Baht, but only four of the US$ 100
bills had been accepted by the foreign exchange dealer because the fifth one was "no good;" that
unconvinced by the reason for the rejection, they had asked a companion to exchange the same bill at
Norkthon Bank in Bangkok; that the bank teller thereat had then informed them and their companion
that the dollar bill was fake; that the teller had then confiscated the US$ 100 bill and had threatened to
report them to the police if they insisted in getting the fake dollar bill back; and that they had to settle
for a Foreign Exchange Note receipt. The spouses claimed that later on, they had bought jewelry from
a shop owner by using four of the remaining US$100 bills as payment; that on the next day, however,
they had been confronted by the shop owner at the hotel lobby because their four US$ 100 bills had
turned out to be counterfeit; that the shop owner had shouted at them: "You Filipinos, you are all
cheaters!;" and that the incident had occurred within the hearing distance of fellow travelers and
several foreigners. The petitioners continued that upon their return to the Philippines, they had
confronted the manager of the Metrobank's Pateros branch on the fake dollar bills, but the latter had
insisted that the dollar bills she had released to them were genuine inasmuch as the bills had come
from the head office; that in order to put the issue to rest, the counsel of the petitioners had submitted
the subject US$ 100 bills to the BangkoSentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) for examination; that the BSP had
certified that the four US$100 bills were near perfect genuine notes; and that their counsel had
explained by letter their unfortunate experience caused by the respondent's release of the fake US
dollar bills to them, and had demanded moral damages of ₱10 Million and exemplary damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses are entitled to moral and exemplary damages on account of their
suffering the unfortunate experience abroad brought about by their use of the fake US dollar bills
withdrawn from the latter

RULING: No. It is true that the petitioners suffered embarrassment and humiliation in Bangkok. Yet,
we should distinguish between damage and injury. In The Orchard Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Yu,
the Court has fittingly pointed out the distinction, viz.: x xx Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal
right, damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense
or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations
are often called damnumabsqueinjuria. In every situation of damnumabsqueinjuria, therefore, the
injured person alone bears the consequences because the law affords no remedy for damages resulting
from an act that does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
 SPOUSES CUENO vs. SPOUSES BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 246445. March 2, 2021, Division, Caguioa, J.:

FACTS

Lot No. 2836 was previously owned by the two sons of Ramon Bonifacio, i.e., Luis
Bonifacio, married to Juana Toribio, and Isidro Bonifacio, married to Victoria Falcatan. These two
sons sold part of their interest to the City of Zamboanga and retained about 7,991 sq. m. as co-owners.
Petitioner Cueno is the daughter of Luis and Juana and is married to petitioner Eulalio Cueno. In
1961, petitioners bought the pro indiviso share of Isidro in the subject property (first sale). Pursuant
to said sale, a TCT was issued in the names of Luis and Eulalio. Prior to the issuance of TCT, Eulalio
supposedly sold his and Flora's share of the lot to the latter's father, Luis, without Flora's consent
(second sale).
The second sale was also registered on the same day the previous TCT was issued in the
names of Luis and Eulalio. Thereafter, TCT was issued solely in the name of Luis, married to Juana.
In a Deed of Absolute Sale (third sale), Luis allegedly sold the property to herein respondents. Hence,
another TCT was registered in the name of Spouses Bautista. Thereafter, it appears that respondents
took possession of the property and built improvements on the same. Much later, respondents donated
the subject property to their four children and TCTs were issued in the latter's names.
Allegedly deprived of their share in the property through fraud, petitioners filed a Complaint
for recovery of shares and participation in the subject property, recovery of possession, declaration of
nullity of the second sale and donation, and cancellation of the TCTs issued in the names of the
Bautista children.
Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that they acquired the subject property in good faith
and for value from the registered owner thereof, Luis, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale.
They further alleged that they constructed their houses on said lot and continuously possessed the
same for over 30 years without objection or protest from petitioners.
RTC: granted the complaint and declared the second sale between Eulalio and Luis
void.
CA: reversed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of petitioners' complaint.

RULING

NO. RTC invalidated the second sale solely on the ground of lack of spousal consent. Without
discussing the foregoing issue however, the CA directly stated that respondents had a better right over
the subject property as they were innocent purchasers for value. As the CA failed to resolve the issue
of whether the second sale was indeed void for lack of spousal consent. Non-compliance with
Article 166 renders the contract merely voidable under Article 173.
 FRANCIS LUIGI G. SANTOS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 250520, May 5, 2021, First Division (Caguioa, J.)

FACTS

Petitioner Francis Luigi G. Santos filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court seeking to change his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla" in his Certificate of Live
Birth. He alleged that sometime in 1991, his parents, Lovely Maria T. Guzman and Jose Marie
Bautista, Jr., also known as Ramon Bong Revilla, Jr., met and engaged in an intimate relationship. He
was later born in Quezon City on January 9, 1992 as "Francis Luigi Guzman.” Lovely Guzman and
Bong Revilla were never married as the latter was already married to Lani Mercado. Thus, petitioner's
Certificate of Live Birth did not bear the Revilla surname and his father was marked as unknown.

In 1999, Lovely Guzman married Patrick Joseph P. Santos, who, in turn, legally adopted
petitioner. Thus, petitioner's name was changed from "Francis Luigi Guzman" to "Francis Luigi G.
Santos." Although petitioner lived with his mother, he grew up close to Bong Revilla and the latter's
wife and children and was treated by the family as a legitimate son. He also claimed that he used the
name "Luigi Revilla" when he entered show business. Thus, he filed the instant petition in order to
"avoid confusion," "to show his sincere and genuine desire to associate himself to Bong Revilla and to
the Revillas," and to ensure that his records show his true identity as Bong Revilla's son.

The RTC denied the petition. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in denying the petition to change petitioner's surname from
"Santos" to "Revilla."

RULING
NO. To justify a change of name, a person "must show not only some proper or compelling reason
but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name." Unfortunately, none of
these reasons justify, in law, the desired change. The Court agrees with the RTC that the use of the
surname "Revilla" would create further confusion rather than avoid it, given that: (1) petitioner has
never legally used the name "Revilla" despite having been acknowledged in 1996; (2) he was legally
adopted by Patrick Santos in 2001; (3) he has used the name "Santos'' for all documentary purposes
since his adoption; (4) although he is publicly known to be the son of Bong Revilla, he is known by
his peers as "Luigi Santos"; (5) even after a change of surname, Patrick Santos shall continue to be the
father named in his birth certificate; and (5) he only began using the surname "Revilla" when he
entered show business.
 REPUBLIC v. VILLACORTA
G.R. No. 249953, June 23, 2021, First Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE

Article 45(3) of the Family Code provides that a marriage may be annulled for any of
the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: xxx (3) That the consent of either
party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife."

FACTS
Melvin and Janufi met in March of 1996 while they were both studying at Southwestern
University, Cebu City. They became sweethearts but ended their relationship in 2000.
Thereafter, Melvin heard that Janufi began dating someone who was working near the
establishment where she was then employed. For months, Melvin and Janufi did not
communicate with one another. Melvin learned that Janufi was pregnant. Melvin was
"surprised" and "doubtful" to learn Janufi was already one month pregnant because they had sexual
intercourse only in March of 2001. Although Melvin doubted the paternity of the child, Janufi
supposedly assured him that he was the only person she had sexual intercourse with. On December 1,
2001, Janufi gave birth to a baby girl named Mejan Dia and she and
Melvin then began living together. After almost three years or on August 14, 2004, Melvin and Janufi
finally got married.
October 18, 2004, Janufi gave birth to a second child named Javen Melt. During their
marriage, the couple quarreled about ordinary things. Often times, however, the paternity of Mejan
Dia would become an issue. During a dinner party in 2010, Melvin and Janufi quarreled and the issue
of Mejan Dia's paternity was brought up in the presence of their relatives. This drove Melvin to finally
take a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) Parentage Examination (DNA test) at Hi-Precision Diagnostics.
In November of 2010, the results of the DNA test were released, which revealed that there
was a 0.0% probability that Melvin was the father of Mejan Dia.
Melvin received a text message from Janufi stating that she had no intention to deceive
Melvin into acknowledging paternity but it only happened once while she was drunk, and that she
never thought her one-time "sin" would "bear fruit. The message also stated that Janufi was shocked
at the result of the DNA test and could not believe that Melvin was not the father of Mejan Dia.
Melvin filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud under Article 45(3)
in relation to Article 46(2) of the Family Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not the marriage should be annulled.
RULING
NO. The facts do not warrant annulment under Article 45(3) in relation to Article
46(2) of the Family Code.

To constitute fraud that warrants annulment under Article 46(2): 1) the wife must have been
pregnant by a man other than her husband at the time of the marriage and 2) the wife must have
fraudulently concealed the same.
 Ho Ching Yi vs. Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 227600, June 13, 2022

Facts:
This case involves a naturalization proceeding where Ho Ching Yi appealed the denial
of her petition for naturalization by the Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's decision, and Ho's Petition for Review on Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court. The
court emphasized the strict compliance with citizenship requirements and the burden of proof on the
applicant. The court ruled that Ho failed to establish the credibility of her witnesses and did not prove
all the necessary qualifications for naturalization. Therefore, her appeal was denied.
Issue:
WON the petitioner, Ho Ching Yi, has provided sufficient evidence to prove that she meets
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization in the Philippines.
Ruling:
The ruling in this case is that the Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari
filed by Ho Ching Yi, affirming the decisions of the lower courts that denied her petition for
naturalization. The Court emphasized that naturalization proceedings are matters of high public
interest and the burden of proof lies solely with the applicant In Ho's case, she failed to establish that
her witnesses were credible and even if they were, they were not competent to testify that she
possessed all the required qualifications for naturalization Therefore, her petition was dismissed due
to insufficient evidence to prove her qualifications for naturalization.
 [ G.R. No. 208258. April 27, 2022 ]
MARIA VICIA CARULLO-PADUA, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND JOSELITO PADUA, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: Maria and Joselito were married in a civil ceremony on February 5, 1982 followed by a
church wedding on December 18, 1982. The union produced a son born on March 23, 1986.
On July 17, 1997, Maria filed a petition7 for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage with the
trial court anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code. Maria alleged that at the time of the celebration
of their marriage, Joselito was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
During their cohabitation, Joselito exhibited excessive sexual desire and forced her to perform oral
and anal sex with him; that there were occasions when respondent attempted to sexually molest her
sister, nieces and their household help who were staying with them; that respondent admitted to said
attempts of molestations but begged her to keep said incidents a secret; that Joselito misrepresented
himself as a Roman Catholic when he was actually a born-again christian; that when Maria refused to
convert to Joselito's religion, he began insulting her religious beliefs; and that at one point, at the heat
of their quarrel, Joselito attempted to kill Maria by threatening to stab her with a letter opener.
ISSUE: Whether the totality of evidence presented by Maria is sufficient to prove that Joselito is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations, meriting the dissolution of
his marriage with Maria.
RULING: No, Article 36 of the Family Code reads:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves,
also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. It must be stressed
that an unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
Time and again, it has been held that the State takes a high stake in the preservation of marriage
rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution.61 Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and preservation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. Presumption is
always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The August 28, 2006 Decision and
November 14, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80952 sustaining the
validity of the marriage of Maria Vicia Carullo-Padua with Joselito Padua are hereby AFFIRMED.
 [ G.R. No. 249178. July 13, 2022 ]
AIDA EGMALIS-KE-EG, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS
FACTS: The case stemmed from the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code filed by Aida against Ireneo before the RTC. Aida prayed that her marriage to
Ireneo be declared null and void on the ground that Ireneo is psychologically incapacitated to perform
his essential marital obligations.
Aida and Ireneo met in high school and dated for about two years. In 1982, Ireneo got Aida pregnant.
Ashamed and afraid, Aida did not inform Ireneo and her family about her pregnancy. Instead, she
went to Baguio City and worked as a waitress. When her pregnancy became more noticeable, she
decided to return home to Lon-oy, San Gabriel, La Union. It was only then that her family, Ireneo,
and Ireneo's family learned that she was pregnant.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Aida and Ireneo is null and void ab initio on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of either or both of them to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
RULING: Yes. The marriage between Ireneo and Aida is null and void ab initio on the ground that
Ireneo is psychologically incapacitated to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The marriage between Ireneo and Aida is null and void ab initio on the ground that Ireneo is
psychologically incapacitated to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The Court finds that the totality of evidence clearly and convincingly showed Ireneo's psychological
incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. These obligations are found in the Family
Code, specifically Articles 68 to 71 with respect to the husband and wife and Articles 220, 221, and
225 as regards parents and their children. Indeed, the marriage between Ireneo and Aida has no solid
foundation. There is no love, respect, commitment, and devotion. Ireneo manifestly failed to comply
with his essential marital obligations.
It is the Court's Constitutional duty to value the sanctity of marriage. Corollary to this is the duty to
ensure that only marriages that establish conjugal and family life are maintained. "That marriage is an
inviolable social institution does not mean that a spouse who unwittingly marries an individual with a
certain level of 'dysfunctionality that show[s] a lack of understanding and concomitant compliance
with one's essential marital obligations due to psychic causes' is condemned to a life sentence of
misery." In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, the Court does not deride but "really
assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The
foundation of our society is thereby made all the more strong and solid."

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 29, 2018 and the
Resolution dated July 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 108998 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The marriage between petitioner Aida Egmalis-Ke-eg and Ireneo Ke-eg is declared
null and void ab initio.
 SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR. VS. ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS
En Banc, G.R. No. 193719. March 21, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were married on December 28, 1992. However, Pacasum discovered that
Zamoranos was previously married to one Jesus De Guzman on July 30, 1982. On December 14,
2004, Pacasum filed an administrative complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct against
Zamoranos on the ground that she had contracted a bigamous marriage. Respondent, on the other
hand, argued that her previous marriage under the Code ofMuslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
(the Muslim Code). Prior to her marriage with De Guzman, she had converted to Islam. In 1983,
however, she and De Guzman divorced, as evidenced by the Decree of Divorce issued by Presiding
Judge Kaudri L. Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court of Isabela, Basilan in Case No. 407-92. The CSC
dismissed the complaint because Pacasum failed to assail the existence, much less validity, of the
Decree of Divorce. On appeal, the CA initially granted the petition, relying on the judicial admissions
of Zamoranos in the various cases between her and Pacasum. However, on consideration, the
appellate court corrected its initial ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s previous marriage was validly terminated by reason of divorce
decree under Sharia Law.
RULING: The Muslim Code recognizes divorce in marriages between Muslims, and mixed marriages
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim
law or the Muslim Code in any part of the Philippines. At present, this is the only law in the
Philippines that allows domestic divorce. The divorce becomes irrevocable after observance of a
period of waiting called idda, the duration of which is three monthly courses after termination of the
marriage by divorce. Once irrevocable, the divorce has the following effects: the severance of the
marriage bond and, as a consequence, the spouses may contract another marriage; loss of the spouses'
mutual rights of inheritance; adjudication of the custody of children in accordance with Article 78 of
the Muslim Code; recovery of the dower by the wife from the husband; continuation of the husband's
obligation to give support in accordance with Article 67; and the dissolution and liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, if stipulated in the marriage settlements.
The High Court agrees with the CA that the Decree of Divorce cannot be the subject of a
collateral attack. It is evident that Pacasum's persistence in pursuing the administrative case against
Zamoranos on the sole ground of bigamy is premised on the supposition that the latter's marriage with
De Guzman was still subsisting when she contracted marriage with Pacasum, which effectively
challenges the Shari'a Circuit Court's divorce judgment. As we have noted, however, the judgment of
the court is valid on its face; hence, a collateral attack in this case is not allowed. The collateral
unassailability of the divorce is a necessary consequence of its finality. It "cannot now be changed in
any proceeding; and much less is it subject to the collateral attack which is here made upon it." As no
appeal was taken with respect to the divorce decree, it must be conceded to have full force and
effect.The decree, insofar as it affects the civil status of Zamoranos, has therefore become res judicata,
subject to no collateral attack. Furthermore, the proscription against collateral attacks similarly applies
to matters involving the civil status of persons. Thus, we have held that collateral attacks against the
legitimacy and filiation of children, adoption, and the validity of marriages (except void marriages)
are not allowed. Zamoranos' civil status as "divorced" belongs to the same category, and Pacasum
cannot impugn it in an administrative case filed with the CSC, where the sole purpose of the
proceedings is to determine the administrative liability, if any, of Zamoranos.
 MARIA VICTORIA SOCORRO LONTOC-CRUZ VS. NILO SANTOS CRUZ
G.R. No. 201988, October 11, 2017

FACTS:
Twenty-two-year-old Marivi met 28-year old Nilo sometime in March 1986. They became steady in
August of the same year. Nilo, whose job was then in Hong Kong, prodded Marivi to marry him so
she could join him there soonest. Marivi agreed. The couple married in a civil ceremony followed by
a church wedding. The marriage produced two sons: Antonio Manuel and Jose Nilo.

On July 7, 2005, Marivi filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa City a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity. She averred that it had been medically ascertained that
Nilo was suffering from "inadequate personality disorder related to masculine strivings associated
with unresolved oedipal complex," while she herself was found to be suffering from a "personality
disorder of the mixed type, [h]istrionic, [n]arcissistic with immaturity x x x." In support of her claim
that she and Nilo were suffering from psychological incapacity, Marivi presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas,
a psychiatrist, and Dr. Ruben Encarnacion, a clinical psychologist. According to Dr. Villegas, both
parties could not tolerate each other’s weaknesses and that the incapacities of the parties are grave
because they preferred to satisfy their own needs rather than to give in to the other's needs.

ISSUE:
Whether the psychological conditions of the parties fall under Article 36 of the Family Code to
warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage.

RULING:
No. Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or
ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness.

In Marcos v. Marcos, the actual medical examination of the one claimed to have psychological
incapacity is not a condition sine qua non, for what matters is the totality of evidence to sustain a
finding of such psychological incapacity. While it behooves this Court to weigh the clinical findings
of psychology experts as part of the evidence, the court's hands are nonetheless free to make its own
independent factual findings. "It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try,
must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings." Thus, the Court believes that the
protagonists in this case are in reality simply unwilling to work out a solution for each other's
personality differences, and have thus become overwhelmed by feelings of disappointment or
disillusionment toward one another. Sadly, a marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not
a null and void marriage.
 Espiritu vs. Boac-Espiritu, G.R. No. 247583, October 6, 2021

Facts:
The petitioner and respondent were married in 2000 and had three children. The
petitioner claimed that the respondent exhibited signs of psychological incapacity by refusing sexual
intimacy, being hot-tempered, and constantly accusing him of infidelity. He consulted a clinical
psychologist, Dr. Tudla, who diagnosed the respondent with "Histrionic Personality Disorder and
Paranoid Personality Disorder."
However, the trial court ruled that the evidence presented failed to prove the respondent's
psychological incapacity. Dr. Tudla's diagnosis was based solely on information from the petitioner,
their driver, and neighbor, and lacked reliability.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, noting that Dr. Tudla's findings were one-
sided and unreliable since she did not personally examine the respondent, and the petitioner could not
present independent witnesses to testify on the respondent's alleged incapacity.
Issue:
Whether the parties' marriage should be nullified on the ground of respondent's psychological
incapacity.
Ruling:
No. The petition is dismissed as unmeritorious. Applying the Tan-Andal ruling, the Court
finds that the petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent suffers
from psychological incapacity that would hinder her from fulfilling her marital duties.
Firstly, the Court acknowledges the petitioner's testimonies but notes that they do not provide a
complete picture of the respondent's supposed psychological incapacity. The petitioner's claims about
the respondent's behavior raise questions about the specific reasons for her actions, and the evidence
remains insufficient to establish the petitioner's case.
Secondly, the Court emphasizes that psychological incapacity is not merely a personality disorder and
does not require expert medical or clinical identification. While an expert had opined that the
respondent had certain personality disorders, this opinion did not demonstrate how these traits
constituted a clear dysfunction preventing her from understanding and fulfilling her marital
obligations.
Thirdly, the petitioner failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of the requisite juridical
antecedence, gravity, and incurability of the respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. The lack
of evidence regarding the respondent's upbringing and the gravity of her actions, as well as the
absence of proof of her true personality structure, resulted in the dismissal of the petitioner's case.
 Maristela Cuan vs. Cuan Jr., G.R. No. 248518, December 7, 2021
Facts: Janice and Marcelino met in 1997, married secretly on June 20, 1997, and never lived together
as a couple. Their relationship was marred by Marcelino's jealousy and overprotectiveness, which
escalated over time. They never engaged in sexual relations, and in 1999, their last argument led to no
communication. In 2015, Janice sought to void their marriage due to psychological incapacity.
Janice's friend, Janette Velasco, confirmed their lack of cohabitation and children. Clinical
Psychologist Dr. Nedy L. Tayag diagnosed Janice with Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder and
Marcelino with Paranoid Personality Disorder with Narcissistic and Antisocial Features, supporting
Janice's claim.
Issue: Whether the evidence on record sufficiently support the petition of Janice for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with Marcelino on ground of psychological incapacity.
Ruling: Only Marcelino is psychologically incapacitated in the legal sense. The Court refer to the
three (3) criteria for psychological incapacity — juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability, as
recalibrated in Tan-Andal, viz.:
Juridical Antecedence: Marcelino's psychological issues existed before the marriage,
evident from his overprotective tendencies and jealousy during their dating period, which
continued into their marriage.
Gravity: Marcelino's psychological condition was not mild but severe, as evidenced by his
inability to fulfill basic spousal duties, including living together and consummating the
marriage, coupled with escalating jealousy and violence.
Incurability: Marcelino's psychological incapacity was legally incurable, as his motivation
for marriage was not love or family but rather a misguided attempt to alleviate his anxiety.
His personality traits prevented him from fulfilling his spousal obligations, leading to the
eventual dissolution of the marriage over the phone.
Dr. Tayag's findings support Marcelino's psychological incapacity, and it's important to note that,
according to Tan-Andal, a medical expert's testimony is no longer mandatory for establishing
psychological incapacity as a legal concept. In this case:
● Expertise: Dr. Tayag, a clinical psychologist with extensive experience in diagnosing
personality disorders, testified as an expert witness.
● Methodologies Applied: Dr. Tayag described the methodologies and procedures she used,
including personal interviews and psychological tests, to assess Janice and Marcelino's
conditions. Her findings revealed that Marcelino exhibited symptoms of Paranoid Personality
Disorder with Narcissistic and Antisocial Features, which were attributed to his unhealthy
family background.
● Evidence Admissibility: Despite not being able to personally interview Marcelino due to
his refusal to participate in psychological evaluation, Dr. Tayag's findings were deemed
admissible. Tan-Andal clarified that expert opinions based on hearsay evidence could be
admitted if the facts relied upon were of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.
In conclusion, based on the evidence presented, the Court determined that Marcelino's psychological
incapacity prevented him from fulfilling his basic marital obligations, and therefore, Janice should be
granted the nullity of her marriage with Marcelino.
 Austria-Carreon vs. Carreon, G.R. No. 222908, December 6, 2021
Facts: Petitioner and respondent married in 1994, but their marriage faced numerous challenges:
● Petitioner provided financial support and managed household expenses.
● Respondent showed disinterest in communication and often watched TV alone.
● Petitioner discovered respondent's extramarital affairs.
● They separated in 2000, reconciled in 2001, but lacked intimacy.
● In 2007, petitioner discovered evidence of respondent's infidelity through text
messages and asked him to leave.
In 2008, petitioner filed a petition for the nullity of their marriage. Supporting her case was a
Psychological Evaluation Report by Dr. Julian R. Montano, which diagnosed both parties with
psychological disorders (Dependent and Depressive Personality Disorders for petitioner, Narcissistic
Personality Disorder for respondent). Dr. Montano concluded that their disorders rendered them
incapable of fulfilling essential marital obligations and recommended nullifying the marriage.
The RTC found both petitioner and respondent psychologically incapacitated to fulfill marital
obligations. It relied on Dr. Montano's findings, attributing their psychological issues to their
upbringing. The RTC deemed these psychological incapacities grave and incurable. The CA
disagreed, stating that respondent's lack of communication skills, financial resources, alleged
infidelity, and immaturity were not psychological issues warranting marriage nullification. Issue:
Whether the CA committed reversible error in dismissing petitioner's Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage.
Ruling: No. The petition is dismissed. To prove psychological incapacity, certain requisites must be
met, including gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, as established in previous cases like
Santos v. CA and Molina. However, the recent case of Tan-Andal v. Andal modified these guidelines
to provide a more nuanced interpretation of psychological incapacity.
Now, expert testimony is no longer mandatory, and ordinary witnesses who observed the concerned
spouse's behavior before marriage can testify. These observations are evaluated by the judge to
determine if they indicate a serious incapacity to fulfill marital obligations. Psychological incapacity
should be considered a legal concept rather than a medical one.
Regarding gravity, it doesn't require a severe illness but must result from a genuinely serious psychic
cause. Mild character peculiarities, mood changes, or occasional emotional outbursts do not qualify as
psychological incapacity. In this case, the petitioner failed to establish the gravity of psychological
incapacity.
The Court commiserates with the petitioner but emphasizes that Article 36 of the Family Code is not a
divorce law. While expert opinions may be considered, the totality of evidence must convince the
Court of the alleged psychological incapacity. In this case, the evidence presented was insufficient to
nullify the marriage.
 SPOUSES CUENO vs. SPOUSES BAUTISTA (G.R. No. 246445. March 2, 2021,
Division, Caguioa, J.:)

DOCTRINE

All dispositions, alienations or encumbrances of conjugal real property acquired after the
effectivity of the New Civil Code needs the consent of the wife. Also, all donations of real or
personal property require the consent of the wife except those to the common children for
securing their future or finishing a career, and moderate donations for charity. But should the
wife refuse unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.

FACTS

Lot No. 2836 was previously owned by the two sons of Ramon Bonifacio, i.e., Luis
Bonifacio, married to Juana Toribio, and Isidro Bonifacio, married to Victoria Falcatan. These two
sons sold part of their interest to the City of Zamboanga and retained about 7,991 sq. m. as co-owners.
Petitioner Cueno is the daughter of Luis and Juana and is married to petitioner Eulalio Cueno. In
1961, petitioners bought the pro indiviso share of Isidro in the subject property (first sale). Pursuant
to said sale, a TCT was issued in the names of Luis and Eulalio. Prior to the issuance of TCT, Eulalio
supposedly sold his and Flora's share of the lot to the latter's father, Luis, without Flora's consent
(second sale).

The second sale was also registered on the same day the previous TCT was issued in the
names of Luis and Eulalio. Thereafter, TCT was issued solely in the name of Luis, married to Juana.
In a Deed of Absolute Sale (third sale), Luis allegedly sold the property to herein respondents. Hence,
another TCT was registered in the name of Spouses Bautista. Thereafter, it appears that respondents
took possession of the property and built improvements on the same. Much later, respondents donated
the subject property to their four children and TCTs were issued in the latter's names.

Allegedly deprived of their share in the property through fraud, petitioners filed a Complaint
for recovery of shares and participation in the subject property, recovery of possession, declaration of
nullity of the second sale and donation, and cancellation of the TCTs issued in the names of the
Bautista children.

Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that they acquired the subject property in good faith
and for value from the registered owner thereof, Luis, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale.
They further alleged that they constructed their houses on said lot and continuously possessed the
same for over 30 years without objection or protest from petitioners.RTC: granted the complaint and
declared the second sale between Eulalio and Luis void.CA: reversed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of petitioners' complaint.

RULING

NO. RTC invalidated the second sale solely on the ground of lack of spousal consent. Without
discussing the foregoing issue however, the CA directly stated that respondents had a better right over
the subject property as they were innocent purchasers for value. As the CA failed to resolve the issue
of whether the second sale was indeed void for lack of spousal consent. Non-compliance with
Article 166 renders the contract merely voidable under Article 173.
FRANCIS LUIGI G. SANTOS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 250520, May
5, 2021, First Division (Caguioa, J.))

DOCTRINE

It must be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege not a matter of
right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully
the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are
shown. Before a person can be authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official
name or that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must
show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such
change.

FACTS

Petitioner Francis Luigi G. Santos filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court seeking to change his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla" in his Certificate of Live
Birth. He alleged that sometime in 1991, his parents, Lovely Maria T. Guzman and Jose Marie
Bautista, Jr., also known as Ramon Bong Revilla, Jr., met and engaged in an intimate relationship. He
was later born in Quezon City on January 9, 1992 as "Francis Luigi Guzman.” Lovely Guzman and
Bong Revilla were never married as the latter was already married to Lani Mercado. Thus, petitioner's
Certificate of Live Birth did not bear the Revilla surname and his father was marked as unknown.

In 1999, Lovely Guzman married Patrick Joseph P. Santos, who, in turn, legally adopted
petitioner. Thus, petitioner's name was changed from "Francis Luigi Guzman" to "Francis Luigi G.
Santos." Although petitioner lived with his mother, he grew up close to Bong Revilla and the latter's
wife and children and was treated by the family as a legitimate son. He also claimed that he used the
name "Luigi Revilla" when he entered show business. Thus, he filed the instant petition in order to
"avoid confusion," "to show his sincere and genuine desire to associate himself to Bong Revilla and to
the Revillas," and to ensure that his records show his true identity as Bong Revilla's son. The RTC
denied the petition. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in denying the petition to change petitioner's surname from

"Santos" to "Revilla."

RULING

NO. To justify a change of name, a person "must show not only some proper or compelling reason
but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name." Unfortunately, none of
these reasons justify, in law, the desired change. The Court agrees with the RTC that the use of the
surname "Revilla" would create further confusion rather than avoid it, given that: (1) petitioner has
never legally used the name "Revilla" despite having been acknowledged in 1996; (2) he was legally
adopted by Patrick Santos in 2001; (3) he has used the name "Santos'' for all documentary purposes
since his adoption; (4) although he is publicly known to be the son of Bong Revilla, he is known by
his peers as "Luigi Santos"; (5) even after a change of surname, Patrick Santos shall continue to be the
father named in his birth certificate; and (5) he only began using the surname "Revilla" when he
entered show business.
REPUBLIC v. VILLACORTA (G.R. No. 249953, June 23, 2021, First Division (Caguioa, )

DOCTRINE

Article 45(3) of the Family Code provides that a marriage may be annulled for any of
the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: xxx (3) That the consent of either
party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife."

To constitute fraud that warrants annulment under Article 46(2): 1) the wife must
have been pregnant by a man other than her husband at the time of the marriage and 2) the
wife must have fraudulently concealed the same.

FACTS :Melvin and Janufi met in March of 1996 while they were both studying at Southwestern
University, Cebu City. They became sweethearts but ended their relationship in 2000. Thereafter,
Melvin heard that Janufi began dating someone who was working near the establishment where she
was then employed. For months, Melvin and Janufi did not communicate with one another. Melvin
learned that Janufi was pregnant. Melvin was "surprised" and "doubtful" to learn Janufi was already
one month pregnant because they had sexual intercourse only in March of 2001. Although Melvin
doubted the paternity of the child, Janufi supposedly assured him that he was the only person she had
sexual intercourse with.

On December 1, 2001, Janufi gave birth to a baby girl named Mejan Dia and she and Melvin
then began living together. After almost three years or on August 14, 2004, Melvin and Janufi finally
got married.

October 18, 2004, Janufi gave birth to a second child named Javen Melt. During their
marriage, the couple quarreled about ordinary things. Often times, however, the paternity of Mejan
Dia would become an issue. During a dinner party in 2010, Melvin and Janufi quarreled and the issue
of Mejan Dia's paternity was brought up in the presence of their relatives. This drove Melvin to finally
take a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) Parentage Examination (DNA test) at Hi-Precision Diagnostics.

In November of 2010, the results of the DNA test were released, which revealed that there
was a 0.0% probability that Melvin was the father of Mejan Dia. Melvin received a text message from
Janufi stating that she had no intention to deceive Melvin into acknowledging paternity but it only
happened once while she was drunk, and that she never thought her one- time "sin" would "bear fruit.
The message also stated that Janufi was shocked at the result of the DNA test and could not believe
that Melvin was not the father of Mejan Dia.

Melvin filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud under Article 45(3)
in relation to Article 46(2) of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage should be annulled.

RULING: NO. The facts do not warrant annulment under Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(2) of
the Family Code.

To constitute fraud that warrants annulment under Article 46(2): 1) the wife must have been
pregnant by a man other than her husband at the time of the marriage and 2) the wife must have
fraudulently concealed the same.
 CONSTANCIA JAVATE-ASEJO, PETITIONER, VS. JUSTINIANO ZANTUA ASEJO AND
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
[ G.R. No. 247798. January 18, 2023 ]

FACTS:

Constancia met Justiniano after she was widowed in 1987. Justiniano, a friend of Constancia's late
husband, assisted her in processing her pension benefits. Constancia and Justiniano became close and
later developed a "mutual understanding."During the time they were together, Constancia discovered
the following about Justiniano: a) that respondent Justiniano lives in a rowdy compound in Ugac Sur,
Tuguegarao City where most of the residents therein are his relatives who are into gambling,betting,
and drinking, living an easy (sic) go lucky lifestyle, b) that he lives with his family and being
unemployed, depends on his parents and siblings for financial support; that his group of friends were
known to be drug users and drunkards, and c) that he finished his studies but was never employed. In
1989, Constancia got pregnant and, she and Justiniano got married on December 23, 1989. Thereafter,
they lived with Justiniano's family as he is unemployed and his family provided them financial
support. Constancia pleaded with Justiniano to get a job, but he refused to do so and continued to rely
on their respective families for financial support. On September 9, 2013, Constancia filed a Petition
for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Justiniano did
not file any Answer to the Petition. RTC declared the nullity of Constancia and Justiniano’s marriage.
CA reversed RTC’s decision, hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA commit any error in reversing the RTC's declaration of nullity of
the marriage between Constancia and Justiniano.

RULING:

Contrary to the finding of the RTC that the psychological incapacity of Justiniano has been
established through a preponderance of evidence, this Court finds that the evidence presented is more
compelling, and ought to be properly regarded as clear and convincing proof.The expert testimony
was anchored on interviews with unbiased witnesses and has been corroborated by the other witnesses
presented by Constancia. Justiniano's persisting psychological condition was identified, its history
traced from his childhood and upbringing, and its manifestations prior to and throughout their
marriage have been demonstrated by evidence beyond reproach. Thus, Constancia was able to
discharge the requisite burden of proof. Moreover, based on the foregoing discussions, this Court has
noted that even the evidence presented by the State failed to dissuade and have actually buttressed the
case for declaring the nullity of this marriage. All told, the records speak clearly and convincingly that
Justiniano is suffering from psychological incapacity, of such gravity, antecedence, and incurability,
that prevents him from recognizing his essential marital obligations and renders his marriage to
Constancia null and void ab initio.

DOCTRINE: Being psychologically incapacitated is a ground for nullity of

marriage between husband and wife.
 Teodora Altobano-Ruiz Vs. Attys. Wilfredo A. Ruiz, Cherry Anne Dela Cruz, and
Francisco S. Benedicto, III A.C. No. 13132. January 31, 2023

FACTS:

In 2008, AAA sued her husband, then Atty. Ruiz, for violation of Republic Act No. 9262. AAA
accused Ruiz of inflicting on her physical violence, emotional stress, and economic abuse by
depriving her and her children of support. She also applied for a Permanent Protection Order (PPO).
The Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the PPO, which included a directive to Ruiz to
provide AAA and their children, BBB and CCC, support equivalent to 50% of his income. His
employers were thus directed to withhold and automatically remit directly such amount to AAA.
Despite the said directive in the PPO, however, Ruiz still failed to provide for his family. This
prompted AAA to enforce the PPO, resulting in the issuance by the RTC of a writ of execution in
2013. But Ruiz continued to refuse to provide support. Ruiz subsequently filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage with AAA, which was granted in 2016. AAA filed a complaint
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Ruiz for violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). The IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended that Ruiz be
disbarred however, modified the recommended penalty to one-year suspension from the practice of
law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Atty. Ruiz merits his disbarment from the profession.

RULINGS: The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner and meted the penalty of disbarment on Ruiz, ordering that his name be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys. The Court underscored that “membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. “A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of members
of the Bar. They must conduct themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond
reproach anywhere and at all times,” stressed the Court. Such conduct is affirmed in the CPR, which
lawyers, including Ruiz, vowed to uphold. Among the prohibitions on lawyers laid down in the CPR
are: engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01); engaging in conduct
that adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law and behaving in a scandalous manner,
whether in public or private life, to the discredit of the legal profession (Rule 7.03). Ruiz was found to
have violated the provisions of the CPR when he committed multiple, immoral, deceitful, and
dishonest acts for abusing court processes that he could repeatedly evade the writ of execution for his
child’s support. Such acts of Ruiz thus “trivialized the authority of the court and undermined the rule
of law with his deliberate and calculated acts to violate the CPR and the lawyer’s oath. As a final
reminder, the Court stressed: “the noble legal profession is simply no place for abusers. We have all
vowed to uphold the protection of women and children when we took our sacred oath. This involves
the imposition of administrative policies, including the supreme penalty of disbarment, when our own
officers of the Court violate this sworn duty.” (Courtesy of the Supreme Court
Public Information Office)
 RAEMARK S. ABEL v. MINDY P. RULE G.R. No. 234457, May 12, 2021
FACTS:
Raemark S. Abel, an American citizen, married Mindy P. Rule, a Filipino citizen, in California. On
November 18, 2008, Abel and Rule jointly sought the summary dissolution of their marriage before
the Los Angeles Superior Court. They neither acquired community assets or liabilities nor bore any
children during the time they were married. Their Joint Petition for the summary dissolution of
marriage was timely filed within five years from the date of their marriage. They also waived their
rights to appeal, move for a new trial, and ask for spousal support in their petition. The Superior Court
of California dissolved Abel and Rule's marriage. Meanwhile, Abel reacquired his Filipino citizenship
and became a dual citizen of the Philippines and the United States of America on December 3,
2008.On the other hand, Rule became a citizen of the United States of America on September 21,
2012. On January 10, 2017, an authenticated California judgment dissolving Abel and Rule's marriage
was recorded with the City Registry Office of Manila. Abel then filed a Petition for the judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and correction of civil entry before the Regional Trial Court. On
February 22, 2017, the RTC found the Petition to be sufficient in form and substance. The Office of
the Solicitor General filed an Opposition to Abel's petition. It claimed that the divorce sought to be
recognized was not obtained by the alien spouse, contrary to law, because Abel and Rule jointly filed
the petition for summary dissolution of marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not a divorce decree jointly obtained by a Filipino and their alien
spouse can be judicially recognized in the Philippines.

RULING: YES. In Republic v. Manalo and succeeding cases, it was consistently held that it is
irrelevant if the foreign or Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding. Article 26(2) of
the Family Code, when read together with Section 19 of Republic Act No. 9710 (Magna Carta of
Women), can only be interpreted to mean that it is immaterial who initiated the divorce proceedings
abroad. In a concurring opinion to Manalo, it was emphasized that once a divorce decree is issued,
the foreign spouse is deemed to have 'obtained' a divorce which capacitates him or her to remarry. The
same status should therefore be afforded to the Filipino spouse. Here, Abel and private respondent
Rule jointly filed for the summary dissolution of their marriage and their petition was granted by the
Superior Court of California. Article 26 shows that what is only required is that the divorce must have
been validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. It does not impose an additional requirement for the
alien spouse to solely obtain the divorce. In Galapon v. Republic, the Supreme Court through Justice
Caguioa ruled that Article 26(2) applies to mixed marriages where the divorce decree is:(i) obtained
by the foreign spouse; (ii) obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign spouse; and (iii) obtained solely
by the Filipino spouse. Applying Manalo and Galapon to the present case, it is immaterial that the
divorce decree was obtained jointly by petitioner, then a citizen of the United States of America,and
private respondent, then a Filipino citizen. They are deemed to have obtained the divorce as required
in Article 26(2) of the Family Code, capacitating them to remarry under the Philippine law.
 LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent G.R. No. 200233, FIRST DIVISION, JULY 15, 2015,
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended
parties depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused
without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of
the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information
as a co-accused.
FACTS:
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, Leonila G. Santiago
and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her
putative husband escaped the criminal suit. The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had
been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was
a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law
and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was "without
responsibility." Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an
accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single
when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second
marriage to her should be DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 135 proven
valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a
marriage license.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner should be held liable for the crime of bigamy. (YES)
RULING:
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry
each other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in
Nepomuceno: In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties
depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware
of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved
marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. Therefore, the
lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang. Both courts
consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following
circumstances: (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they
openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to
not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with
petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had already
told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.
 RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, Petitioner, -versus- EDNA G. SIASAT, Respondents. G.R.
No.
200169, SECOND DIVISION, January 28, 2015, Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died, intestate
and without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994, respectively. Included in their estate are
two parcels of land (herein subject properties) covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896
and T-(15462) 1070 of the Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod (the subject titles). Petitioner
filed a civil case for mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat. The
complaint alleged that petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he
(petitioner) discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from
the Siasat clan could have stolen the same; that he executed affidavits of loss of the subject titles and
filed the same with the Registries of Deeds of Bacolod and Bago; that on June 22, 1996, he filed
before the Bacolod RTC a Petition for the issuance of second owner’s copy of Certificate of Title No.
T-25896, which respondent opposed; and that during the hearing of the said Petition, respondent
presented the two missing owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles. To prove filiation, petitioner
presented, among other documents, Alfredo Aguilar’s Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1
(Exhibit G) dated October 10, 1957, a public instrument subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo
Aguilar during his employment with BMMC, which bears his signature and thumb marks and
indicates that petitioner, who was born on March 5, 1945, is his son and dependent. The RTC and CA
essentially ruled against petitioner, and ruled that he failed to present sufficient evidence that establish
his filiation with the deceased spouses Aguilar.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in not taking into consideration petitioner’s Exhibit G (SSS
Form E-1, was acknowledged and notarized before a notary public, executed by Alfredo Aguilar,
recognizing the petitioner as his son) as public document that satisfies the requirement of Article 172
of the Family Code in the establishment of the legitimate filiation of the petitioner with his father,
Alfredo Aguilar (YES)
RULING
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record
of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in
a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. Filiation
may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any authentic writing is,
in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. It
was erroneous for the CA to treat Exhibit G as mere proof of open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it is
evidence of filiation under the first paragraph thereof, the same being an express recognition in a
public instrument.
 ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS -versus- ANACLETO ALCORAN and ELENETTE
SUNJACO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 163362, FIRST DIVISION, July 8, 2015

FACTS
Raymundo Alcoran (Raymundo) was married to Joaquina Arado (Joaquina), and their
marriage produced a son named Nicolas Alcoran (Nicolas). In turn, Nicolas married Florencia
Limpahan (Florencia) but their union had no offspring. During their marriage, however, Nicolas had
an extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita (Francisca), who gave birth to respondent Anacleto
Alcoran (Anacleto) on July 13, 1951 during the subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia. In
1972, Anacleto married Elenette Sonjaco. Joaquina had four siblings, i.e., Alejandra, Nemesio,
Celedonia and Melania, all surnamed Arado. Nemesio had six children, namely: (1) Jesusa, who was
married to Victoriano Alcoriza; (2) Pedro, who was married to Tomasa Arado; (3) Teodorico; (4)
Josefina; (5) Gliceria; and (6) Felicisima. During the pendency of the case, Pedro died, and was
substituted by his following heirs, to wit: (1) Juditho and his spouse, Jennifer Ebrole; (2) Bobbie Zito
and his spouse, Shirly Abad; (3) Juvenil and his spouse, Nicetas Ventula; (4) Antonieta and her
spouse, Nelson Somoza; and (5) Nila. Alejandra, Jesusa, Victoriano Alcoriza, Pedro and Tomasa filed
in the RTC a complaint for recovery of property and damages (with application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction) against Anacleto and Elenette. The aforementioned plaintiffs
argue, among others, that Nicolas did not recognize Anacleto as his spurious child during his lifetime.
The RTC opined that Anacleto established that he was really the acknowledged illegitimate son of
Nicolas. It cited the certificate of birth of Anacleto (Exhibit 4) and Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214
of the Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong (Exhibit 3), which proved that Nicolas had
himself caused the registration of Anacleto's birth by providing the details thereof and indicating that
he was the father of Anacleto. It observed that the name of Nicolas appeared under the column
"Remarks" in the register of births, which was the space provided for the name of the informant; that
because the plaintiffs did not present evidence to refute the entry in the register of births, the entry
became conclusive with respect to the facts contained therein. The CA agreed with the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not Anacleto is the illegitimate son of Nicolas (YES)
RULING
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. One of the ways filiation of legitimate children is established is by
any of the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment. Rightly enough, the RTC
and the CA unanimously concluded that Nicolas had duly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate
son. The birth certificate of Anacleto appearing in the Register of Births of the Municipality of
Bacong, Negros Oriental showed that Nicolas had himself caused the registration of the birth of
Anacleto. The showing was by means of the name of Nicolas appearing in the column "Remarks" in
Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register of Births. Based on the certification issued by the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental, the column in the Register of
Births entitled "Remarks" (Observaciones) was the space provided for the name of the informant of
the live birth to be registered. Considering that Nicolas, the putative father, had a direct hand in the
preparation of the birth certificate, reliance on the birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his
paternity was fully warranted.
 Renalyn A. Masbate vs. Ricky James Relucio, GR. No. 235498 | July 30, 2018
FACTS:
Queenie was born to Renalyn and Ricky James, who had been living together with Renalyn's
parents without the benefit of marriage. Three years later, the relationship ended. Renalyn went to
Manila leaving Queenie behind in the care and custody of her father, Ricky James. Ricky James
alleged that on November 7, 2015, Spouses Renata and Marlyn Masbate (Renalyn's parents) took
Queenie from the school where he had enrolled her. When asked to give Queenie back, Renalyn's
parents refused and instead showed a copy of a Special Power of Attorney executed by Renalyn
granting full parental rights, authority, and custody over Queenie to them. Consequently, Ricky James
filed a petition for habeas corpus and child custody. A hearing was conducted, where Renalyn brought
Queenie and expressed the desire for her daughter to remain in her custody. The RTC ruled that the
custody of three-year-old Queenie rightfully belongs to Renalyn.
The CA set aside the assailed RTC Orders and remanded the case to the lower court for
determination of who should exercise custody over Queenie. The CA found that the RTC hastily
dismissed the petition a quo upon Queenie's production in court, when the objective of the case was to
establish the allegation that Renalyn had been neglecting Queenie, which was a question of fact that
must be resolved by trial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly remanded the case a quo for determination of who should
exercise custody over Queenie?

RULING:
Accordingly, mothers are entitled to the sole parental authority of their illegitimate children,
notwithstanding the father's recognition of the child. In the exercise of that authority, mothers are
consequently entitled to keep their illegitimate children in their company, and the Court will not
deprive them of custody, absent any imperative cause showing the mother's unfitness to exercise such
authority and care.
Article 213 of the same Code provides for the so-called tender-age presumption, stating that
"no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." According to jurisprudence, the following instances may
constitute "compelling reasons" to wrest away custody from a mother over her child although under
seven years of age: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.
The Court found that Queenie's best interest demands that a proper trial be conducted to
determine if she had, indeed, been neglected and abandoned by her mother, rendering the latter unfit
to exercise parental authority over her, and in the event that Renalyn is found unsuitable, whether it is
in Queenie's best interest that she be in the custody of her father rather than her grandparents upon
whom the law accords a far superior right to exercise substitute parental authority.
While the appellate court correctly remanded the case for trial, the Court, however, held that it
erred in granting Ricky James temporary custody for a limited period of twenty-four consecutive
hours once every month, in addition to visitation rights, invoking "humane and practical
considerations," which were based solely on Ricky James' allegations. By granting temporary albeit
limited custody ahead of trial, the appellate court overturned the tender-age presumption with nothing
but Ricky James' bare allegations, to which the Court cannot give its imprimatur. As earlier intimated,
the issue surrounding Renalyn's fitness as a mother must be properly threshed out in the trial court
before she can be denied custody, even for the briefest of periods, over Queenie.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUDYSON C. CATUBAG
G.R. No. 210580 | April 18, 2018
FACTS:
Prior to the celebration of their marriage in 2003, Ludyson and Shanaviv had been cohabiting with
each other as husband and wife. Their union begot two (2) children. In 2001, Ludyson took work
overseas while Shanaviv stayed behind in the Philippines to tend to the needs of their children. On
June 26, 2003, private respondent and Shanaviv tied the knot in Rizal, Cagayan. Thereafter, private
respondent returned overseas to continue his work. While abroad, he maintained constant
communication with his family.

On July 12, 2006, while working abroad, Ludyson was informed by his relatives that Shanaviv left
their house and never returned. In the meantime, his relatives took care of the children. Ludyson took
an emergency vacation and flew back home. He looked for his wife in Enrile Cagayan, but to no avail.
He then proceeded to inquire about Shanaviv's whereabouts from their close friends and relatives, but
they too could offer no help. Ludyson travelled as far as Bicol, where Shanaviv was born and raised,
but he still could not locate her. Ludyson subsequently sought the help of Bombo Radyo Philippines,
one of the more well-known radio networks in the Philippines, to broadcast the fact of his wife's
disappearance. Moreover, he searched various hospitals and funeral parlors in Tuguegarao and in
Bicol, with no avail.

After almost seven years of waiting, private respondent filed with the RTC a petition to have his wife
declared presumptively dead. The RTC rendered its Decision granting the Petition. Petitioner, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated the judgment of the RTC to the CA via a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner's main contention is that private
respondent failed to establish a "well-founded belief' that his missing wife was already dead. The CA
dismissed the petition because no motion for reconsideration was filed with the court a quo. The CA
ruled that such defect was fatal and warranted the immediate dismissal of the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent complied with the essential requisites of a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code.

RULING:
NO. Prevailing jurisprudence has time and again pointed out four (4) requisites under Article
41 of the Family Code that must be complied with for the declaration of presumptive death to prosper:
first, the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391 of the Civil Code. Second, the present spouse wishes to remarry. Third, the present spouse has a
well-founded belief that the absentee is dead. Fourth, the present spouse files for a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. Notably, the records reveal that
private respondent has complied with the first, second, and fourth requisites. Thus, what remains to be
resolved is whether or not private respondent successfully discharged the burden of establishing a
well-founded belief that his wife, Shanaviv, is dead.
The Court is of the view that private respondent's efforts in searching for his missing wife,
Shanaviv, are merely passive. Private respondent could have easily convinced the Court otherwise by
providing evidence which corroborated his "earnest-efforts." Yet, no explanation or justification was
given for these glaring omissions. Again, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by some
other means than mere allegations.
 Spouses Julieta and Fernando Carlos vs. Juan Cruz Tolentino
G.R. No. 234533 | June 27, 2018

FACTS:
Respondent Juan Cruz Tolentino filed a complaint for annulment of title against his wife,
grandson, and petitioners, the subject matter of which is a parcel of land covered by a TCT which was
issued on March 17, 1967 and registered in the name of Juan C. Tolentino, married to Mercedes
Tolentino. Without Juan’s knowledge and consent, Mercedes and Kristoff, who were then residing in
the subject property, allegedly forged a deed of donation, making it appear that Juan and Mercedes
donated the property to Kristoff. By virtue of the forged deed, a new TCT was issued in his name. The
subject property was then, offered for sale to Julieta’s brother. When Felix informed Julieta of the
availability of the subject property, Spouses Carlos then asked him to negotiate for its purchase with
Kristoff. Kristoff surrendered the copies of the title and tax declaration covering the said property.
After a series of negotiations, Kristoff and Julieta executed a memorandum of agreement
stating that Kristoff is selling the subject property to Julieta. Upon learning of the foregoing events,
Juan executed and affidavit of adverse claim. Meanwhile, Kristoff and Julieta executed another deed
of absolute sale over the subject property in favor of Spouses Carlos.

ISSUE:
What law should govern the property relations of the spouses.

RULING:
Juan and Mercedes appear to have been married before the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. There being no indication that they have adopted a different property regime, the
presumption is that their property relations is governed by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
Which is stated under Art. 119 of the Civil Code.

Likewise, the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal partnership of gains that
supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil Code, which is stated under
Art. 105 of the Family Code.

Since the subject property was acquired on March 17, 1967 during the marriage of Juan and
Mercedes, it formed part of their conjugal partnership. It follows then that Juan and Mercedes are the
absolute owners of their undivided one-half interest, respectively, over the subject property.

Meanwhile, as in any other property relations between husband and wife, the conjugal
partnership is terminated upon the death of either of the spouses. In respondent Juan’s Comment filed
before the Court, the Verification which he executed on February 9, 2018 states that he is already a
widower. Hence, the Court takes due notice of the fact of Mercedes’ death which inevitably results in
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
 Rivo vs Rivo, G.R. No. 210780, January 25, 2023
FACTS:
Edward N. Rivo (petitioner) and Dolores S. Rivo (respondent) were officemates when they
started dating in 1978 and got married on January 19, 1979 in a civil ceremony. On March 14, 1979,
they celebrated their church wedding. Prior to their marriage, respondent begot a child with her
former lover. Petitioner accepted respondent's son and treated him as his own son. On the other hand,
petitioner and respondent have three children. During their marriage, petitioner observed that
respondent gave priority to her work and devoted little time with petitioner and their children. Even
on Sundays, respondent would tend to her family's grocery store rather than spend time with her
family. Respondent was always too tired and unconcerned about her physical appearance. Most of the
time, she went to bed without cleaning herself, thus, petitioner did not have the urge to be intimate
with her. On April 26, 2005, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent. Petitioner alleged that respondent was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential
obligations of marriage, and the incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage
although he discovered it only after their marriage.
ISSUE: WON the psychological incapacity discovered after marriage is a ground for nullification of
marriage.
HELD: Petitioner anchors his petition mainly on the fact that both expert witnesses, Doctors Dayan
and De Guzman, found him psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital
obligations to respondent. Petitioner argues that the Molina guidelines formulated in the case of
Republic v. Molina have been satisfied in this case since it was established through the testimony of
expert witnesses that he is afflicted with a grave, pre-existing, and
incurable psychological incapacity. In the recent case of Tan-Andal v. Andal, the Court en banc
introduced a nuanced interpretation of what constitutes psychological incapacity in order to address
the rigid application of the Molina guidelines. The Court came up with a new set of parameters, which
either retained, abandoned, or amended for the purpose the Molina guidelines, that will aid in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at the time of the
celebration of marriage;
(2) Caused by a durable aspect of one's personality structure, one that was fanned prior to
their marriage;
(3) Caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause; and
(4) Proven by clear and convincing evidence.
In addition, the Court has categorically abandoned the second Molina guideline and held that
psychological incapacity is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified;
hence, expert opinion is not required. In lieu thereof, Tan-Andal required proof of the durable or
enduring aspects of a person's personality, called "personality structure" which manifests itself
through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family such that the spouse's personality
structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and to comply with his or her essential
marital obligations. This may be proven by testimonies of ordinary witnesses, who have been present
in the life of the spouses before they contracted marriage, on behaviors that they have consistently
observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. Tan-Andal Case emphasized that the
psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one's personality structure, one that was formed before
the parties married.
 Fernando C. Clavecilla v. Marivic B. Reyes-Clavecilla, G.R. No. 228127, March 6, 2023

Doctrine: The law only requires specific allegations of psychological incapacity, and the burden of
proof lies with the petitioner. The doctrine of unclean hands only applies when the petitioner's own
misconduct is directly related to the cause of action.

Facts of the Case:

Fernando C. Clavecilla filed a petition to declare his marriage with Marivic B. Reyes-
Clavecilla null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity. He alleged that his wife was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage.
Specifically, he claimed that Marivic was emotionally unstable, had a tendency to be violent, and was
unable to fulfill her duties as a wife and mother. The trial court granted Fernando's petition, but the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The Court of Appeals held that Fernando failed to prove that
Marivic was psychologically incapacitated and that his own infidelity constituted unclean hands,
which barred him from seeking nullity of their marriage.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's decision to declare the
marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Ruling:

The trial court granted Fernando's petition, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
The Court of Appeals held that Fernando failed to prove that Marivic was psychologically
incapacitated and that his own infidelity constituted unclean hands, which barred him from seeking
nullity of their marriage. Fernando appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals
erred in reversing the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court agreed with Fernando and reinstated
the trial court's decision. The Court held that Fernando's allegations of his wife's psychological
incapacity were sufficient to declare the marriage null and void. The Court also ruled that the doctrine
of unclean hands did not apply in this case, as Fernando's alleged infidelity did not constitute a bar to
his petition for nullity.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the law only requires specific allegations of
psychological incapacity, and that the burden of proof lies with the petitioner. The Court also clarified
that the doctrine of unclean hands only applies when the petitioner's own misconduct is directly
related to the cause of action. In this case, Fernando's infidelity was not related to his wife's
psychological incapacity, and therefore did not constitute unclean hands. In conclusion, the case of
Fernando C. Clavecilla v. Marivic B. Reyes-Clavecilla highlights the importance of specific
allegations of psychological incapacity in petitions for nullity of marriage. The doctrine of unclean
hands should only be applied when the petitioner's own misconduct is directly related to the cause of
action.
 Republic v. Romero, G.R. No. 209253 February 24, 2016
FACTS: Reghis and Olivia were married on May 11, 1972 at the Mary the Queen Parish in San Juan
City and were blessed with two (2) children. The couple first met in Baguio City in 1971 when Reghis
helped Olivia and her family who were stranded along Kennon Road. Since then, Reghis developed a
closeness with Olivia's family, especially with the latter's parents who tried to play matchmakers for
Reghis and Olivia. In the desire to please Olivia's parents, Reghis courted Olivia and, eventually, they
became sweethearts. Reghis was still a student at the time, determined to finish his studies and
provide for the financial needs of his siblings and parents. Thus, less than a year into their
relationship, Reghis tried to break-up with Olivia because he felt that her demanding attitude would
prevent him from reaching his personal and family goals. Olivia, however, refused to end their
relationship and insisted on staying with Reghis at the latter's dormitory overnight. Reghis declined
and, instead, made arrangements with his friends so that Olivia could sleep in a female dormitory. The
next day, Reghis brought Olivia home and while nothing happened between them the previous night,
Olivia's parents believed that they had eloped and planned for them to get married. Reghis initially
objected to the planned marriage as he was unemployed and still unprepared. However, Olivia's
parents assured him that they would shoulder all expenses and would support them until they are
financially able. The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage, often having violent
fights and jealous fits. Reghis could not forgive Olivia for dragging him into marriage and resented
her condescending attitude towards him. They became even more estranged when Reghis secured a
job as a medical representative and became engrossed in his career and focused on supporting his
parents and siblings. As a result, he spent little time with his family, causing Olivia to complain that
Reghis failed to be a real husband to her. In 1986, the couple parted ways. On June 16, 1998, Reghis
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Quezon City, citing his
psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations.
ISSUE: WON there was psychological incapacity to render the marriage between Reghis and Olivia
null and void ab initio.
HELD: The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. As such, the Constitution decrees
marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Thus, it has
consistently been held that psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
To warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the psychological incapacity must: (a) be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage; (b) have juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The
Court finds that the foregoing requirements do not concur. As aptly pointed out by the petitioners,
Reghis' testimony shows that he was able to comply with his marital obligations which, therefore,
negates the existence of a grave and serious psychological incapacity on his part. Reghis admitted that
he and Olivia lived together as husband and wife under one roof for fourteen (14) years and both of
them contributed in purchasing their own house in Paranaque City. Reghis also fulfilled his duty to
support and take care of his family, as he categorically stated that he loves their children and that he
was a good provider to them.
 Republic vs Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

Facts:
Respondent was previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national. A case for divorce was
filed by the respondent in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree was rendered by the
Japanese Court. By virtue of this judgment, respondent and her divorced Japanese husband are no
longer living with each other. On January 10, 2012, respondent filed a petition for cancellation of
entry of marriage in Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of divorce rendered by a Japanese
Court. The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit ruling that the divorce obtained by the
respondent in Japan cannot be recognized in pursuant of Article 15 of the Civil Code. They held that
the Philippine law does not afford Filipinos the right for a divorce, whether they are in the country or
living abroad, if they are married to Filipino or to foreigners, or if they celebrated marriage in the
Philippines or in another country. On appeal, the Court of Appeals overturned the decision of the trial
court holding that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable even if it was Manalo
who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter
no longer married to the former, thereby capacitating him to remarry.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by the respondent abroad should be recognized in the Philippines.

Held:
Yes.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of a divorce validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry. Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there
be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse
should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. As such, the Court is bound by the words of the statute.
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in a country
where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective
measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating
his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: The Filipino spouse will effectively be
without a husband or wife.
 Tadeo-Matias vs Republic, G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018

Facts:
The petitioner and Wilfredo entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968. Wilfredo never came
back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never made contact or
communicated with the petitioner nor to his relatives. That according to the service record of Wilfredo
issued by the National Police Commission, Wilfredo was already declared missing since 1979. The
petitioner never gave up hope, and after more than three (3) decades of awaiting, it is now necessary
for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive. That one of the
requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or at least declaration of
presumptive death by the Honorable Court.
The RTC issued a Decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the petition using Article 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 41 of the Family Code should be applied in this case.

Held:
No.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would
have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of death
established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under
the said law.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive
death Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage.
In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same
was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a
amended. Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the
purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article
390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code as the basis of her petition.
 Republic vs Tecag, G.R. No. 229272, November 19, 2018
Facts:
On October 9, 2012, Gina filed a petition to declare her marriage with Marjune null and void on the
basis of the latter's psychological incapacity. During trial, Gina presented the findings of Prof.
Sanchez, the psychologist who conducted a psychological examination of the parties. In the Case
Analysis Report, Prof Sanchez stated that Gina was suffering from "Anxious and Fearful Personality
Disorder" where traces of "Dependent Personality Disorder" were observed, rendering her
psychologically incapacitated as a spouse to Marjune.
With respect to Marjune, Prof. Sanchez found that his behavior was suggestive of an "Avoidant
Personality Disorder," even though she was unable to interview him. She also concluded that Gina
and Marjune's personality disorders "affected their behaviors even before they contracted marriage
and, in the presence of situational factors, became more evident during the time they were together
during the marriage."
The RTC granted the petition, finding that their personality disorders existed even before marriage,
and that because these prevented the parties from performing the essential marital duties, they are
considered grave and serious, and likewise incurable, as concluded by Prof. Sanchez. On appeal,
citing the findings of Prof. Sanchez extensively, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the probative value of the findings of the expert witnesses may be heavily relied on to
support the ground of psychological incapacity for the annulment of marriage.

Held:
Yes.
In ruling against the respondent, it held that:
Based on jurisprudence, psychological incapacity has a specific and peculiar denotation. It
ought to pertain to only the most serious cases of personality disorders that clearly
demonstrate the party's/parties' utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. It should refer to no less than a mental — not merely physical — incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as provided under
Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support.
 MORIMOTO VS. MORIMOTO, G.R. No. 247576. March 15, 2022
FACTS:
Sometime before December 2007, Rosario was introduced to Yoshio as one with whom she can
simulate a marriage with for her to acquire a Japanese Visa. On December 5, 2007, they met at the
Manila City Hall and signed a blank marriage certificate. They were assured by the
S.O. that such certificate will never be registered in the Civil Registry.
Eventually, when she was about to secure a Certificate of No Marriage, she found out that a
Certificate of Marriage was registered that she married Yoshio on December 5, 2007, in a ceremony
officiated by a certain Reverend Roberto Espiritu. There was also a marriage license that appeared on
record that was issued by the Office of the Civil Registry of San Juan.
On October 5, 2009, Rosario filed a Petition for Declaration of nullity of Marriage before the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court. She claimed that the marriage did not actually happen and that there was
no application for a marriage license at all.
As proof she provided as evidence a certification issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, NO,
stating that "said office mistakenly stated that a marriage was solemnized between Rosario and
Yoshio." She also provided as evidence a Certificate issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, San
Juan City, which states that "no record of Marriage License No. 6120159 was issued to the parties."
The RTC denied her petition and the CA also denied her appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the registered marriage between petitioner Rosario D. Ado-An-Morimoto and
respondent Yoshio Morimoto should be declared null and void.
RULING:
Yes, the marriage should be declared null and void for having been simulated and lacking in the
essential and formal requisites of marriage.
This Court takes petitioner's assertions to be corresponding with the truth, or otherwise "affording”
the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute." They are convincing proof that no marriage between her
and respondent Yoshio ever took place.
In any case, petitioner's assertions do not stand by their lonesome. They are bolstered by the Assistant
City Prosecutor's Report indicating that there is no collusion between petitioner and respondent
Yoshio to obtain a favorable ruling from the Regional Trial Court. This works to thwart any claim that
respondent Yoshio's not having directly contradicted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity, or
otherwise insisting on the subsistence of their supposed marriage, indicates duplicity on petitioner's
part.
More importantly, a Certification was issued by the Office ofthe Civil Registrar, Philippine Statistics
Authority, stating that "said office mistakenly certified that a marriage was solemnized between
[petitioner and respondent Yoshio.]" This categorical turnaround should, once and for all, negate any
lingering doubt on whether the supposed marriage between petitioner and respondent Yoshio actually
transpired. It could even render this case moot.
 DEDICATORIA VS. DEDICATORIA, G.R. No. 250618. July 20, 2022
FACTS:
Jennifer and Ferdinand were married on December 20, 1995. However, on October 23, 2014, Jennifer
filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage due to Ferdinand's psychological incapacity.
Summons was served through substituted service, but Ferdinand failed to file an answer. The Office
of the Solicitor General entered its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and
deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City on its behalf. After investigation, the
Assistant City Prosecutor found no collusion between the parties.
ISSUE:
Whether sufficient evidence was presented to prove psychological incapacity for the Court to declare
the marriage void.
RULING:
Yes.
Psychological incapacity as a ground to consider a marriage void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, is not a medical, but a legal concept. Application of rigid medical parameters for its
determination is, thus, ill-suited. Expert opinions furnished by psychiatrists or psychologists on the
psychological temperament of parties are not indispensable.It is enough that the totality of clear and
convincing evidence proves that an enduring aspect of a spouse's personality, existing at the time of
the celebration of marriage, render him or her incapable of understanding or performing essential
marital obligations.
In all, the totality of evidence presented, comprising of Montefalcon's psychological report, and the
testimonies of Jennifer and Anarose, sufficiently prove Ferdinand's psychological incapacity as
contemplated under Article 36 of the:
It is cases like these that the law contemplates a situation where a spouse's psychic causes destroy a
marriage. Corollary to this Court's Constitutional duty to value the sanctity of marriage is Our duty to
ensure that only marriages that establish conjugal and family life are maintained. That marriage is an
inviolable social institution does not mean that a spouse who unwittingly marries an individual with a
certain level of "dysfunctionality that shows a lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with
one's essential marital obligations due to psychic causes" is condemned to a life sentence of misery.
There are more than enough jokes about the pitfalls of marriage. In the most serious of cases such as
this, the Court steps in to ensure that the sanctity of marriage is maintained not derided. (Emphasis
supplied and citation omitted)
To be sure, the time-honored spiel "until death do us part" is not a blind vow of eternal condemnation
for worse but a simple pledge of faithful observance by the spouses of their utter commitment of
mutual love, respect, support, and fidelity. Any complicity to breach their essential duties borne by
dysfunctionality will not justify their continued union lest the inviolability of marriage as an
institution will falter to perdition, betraying the constitutionally- enshrined purpose of sustaining the
family as a basic social institution.
 G.R. No. 208258. April 27, 2022
FACTS:
Maria filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Joselito.
During trial, Petitioner presented herself and psychiatrist Dr. Villegas as witnesses. Dr. Villegas
testified that she diagnosed Joselito with a personality disorder of a sexual deviant or perversion based
on Maria’s narrations. Dr. Villegas added that the psychological disorder of Joselito is grave, serious,
and not clinically curable which rendered him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations.
The trial court denied the petition, it held that the evidence adduced by Maria failed to overcome the
legal presumption in favor of the validity of her marriage with respondent. On appeal, the appellate
court sustained the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the totality of evidence presented by Maria is sufficient to prove that Joselito is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations, meriting the dissolution of
his marriage with Maria.
RULING:
No. Republic v Iyoy instructs that the psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
(a) Gravity – it must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
Thus, as categorically declared by the Court, expert testimony or the testimony of a
psychologist/psychiatrist is no longer required to prove psychological incapacity. Ordinary witnesses
who have been present in the spouses’ lives before they contracted marriage may testify on their
observations as to the incapacitated spouse’s behavior. What is important is that the totality of
evidence is sufficient to support a finding of psychological incapacity.
Using the foregoing yardsticks, the Supreme Court reviewed the totality of evidence presented by
Maria and found that the same was miserably wanting to sustain the conclusion that Joselito was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of marriage.
The psychiatrist’s description of Joselito’s parents’ traits does not give this Court a deeper intuitive
understanding of Joselito’s psychological state. Notably, there was no information how Joselito
reacted towards the supposed contrasting personalities of his parents during his formative years.
Neither was there any account as to how the said contrasting parenting behavior affected Joselito’s
social, intellectual, moral, and emotional growth.
 Nicxon Perez vs. Avegail Perez-Senerpida [ G.R. No. 233365, March 24, 2021 ];

Facts:
Spouses Eliodoro and Adelita Perez were the registered owners of a parcel of land in
Olongapo City. Prior to his marriage with Adelita, Eliodoro was married and had several children, one
of whom was Nicxon Perez, Sr., who sired Nicxon, Jr. In 1995, Adelita executed a Renunciation and
Waiver of Rights in favor of Eliodoro. In 2004, Eliodoro donated the parcel of land to the petitioner
Nicxon Jr. In 2005, Eliodoro filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 of
the Family Code. The court eventually declared the marriage between Eliodoro and Adelita void ab
initio. June 28, 2008, Eliodoro died. On April 14, 2009, an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs
with Waiver was executed and signed by his legitimate and compulsory heirs. September 30, 2010,
Avegail Perez-Senerpida brought an action for Annulment of Donation and Title with Prayer for a
TRO and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Nicxon, alleging that she is one of the children of
the late Eliodoro and Adelita. Nicxon filed his Answer (With Counterclaims) denying Avegail’s
allegation that Adelita is part owner of the subject property together with the late Eliodoro and argued
that even if she was indeed part owner, she has no more right thereon when she executed the [RWR]
in 1995.

Issue: Whether consent to the donation of property acquired during the cohabitation of a man and a
woman under a void marriage is required just like in a lawfully married couple.

Ruling:
Yes. For a couple living under a void marriage, consent of the other party is required for the
donation of property acquired during cohabitation under a void marriage. Article 147 of the Family
Code covers the exclusive cohabitation of a man and woman as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage. With Article 493 of the Civil Code as basis, Eliodoro could
have alienated onerously or gratuitously his part or share in the subject property to Nicxon without the
consent of Adelita, who was half co-owner thereof, and the alienation would have been limited to the
half portion allotted to Eliodoro upon termination of the co-ownership or partition.
However, Article 493 of the Civil Code cannot supersede and must yield to, Article 147 of the
Family Code, which expressly mandates that: “Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without
the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
 Tan- Andal v. Andal G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021

Facts:
Mario Victor M. Andal (Mario) and Rosanna L. Tan (Rosanna) married on December
16, 1995, at the Saints Peter and Paul Parish in Poblacion, Makati City. After four years of marriage,
Mario and Rosanna separated in 2000. On August 6, 2003, Rosanna filed a Petition for a declaration
of nullity of her marriage, claiming that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his
essential marital obligations to her. Rosanna maintains that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
reversing the trial court’s Decision, claiming that the totality of evidence she presented was sufficient
to prove Mario’s psychological incapacity. With respect to Dr. Garcia’s findings, Rosanna claims that
they are reliable, having been subjected to cross-examination by Mario’s counsel and were based on
documents written by Mario himself, among others. Mario maintains that she failed to prove that his
past drug use was a manifestation of a personality disorder that rendered him psychologically
incapacitated. Mario argues that his past drug use is, at best, only grounds for legal separation, not for
the nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity. Mario argues that psychological incapacity is
truly incurable, which means it is medically or clinically permanent. Rosanna contended that Mario’s
drug use was the manifestation of a grave personality disorder “deeply rooted within [Mario’s]
adaptive system.” She thus prayed that the trial court nullifies their marriage and that she be declared
the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land donated to her by her aunt as well as the duplex built
on it. To prove Mario’s psychological incapacity, Rosanna presented Dr. Valentina Del Fonso Garcia
(Dr. Garcia), a physician-psychiatrist, as an expert witness.
In its May 9, 2007 Decision, the Regional Trial Court found that Rosanna discharged the
burden of proving Mario’s psychological incapacity. The trial court thus voided Mario and Rosanna’s
marriage. Reversing the trial court’s ruling and declaring that the marriage is valid and subsisting. The
Court of Appeals found Dr. Garcia’s psychiatric evaluation of Mario to be “unscientific and
unreliable” since she diagnosed Mario without interviewing him. The Court of Appeals ruled that Dr.
Garcia “was working on pure suppositions and second-hand information fed to her by one side.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Mario and Rosanna is void due to psychological
incapacity.

Ruling:
Yes, their marriage is void due to psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code
provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization In the case at
bar, the Court found that Rosanna proved with clear and convincing evidence that Mario was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations. Hence, the marriage is
void due to psychological incapacity.
 Almazan v. Bacolod, G.R. No. 227529, June 16, 2021

Facts:
Petitioner is one of the registered owners of the subject property with TCT No. T-060-
2012008993. He and his co-owners inherited the subject property from their grandfather. Sometime in
2010, petitioner visited the subject property, and was surprised to discover the respondents occupying
the same. He demanded them to vacate the land. However, the respondents refused claiming that they
are agricultural tenants of the subject property, as affirmed by the decisions of Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Petitioner denied the existence of any tenurial relationship between him and his co- owners
and the respondents. Meanwhile, on 2013, petitioner filed before the RTC, a Complaint for Quieting
of Title, Accion Reivindicatoria, and Damages against the respondents. Petitioner claimed that he
and his co-owners are not bound by the PARAD and DARAB Decisions considering that the
respondents were never their tenants, and the Decisions were rendered against Arturo, Norberto,
Virginia, Ruben, Manuel and Bayani, all surnamed Erana (collectively, Eranas), with whom the
petitioner has no relationship with. Accordingly, said Decisions constitute a cloud on their title and
possessory rights over the subject property. Respondent averred that the issues and reliefs sought by
the petitioner in his Complaint are beyond the power and authority of the trial court, since in reality,
the complaint seeks to reverse and set aside the final and executory Decisions of the PARAD and
DARAB.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint for quieting of Title, accion
reivindicatoria and damages.

Ruling:
Yes. Regular courts have jurisdiction over actions for quieting of title. The SC remanded the
issue to the RTC for a full resolution. Significantly, the purpose of an action to quiet title is to secure a
ruling that a claim of title to, or an interest in property, adverse to that of the plaintiff is invalid, so that
the plaintiff and all others claiming rights under him/her may be perpetually liberated from any danger
of a hostile claim. To achieve this end, the court must determine the respective rights of the parties to
put things in their proper place and to prevent the defendant who has no rights over the immovable,
respect and correspondingly, refrain from disturbing the title of the plaintiff. For the action to prosper,
the plaintiff must establish a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the subject property.
Furthermore, he/she must prove that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding alleged to be casting
a cloud on his/her title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy. Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that the allegations in the petitioner's Complaint
make out an action to quiet title. Judging by the ultimate facts alleged therein, petitioner claimed that
he has a legal title on the subject property, based on TCT No. T-060-2012008993; and that the
PARAD and DARAB Decisions are unenforceable and constitute clouds on his title.
 RHODORA ILUMIN RACHO VS. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS PINAS, G.R. NO.
199515, JUNE 25, 2018,
FACTS:
Racho and Seiichi Tanaka were married on April 20, 2001 in Las Pinas City, Metro Manila.
They lived together for nine years in Japan and did not have any children. Racho alleged that on
December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and the divorce was granted. She issued a Divorce
Certificate issued by Consul Kenichiro Takayama of the Japanese Consulate in the Philippines and
had it authenticated by the DFA. She was informed that by reason of certain administrative changes,
she was required to return to the Philippines to report the documents for registration and to file the
appropriate case for judicial recognition of Divorce. She tried to have the Divorce Certificate
registered with the Civil Registry of Manila but was refused since there was no court order
recognizing it. She was informed by the National Statistics Office that her divorce could only be
annotated in the Certificate of Marriage if there was a court order capacitating her to remarry. She
filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry before the RTC but
the latter held that failed to prove that Tanaka legally obtained a divorce.
Racho filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC but the latter differed action on
her Petition pending her submission of a duly authenticated acceptance certificate of the notification
of divorce, On March 16, 2012, petitioner submitted her compliance, attaching a duly authenticated
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of divorce that she obtained in Japan. Petitioner argues that
under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by agreement becomes effective upon notification, whether
oral or written, by both parties and by two or more witnesses. She contends that the Divorce
Certificate stating “Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce issued by the Mayor of
Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., is sufficient to prove that she and her husband have divorced by
agreement and have already effected notification of the divorce. She avers further that under Japanese
law, the manner of proving a divorce by agreement is by record of its notification and by the fact of its
acceptance, both of which were stated in the Divorce Certificate. She insists that she is now legally
capacitated to marry since Article 728 of the Civil Code of Japan states that a matrimonial
relationship is terminated by divorce.
ISSUE:
Whether the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is sufficient to prove the fact
that a divorce was validly obtained by Tanaka according to his national law.
RULING:
Yes. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between a foreigner and a Filipino
may be recognized in the Philippines as long as it was validly obtained according to the foreign
spouse’s national law. The second paragraph provides that where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippines law. Mere presentation of Divorce Decree before a trial court is insufficient. It
would be inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own national laws from
something that a foreign law may allow. Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the
matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce. The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce does not state any qualifications that would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There
can be no other interpretation than that the divorce procured by petitioner and respondent is absolute
and completely terminates their marital tie. Even under our laws, the effect of the absolute dissolution
of the marital tie is to grant both parties the legal capacity to remarry.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO,. G.R. NO.
218630, JANUARY 11, 2018,
FACTS:
Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico (Katrina) filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Lawrence C. Tionglico (Lawrence) on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Katrina and Lawrence met in 1971. After a brief courtship, they entered into a relationship.
When she got pregnant, they got married. Even during the early stage of their marriage, it was marred
by bickering and quarrels. As early as their honeymoon, they were fighting so much that they went
their separate ways most of the time and Katrina found herself wandering the streets of Hongkong
alone. Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence’s parents until the birth of their child,
Lanz Rafael Tabora Tionglico (Lanz), Lawrence was distant and did not help in rearing the child,
saying he knew nothing about the children and how to run a family. He spent almost every night out
for late dinners, parties and drinking sprees. Katrina noticed that Lawrence was alarmingly dependent
on his mother and suffered from a very high degree of immaturity. Lawrence would repeatedly taunt
Katrina to fight with him. They lost intimacy between them as he insisted to have a maid sleep in their
bedroom every night to see the needs of Lanz. Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and
all of Katrina’s decisions – from the manner by which she took care of Lanz, to the way she treated
the household help. Most fights ended up in full blown arguments often in front of Lanz. Due to their
incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his parent’s home and to never come back. They
have been separated in fact since then. Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano, who
confirmed her beliefs on Lawrence’s psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage of Katrina and Lawrence is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
RULING:
First, judgments must be based not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but
on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings. Here, Dr. Arellano’s findings that
Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated were based solely on Katrina’s statements. Basic is the rule
that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Katrina did not present
other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Lawrence’s psychological incapacity. Her testimony
therefore is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.

Secondly, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person, it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the
marriage should be grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his/her awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he/she was then about to assume. Here the testimony of
Katrina as regards the behavior of Lawrence hardly depicts the picture of a psychologically
incapacitated husband. Their frequent fights, as well as his insensitivity, immaturity and frequent
night-outs can hardly be said to be a psychological illness. These acts do not rise to the level of the
“psychological incapacity” that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the “difficulty,” if
not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize
some marriages.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. LIBERATO P. MOLA CRUZ,
RESPONDENT. G.R. NO. 236629, JULY 23, 2018, JUSTICE GESMUNDO

FACTS:
Respondent Liberato and Liezl were married. In the course of their relationship, Liezl left for
Japan to work as an entertainer for six months. The couple then got married after Liezl returned home.
Later, they moved to Japan where Liezl again worked as an entertainer and respondent found work as
a construction worker. It was while living in Japan when respondent noticed changes in Liezl. She
began going out of the house without respondent’s permission and started giving respondent the cold
treatment. The couple later returned to the Philippines. It was then that Liezl confessed to respond her
romantic affair with a Japanese man. Despite the confession, respondent expressed his willingness to
forgive Liezl, but the latter chose to walk away from their marriage. The couple reconciled after
respondent made effort to change the mind of Liezl. One day, however, respondent found Liezl’s
Japanese lover in their house. Respondent went along with the charade and allowed Liezl to share her
bed with her lover as she threatened to leave their home. Liezl left respondent a second time.
Respondent tried to move on and left for Singapore to work. While broad, he found out that Liezl
already cohabited with her lover. Respondent decided to file a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC granted respondent’s petition and declared
respondent and Liezl’s marriage void ab initio and testimony of expert witness, Dr. Pacita Tudla, a
clinical psychologist. Dr. Tudla found that Liezl’s psychological incapacity existed prior to the
marriage because she grew up irritable, hard-headed and fond of friends than family. The CA affirmed
the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether Liezl’s psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations was
sufficiently established by the totality of evidence presented by respondent.
RULING:
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharge by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. Further, psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. A person’s psychological
incapacity to comply with his/ her essential obligations, as the case may be, in marriage must be
rooted on a medically or clinically identifiable grave illness that is incurable and shown to have
existed at the time of marriage, although the manifestations thereof may only be evident after
marriage.

The findings of the RTC on the existence or non-existence of a party’s psychological incapacity
should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of testimonies of witnesses and
other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. In every situation where the
findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial,
the appellate court should retrain itself from substituting its own judgment.