TITLE XII – CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS

Simulation of Birth
1. People vs. Sangalang, 74 O.G. 5983
FACTS:
The Sangalang spouses together with Gloria and Bienvenido were charged of the crime of simulation of
birth. The information alleged that a child was furnished by Gloria to the Sangalangs. Accused
Bienvenido registered the birth of said child in the local civil registrar by supplying to said office the
necessary information required so that a birth certificate would be issued. He named the Sangalangs as the
child’s parents. A birth certificate was hence issued. Information did not contain any specific allegation
as to what the spouses did, except that they had conspired with Gloria and Bienvenido.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused (Sangalan Spouses) are guilty of Simulation of Birth

HELD:
No.
By merely presenting a child as having born to the accused from feigned pregnancy or pretended delivery,
the crime is not committed if the legal formalities of investing a child with a civil status other than her
own are not present.
2. Babiera vs. Catota, G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000
FACTS:
Presentacion B. Catotal filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera. From
the petition filed, Presentacion asserted the following:
that she was the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who
died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively;
that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by “hilot” in the house of spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and
a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the facts of
birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and
Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her
signature that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally
witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by “hilot”;
that the birth certificate of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of
informant forged, and it contained false
Teofista filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that “the petition states no cause of action, it being an
attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and
HermogenaCariñosaBabiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to
TITLE XII – CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS
Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by prescription in
accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a certificate of live birth is sufficient to establish the legitimacy of a child regardless of the
fact that the same is obtained by fraud or that it contained some irregularities

RULING:
No. The present case alleged and showed that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. The prayer was
not to declare that petitioner was an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former was
not the latter’s child at all. The action did not impugn petitioner’s filiation to Spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera, because there was no blood relation to impugn in the first place.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioner’s Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of
regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case, as well as the totality of the evidence presented during
trial, sufficiently negate such presumption. First, there were already irregularities regarding the Birth
Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar. More important, the Court of Appeals
observed that the mother’s signature therein was different from her signatures in other documents
presented during the trial.
The circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena was not the former’s real
mother. There was no evidence of Hermogena’s pregnancy, such as medical records and doctor’s
prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth,
Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at such a late
age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age necessitated proper
medical care normally available only in a hospital. The most significant piece of evidence, however, was
the deposition of Hermogena Babiera which stated that she did not give birth to petitioner, and that the
latter was neither hers nor her husband Eugenio’s.
Bigamy
3. Pulido vs. People, G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021
FACTS:
On 5 September 1983, Pulido (who was 16 years old then), married his teacher, Arcon (who was then 22
years old) in a civil ceremony. The couple lived together until 2007 when Pulido stopped going home.
Arcon then confronted Pulido, to which Pulido admitted to his affair with Baleda. Arcon also learned that
Pulido and Baleda entered into marriage on 31 July 1995 where their marriage certificate indicated
Pulido’s civil status as single.
Consequently, Arcon charged Pulido and Baleda with bigamy in December 2007. In his defense, Pulido
argued and insisted that he could not be held criminally liable for bigamy because both his marriages
were null and void. He stated that his marriage with Arcon (in 1983) is null and void for lack of a valid
marriage license, while his second marriage with Baleda (in 1995) is null and void for lack of a marriage
ceremony.
TITLE XII – CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS

Baleda, for her part, claimed that she belatedly knew of Pulido’s prior marriage with Arcon sometime in
April 2007. She added that even prior to the filing of the bigamy case, she already filed a petition to annul
her marriage with Pulido and on 25 October 2007, the RTC of Imus, Cavite declared her marriage with
Pulido as null and void for being bigamous in nature. Baleda was acquitted but Pulido was convicted by
the lower court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. Pulido elevated the case to the SC.
Issue:
can Article 40 of the Family Code be given a retroactive application on his case which requires him to
obtain a judicial declaration of absolute nullity before he can contract another marriage, otherwise, he can
be prosecuted for bigamy, considering that Pulido’s first marriage was contracted in 1983 or before the
effectivity of the Family Code while his second marriage was celebrated in 1995, during the effectivity of
the said law?
The SC held that Article 40 of the Family Code applies retroactively on marriages celebrated before the
Family Code insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. Thus, a judicial
declaration of nullity is required for prior marriages contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code
but only for purposes of remarriage.
In this case, “the SC recognizes the retroactive application of Article 40 of the Family Code but only
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. xxx Hence, Pulido is required to obtain
a judicial decree of absolute nullity of his prior void ab initio marriage but only for purposes of
remarriage. As regards the bigamy case, however, Pulido may raise the defense of a void ab initio
marriage even without obtaining a judicial declaration of absolute nullity.”
Issue:
does the subsequent declaration of the nullity of the first and second marriages constitute a valid defense
in bigamy?
The SC ruled in the affirmative and abandoned its earlier rulings that a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of the first and/or second marriages cannot be raised as a defense by the accused in a criminal
prosecution for bigamy. Accordingly, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a
void ab initio prior and subsequent marriages in a bigamy case. Consequently, judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of the first and/or second marriages presented by the accused in the prosecution for
bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the time within which they are secured. The aforesaid
conclusion is anchored on and justified by the retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage, the
legislative intent of Article 40 of the Family Code, and the fundamental rules of construction governing
penal laws.”
Lastly, the SC concluded, “A void marriage is ipso facto void without need of any judicial declaration of
nullity; the only recognized exception under existing law is Article 40 of the Family Code where a
marriage void ab initio is deemed valid for purposes of remarriage, hence necessitating a judicial
declaration of nullity before one can contract a subsequent marriage. Clearly, when the first marriage is
void ab initio, one of the essential elements of bigamy is absent, i.e., a prior valid marriage. There can be
no crime when the very act which was penalized by the law, i.e. contracting another marriage during the
TITLE XII – CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS
subsistence of a prior legal or valid marriage, is not present. Thus, an accused in a bigamy case should be
allowed to raise the defense of a prior void ab initio marriage through co
4. Morigo vs. People, G.R. No. 145226 Feb. 6, 2004
Facts:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran
City

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former
replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.

Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they
maintained constant communication.

Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed
to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago[4] at the Virgen sa
Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others,
the declaration of nullity of accused's marriage with Lucia, on... the ground that no marriage ceremony
actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information[5] filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
TITLE XII – CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS
the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia
void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place.
No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
Issues:

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so,
whether his defense of good faith is valid.

Ruling:

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner's claim that his first marriage to Lucia
was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[8] the trial court ruled that want of
a valid marriage... ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which held that
the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may
resort merely for the purpose of... obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial
status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere.
the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia
void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place.
No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent
declaration of nullity of Lucio's marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The
reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349[12] of the Revised Penal Code is the act of
contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact
that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court
could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15[13] of the Civil Code and given
the fact that it is contrary to public policy... in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17[14] of the Civil Code, a
declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign
jurisdiction.
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by
a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two,
without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held... that the marriage is void ab
initio, in accordance with Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code.

"This simply means that there was no marriage to begin... with; and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the
TITLE XII – CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS
date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first
marriage,... the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married."
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in
this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a... marriage being declared void ab initio,
the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal
effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to
Lucia at the... time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the
first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The... petitioner, must, perforce
be acquitted of the instant charge.
no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears no semblance to a valid... marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such
act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner
might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he...
contracts a subsequent marriage.
5. Manuel vs. People, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005
Facts:
On July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña. He met the private complainant Tina B.
Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. Tina was then 21 years old, while Eduardo was
39. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even
brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by them that their son was still
single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was “single.”
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. However, starting 1999, Manuel
started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and
whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her. Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took
all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina made inquiries from the (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo
had been previously married. In his defense, Eduardo insisted that he married Tina believing that his
first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus, his former wife from the first
marriage, for more than 20 years.
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo’s belief, that his first
marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate
him from liability for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because
when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He
maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his
first marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code,
there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in
TITLE XII – CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS
marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful
marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil
Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v. Peñalosa and
Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.
CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the
accused. The CA averred that Eduardo’s defense of good faith and reliance on the Court’s ruling in
United States v. Enriquez were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which
amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. It held that before Manuel could lawfully marry the private
complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Rubylus’ presumptive death as the absent
spouse.
Eduardo now filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of bigamy.

Held:
YES.
RPC states that: Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law. The phrase “or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings” in Article 349 of the RPC means that the requirement
for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as
protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be
charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found
incredible.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private
complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of
the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.

The burden of proof is upon the petitioner. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent
court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code and that could constitutes proof that the petitioner acted
TITLE XII – CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS
in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and,
as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case.

The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present spouse
contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latter’s reappearance. This
provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349
of the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively
dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second marriage is already established.
6. Sarto vs. People, G.R. No. 206284, February 28, 2018
FACTS:
Redante and Maria Socorro, both natives of Buhi, Camarines Sur, were married on 31 August 1984 in a
ceremony held in Angono, Rizal. Sometime thereafter, Maria Socorro left for Canada to work as a nurse.
While in Canada, she applied for Canadian citizenship. The application was eventually granted and Ma.
Socorro acquired Canadian citizenship on 1 April 1988. Maria Socorro then filed for divorce in British
Columbia, Canada, to sever her marital ties with Redante. The divorce was eventually granted by the
Supreme Court of British Columbia on 1 November 1988. Sometime in February 1998, Redante met Fe
to whom he admitted that he was previously married to Maria Socorro who, however, divorced him.
Despite this admission, their romance blossomed and culminated in their marriage on 29 December 1998
at the Peñafrancia Basilica Minore in Naga City. Their relationship, however, turned sour when Ma.
Socorro returned to the Philippines and met with Redante to persuade him to allow their daughter to apply
for Canadian citizenship. After learning of Redante and Maria Socorro’s meeting and believing that they
had reconciled, Fe decided to leave their conjugal home on 31 May 2007.

On 4 June 2007, Fe filed a complaint for bigamy against Redante. In its judgment, the RTC found
Redante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. The trial court ratiocinated that
Redante’s conviction is the only reasonable conclusion for the case because of his failure to present
competent evidence proving the alleged divorce decree; his failure to establish the naturalization of Maria
Socorro; and his admission that he did not seek judicial recognition of the alleged divorce decree. In its
assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused is no longer guilty of bigamy since the first marriage was dissolved by divorce
obtained abroad – NO. Divorce was not sufficiently proven.

RULING AND DOCTRINE:

A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage. As in any other foreign judgment, a divorce decree does not have an automatic effect in the
Philippines. Consequently, recognition by Philippine courts may be required before the effects of a
TITLE XII – CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS
divorce decree could be extended in this jurisdiction. Recognition of the divorce decree, however, need
not be obtained in a separate petition led solely for that purpose. Philippine courts may recognize the
foreign divorce decree when such was invoked by a party as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Proving the foreign law under which the
divorce was secured is mandatory considering that Philippine courts cannot and could not be expected to
take judicial notice of foreign laws. For the purpose of establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of the divorce
decree itself must be presented and admitted in evidence. This is in consonance with the rule that a
foreign judgment may be given presumptive evidentiary value only after it is presented and admitted in
evidence.

Applying the foregoing, the Court is convinced that Redante failed to prove the existence of the divorce
as a fact or that it was validly obtained prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage to Fe. Aside
from the testimonies of Redante and Maria Socorro, the only piece of evidence presented by the defense
to prove the divorce, is the certificate of divorce allegedly issued by the registrar of the Supreme Court of
British Columbia on 14 January 2008. This certificate of divorce, however, is utterly insufficient to rebut
the charge against Redante. First, the certificate of divorce is not the divorce decree required by the rules
and jurisprudence. As discussed previously, the divorce decree required to prove the fact of divorce is the
judgment itself as rendered by the foreign court and not a mere certification. Second, assuming the
certificate of divorce may be considered as the divorce decree, it was not accompanied by a certification
issued by the proper Philippine diplomatic or consular officer stationed in Canada, as required under
Section 24 of Rule 132. Lastly, no copy of the alleged Canadian law was presented by the defense. Thus,
it could not be reasonably determined whether the subject divorce decree was in accord with Maria
Socorro’s national law. Further, since neither the divorce decree nor the alleged Canadian law was
satisfactorily demonstrated, the type of divorce supposedly secured by Maria Socorro — whether an
absolute divorce which terminates the marriage or a limited divorce which merely suspends it — and
whether such divorce capacitated her to remarry could not also be ascertained. As such, Redante failed to
prove his defense that he had the capacity to remarry when he contracted a subsequent marriage to Fe. His
liability for bigamy is, therefore, now beyond question.
7. Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109454, June 14, 1994
Facts:

That petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems impliedly admitted.

In an information filed on 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy... for
contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia
C. Nievera... remained valid and subsisting.

Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has been
extinguished by prescription.
TITLE XII – CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS
petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by prescription. He avers
that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975,
[7] such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes notice to the whole
world. The offended party therefore is considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent
marriage as of 1975;

For this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and
not only in 1992.

the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the commission of the crime
but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.

Issues:

whether his prosecution for bigamy is already time-barred,... whether its discovery is deemed to have
taken place from the time the offended party actually knew of the second marriage or from the time the
document evidencing the subsequent marriage was registered with the Civil Registry consistent with the
rule on constructive notice

Ruling:

To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from... registration thereof would amount to
almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous
marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its registration, the offender however is not
truthful as he conceals from the... officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his previous
subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a married person. He likewise conceals
from his legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in...
a place where he is not known to be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under
which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take
time. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period... for the crime of bigamy should be counted
only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their
agency (sic).

Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the prescriptive period for the
offense of bigamy were to be counted from the date of registration thereof, the prosecution of the
violators of the said offense would almost be impossible.
TITLE XII – CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS
Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there was no concealment at all because his marriage
contract with Ms. Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry which is open to all and sundry for
inspection. We cannot go along with his argument because why did he indicate... in the marriage contract
that he was "single" thus obviously hiding his true status as a married man? Or for that matter, why did he
not simply tell his first wife about the subsequent marriage in Marikina so that everything would be out in
the open. The answer is obvious: He... knew that no priest or minister would knowingly perform or
authorize a bigamous marriage as this would subject him to punishment under the Marriage Law.

Obviously, petitioner had no intention of revealing his duplicity to his... first spouse and gambled instead
on the probability that she or any third party would ever go to the local civil registrar to inquire. In the
meantime, through the simple expedience of having the second marriage recorded in the local civil
registry, he has set into motion the... running of the fifteen-year prescriptive period against the unwary
and the unsuspecting victim of his philandering.

Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all likelihood we would be
playing right into the hands of philanderers. For we would be equating the contract of marriage with
ordinary deeds of conveyance and other similar documents without... due regard for the stability of
marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation of which is a primary concern of our society.
8. Republic vs. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005
Facts:

Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981. Related imageThey were blessed with a with a son
and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few years,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in California.

He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but
it was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.

Issue:
TITLE XII – CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS

Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Held:

Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code be
interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,one of them became naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtained a divorce decree.

The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a
divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed, she remarried an American citizen while residing in
the US. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he was still barred from
remarrying.
9. Juliano-Llave vs. Republic, G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011
FACTS:

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic laws
and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by
an RTC Judge on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was indicated as
divorced. On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A.Tamano (Zorayda) and her
son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos
Legitimate children with Zorayda,filed a complaint with the RTC for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Estrellita and Sen.Tamano for being bigamous.The complaint alleged,inter alia, that
Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained
subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

Summons were served to Estrellita but she failed to file an Answer. Instead of submitting her answer,
however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss on February 20, 1995, argued that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code
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of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim
marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.The RTC denied, leaving
Estrellita to file a petition for certiorari, referred to the CA. Regarding the nullity case filed by Zorayda in
the RTC, hearings there were repeatedly postponed at the instance of Estrellita. The CA then denied
Zoraydas Motion to Dismiss, prompting her to file a petition of certiorari with the SC, which still upheld
the jurisdiction of the RTC. Meanwhile, the RTC declared the marriage between Estrellita And Sen.
Tamano void. The CA affirmed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Estrellita was denied her right to due process

2. Whether or not the marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano is void
3. Whether or not Zorayda had standing to file the nullity case

HELD:

The petition is denied.

REMEDIAL LAW: Certiorari petition.

First issue: Estrellita argues that the RTC prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first
for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this Court. However,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case
unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding in the case."

CIVIL LAW: Void marriages; standing.

Second issue: The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not
recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its
effectivity.
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For Estrellita, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD
1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws.However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita.As ruled in
Tamano v. Hon. Ortiz, Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites. Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977,
and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the
marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.In view of Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which subsisted at the
time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as voidab initio.

Third issue: Under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, "Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for
annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages." This refers to the
"aggrieved or injured spouse," as in bigamy cases.If Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior
spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action.Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated. Zorayda
and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in November 1994.While the
Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage prior toA.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage
has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.

DENIED.
Performance of Illegal Marriage
10. Romulo vs. People, G.R. No. 182438 Jul 2, 2014
FACTS: Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the
Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the
supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the
couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,
and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the
Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the
petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been
informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He conducted the
ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and
the rest of their invited guests.
Petitioner entered the plea of “not guilty” to the crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony.
Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified
that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss
each other, and sign a document. She heard the petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the
marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the
petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey.
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Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony that
they take each other as husband and wife. Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil
registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate
that no marriage license was issued to the couple.
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple
was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner was guilty of violating Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.

HELD: YES.
RATIO: Petitioner conducted an illegal marriage ceremony. The crime as provided for in Art 352 of the
RPC refers to the performance of marriages under Articles 3 and 6 of the Family Code which reads:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be
necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and
declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband
and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the
contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.

The Supreme Court explained that what made the petitioner’s act a marriage ceremony and not just a
mere blessing was that while there is no prescribed form or religious rite, all that was required was “for
the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.”
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was
testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation,
the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of witnesses, that the contracting parties personally
declared that they take each other as husband and wife. Thus, it is clear that petitioner conducted a
marriage ceremony and not a mere blessing.
The marriage ceremony was also illegal. The Supreme Court stated that:
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a
valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no
marriage license, yet he conducted the “blessing” of their relationship.
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Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and
formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal.
The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal
liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a
marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as
discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the
petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.