PATERNITY AND FILIATION

TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner, vs.PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.

G.R. No. 138493               June 15, 2000
FACTS:
Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of Teofista. She asserted that the birth
certificate is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, the signature of informant forged, and
contained false entries, to wit:
 That Teofista is the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariñosa;
 Signature of the mother, Hermogena, is falsified;
 Teofista's correct family name is GUINTO, not Babiera;
 Her real mother was Flora Guinto, and her status is an illegitimate child;
 It was clinically and medically impossible for Hermogena to bore a child at 54 years of
age; her last child birth was when Presentacion was born.
Presentacion ask the court to declare Teofista's certificate of birth void and ineffective, and to order the
City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it affect the hereditary rights of Presentacion who inherited the
estate.
 
Teofista countered that she and Presentacion are full-blooded sisters, as showed therein her certificate of
birth, Certificate of Baptism, and her School Report Card. She also filed a motion on the grounds that:
the petition states no cause of action, being an attack on her legitimacy as the child of Hermogena and
Eugenio; that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the petition pursuant to Art. 171 of the Family
Code;
and that the petition was barred from prescription in accordance with Art. 170 of the Family Code.
 
The trial court ruled in favor of Presentacion. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUES:
1. WON respondent does not have the legal capacity to file the special proceeding.
2. WON the CA utterly failed to hold that the ancient public record of petitioner’s birth is
superior to the self-serving testimony of respondent. 
RULINGS:
1. No, respondent has the standing to sue. 

Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 171 of the Family Code
8 

states that the child's filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special circumstances, his heirs.
She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section 2,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The interest of
9 

respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action for partition which the latter filed against
the former.  The case concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her parents.
10 

Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of this
provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child.
The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The
present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer
herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the
former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner's filiation to
Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.
 2. The specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality of the evidence presented
during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption.
First, there were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local
civil registrar.  More important, the Court of Appeals observed that the mother's signature therein was
different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena is not the former's
real mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy, such as medical records and
doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to
the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time.1awphil Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth,
Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at such a late
age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age necessitated
proper medical care normally available only in a hospital.
Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth Certificate, petitioner has presented no other
evidence other than the said document to show that she is really Hermogena's child; Neither has she
provided any reason why her supposed mother would make a deposition stating that the former was not
the latter's child at all.

Andal vs Macaraig (1951) L- 244, May 30, 1951, 89 Phil. 65

FACTS:

Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad litem, brought an
action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and
possession of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talacop, Calabanga, Camarines Sur.

Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother,
Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His
sickness became worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak that he
could hardly move and get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife,
eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the middle of 1943.
Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband
and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even
attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy, who was given the
name of Mariano Andal.

It appears undisputed that the land in question was given by Eduvigis Macaraig to her son
Emiliano Andal by virtue of a donation propter nuptias she has executed in his favor on the
occasion of his marriage to Maria Dueñas. If the son born to the couple is deemed legitimate,
then he is entitled to inherit the land in question. If otherwise, then the land should revert back to
Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to succeed him under the law.

ISSUE:

Wthether or not the child be considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano.

HELD:
YES, the child is still the legitimate child of Emiliano.

Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the
former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he was born within 300 days
following the dissolution of the marriage.  The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy.  This presumption can only be rebutted by
proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the
first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child.  Impossibility of access by
husband to wife includes absence during the initial period of conception, impotence which is
patent, and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place
through corrupt violation of prison regulations.   Maria’s illicit intercourse with a man other than
the husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation between husband and wife.

section 68, par. (c) of Rule 123, of the Rules of Court provides:

The issue of a wife cohabiting with the husband who is not impotent, is indisputably presumed
to be legitimate, if not born within one hundred eighty days immediately succeeding the
marriage, or after the expiration of three hundred days following its dissolution.

Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had access one to the other, and Emiliano
was not impotent, and the child was born within three (300

AGUILAR v SIASAT 
G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015
 
To repeat what was stated in  De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an admission
of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further
court action is required.

FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar died intestate without
debts leaving two parcels of land. Petitioner Rodolfo Aguilar filed a case for
mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Siasat alleging that he is
the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses. Thus, he was entitled to
the said parcels of land.
Respondent on the other hand claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole
surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the
Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart. That petitioner is not a
natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses and since Alfredo Aguilar
predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal
share of the former.
RTC ruled that petitioner is not deemed vested with sufficient interest in this
action for failure to support evidentiary evidence to show his filiation to the
spouses. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto with stating that the use of a
family surname certainly does not establish pedigree. Hence, plaintiff-appellant’s
evidence failed to hurdle the “high standard of proof” required for the success of an
action to establish one’s legitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions
regarding open and continuous possession or any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws.
 
ISSUE: WON SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) satisfies the requirement for proof of
filiation and relationship under Article 172 of the Family Code particularly
[paragraph] 3 thereof in conjunction with Section 19 and Section 23, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court. YES
 
RULING:
The Court granted the Petition. In De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon, it was held
that:
 
“The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or
a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation
shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.  The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no
further court action is required.  In fact, any authentic writing
is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in
itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition
is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e.,
outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record
or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of
limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s
acknowledgment.”
 
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be
concluded that petitioner – who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage
of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar and before their respective
deaths – has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar
spouses.  As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit
“G”) satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar
spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes
an “admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.”
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since
all the records covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod
City were destroyed, which necessitated the introduction of other documentary
evidence – particularly Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) – to prove
filiation.  It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first
paragraph thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public instrument.

 ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS vs. ANACLETO ALCORAN and ELENETTE SUNJACO

FACTS:
Raymundo Alcoran (Raymundo) was married to Joaquina Arado (Joaquina), and their marriage
produced a son named Nicolas Alcoran (Nicolas). 
Nicolas married Florencia Limpahan (Florencia), but their union had no offspring. During their marriage,
however, Nicolas had an extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita (Francisca), who gave birth to
respondent Anacleto Alcoran (Anacleto) on July 13, 1951 during the subsistence of Nicolas' marriage
to Florencia. 
In 1972, Anacleto married Elenette Sunjaco.
Raymundo died in 1939, while Nicolas died in 1954. Likewise, Florencia died in 1960, and Joaquina in
1981.
Florencia had three siblings, namely: Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan. 
Joaquina had four siblings, i.e., Alejandra, Nemesio, Celedonia and Melania, all surnamed Arado. 
Nemesio had six children, namely: (1) Jesusa, who was married to Victoriano Alcoriza; (2) Pedro, who
was married to Tomasa Arado; (3) Teodorico; (4) Josefina; (5) Gliceria; and (6) Felicisima. 
During the pendency of the case, Pedro died, and was substituted by his following heirs, to wit: (1)
Juditho and his spouse, Jennifer Ebrole; (2) Bobbie Zito and his spouse, Shirly Abad; (3) Juvenil and his
spouse, Nicetas Ventula; (4) Antonieta and her spouse, Nelson Somoza; and (5) Nila.
COMPLAINT:

On January 14, 1992, Alejandra, Jesusa, Victoriano Alcoriza, Pedro and Tomasa filed in the RTC a
complaint for recovery of property and damages (with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction) against Anacleto and Elenette. Named as unwilling co-plaintiffs were Sulpicio, Braulia and
Veronica Limpahan, along with Teodorico, Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima.
The properties subject of the action were ten (10) properties. The parties later stipulated that the first eight
of the subject properties had previously belonged to Raymundo, while the last two had been the
paraphemal properties of Joaquina.
PETITIONER’s CONTENTION:
When Raymundo died in 1939, his properties were inherited by his son Nicolas alone "as it was during
the period of the old Civil Code, where the spouse could not inherit but only a share of the usufruct, which
was extinguished upon the death of the usufructuary;" that when Nicolas died in 1954 without issue, half
of his properties were inherited by his wife, Florencia, and the other half by his mother, Joaquina; that
Florencia was, in turn, succeeded by her siblings Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica; that during the marriage
of Nicolas and Florencia, the former had an affair with Francisca, from which affair Anacleto was born, but
it was unknown whether he was the spurious son of Nicolas; that Nicolas did not recognize Anacleto as
his spurious child during Nicolas' lifetime; hence, Anacleto was not entitled to inherit from Nicolas; that
nonetheless, Anacleto claimed entitlement to the properties as the heir of Nicolas and by virtue of the will
executed by Joaquina; that the will was void for not having been executed according to the formalities of
the law, and the same did not reflect the true intention of Joaquina; that the supposed testator did not
acknowledge the will, which was not submitted for probate; that they were the rightful heirs to the
properties; that notwithstanding their repeated demands for the return of the properties, the defendants
persistently refused; that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction should issue to prevent the defendants
from further violating their rights in the properties; and that the defendants should be ordered to reconvey
the properties, and to pay ₱20,000.00 as actual damages, ₱20,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages,
and ₱20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Anacleto was expressly recognized by Nicolas as the latter's son, a fact evidenced by the certificate of
birth of Anacleto; that Anacleto thus had the right to inherit the properties from Nicolas; that because
Anacleto was still too young when Nicolas died, the administration of the properties passed to Anacleto's
grandmother, Joaquina; that Joaquina executed a last will and testament in Anacleto's favor; that
Joaquina's possession of the properties was for and in behalf of Anacleto, who had been living with her
since his birth; that such possession began in 1954 when Nicolas died and continued until Joaquina' s
death in 1981; that Anacleto then took over the possession of the properties to the exclusion of all others;
that granting for the sake of argument that the plaintiffs had rights in the properties, the same were
already lost through laches, estoppel and prescription; and that Anacleto was the rightful owner of the
properties, and his ownership and possession should not be disturbed.
As a counterclaim, they also prayed that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, In
,000.00 "as initial expenses as costs of this litigation which will increase as the case progresses" and
Pl0,000.00 as attorney's fees.
RTC:
Dismissed the complaint and the counterclaim for lack of merit. Costs against the plaintiffs. The RTC
opined that Anacleto established that he was really the acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. It further
ruled that because there were no legitimate children of Nicolas who contested Anacleto's right to inherit,
the rule on the separation of the legitimate from the illegitimate family was rendered irrelevant; and that,
accordingly, Anacleto was entitled to possess the subject properties upon having established that he was
the acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. 
CA:
Affirmed the judgment of the RTC. The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC to the effect that Anacleto was
an acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas.
ISSUES:

1. Whether Anacleto Alcoran is the illegitimate son of Nicolas Alcoran.

2. Whether he is entitled to the properties in litigation.

RULING:
The Court affirms the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint by the RTC, albeit for different reasons.
The complaint filed by the petitioners in the RTC to recover the subject properties is properly
characterized as an accion reivindicatoria. Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges
ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. In essence, the petitioners seek
to put an end to Anacleto's possession of the properties on the basis of their being the rightful heirs
considering that Anacleto, being the spurious child of Nicolas, held no successional rights in the estate of
Nicolas. The burden of proof to establish the averments of the complaint by preponderance of evidence
pertained to the petitioners as the plaintiffs. The petitioners did not discharge their burden of proof.
The Court affirms the holding by the RTC and the CA that the provisions of the Family Code should apply
because the petitioners' complaint was filed, litigated and decided by the RTC during the effectivity of the
Family Code. Under the Family Code, the classification of children is limited to either legitimate or
illegitimate. Illegitimate filiation is proved in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. The action
already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
1 Issue: YES.
st

The birth certificate of Anacleto appearing in the Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros
Oriental showed that Nicolas had himself caused the registration of the birth of Anacleto. The showing
was by means of the name of Nicolas appearing in the column "Remarks" in Page 53, Book 4, Register
No. 214 of the Register of Births. Based on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental, the column in the Register of Births entitled "Remarks"
(Observaciones) was the space provided for the name of the informant of the live birth to be registered.
Considering that Nicolas, the putative father, had a direct hand in the preparation of the birth certificate,
reliance on the birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his paternity was fully warranted.
Anacleto's baptismal certificate was of no consequence in determining his filiation. While a baptismal
certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of
the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's paternity;
and that baptismal certificates were "per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation," and thus
"cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove filiation." Hence, we attach no probative
value to the baptismal certificate as proof of the filiation of Anacleto.
The weight accorded by the R TC and the CA to the picture depicting the young Anacleto in the arms
of Joaquina as she stood beside the coffin of the departed Nicolas was also undeserved. At best,
the picture merely manifested that it was Joaquina who had acknowledged her filiation with Anacleto. 
The school records of Anacleto, which evinced that Joaquina was the guardian of Anacleto in his
grade school years, and the marriage contract between Anacleto and Elenette, which indicated
that Joaquina had given consent to Anacleto's marriage, did not have the evidentiary value accorded
by the RTC and the CA. The recognition "must be made personally by the parent himself or herself, not
by any brother, sister or relative; after all, the concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary declaration by
the parent, of if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to establish the paternity or maternity of children
born outside wedlock."
The lack of probative value of the respondents' aforecited corroborative evidence notwithstanding,
Anacleto 's recognition as Nicolas' illegitimate child remained beyond question in view of the showing that
Nicolas had personally and directly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son.
2 Issue: Anacleto had an established right to inherit from Nicolas. However, Anacleto was barred
nd

by law from inheriting from the estate of Joaquina.

To recall, the parties stipulated that the first eight of the subject properties had previously belonged to
Raymundo, while the remaining two had been the paraphernal properties of Joaquina.
With Raymundo having died in 1939, the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 was the governing law on
succession. Under Article 807 thereof, Joaquina and Nicolas, i.e., the surviving spouse and the legitimate
son of Raymundo, were the forced heirs who acquired legal title to Raymundo's estate upon his death. In
accordance with Article 834 thereof, Nicolas was entitled to inherit the entire estate of Raymundo, while
Joaquina was entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to the one third portion available for betterment.
When Nicolas died in 1954, the Civil Code of the Philippines was already in effect. Under Article 1000, the
heirs entitled to inherit from Nicolas's estate were Joaquina (his mother), Florencia (his surviving spouse),
and Anacleto (his acknowledged illegitimate son). Said heirs became co-owners of the properties
comprising the entire estate of Nicolas prior to the estate's partition in accordance with Article 1078 of the
Civil Code.
Anacleto had an established right to inherit from Nicolas, whose estate included the first eight of the
subject properties that had previously belonged to Raymundo Anacleto became a co-owner of said
properties, pro indiviso, when Nicolas died in 1954. Likewise, Joaquina succeeded to, and became a pro
indiviso co-owner of, the properties that formed part of the estate of Nicolas. When Joaquina died in 1981,
her hereditary estate included the two remaining properties, as well as her share in the estate of Nicolas.
Inasmuch as Joaquina died without any surviving legitimate descendant, ascendant, illegitimate child or
spouse, Article 1003 of the Civil Code mandated that her collateral relatives should inherit her entire
estate.
Anacleto was barred by law from inheriting from the estate of Joaquina. To start with, Anacleto
could not inherit from Joaquina by right of representation of Nicolas, the legitimate son of Joaquina. Under
Article 992 of the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; in the same manner, such children or relatives shall not
inherit from the illegitimate child. Secondly, Anacleto could not inherit from the estate of Joaquina by
virtue of the latter's last will and testament. Article 838 of the Civil Code dictates that no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless the same is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court. The probate of the will is mandatory. It appears that such will remained ineffective considering that
the records are silent as to whether it had ever been presented for probate, and had been allowed by a
court of competent jurisdiction.
As the petitioners were among the collateral relatives of Joaquina, they are the ones entitled to inherit
from her estate. Nonetheless, the petitioners' appeal still fails because the parties did not establish that
the estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina had been respectively settled with finality through the
appropriate testate or intestate proceedings, and partitioned in due course. 
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 28, 2003 by the Court of
Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
151. ARA v PIZARRO

FACTS
Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia (petitioners), and Dra. Fely S. Pizarro and
Henry A. Rossi (respondents) all claimed to be children of the late Josefa A. Ara (Josefa),
who died on November 18, 2002.
Petitioners assert that Fely S. Pizarro (Pizarro) was born to Josefa and her then
husband, Vicente Salgado (Salgado), who died during World War II.  At some point
toward the end of the war, Josefa met and lived with an American soldier by the name
of Darwin Gray (Gray). Romeo F. Ara (Ara) was born from this relationship. Josefa later
met a certain Alfredo Garcia (Alfredo), and from this relationship, gave birth to sons
Ramon Garcia (Ramon) and William A. Garcia (Garcia). Pizzaro claims that, to her
knowledge, she is the only child of Josefa.
Petitioners, together with Ramon and herein respondent Rossi (collectively,
plaintiffs a quo), verbally sought partition of the properties left by the deceased Josefa,
which were in the possession of respondent Pizarro.
Plaintiffs a quo filed a Complaint dated April 9, 2003 for judicial partition of
properties left by the deceased Josefa, before the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay
City. 
In her Answer, respondent Pizarro averred that, to her knowledge, she was the
only legitimate and only child of Josefa. She denied that any of the plaintiffs a quo were
her siblings, for lack of knowledge or information to form a belief on that matter.
Further, the late Josefa left other properties mostly in the possession of plaintiffs a quo,
which were omitted in the properties to be partitioned by the trial court in Special Civil
Action No. 337-03, enumerated in her counterclaim (Additional Properties).

RTC RULING
1. Awarded the Baguio property to Henry Rossi, to be deducted from his share;
2. Awarded the Valencia property covered by OCT No. T-30333; Tamaraw FX and the
RCBC Bank Deposit Passbook to defendant Fely S. Pizarro, to be deducted from her
share; and
3. With respect to the other properties that may not be covered by the foregoing, the
same are declared under the co-ownership of all the plaintiffs and defendant and in
equal shares.

CA RULING
 Only Pizzaro and Rossi as well as Ramon were the children of Josefa and are
entitled to shares in Josefa’s estate. 
 Ruled that RTC erred in allowing petitioners to prove their status as illegitimate
sons of Josefa after her death, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.

ISSUES
Whether petitioners may prove their filiation to Josefa through their open and
continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children, found in the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
 Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erroneously applied Article 285 of the
Civil Code, which requires that an action for the recognition of natural children
be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parents, subject to exceptions.
 That Josefa acknowledged them as her children directly and without
concealment during her lifetime. 
 Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not apply the second paragraph
of Article 172 of the Family Code, which states that filiation may be established
even without the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or an admission
of filiation in a public or handwritten document.
 Petitioners claim that there is no direct evidence to prove the filiation of Rossi to
Josefa, except his baptismal certificate which was testified only by Rossi. 

RULING
Petitioners did not present evidence that would prove their illegitimate filiation
to their putative parent, Josefa, after her death as provided under Articles 172 and 175
of the Family Code.
A  person who seeks to establish illegitimate filiation after the death of a putative
parent must do so via a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, or an admission of legitimate filiation.
The law provides in the case of illegitimate children that the birth certificate shall
be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the
father refuses. This ensures that individuals are not falsely named as parents.
To overthrow the presumption of truth contained in a birth certificate, a high
degree of proof is needed. However, the circumstances surrounding the delayed
registration prevent us from according it the same weight as any.
A delayed registration of birth, made after the death of the putative parent, is
tenuous proof of filiation. Thus, we are unable to accord petitioner Garcia’s delayed
registration of birth the same evidentiary weight as regular birth certificates.
Even without a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment,
filiation may still be established after the death of a putative parent through an
admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument, signed
by the parent concerned. However, petitioners did not present in evidence any
admissions of filiation. An admission is an act, declaration, or omission of a party on a
relevant fact, which may be used in evidence against him. 
The evidence presented by petitioners such as group pictures with Josefa and
petitioners’ relatives, and testimonies do not show that Josefa is their mother. They do
not contain any acts, declarations, or omissions attributable directly to Josefa, much less
ones pertaining to her filiation with petitioners. Although petitioner Garcia’s Baptismal
Certificate, Certificate of Marriage, and Certificate of Live Birth obtained via late
registration all state that Josefa is his mother, they do not show any act, declaration, or
omission on the part of Josefa. Josefa did not participate in making any of them. The
same may be said of the testimonies presented. Although Josefa may have been in the
photographs, the photographs do not show any filiation. By definition, none of the
evidence presented constitutes an admission of filiation under Article 172 of the
Family Code.
The limitation that an action to prove filiation as an illegitimate child be brought
within the lifetime of an alleged parent acknowledges that there may be other persons
whose rights should be protected from spurious claims. This includes other children,
legitimate and illegitimate, whose statuses are supported by strong evidence of a
categorical nature.
Pizarro has submitted petitioners’ certificates of live birth to further disprove
petitioners’ filiation with Josefa. A Certificate of Live Birth issued in Paniqui, Tarlac on
July 19, 1950 shows that Garcia’s parents are Pedro Garcia and Carmen Bugarin while
another Certificate of Live Birth issued in petitioner Ara’s birthplace, Bauang, La Union,
shows that he is the son of spouses Jose Ara and Maria Flores.7

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The August 1, 2008
Decision and the March 16, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 00729 are AFFIRMED.

SALAS vs. MATUSALEM

Doctrine: A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation
of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the
mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity.
FACTS
Respondent Annabelle Matusalem filed a complaint for Support/Damages against petitioner
Narciso Salas in the RTC of Cabanatuan City. Respondent testified that petitioner told her he is
already a widower and he has no more companion in life because his children are all grown-up.
Petitioner at the time already knows that she is a single mother as she had a child by her former
boyfriend in Italy. Thereafter, they saw each other weekly and petitioner gave her money for her
child. When she became pregnant with petitioner’s child, she discovered that he is in fact not a
widower. She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner opposed it because he wanted to have
another child. Petitioner rented an apartment where the respondent stayed and shouldered all the
expenses including the expenses in the delivery of the child; She gave birth to their child, Christian
Paulo, on December 28, 1994. Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at the hospital room and
massaged her stomach, saying he had not done this to his wife. She filled out the form for the
child’s birth certificate and wrote all the information supplied by petitioner himself. 
Petitioner, for his part, denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo. He claimed that he was
motivated by no other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the
expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware of respondent’s chicanery and deceit designed to
“scandalize” him in exchange for financial favor.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent’s evidence sufficiently proved that her son is the illegitimate father of
the petitioner
HELD
No. Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name
of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only
respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said document though she claims it was
petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein. 
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing
of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of
paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument
and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.

JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad litem, ARLENE S.
SALGADO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V.
JAO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-49162               July 28, 1987
FACTS:
On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother
and guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and support with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court against private respondent Perico V. Jao. The latter
denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course
conducted by the NBI upon order of the trial court. The result of the blood grouping test
indicated that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Perico V. Jao and Arlene
S. Salgado. 
RTC: Initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but upon Janice’s second
motion for reconsideration, it ordered a trial on the merits, after which, Janice was declared
the child of Jao, thus entitling her to his monthly support.
Jao appealed to the CA, questioning the trial court’s failure to appreciate the result of the
blood grouping tests. As there was no showing whatsoever that there was any irregularity
or mistake in the conduct of the tests, Jao argued that the result of the tests should have
been conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-paternity.
Court of Appeals: Upheld Jao’s contentions and reversed the trial court’s decision. In its
decision, the Court of Appeals held that the conflicting claims of Arlene and Jao regarding
the date of their first intercourse, considering that the record discloses that Janice was born
on August 16, 1968 upon complete 36 weeks which indicate that Arlene must have
conceived on or about the first week of December 1967, emphasize the role of the blood
grouping tests conducted by the NBI which yielded a negative finding in the paternity of
Jao.
ISSUE: Whether or not the blood grouping test may be admissible and conclusive to prove
non-paternity (YES)
HELD:
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm paternity was
dealt with in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals, an action for declaration of filiation, support and
damages. In said case, the NBI expert’s report of the blood tests stated that "from their
blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the child." From this
statement the defendant contended that the child must have been the child of another man.
The Court noted: "For obvious reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the
appellant was the father of the child; he can only give his opinion that he is a "possible
father." This possibility, coupled with the other facts and circumstances brought out during
the trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant Co Tao is the father of the child
Manuel." 
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove
paternity, rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For the past three
decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an
important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that
blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to
paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the
mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such
parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of
the mother and that of the alleged father are cross-matched, then the child cannot possibly
be that of the alleged father. 
In jurisdictions like the United States, the admissibility of blood tests results to prove non-
paternity has already been passed upon in several cases, where the US Courts held that the
positive results of blood tests excluding paternity. In Gilpin v. Gilpin, in a case in which it
was shown that proper safeguards were drawn around the testing procedures, were
recognized as final on the question of paternity. In Cuneo v. Cuneo, evidence of non-
paternity consisting of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a finding
that the alleged father had cohabited with the mother within the period of gestation.
Legislation expressly recognizing the use of blood tests is also in force in several states. 
Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests in the instant
case by impugning the qualifications of the NBI personnel who performed the tests and the
conduct of the tests themselves. Her allegations, in this regard, appear to be without merit.
The NBI"s forensic chemist who conducted the tests is also a serologist, and has had
extensive practice in this area for several years. The blood tests were conducted six (6)
times using two (2) scientifically recognized blood grouping systems, the MN Test and the
ABO System, under witness and supervision. 
Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have been a proper subject
for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years after the first blood test, she,
represented by her mother, declined to undergo the same blood test to prove or disprove
their allegations, even as Jao was willing to undergo such a test again.
Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the CA and holds that the result of the blood
grouping tests involved in the case at bar, are admissible and conclusive on the non-
paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No evidence has been presented
showing any defect in the testing methods employed or failure to provide adequate
safeguards for the proper conduct of the tests. The result of such tests is to be accepted
therefore as accurately reflecting a scientific fact.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby denied. Without pronouncement as
to costs.

154. ILANO vs CA

ARTEMIO G. ILANO, Petitioner, -versus- THE COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDITAS

(sic) S. ILANO, represented by her mother, LEONCIA DE LOS SANTOS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 104376, SECOND DIVISION, February 23, 1994, Nocon, J.

FACTS:

Leonicia first met petitioner Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C. Virata.
Petitioner was one of the clients of Atty. Virata. On several occasions, she and petitioner took
lunch together. In less than a year’s time, she resigned from her work.

Leonicia then managed her own business where she met petitioner again who was engaged in
the same business and they renewed acquaintances. He courted her for more than four years.
Their relationship became intimate and they eventually eloped in Guagua, Pampanga in April
1962. They stayed at La Mesa Apartment, located behind Filipinas Telephone Company branch
office, of which he is the president and general manager. He came home to her 3-4 times a
week.

The apartment was procured by Melencio Reyes, Officer- in-Charge of the Filipinas Telephone
Company branch office. He also took care of the marketing and paid rentals, lights and water
bills. Unable to speak the local dialect, Leoncia was provided also by Melencio with a maid by
the name of Nena. Petitioner used to give her P700.00 a month for their expenses at home. In
June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time, was fetched by petitioner and they
transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City. In October, 1962, she delivered a still-born female child
at the Manila Sanitarium. The death certificate was signed by petitioner. Thereafter, while they
were living at Highway 54, Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born on
December 30, 1963 also at the Manila Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los
Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. Leoncia
submitted receipts issued by the Manila Sanitarium to show that she was confined there from
December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1964 under the name of Mrs. Leoncia Ilano. The support by
petitioner for Leoncia and Merceditas was sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered
by him, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of Leoncia) or thru Merceditas herself. Sometimes in
the form of a check like Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532, the signature appearing
thereon having been identified by Leoncia as that of petitioner because he often gives her
checks which he issues at home and saw him sign the checks.
During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed concern
as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial
School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods as her parent. Those
signatures were both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas because he signed them in their
residence in their presence and of Elynia. Since Merceditas started to have discernment, he
was already the one whom she recognized as her Daddy. He treated her as a father would to
his child. He would bring home candies, toys, and anything a child enjoys. He would take her for
a drive, eat at restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep.

In May, 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived with Leoncia and petitioner. She
accompanied her aunt when she started having labor pains in the morning of December 30,
1963. Petitioner arrived after five o'clock in the afternoon. When the nurse came to inquire about
the child, Leoncia was still unconscious so it was from petitioner that the nurse sought the
information. Inasmuch as it was already past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised
to return the following morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth
certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following morning. 

Prior to the birth of Merceditas, Elynia used to accompany her aunt and sometimes with
petitioner in his car to the Manila Sanitarium for prenatal check-up. At times, she used to go to
his office at 615 Sales St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, upon his instructions to get money as support and
sometimes he would send notes of explanation if he cannot come which she in turn gave to her
aunt. They stayed at 112 Arellano St., then Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966 before they finally
transferred to Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner lived with them up to June, 1971 when he stopped
coming home. 

Petitioner’s defense was a total and complete denial of any relationship with Leonicia and
Merceditas. He disowned the handwritten answers and signatures of the death certificates.

After weighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the parties, the trial court was not
fully satisfied that petitioner is the father of Merceditas. On the other hand, the CA held that
petitioner is the father of private respondent entitling her to support. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not Merceditas is the child of Artemio and is entitled to support (YES)

HELD: 
Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are
conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural,
whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the
time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other and
(2) Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain
legal impediments. Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas
was conceived, she is a spurious child. In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that
illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural
children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in
the Civil Code. The Civil Code has given these rights to them because the transgressions of
social conventions committed by the parents should not be visited upon them. They were born
with a social handicap and the law should help them to surmount the disadvantages facing them
through the misdeeds of their parents. However, before Article 287 can be availed of, there
must first be a recognition of paternity either voluntarily or by court action. 
The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence of recognition on the part of petitioner. The
evidences submitted like the signature in the report cards, testimonies, and other pieces of
evidence shows that petitioner indeed recognized Merceditas as his child and thus entitles her
to support.

The relevant law on the matter is Article 283: 

Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his
natural child:
1. In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more
or less with that of the conception;
2. When the child is in continuos possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the
direct acts of the latter or of his family;
3. When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
4. When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

While the aforementioned provision speaks of the obligation of the father to recognize the child
as his natural child, for the purpose of the present case, petitioner is obliged to recognize
Merceditas as his spurious child. This provision should be read in conjunction with Art. 289 of
the CC:

Art. 289. Investigation of the paternity or maternity of (or other illegitimate) children. . .
under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284.

To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is
necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not, however,
mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an
intermittent character while it continues. The possession of such status means that the father
has treated the child as his own, directly and not through other, spontaneously and without
concealment though without publicity. 

Merceditas bore the surname of "Ilano" since birth without any objection on the part of Artemio,
the fact that since Merceditas had her discernment she had always known and called Artemio
as her "Daddy"; the fact that each time Artemio was at home, he would play with Merceditas,
take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and sometimes sleeping with Merceditas and does all
what a father should do for his child — bringing home goodies, candies, toys and whatever he
can bring her which a child enjoys which Artemio gives Merceditas are positive evidence that
Merceditas is the child of Artemio and recognized by Artemio as such.

Granting ex gratia argument that private respondent's evidence is not sufficient proof of
continuos possession of status of a spurious child, respondent court applied next paragraph (4)
of Article 283. 

The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers all the other
cases in the preceding paragraphs. "Any other evidence or proof" that the defendant is the
father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the
evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet
requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph. This
paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with
respect to illegitimate filiation.

Tayag v Court of Appeals

209 SCRA 665

Facts:
In April 9, 1987, private respondent (Emelie Dayrit Cuyugan) in her capacity as mother
and legal guardian of Chad Cuyugan, filed a claim for inheritance against the petitioner
(Corito Ocampo Tayag) as “administratrix” of the estate of the late Ricardo Ocampo.
The private respondent alleged the following that she is the mother and legal guardian
of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan. She has been estranged from her husband for several
years, and that she and Atty. Ocampo had an illicit amorous relationship with each
other, and as consequence, they begot a child named Chad Cuyugan. Chad was born
in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 who had been sired, showed with exceptional
affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for being his only son, as can be
gleaned from letters and documents produced by Atty. Ocampo. 
“…Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me alone and for me all the time.
As I have now I shall save my heart to you and to Chad…
…I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir…
Why should we not start now to own him, jointly against the whole world. After all we
love each other and CHAD is the product of our love…”
Private respondent alleged that Chad, although illegitimate, is entitled to a share in the
intestate estate of his father. The estate of Atty. Ocampo has not yet been inventoried
and the only surviving heirs of the deceased are his children Corito, Rivina, Evita, Felina
and the said minor, Chad. 
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, then a motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the trial court. So she filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, which denied the same. 

Issue:
1. WON the complaint is premature and that it states a cause of action?
2. WON an action to compel recognition has prescribed? 

Ruling:

1.
Petitioner’s contention: Petitioner contends that the claim for inheritance is premature
and that the complaint states no cause of action. She submits that the recognition of the
minor child, either voluntary or by judicial action, must first be established before the
child can invoke his right to succeed and participate in the estate. And that since there
is no allegation of such recognition in the complaint denominated as “Claim for
inheritance” then there is no basis for private respondent’s claim. 
Ruling:
The Supreme Court said that the case is similar to Paulino v. Paulino, however the
difference is that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the claimant had reached the
age of majority, whereas the claimant in the present case is merely a minor. That the
ratio decidendi in Paulino is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the
petitioner to allege the fact in the acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription
of action. 
In the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the private respondent’s complaint
merely alleges that Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is
actually a claim for inheritance. From the allegations therein, the same may be
considered as one to compel recognition. Further, the two causes of action, one to
compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint,
and is not new in our jurisprudence. 

2.

Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during
the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter
may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when
the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action
may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record of
birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in
a public document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based on the open and
continuous possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other
evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed
that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. 

Petitioner’s contention: Petitioner contends that the action is one to compel

recognition and that private respondent’s cause of action has prescribed for the reason
that, since filiation is sought to be proved by means of a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent and under Art. 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish
filiation must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged putative father. That Art 285 of
the Civil Code is not applicable, but Art. 175 since the provision of law is procedural in
nature, and no vested rights are created, hence Art. 175 should be applied
retroactively. 
Ruling:
Art. 256 of the Family Code (FC) states that, “This code shall have retroactive effect,
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested rights acquired in accordance with the
Civil Code.” 
The right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in
court under the Regime of the Civil Code prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We
herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the
petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in
accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced
or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Even assuming that the provision in the Family Code is procedural in nature, the rule
that, “statutory change in matters of procedure may affect pending actions and
proceedings unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation”, is not so
persuasive, that it may be used to invalidate proceedings before it goes effective, since
procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of
procedure arises, especially where vested rights are prejudiced. 
Art. 175 of the FC finds no application to the instant case since it will affect the right of
the private respondent and the minor she represents, both of which have been vested
by the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore correct in applying Art.
285 of the Civil Code. The private respondent’s cause of action has not yet prescribed. 

G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994

JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO S. FERNANDEZ, respondents.

FACTS
Violeta P. Esguerra, as mother and guardian ad litem of petitioners Claro and John Paul, filed an action
for recognition and support against the private respondent. Petitioners presented the following
documentary evidence: their certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the
baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his father is respondent Carlito;
photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito
and Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra. Petitioners likewise presented witnesses who told the
trial court that Violeta Esguerra had, at different times, introduced the private respondent to them as her
"husband". Fr. Fernandez, on the other hand, testified that Carlito was the one who presented himself as
the father of petitioner Claro during the latter's baptism.

Respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two petitioners. He averred he only
served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was corroborated by the
testimony of an officemate of respondent Carlito who also stood as a sponsor of petitioner Claro during
his baptism.  Private respondent also declared he only learned he was named in the birth certificates of
both petitioners as their father after he was sued for support.

The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners, but the Court of Appeals reversed the same ruling that the
proof relied upon by the trial court is inadequate to prove the private respondent’s paternity and filiation
of petitioners.

ISSUE
Whether or not the evidence presented by petitioners prove the paternity and filiation of private
respondent (NO)

RULING
First, petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of the private respondent in the
baptism of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the
sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated by one of the sponsors. 

Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity. 

Thirdly, the baptismal certificates of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his father has scant
evidentiary value. While baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve
as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily
competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity. 

Fourth, the certificates of live birth of the petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are not
also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. A birth certificate not signed by the alleged father
therein indicated is not competent evidence of paternity.

Lastly, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta Esguerra and the private
respondent which should render unquestionable his identification of the private respondent during
petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence of this proof, the Court is not prepared to concede that Father
Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember the parents of
the children he has baptized.

Petition is DISMISSED.

CAMELO CABATANIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS

G.R. No. 124814             October 21, 2004
Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos, filed a
petition for recognition and support. 

During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born
on September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after
her husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look
for work and was eventually hired as petitioner’s household help. It was while working there as a
maid that petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and
had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant. 

Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner’s child 27 days after their sexual
encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in San Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that
Florencia was pregnant, petitioner’s wife sent her home. But petitioner instead brought her to
Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by
a hilot in her aunt’s house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private
respondent Camelo Regodos.

 Petitioner’s Version 

He testified that he was a sugar planter and a businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he
hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the course of her employment, she would often go
home to her husband in the afternoon and return to work the following morning. This displeased
petitioner’s wife, hence she was told to look for another job. 

In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New Year’s
Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and
invited her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner
offered to lend her save money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual
intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told
him she was pregnant with the child of her husband. They went home the following day. 

In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to petitioner’s house
hoping to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioner’s wife was in need of one, she
was re-hired. However petitioner’s wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired about
the father of the unborn child. She told petitioner’s wife that the baby was by her husband.
Because of her condition, she was again told to go home and they did not see each other
anymore. 

Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencia’s counsel.
She was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused,
denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex. He
denied going to Bacolod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently
denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in Singcang,
Bacolod City.

 RTC Ruling: Declared Petitioner the father of Camelo Regodos. 

o based on the testimony of the child’s mother and "the personal appearance of the
child”
  CA Ruling: AFFIRMED  the RTC. 

ISSUE: WON Petitioner is the father of Camelo Regodos and thus liable to give support—NO 

HELD: 

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome
situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued
only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.

The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code. 

Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the
preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of
live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person. 

In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public
document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date
specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity. Thus, certificates
issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence
as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove
the same.

Aside from Florencia’s self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in Singcang,
Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition.

We now proceed to the credibility of Florencia’s testimony. Both the trial court and the appellate
court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition that she
was a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her
testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid
subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that
marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of
a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. 

In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely
subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to
prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
 MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO,
REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband,
CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.

GR No. 89224-25, January 23, 1992

Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of
recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as
the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation
and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such contrary evidence is lacking in the
case at bar.

Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present
proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for
partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.

FACTS:

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios
and Teodoro. Eleno and Rafaela died. Thereafter, Teodoro married Isabel Bautista, both of
which also died. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and
Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.

Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother,
filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in the RTC of Albay. The action was
resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the
disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.

Thereafter, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the
couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the RTC of
Albay.  The complainants asserted the same defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, that
Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents'
estate by right of representation.

RTC, in both cases, decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of
practically the same evidence. The RTC ruled that Delia and Edmundo were the legally
adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, while Doribel was their legitimate
daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate. Consequently, the three children were
entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. They are also the
legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence.
CA modified the decision of the RTC. The CA affirmed the RTC decision that Delia, Edmundo
and Doribel were entitled to inherit from Teodoro and Isabel Sayson as legitimate heirs.
However, Delia and Edmundo were disqualified from inheriting from the estate of Eleno
and Rafaela Sayson.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS:

Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel had already been born on
February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of
Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of
the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."

That Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact
born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she
was her natural mother.

ISSUE: Whether or not Doribel is the legitimate child of Teodoro and Isabel. (YES)

RULING:

Doribel is the legitimate child of Teodoro and Isabel.

Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed

means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code.
It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence
of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in
the case at bar.

Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was
understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of
Abila denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of
course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts.
Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court
of Appeals, where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be
sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."

Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present
proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for
partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.

OTHER RULINGS:

The adoption decree is valid.

It is too late to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory.
The adoption decree was made back in 1967. Assuming the petitioners were proper
parties, they should have seasonably appealed the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth
of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did
not. Hence, the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the
finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified absent any information of
Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. 

Furthermore, their challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as
in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.

Right of Representation of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel

In accordance with the findings above, Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to
the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the
Civil Code.

As the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela,
Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate
estate of her grandparents. However, a different conclusion must be reached in the case of
Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that
the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the
latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by
the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not
extend to the blood relatives of either party.

CIVIL LAW LAW REVIEW

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, vs. JUANITA
TANHOTI-LIYAO, et al. 
G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002, SECOND DIVISION, DE LEON, JR., J.

Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly confronted with the
scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one to decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest
involved.  Hence, it was then settled that the legitimacy of the child can only be impugned in a
direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by
law.

FACTS:
 On 29 November 1976, William Liyao, Jr. (Billy), represented by his mother Corazon,
filed a Civil Case before the RTC of Pasig for an action for compulsory recognition as the
illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao (William) against herein respondents,
Juanita, et al. The complaint was later amended to include the allegation that petition was in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William, petitioner having
been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime.  

Petitioner’s Contention:

Corazon is legally married to but living separately from Ramon for more than 10 years
at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William from
1965 up to the time of Williams untimely demise sometime in December 1975. They lived
together in the company of Corazons 2 children from her subsisting marriage. They lived with
William’s legitimate children and were both employed at the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of
which Corazon and William were then vice president and president, respectively.

Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the
signature of her husband, Ramon, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale. She failed to secure
his signature and, had never been in touch with him despite the necessity to meet him. Upon the
advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land located at the Valle Verde Subdivision
was registered under the name of Far East Realty Investment, Inc.

On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to Billy at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital.
During her 3-day stay at the hospital, William visited and stayed with her and the new born baby,
Billy. All medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of
William. William even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia, to secure a copy of Billy’s
birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein.
William would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their
pictures taken together. 

During the lifetime of William several pictures were taken showing him with Billy and
Corazon in various events and social gatherings. Since birth, Billy had been in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William by
the latter’s direct and overt acts. William supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and
other material needs. However, after William’s death, it was Corazon who provided sole support
to Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills. William left his personal
belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White
Plains where he shared his last moments with Corazon.

Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita declared that she knew both Corazon and William
Liyao who were godparents to her children. Gloria testified that she is the owner of a beauty
parlor and that she knew that Billy is the son of her neighbors, William and Corazon, the latter
being one of her customers. Enrique testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon, from
the time that the latter abandoned and separated from his family. Enrique was about 6 years old
when William started to live with them up to the time of the latter’s death on December 2, 1975.
William was very supportive and fond of Enriques half brother, Billy.

Respondents’ Contention
Respondent Linda stated her parents were legally married and that her parents were not
legally separated or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her parents would institute
legal separation proceedings in court. Even during out of town business trips or for conferences
with the lawyers at the office, her father would change his clothes at home because of his
personal hygiene and habits. Her father reportedly had trouble sleeping in other people’s homes.

Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon
was not legally separated from her husband and the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not
indicate that the couple obtained any annulment of their marriage. Once in 1973, Linda chanced
upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the company garage. Immediately after the
death of Lindas father, Corazon went to Lindas office for the return of the formers alleged
investments with the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas
and Company. Linda added that Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the company, was able
to take out documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office.
There was one instance when she was told by the guards, Mrs. Yulo is leaving and taking out
things again. Linda did not recognize any article of clothing which belonged to her father after
having been shown three (3) large suit cases full of men’s clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts
and pajamas.

Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never been
separated. Tita Rose testified that after the death of William, Corazon was paid the amount of
P100,000.00 representing her investment in the Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita Rose also
stated that her family never received any formal demand that they recognize a certain William
Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her father, William. After assuming the position of President
of the company, Tita Rose did not come across any check signed by her late father representing
payment to lessors as rentals for the house occupied by Corazon. Tita Rose added that the
laminated photographs presented by Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased
which were displayed at the latter’s office.

Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of Corazon and
that he knew the latter as one of the employees of the Republic Marker. He further averred that
people knew that she was married to Ramon Yulo and that her husband would sometimes go to
the office.

RTC’s RULING:

The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court
said it was convinced by preponderance of evidence that the deceased William Liyao sired
William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited
with the deceased. The trial court observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased by direct and overt acts of the
latter such as securing the birth certificate of petitioner through his confidential secretary, Mrs.
Virginia Rodriguez; openly and publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing
sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children.

CA’s RULING:

The CA reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the law favors the legitimacy
rather than the illegitimacy of the child and the presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on
ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy between husband and wife was physically
impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code. The
appellate court gave weight to the testimonies of some witnesses for the respondents that
Corazon and Ramon who were still legally married and have not secured legal separation, were
seen in each others company during the supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the deceased
William Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the birth certificate and the baptismal
certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which were presented by petitioner are not sufficient to establish
proof of paternity in the absence of any evidence that the deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in
the preparation of said certificates and considering that his signature does not appear thereon.
The CA stated that neither do family pictures constitute competent proof of filiation. With regard
to the passbook which was presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate court observed that
there was nothing in it to prove that the same was opened by William Liyao for either petitioner
or Corazon since William Liyao’s signature and name do not appear thereon.

MR denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from
the estate of the deceased. 

RULING:

Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is
presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out
from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice
and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and

consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New
Civil Code provides:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one
 hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the
child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.

The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon
Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical
impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for
impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the
husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil
Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the
scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest
involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an
insult to his memory.

It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as

guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of
petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is
settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.  We 30

cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law
that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of
a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own
filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child,
then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers
alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child
cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFRIMED. 

DE JESUS VS ESTATE OF DIZON  

G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001
FACTS: 
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was
during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein
petitioners, were born. 

In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged

Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves
de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992. 

Jacqueline and Jinkie filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and
Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court.  

Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G.
Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the
dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one
for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the
legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be
the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. 

Trial Court: dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for
being improper. It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a
special proceeding in as much as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status
or right. 

CA: upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered the case to be remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the conflicting assertions
should be threshed out at the trial considering that the birth certificates presented by
respondents appeared to have effectively contradicted petitioners allegation of
illegitimacy.

ISSUE: WON Jacqueline and Jinkie are illegitimate children of the late Juan Dizon 

HELD: 

No. 

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by 

(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or 

(2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned. 

In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by 

(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or 
 (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement

before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated
act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact,
any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself
a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely
tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s
acknowledgment.

A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of
their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being
their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. 

Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon,
petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de
Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law
itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can
contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it
is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected. 

The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly
invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are
indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as
being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful
wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy
by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a
direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock
shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress. 

WHEREFORE , the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED.

No costs.
G. R. No. 146737 - December 10, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN "JHONNY"
LOCSIN, SR., LUCY A. SOLINAP (Daughter of the late Maria Locsin Araneta),
the successors of the late LOURDES C. LOCSIN, MANUEL C. LOCSIN, ESTER
LOCSIN JARANTILLA and the intestate estate of the late JOSE C. LOCSIN,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
JUAN C. LOCSIN, JR., Respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
November 11, 1991, or eleven (11) months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.  died 1

intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 30, a "Petition for Letters of Administration" praying
that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged,
among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin;
(b) that during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal properties which include
undetermined savings, current and time deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of
the undivided mass of real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose
Locsin, Jr., Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin; and (c)
that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
The heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester
Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to
respondent's petition for letters of administration. They averred that respondent is not
a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his
lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.
Another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria
Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of
the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as a natural child is barred
by prescription or the statute of limitations.
Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also entered its
appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors.
To support respondent’s claim, that he is an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased and, therefore, entitled to be appointed administrator of the intestate estate,
respondent submitted a machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D")  of his Certificate of Live
3

Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Clerk
Registrar of Iloilo City. To prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied, respondent presented Rosita
J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She produced and identified in court
the bound volume of 1957 records of birth where the alleged original of Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 is included.
Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph (Exhibit "C")  showing him and his
4

mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body.
In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit
"D") is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit "8",  indicating
5
that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that
the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin. They observed as
anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth
was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live Birth No. 447
(Exhibit "D") was recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form.
The trial court, finding that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and the
photograph (Exhibit "C") are sufficient proofs of respondent's illegitimate filiation with
the deceased, granted the Petition.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged Decision affirming in toto the
order of the trial court.
ISSUE:
1. which of the two documents Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is genuine? 
HELD:
Here, undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not survived by a
spouse. In his petition for issuance of letters of administration, respondent alleged that
he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased, implying that he is an interested
person in the estate and is considered as next of kin.
The Supreme Court, through Justice Vitug held:
"The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in
any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child,
and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just
a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not
require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is
predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record
of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial
action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the
child's acknowledgment."  (Emphasis ours)
12

Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with the deceased, presented to the
trial court his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and a photograph (Exhibit
"C") taken during the burial of the deceased.
A copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar General
should be identical in form and in substance with the copy being kept by the latter. In
the instant case, Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not
identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City. Such circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals and should have impelled them to declare Exhibit "D" a spurious
document.
Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his mother. In the
same Exhibit "8", the signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as respondent's
father and the entry that he and Amparo Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on
November 28, 1954 do not appear.
It Was in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals  where this Court said that "a birth certificate
17

not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not competent
evidence of paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil
Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation.
However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be
refuted by contrary evidence.  Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where
18

there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this
case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the
Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the
badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was
removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.
In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth
(Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the
Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry
General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan
C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation,  lest we recklessly set a very
19

dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody
can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize
it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
AS TO VENCER’S TESTIMONY
Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly made and entered in the
Local Civil Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on her general impressions of
the existing records in that Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary
from those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to
the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and rational
manner. In this regard, we find Vencer's explanation not convincing.
Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a December
1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when respondent's
birth was recorded, Vencer answered that "x x x during that time, maybe the forms in
1956 were already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested for a new
form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form." 13

The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an event.

When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume, Vencer had no answer
except to state, "I am not aware of this because I am not a bookbinder."

Gerardo Concepcion v. Court of Appeals and Ma. Theresa Almonte 

G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005

The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. The
presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy
to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is
a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. 
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the
period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family
Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled
the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not
disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The presumption is
quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between
husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of
the child.

FACTS: 

Petitioner  Gerardo  Concepcion  and  private  respondent  Ma.  Theresa Almonte were married in
1989. Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. In 1991, however, Gerardo filed
a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that 9
years before he married private respondent, the latter had married one Mario Gopiao, which
marriage was never annulled. Although Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario, she averred that
the marriage was a sham and that she have never lived with Mario at all.

The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she
married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose
Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa
while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. 

Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa
by Gerardo but by Mario during his first marriage considering the fact that the second marriage was
void from the beginning. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo – under the law – is the child of the legal
and subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of Mario and
not petitioner Gerardo. (YES) 

RULING:
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised as per Art. 164 of the Family Code which
states, a child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. It is fully
supported by Art. 167 of the Family Code which states, “The child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.”. The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of the legitimacy.
It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. The
presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy
to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is
a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. 

In the present case, since the marriage between Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void ab initio, the
marriage between Mario and Ma. Theresa was still subsisting at the time Jose Gerardo was
conceived, and thus the law presumes that Jose Gerardo was a legitimate child of private
respondent and Mario. Also, Gerardo cannot impugn the legitimacy of the child because such right is
strictly personal to the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo
and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never became her husband and thus never
acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the
period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family
Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled
the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not
disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The presumption is
quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between
husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of
the child.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be
presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption
of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario,
stands. As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father
Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A
persons surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from
parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of
the law, not related to him in any way. Also, there being no such parent-child relationship between
the child and Gerardo, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit the child.
The minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother
and/or even much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are
the legitimate or illegitimate children for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised.
It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is. Additionally, public policy demands
that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be at the
mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness. 
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender
years. Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents, to the
end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be
impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this
case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage. The child, by
reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and care, including
appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth. In case of assault on his rights by those
who take advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with the
single-minded purpose of upholding only his best interests.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Gerardo is hereby DENIED. The resolution of the Court of Appeals in
favor of respondents is AFFIRMED.

Agustin v. Prollamante
G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005
FACTS:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father, Arnel
Agustin, for support. Respondents alleged that Arnel impregnated Fe. Arnel insisted on aborting the
child, but Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to Martin out of wedlock. 
The birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. They further alleged that Arnel
shouldered the hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s requests for Martin’s support and even
suggested to place the child for adoption. Arnel denied having fathered the child. While Fe was carrying
five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van,
with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This incident was reported to the police. 
Months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe
and Martin then sued Arnel for support. In his answer, Arnel denied having fathered the child because
his affair with Fe had allegedly ended long before Martin’s conception. He alleged that Fe had at least
one other secret lover and that she became so obsessed with him that she even resorted to various
devious ways and means to alienate him from his wife and family. Arnel also claimed that the signature
attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Marin’s birth certificate were falsified. 
Respondents therefore filed a motion in court for issuance of an order to direct all parties to submit
themselves to DNA Paternity testing. Petitioner Arnel filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
cause of action since under the law an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by
the putative father. 
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves
to DNA paternity testing. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Martin has no right to ask for support and must first establish his filiation in a
separate suit under Article 283 in relation to Article 265 of the Civil Code.

2. 2. Whether or not DNA testing is a valid means to prove paternity.

RULING:
1. NO. The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for
recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against
petitioner. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an action to
compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with
jurisprudence. 

In Tayag v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed the integration of an action to compel
recognition with an action to claim one's inheritance. The two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint.
In Briz vs. Briz, et al. the Court held that, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action
to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful
conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character
of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to
require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other
cases. 
 Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or
rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled
to support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only
result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To
paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these proceedings.

2. Yes. Illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence.
The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer
for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. The Court has long believed in the merits of DNA
testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time
when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence
gathering. The Court therefore reiterated that DNA testing is a valid means of determining
paternity. 

The case of Wilson v. Lumb shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in some
instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St.
Lawrence County, New York pointed out that a determination of paternity made by any other
state, whether established through the parents acknowledgment of paternity or through an
administrative or judicial process, must be accorded full faith and credit, if and only if such
acknowledgment meets the requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security
act. 

In Rafferty v. Perkins, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results showing
paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the
course of a marriage: The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the
blood test eliminating Perkins as Justin's father, even considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to Perkins, we find that no reasonable jury could find that Easter is not Justin's father
based upon the 99.94% probability of paternity concluded by the DNA testing.

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL

REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be
amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, 

JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, petitioner, vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL
REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, respondent

Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish
him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
Before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil
registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such
change. In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society
easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute

FACTS: 

Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a
petition for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. 

The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let
him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in
Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person's name, they
anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered
name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother
and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore's Mandarin language
since they do not have the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that
the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang

RTC: Denied the petition. 

 The reason given for the change of name sought in the petition — that is, that petitioner Julian
may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle name — did not
fall within the grounds recognized by law. 
 Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the
convenience of the bearers. 
 Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of
the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be taken from
petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor.
RTC denied petitioner’s MR. The trial court maintained that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a
middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends
to study there. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or
application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling. 

OSG’s comment: The trial court correctly denied the petition for change of name. The OSG argues that
under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of their
father and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same. 

The OSG reiterates its argument raised before the trial court that the dropping of the child's middle
name could only trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence, while
petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confusion since both use the
surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle
name, it has also not been shown that the use of such middle name is actually proscribed by
Singaporean law.
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether the law allows one to drop the middle name from his registered name (NO)

RULING:

Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish
him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. Our laws on the use of
surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. 

The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,
while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother unless their father recognizes their
filiation, in which case they may bear the father's surname. Accordingly, the registration in the civil
registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The
registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or
proper name, a middle name, and a surname. 

Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help him
to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society. With this, he cited cases to
support his contentions. However, the factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases
are not at all analogous to the case at bar. Petitioners in the mentioned cases showed proper or
compelling reasons for such change and that they will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. 

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society
easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered
complete name.

Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that
the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of
majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of
his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.

JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner, vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL,

and LORETA P. MIGUEL, respondents.
Facts:
The case stems from the petition for Habeas Corpus filed by petitioner Joey Briones
against herein respondents Maricel Miguel, Francisca Miguel and Loreta Miguel to
obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. The petitioner and respondent
Loreta Miguel provided conflicting versions of what had occurred. The petitioner, on one
hand, avers that the child was previously under his custody until respondents Maricel
and Francisca took the child under the guise of bringing the child to SM Department
store. On the other hand, the mother of the child, respondent Loreta, avers that she was
the one who took the child and that the petitioner consented to such. Respondent
Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be given to her. Thereafter,
the Court of Appeals awarded the custody of the minor child to his mother, respondent
Loreta.
Loreta’s Contention: Based on Article 213(2) of the Family Code and Article 363 of the
Civil Code, she has the right to the custody over their children.
Petitioner’s Contention: Loreta is not always in the country. When she is abroad, she
cannot take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is that she lives most of
the time in Japan, as evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 2001,8
granting to her sister temporary custody over the minor. 
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner, as the natural father, may be denied the custody
and parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away.
Held: 
YES. The child is an illegitimate child of the petitioner and respondent Loreta because
he was born outside wedlock. Under Article 176 of the Family Code, an illegitimate child
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of the mother, and
shall be entitled to support in accordance with the provisions of the Family Code.
Therefore, it is apparent from the cited provision that parental authority vests with the
mother of the child.
Moreover, as held by the Court in David vs. CA, the recognition of an illegitimate child of
by the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody
of, the child. The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an
illegitimate child. Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness
to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and
the award of custody to someone else.
However, the father still has visitation right over his child. The Court held in Silva vs.
Court of Appeals that the father has visitorial right over his child in view of the
constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Even
when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, their
attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the
courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the
wellbeing of the child.
 GRACE GRANDE v. PATRICIO ANTONIO
G.R. No. 206248, 18 February 2014

DOCTRINE: The general rule is an illegitimate child shall use his mother’s surname. Exception
is if filiation is recognized by the father, then the illegitimate child may use the father’s
surname. Thus, it is the illegitimate child who has the right to decide if they want to use his
father’s surname.
FACTS:
Grace and Patricio lived together as husband and wife. At the time of their cohabitation,
Patricio had a subsisting marriage with someone else. Out of their illicit relationship, two sons
were born. They were not expressly recognized by Patricio as his own in the Records of Birth of
the children.
Soon thereafter, they separated, and Grace left for the US with her two sons. Patricio
filed a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority,
Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors. The RTC ruled in his favor,
holding that it is in the children’s best interest if they were to be under Patricio’s custody.
Significantly, it also ordered the change of their surname from Grande to Antonio.
The CA ruled that the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over the
minor illegitimate children. However, it held that the consequence of the recognition by Patricio
compels the use by the children of the surname “Antonio”
ISSUE: Whether or not Patricio can compel his sons to use his surname? (NO)
RULING:
Art. 176 of the FC, as amended by RA 9255 states that illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through
the (a) record of birth in the civil register; (b) admission in a public document; or (c) private
handwritten instrument.
Applying the foregoing, the general rule is an illegitimate child shall use his mother’s
surname. Exception is if filiation is recognized by the father, then the illegitimate child may use
the father’s surname. Thus, it is the illegitimate child who has the right to decide if they want to
use his father’s surname. It is not for the father to decide on the matter. The use of the word
“may” readily show that an illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use father’s surname; it
is merely permissive. 
IRR of RA 9255 is void for making such act mandatory. The 2 sons likewise sent letters
stating their opposition to have their surnames changed.   

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner, v. TRINIDAD CAPOTE, Respondent

 G.R. No. 157043. February 2, 2007

FACTS:

In 1998, Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition for change of name of her ward from
Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. The petition alleged that: Giovanni is the
illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. He was given the
surname of his father despite the absence of marriage between his biological parents. However,
Giovanni’s father has not been taking responsibility and the former now desires to have his
surname changed to that of his mother’s surname. 

The trial court gave due course to the petition. Publication of the petition was ordered and the
local civil registrar and the Office of the Solicitor General was notified. Since there was no
opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte
before a court-appointed commissioner.  The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor,
did not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion. After the reception of evidence, the
trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso
to Giovanni Nadores. 

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment
of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding. Ruling that the
proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision ordering the change of name. Petitioner appealed to the SC contending that the CA
erred in affirming the trial court’s decision which granted the petition for change of name despite
the non-joinder of indispensable parties. The purported parents and all other persons who may
be adversely affected by the child’s change of name should have been made respondents to
make the proceeding adversarial.

ISSUE: Whether or not Giovanni's is entitled to change his name from Giovanni N. Gallamoso
to Giovanni Nadores.

RULING: Yes.

When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code of
the Philippines),19 the pertinent provision of the Civil Code then as regards his use of a
surname, read:
Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname
of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the
surname of the recognizing parent. 

Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mother’s surname from birth. The
records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovanni’s putative father to actually
recognize him. 

Meanwhile, according to the Family Code which repealed, among others, Article 366 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
xxx xxx xxx
Applying laws and jurisprudence, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the
father bears only a given name and his mother’ surname, and does not have a middle name.
The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when
the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged
by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his
mother’s surname as his middle name and his father’s surname as his surname, reflecting his
status as a legitimate child or an acknowledged child.

The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s name to his
identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or
illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who
may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence in favor of or against such change.

The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper
remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and
complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and
the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of
Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code,
Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while
his mother has always recognized him as her child . A change of name will erase the
impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will
facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will
not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.

MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, petitioner, vs. HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, JUDGE,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 and CONCHITA TALAG DE
SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 105619 December 12, 1995

Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized? There being no explicit provision of law in
point, the Court is called upon to cast illumination in a gray area even as it fills up unintentional
interstices in the fabric of Civil Law with overlays of philosophical, historical and sociological
strands. For an understanding of how the issue arose, we now proceed to unravel the pertinent
factual background.

Facts:

Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a daughter, herein
petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. Their relationship became strained to the breaking point.
Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag, private respondent herein.
Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a
Nevada court in 1949.
Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan to marry private respondent, with whom he had been
cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia, and such union produced 11 children.
Subsequently, Sofia died and in less than a month, Antonio and private respondent contracted a
marriage in Tagaytay City. Antonio then died intestate leaving properties with an estimated
value of P15,000,000.00.

A petition was granted for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of private respondent.
However petitioner filed a motion to intervene stating therein that private respondent's children
were illegitimate. Nonetheless, the court declared private respondent's ten children legitimated
and thereupon instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the
heirs of Antonio de Santos. 

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition contending that since only natural children can be
legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters.

Issue:

Whether or not private respodent’s children are legitimated. (No)

Ruling:

Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states that only natural children can be legitimated.
Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural. In other words, a child's
parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception
for him to qualify as a "natural child."

In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent and
deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to
petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were
married abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his
legitimate wife does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in
this jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, the decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had
to have the marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that
he was likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though
estranged wife died, he hastily contracted another marriage with private respondent, this time
here in Tagaytay.

It must be noted that while Article 269, which falls under the general heading of "Paternity and
Filiation," specifically deals with "Legitimated Children," Article 89, a provision subsumed under
the general title on "Marriage," deals principally with void and voidable marriages and
secondarily, on the effects of said marriages on their offspring. It creates another category of
illegitimate children, those who are "conceived or born of marriages which are void from the
beginning," but because there has been a semblance of marriage, they are classified as
"acknowledged natural children" and, accordingly, enjoy the same status, rights and obligations
as such kind of children. 

In the case at bench, the marriage under question is considered "void from the beginning"
because bigamous, contracted when a prior valid marriage was still subsisting. It follows that the
children begotten of such union cannot be considered natural children proper for at the time of
their conception, their parents were disqualified from marrying each other due to the impediment
of a prior subsisting marriage.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of the court a quo
dated November 14, 1991 and January 9, 1992, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Maria Rosario de Santos is hereby declared the SOLE LEGITIMATE CHILD of the decedent
Antonio de Santos and, as such, entitled to all the rights accorded to her by law.