Title Vii - Crimes Committed by Public Officers

TITLE VII – CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
Public Officer
1. Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 116033, February 26, 1997
FACTS:
Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated a hauling business. Occasionally, he engaged the services
of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’s premises A Warrant
of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the Main Office of the BIR addressed to the
Regional Director or his authorized representative of Revenue Region 10, Butuan City
commanding the latter to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of
Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of
Garnishment was issued to Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to
BIR the property in his possession owned by taxpayer Ancla. Azarcon, in signing the “Receipt
for Goods, Articles, and Things Seized Under Authority of the National Internal Revenue,”
assumed the undertakings specified in the receipt. Subsequently, however, Ancla took out the
distrained truck from Azarcon’s custody. For this reason, Azarcon was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 in
relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Can Azarcon be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by the BIR as a
depositary of distrained property?
HELD:
Article 223 of the RPC defines a public officer as “any person who, by direct provision of the
law, popular election, or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance
of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official,
of any rank or classes”. Azarcon obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election.
Neither can his designation by the BIR as a custodian of distrained property qualifies as
appointment by direct provision of law, or by competent authority. While it is true that Sec. 206
of the NIRC, as pointed out by the prosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive
distraint by requiring “any person” to preserve a distrained property there is no provision in the
NIRC constituting such person a public officer by reason of such requirement. The BIR’s power
authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to
appoint him as a public officer. The charge against Azarcon should forthwith be dismissed.
2. Javier v. Sandiganbayan, GR 147026-27, September 11, 2009
FACTS:
Javier was charged with malversation of public funds. Javier was the private sector
representative in the National Book Development Board (NBDB), which was created by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047, otherwise known as the “Book Publishing Industry Development
Act”. R.A. No. 8047 provided for the creation of the NBDB, which was placed under the
administration and supervision of the Office of the President. The NBDB is composed of eleven
(11) members who are appointed by the President, five (5) of whom come from the government,
while the remaining six (6) are chosen from the nominees of organizations of private book
publishers, printers, writers, book industry related activities, students and the private education
sector. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Javier for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. In an
Information dated February 18, 2000, Javier was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. The Commission on Audit also
charged Javier with malversation of public funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, an Information dated February 29, 2000 was filed before the
Sandiganbayan. On October 10, 2000, Javier filed a Motion to Quash Information, averring that
the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to hear the case as the information did not allege that she
is a public official who is classified as Grade “27” or higher. Neither did the information charge
her as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. She also averred that she is not a public officer or employee
and that she belongs to the NBDB only as a private sector representative under R.A. No. 8047,
hence, she may not be charged under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan or under any statute which covers public officials. Moreover, she claimed that
she does not perform public functions and is without any administrative or political power to
speak of – that she is serving the private book publishing industry by advancing their interest as
participant in the government’s book development policy. On January 17, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying Javier’s motion. Javier filed a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court. Javier hinges her petition on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not quashing the two
informations charging her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the
Revised Penal Code on malversation of public funds. She advanced the following arguments in
support of her petition, to wit: first, she is not a public officer, and second, she was being charged
under two (2) informations, which is in violation of her right against double jeopardy.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not a private sector representative to the board a public officer. YES (2)
Whether or not there is a violation of her right against double jeopardy. NO
HELD: (1) YES, Javier was a public officer. - To substantiate her claim, petitioner maintained
that she is not a public officer and only a private sector representative, stressing that her only
function among the eleven (11) basic purposes and objectives provided for in Section 4, R.A.
No. 8047, is to obtain priority status for the book publishing industry. At the time of her
appointment to the NDBD Board, she was the President of the BSAP, a book publishers
association. As such, she could not be held liable for the crimes imputed against her, and in turn,
she is outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. - The NBDB is the government agency
mandated to develop and support the Philippine book publishing industry. It is a statutory
government agency created by R.A. No. 8047, which was enacted into law to ensure the full
development of the book publishing industry as well as for the creation of organization structures
to implement the said policy. To achieve this end, the Governing Board of the NBDB was
created to supervise the implementation. . . - A perusal of the above powers and functions leads
us to conclude that they partake of the nature of public functions. A public office is the right,
authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion
of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public. The individual so invested is a public officer. - Notwithstanding that petitioner came from
the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the government is achieved. In this
case, the government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in
the national development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the public sector and not
from the other branches or agencies of the government does not take her position outside the
meaning of a public office. She was appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to it that
the purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved. The Governing Board acts collectively
and carries out its mandate as one body. The purpose of the law for appointing members from the
private sector is to ensure that they are also properly represented in the implementation of
government objectives to cultivate the book publishing industry. - Moreover, the Court is not
unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, which provides
that a public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation,
even nominal, from the government. - Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public
officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public office. Petitioner was appointed by the
President to the Governing Board of the NDBD. Though her term is only for a year that does not
make her private person exercising a public function. The fact that she is not receiving a monthly
salary is also of no moment. Section 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of the Governing
Board shall receive per diem and such allowances as may be authorized for every meeting
actually attended and subject to pertinent laws, rules and regulations. Also, under the Anti-Graft
Law, the nature of one’s appointment, and whether the compensation one receives from the
government is only nominal, is immaterial because the person so elected or appointed is still
considered a public officer. - On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer
as any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, popular election or
appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall
Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment
3. Diego vs. Judge Castillo, A.M. NO. RTJ-02-1673 : August 11, 2004
Facts:
a) On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr.,
solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple were both Filipinos.
In the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name Crescencia Escoto,... with a
civil status of single;
February 15, 1978,... heretofore existing between Jorge de Perio and Crescencia de Perio are
hereby Dissolved, Cancelled and Annulled and the Petitioner is hereby granted a Divorce
Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with herein complainant's brother, Manuel P. Diego,
solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City. The marriage
contract shows that this time, the accused used and... adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again,
with a civil status of single.[
Issues:
administrative complaint against Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for allegedly
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or rendering judgment in gross
ignorance of the law. He questions the evidentiary weight and admissibility of the divorce decree
as a basis for the finding of good faith. In addition,... complainant stresses that the evidence on
record negates respondent Judge's finding of good faith on the part of the accused.
Held :
After trial of the criminal case for bigamy, respondent Judge promulgated a decision, on
February 24, 1999, the dispositive part of which stated:
Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment
There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Applying these precedents to the present case, the error committed by respondent Judge being
gross and patent, the same constitutes ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant
disciplinary action
Applying these precedents to the present case, the error committed by respondent Judge being
gross and patent, the same constitutes ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant
disciplinary action.
4. Sacmar vs. Judge Reyes-Carpio, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1766, March 28, 2003
FACTS: In the case filed by complainant Sacmar against Zoren Legaspi in the MTC of Pasig
City, the latter was convicted for grave threats and was sentenced to arresto mayor and and to
pay complainant moral damages of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Upon appeal by
Legaspi, RTC Judge Reyes-Carpio (herein respondent) modified the decision, finding the
accused guilty only of Other Light Threats under Article 265 of the RPC, reducing the penalty to
arresto menor and to pay moral damages of ten thousand pesos (P10,000). Complainant claims
that respondent judge wittingly afforded unwarranted benefits to the accused which caused
undue injury to her as private complainant in the case. She likewise avers that respondent judge
exhibited manifest partiality towards the accused when she disregarded the evidence on record in
modifying the decision of the MTC by downgrading the conviction of Legaspi from Grave
Threats to Other Light Threats thereby reducing the criminal and civil liabilities of Legaspi.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Judge rendered an unjust judgment pursuant to Art. 204,
RPC and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
RULING:
No. Case dismissed for lack of merit.
As a rule, the acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial functions are not subject to disciplinary
power unless they are committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. To hold
otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. .
Complainant failed to satisfactorily show that respondent judge acted in bad faith, with malice or
in willful disregard of her right as a litigant. Although the application and interpretation of the
law by respondent judge differed from that of the judge of the MTC, complainant cannot
sweepingly claim that respondent judge knowingly rendered an unjust judgment. For a charge of
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment to prosper, it must be shown that the judgment was
unjust, and not that the judge merely committed an error of judgment or took the unpopular side
of a controversial point of law. He must have known that his judgment was indeed unjust. The
failure of a judge to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented
does not necessarily render him administratively liable.
5. Atty. Ubarra vs. Judge Mapalad, A.M. No. MTJ-91-622 March 22, 1993
6. Cortes vs. Sandiganbayan Justices, A.M. NO. SB-04-11-J : February 13, 2004
7. Loyola v. Gabo, Jr., A.M. RTJ-00-1524, January 26, 2000
FACTS:
On 4 June 1996, Lucia Layola filed a complaint charging SPO2 Leopoldo German and PO2
Tomasito Gagui of Santa Maria, Bulacan with homicide for the death Layola’s son. The case
was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Basilio Gabo.
On March 1997, petition to take custody of German was filed by Chief of Police base on PD
971, PD 1184 and EO 106 and that the offense imputed is the death of Pablo Layola who was
then inside jail. Such petition was granted by Gabo on 7 Apr 1997. Motion for reconsideration
was denied by Gabo.
Gabo’s justification:
The order was issued according to the comment of the Asst. Prov Prosecutor to whose office the
prosecution of the case was indorsed by the Deputy Ombudsman for the military. The accused
indictment was based on circumstantial evidence, hence not so strong as to deprive the accused
of his right to bail;
The motion for reconsideration did not raise strong arguments on why the order should be
modified;
The disputed order is not the subject of a petition for certiorari in the CA initiated by the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the military.
Elements of unjust interlocutory
The offender is a judge; He performs any of the following acts;
Knowingly renders unjust interlocutory order or decree;
Renders a manifestly unjust interlocutory order or decree through inexcusable negligence or
ignorance.
ISSUE:
W/N Sandiganbayan committed error in denying the petition to quash and for not
considering the findings of the special prosecutor.
W/N petitioners were denied of due process of law.
W/N petitioners were denied of equal protection of the law.
HELD:
No. While OCA perceived no evidence that the respondent judge issued the questioned
order knowing it to be unjust; and neither is there any proof of conscious and deliberate intent to
do an injustice, it found Gabo liable for gross ignorance of the law in failing to conduct a
summary proceeding to determine whether or not the evidence of guilty was strong, considering
that the charge of murder is non-bailable.
The Court ruled that the quantum of proof required to hold respondent judge guilty for
alleged violations of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code, is
proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty. Here, the allegations of the
complaint-affidavit are unsubstantiated. Respondent judge cannot, of course, be pronounced
guilty on the basis of bare allegations. There has to be evidence on which conviction can be
anchored. The evidence must truly be beyond reasonable doubt.
On the matter of gross ignorance of the law, records on hand decisively warrant a finding
against the respondent. Respondent judge was acting upon a case of murder punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death. Murder being a capital offense, respondent judge should have been
mindful that bail cannot be allowed as a matter of right. The discretion of the court, in cases
involving capital offenses may be exercised only after there has been a hearing called to
ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused. The discretion lies in appreciating and
evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilty against the accused. Granting bail in non-
bailable offenses without hearing is gross ignorance of the law.
Thus, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor , i.e. , that the Court may impose its authority upon
erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the
law, or misconduct, is obviously applicable in the instant case.
8. Re: Verified Complaint for Disbarment of AMA Land Inc. against CA Association
Justice Bueser et al., OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J, March 11, 2014
Facts:
AMA Land, Inc., (AMALI) brought this administrative complaint against Associate Justice
Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R.
Rosario, all members of the Court of Appeals (CA), charging them with knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, gross misconduct, and violation of their oaths on account of their promulgation
of the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994. AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey
condominium project. Due to the project’s location, AMALI would have to use Fordham Street
as an access road and staging area for the construction activities. However, WWRAI (Wack
Wack Residents Association, Inc. (WWRAI) allegedly tried to demolish the field office and set
up a fence to deny access to AMALI’s construction workers, which prompted AMALI to file a
petition for the enforcement of an easement of right of way and TRO which the RTC granted.
Meanwhile the WWRAI filed TRO to enjoin the RTC from further proceeding of the civil case
which was later granted the petition of WWRAI. AMALI then brought this administrative
complaint, alleging that respondent Justices had conspired with the counsels of WWRAI, in
rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI stated that the decision of the CA had been rendered in
bad faith and with conscious and deliberate intent to favor WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice
to AMALI. In thereby knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, respondent Justices were guilty
of gross misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: will the administrative complaint will prosper?

Held: 1st: No, The administrative complaint is bereft of merit 2nd: In administrative
proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations of the complaint by
substantial evidence.Failure to do so will lead to the dismissal of the complaint for its lack of
merit. This is because an administrative charge against any official of the Judiciary must be
supported by at least substantial evidence. But when the charge equates to a criminal offense,
such that the judicial officer may suffer the heavy sanctions of dismissal from the service, the
showing of culpability on the part of the judicial officer should be nothing short of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, especially because the charge is penal in character 3rd:
AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment against respondent Justices. In this case, AMALI had already filed a petition for
review on certiorari challenging the questioned order of the respondent CA justices which is still
pending final action by the Court. Consequently, a decision on the validity of the proceedings
and propriety of the orders of the respondent CA Justices in this administrative proceeding would
be premature. Besides, even if the subject decision or portions thereof turn out to be erroneous,
administrative liability will only attach upon proof that the actions of the respondent CA Justices
were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred, or attended by fraud or corruption, which
were not sufficiently shown to exist in this case. Neither was bias as well as partiality
established. Acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be
clearly shown before he can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. In the same vein,
bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a party.
Here, other than AMALI’s bare and self-serving claim that respondent CA Justices "conspired
with WWRAI’s counsel in knowingly and in bad faith rendering an unjust judgment and in
committing xxx other misconduct," no act clearly indicative of bias and partiality was alleged
except for the claim that respondent CA Justices misapplied the law and jurisprudence. Thus, the
presumption that the respondent judge has regularly performed his duties shall prevail.
9. De Vera v. Pelayo, G.R. No. 137354, July 6, 2000
FACTS:
On 28 Aug. 1996, petitioner Salvador De Vera filed a special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the MTC from proceeding with a complaint for ejectment
against him. The case was re-raffled to Judge Benjamin Pelayo.
On 9 June 198, MTC denied petitioner’s application for TRO. 1 Sept. 1998 when his
motion for reconsideration was denied.
On 23 Sept 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman a complaint against Pelayo,
accusing him of violating Arts. 206 and 207 and RA 3019.
On 2 Oct 1998, Associate Graft Investigation Officer Erlinda Rojas recommended the
petitioner’s complaint to be referred to the SC.
On 13 Oct 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman referred the case to the Court Administrator,
Supreme Court.
On 6 Nov 1998, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Evaluation Report.
Petitioner criticizes the jurisprudence cited by the Ombudsman as erroneous and not applicable
to his complaint. He insists that since his complaint involved a criminal charge against a judge, it
was within the authority of the Ombudsman not the Supreme Court to resolve whether a crime
was committed and the judge prosecuted therefor.
On 4 Jan 1999, the Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
W/N the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to entertain criminal charges filed against a judge of
RTC in connect with his handling of cases before the court.
HELD:
No, the referral of the case to the Supreme Court is correct. The Court agreed with the
SolGen that the Ombudsman committed no grave abuse of discretion. The Court ruled that that
before a civil or criminal action against a judge for a violation of Art. 204 and 205 (knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment or order) can be entertained, there must first be "a final and
authoritative judicial declaration" that the decision or order in question is indeed "unjust." The
pronouncement may result from either:
An action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the judgment;
An administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for promulgating
an unjust judgment or order.
The determination whether a judge has maliciously delayed the disposition of the case is
also an exclusive judicial function.
The Court reiterated that the prerogative to review a judicial order or decision -- whether
final and executory or not -- and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or
administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order belongs to the courts alone
Dereliction of Duty/Tolerance
10. Fianza v. Pleb, G.R. No. 109638, March 31, 1995
Facts: Sometime in July 2010, AAA, who was then 11 years old, was asked by appellant to wash
his clothes. Thereafter, petitioner asked her to go with him to the kamalig. Thereat, they
proceeded to the second floor where petitioner removed his pants and briefs, lied down, and
ordered AAA to hold his penis and masturbate him. After ejaculating, he put on his clothes, and
gave P20.00 to AAA who, thereafter, went home. Likewise, on November 30, 2010, while AAA
was home, petitioner called her to his house, and asked her to clean the same. After she was done
sweeping the floor, they proceeded to the second floor of the kamalig. Thereat, petitioner again
removed his pants and briefs, lied down, and ordered AAA to fondle his penis. After the deed, he
gave P20.00 to AAA who, thereafter, went home.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty with violations of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610.
Held:
At the outset, the Court deems it appropriate to correct the appellation of the crime with which
petitioner was charged to Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC considering that
the victim, AAA, was only 11 years old at the time of the incidents.
In instances where the child subjected to sexual abuse through lascivious conduct is below
twelve (12) years of age, the offender should be prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, but
suffer the higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period in accordance with Section 5
(b), Article III of RA 7610, which pertinently reads:
SECTION 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female,
who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
In the present case, records disclose that on two (2) occasions in July 2010 and on November 30,
2010, appellant induced AAA, an 11-year-old minor, to hold his penis and masturbate him.
Betrayal of Trust/Betrayal of Secret

11. People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 115439-41, July 16, 1997
FACTS:
The case involves a prominent politician in Mindanao, respondent Ceferino Paredes, Jr., who
was formerly the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor, and Congressman.
During his stint, Paredes applied for and was granted a free patent over a vast tract of land.
However, it was cancelled because apparently, it has already been designated and reserved as a
school site. The court found that Paredes had obtained title thereto through fraudulent
misrepresentations in his application, and somebody came forward and filed a case of perjury
against him. However, the same was dismissed on the ground of prescription. Then again,
another case was filed against him for violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act) for using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of
Lands officials to favorably act on his application for patent. In all these cases, Paredes was
represented by respondent Atty. Sansaet, a practicing attorney. Paredes, as defense, contends that
he has already been charged under the same set of facts and the same evidence where such
complaint (perjury case where he was already arraigned) has already been dismissed. Hence,
double jeopardy has already attached. In support hereof, Paredes presented court records and
transcripts as proof of his arraignment in the perjury case. However, the documents were found
to be falsified, in conspiracy with Paredes’ counsel and the clerk of court where the perjury case
was filed. One Teofilo Gelacio claims that no notice of arraignment was ever received by the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal. Hence, another case was filed for falsification of judicial records.
It was then that respondent Sansaet offered to testify as a state witness against his client Paredes,
claiming that the latter contrived and induced him to have the graft case dismissed on the ground
of double jeopardy by having him and co-respondent prepare and falsify the subject documents.
But the Sandiganbayan denied the motion on the ground of attorney-client privilege since the
lawyer could not testify against his own client. In view of such relationship, confidential matters
must have been disclosed by Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer, in his
professional capacity, and therefore privileged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by
attorney-client privilege.
HELD:
No. There is no privileged communication rule to talk about. The privilege applies only if the
information was relayed by the client to the lawyer respecting a past crime. The reckoning point
is when the communication was given, not when the lawyer was made to testify. The attorney-
client privilege cannot apply in these cases as the facts thereof and the actuations of both
respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule. It may be correctly assumed that there
was a confidential communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with the criminal
cases since the latter served as his counsel therein. The privilege is not confined to verbal or
written communications made by the client to his attorney but extends as well to information
communicated by other means. IOW, including physical acts. The acts and words of the parties,
therefore, during the period when the documents were being falsified were necessarily
confidential since Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to
witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and confidence.
However, the announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the
confidences which his attorney is bound to respect. It is true that by now, insofar as the
falsifications are concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the
privilege to apply, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication
was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with
respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. IOW, if the client seeks his lawyer’s
advice with respect to a crime which he has already committed, he is given the protection of a
virtual confessional seal which the privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without
the client’s consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to
a crime a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks
the lawyer’s advice. Here, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are
the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the
time he and Honrada were about to falsify the documents. Clearly, therefore, the confidential
communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the
crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in
confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes of
a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege. It is
well settled that communication between a lawyer and his client, to be privileged, must be for a
lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents
the privilege from attaching. In fact, the prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and
client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an
attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not
only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to
disclose at once in the interest of justice. To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the
genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection
thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties in the rules of evidence and
practice in the noble profession of law.
Direct Bribery
12. Mangulabnan vs. People, G.R. No. 236848, June 8, 2020
13. Merencillo vs. People, G.R. Nos. 142369-70, April 13, 2007
Facts:
above-named accused being then a public official connected with the Bureau of Internal Revenue
as... its Group Supervising Examiner... extort from a certain Mrs. Maria Angeles Ramasola Cesar
the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS... in consideration and in exchange for the
release of the certification of her payment of the capital gains tax for the land purchased by the
Ramasola... a transaction wherein the aforesaid accused has to intervene in... his official
capacity... information for direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code... above-named accused being then a public official connected with the performance of
official duty... as its Group Supervising Examiner... extort and agree to perform an act
constituting a crime, an act which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, that
is - that... the certification for payment of the capital gains tax relative to the land purchased by
the Ramasola Superstudio Incorporated from Catherine Corpus Enerio be released by him only
upon payment of an additional under the table transaction
Issues:
He also asserts that he was placed twice in jeopardy when he was prosecuted for violation of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 and for direct bribery.
HELD:
Petitioner is wrong.
One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under the
Revised Penal Code for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being
charged with a felony under the Revised Penal Code.
There is no... double jeopardy if a person is charged simultaneously or successively for violation
of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the Revised Penal Code.
The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense.
The test is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it or a
frustration thereof; or whether one offense... necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
other
A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and punished under Article
210 of the Revised Penal Code and those of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 shows that
there is neither identity nor necessary inclusion between the two offenses.
Clearly, the violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor necessarily inclusive of
direct bribery.
While they have common elements, not all the essential elements of one offense are included
among or form part of those enumerated in the other
Whereas the mere... request or demand of a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit is enough
to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, acceptance of a promise or offer or receipt
of a gift or present is required in direct bribery.
It is limited only to contracts or transactions involving monetary consideration where the public
officer has the authority to intervene under the law.
14. Tad-Y v. People, G.R. No. 148862, August 11, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Ruben Tad-y was accused direct bribery of demanding and receiving P4,000.00 from
Encabo on July 24, 1995 in consideration for his signing a certificate of occupancy, which he
also signed on the said date. Tad-y was also charged with violation of Section 3(c ) of RA3019
He was convicted by the MTC of violation of Paragraph 2 of Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code, which decision was upheld by the RTC with modifications as to penalty, and the RTC
decision was affirmed in toto by the CA. while the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration,
however, it agreed with Tad-y’s contention that what the latter signed was a certificate of final
inspection and not a certificate of occupancy, in connection with which he was acquitted of
charges of violation of Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Issue: whether the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt for direct
bribery under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling: The MTC convicted the petitioner of direct bribery on its finding that the petitioner
demanded P4,000.00 from Wong, through Encabo, in consideration of signing a certificate of
occupancy, and that on July 24, 1995, the petitioner received the said amount from Encabo and
signed the said certificate for the Atrium building. There is no iota of competent and credible
evidence to support these findings. There is no evidence on record that the petitioner and Encabo
met on April 24, 1995. In fact, it was only on April 25, 1995 that Encabo arrived at the OCE to
make arrangements for the final inspection of the building by the officers concerned, the signing
of the certificate of inspection by said officers, and the signing of the certificate of occupancy by
the building official. There is also no dispute that what was signed by the petitioner, on July 24,
1995, following his final inspection of the building, was the certificate of final inspection and not
a certificate of occupancy of the building. Even Encabo admitted that the petitioner refused to
sign the said certificate because as of July 24, 1995, there had been no final inspection of the
building, and not because he was demanding P4,000.00 from Encabo. There is also no credible
evidence on record that the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Wong, through Encabo, in
exchange for the signing of the certificate of occupancy. Indeed, it is incredible that the
petitioner would demand the said amount as a precondition to his signing a certificate,
considering that, under Section 309 of P.D. No. 1096, the authority to sign said certificate is
vested specifically on the building official, and not on the petitioner: Petition granted; decisions
of the MTC, RTC and CA reversed and set aside. Petitioner is acquitted.
15. Marifosque v. People, G.R. No. 155685, July 27, 2004
Facts:
direct bribery Hian Hian Yu Sy and her husband, Arsenio Sy... went to the office of Captain
Alberto Salvo, Chief of the Intelligence and Operating Division stationed at the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS)... to report the... robbery... of... the gasoline station of her father, Yu
So Pong... and the alleged extortion attempt by petitioner, Police Sergeant Narciso Marifosque,
in exchange for the recovery of the lost items.
Captain Salvo and his men set up a plan to entrap the... petitioner
The pay-off was scheduled... in Golden Grace Department Store which was owned by Yu So
Pong
Marifosque arrived... went inside the store... and demanded the money from Hian Hian Yu Sy
and Yu So Pong. The latter handed to him the marked money
When petitioner stepped out of the store... arresting operatives swooped down upon the... suspect
and arrested him.
Marifosque testified that... a police asset came to his house and reported that he witnessed a
robbery at the gasoline station of Yu So Pong. Petitioner went to the gasoline station of Yu So
Pong and relayed to... him the information.
Yu So Pong proceeded to the police station to report the robbery... desk officer, PFC Jesus
Fernandez, who then dispatched petitioner and a certain Pat. Garcia to conduct an investigation.
As they were leaving the police... station, the asset approached petitioner asking if he could get
P350.00 per cylinder tank as his reward. detitioner relayed the message to Yu So Pong, who said
he was amenable "if that [was] the only way to recover the cylinders and to apprehend the
robbers."[... police investigators proceeded to the house of Edgardo Arnaldo... where they found
the stolen gas tanks. The group loaded the gas tanks into the vehicle. Meanwhile, Arnaldo
arrived.
Petitioner did not arrest him at that time because he promised to lead them to the other stolen
cylinder tanks
Elmer Arnaldo testified... he went out to buy bread and saw three... individuals stealing gas
cylinder tanks in the nearby gasoline station. He later visited petitioner and reported to him the
robbery.
dropped by the police station to discuss with petitioner the reward of
P350.00 per cylinder tank recovered. Petitioner gave him 1,000.00 and told him to return at
6:00 p.m. for the remainder. At 7:00 p.m., he and petitioner went to the store of Yu So Pong to
collect the balance of the reward money.
Petitioner went inside the... store and Arnaldo, who was left outside, saw a woman giving him a
folded newspaper. Suddenly, armed men apprehended the petitioner, so he ran away.
Issues:
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 17030, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Direct Bribery and imposing upon him the indeterminate prison term of 3... years, 6
months, and 5 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to 7 years, 8 months, and 9 days of
prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the fine is increased
to P18,000.00.
In addition, petitioner shall suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.

SO ORDERED.
His claim that he previously gave P1,000.00 to his asset, which purportedly represented a partial
payment of the reward money, was not... corroborated by his asset.
When he was arrested and interrogated at Camp Ibalon, he made no attempt to present his asset
to explain and justify his receipt of the reward money. Instead, he accepted his arrest and
investigation with an air of resignation, which is characteristic... of a culprit who is caught red-
handed.
He did not apprehend Edgardo Arnaldo or invite him for investigation although the cylinder
tanks were found in his possession
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the
following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or
through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or... promise
has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a
crime, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and (4) that the
crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
At the time of the incident, petitioner was a police sergeant assigned to the Legazp
City Police Station. He directly received the bribe money from Yu So Pong and his daughter
Hian Hian Yu Sy in exchange for the recovery of the stolen cylinder tanks, which was an act not
constituting a crime within the meaning of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. The... act of
receiving money was connected with his duty as a police officer.
Evidence shows that petitioner received an aggregate amount of P5,800.00.[12] He should
therefore be ordered to pay a fine not less than 3 times its value.
Accordingly, a fine of P18,000.00 is deemed reasonable. reccional, as minimum, to 7 years, 8

months, and 9 days of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the fine is increased to P18,000.00
In addition, petitioner shall suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.
16. People v. Abesamis, G.R. No. L-5284, September 11, 1953
Facts:
The accused being then the Justice of the Peace and a public officer, demand and receive from
Marciana Sauri the amount of P1,100 with the agreement that he would dismiss the case for
Robbery in Band with Rape against Emiliano Castillo, son of said Marciana Sauri, which was
then pending in his Court.
Issue/s:
Whether the accused is gulty of direct bribery?

Ruling:
No. The crime charged does not come under the first paragraph. To fall within that paragraph the
act which the public officer has agreed to perform must be criminal. It is possible, under the
allegations of the information to regard the crime charged as falling within the second paragraph
of article 210. This paragraph, however, distinguishes between two cases: one in which the act
agreed to be performed has been executed and one in which the said act has not been
accomplished, but there is telling whether the information is for one or the other. The
information is, therefore, defective in that aspect. But while the information is insufficient to
hold the accused for trial for direct bribery under the first or second paragraph of article 210, it is
a sufficient indictment for indirect bribery under article 211.
17. Balderama v. People, G.R. Nos. 14578-85, January 28, 2008

Facts:
Rolando L. Balderama was employed with the Land Transportation Commission (LTO)
assigned to the Field Enforcement Division, Law Enforcement Services. Juan S. Armamento,
respondent, operates a taxi business with a fleet of ten (10) taxi units.
Acting on complaints that taxi drivers in the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
discriminate against passengers and would transport them to their destinations only on a
“contract” basis, the LTO created a team to look into the veracity of the complaints.
The team flagged down for inspection an “SJ Taxi” owned by respondent. The team impounded
the taxi on the ground that its meter was defective. However, upon inspection and testing by the
LTO Inspection Division, the results showed that contrary to the report of the team, the meter
waiting time mechanism of the vehicle was not defective and was functioning normally. The
vehicle was released to respondent.
Respondent, feeling aggrieved of the malicious impounding of his vehicle, filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman a complaint for bribery and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, as amended, against herein petitioner. He alleged that prior to the impounding of his
taxi, the four LTO officers had been collecting “protection money” from him.
Issue:
Is petitioner guilty of direct bribery?
Ruling:
YES. The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code contains
the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or
through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has
been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime,
or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act
relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
The Sandiganbayan found the above elements of direct bribery present. It was duly established
that the accused demanded and received P300.00 as “protection money” from respondent on
several dates. As against the prosecution’s evidence, all that the accused could proffer was alibi
and denial, the weakest of defenses.
To hold a person liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the concurrence of the following
elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution: (1) that the accused is
a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that the said public
officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in
relation to his or her public positions; (3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether
the government or a private party; and (4) that the public officer has acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The Sandiganbayan found that
petitioners and Lubrica participated directly in the malicious apprehension and impounding of
the taxi unit of respondent, causing him undue injury.
Settled is the rule that findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan in cases before this Court are
binding and conclusive in the absence of a showing that they come under the established
exceptions, among them: 1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures; 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is a grave abuse
of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) said findings of facts are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and, 6) the findings of
fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence on record. We found none
of these exceptions in the present cases.
Indirect Bribery
18. Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-75160, 18 March 1988
Facts:
Petitioner Formilleza was a personnel supervisor of National Irrigation Administration (NIA) for
20 years. Her duties include the processing of the appointment papers of employees. Ms. Mutia
is an employee of NIA. However, her appointment was terminated but she continued working
due to the verbal instructions of the regional director of NIA. Ms. Mutia took steps to obtain
either a permanent or at least a renewed appointment. Then, she approached the regional director
about the matter. She was advised to see the petitioner since her duty is to determine the
employees to be appointed or promoted. However, The petitioner refused to attend to her
appointment papers unless the latter given some money. Ms. Mutia reported the action of the
petitioner and set up an entrapment. During the entrapment, Mrs. Mutia suddenly placed
something in the petitioner’s hand. When the petitioner saw it was money she threw it away.
Then, the petitioner was arrested during the entrapment.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner commit the crime of indirect bribery.
Ruling:
No. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery is that the public officer concerned must have
accepted the gift or material consideration. There must be a clear intention on the part of the
public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as his own property from then on,
such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt
unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient
to lead the court to conclude that the crime of indirect bribery has been committed. Otherwise, it
will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by simply putting within
their physical custody some gift, money or other property. Thus, petitioner is not liable for the
said crime.
19. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 155574, November 20, 2006

FACTS:
Various information were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Timoteo Garcia, Gilbert
Nabo and Nery Tagupa for violation of Sec 3(b) RA 3019 on 14 Aug 1997. The information
alleged that on 9-10 Jan 1993, in Cagayan de Oro, the accused, being public officers of LTO,
conspired with each other to borrow a specific car from Oro Asian Automotive Corp. (the
Company), which is engaged in the business of vehicle assembly and dealership. The other 56
information are similarly worded except for the dates and types of vehicles.
On 22 Aug 1997, Sandiganbayan issued orders for the arrest of the accused. On 17 Aug
1998, when arraigned, petitioner and Tagupa pleaded not guilty, while Nabo remained at large.
Evidence of Prosecution:
Estanislao Yungao, employed as a drier and liaison officer of the Company, had to officially
report to the LTO all the engine and chassis numbers prior to the assembly of any motor vehicle.
The Company had to secure a Conduct Permit for the road testing of vehicles assembled. After
road testing, vehicles had to be registered with the LTO. Garcia, as the Director of LTO CDO,
was the approving authority. By reason thereof, Garcia would regularly summon Yungao to his
office to tell him to inform either Aurora or Alonzo Chiong, the owners of the Company, the he
would borrow a vehicle in visiting his farm because he could not use the assigned government
vehicle for his own use during weekends in going to his farm. When Yungao could not be
contacted, Garcia would personally call the Company and talk to the owners to borrow the
vehicle. Although there was a Regulation Officer before whom the request is to be presented,
Yungao was often told to go straight up to the office of Garcia. Yungao testitfied that the names
and signatures of the persons who actually received the vehicles were reflected on the faces of
the delivery receipts but did not recognize the signatures because Yungao was not present when
the vehicles were taken.
Ma Lourdes Miranda was present when Yungao testified. The parties agreed to enter into
stipulations prior to her presentation that Miranda was the mother of a child Jane, who was run
over and killed in a vehicular accident; that the driver was Nabo; that Miranda discovered the
vehicle and numerous delivery receipts in the files of the Company; that such led to the
institution of the subject criminal cases against accused.
Aurora Chiong, the VP and Gen Manager of the Company, recounted that Garcia had a
farm and would borrow a vehicle from the Company on a weekly basis by asking her directly or
through Yungao. Each time Garcia would borrow, the Company would issue a delivery receipt
which would usually be sign by Chiong. On several occasions, Chiong had seen Nabo affixing
his signature on the delivery receipt before taking out the vehicles. She also testified that Garcia
would return the vehicle in the after of the same day and that there was only once when Garcia
returned the car the day after – when the car met an accident involving the death of Jane, the
daughter or Miranda. It was clarified that the cars borrowed by Garcia were all company service
cars and not newly assembled vehicles.
Garcia’s defense:
He testified that he was the Reg Dir of LTO and denied borrowing any motor vehicle from
the Company arguing that his signatures never appeared in the Delivery Receipts submitted by
prosecution. He added that he warned his subordinates against the borrowing of vehicles from
their friends but they merely turned a deaf ear. Lastly, his driver Nabo had, on several occasions,
driven motor vehicles and visited him at his farm, and that he rode with him in going home
without allegedly knowing that the vehicles driven by Nabo were merely borrowed from Nabo’s
friends.
On 6 May 2002, Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner on 56 counts of violation of Sec 3(b)
RA 3019, Tagupa was acquitted for lack of evidence, while the cases of Nabo, who remained at
large, were archived.
ISSUES:
W/N petitioner is guilty under Sec 3(b) RA 3019.
W/N petitioner is guilty of direct briber.
W/N petitioner is guilty of indirect bribery.
HELD:
No. The Court held that the prosecution failed to proved the existence of all (absence of the
4th) the elements of Sec 3(b) RA 3019 [PROMO]:
The offender is a public officer;
He requested or received a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit;
He made the request or receipt on behalf of the offender or any other person;
The request or receipt was made in connection with a contract or transaction with the
government;
He has the right to intervene, in an official capacity under the law, in connection with a contract
or transaction.
In the case at bar the prosecution did not specify what transactions the Company had with
the LTO that petitioner intervened in when he allegedly borrowed the vehicles from the
Company. It is insufficient that petitioner admitted that the Company has continually transacted
with his office.
To establish the existence of the 4th element, the relation of the fact of requesting and
receiving, and that of the transaction involved must be clearly shown. The allegation that the
Company regularly transacts with Garcia for the registration of their vehicles will not suffice
No. The Court ruled that there is utter lack of evidence adduced by the prosecution showing
that petitioner committed any of the 3 acts of direct bribery [CUR]:
By agreeing to perform, or by performing, in consideration of any offer, promise gift or present

an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties;
By accepting a gift in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime
but is unjust, in connection with the performance of his official duties;
By agreeing to refrain, or by refraining, from doing something which is his official duty to do, in
consideration of any gift or promise.
The two witnesses did not mention anything about petitioner asking for something in
exchange for his performance of, or abstaining to perform, an act in connection with his official
duty. In fact Atty. Aurora Chiong testified that the Company complied with all the requirements
without asking for any intervention from petitioner.
No. Indirect bribery is committed by a public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him
by reason of his office. The essential ingredient is that the public officer must have accepted the
gift or material consideration. In the case at bar, the prosecution was not able to show that
petitioner truly borrowed and received the vehicles. The prosecution claims that petitioner
received the vehicles via his representative. Contrary, the Court held that the delivery receipts o
not sufficiently prove that petitioner received the vehicles considering that his signatures do not
appear therein in addition, the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner’s
representatives who picked up the vehicles. If the identity of the person who allegedly picked up
the vehicle is uncertain, there can also be no certainty that it was petitioner who received the
vehicles in the end.
The Court ruled that the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are binding and conclusive
except [SM – GMW - P]:
When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
The inference made is manifestly mistaken;
There is a grave abuse of discretion;
The judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
Said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
Findings of facts are premised on the absence of evidence on the record.
Nonetheless, the Court held that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan is grounded on
speculation, surmise, and conjectures and not supported by evidence on record.
Qualified Bribery
20. Buenaventura v. Mabalot, A.M. No. P-09-2726, August 28, 2013
Corruption of Public Official
21. Disini v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 169823-24, Sept. 11, 2013

FACTS:
· June 30, 2004 – Office of the OMB SB- 2 information against Herminio Disini –
corruption of public officials, Art 212 in rel. to Art 210 (RPC) and violation of RA 3019.
Conspiring together and confederating with former Pres. Marcos. Taking advantage of close
personal relation, intimacy and free access
· Aug. 2 – Disini MTQ – crim actions has been extinguished by PRESCRIPTION and
information do not conform to the prescribed form OPPOSED
· Sept. 16 – Disini VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION for arraignment Plea of NOT GUILTY
to obtain the SB’s favorable action on his Motion for permission to travel abroad Jan. 17, 2005
– SB DENIED DISINI MR DENIED
· (Disini’s) challenged the jurisdiction of SB information did NOT allege that the charges
were being filed pursuant to and in connection with EO 1, 2, 14, 14-01; (2) allegations neither
pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth nor involved sequestration cases; (3) cases filed by
the OMB instead of PCGG; (4) private individual, NOT charged as co-principal, accomplice,
accessory of a public officers, should be in regular courts.
HELD: SB has OEJ over the offense charged

· SG SB has jurisdiction over the offense charged because the crim cases were filed within
the purview of SEC. 4(C) of RA 8242 and both complaints were initially filed by the PCGG
pursuant to its mandate.
He is involved in the same transaction, specifically the contacts awarded through his and
Marcos’ intervention in favor of Burns and Rose to do engineering and architectural design, and
Westinghouse to do the construction of the PNPPP.
Sec. 2, EO 1
· The offense have NOT yet prescribed
· In resolving the issue of prescription, the ff. must be considered:
1) The period of prescription for the offense;
2) The time when the period of prescriptions starts to run; and
3) The time when the prescriptive period is interrupted.
· GR: prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed.
ETR: “BLAMELESS IGNORANCE” DOCTRINE
(Incorporated in SEC. 2, ACT 3326)
- The statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which
will support a cause of action.
- In other words, the court would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff
does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of the cause of action.
Penalty of the offense charged = PRISION MAYOR
22. Go v. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, Sept. 3, 2007
Malversation
G.R. No. 172602 April 13, 2007
HENRY T. GO vs.THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Vicente C. Rivera, then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Henry Go, Chairman and President of
PIATCO, were charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Go, in relation to the voided 1997 Concession Agreement and the
Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) entered into by the government with
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO).
Petitioner Go contended that it was error to charge him with the violation given that he was not a
public officer, a necessary element of the offense under Sec 3(g) of RA 3019. He further assert
that conspiracy by a private party with a public officer is chargeable only with the offense under
Sec3(e).
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner Go, a private person, may be charged with violation of Sec 3(g) of RA
3019.
Ruling:
The application of the anti-graft law extends to both public officers and private persons.
Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found
guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019. This is in consonance
with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private
persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.
Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan is inapplicable to Go’s case. In the former, Dans, the public officer
and with whom Marcos had allegedly conspired with in committing Section 3(g) of RA 3019,
had already been acquitted. Marcos could then not be convicted, on her own as a private person,
of the said offense.
The finding of probable cause against petitioner by the Office of the Ombudsman is a function
duly belonging to the latter. The exercise of such function cannot be meddled with by the courts
by virtue of the doctrine of non-interference except for compelling reasons.
23. People v. Reyes, SB Case No. 26892, Aug. 15, 2006

24. Manhit vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. NO. 159349 Sep. 7, 2007
25. Manuel v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158413, February 8, 2012
26. Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, July 29, 2015

FACTS
The case stemmed from an anonymous complaint filed against Constantino-Zoleta, Gadian, and
Tangan before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao for participating in the scheme of
questionable grants and donations to fictitious entities using provincial funds. COA conducted
special audit and thereafter, the Ombudsman, charged the petitioner, Vice-Governor Felipe
Constantino, Violeta Bahilidad, Mari Camanay, and Teodorico Diaz with malversation of public
funds by falsification of public documents defined and penalized under Article 217.
The Sandiganbayan found the petitioner and Bahilidad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. It explained that the petitioner, who was Vice-Governor Constantino’s own
daughter and who held the position of Executive Assistant III in his office, committed the
following acts: (a) ordered Mary Ann Gadian, a computer operator at the Office of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani, to make a letter-request for financial assistance using a
nonexistent cooperative; (b) directed Jane Tangan, the Local Legislative Staff Officer of the
Office of the Vice-Governor, to falsify the signature of WIP’s secretary, Melanie Remulta, on
the request-letter; and (c) certified and approved the disbursement voucher; and then presented it
to Diaz, Camanay, and Vice-Governor Constantino for their respective signatures.
ISSUE
Whether or not Constantino-Zoleta is guilty of Malversation.
RULING
YES. The court ruled that the petitioner is guilty. Malversation may be committed by
appropriating public funds or property; by taking or misappropriating the same; by consenting, or
through abandonment or negligence, by permitting any other person to take such public funds or
property; or by being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property. SC enumerated elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, are the following: (a) that the offender be a public officer; (b)
that he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) that
those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d) that
he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them. All the elements of the crime were clearly and sufficiently
proved by the prosecution.
SC emphasized that malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or
the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the
mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and
conviction thereof is proper. All that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the
accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not have them in his possession when
demand therefor was made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct
evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary as long as the accused
cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in his accounts. Therefore, the petition was denied and
the decision of the Sandiganbayan was affirmed.
27. Torres v. People, G.R. No. 17504, Aug.t 31, 2011
FACTS
Jesus U. Torres was charged with the crime of Malversation of Public Funds before the Regional
Trial Court. Jesus Torres was the principal of Viga Rural Development High School. He directed
Edmundo Lazado, the school's collection and disbursing officer, to prepare the checks
representing the teachers' and employees' salaries, salary differentials, additional compensation
allowance and personal emergency relief allowance for the months of January to March, 1994.
Lazado prepared three checks in the total amount of P196,654.54, all dated April 26, 1994.
Torres and Amador Borre, Head Teacher III, signed the three checks. Upon the instruction of the
Torres, Lazado endorsed the checks and handed them to him. It was the custom in the school for
Lazado to endorse the checks representing the teachers' salaries and for the accused to encash
them at PNB, Virac Branch and deliver the cash to Lazado for distribution to the teachers. The
following day, the accused encashed the three checks at PNB but he never returned to the school
to deliver the money to Lazado. For his defense, Torres claimed that instead of going back to the
school, he proceeded to the airport and availed of the flight to Manila to seek medical attention
for his chest pain. Two days after, around 4:30am of April 29, 1994, while he and his nephew
were on the road waiting for a ride, three armed men held them up and took his bag containing
his personal effects and the proceeds of the subject checks. He reported the incident to the police
authorities, but he failed to recover the money.
After finding that the prosecution has established all the elements of the offense charged, the
RTC rendered a Decision convicting petitioner of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.
Torres appealed the case to the CA, which it dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE Whether Torres may be held guilty of the crime of malversation under Art 217 (YES)
RULING He is an accountable officer within the contemplation of Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, hence, is untenable. An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code, is one who has custody or control of public funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office. The nature of the duties of the public officer or employee, the
fact that as part of his duties he received public money for which he is bound to account and
failed to account for it, is the factor which determines whether or not malversation is committed
by the accused public officer or employee. Hence, a school principal of a public high school,
such as petitioner, may be held guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with public funds
and misappropriates the same. Petitioner also posits that he could not be convicted under the
allegations in the Information without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the
accusations against him. He maintains that the Information clearly charged him with intentional
malversation and not malversation through negligence, which was the actual nature of
malversation for which he was convicted by the trial court. This too lacks merit. Malversation
may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property,
or passively through negligence. To sustain a charge of malversation,
there must either be criminal intent or criminal negligence, and while the prevailing facts of a
case may not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the
reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both are equally punishable
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. More in point, the felony involves breach of public
trust, and whether it is committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and
prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the Information charges willful malversation,
conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately
proves the mode of commission of the offense.
28. Cifranca, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94408, Feb. 14, 1991
29. Panganiban v. People, G.R. No. 211543, December 9, 2015
30. People v. Pajaro, G.R. Nos. 167860-65, June 17, 2008
Facts;
The Sandiganbayan which found appellants guilty of four (4) counts of malversation of public
funds through falsification of public documents and two (2) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. Appellant Teddy M. Pajaro (Pajaro) was the Municipal Mayor of
Lantapan, Bukidnon from 1989 to 1998; while appellants Crispina Aben (Aben) and Flor S.
Libertad (Libertad) served as acting Municipal Accountant and Municipal Treasurer
respectively. During their term of office, they allegedly caused the irregular disbursement of
public funds as financial assistance pursuant to livelihood projects and IEC-Peace and Order
Program in the respective amounts of P179,000.00 and P140,000.00. In a special audit of certain
disbursements made during Pajaro's administration, State Auditor Rogelio Tero (Auditor Tero)
noted that P74,000.00 of the money disbursed was not actually received by the intended
beneficiaries who were chosen arbitrarily; and that the disbursements were irregularly processed
and released to the prejudice of the local government.
For his part, appellant Pajaro claimed that the disbursements were properly made pursuant to
approved resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan and the Municipal Development Council and
were provided for in the Municipal Budget Plan for 1998. He stated that as municipal mayor, his
role was limited to approving the vouchers with respect to the disbursement of local funds and he
usually does not have any personal knowledge whether the amounts disbursed were received by
the intended beneficiaries except in the case of Penar whom he personally know and Lacerna
whose brother received the money on her behalf. He insisted that the subject documents were
executed according to procedure save for the budget officer's certification because the municipal
budget officer unjustifiably refused to affix his signature on the documents despite the
supporting attachments.
On January 19, 2005, the Sandiganbayan finds the three accused, Teddy Pajaro, Crispina Aben,
and Flor Libertad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the six (6)
informations. Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
Sandiganbayan; hence this appeal.
Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellants are charged, in conspiracy with each other, with the complex crime of Malversation
of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents defined and penalized under Article 217,
in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows:
a.) The offender is a public officer;
b.) He has custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
c.) The funds or property are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
d.) He has appropriated, taken, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or

negligence, permitted another person to take them.
It is undisputed that appellants are all public officers and the funds allegedly misappropriated are
public in character. Appellant Libertad, by reason of her office as Municipal Treasurer had
custody and control of such funds and is therefore accountable for the same. Ordinarily, a
municipality's mayor and accountant are not accountable public officers as defined under the
law. However, a public officer who is not in charge of public funds or property by virtue of his
official position, or even a private individual, may be liable for malversation if such public
officer or private individual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit
malversation, as in the instant case. In finding that appellants misappropriated the said public
funds, the Sandiganbayan ruled on the authenticity of the signatures of the alleged beneficiaries
Penar and Lacerna on the disbursement vouchers.
There is no doubt that appellants facilitated the illegal release of the funds by signing the subject
vouchers. Without their signatures, said monies could not have been disbursed. Pajaro, as Mayor,
initiated the request for obligation of allotments and certified and approved the disbursement
vouchers; Aben, as Acting Municipal Accountant, obligated the allotments despite lack of prior
certification from the budget officer. Municipal Treasurer Libertad certified to the availability of
funds and released the money even without the requisite budget officer's certification. Their
combined acts, coupled with the falsification of the signatures of Penar and Lacerna, all lead to
the conclusion that appellants conspired to defraud the government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 19, 2005 Decision of the Sandiganbayan
finding appellants guilty of four (4) counts of malversation of public funds through falsification
of public documents and two (2) counts of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as well as the
March 21, 2005 Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
31. Pondevida vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 160929-31 August 16, 2005
FACTS:
Based on the submitted cashbook of Pondevida, the State auditors discovered that the Pondevida
had a shortage of P1,176,580.59. Thus, 3 Informations for malversation of public funds through
falsification of commercial documents relating to the checks disbursements were filed in the
Sandiganbayan against Mayor Amigable, Pondevida, and three private individuals, namely,
Victor Grande, Norma Tiu and Glenn Celis. Allegedly, Amigable and Pondevida, public officers,
conniving with one VICTOR GRANDE, a private individual and proprietor of V.N. Grande
Enterprises, falsified a commercial document consisting of a check of LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, with V.N. Grande Enterprises as the payee, by making it appear therein that the
municipality of Badiangan has some accounts payable to V.N. Grande Enterprises for some
purchases. Sandiganbayan convicted Rene Pondevida, the Municipal Treasurer of Badiangan,

Iloilo, of three counts of the complex crime of malversation of public funds through falsification
of commercial documents. AMIGABLE and GRANDE and the Mayor were acquitted.
ISSUE: WON PONDEVIDA IS GUILTY OF MALVERSATION under ARTICLE 217 of the
RPC- YES!
HELD:
The essential elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code are the following:
(a) That the offender be a public officer. (b) That he had the custody or control of funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office. (c) That those funds or property were public funds
or property for which he was accountable. (d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
A public officer may be liable for malversation even if he does not use public property or funds
under his custody for his personal benefit, but consents to the taking thereof by another person,
or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted such taking. In the present case, the petitioner
does not dispute the fact that, by his overt acts of drawing and issuing the checks to the order of
Victor Grande, Glenn Celis and Norma Tiu, they were able to encash the checks. Even if the
petitioner received P893,860.67 from them on June 15, 1997, a day after the checks were
encashed, by then, the felonies of malversation had already been consummated. Case law has it
that the individuals' taking of funds is completed and is consummated even if the severance of
the funds from the possession was only for an instant. Restitution of the said amount after the
consummation of the crimes is not a ground for acquittal of the said crimes. On the petitioner's
claim that he deposited the amount of P893,890.67 with the LBP on June 15, 1995 as evidenced
by the deposit slips, SC held that it was petitioner's burden to prove that the said amount was part
of the deposit he made with the LBP on June 15, 1997, but he failed to do so.
32. Escobar vs. People, G.R. No. 205576, November 20, 2017
FACTS:
An audit was made by the Commission on Audit (COA) in Sarangani Province. It was
discovered that the Province’s grant of financial assistance had irregularities and violates COA
Circular No. 96-003. The audit team submitted their findings to then Governor Escobar and other
public officers who are accountable to such government funds. Upon investigation, the financial
assistance to a certain market vendors association in the province was illegally appropriated and
the documents falsified due to the verification of the said association denying that they received
such financial assistance for the rehabilitation of their public market. Furthermore, the payee in
the disbursement vouchers and the checks issued were of different persons and all of which are
fictitious names and cannot be located. Due to this findings an information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan against the petitioners. On their defense, particularly Governor Escobar, Cagang
and Telesforo allege that they should not be held liable for malversation because they are not
accountable public officer which have in their custody the said public fund. In its assailed
decision, the Sandiganbayan find that Escobar, et al. are guilty of malversation through
negligence and finding them accountable because their signature is required to disburse funds
from the treasury of Sarangani Province. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are liable for malversation through negligence.
RULING
The petitioners Escobar, Telesforo and Cagang are criminally liable for malversation because as
accountable public officers they did not exercise due diligence in the performance of their duties
and allowed the misappropriation of public funds. Citing the case of Cruz vs. Sandiganbayan an
exceptional circumstance exist which would negate the application of Arias vs. Sandiganbayan
were the public officer should be on guard when examining checks and vouchers coupled with
some degree of circumspection before signing it and not simply relying on the recommendations
of his subordinates
In this case, the disbursement vouchers and the checks have different payees which should have
prompted the petitioners to prod on the matter and examine the documents before attaching his
signature thereat and relying heavily on the recommendations of his subordinates.
Hence, the petitioners, Escobar, Telesforo and Cagang are criminally liable for malversation
through negligence.
33. Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103507, February 17, 1997

Facts:
Luis Tabuena as General Manager of MIAA received direct order from Marcos to pay directly to
his office sum of 55mio in cash to pay for MIAAs liability to PNCC. He then received
Presidential Memorandum from Fe Gimenez (secretary). The money was delivered in cash in
three withdrawals, no vouchers prepared to support the disbursement although Gimenez issued a
receipt on the third delivery for the entire amount. Tabuena was accused and convicted of the
crime of malversation by Sandiganbayan for defrauding the government, taking and
misappropriating money when there is no outstanding obligation between MIAA and PNCC.
Petitioner contended that he was acting in good faith when the office of the president directed
him to deliver the said amount to his office – “person who acts in obedience to an order issued
by a superior for some lawful purpose.”
Issue:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan violated due process on the ground of departing from that
common standard of fairness and impartiality?
Held:
Sandiganbayan decision reversed and set aside. Tabuena and Peralta are acquitted of the crime of
malversation. The majority believes that the interference by the Sandiganbayan Justices was just
too excessive that it cannot be justified under the norm applied to a jury trial, or even under the
standard employed in a non-jury trial where the judge is admittedly given more leeway in
propounding questions to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence.
It is never proper for a judge to discharge the duties of a prosecuting attorney. However anxious
a judge may be for the enforcement of the law, he should always remember that he is as much
judge in behalf of the defendant accused of crime, and whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge
in behalf of the state, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of society.
34. Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 93885, May 14, 1991

FACTS:
As found by respondent court, petitioner, in his official capacity as postmaster of San Juan,
Southern Leyte, was audited of his cash and accounts for the period from August 29, 1984 to
May 28, 1985. The audit examination disclosed that petitioner incurred a shortage of
P160,905.63. Required to produce immediately the missing funds and to explain in writing
within seventy-two (72) hours the fact of shortage, petitioner neither restituted the missing sum
nor made any written explanation.- As a consequence, petitioner was charged with malversation
of public funds before respondent Sandiganbayan. Arraigned on May 4, 1989, with the assistance
of counsel, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After trial, however, respondent
Sandiganbayan rendered a judgment of conviction. Petitioner argued that he cannot be convicted
of intentional malversation since there is no evidence showing that he appropriated the funds for
his personal use. Petitioner contends that he has sufficiently overthrown said presumption by his
account of the items for which the funds were supposedly expended. Corollarily, petitioner
argues that he can neither be convicted of malversation through negligence since the information
does not charge such mode of commission, hence "(o)f that mode of committing malversation,
he was not legally informed." He theorizes that an accused charged with intentional malversation
cannot be convicted of malversation through negligence.-
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of violating Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
HELD:
Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds
or property of passively through negligence by allowing another to commit such
misappropriation. Nonetheless, all that is necessary to prove in both acts are the following: (a)
that the defendant received in his possession public funds or property (b) that he could not
account for them and did not have them in his possession when audited; and (c) that he could not
give a satisfactory or reasonable excuse for the disappearance of said funds or property. An
accountable officer may thus be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of
misappropriation and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in the officer's accounts which
he has not been able to explain satisfactorily:
There is no dispute that the presumption of malversation under said Article 217 of the Code is
merely prima facie and rebuttable and that the presumption is deemed overthrown if the
accountable public officer satisfactorily proves that not a single centavo of the missing funds was
used by him for his personal interest but that the funds were extended as cash advances to co-
employees in good faith, in the belief that they were for legitimate purposes, with no intent to
gain and out of goodwill considering that it was a practice tolerated in the office. But petitioner
has failed to prove good and valid reasons for his failure to justify how the amount of
P160,905.63 was spent, aside from the fact that the same remains unpaid. He cannot exculpate
himself on the bare asseveration that most of the missing funds were "vales" to postal personnel
since he was thoroughly aware that the giving of such "vales" was violative of post office rules
and regulations.
As earlier mentioned, petitioner insists that he cannot be convicted of intentional malversation on
the basis of the evidence of the prosecution, nor can he be convicted of malversation through
negligence as he is not so charged in the information.
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in
the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs
from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is
proper. A possible exception would be when the mode of commission alleged in the particulars
of the indictment is so far removed from the ultimate categorization of the crime that it may be
said due process was denied by deluding the accused into an erroneous comprehension of the
charge against him. That no such prejudice was occasioned on petitioner nor was he beleaguered
in his defense is apparent from the records of this case.
35. Legrama v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 178626, June 13, 2012
FACTS: Office of the Provincial Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA), Zambales directed
an Audit Team to conduct an examination of the cash and account of petitioner Cecilia Legrama,
the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales. The COA prepared a
Special Cash Examination Report on the Cash and Accounts of petitioner which contained the
findings that petitioners cash accountability has a shortage in the amount of P1,152,900.75. From
the total amount of the shortage, petitioner was able to restitute the initial amount of P60,000.00.
Consequently, petitioner and Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida), the Municipal Mayor were
charged in an Informationwith the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. Both petitioner and
Lonzanida voluntarily surrendered and posted their respective cash bonds. Sandiganbayan
rendered a Decision acquitting Lonzanida (lack of proof that is conspired with petitioner).
However, the tribunal concluded that petitioner malversed the total amount of P1,131,595.05 and
found her guilty of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. The amount involved in the
instant case is more than Php22,000.00. Hence, pursuant to the provisions of Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua. Considering the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of
two mitigating circumstances, viz., accused Legramas voluntary surrender and partial restitution
of the amount involved in the instant case, and being entitled to the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 4
years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as maximum. Further, she is ordered to pay the amount of Php299,204.65, representing
the balance of her incurred shortage after deducting therein the restituted amount of
Php832,390.40 and the Php200.00 covered by an Official Receipt dated August 18, 1996 issued
in the name of the Municipality of San Antonio (Exhibit 22). She is also ordered to pay a fine
equal to the amount malversed which is Php1,131,595.05 and likewise suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and to pay costs.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is guilty of Malversation of Public funds and is entitled of 2
mitigating circumstances. RULING: Yes. Undoubtedly, all the elements of the crime are present
in the case at bar. First, it is undisputed that petitioner was the municipal treasurer at the time
material to this case. Second, it is the inherent function of petitioner, being the municipal
treasurer, to take custody of and exercise proper management of the local governments funds.
Third, the parties have stipulated during the pre-trial of the case that petitioner received the
subject amount as public
funds and that petitioner is accountable for the same. Fourth, petitioner failed to rebut the prima
facie presumption that she has put such missing funds to her personal use. Verily, in the crime of
malversation of public funds, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable
officer had received the public funds and that he failed to account for the said funds upon
demand without offering sufficient explanation why there was a shortage. In fine, petitioners
failure to present competent and credible evidence that would exculpate her and rebut the prima
facie presumption of malversation clearly warranted a verdict of conviction. As for the
appropriate penalty, since the amount involved is more than P22,000.00, pursuant to the
provisions of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. However, as aptly concluded by the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner enjoys the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
restitution. Although restitution is akin to voluntary surrender, as provided for in paragraph 7 of
Article 13, in relation to paragraph 10 of the same Article of the Revised Penal Code, restitution
should be treated as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused when the two
circumstances are present in a case, which is similar to instances where voluntary surrender and
plea of guilty are both present even though the two mitigating circumstances are treated in the
same paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering that restitution is also
tantamount to an admission of guilt on the part of the accused, it was proper for the
Sandiganbayan to have considered it as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner.
Taking into consideration the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of two
mitigating circumstance, i.e., petitioners voluntary surrender and partial restitution of the amount
malversed, the prescribed penalty is reduced to prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, which has a range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months. In accordance with paragraph 1, Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code.] and considering that there are no other mitigating circumstance present, the maximum
term should now be the medium period of prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal
medium, which is reclusion temporal minimum and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum term should be anywhere within the period of prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor medium. Hence, the penalty imposed needs modification. Accordingly, petitioner
is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
36. Venezuela vs. People, G.R. No. 205693, February 14, 2018
Facts:
Venezuela was the Municipal Mayor of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan from 1986 to June 30, 1998.[4]
On June 10, 1998, a team of auditors composed of State Auditors II Ramon Ruiz (Ruiz), Rosario
Llarenas, and Pedro Austria conducted an investigation on the cash and accounts of Pacita
Costes (Costes), then Municipal Treasurer of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, for the period covering
December 4, 1997 to June 10, 1998.
In the course of the investigation, the Audit Team discovered a shortage of Php 2,872,808.00 on
the joint accounts of Costes and Venezuela.
Consequently, team member Ruiz issued three demand letters to Venezuela, ordering him to
liquidate his cash advances. In response, Venezuela sent an explanation letter acknowledging his
accountability for the cash advances amounting to Php 943,200.00, while denying the remainder
of the cash advances. An audit report was thereafter submitted by the Team. Venezuela denied
the truth of the contents thereof.[10]
Meanwhile, on March 20, 2000, an Information[11] was filed by the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, accusing Venezuela of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, as
defined and penalized under Article 217 of the RPC
On May 3, 2000, the Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest for the immediate apprehension of
Venezuela.[13]
On May 11, 2000, Venezuela voluntarily surrendered, and posted bail. However, Costes
remained at large.[14]
Venezuela moved for reconsideration and reinvestigation of the case, which was denied by the
Office of the Special Prosecutor in a Memorandum dated January 14, 2001.[15]
Thereafter, the trial of the case proceeded, but only with respect to Venezuela.
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented witnesses, in the persons of Ruiz, State
Auditor II of the COA and Unit Head of the Municipal Audit Team of Binalonan, Pangasinan;
[16] and Marita Laquerta (Laquerta), Municipal Accountant of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.[17]
Ruiz affirmed that on June 10, 1998, he, together with other state auditors, conducted an
investigation on the cash and accounts of Costes, for the period of December 4, 1997 until June
10, 1998.
They likewise discovered that Venezuela was not bonded or authorized to receive cash advances.
Ruiz further confirmed that they issued demand letters to Venezuela, who admitted
accountability for the cash advances amounting to Php 943,200.00.
On the other hand, Laquerta confirmed that the signatures appearing on 16 of the 17 illegal
disbursement vouchers belonged to Venezuela, who was the claimant under the said vouchers.
[21]
Upon cross-examination, Laquerta related that Venezuela remitted the amount of Php 300,000.00
on November 6, 1998.[22] This reduced the total amount of Venezuela's unliquidated cash
advances to Php 2,572,808.00, as reflected in the Final Demand Letter sent by the COA Auditors
to Venezuela.[23]
On the other hand, Venezuela vehemently denied the charge leveled against him. To corroborate
his claim of innocence, he testified, alongside his other witnesses, namely, Arthur C. Caparas
(Caparas), Venezuela's Executive Assistant I; and Manuel D. Ferrer (Ferrer), Senior Bookkeeper
of Pozorrubio from 1994 to 2004, among others.
Venezuela declared that he submitted to then Municipal Treasurer Costes all the supporting
documents to liquidate his cash advances before the end of his term in June 1998.
Further, he asserted that he remitted the amount of Php 2,572,808.00, in installments to Costes.
In fact, he asserted that his payment was evidenced by official receipts bearing the following
serial numbers and dates,... Supporting the claim of liquidation, Caparas affirmed that Venezuela
liquidated his cash advances through his private secretary who submitted the same to the
Municipal Treasurer.[25]
Likewise, Ferrer related that he saw Venezuela going to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer to
submit the liquidation of his cash advances. However, on cross-examination, Ferrer admitted that
he did not actually see Venezuela liquidating his cash advances.[26]
On rebuttal by the prosecution, Zoraida Costales (Costales), Officer in Charge in the Municipal
Treasurer's Office of Pozorrubio, testified that as per records of the Municipal Treasurer's Office,
the receipts presented by Venezuela, which purportedly evidence his payment of the unliquidated
cash advances, did not actually reflect the payments so claimed by Venezuela.
Rather, the receipts were issued to different persons, in different amounts and for different
purposes.
Moreover, during the period shown in the official receipts presented by Venezuela, Costes, the
alleged issuer of the receipts, was no longer holding office at the Municipal Treasurer's Office.
Similarly, Laquerta attested that she never encountered the receipts presented by Venezuela, and
that as per records, the last cash liquidation made by Venezuela was in November 1998, in the
amount of Php 300,000.00.[28]
On May 10, 2012, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision[29] convicting
Venezuela of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. The Sandiganbayan held that the
prosecution proved all the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan opined that Venezuela's defense of payment was
unsubstantiated.[33] The serial numbers in the receipts he presented as proof of his purported
payment revealed that they were issued to other payees and for different purposes. Moreover,
Costes, to whom Venezuela allegedly remitted his payments, was no longer the Municipal
Treasurer of Pozorrubio during the dates when the supposed payments were made.
However, the Sandiganbayan acknowledged that Venezuela made a partial refund of his
liabilities, thereby reducing his unliquidated cash advances to Php 2,572,808.00. The
Sandiganbayan considered such refund as a mitigating circumstance akin to voluntary surrender.
Aggrieved, Venezuela filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[38] which was denied in the
Sandiganbayan Resolution[39] dated February 4, 2013.
Undeterred, Venezuela filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[40] under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court, praying for the reversal of the assailed Sandiganbayan decision and
resolution.
Issues:
whether or not the prosecution failed to establish Venezuela's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The instant petition is bereft of merit.

It must be noted at the outset that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court over the decisions and
final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of law. As a general rule, the Court does
not review the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan, which are conclusive upon the Court.
The resolution of the issues raised in the instant case, which pertains to the finding of guilt
rendered by the Sandiganbayan, involves a calibration of the evidence, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the existence and the relevance of surrounding circumstances,[54] which are
beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari.
At any rate, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any reversible error in convicting Venezuela of
Malversation of Public Funds.
Technical Malversation
37. Dela Cuesta v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 160468-69, Nov. 19, 2013
Facts:
On February 9, 1995 the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) filed two separate informations
against former members of the Governing Board of the Philippine Coconut Administration
(PCA), including its chairman, accused Rolando P. De La Cuesta, and a member, Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr.,... before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases 22017 and 22018. They were
charged with granting financial assistance of P2 million in 1984[1] and P6 million in 1985[2] to
the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED), a nationwide... association of
coconut farmers, in violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act).
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally donate and/or extend financial assistance to... the Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED), a private entity... which sum was taken from the
Special Funds of the Philippine Coconut Authority... and... that the same amount was not
included in the budget Fund 503, thereby giving unwarranted benefit in favor of the Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED) and, consequently, causing undue injury to the
Government in the aforestated amount.
Issues:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in failing to hold that the accused may be held for trial,
using the same criminal informations, for the crime of technical malversation under Article 220
of the Revised Penal Code;
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in declining to dismiss the criminal actions against the
accused on the ground of denial of their right to speedy trial.
Ruling:
Apparently conscious that its charge of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 against the
accused had not been strong, the prosecution claims that the latter may alternatively be
prosecuted and tried under the same informations for two counts of technical malversation under
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
The rule of course is that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not by the caption
of the information or the citation of the law allegedly violated but by the actual recital of facts in
that information.[56] Consequently, the issue is... whether the facts alleged in the informations in
the subject criminal cases make out a case for the crime of technical malversation.
38. Abdulla v. People, G.R. No. 150129, April 6, 2005

Facts:
Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illegal use of public
funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, or more commonly
known as technical malversation, appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this Court on
petition for review under Rule 45. Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was
charged under an Information which pertinently reads: That on or about November, 1989 or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL,
both public officers, being then the President and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College,
and as such by reason of their positions and duties are accountable for public funds under their
administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with
MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said
school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply
for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00),
Philippine Currency, which amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials
of secondary school teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public
service .Appellant’s co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only
appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its decision. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellant’s sentence by deleting the temporary
special disqualification imposed upon her. Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court,
persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged.
Issue:
1) Whether or not there was unlawful intent on the appellant’s part.
2) Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation is present.
Held:
The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its reliance on Section 5 (b) of
Rule 131 as basis for its imputation of criminal intent upon appellant. The presumption of
criminal intent will not automatically apply to all charges of technical malversation because
disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot
be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College
to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under
existing civil service laws. There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose –
payment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent
to note the high priority which laborers’ wages enjoy as claims against the employers’ funds and
resources. Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Absent this required quantum of evidence
would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The Sandiganbayan’s improper reliance on Sec.
5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the day for the prosecution’s deficiency in proving the existence
of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional presumption of innocence
to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent, this Court has no basis to affirm appellant’s
conviction. 2. The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of
secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime
of technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated
by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and
Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of
salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty
thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the
terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty
of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically
appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth
elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case.
Acquittal is thus in order.
Infidelity of Public Officers
39. U.S. v. Bandino, 29 Phil 459
40. Rodillas vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-58652 May 20, 1988
Facts:
Rodillas, as a policeman, charged to deliver and return a detention prisoner. Petitioner allows and
permits the detention prisoner to have snack and enter the comfort room without first
ascertaining whether the said comfort room is safe and without any egress by which the said
detention prisoner could escape. Thus, the detention prisoner enabled to escape thru the window
inside the comfort room and ran away from the custody of the said accused.
Issue:
whether or not the petitioner violated the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner thru
Negligence.
Ruling: Yes. The elements of the crime are: a) that the offender is a public officer; b) that he is
charged with the conveyance or custody of a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoner by
final judgment; and c) that such prisoner escapes through his negligence. There is no question
that the petitioner is a public officer. Neither is there any dispute as to the fact that he was
charged with the custody of a prisoner. It is evident from the records that the petitioner acted
negligently and beyond the scope of his authority when he permitted his charge to create the
situation which led to her escape. As a police officer who was charged with the duty to return the
prisoner directly to jail, the deviation from his duty was clearly a violation of the regulations.
41. Zapanta v. People, G.R. Nos. 192698-99, April 22, 2015)
Anti-Torture Act
42. Lagman vs. Medeldea
FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring
Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the president submitted a written report to Congress on the
factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as required by the Constitution). The main basis of
the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the
report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in
Marawi City (and might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the
ongoing rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privelege of writ of habeas corpus
RATIO DECIDENDI: In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to
or at the time of the declaration. The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual
basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and
Proclamation. The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had
sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to
ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus. The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified
news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the
contents thereof. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice
removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than
proving the truth of the matter asserted. The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just
pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other
independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists.
43. Rubrico v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, Feb. 18, 2010 concurring opinion of
Justice Brion R.A. No. 3019
FACTS : On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa
Adhikan, was abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security
Squadron (AISS) based in Lipa City while attending a Lenten pabasa in Dasmarinas, Cavite. She
was brought to and detained at the air base without charges. She was released a week after
relentless interrogation, but only after she signed a statement that she would be a military asset.
Despite her release, she was tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed a complaint with
the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and
grave misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan, but nothing has happened.
She likewise reported the threats and harassment incidents to the Dasmarinas municipal and
Cavite provincial police stations , but nothing eventful resulted from their investigation.
Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation which indicated that
men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abduction of Lourdes.
Based on such information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ of amparo with the Supreme
Court on 25 October 2007, praying that respondents be ordered to desist from performing any
threatening act against the security of petitioners and for the Ombudsman to immediately file an
information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the
offended party. Rubrico also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents
submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes. The Supreme Court issued the desired writ and
then referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for summary hearing and appropriate
action. At the hearing conducted on 20 November 2007, the CA granted petitioner’s motion that
the petition and writ be served on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma, and Jonathan.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case. On 31 July
2008, after due proceedings, the CA rendered its partial judgment, dismissing the petition with
respect to Esperon, Razon, Roquero, Gomez, and Ombudsman.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo
petition.
ANSWER: No. SUPREME RULINGS:
COURT DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY and THE WRIT OF AMPARO
Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings –
[C]ommand responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law,
has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. The evolution of the command responsibility
doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr.
Bernas, command responsibility, in its si mplest terms, means the responsibility of commanders
for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to
their control in international wars or domestic conflict. In this sense, command responsibility is
properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of
command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of
control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is an omission mode of
individual criminal liability, whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by
his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators. There is no Philippine law that
provides for criminal liability under the Doctrine of Command Responsibility – While there are
several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides for
criminal liability under that doctrine. It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility,
as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra -legal killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the
command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary

international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.
44. Serana v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008
Fact:
Petitioner was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu was appointed by then
President Joseph Estrada as a student regent of UP. petitioner discussed with President Estrada
the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. petitioner, with her siblings and relatives,
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons
Hall Annex. President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as
financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the
information, was the Office of the President. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize. The succeeding student regent, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of
Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman who after due investigation, found
probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother for estafa in the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have
any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student
regent, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. It has
no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa that It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title
VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the
RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Petitioner likewise posited that as a student
regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, She further
contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. The Ombudsman
opposed the motion. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit. The
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied with finality, hence this case.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has Jurisdiction over the Petitioner who is not Salary Grade 27, not
compensated and merely represented her peers in the Board of Regent, and the crime committed
was not within the its Jurisdiction.
Held: Yes, The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible
construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis
semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Evidently, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to
their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses
included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public
officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b)
the offense is committed in relation to their office.
It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The court
held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and
higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be
of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is
placed there by express provision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested
the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR
performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation By express
mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
45. Baluyot vs. Holganza, G.R. No. 136374, February 9, 2000
FACTS: During a spot audit conducted on March 21, 1977 by a team of auditors from the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) headquarters, a cash shortage of P154,350.13 was
discovered in the funds of its Bohol chapter. The chapter administrator, petitioner Francisca S.
Baluyot, was held accountable for the shortage. Thereafter, private respondent Paul E. Holganza,
in his capacity as a member of the board of directors of the Bohol chapter, filed an affidavit-
complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman charging petitioner of malversation under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code. However, upon recommendation by respondent Anna Marie P.
Militante, Graft Investigation. Officer I, an administrative docket for dishonesty was also opened
against petitioner. On March 14, 1998, petitioner filed her counter-affidavit, raising principally
the defense that public respondent had no jurisdiction over the controversy. She argued that the
Ombudsman had authority only over government-owned or controlled corporations, which the
PNRC was not, or so she claimed. Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the controversy since the PNRC is allegedly a private voluntary
organization. The following circumstances, she insists, are indicative of the private character of
the organization: (1) the PNRC does not receive any budgetary support from the government,
and that all money given to it by the latter and its instrumentalities become private funds of the
organization; (2) funds for the payment of personnel's salaries and other emoluments come from
yearly fund campaigns, private contributions and rentals from its properties; and (3) it is not
audited by the Commission on Audit. Petitioner states that the PNRC falls under the
International Federation of Red Cross, a Switzerland based organization, and that the power to
discipline employees accused of misconduct, malfeasance, or immorality belongs to the PNRC
Secretary General by virtue of its by-laws. She threatens that "to classify the PNRC as a
governmentowned or controlled corporation would create a dangerous precedent as it would lose

its neutrality, independence and impartiality.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS IS A GOVERNMENT-OWNED
AND CONTROLLED CORPORATION.
HELD: YES. Following the ruling in Camporedondo v. National Labor Relations Commission,
et. al., Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government owned and controlled
corporation, with an original charter under Republic Act No. 95, as amended. The test to
determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is
simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation
under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations
subject to its provisions, and its employees are under
the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory members of the
Government Service Insurance System. The PNRC was not "impliedly converted to a private
corporation" simply because its charter was amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be
exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges of all kinds on all
importations and purchases for its exclusive use, on donations for its disaster relief work and
other services and in its benefits and fund raising drives, and be allotted one lottery draw a year
by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office for the support of its disaster relief operation in
addition to its existing lottery draws for blood program.
46. Ombudsman vs. Andutan, G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011
Facts: Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty
Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, then Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued a Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those
occupying political positions to vacate their positions effective July 1, 1998. On July 1, 1998,
pursuant to the Memorandum, Andutan resigned from the DOF.
On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Antonio P. Belicena, former Undersecretary,

DOF; Rowena P. Malonzo, Tax Specialist I, DOF; Benjamin O. Yao, Chairman and Executive
Officer, Steel Asia Manufacturing Corporation (Steel Asia); Augustus S. Lapid, Vice-President,
Steel Asia; Antonio M. Lorenzana, President and Chief Operating Officer, Steel Asia; and
Eulogio L. Reyes, General Manager, Devmark Textiles Ind. Inc., was criminally charged by the
Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. As government
employees, Andutan, Belicena and Malonzo were likewise administratively charged of Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service.
The criminal and administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax
Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others.
Issue: Whether or not Andutan may still be charged for offenses committed during his tenure in
the public office despite his involuntary resignation.
Held: Yes. The Ombudsman relies on Section VI(1) of Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 38 for this proposition, viz.:
An officer or investigation may be allowed to resign pending decision of his case but it shall be
without prejudice to the continuation of the proceeding against him. It shall also be without
prejudice to the filing of any administrative, criminal case against him for any act committed
while still in the service. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To recall, we have held in the past that a public officials resignation does not render moot an
administrative case that was filed prior to the officials resignation. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., we
held that:
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan [A.M. No. P-03-1726, 22 July 2004, 434 SCRA
654, 658], this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government
employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot
the administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability
when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the
finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable [Baquerfo v.
Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974, 6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 13, 19-20]. [emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the
Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to accept
the Ombudsmans position that Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him, his forced
resignation negates the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of the administrative case.
Having established the inapplicability of prevailing jurisprudence, we turn our attention to the
provisions of Section VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38. We disagree with the
Ombudsmans interpretation that as long as the breach of conduct was committed while the public
official or employee was still in the service x x x a public servants resignation is not a bar to his
administrative investigation, prosecution and adjudication. If we agree with this interpretation,
any official even if he has been separated from the service for a long time may still be subject to
the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad infinitum. We believe that this interpretation is
inconsistent with the principal motivation of the law which is to improve public service and to
preserve the publics faith and confidence in the government, and not the punishment of the
public official concerned. Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed inimical
to the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same.
First, although we have held that the resignation of an official does not render an administrative
case moot and academic because accessory penalties may still be imposed, this holding must be
read in its proper context. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., indeed, we held:
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the
parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case [Tantoy, Sr. v.
Abrogar, G.R. No. 156128, 9 May 2005, 458 SCRA 301, 305]. The instant case is not moot and
academic, despite the petitioners separation from government service. Even if the most severe of
administrative sanctions – that of separation from service – may no longer be imposed on the
petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of
administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government
office and the forfeiture of benefits. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Second, we agree with the Ombudsman that fitness to serve in public office x x x is a question of
transcendental importance and that preserving the inviolability of public office compels the state
to prevent the re-entry to public service of persons who have x x x demonstrated their absolute
lack of fitness to hold public office. However, the State must perform this task within the limits
set by law, particularly, the limits of jurisdiction. As earlier stated, under the Ombudsmans
theory, the administrative authorities may exercise administrative jurisdiction over subordinates
ad infinitum; thus, a public official who has validly severed his ties with the civil service may
still be the subject of an administrative complaint up to his deathbed. This is contrary to the law
and the public policy behind it.
Lastly, the State is not without remedy against Andutan or any public official who committed
violations while in office, but had already resigned or retired therefrom. Under the threefold
liability rule, the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal
and administrative liability. Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file an administrative case
against a public official who has already resigned or retired, the Ombudsman may still file
criminal and civil cases to vindicate Andutans alleged transgressions. In fact, here, the
Ombudsman through the FFIB filed a criminal case for Estafa and violations of Section 3(a), (e)
and (j) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against Andutan. If found guilty, Andutan
will not only be meted out the penalty of imprisonment, but also the penalties of perpetual
disqualification from office, and confiscation or forfeiture of any prohibited interest.
Public office is a public trust. No precept of administrative law is more basic than this statement
of what assumption of public office involves. The stability of our public institutions relies on the
ability of our civil servants to serve their constituencies well.
47. Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

FACTS:
The case basically revolves around the series of events that happened prior and subsequent to the
event we know as EDSA II. During the 1998 elections, Joseph E. Estrada and Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo were elected as president and vice-president respectively. The downfall of the Estrada
administration began when For. Gov. Luis Chavit Singson went to the media and released his
exposé that petitioner was part of the Jueteng scandal as having received large sums of money.
After this expose, a lot of different groups and many personalities had asked for the resignation
of the petitioner. Some of which are the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP),
Sen. Nene Pimentel, Archbishop of Manila, Jaime Cardinal Sin, For. Pres. Fidel Ramos, and For.
Pres. Corazon Aquino who asked petitioner to make the “supreme self-sacrifice”. Respondent
also resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services and also asked
petitioner for his resignation. 4 senior economic advisers of the petitioner resigned and then
Speaker Manny Villar, together with 47 representatives, defected from Lapian ng Masang
Pilipino.
By November, an impeachment case was to be held as Speaker Manny Villar had transmitted the
Articles of Impeachment to the senate. On November 20, the 21 senators took oath as judges to
the impeachment trial with SC CJ Hilario Davide, Jr., presiding. The impeachment trial was one
for the ages. It was a battle royal of well known lawyers. But then came the fateful day, when by
the vote of 11-10, the judges came to a decision to not open the second envelop allegedly
containing evidence showing that the petitioner had a secret bank account under the name “Jose
Velarde” containing P3.3 billion. The not opening of the 2nd envelop resulted to the people
going to the streets and the public prosecutors withdrawing from the trial. On January 19, AFP
Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes marched to EDSA shrine and declared “on behalf of your Armed
Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are
withdrawing our support to this government.” PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson
together with some Cabinet members made the same announcement.
June 20 was the day of surrender. At around 12:20 AM, negotiations started for the peaceful
transition of power. But at around 12 noon, respondent took oath as the 14th president of the
Philippines. At 2:30 PM, petitioner and his family left Malacanang. He issued the following
Press Statement:
“20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our
country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity
and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this
country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the
Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I
will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our
country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.

MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:
“Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By
operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”
On January 22, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-
SC. The said resolution confirmed the authority given by the 12 SC justices to the CJ during the
oath taking that happened on January 20. Soon, other countries accepted the respondent as the
new president of the Philippines. The House then passed Resolution No. 175 “expressing the full
support of the House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines.” It also approved Resolution No. 176
“expressing the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its
congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of
the nation’s goals under the Constitution.”
On February 6, respondent recommended Teofisto Guingona to be the vice president. On

February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution 82 which confirmed the nomination of Senator
Guingona. On the same day, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the
impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated. Several cases were filed against
the petitioner which are as follows: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales
on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by
the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture,
graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for
government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines
Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery,
perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on
November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property,
plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28,
2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080;
and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for
plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to

investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman
Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan,
Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22,
the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of
his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints
against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR
No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in Case
Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that
may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally
warranted.” Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.” Acting on
GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents “to
comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001.” On February
13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing
of the respondents’ comments “on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15.”
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press
statement for “Gag Order” on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No.
146738, the Court resolved:
“(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring
the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement
justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of
being cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits
of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent
Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office
against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news
reports that the respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner
Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action will
make the cases at bar moot and academic.”
ISSUES:
I Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a
President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal
prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still
President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial
publicity.
HELD:
I No. The case is legal not political.
II No. He is not a president on leave.
III No. The impeachment proceedings was already aborted. As a non-sitting president, he is not
entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution
IV There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of
the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman.
48. Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 81563 & 82512, Dec. 19, 1989
FACTS: April to October 1978- Mangahan Floodway Project was entrusted to Pasig Engineering
District headed by petitioner, District Engineer Cresencio Data.  Engr. Data formed a
committee to gather and verify documents, facilitate the acquisition of private lots for the
project’s right-of-way. Among the lots affected was a 19,004 sqm land in Pasig owned by
Benjamin Agleham. The property was originally classified as a “ricefield” valued at P5 per sqm
as per Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Feb 27, 1978). In filing an application for payment,
Agleham’s counsel Natividad Gutierrez submitted a xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895,
supposedly certified by Pasig Treasurer Alfredo Prudencio, describing the property as
"residential" (instead of riceland), and with a fair market value of P2,413,520 or P80 per sqm
(instead of P5 per sqm). April 20, 1978- Engr. Data and Atty. Gutierrez signed a Deed of
Absolute Sale, prepared by the former’s committee supposedly after its “examination” of
Gutierrez and Agleham’s documents June 8, 1978- The sale was registered and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T12071 was issued in the name of the Government, after Engr. Data sent
the papers to the Bureau of Public Works, who then recommended to the Assistant Secretary of
Public Works the approval of the Deed of Sale. October 23, 1978- Petitioner Amado C. Arias, in
his capacity as the Auditor of the Pasig Engineering District, pre-audited and approved for
payment the general voucher for Agleham’s land.
October 24, 1978- 16 PNB checks, with Serial Nos. 188532 to 188547, with a total sum of
P1,520,320.00 were issued to Gutierrez as payment for Agleham's 19,004-square-meter lot.
October 1979- Investigation by the Ministry of National Defense on the supposed gross
overpricing of Agleham's property found that the xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895
submitted by Gutierrez was fake.  Pasig Treasurer Alfredo Prudencio and Asst. Assessor Pedro
Ocol testified that (1) the tax declaration number in the submitted document was typewritten, not
machine-numbered as in the genuine tax declaration; (2) the stamp mark of registration was
antedated to Dec 15, 1973 in the fake, instead of the correct date - Feb 27, 1978; (3) the
classification of the property was "residential," instead of "ricefield," which is its classification in
the genuine document; and (4) the lot was overpriced at P80 per sqm, instead of the appraised
value of only P5 per sqm in the original declaration. PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Petitioners
Arias and Data, together with other officials, were accused of violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), for supposedly affecting undue injury, damage and
prejudice to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines by causing, allowing and/or
approving the illegal and irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds in favor and in
the name of Benjamin Agleham, in connection with the overpriced land purchase for the
Mangahan Floodway Project.  Nov 16, 1987- Sandiganbayan rendered a 78-page decision
finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt. The penalties were imprisonment for 3-6
years, perpetual disqualification from public office and payment of P1,425,300 to the
Government. Arias filed a petition for review of the Sandiganbayan's decision at the Supreme
Court contending that the court's findings that he conspired with his co-accused and that he was
grossly negligent are based on misapprehension of facts, speculation, surmise, and conjecture. 
Data’s main defense is that the acquisition of the Agleham property was the work of his formed
committee in which he did not take an active part, and that the price which the Government paid
for it was reasonable.
ISSUE: 1. WON petitioners ARIAS and DATA are guilty as co-conspirators in the conspiracy to
cause injury to the Government through the irregular disbursement and expenditure of public
funds. NO HOLDING: NO 1. Guilt must be premised on a more knowing, personal, and
deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy. 
Department secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors
cannot be guilty of conspiracy simply because he/she was the last of a long line of officials and
employees who acted upon or affixed their signatures to a transaction.  There should be other
grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy
charge and conviction.  It would set a bad precedent if a department head or chief auditor is
suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every
single detail, or painstakingly trace every step from inception, or investigate the motives of every
person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority. 2.
Arias Principle: All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and
on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. 
While it can be argued that Arias should have probed records and documents, and questioned
persons; or that Data should have inspected the documents accepted by his committee, it is
doubtful if any auditor or head of a fairly sized office could personally do all these things in all
vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible.  There are
hundreds of document, letters and supporting paper that routinely pass through the hands of an
executive head even of a small government agencies or commissions. Thus, there has to be some
added reason why he/she should examine a specific document in such detail.
3. Sandiganbayan’s decision to convict the petitioners of causing undue injury, damage, and
prejudice to the Government because of gross overpricing is grounded on shaky foundations. 
While the Court is not prepared to say whether P80.00-P500.00 per sqm of land in Pasig in 1978
would be a fair evaluation, since the value must be determined in an eminent domain proceeding
by a competent court, it is certain that it cannot be P5.00 per sqm.  The Court held that the
Sandiganbayan erred in assuming that the P5.00 per sqm value fixed by the assessor in the tax
declarations was the correct market value of the property. As the Court has previously held in
EPZA v Dulay, factors other than the value stated by the landowner in his tax declaration or
fixed by the municipal assessor must be considered in finding the true value of just
compensation. JUDGMENT: 1. The Sandiganbayan Decision dated November 16, 1987 is SET
ASIDE. 2. Petitioners Arias and Data are ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.
DISSENTING OPINION OF GRINO-AQUINO: Conspiracy of Silence and Inaction: The

petitioners kept silent when they should have asked questions; they looked the other way when
they should have probed deep into the transaction.  The petitioner's partiality for
Agleham/Gutierrez may be inferred from their having deliberately closed their eyes to the
defects and irregularities of the transaction in his favor and their seeming neglect, if not
deliberate omission, to check, the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval.
 Chiefs of offices who should be vigilant to protect the interest of the State should not accept as
gospel truth the certifications of their subordinates and approve without question million-peso
purchases which should have prompted them to make inquires or verify the authenticity of the
documents presented to them for approval.  Since partiality is a mental state or predilection, in
the absence of direct evidence, it may be proved by the attendant circumstance instances.
49. Abubakar vs. People, G.R. No. 202408, June 27, 2018
FACTS:
The case was a Petitions for Review on Certiorari concerning alleged anomalies in the
implementation of infrastructure projects within the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM).
Abubakar, Baraguir, and Guiani were public officials of the Department of Public Works and
Highways in ARMM (DPWH-ARMM) when the offenses were allegedly committed. Abubakar
held the position of Director III, Administrative, Finance Management Service. Baraguir was the
Director of the Bureau of Construction, Materials and Equipment, and a member of the Pre-
Qualification Bids and Awards Committee, while Guiani was the DPWH-ARMM Regional
Secretary.
Based on the report submitted by the Commission on Audit, the Office of the Ombudsman
conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause to indict the regional officials of
DPWH-ARMM for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. On July 31, 1998, 21 separate Informations were filed against Abubakar,
Baraguir, Guiani, and other officials of DPWH-ARMM. The consolidated cases were docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 24963-24983.
Abubakar, Guiani, Baraguir, and two (2) employees of DPWH-ARMM were charged in
Criminal Case No. 24970 for allegedly awarding excessive mobilization fees to Arce
Engineering Services.
Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and two (2) other officials of DPWH¬-ARMM were charged in
Criminal Case Nos. 24972, 24975 to 24980, and 24982 to 24983 for allegedly advancing
P14,400,000.00 to several contractors for sub-base aggregates
Lastly, Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and several other DPWH-ARMM officials were charged in
Criminal Case Nos. 24973, 24974, and 24981 for allegedly causing overpayment on several
projects due to bloated accomplishment reports.
Upon arraignment, Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and some of their co-accused entered a plea of
not guilty. Seven (7) of their co-accused remained at large while one (1) died prior to the
scheduled arraignment
Abubakar claimed that he was only implicated due to the presence of his signature in the
disbursement vouchers. He asserted that he examined the supporting documents and the
certifications made by the technical experts before affixing his signature.
Accused Guiani, Mamogkat, Abubakar, Baraguir, and Suasin were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for causing the
disbursement of30% of the mobilization fees or advance payment to Arce Engineering Services.
Abubakar and Baraguir filed their respective motions for new trial and reconsideration on
separate dates. They anchored their prayer for new trial on the alleged incompetence of their
former counsel.
Petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir maintain that they are entitled to a new trial due to their
former counsel's incompetence and negligence. They claim that aside from simply adopting the
evidence submitted by their co-¬accused, their former counsel also failed to present and to
formally offer relevant evidence that would exonerate them from liability. Petitioners Abubakar
and Baraguir believe that they were deprived of the opportunity to fully present their case and to
claim that the following documents should have been presented before the Sandiganbayan:
Aside from this, petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir assert that their right to equal protection was
violated due to "selective prosecution." Only a handful of DPWH-ARMM officials were charged
of violation of Republic Act No. 3019. Several employees who allegedly participated in the
preparation of project documents were not indicted
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the right of petitioners Farouk B. Abubakar and Ulama S. Baraguir to the equal
protection of the laws was violated due to "selective prosecution"
RULING:
No. The prosecution of offenses is generally addressed to the sound discretion of the fiscal. A
claim of "selective prosecution" may only prosper if there is extrinsic evidence of "clear showing
of intentional discrimination. The prosecution of one person to the exclusion of others who may
be just as guilty does not automatically entail a violation of the equal protection clause.
Selective prosecution is a concept that is foreign to this jurisdiction. It originated from United
States v. Armstrong a 1996 case decided by the United States Supreme Court. A case for
selective prosecution arises when a prosecutor charges defendants based on "constitutionally
prohibited standards such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification." Essentially, a
selective prosecution claim rests upon an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.]
Although "selective prosecution" has not been formally adopted in this jurisdiction, there are
cases that have been decided by this Court recognizing the possibility of defendants being unduly
discriminated against through the prosecutorial process. The burden lies on the defendant to
show discriminatory intent through extrinsic evidence
50. Mejia v. Pamaran, G.R. No. L-56741, April 15, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner was found guilty of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for using her
position as branch clerk of court to demand and receive money from the persons involved in
certain cases in consideration of a promise that she will help in getting them a favorable
judgment. Under P.D. No. 1606, petitioner is only afforded one stage of appeal.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner was denied due process.
HELD:
NO. If an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against
under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon
notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a
constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.
51. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 155574, Nov. 20, 2006
52. Jaravata v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. L-56170, January 31, 1984
Facts: Hilario Jaravata was accused of violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, said to have been committed in the following manner: That on or about the period
from April 30, 1979 to May 25, 1979, in the Municipality of Tubao, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, being
then the Assistant Principal of the Leones Tubao, La Union Barangay High School and with the
use of his influence as such public official and taking advantage of his moral and official
ascendancy over his classroom teachers, with deliberate intent did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously made demand and actually received payments from other classroom
teachers, ROMEO DACAYANAN, DOMINGO LOPEZ, MARCELA BAUTISTA, and

FRANCISCO DULAY various sums of money, namely: P118.00, P100.00, P50.00 and P70.00
out of their salary differentials, in consideration of accused having officially intervened in the
release of the salary differentials of the six classroom teachers, to the prejudice and damage of
the said classroom teachers, in the total amount of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT
(P338.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency. The arrangement was "to facilitate its [salary
differential] payment accused and the classroom teachers agreed that accused follow-up the
papers in Manila with the obligation on the part of the classroom teachers to reimburse the
accused of his expenses.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner violated the Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
AntiGraft and Corrupt Practice Act.
Held: No. There is no question that Jaravata at the time material to the case was a "public
officer" as defined by Section 2 of R.A. No. 3019. It may also be said that any amount which
Jaravata received in excess of P36.00 from each of the complainants was in the concept of a gift
or benefit. But according to Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019; “Directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein
the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.” There is no law which
invests the petitioner with the power to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials of the
complainants or anyone for that matter. Far from exercising any power, the petitioner played the
humble role of a supplicant whose mission was to expedite payment of the salary differentials. In
his official capacity as assistant principal he is not required by law to intervene in the payment of
the salary differentials. Accordingly, he cannot be said to have violated the law afore-cited
although he exerted efforts to facilitate the payment of the salary differentials.
Plunder
53. Major Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165835, June 22, 2005
Fact:
Petitioner was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership, J6, of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. Petitioner filed this Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 to annul and
set aside public respondent Resolution and Writ of Preliminary Attachment and to enjoin public
respondents from further proceeding with any action relating to the enforcement of the assailed
issuances.
Petitioner argues in this Petition that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction over the “civil
action” for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under R.A. No. 1379, maintaining that
such jurisdiction actually resides in the Regional Trial Courts as provided under Sec. 29 of the
law, and that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in civil actions pertains only to separate
actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos, his family, and
cronies as can be gleaned from Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and Executive Orders E.O.
Nos. 1411 and 14-A.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a Civil Case of Forfeiture?
Held:
Yes, The Sandiganbayan is vested with jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379, entitled
“An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been
Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Proceedings
Therefor.” It establishes that it does not enumerate any prohibited acts the commission of which
would necessitate the imposition of a penalty. Instead, it provides the procedure for forfeiture to
be followed in case a public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount
of property manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to
his lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property. Section 1256 of the law
provides a penalty but it is only imposed upon the public officer or employee who transfers or
conveys the unlawfully acquired property; it does not penalize the officer or employee for
making the unlawful acquisition. In effect, as observed in Almeda, Sr. v. Perez, it imposes the
penalty of forfeiture of the properties unlawfully acquired upon the respondent public officer or
employee
It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the
forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty. The soundness of this
reasoning becomes even more obvious when we consider that the respondent in such forfeiture
proceedings is a public officer or employee and the violation of R.A. No. 1379 was committed
during the respondent officer or employee’s incumbency and in relation to his office. This is in
line with the purpose behind the creation of the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court—to address
the urgent problem of dishonesty in public service.
54. Depakakibo Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, Oct. 12, 2009
FACTS
To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of PhP
143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner Clarita,
children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had allegedly
amassed and acquired, the Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to
Republic Act No. (RA) 1379,3 filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on October 29, 2004 a petition
for the forfeiture of those properties.
ISSUE
Whether or not, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over separate forfeiture cases.
RULING
Yes. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20, 2005 Resolution,13 the civil liability for
forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense, thus:
Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully
acquired properties. The action of forfeiture arises when a “public officer or employee [acquires]
during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion of his salary
x x x and to his other lawful income x x x.” Such amount of property is then presumed prima
facie to have been unlawfully acquired. Thus “if the respondent [public official] is unable to
show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then
the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such
judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State.
55. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 2, 2001

Facts: On 4 April 2001, an Information for plunder was filed against former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted
under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA
7659, assailed the said law for being unconstitutional. He contends that (a) it suffers from the
vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal prosecutions;
and, (c) it abolishes the element ofmens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised
Penal Code, all of which are violations of fundamental right of due process.
Issue: Whether or not the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?
Decision: The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice. The “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The theory is that
“[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself
as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly
broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.” The possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility
that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
56. Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 224162, November 7, 2017
FACTS: On September 16, 2013, the Office of the Ombudsman received the report of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), regarding its investigation on several persons, including
Napoles, former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) and his former Chief of Staff, Atty. Jessica
Lucila Reyes (Reyes). NBI recommended to prosecute Napoles, former Senator Enrile, Reyes,
and several other named individuals for the crime of Plunder for essentially misappropriating
former Senator Enrile’s Priority Development Assistant Fund (PDAF) through non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) that were selected without the required bidding procedure.
Thus, in an Information dated June 5, 2014, Napoles, together with former Senator Enrile, Reyes,
Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, were charged with Plunder filed with the
Sandiganbayan. The Information stated that: the accused unlawfully amassed P172 Million pesos
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts: repeatedly receiving kickbacks or

commissions funded from Enrile’s PDAF targeting Napoles’s NGOs as recipients which turned
out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for
her personal gain and taking undue advantage of their official positions to the prejudice of the
Republic.
A petition for Bail was filed by Napoles on July 7, 2014, arguing that the evidence of the
prosecution is insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She particularly assailed
the credibility of the State witnesses (otherwise referred to as whistleblowers) as these are
allegedly mere hearsay, tainted with bias, and baseless. Citing the res inter alios acta rule,
Napoles submitted that the testimonies of these whistleblowers are inadmissible against her.
In view of Napoles’ application for bail, the Sandiganbayan conducted bail hearings. The
Sandiganbayan denied the petition for Bail for lack of merit. Thus, a petition for certiorari was
filed before the Court.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Resolutions denying Napoles’ application for bail
HELD: NO.
The prosecution bears the burden of proving that evidence of Napoles’ guilt of the crime is
strong.
This right to bail is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, except when the accused is charged with a
capital offense,
While bail may generally be granted as a matter of right prior to the conviction of the accused,
those charged with a capital offense is granted bail only when the evidence of guilt is not strong.
The trial court is thus granted the discretion to determine whether there is strong evidence of
guilt on the part of the accused. The trial court may also deny the application for bail when the
accused is a flight risk, notwithstanding the prosecution’s evidence on the guilt of the accused.
In exercising this discretion, the trial court should receive the parties’ evidence at a hearing duly
scheduled for this purpose. The prosecution and the accused are granted reasonable opportunity
to prove their respective positions: on the part of the prosecution, that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong, and on the part of the defense, the opposite. The hearing is
summary and limited to the determination of the weight of evidence for purposes of granting or
denying bail.
Since Napoles was charged with the crime of Plunder, which carries the imposable penalty of
reclusion perpetua, she cannot be admitted to bail when the evidence of her guilt is strong. As a
trial court, the Sandiganbayan, in turn, possessed the jurisdiction to hear and weigh the evidence
of the prosecution and the defense.
It should not be forgotten that the purpose of the bail hearing is to determine whether the accused
is entitled to provisional liberty before conviction. To require more from the prosecution, as well
as from the trial court, effectively defeats the purpose of the proceeding.
The Court ruled that the prosecution was able to establish that Napoles participated in the
implied conspiracy to misappropriate public funds and acquire ill-gotten wealth.
Here, the implied conspiracy among Napoles and her co-accused was proven through various
documentary and testimonial evidence showing that they acted towards the common goal of
misappropriating the PDAF of former Senator Enrile.
Clearly, the prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence supply interlocking pieces of
information that when taken together, provide a complete picture of the indispensability of the
participation of Napoles in the scheme to misappropriate public funds for the benefit of select
individuals, by using the NGOs as conduits for the PDAF projects of former Senator Enrile. The
directions and instructions she gave to her former employees constitute a clear evidence of her
active participation, not mere acquiescence or presence, in the conspiracy. Thus, the petition for
bail was correctly denied.

Title Vii - Crimes Committed by Public Officers

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Title Vii - Crimes Committed by Public Officers

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TITLE VII – CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

Issue: will the administrative complaint will prosper?

Betrayal of Trust/Betrayal of Secret

In addition, petitioner shall suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.

Accordingly, a fine of P18,000.00 is deemed reasonable. reccional, as minimum, to 7 years, 8

Whether the accused is gulty of direct bribery?

17. Balderama v. People, G.R. Nos. 14578-85, January 28, 2008

Is petitioner guilty of direct bribery?

19. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 155574, November 20, 2006

By agreeing to perform, or by performing, in consideration of any offer, promise gift or present

21. Disini v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 169823-24, Sept. 11, 2013

HELD: SB has OEJ over the offense charged

(Incorporated in SEC. 2, ACT 3326)

23. People v. Reyes, SB Case No. 26892, Aug. 15, 2006

26. Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, July 29, 2015

Whether or not Constantino-Zoleta is guilty of Malversation.

d.) He has appropriated, taken, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or

purchases. Sandiganbayan convicted Rene Pondevida, the Municipal Treasurer of Badiangan,

33. Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103507, February 17, 1997

34. Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 93885, May 14, 1991

The instant petition is bereft of merit.

38. Abdulla v. People, G.R. No. 150129, April 6, 2005

command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary

governmentowned or controlled corporation would create a dangerous precedent as it would lose

On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Antonio P. Belicena, former Undersecretary,

47. Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

“20 January 2001

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”

On February 6, respondent recommended Teofisto Guingona to be the vice president. On

A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to

II No. He is not a president on leave.

DISSENTING OPINION OF GRINO-AQUINO: Conspiracy of Silence and Inaction: The

teachers, ROMEO DACAYANAN, DOMINGO LOPEZ, MARCELA BAUTISTA, and

Yes. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.

55. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 2, 2001

through a combination or series of overt criminal acts: repeatedly receiving kickbacks or

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