TITLES VII to IX
The executive power is generally
CRIM 2
TITLE VII: Crimes committed by Public Officers
I. PUBLIC OFFICER
87 Laurel vs Desierto
Nature: Petition for Review of a decision of the Ombudsman
Ponente: Kapunan, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Salvador Laurel was appointed chairman of the
National Centennial Commission (NCC) which is in charge of the
nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine
Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the
Inauguration of the Malolos Congress. As an ad-hoc body, the existence
of the Commission shall be terminated upon the completion of all
activities related to the Centennial Celebrations. Subsequently, a
corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo Corporation
(Expocorp) was created where petitioner Laurel was elected CEO.
Some anomalies in the commission were discovered as
presented by Senator Coseteng in her privilege speech. In 1999, then
President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35, creating
an ad hoc and independent citizens’ committee to investigate on the
anomalies within the NCC. They recommended the indictment of
Salvador Laurel for violation of section 3( e ) of RA 3019 and Art. 217 of
the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner holds that he should not be
prosecuted under the said laws and under the supervision of the
Ombudsman because he is not a public officer.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Laurel, chairman of the National
Centennial Commission, is a public officer
Ruling: Yes
The NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public
office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer. The characteristics
of a public office, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its
creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the
position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.
The NCC performs executive functions.
defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power
of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance. The executive function, therefore, concerns the
implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation
during his tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but not a
necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not
conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office.
II. Bribery and Corruption of Public Officials
88 NATHANIEL S. MANIPON, JR., vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. L-58889. July 31, 1986
Fernan, J.:
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
As deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City,
Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr. (petitioner) was ordered to execute the
decision in NLRC Case "Longog Tabek, et al vs. Harry Dominguez et
al." The labor arbiter ordered Harry Dominguez, a building contractor,
to pay Longog Tabek the balance of Php 2,720.00 with interest for their
work contract. Manipon notified Commercial Bank and Trust (Comtrust)
to garnish the bank accounts of Dominguez. The bank agreed to hold the
accounts.
Dominguez sought Manipon's help in the withdrawal of the
garnished account. Manipon told Dominguez that the money could not
be withdrawn. When the two met again at the Office of the National
Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA), Manipon told Dominguez
that he "can remedy the withdrawal so they will have something for the
New Year."
After Manipon left, Dominguez confided the offer to NISA Sub-
Station Commander Luisito Sanchez. They then hatched up a plan to
entrap Manipon by paying him with marked money the next day. At 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon, Dominguez went to the bank as planned.
Manipon showed up and delivered his letter to the bank lifting the
garnishment. Dominguez prepared a withdrawal slip for Php
2,500.00. After Dominguez received the money from the teller, he took
out Php 300.00 therefrom and added it to the Php 700.00 in marked bills.
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He then handed the total amount of Php l,000.00 to Manipon. Then they
all left the bank.
A few moments later, Manipon was arrested by PC and NISA
operatives. The Php 1,000.00 was seized from the left breast pocket of
Manipon. Manipon was brought to Camp Dangwa for questioning. He
was subjected to an ultraviolet light test and found positive for
fluorescent powder.
The Sandiganbayan found accused Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr.,
guilty of direct bribery. Manipon came to this Court on petition for
review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the judgment of conviction.
Issue: Whether Manipon committed direct bribery?
Ruling: Yes.
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code consists of the following elements: (1) that the
accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through
another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present
or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some
crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing
something which it is his official duty to do, and (4) that the crime or act
relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer. The promise of
a public officer to perform an act or to refrain from doing it may be
express or implied.
At the time of the commission of the crime Manipon was the
deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio assigned to
implement the execution order issued in NLRC Case, “Longog Tabek, et
al vs. Harry Dominguez et al." When Manipon had garnished the bank
accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust, he did not notify the labor arbiter
so that the corresponding order for the payment by the bank of the
garnished amount could be made and the sum withdrawn immediately
to satisfy the judgment under execution. Manipon had planned to get
Dominguez to acquiesce to a consideration for lifting the garnishment
order. Manipon lifted the garnished bank accounts of Dominguez at
Comtrust when he received Php l,000.00 from Dominguez.
89 Dacumos v. Sandiganbayan (195 SCRA 833)
G.R. No. 95000, 16 April 1991
Facts:
Herein petitioner was a revenue examiner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. He was offered to settle the tax liability of R. Revilla
Interiors in the amount of P73,307.31 by pulling out its assessments
papers from the office of the BIR Commissioner and procuring a tax
clearance. In return, he required a fee of P35,000 which was reduced to
P30,000. Gregorio Samia, the manager of the firm, reported the incident
to the National Bureau of Investigation which arranged an entrapment.
Through the entrapment, Dacumos was arrrested after he accepted the
envelope containing P1,000.00 from Samia.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of direct bribery.
Ruling: Yes
The petitioner failed to show that the findings of the respondent
court are tainted with arbitratriness or are not supported by substantial
evidence. His charge that he was “framed” because Samia resented his
refusal to be bribed is not convincing. The Court is not inclined to believe
that Samia would be so vindictive as to falsely incriminate the petitioner
with the serious charge of bribery simply because the petitioner refused
to reduce the tax assessment of R. Revilla Interiors. Samia was not even
directly involved in the assessment. It is especially remarkable as well
that he met Samia at a private place instead of his office at the BIR,
considering that they were supposed to be discussing official business
and it was Samia who he says was requesting his assistance.
2
90 Laurel V Destiero (G.R. No 145386, 12 April 2002)
Kapunan, J.
Facts:
Former Vice President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the
head of the National Centennial Commission for the preparation of the
National Centennial Celebration. He was also appointed as the chairman
of Expocorp which was specifically created for the celebration
There were alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts for
the development of the celebration and the petitioner was implicated.
An investigation was conducted by the office of the ombudsman and
the petitioner was indicted with a violation of RA 3019, the anti-graft
and corruption practices act
The petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the ombudsman
and contended that he cannot be considered as a public officer in this
case because Exocorp was not a public corporation and that he is not
given any compensation for his position as the chairman of Exocorp.
Issue: Whether the petitioner is a public officer.
Ruling: Yes. The National Centennial Commission is an office created by
an executive order and was performing executive functions to
implement the mandated national policy for the National Centennial
Celebration, hence it is a public office and by virtue of acting as an
chairman of a public office he is an public officer.
While the petitioner claims that he is not an public officer because he is
not being compensated for such a position the court ruled that the fact
the petitioner did not receive any compensation is merely an incidence
and forms no part of the office hence, the petitioner is definitely an public
office and subject to the jurisdiction of the ombudsman.
III. Graft and Corruption
91 ALMEDA v. PEREZ (No. L-18428. 30 Aug 1962)
FACTS:
Almeda acquired cash and properties from unknown source
amounting to P121,407.98 during his incumbency as Assistant Director
of NBI. This violated RA 1379, otherwise known as Anti-Graft Law
Preliminary investigation was conducted and found out that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner acquired manifestly out
of proportion to his salary.
OSG amended the petition and added other counts and items of
alleged unlawful acquisitions and disbursements thus increasing the
cash from unexplained sources to P208,682.45 from Almeda’s salary and
other lawful income of only 59,860.97.
Almeda contends that the new charges have already been
investigated and dismissed, also the respondents were not given a new
preliminary investigation with respect to additional charges. Under RA
1379, the offense being criminal in nature, the petition may not be
amended as substance without respondent’s consent. He asserts that the
amendments were presented only to delay the proceedings to prejudice
the Almedas.
ISSUE: Whether the proceedings for cases under RA 1379 should be
regarded as civil in nature.
Ruling: YesAs the proceeding for forfeiture, as pointed out and as
provided for in the law, is not a penal proceeding but a civil one for the
forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired, and as the procedure
outlined in the law is that which is followed in civil actions, amendment
of the charges or the petition for forfeiture may be made as in ordinary
civil actions; i.e., the amendments may be made before trial or in the
course of trial without need of another investigation. It also follows that
amendments setting forth newly discovered acquisitions may be in the
petition without obtaining the consent of the respondent.
If the investigation is only similar to that in a criminal case, but other
steps in proceedings are those for civil proceedings, it stands to the
reason that the proceeding is not criminal.
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92 Cabal v Kapunan (G.R. No. L-19052, 28 Dec 1962)
Concepcion, J.;
Facts:
Col. Maristela of Philippine Army filed a complaint charging
Manuel Cabal, Chief of Staff of Armed Forces of the Philippines of graft,
corrupt practices and unexplained wealth. The President formed a
committee of 5 members that included 3 former justices and 2 military
generals to investigate the letter-complaint. During the investigation,
Maristela wanted the committee to be his witness for the matter but they
declined. On 18 September 1961, the matter was referred to the City
Fiscal of Manila and a decision was rendered.
The CFI of Manila charged Cabal with contempt under section
580 of the revised administrative code. On 4 October 1961, Cabal filed a
motion to quash the charge on the following grounds:
1. City Fiscal has no authority to file said charge, making the same
void;
2. The facts presented constitute no offense for section 580 of
Revised Administrative Code, violates due process, and is vague
and uncertain;
3. More than one offense is charged on him and
4. The Committee has no power to order a require petitioner to
take the witness stand and be sworn to, upon the request of Co.
Maristela, inasmuch as said order violates petitioner right
against self-incrimination.
The judge denied the motion to quash and by 20 October 1961,
Cabal began the present action for the purpose adverted to above,
alleging that, unless restrained by this court, respondent Judge may
summarily punish him for contempt, and that such action would not be
appealable.
In their answer, respondents herein allege, inter alia, that the
investigation being conducted by the Committee above referred to is
administrative, not criminal, in nature; that the legal provision relied
upon by petitioner in relation to preliminary investigations (Section '08-
C, Republic Act No. 409, as amended by Republic Act No. 1201) is
inapplicable to contempt proceedings; that, under section 580 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Contempt against an administrative
officer is to be dealt with as contempt of a superior court; that petitioner
herein is charged with only one offense; and that, tinder the
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, petitioner herein
may refuse, not to take the witness stand, but to answer incriminatory
questions.
Issue: Is the proceeding before the aforementioned committee civil or
criminal in character?
Ruling:
The proceeding is civil in nature.
In this connection, it should be noted that, although said
Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of
unexplained wealth, there seems to be no question that Col. Maristela
does not seek the removal of petitioner herein as Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a matter of fact he no longer holds
such office. It seems, likewise conceded that the purpose of the charge
against petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the
forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which
is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property. Such for forfeiture has been held, however, to partake
of the nature of a penalty.
Generally speaking, information for the forfeiture of goods that
seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment against any person is deemed
to be civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature
to the extent that where the person using the res illegally is the owner or
rightful possessor of it; the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a
punishment. They have been held to be so far in the nature criminal
proceedings that a general verdict on several count in an information is
upheld if one count is good. According to the authorities such
proceedings, where the owner of the property appears, are so far
considered as quasi-criminal proceeding as to relieve the owner from
being a witness against himself and to prevent the compulsory
production of his books and papers. ... (23 Am. Jur. 612; emphasis ours.)
A person may not be compelled to testify in an action against him for a
penalty or to answer any question as a witness, which would subject him
to a penalty or forfeiture, where the penalty or forfeiture is imposed as a
vindication of the public justice of the state. In general, both at common
law and under a constitution provision against compulsory self-
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incrimination, a person may not be compelled to answer any question as
a witness, which would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, or testify in
action against him for a penalty.
The privilege applies where the penalty or forfeiture
recoverable, or is imposed in vindication of the public justice the state as
a statutory fine or penalty, or a fine or penalty for violation of a municipal
ordinance, even though the action or proceeding for its enforcement is
not brought in a criminal court but is prosecuted through the modes of
procedure applicable to ordinary civil remedy. (98 C. J. S., pp. 275-6.)
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and respondent
Judge hereby enjoined permanently from proceeding further in Criminal
Case No. 60111 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. It is so ordered.
93 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE
COURT, SIMPLICIO BERDON, GAUDIOSA BERDON and LUIS BERDON
G.R. No. 74225. April 17, 1989
Cortes, J.;
Facts:
Mr. Simplicio Berdon, an Assistant Staff Civil Engineer of Regional Office
No. VII of the Bureau of Public Highways in Cebu City, had acquired
unexplained wealth amounting to P124,495.82 in violation of Republic
Act No. 1379. From 1963 to 1969, he and his wife Gaudiosa Mangubat
Berdon purchased parcels of land and constructed a house. The purchase
prices and costs of these properties were not commensurate to their
incomes, savings or declared assets. Based on evidence presented, the
trial court dismissed the petition, holding that respondents have no
unexplained wealth. Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision
of the Court of First Instance dismissing the petition for forfeiture of
unexplained wealth under Republic Act No. 1379 filed against private
respondents. According to IAC, the assets acquired by the respondent-
spouses in excess of their income and receipts from their employment in
the Government were satisfactorily explained.
Issue: Whether the appellate court's decision to dismiss the petition for
forfeiture of unexplained wealth under RA 1379 is valid.
Ruling: Yes.
The Supreme Court held that the acquisition of the subject
properties was satisfactorily explained. While respondent spouses had
acquired properties and constructed a house the costs of which were
disproportionate to their combined incomes from their employment in
the government it had been proved that such were financed through a
donation and loans.
The Solicitor General provided that the statements of assets and
liabilities filed by private respondent Simplicio Berdon did not
accurately reflect the donation and the loans granted to private
respondent spouses and that Simplicio's testimony in effect contradicts
the entries in said statements. The Supreme Court, however, emphasized
that in determining whether or not there is unexplained wealth within
the purview of R.A. No. 1379 the courts are not bound by the statements
of assets and liabilities filed by the respondent. On the contrary, this
statute affords the respondent every opportunity to explain, to the
satisfaction of the court, how he had acquired the property in question
[Sec. 5, R.A. No. 1379]. Clear from these provisions is that the law creates
a presumption against the public officer or employee who acquires
property grossly disproportionate to his income, i.e. that the property
was unlawfully acquired. However, this presumption is juris tantum. It
may be rebutted by the public officer or employee by showing to the
satisfaction of the court that his acquisition of the property was lawful.
In sum, the presumption under See. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 that the
subject properties were unlawfully acquired had been successfully
rebutted by private respondents through competent evidence. Hence,
the Intermediate Appellate Court did not err in affirming the trial court's
decision dismissing the Republic's petition.
Petition is DENIED. CA decision is AFFIRMED.
94 Morfe vs Mutuc
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance
Ponente: Fernando, J.
Facts:
In this petition, the constitutionality of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt practices act (RA 3019) is questioned, citing that it violates the
right to due process and that it is an oppressive exercise of police power
and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit
in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together
with the prohibition against self-incrimination. Section 7 of RA 3019
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requires every public officer to prepare and file with the head of the
office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn statement of assets
and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his
income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount
of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year. This shall be
done, every other year from the assumption of office. The lower court
ruled that the Anti-Graft and Corrupt practices act is unconstitutional,
null and void. Thus, the petition.
Issue: Whether or not section 7 of RA 3019 is unconstitutional, null and
void.
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
Ruling:
“It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls
for disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a person to
privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a
requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far
in precluding assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say
that a public officer, by virtue of a position he holds, is bereft of
constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him
to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities,
including the statement of the amounts and sources of income, the
amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income
taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no
unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private
sphere.”
95 HILARIO JARAVATA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. L-56170, January 31, 1984
Abad Santos, J.;
FACTS: In the period of April 30, 1979 to May 25, 1979, in the
Municipality of Tubao, Province of La Union, Philippines, Jaravata, being
then the Assistant Principal of the Leones Tubao, La Union Barangay
High School and with the use of his influence as such public official and
taking advantage of his moral and official ascendancy over his classroom
teachers xxx demanded and actually received payments from several
classroom teachers, out of their salary differentials, in consideration of
accused having officially intervened in the release of the salary
differentials of the six classroom teachers.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Jaravata violated Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No.
3019
RULING: No, the petitioner did not violate Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act provides, inter alia the following:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared
to be unlawful: xxx xxx xxx
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or
for any other person in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other
party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity
has to intervene under the law. xxx xxx xxx
In this case, there is no question that Jaravata at the time
material to the case was a “public officer” as defined under the law. It
may also be said that any amount which Jaravata received in excess of
P36.00 from each of the complainants was in the concept of a gift or
benefit. The pivotal question, however, is whether Jaravata, an assistant
principal of a high school in the boondocks of Tubao, La Union, “in his
official capacity has to intervene under the law” in the payment of the
salary differentials for 1978 of the complainants. It should be noted that
the arrangement was to facilitate its [salary differential] payment
accused and the classroom teachers agreed that accused follow-up the
papers in Manila with the obligation on the part of the classroom
teachers to reimburse the accused of his expenses.
According to the Supreme Court, Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019,
refers to a public officer whose official intervention is required by law in
a contract or transaction. There is no law which invests the petitioner
with the power to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials of
the complainants or anyone for that matter.
Therefore, the petitioner did not violate Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No.
3019.
6
96 Trieste vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
 In 1980, during his term, the Municipality of Numancia
purchased construction materials from Trigen Agro-Industrial
Development Corporation. Herein petitioner Trieste was
allegedly the president of said corporation.
 Trieste was then sued for allegedly violating the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act particularly for willfully and unlawfully
having financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or
transaction in connection with which said accused intervened
or took part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited
by law from having any interest.
 Trieste, in defense, said that he already divested his interest
from the corporation when he took his office as mayor; that he
sold his shares to his sister; he presented evidence to that effect.
The Solicitor General doubted said sale because it was not
registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission. Further,
the advertisement of Trigen in the local rotary club shows that
Trieste is the president of the corporation.
 In time, the old Sol-Gen was replaced by a new one. The new Sol-
Gen gave credit to the arguments presented by Trieste as it
recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground that
Trieste did divest his interest from the corporation by virtue of
his selling his shares to his sister; that said sale cannot be
doubted simply because it was not reported to the SEC; that
sales of stocks are not required to be reported in the SEC.
Issue: Whether or not Trieste is guilty of a violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act
Held: No. Petition granted.
Ruling:
Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provides that:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers - In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing laws, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in
any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is
prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any
interest.”
There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as
Mayor, used his influence, power, and authority in having the
transactions given to Trigen. He didn’t ask anyone —- neither Treasurer
Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter, to get the construction
materials from Trigen.
Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction.
Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen’s transaction with the
municipality, which by the way, has been dealing with it even before
petitioner had assumed the mayorship on March 3, 1980. Personal
canvasses conducted found that Trigen’s offer was the lowest, most
reasonable, and advantageous to the municipality.
97 Mejorada vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. L-51065, 30 Jun 1987
Cortes, J.;
Facts:
Arturo Mejorada was a public officer who worked as right-of-
way agent in the Office of the Highway District Engineering in Pasig from
Feb 1974 to 31 Dec 1978. He was engaged in negotiating with the
property owners affected by highway constructions or improvements
for the purpose of compensating them for damages they incurred. In the
proposed Pasig-Sta.Cruz-Calamba Road Project, Isagani de Leon, Isaac
Carlos, Napoleon Maybituin, Dominga Villaroza, Florentino de la Cruz,
Cipriano Aran, Celestina Mallari and Rodolfo Rivera were affected.
Around Oct/Nov 1977, petitioner contacted the affected persons
informing them that he could work out their claims for payment of the
values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening
project. Petitioner then required them to sign blank copies of the “Sworn
Statement on the Correct and Fair Market Value of Real Properties and
Agreement to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct improvements.”
Without bothering to find out what the documents were as they were
only interested in the payment of damages, they complied. In the said
7
documents, the value of the respective properties of the claimants were
made to appear very much higher than the actual value claimed by them.
Accused directly intervene and work to facilitate the approval of their
claims. It turned out, however, that said Declarations of Property were
all falsified. Few months after processing the claims, accused
acompanied the claimants in receiving payments personally. After they
received their payments, accused accompanied them to his car where
they were divested of the amounts paid to them leaving only the sum of
P1,000 to each, except Isaac Carlos to whom P5,000.00 was left,
explaining that there were many who would share in said amounts.
Claimants were helpless because of the armed companion of the accused.
Claimants then filed their complaints with Provincial Fiscal’s Office of
Pasig (8 informations were filed against accused). Sandiganbayan found
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec.3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019). Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the essential elements constituting the offense penalized
by Sec.3(e) of RA No.3019 have been clearly and convincingly proven.
Ruling: Yes.
Sec. 3 of RA 3019 enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices
of any public officer declared unlawful. Its reference to any public officer
is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared
unlawful. Paragraph (e) states that “Causing any undue injury to any
party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.” The
last sentence is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and
employees of offices or government corporations which, under the
ordinary concept of public officers may not come within the term. It is a
strained construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively
to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits
or other concessions.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan established the fact that petitioner took
advantage of his position as a right-of-way-agent by making the
claimants sign the said agreements to demolish and sworn statements
which contained falsified declarations of the value of the improvements
and lots. There was evident bad faith on the part of the petitioner when
he inflated the values of the true claims and when he divested the
claimants of a large share of the amounts due them. Moreover, the
prosecution was able to establish through the corroborating testimonies
of the witnesses presented how through evident bad faith, petitioner
caused damage to the claimants and the Government. The manner by
which the petitioner divested the private parties of the compensation
they received was part of the scheme which commenced when the
petitioner approached the claimants and informed them that he could
work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or
improvements affected by the widening of the Pasig-Sta. CruzCalamba
Road.
Thus, the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as presented in the
evidence that he violated Sec.3(e) of RA No. 3019.
98 SEGOVIA v. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. 124067. March 27, 1998)
Special Civil Action in the SC. Certiorari and Prohibition.
Narvasa, C. J
FACTS:
Segovia, et al were designated as members of the Contracts
Committee of NPC for the Mindanao Grid Projects. A bidding was held.
The lowest and second lowest bidders were the Joint Venture of
INPHASE and T & D, and Urban Consolidated Constructors,
Inc., respectively. Joint Venture was disqualified but instead of awarding
the project to Urban it was also disqualified and a failure of bidding was
declared. Subsequently, the project was cancelled. Urban charged
Segovia, et al with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
After a preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman recommended the
filing of a case thus a case was filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution placing Segovia, et al, under
preventive suspension of 90 days. Segovia, et al questioned it claiming
that preventive suspension is not mandatory but is subject to the sound
discretion of the court. Also, their suspension is no longer necessary
8
because the project was already cancelled, they are no longer involved
in the awarding of bids, and that all documents necessary for the
investigation were already submitted.
ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to place under
preventive suspension public officers who stand accused before it,
pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act)? (Or discretionary)
Ruling: Yes
Under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, the
suspension of a public officer is mandatory after a determination has
been made of the validity of the information in a pre-suspension hearing
conducted for that purpose.
SC declared that preventive suspension is mandatory and that it is also
intended to prevent the accused from committing further acts of
malfeasance while in office.
The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended—treating of the
suspension pendente lite of an accused public officer—may no longer be
put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court. As early as
1984, in Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that such suspension
was not penal in character but merely a preventive measure before final
judgment; hence, the suspension of a public officer charged with one of
the crimes listed in the amending law, committed before said
amendment, does not violate the constitutional provision against an ex
post facto law. The purpose of suspension is to prevent the accused
public officer from frustrating or hampering his prosecution by
intimidating or influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary
evidence, or from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.
Substantially to the same effect was the Court’s holding, in 1991, in
Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, that preventive suspension is not violative of
the Constitution as it is not a penalty; and a person under preventive
suspension remains entitled to the constitutional presumption of
innocence since his culpability must still be established.
The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted
upon a valid information under the Act, whether they be appointive or
elective officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining
to the career or non-career service. It applies to a Public High School
Principal; a Municipal Mayor; a Governor; a Congressman; a Department
of Science and Technology (DOST) non-career Project Manager; a
Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG). The term “office” in Section 13 of the law applies to any office
which the officer might currently be holding and not necessarily the
particular office in relation to which he is charged.
It is mandatory for the court to place under preventive suspension a
public officer accused before it. Imposition of suspension, however, is
not automatic or self-operative. A pre-condition therefor is the existence
of a valid information, determined at a pre-suspension hearing. Such a
hearing is in accord with the spirit of the law, considering the serious and
far- reaching consequences of a suspension of a public official even
before his conviction, and the demands of public interest for a speedy
determination of the issues involved in the case. The purpose of the pre-
suspension hearing is basically to determine the validity of the
information and thereby furnish the court with a basis to either suspend
the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or refuse
suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the
proceeding which impairs its validity. The accused should be given
adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the
criminal proceedings against him; e.g. that he has not been afforded the
right to due preliminary investigation; that the acts imputed to him do
not constitute a specific crime (under R.A. 3019 or the Revised Penal
Code) warranting his mandatory suspension from
office under Section 13 of the Act; or that the information is subject to
quashal on any of the grounds set out in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
But once a proper determination of the validity of the information has
been made, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to forthwith issue
the order of preventive suspension. The court has no discretion, for
instance, to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused official on
the pretext that the order denying the latter’s motion to quash is pending
review before the appellate courts.
9
99 AMBIL vs SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. 175457, July 6, 2011)
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari
PONENTE: Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS: Petitioners Ruperto Ambil, Jr., then Provincial Governor of
Eastern Samar, and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr., then the Provincial Jail
Warden, were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Atty. David B. Loste,
President of the Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), wrote to the Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an
investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, a
accused in Criminal Case No. 10963 for murder, from the provincial jail
of Eastern Samar to the residence of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioners
contended that Adalim’s transfer was justified considering the imminent
threats upon his person and the dangers posed by his detention at the
provincial jail. The Sandiganbayan found petitioners guilty of the crime
charged. The court ruled that in moving Adalim to a private residence,
petitioners have conspired to accord him unwarranted benefits in the
form of more comfortable quarters with access to television and other
privileges that other detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under the
Rules, no person under detention by legal process shall be released or
transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of violating Sec. 3(e) of RA
3019
HELD: In order to be held liable under Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019, the following
elements must concur:
(1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions;
(2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence; and
(3) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his functions.
In this case, petitioners displayed evident partiality and bad faith in
transferring Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil’s house and giving him
benefits which other detainees do no enjoy. Furthermore, petitioners
had no authority to effect such transfer, which may only be done by a
court order. The decision of the Sandiganbayan was upheld by the Court.
100 Santiago vs. Garchitorena (1993)
G.R. No. 109266. 2 Dec 1993
Facts:
 On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for allegedly favoring
“unqualified” aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program.
Santiago allegedly approved the application of 32 aliens and gave them
indirect benefits and advantages even if those aliens were unqualified.
She contended, among others, that the information did not even allege
that the acts caused damage to the Government, and therefore, RA 3019
is not violated.
Issue:
 Whether an act without causing damage to the Government, is
still punishable by RA 3019.
Held and Ratio:
 Yes. There are two ways in committing a violation of
R.A. No. 3019. These are by:
1.) causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; and 2.)
by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage, or
preference. In this case, although the act of legalization was not covered
by the first mode, it falls within the 2nd mode when the 32 aliens were
given benefit, advantage and preference even though they were not
entitled to it.
IV. Plunder
101 Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the
Philippines (G.R. No. 148560, 19 Nov 2001)
Bellosillo, J.
Facts
 On 25 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in
Criminal Case No. 26558 finding that a probable cause for the
offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for
the arrest of the accused, petitioner and then President of the
Philippines, Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada). The
Sandiganbayan held that Estrada should be prosecuted under
10
 the “Plunder Law” or RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing
the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
Estrada contended that the Plunder Law is unconstitutional because,
according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it
dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal
prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are
purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to
due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations against him.
The specific provisions of the Plunder Law which Estrada claims have
transgressed constitutional boundaries are as follows:
Section 1. x x x x (d)“Illgotten wealth” means any asset, property, business,
enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of
Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through
dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by
any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or
project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies
or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares
of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or
other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties.—
Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires illgotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million
pesos (P50.000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder
and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.
Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for
such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree
of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances as provided by the
RevisedPenal Code shall be considered by the court. The
court shall declare any and all illgotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and assetsi ncluding the
properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit
or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.
Section 4. Rule of Evidence.—For purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done
by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten
wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
11
 indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy
The Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issues
1. Whether the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague;
2. Whether the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the
accused to due process; and,
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is malum prohibitum.
Held: Petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
Ruling
1. Whether the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
No, the Plunder Law is not unconstitutional for being vague.
Estrada emphasized the failure of the law to provide for the statutory
definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts” and the word “pattern”
in Sec. 4. According to Estrada, the omissions render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being vague and overboard and deny him the right
to be informed hence violative of his right to due process.
The Supreme Court held that a statute is not rendered void just because
of the employment of general terms or the failure to define the terms
used. The validity of the law is upheld as long the law provides a guide
as to what would render the subjects of the Plunder Law liable. The
Supreme Court further held that Estrada cannot rely on the “void for
vagueness” doctrine since it does not apply to laws that merely have
imprecise language.
II. Whether the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the
accused to due process.
No, the Plunder Law does not require less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore does not violate the rights of
the accused to due process.
III. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is malum prohibitum.
No, Plunder is malum in se which requires criminal intent.
The State contended that Plunder is malum in se which requires proof
of criminal intent because its constitutive crimes are malum in se. The
elements of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. In
the case of Estrada, it was emphasized that the information alleges that
the crime of plunder was committed “willfully, unlawfully and
criminally,” which alleges guilty knowledge on the part of Estrada.
On the other hand, Estrada contended the Plunder Law removes the
requirement of mens rea. Thus the statute should be void.
The SC held that the application of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the
Plunder Law shows that mens rea is an element of plunder since the
degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal
intent.
While Section 2 refers to “x x x Any person who participated with the said
public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder x x x,” the Court held that there is no reason to believe that is
does not apply to the public officer as principal of the crime as well.
Furthermore, the legislative declaration in the Plunder Law that plunder
is a heinous offense implies that it is malum in se. When acts punished
are inherently wrong they are malum in se. It does not matter if such acts
are punished under special law.
Hence, the Supreme Court held that the “Plunder Law” or RA 7080 (An
Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA
7659 is constitutional.
12

102 Serapio v. Sandiganbayaan
G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003
Callejo, Sr., J.
Facts:
- Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and Legal
Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth foundation and received a
Php 200M donation from Governor Chavit Singson of Ilocos
Norte on April, 2001.
- Later that same month, Singson accused a Pres Estrada and
others, Petitioner included, of engaging in Illegal Activities. Such
accusations were cause for a filing of several Criminal
Complaints against, Erap, associates, and petitioner.
- The subsequent investigation led to a recommendation by the
Ombudsman to file a case against Erap, associates, and
petitioner with the Crime of Plunder on April 4, 2001.
- Petitioner filed for reconsideration and reinvestigation on April
5, 2001, but was rejected by the Sandiganbayan on April 10.
- Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner’s arrest on April 25 and was
detained at Camp Crame. A motion for bail was filed on April 27
2001, with a hearing for said motion set on May 21, 2001.
- The hearing did not proceed as scheduled owing to delays and
the fact that petitioner filed a motion to quash on June 26, 2001.
- Petitioner grounds his motion to quash on the argument that his
acts do not constitute plunder which requires a combination of
criminal acts indicative of an overall scheme or conspiracy.
- Motion to quash denied on July 9.
Issue :
- Whether petitioner Serapio act of accepting a Php 200M
donation classifies as plunder under R.A. 7080.
Ruling: Yes
- R.A. 7080 defines plunder as any” combination of overt or
criminal acts or similar schemes or means” to commit plunder
in Section 1 of R.A. 7080. Section 3 of the same act states that
any charge filed under R.A. 7080 should not necessitate that
they indicate that the act was part of an overall scheme.
- There is probable cause that Petitioner Committed plunder in
accepting those donations with the intent to amass wealth for
Pres. Estrada
V. Malversation
103 Labatagos vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 71581. 21 March 1990)
FACTS: From January 1978 to December 1980, petitioner Carmen
Labatagos was the cashier and collecting officer of the Mindanao State
University (MSU), General Santos City. She filed a leave of absence for the
months of March, April and May 1978. On 1 October 1980, Francisco T.
Rivera, under Commission on Audit (COA) was designated leader of a
team to conduct the examination of the cash and accounts of the
petitioner. When the team conducted the examination, the petitioner did
not have any cash in her posssession, so she was asked to produce all her
records, books of collection, copies of official receipts and remittance
advices and her monthly reports of collections.
ISSUE: Whether the accused’s acts constitute malversation.
RULING: Yes. Accused’s defense that she signed the audit report and
statement of collections and deposits prepared by the audit team on the
understanding that her shortage was only P2,000.00 unmeritorious.
Auditor is correct in refusing to credit the accused with the three
different amounts mentioned in her letter of October 22, 1980.
Malversation consists not only in misappropriation or converting public
funds or property to one’s personal use but also by knowingly allowing
others to make use of or misappropriate them.
13

104 Estepa v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. L-59670. 15 Feb 1990)
Feliciano, J.:
Facts:
Leonardo Estepa was a senior paymaster of the cash division of
the city treasurer’s office of the city of manila. Estepa and 9
other paymasters and supervising paymaster Cesar Marcelo went to the
Central Bank to get P7,640,000 which is the amount of cash advances
requested by the 10 paymasters. The cash was placed inside 2 duffel
bags and transported to the city treasurer’s office of the city of manila.
The cash distribution was made in Atty. Kempis’ room, head of
cash division, where the door was closed and guarded to stop people
from entering. With Atty. Kempis and the 10 paymasters, Marcelo
opened the duffel bags and again counted the sum of P7,640,000 and was
placed in a table. Each paymaster was given the sum they requested
for in different denominations. Estepa was given the amount
of P850,000. After all 10 paymasters got their money, Marcelo asked if
everything was fine, no complaints were heard, even from Estepa. All of
them left the room.
Upon receiving the money, Estepa placed them on the sofa and
transported the smaller denominations first to the table, leaving the
bigger denomination on the sofa since he could not carry all at once.
People were already entering the office of Atty. Kempis. He brought the
bigger denominations to his cage first then the smaller ones.
After counting the money in his cage, he discovered that
P50,000 was missing and reported it to Marcelo. Marcelo summoned the
10 paymasters and asked if they got the correct amount. All of them got
the correct amount except for Estepa.
Issue: Whether Estepa is guilty of the crime of malversation of public
funds under Art 217 of Revised Penal Code.
Ruling: Yes.
In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction
is proof that the accountable officer had received the public funds and
that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefore was
made and he could not satisfactorily explain his failure so to account. An
accountable public officer may be convicted for malversation even if
there is no direct evidence of personal misappropriation, where he has
not been able to explain satisfactorily the absence of the public funds
involved.
105 Ilogon vs Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 102356, 9 Feb 1993)
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari
PONENTE: Campos, Jr., J.
Facts: Calinico B. Ilogon was the acting Postmaster of the Bureau of Posts
in Cagayan de Oro City from July, 1978 to January, 1986. He was also in
charge of accepting payments, making collections and effecting
disbursement. Auditors from the Commission on Audit conducted an
examination of the cash and accounts of petitioner covering the period
from September 8, 1983 to September 13, 1988, which showed that
petitioner had a shortage of P118,871.29. After being charged and
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, petitioner posited the defense that the shortage was
not used for his personal needs but for the needs of his fellow employees,
as these funds had been used as cash advances. He implored the Court to
consider his humanitarian intentions as a reason for not having been
able to have the funds in his possession during the audit. Petitioner also
averred that he had returned the missing funds and should therefore be
acquitted of the crime charged.
Issue: Whether or not personal use by the accused of the missing funds
is necessary for a conviction of Malversation of Public Funds
Ruling: No. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for
conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received public funds
and that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor
was made. Furthermore, petitioner knows that his granting of "chits"
and "vales" which constituted the bulk of the shortage was a violation of
the postal rules and regulations. The fact that petitioner did not
personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and will not
exculpate him from his criminal liability. The return of funds malversed
is not a defense. It is neither an exempting circumstance nor a ground for
14
extinguishing the accused's criminal liability. At best, it is a mitigating
circumstance. The decision of the Sandiganbayan was therefore upheld.
106 Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No.116033, 26 Feb 1997)
Facts:
 Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-
moving business. He also contracts with sub-contractors, one of which
was a certain Jaime Ancla, whose trucks were left at Azarcon’s premises.
On 25 of May 1983, Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued
by the BIR ordering one of its Regional directors to distraint the goods
and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, who is a delinquent tax
payer. A warrant of Garnishment was issued and signed by Azarcon
ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit the property
in his possession owned by Ancla to BIR. Azarcon then volunteered to be
the custodian of the truck owned by Ancla. Some time later, Azarcon
informed the Regional Director if BIR that he relinquishes responsibility
over the property because Ancla secretively withdrew the equipment
from him. However, he was not relieved of the responsibility and was
charged by the Sandiganbayan of Malversation of public property.
Issue:
 Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private
individual designated by BIR to be the custodian of a public property.
Ratio: 
 NO. Section 4 of PD 1606 states that Sandiganbayan will only
have jurisdiction over a private person if the complaint charges the
private individual either as co-principal, accomplice, or accessory of a
public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its
jurisdiction. Since Azarcon was not charged as any of those,
Sandiganbayan will not have a jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, he is
not to be considered as a public officer since he was not appointed nor
given authority to be a public officer.
VI. Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners
107 Rodillas vs Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. L-58652, 20 May 1988)
Nature: Petition to review the decision of Sandiganbayan
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr, J.
Facts:
Alfredo Rodillas was found guilty of Infidelity in the Custody of
Prisoner Thru Negligence (Art. 224, RPC). The petitioner was a
patrolman of the Integrated National Police Force. He was assigned to
escort Zenaida Andres, who is accused of a violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. The petitioner allowed the said accused to have lunch
with her husband, and her family in the cafeteria of the court building.
Afterwards, Zenaida requested permission to go to the comfort room
with a lady companion. This was granted by the petitioner, who went to
accompany both the accused and her companion. While in the comfort
room, Zenaida requested for her lady companion to buy napkin as she
was having her menstruation. 10 minutes later, he noticed that the lady
companion did not come back and when he checked the comfort room,
Zenaida was gone. He then checked the comfort room and noticed that
the window was open, which had no railings to prevent any person from
passing through. The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty. Thus, the
petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Rodillas is guilty of Art. 224, infidelity
in the custody of prisoner
Held: Yes.
Ruling:
The elements of the crime under the abovementioned article
are: a) that the offender is a public officer; b) that he is charged with the
conveyance or custody of a prisoner, either detention prisoner or
prisoner by final judgment; and c) that such prisoner escapes through
his negligence
As a police officer who was charged with the duty to return the
prisoner directly to jail, the deviation from his duty was clearly a
violation of the regulations. In the first place, it was improper for the
petitioner to take lunch with the prisoner and her family when he was
supposed to bring his charge to the jail. He even allowed the prisoner
and her husband to talk to each other at the request of a coofficer. It is
the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to take
necessary precautions to assure the absence of any means of escape. A
failure to undertake these precautions will make his act one of definite
laxity or negligence amounting to deliberate non-performance of duty.
His tolerance of arrangements whereby the prisoner and her
15
companions could plan and make good her escape should have aroused
the suspicion of a person of ordinary prudence.
TITLE VIII: CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
I. Parricide
108 People vs. Jumawan (G.R. No. L-50905, 23 Sep 1982)
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Facts:
A complaint for murder was filed in the Municipal Court of
Sariaya, Quezon, on July 19, 1976, against Francisco Jumawan, Cesario
Jumawan, Manuel Jumawan and Presentacion Jumawan for the death of
Rodolfo Magnaye.
The lower court finds Cesario Jumawan, Presentacion Jumawan-
Magnaye, Manuel Jumawan, and Francisco Jumawan guilty as principals
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and
punished under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
It appears from the evidence adduced during the trial that Rodolfo
Magnaye was married on 26 January 1974 to Presentacion Jumawan, one
of the accused in the above entitled criminal case. Presentacion
Jumawan-Magnaye left the conjugal home and stayed with her sister
Sebastiana Jumawan. Rodolfo Magnaye, on the other hand, went and
stayed with his mother Trinidad Alcantara.
The mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye made several
attempts to secure the signature of Rodolfo Magnaye on a document
agreeing to a separation from his wife so that both he and his wife will
be free to marry again but Rodolfo Magnaye persisted in refusing to sign
said document.
On one occasion the mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye
even brought Rodolfo Magnaye and his mother to the Provincial
Constabulary Command to ask for the assistance of Sgt. Mortilla to assist
her daughter in securing a separation from Rodolfo Magnaye but they
were told by Sgt. Mortilla that it cannot be legally done.
Issue: WON Presentacion Jumawan, as wife of the victim is liable of
parricide.
Ruling: No. Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but as
it is, since her relationship to the deceased is not alleged in the
information, she, like the others, can be convicted of murder only
qualified by abuse of superior strength.
Although not alleged in the information, relationship as an aggravating
circumstance should be assigned against the appellants. True,
relationship is inherent in parricide, but Presentacion stands convicted
of murder. And as to the others, the relationships of father-in-law and
brother-in-law aggravate the crime. The penalty for murder with an
aggravating circumstances is death. However, for lack of necessary
votes, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
109 People v. Tomotorgo (G.R. No. L-47941, 30 April 1985)
136 scra 238
Facts:
On 23 June 1977, upon returning home from his farm,
Tomotorgo found his wife and three-month old child already gone. About
200 meters away from their home, Tomotorgo saw his wife and child
leaving the barrio with a bundle of clothes. He approached them and
pleaded that they return home with him. When his wife refused to do so,
Tomotorgo picked a piece of wood and hit his wife several times until
she fell on ground. Tomotorgo then brought his wife and child home and
tried to alleviate his wife’s injuries. Although, despite his efforts she died
within the day. Tomotorgo reported the incident to the Barangay Captain
and was charged and convicted with parricide. The trial court sentenced
him with the penalty of reclusion perpetua and denied his motion for
reconsideration, hence this appeal. Tomotorgo contends that the Court
should have applied Art. 49 of the RPC which states the penalty to be
imposed when the crime committed is different from that intended. He
avers that he only intended serious physical injuries and therefore
should only be punished for such offense.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant-appellant was rightfully sentenced
to reclusion perpetua for parricide.
Ruling: Yes
The contention of the accused is incorrect. Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code expressly states that criminal liability shall be
16
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act be different from that which he intended and that the
accused is liable for all the consequences of his felonious acts. The
reference made by the accused to Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code
which prescribes graduated penalties for the corresponding physical
injuries committed is entirely misplaced and irrelevant considering that
in this case the victim died very soon after she was assaulted. Therefore,
it is illogical to consider his acts as falling within the scope of Article 263
of the Revised Penal Code. The crime committed is parricide not serious
physical injuries.
II. Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted under Exceptional
Circumstances
110 People vs. Francisco Abarca (G.R. No. 74433, 14 Sep 1987)
Facts:
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley
Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the
accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The
accused who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room
jumped and ran away. The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban
City. He went to the house of a PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving
there at around 6:30 p.m. He gotTalbo's firearm and went back to his
house. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to
the "mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The
accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh three times
with his rifle. Koh was hit and died. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were
occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was playing mahjong
were also hit by the shots fired by the accused. The trial court foundthe
accused, Abarca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
murder with double frustrated murder as charged in the amended
information.
Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of complex crime of murder with
double frustrated murder.
Ruling:
No. There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her
paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result
of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate
outburst.Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed
between the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife having
sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually
shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the
pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code,
in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . .
immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does
not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only
requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest
act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by
the same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by external
factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.
Hence, Art. 247 is applicable in this case.However, the accused is not
totally free from any responsibility. Granting the fact that he was not
performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he cannot be
said to be entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the
deceased, he uttered warning words, that is not enough a precaution to
absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. We
nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him liable
under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious
physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence.
III. Murder and Homicide
111 People vs Buensuceso (G.R. No. L-32103, 28 Sep 1984)
Facts:
Defendants Buensuceso, Aguilar, Izon and Joson with two other
policemen (dela Cruz and Mallari) were charged with the murder of
Tayag. Only the 4 defendants were found guilty and sentenced with
reclusion perpetua.
According to witness Salvador, patrolmen Aguilar and Tayag
were found walking towards the municipal building. Aguilar was trying
to take the fan knife of Tayag, but Tayag prevented him from taking it
because he was not making any trouble. At the suggestion of Aguilar,
17
they went to the police chief where they had a heated argument. Aguilar
said that Tayag cursed the patrolman Mallari and Canlas who were also
present. Tayag denied this and argued that Aguilar was trying to force
him to give up his knife.
As Tayag left the office, Aguilar, Mallari and dela Cruz followed
him. Aguilar fired his gun upward. Tayag retreated until he reached the
fence of the plaza then Aguilar hit him above the right knee. Tayag
continued to run towards his house. Aguilar and Mallari went to the shed
and took opposite sides of the road to intercept Tayag. Then there were
several successive gunshots and TAyag was seen dead.
Dela Cruz took the knife from Tayag and gave it to Buensuceso
who had a revolver. The witness also saw Izon and Jose who also had
guns.
PCT Sgt. Espiritu arrived and conducted an on-the-spot
investigation. The service pistol of Aguilar and Buensuceso were found
that they had been fired. Dela Cruz was not found with a pistol. A paraffin
test shows that Izon and Joson were positive while Dela Cruz and Mallari
are negative. The defendants allege that the Court erred in giving
credence to the necropsy and ballistic report.
Issue: Whether the court correct in holding that although there was no
conspiracy between the 4 police officers, they are guilty of Murder under
Art. 248 of RPC
Ruling: YES. Although it has not been established as to which wound was
inflicted by each accused the Court held that where the victim died as a
result of wounds received from several persons acting independently of
each other, but it has not been shown which wound was inflicted by each
assailant, all of the assailants are liable for the death of the victim.
The crime was qualified by TREACHERY hence it’s MURDER. Because:
a. The victim was already retreating backwards until he
reached the fence of the town plaza when AGUILAR fired his
revolver at the former hitting him above the right knee.
b. Despite the fact that he was already hit & wounded, &
possibly immobilized, he was still subjected to successive
shots as shown by the wounds that he had received,
even at his back.
c. Evidently the means employed by the police tended directly
& specially to insure the execution of the crime without risk
to themselves arising from any defense which the victim
might have made.
112 People vs. Aurelio Cabalhin Y Daclitan
G.R. No. L-100204. March 28, 1994
Padilla, J.;
Facts:
Aurelio Cabalhin y Daclitan was found guilty of committing
frustrated homicide, homicide and parricide for stabbing Marianita
Cabalhin (his wife), Flaviana Saldivia and Rolito Saldivia, which resulted
in the deaths of Marianita and Rolito and inflicted a fatal wound on
Flaviana Saldivia. The trial court appreciated the testimony of Robin
Saldivia, the brother of Rolito, who claimed that Aurelio forcibly entered
their house, drew a double-bladed instrument, and stabbed the three
victims as he hid under their house after sensing the danger from the
break-in. The testimony was supported by Igmidio Ducay, who saw
Aurelio kick open the door to the house and stab the victims through the
open door. The court also appreciated the testimony of barangay tanod
Romulo del Monte, who went to the house of the Saldivias after being
informed of the incident, who found the deceased Marianita fully dressed
and Rolito in khaki pants but no shirt. Later that day, he saw Aurelio in a
nearby alley with bloodied pants and his right hand inside a bag.
In his defense, Aurelio claimed that after he found out that his
wife was no longer at the house of Lola Waway for whom she had been a
housemaid, he learned from Jun Dagame, the brother of his sister-in-
law’s husband, that his wife had a paramour and was in the house of
Wenceslao Saldivia. He then went to the house and claimed to have found
Rolito and his wife in engaged in the sexual act, causing him to stab them
in his rage, and also stabbed Flaviana, who grabbed his shirt from
behind. He then went to a police outpost and surrendered himself for
killing his wife and her paramour.
Issues: Whether the trial court erred in finding Cabalhin guilty of
frustrated homicide, homicide and parricide.
18
Ruling: There is no merit in the appeal.
The Court gave great weight to the findings of fact of the trial
court that appreciated the testimony of Romulo, an unbiased witness,
who found the dead body of Marianita fully clothed and that of Rolito
wearing khaki pants. The Court thus rejected the application of Article
247 which justifies a husband’s killing of his wife while engaged in sexual
intercourse with another man. Since the wound inflicted on Flaviana was
potentially fatal, the crime of frustrated homicide, not serious physical
injury, was affirmed. The court also upheld the finding of the two
mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation for finding his wife
with her paramour and voluntary surrender.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed in toto.
113 Murder and Homicide
113 Sison vs. People (G.R. Nos. 108280-83, 16 Nov 1995)
1. Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard De Los Santos, and
Joselito Tamayo vs. People and CA (G.R. Nos. 108280-83. 16 Nov 1995)
2. People vs. Annie Ferrer, Accused. Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan,
Richard De Los Santos, And Joselito Tamayo, Accused-Appellants (G.R.
Nos. 114931-33. 16 Nov 1995)
Petition for review on certiorari and Automatic Review of a decision of
the CA
Puno, J:
 The case before us occurred at a time of great political
polarization in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution.
Facts:
 On 27 July 1986, despite the denial of the permit to hold a rally,
3k of Marcos loyalists gathered at the Rizal Monument of the
Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day was Led by
Atty. Oliver Lozano and Atty. Benjamin Nuega.
 When no permit could be produced by the leaders, Colonel Dula
Torres thereupon gave them 10 mins. to disperse. Atty. Lozano
turned towards his group and said “Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng
mga Cory infiltrators.”Atty. Nuega added “Sige, sige gulpihin
ninyo!”The police then pushed the crowd, and used tear gas and
truncheons to disperse them.
 At about 4:00 P.M., a small group of loyalists converged at the
Chinese Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. There, they saw Annie
Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of President
Marcos, jogging around the fountain. They approached her and
informed her of their dispersal and Annie Ferrer angrily
ordered them “Gulpihin ninyo ang mga Cory hecklers!” Then she
continued jogging around the fountain chanting “Marcos pa rin,
Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos, Bugbugin
ang mga nakadilaw!” The loyalists replied “Bugbugin!”A few
minutes later, Annie Ferrer was arrested by the police.
 Renato took off his yellow shirt. He then saw a man wearing a
yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting “Iyan,
habulin iyan. Cory iyan!” The man in the yellow t- shirt was
Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists.
Several of the accused caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and
mauled him relentlessly.
 Salcedo died of “hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic.” He
sustained various contusions, abrasions, lacerated wounds
and skull fractures as revealed in the following post-
mortem findings
 The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and
several press people, both local and foreign. The press took
pictures and a video of the event which became front-page news
the following day, capturing national and international
attention.
 This prompted President Aquino to order the Capital Regional
Command and the Western Police District to investigate the
incident. A reward of P10,000.00 was put up by Brigadier
General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, for persons who could
give information leading to the arrest of the killers. Several
persons, including Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo,
cooperated with the police, and on the basis of their
identification, several persons, including the accused, were
apprehended and investigated.
 For their defense, the principal accused denied their
participation in the mauling of the victim and offered their
respective alibis.
 On 16 Dec 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding
Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and
19
 Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder
qualified by treachery and sentenced them to 14 years 10
months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20
years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was
likewise convicted as an accomplice. The court, however, found
that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other
accused and thus acquitted Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando
Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega.
 On appeal, the CA on 28 Dec 1992, modified the decision of the
trial court by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty
of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito Tamayo, to
reclusion perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of
murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, but convicted
Joselito Tamayo of homicide because the information against him
did not allege the said qualifying circumstance.
Issue: Whether the CA gravely erred in finding that the crime committed
is murder and not death (homicide) caused in a tumultuous affray.” NO
Appellants mainly claim that the CA erred in sustaining the testimonies
of the two prosecution eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato
Banculo, because they are unreliable, doubtful and do not deserve any
credence. According to them, the testimonies of these two witnesses are
suspect because they surfaced only after a reward was announced by
General Lim. Renato Banculo even submitted 3 sworn statements to the
police geared at providing a new or improved version of the incident. On
the witness stand, he mistakenly identified a detention prisoner in
another case as accused Rolando Fernandez. Ranulfo Sumilang was
evasive and unresponsive prompting the trial court to reprimand him
several times.
Ruling:
There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of
the reward announced by General Lim, much less that both or either of
them ever received such reward from the government. On the contrary,
the evidence shows that Sumilang reported the incident to the police and
submitted his sworn statement immediately two hours after the
mauling, even before announcement of any reward. He informed the
police that he would cooperate with them and identify Salcedo’s
assailants if he saw them again.
The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not
make them and his testimony incredible. The sworn statements were
made to identify more suspects who were apprehended during the
investigation of Salcedo’s death.
The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times
by the trial court on the witness stand for being argumentative and
evasive. This is not enough reason to reject Sumilang’s testimony for he
did not exhibit this undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On
the whole, his testimony was correctly given credence by the trial court
despite his evasiveness at some instances. Except for compelling
reasons, we cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of
witnesses considering their visual view of the demeanor of witnesses
when on the Witness stand. As trial courts, they can best appreciate the
verbal and non-verbal dimensions of a witness’ testimony. Banculo’s
mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does not
make him an entirely untrustworthy witness.
It does not make his whole testimony a falsity. An honest
mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful testimony. Perfect
testimonies cannot be expected from persons with imperfect senses. In
the court’s discretion, therefore, the testimony of a witness can be
believed as to some facts but disbelieved with respect to the others.
We sustain the appellate and trial court’s findings that the
witnesses’ testimonies corroborate each other on all important and
relevant details of the principal occurrence. Their positive identification
of all petitioners jibe with each other and their narration of the events
are supported by the medical and documentary evidence on record.
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation, testified that the victim had various wounds on
his body which could have been inflicted by pressure from more than
one hard object. The contusions and abrasions found could have been
caused by punches, kicks and blows from rough stones. The fatal injury
of intracranial hemorrhage was a result of fractures in Salcedo’s skull
which may have been caused by contact with a hard and blunt object
such as fistblows, kicks and a blunt wooden instrument.
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and
punched. Sumilang in fact testified that Salcedo was pummelled by his
assailants with stones in their hands.
20
 The admissibility of these photographs is being questioned by
appellants for lack of proper identification by the person or persons who
took the same.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented
in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production
and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced.
The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct
representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is
determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the
crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can
identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as
a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima
facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other
competent witnesses, after Which the court can admit it subject to
impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be
identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness
who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the
photographs as part of its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty.
Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of proper
identification. However, when the accused presented their evidence,
Atty. Winlove Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry
Nery used Exhibits “V,” “V-1” to “V-48” to prove that his clients were not
in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the
mauling of the victim. The photographs were adopted by appellant
Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Nery as part of the defense exhibits.
And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other accused per
understanding with their respective counsels, including Atty. Lazaro,
who were absent. At subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the
photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness
stand. No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused, not until
Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuing
objection to their admissibility.
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the
photographs is anchored on the fact that the person who took the same
was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these
photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-
participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy
thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling
incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo
Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for
their presence thereat.
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused’s
testimonies reveal that only 3 of the appellants, namely, Richard de los
Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in various
belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over the victim.
Appellant Romeo Sison appears only once and he, although afflicted with
hernia, is shown merely running after the victim. Appellant Joselito
Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. The absence of the 2
appellants in the photographs does not exculpate them. The
photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo
but only segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and
Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang
and Banculo. Appellants’ denials and alibis cannot overcome their
eyeball identification.
Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the
existence of conspiracy among the principal accused and in convicting
them of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, not death in
tumultuous affray.

Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of
the Revised Penal Code as follows:
“Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray.—When, while several
persons, not composing groups organized for the common purpose of
assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault
each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of
the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually
killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious
physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be
punished by prision mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical
injuries on the deceased, the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those who
shall have used violence upon the person of the victim.”
For this article to apply, it must be established that:
(1) there be several persons;
(2) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose
of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally;
(3) these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a
21
confused and tumultuous manner;
(4) someone was killed in the course of the affray;
(5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and
(6) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or
who used violence can be identified.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the
course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof
cannot be ascertained.
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between
one distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have occurred
because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion
subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was
only a while later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified
as loyalists picked on one defenseless individual and attacked him
repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him.
There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was
there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.
As the lower courts found, the victim’s assailants were
numerous by as much as 50 in number and were armed with stones with
which they hit the victim. They took advantage of their superior strength
and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and
free himself. They followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal
Monument several meters away and hit him mercilessly even when he
was already fallen on the ground. There was a time when Salcedo was
able to get up, prop himself against the pavement and wipe off the blood
from his face. But his attackers continued to pursue him relentlessly.
Salcedo could not defend himself nor could he find means to defend
himself. Sumilang tried to save him from his assailants but they
continued beating him, hitting Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded
for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost consciousness.
The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a
defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the
instant case. There is no proof that the attack on Salcedo was deliberately
and consciously chosen to ensure the assailants’ safety from any defense
the victim could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo was sudden and
unexpected but it was apparently because of the fact that he was wearing
a yellow t-shirt or because he allegedly flashed the “Laban” sign against
the rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate court well
found, Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the temper of the
rallyists and run away from them but he, unfortunately, was
overtaken by them. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the
person being attacked.
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was
alleged in the information against Joselito Tamayo. Evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case because the attack
against Salcedo was sudden and spontaneous, spurred by the raging
animosity against the so-called “Coryistas.” It was not preceded by cool
thought and reflection.
We find however the existence of a conspiracy among appellants. At the
time they were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed a
unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death
of Salcedo. Where a conspiracy existed and is proved, a showing as
to who among the conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not
required to sustain a conviction. Each of the conspirators is liable
for all acts of the others regardless of the intent and character of
their participation, because the act of one is the act of all.
The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual
damages, P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one half of
the costs of the suit. At the time he died on July 27, 1986, Salcedo was 23
years old and was set to leave on 4 Aug 1986 for employment in Saudi
Arabia. The reckless disregard for such a young person’s life and the
anguish wrought on his widow and three small children, warrant an
increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00. The
indemnity of P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the death of the
victim.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and
modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan and Richard
de los Santos are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance and are each hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with the generic
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and, as
22
 a consequence, he is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of  Then they were all admitting their guilt but for the lesser offense
TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to TWENTY of Homicide
(20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum; 

Issue: Whether or not the accused should be guilty of the crime of
3. All accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally
homicide or muder?
the heirs of Stephen Salcedo the following amounts: 

(a) P74,000.00 as actual damages; 
 Ruling: Corpuz for Homicide; Ribadajo for Murder; Basas for Murder;
Anor for Murder; and Torres for Homicide. The aggravating
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and 
 circumstance of recidivism has to be considered because all the accused
(c) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim. 
 at the time of the commission of the offense, were serving their
4. Costs against accused-appellants. SO ORDERED. respective sentences by virtue of a final judgment for other crimes
embraced in the same Title of the Revised Penal Code. We find no
sufficient basis, therefore, to destroy the presumption of voluntariness
114 People v Ribadajo of appellants' confessions. The presumption of the law is in favor of the
G.R. No. L-40294 11 July 1986 spontaneity and voluntariness of an extrajudicial confession of an
Melencio-Herrera, J. accused in a criminal case.

Facts: Treachery was present because the attack on the victim was sudden and
 Accused: Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Federico Basas, unexpected. When the inmates from Brigade 3-a went out to get their
Rosendo Anor, Rodolfo Torres and Loreto Rivera, are all food ration appellants immediately rushed out of their own cell and
inmates of the New Bilibid Prison. However, Loreto Rivera died attacked, with their improvised weapon, the unsuspecting victim. There
during the pendency of the case. was a collective effort on appellants' part, who were all armed, in
assaulting the victim who was unarmed, and who was completely
 On November 18, 1971, prisoners from brigade 3-C succeeded
in opening the door of their dormitory using a tin can and deprived of an opportunity to prepare for the attack or to defend himself,
or to prepare for a fight or retreat. Evident premeditation was also
attacked the inmates from dormitory 3-A.
present because the plan to kill any prisoner from Brigade 3-a was
 The victim, Bernardo Cutamora, while getting his ration was
hatched around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of November 18, 1971, and
stabbed simultaneously and suffered multiple stab wounds on
the plan was consummated at about 8:00 in the evening of the same day.
the different parts of his body and caused his death.
Evident premeditation is present when murder was contemplated at
 In an investigation conducted by the Investigation Section of the
least one hour prior to its execution. Appellants had ample time to desist
New Bilibid Prisons, all the accused executed statements
from the execution of the offense but they clung to their determination
admitting their participation in the slaying of Cutamora.
to achieve their criminal intent.
 During the arraignment, at the presentation of evidence for the
IV. Unintentional Abortion
defense, accused Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, and Rodolfo
Torres withdrew their pleas of guilty, stating that their
115 People of the Philippines v. Salufrania
extrajudicial confessions were extracted by force; that they had
G.R. No. L-50884, March 30, 1988
been exposed for more or less one day to the heat of the sun and
Padilla, J.
the wetness and coldness of the rain, and had been subsequently
beaten up and placed in a "bartolina"

23
Facts: Filomeno Salufrania and his wife Marciana Abuyo quarrelled in
their small house at a sitio in barrio Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte.
During said quarrel, he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach and,
once fallen on the floor, he strangled her to death; that blood oozed from
the eyes and nose of Marciana and that she died right on the spot where
she fell.
Pedro Salufrania, the spouses’ son, testified as an eyewitness to
the crime. He further testified that after killing his mother, the Filomeno
went out of the house to get a hammock; that his brother Alex and he
were the only ones who witnessed how the accused killed their mother
because his sister and other brothers were already asleep when the
horrible incident happened; that his brothers Celedonio, Danilo and
sister Merly woke up after the death of their mother and kept watch at
their mothers body while their father was away; that their father arrived
early the next morning with the hammock and after placing their dead
mother on the hammock, the accused carried her on his shoulder and
brought the cadaver to the house of his sister Conching, located at
Tigbinan. From Tigbinan the corpse was transferred to Gabon, Talisay,
Camarines Norte for burial.
Pedro Salufrania stated that his father has threatened to kill him
and his other brothers and sister should he reveal the true cause of his
mother's death. Filomeno denied the allegations and contended that his
wife died due to a stomach ailment and headache. The trial court found
the accused guilty of the complex crime of parricide with intentional
abortion.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the complex crime of
parricide with intentional abortion
Ruling:No.
There is no evidence to show that he had the intention to cause
an abortion. He should not be held guilty of the complex crime of
Parricide with Intentional Abortion but of the complex crime of Parricide
with Unintentional Abortion. The elements of Unintentional Abortion
are as follows: 1) That there is a pregnant woman. 2) That violence is
used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion. 3) That
the violence is intentionally exerted. 4) That as a result of the violence
the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled
therefrom.
Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate
strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent
to cause an abortion. The appellant must have merely intended to kill the
victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion.
The abortion, in this case, was caused by the same violence that
caused the death of Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily
exerted by the herein accused upon his victim.
V. Rape
115 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SEMION MANGALINO y
LUMANOG
G.R. No. 79011. February 15, 1990
Sarmiento, J.;
Facts:
Marichelle, the 6-year old victim was playing
at the apartment of the accused and his wife. The accused and
Marichelle’s parents are neighbors with their apartments almost
opposite each other. At the time of the incident, there were 2 people
playing chess at the sala, and another
witness who testified in favour of accused. Mangalino gave Php2 to the
girl and told her not to tell anybody. The accused then laid the girl down,
removed her jogging pants, and placed them beside her feet. He kissed
her and fondled her infantile breasts. He inserted his finger into the
private part of the victim, and then forcibly and repeatedly introduced
his sexual organ into her undeveloped genitalia, but in vain. When the
victim told her mother what happened, her mother submitted the child
to a physical and genital examination. The result of which is that “No
evidence (or) sign of any extragenital physical injury noted on the body
of the subject at the time of examination. Hymen, intact and its orifice,
narrow. Sign of recent genital trauma, present.” Confrontation between
the victim and the accused ensued. 

Issue: Whether despite the failure to insert and the fact of many people
denying the incident taking place in broad daylight as well, may the
accused be convicted of rape?
24
Ruling: Yes. Mangalino should be convicted of statutory rape
In statutory rape, proof of intimidation or force used on the
victim, or lack of it, is immaterial. The gravamen of the offense of
statutory rape as provided in Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised
Penal Code is the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age.
For rape to be committed, full penetration is not required, proof of
entrance of the male organ within the labia or pudendum of the female
organ is sufficient. Rape may also be committed even in a place where
people congregate. Lust is no respecter of time or place. Also, minor
inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses are but natural, and
even enhance their credibility as witnesses as these discrepancies
indicate that the responses given were honest and unrehearsed
In this case, the victim was raped and beyond that, proof of
intimidation or force used on her, or lack of it, is immaterial. The victim
being of a tender age, the penetration could go only as deep as the labia.
Moreover, the heart of the matter is the violation of a child's incapacity
to discern evil from good. As the behavior of the victim towards the
accused during the commission of the crime and her testimony before
police officers and in the court indicate, she had no awareness of the
wrongfulness of the action of the accused who was old enough to be her
grandfather, which indicates the absolute trust and confidence of the
very young in an older person. Lastly, this Court held that rape can be
committed even in places where people congregate: in parks, along the
road side, within school premises, and even inside a house where there
are other occupants.
116 PEOPLE V. ATENTO
G.R. No. 84728. April 26, 1991
 According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel’s vagina.
FACTS:
Sometime in April 1986, The accused was able to persuade the victim to
come to his house and succeeded in deflowering her. Afterwards, she
was given P5.00. The victim said that there were 4 other succeeding
occasions were similar incidents occurred. 5 months later into her
pregnancy, she confessed that it was the accused who is the father of her
baby.
The accused was found guilty of Rape.
ISSUE: Whether the accused is liable for rape.
RULING: Yes
The trial court, held Atento guilty of rape under Paragraph 3,
citing People v. Asturias, where it was held: Assuming that complainant
Vilma Ortega voluntarily submitted herself to the bestial desire of
appellant still the crime committed is rape under paragraph 3 of Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code. This is so even if the circumstances of
force and intimidation, or of the victim being deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious are absent. The victim has the mentality of a child
below seven years old. If sexual intercourse with a victim under twelve
years of age is rape, then it should follow that carnal knowledge with a
seventeen year old girl whose mental capacity is that of a seven year old
child would constitute rape.
118 People vs Campuhan (G.R. No. 129433. 30 Mar 2000)
Nature: Automatic Review
Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
Facts: On 25 April 1996, at around 4 o’clock in the afternoon, Ma.
Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4) year old Crysthel Pamintuan,
went down from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo
chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At the ground floor she met
Primo Campuhan, who was a helper of Conrado Plata, Jr., brother of
Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her
daughters cry, “Ayo’ko, ayo’ko!” prompting Corazon to rush upstairs.
Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her children’s room
kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or “jogging pants” and panty
were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees.
Primo was apprehended after Corazon shouted for help. Medical
examination of Crysthel’s body for any sign of rape yielded negative
results. Nevertheless, Primo was convicted of statutory rape by the trial
court and sentenced to death.
Issue: Whether or not perfect penetration of the woman’s genitals is
required to consummate the crime of rape
25
Ruling: No. Complete or full penetration of the vagina is not required for
rape to be consummated. Any penetration, in whatever degree, is enough
to raise the crime to its consummated stage. Even if there be no rupture
of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, to warrant a conviction for
consummated rape. While the entry of the penis into the lips of the
female organ was considered synonymous with mere touching of the
external genitalia, the touching must be tacked to the penetration itself.
In this case, however, it was not proven that any form of penetration had
occurred, as evidenced by the testimony of the victim as well as the
medical records presented. The accused was convicted of attempted
rape instead of consummated rape.
119 People vs. Gallo (G.R. No. 124736, 29 Sep 1999)
Facts:
 On May 1994, accused Gallo was found guilty of the crime of
Rape by having sexual intercourse with a 13 year old girl, Marites Gallo
and was sentenced the the penalty of death due to the qualifying
circumstance of relationship since he was the father of the victim. Such
relationship was not indicated in the information filed, thus, the accused
prayed for penalty of Reclusion Perpetua instead of Death. Prosecution
contended that such should still be a special qualifying circumstance
because the relationship was proven during trial.
Issue: 
 Whether the relationship of the accused should be considered
a qualifying circumstance and thus increase the penalty to death even it
being not alleged in the information.
Ruling: No. The additional attendant circumstances introduced by
Republic Act 7659 should be only be considered as special qualifying
circumstances if pleaded as such. Otherwise, they can only be
appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances. The accused-
appellant’s relationship to the victim, although proven but not alleged in
the information, cannot be considered to be a qualifying circumstance.
120 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL BERANA y GUEVARRA
G.R. No. 123544. July 29, 1999
Romero, J.;
Facts:
On June 2, 1994 at around 2:00 o'clock in the morning, 14-year
old Maria Elena Jarcia was sleeping with her four-year old niece in one
of the two rooms in a house her family was renting when she was
awakened by her brother-in-law, herein accused-appellant. Complainant
recognized him because light was filtering in from a nearby window.
Berana pointed a "buntot page" at her neck and warned her not to make
any noise, otherwise she would be killed. The terrified girl was made to
lie down while accused- appellant raised her duster and proceeded to
remove her shorts and her underwear, after which he mashed her breast
and lay on top of her. The helpless girl was again threatened not to make
any noise otherwise he would kill her. Complainant tried to cover her
breasts with her arms but accused-appellant pushed her arms aside. As
he inserted his organ into her womanhood, Elena felt excruciating pain.
He began kissing her and made several push and pull movements, after
which, the victim felt something liquid in her organ. Accused-appellant
sat down and warned her not to talk to anyone about the incident.
The trial court finds accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and imposed death penalty on the
ground of the relation of the accused to the victim.
Issue: Whether or not the relationship between the accused and the
complainant should properly aggravate the crime of rape.
Ruling: No.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed, among others, with the following attendant circumstance:
“When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the
parent of the victim.”
However, considering that the relationship of accused-appellant
to complainant qualifies the crime of rape punishable by reclusion
perpetua to rape punishable by death, it is but proper that a more
stringent proof of relationship between the offender and the offended
party must be established by the prosecution. The relationship of
accused-appellant and the complainant, is not adequately substantiated
26
since it is merely based on testimony of the complainant, her mother's
testimony and the accused-appellant's use of the words, "mama at papa"
in his letters. Needless to say, the evidence presented are not sufficient
to dispel doubts about the true relationship of accused-appellant and the
complainant, to the benefit of which the accused is entitled. Where the
life of an accused-appellant hangs in the balance, a more exacting proof
must be adduced.
VI. Child Abuse
121 ISIDRO OLIVAREZ, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 163866, July 29, 2005
Ynares-Santiago, J.;
Facts:
Cristina Elitiong, a 16-year old student was employed by the
accused, Isidro Olivarez, in making sampaguita garlands. For one year,
she had been reporting during weekends at Isidro’s residence. Cristina
and her two brothers were at their work when the accused called for
Cristina. The accused asked her if she had told her mother that he gave
her money, and when she said that she did not, he embraced her and held
her breast. The workers were facing the street so that the two, Isidro and
Cristina, were not seen. He pulled her to the kitchen and, closing the
kitchen door, kissed her on the lips. She pushed him away and went back
to her station. Her brother Macoy saw her crying when she came back.
She did not say a word, but went to the faucet and washed her face. The
offended party continued to finish the garlands she was working on, and
waited until the afternoon for her wages. When she arrived at her home,
she first told her mother that she no longer wished to go back. When
pressed for a reason, she said basta po ayaw ko ng magtuhog. She told
her mother what happened and filed complaint against Isidro. The
accused claimed that it could not have happened as he was gassing up
his car during the time when the alleged crime was committed.
The trial court found Olivarez guilty. The CA affirmed the trial’s
courts ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in not holding that one of the
essential elements in violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act
7610, which includes the age of the offended party, that such age not
having been alleged in the Information, petitioner/accused cannot be
found guilty of said offense and must be acquitted.
Ruling: No, the CA was correct in confirming the the trial court’s decision.
Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 consists of three elements. The first
element, i.e., that the accused commits the act sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, is present. It was established beyond reasonable
doubt that Olivarez kissed Cristina and touched her breasts with lewd
designs. The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, is likewise
present. Cristina was sexually abused because she was coerced or
intimidated by petitioner. The Court noted that Article III of R.A. 7610 is
captioned as “Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse” as the
legislators intended to cover situations where the minor may have been
coerced into lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit. The
third element, i.e., the child is below 18 years of age. Olivarez makes
much of the failure that such age was not alleged in the information. He
claims that he had no personal knowledge of Cristina’s age. However, the
Court found the information filed to be sufficient. Furthermore, the
missing averment, that is Cristina’s age, was supplied in the Complaint.
Petitioner was furnished a copy of the Complaint which was mentioned
in the information, hence he was adequately informed of the age of the
complainant. Olivarez also argues that the information merely states that
he was being charged for the crime of “violation of R.A. 7610” without
citing the specific sections alleged to have been violated. The information
filed may not refer to specific section/s of R.A. 7610 alleged to have been
violated by Olivarez, but it is all to evident that the body of the
information contains an averment of the acts alleged to have been
performed by Olivarez which unmistakably refers to acts punishable
under Section 5 of R.A. 7610. As to which section of R.A. 7610 is being
violated by petitioner is inconsequential. What is determinative of the
offense is the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the
complaint or information.
The petition is denied.
122 Navarette v. People (GR 147913, 31 Jan 2007)
27

Facts: On 30 Oct 1995, at around past 9:00 in the evening, the victim,
BBB went to petitioner’s house to watch television, which was
something she often did. Only petitioner and BBB were there that night.
BBB testified that it was on this occasion that petitioner sexually abused
her. He placed his penis [in her] vagina twice, poked her vagina with a
stick with cotton. Then, the petitioner brought her to the comfort room
and pointed a knife to her throat and boxed her on the right side of her
eye. Afterwards, she and petitioner watched a pornographic movie.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was rightfully convicted of acts of
lasciviousness in relation to Art. III of RA 7610 although the charge
against him was statutory rape.
Ruling: Yes
When the victim is under 12 years old, the accused shall be
prosecuted under either Article 335 (for rape) or Article 336 (for acts of
lasciviousness) of the RPC. Accordingly, although an accused is charged
in the information with the crime of statutory rape (i.e., carnal
knowledge of a woman under twelve years of age ), the offender can be
convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness, which is included
in rape. In the case, both lower courts also found that petitioner poked
the victim’s vagina with a stick with cotton and watched a pornographic
movie with her. These acts are undoubtedly acts of lasciviousness or
lewdness. The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610
that must be proven in addition to the elements of acts of lasciviousness
are as follows: 1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct; 2. The said act is performed with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and 3. The child,
whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. The aforestated acts of
petitioner undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct under RA 7610.
123 PEOPLE vs. JOVER MATIAS y DELA FUENTE
G.R. No. 186469. June 13, 2012
Perlas-Bernabe, J.:
Facts:
Appellant Jover Matias y Dela Fuente and private complainant
AAA were neighbors at Sto. Niño St., Barangay San Antonio, Quezon City.
In the evening of June 6, 2004, AAA, a minor, was on her way to the
vegetable stall to buy something when, all of a sudden, appellant pulled
her towards a house under construction. Appellant forced her to lie on a
bamboo bed, removed her shorts and underwear, and inserted his finger
then his penis into her vagina. Appellant threatened to kill her if she
reported the incident to anyone.
When AAA arrived home, she narrated to her mother and aunt
what appellant did to her.1âwphi1Together, they proceeded to the
barangay to report the incident and to the Baler District Police Station to
file a complaint. A physical examination was conducted upon AAA. AAA
was found to have deep-healed lacerations and was in a non-virgin state
physically at the time of examination.
Issue: Whether Appellant Jover Matias y Dela Fuente committed the
crime of "rape" under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610?
Ruling: Yes.
Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.
- Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or
any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; xxx
Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, if the victim of sexual
abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for
sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the
Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other
hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged
with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under
Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code.
However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act
because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced.
28
 Rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA
7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes),
a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be
complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
AAA was born on April 23, 1991, which would make her 13
years old at the time of the commission of the offense on June 6, 2004.
Thus, appellant can be prosecuted and convicted either under Sec. 5 (b),
Article III of RA 7610 for sexual abuse, or under Article 266-A of the RPC,
except for rape under paragraph 1(d). The penalties under these two
laws differ: the penalty for sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA
7610 is reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua, while rape
under Article 266-A of the RPC is penalized with reclusion perpetua.
In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances,
the Court finds appellant Jover Matias y Dela Fuente guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime under Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic
Act No. 7610 and imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period.
VII. illegal Possession of Firearms
124 26 People vs Ladjaalam
Facts: Appellant Ladjaalam was charged with the following:
(1) The Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
(2) Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition
(3) Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide
By virtue of a Search Warrant No. 20, thirty members of the Zamboanga
City Police conducted a police raid on the residence of herein appellant
Ladjaalam and his wife. 10 meters before approaching the main gate of
the said house of Ladjaalam, three bystanders near the area shouted
“Police Raid! Police Raid!”. Thereafter, the policemen were met by a
rapid burst of gunfire coming from the second floor. There was also
gunfire at the back of the house.
The police saw appellant Ladjaalam firing the M14 gun at the window of
the second floor.
Upon reaching the second floor of the house, one of the policemen saw
an M14 rifle, unloaded it and counted 17 live ammunition inside the
magazine.
The said M14 was unlicensed. Thus, appellant Ladjaalam was found
guilty of “Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition”. Also, for firing
at the members of the police who went to his residence to serve a search
warrant, appellant Ladjaalam was found guilty of Direct Assault with
Attempted Homicide.
Issue: Whether or not appellant Ladjaalam should be liable for the crime
of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition, as a separate offense
from the crime of Direct Assault with Multiple Homicide
Held: No.
Ruling:
Where an accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple
attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several
policemen who were about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held
guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms. Neither
can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct
assault.
Section 1 of RA 8294, which amended PD 1866 provides that:
“Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to
be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. -- The penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and
other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other
crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified
as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in
diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44,
.45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as
caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with
firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided,
however, That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.
29
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.”
A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is
used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of
simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder
or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an
aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense.
Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was
committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal
possession of firearms.
Appellant is only guilty of two offenses: (1) Direct Assault and Multiple
Attempted Homicide with the use of a weapon; and (2) Maintaining a
Drug Den
Other Notes: The Search Warrant No. 20 served by the Zamboanga City
Police was eventually declared Null and Void for indicating several offenses
in only search warrant. Despite this, the arrest was still considered lawful.
125 Celino V. CA (G.R. No. 170562, 29 June 2007)
Carpio Morales, J.
Facts:
There were two separate informations filed against Angelo Celino for
the violation of the COMELEC gun ban and for the illegal possession of
firearms under RA 8294
He files a motion to quash the 2nd crime contending that he cannot be
prosecuted for illegal possession because he was also charged of having
committed an another crime.
The trial court denied said motion on the ground that the offence was
not enumerated in RA 8294 and should be considered as an separate
offence. The CA affirmed said ruling.
Issue: Whether the court erred in the denial of the motion to quash
Held: No, the correct was correct in denying the motion to quash
Ratio:
R.A. 8294 provides that the accused will only be charged with illegal
possession only if no other crime was committed by the person
arrested. In this case, he was arrested for committing also a separate
crime of the COMELEC gun violation hence he is guilty of violating the
gun ban and for illegal possession separately.
TITLE IX CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
I. Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
126 People vs Tomio (G.R. No. 74630. 30 Sep 1991)
Nature: Appeal
Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.
Facts: Tatsumi Nagao, a Japanese national, arrived in Manila on April
29,1986 for a five-day vacation tour and was billeted at the Holiday Inn.
On May 2,1986, while Nagao was having lunch alone at the coffee shop
of the hotel, two (2) Japanese men, Maida Tomio alias Sato Toshio and
Mitamura, approached his table informed him that they have been in the
Philippines for quite a time and offered themselves as his guides in
Manila. Thereafter, Mitamura brought him to the sauna bath of the hotel
and a department store in Manila. Eventually, they ended up at the Leo's
Restaurant located along Roxas Boulevard at around 7:30 o'clock in the
evening where they had dinner. Before leaving the restaurant, Nagao's
companion placed a pack of cigarettes on his (Nagao's) shirt pocket and
instructed him to just wait because he has to talk to a taxi driver.
However, Nagao was approached by five (5) plainclothesmen who
identified themselves as policemen, They bodily searched him and found
the pack of cigarettes earlier given him which the policemen claimed
contained marijuana. Thereafter, the policemen brought him to the
Southern Police District Station. While Nagao was at the police station,
Tagahiro Nakajima alias Yamada arrived. Later, Sato Toshio alias Maida
Tomio also arrived. Both acted as interpreters for him. One of them
informed him that if he is found guilty of possession of marijuana, he can
be sentenced from six (6) to twelve (12) years imprisonment. The two
(2) then suggested that Nagao give money to the policemen who, they
30
claim, demanded U.S. $100,000.00 for his release. Nagao agreed.
Thereafter, Toshio and Nakajima informed him that they had advanced
the payment of the bribe money to the policemen who, accordingly,
agreed to release him.
From May 2-12, 1986, the accused never left Nagao’s side and
transferred him from one hotel to another. Nagao had also called up his
father in Japan to ask for the money which would be paid to the accused
for the supposed advanced payment to the police. Upon knowing that
Nagao’s father had deposited the money, the accused, together with their
victim, went to RCBC to withdraw the money. There, they were
apprehended and charged with kidnapping.
The accused contended that they only wanted to help their countryman
who did not speak English or any Philippine language. According to
them, they stuck to the victim for several days to compel him to pay the
money which they advanced to the police. The trial court convicted them
of the crime charged.
Issue: Whether or not there was illegal detention
Ruling: Yes. The Court held that although no violence was used on the
victim, he was still deprived of his liberty because the accused had taken
his money and other possessions. The victim was left with no choice but
to stay with his captors because he was in a foreign country, whose
language he did not speak, and where he did not know anyone. That in
itself constituted a restraint on the victim’s liberty. Assuming that the
purpose of the incarceration was indeed to compel the payment of a
debt, such act is still tantamount to kidnapping, as held in People vs
Akiran, et. al. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
127 People v. Mercado (G.R. No. L-65152, 30 Aug 1984)
Relova, J.;
Facts:
Alberto Mercado was the boyfriend of Susan Baylon. On 1
September 1979, Susan left her residence for unknown reasons. Alberto
then suspected that it was her sister, Yvonne, who instigated her to leave.
One day, Yvonne was walking in their subdivision when accused came
from behind and grabbed her on the neck, with a knife pointed on her
throat. Upon arriving at the porch in Norma’s house, Yvonne asked why
he was acting that way and accused said that he was angry to her and
demanded to produce her sister. At this juncture, he dragged Yvonne on
the road, causing some commotion. Yvonne’s brothers and some
neighbors pleaded on him to release her but he did not heed the plea. He
dragged her to a store wherein the Chief of Police and some policemen
talked to him. The negotiation lasted until 12 noon until the barrio got
the chance to restrain him.
Accused averred that even if they are not legally married, Susan
is her wife for they have been living for quite some time in her family
home in Tayuman. They had a quarrel before finding out that Susan went
away alone. Alberto inquired from neighbors of her whereabouts but to
no avail. Upon returning, he saw his clothes near the door and was told
by Yvonne to leave the house. On 2 September 1979, he saw Yvonne at a
store in Tayuman. Yvonne was holding a knife and was about to stab
Alberto. Because of the warning he got from a friend, he was able to stop
the attack and asked her why she wanted to stab him. Yvonne replied
that Susan complained to her and she was crying while doing that. It was
during the act pointing the knife on her chest that the authorities arrived
and thought that accused is going to stab Yvonne. He only asked for a
vehicle but not any money, as claimed by Yvonne and others. The lower
court convicted him of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting of such crime
and in not crediting him with the period of his preventive detention.
Ruling: The issue lies in the credibility of the witnesses and that of the
appellant in finding him guilty of the offense charged.
In the matter of credibility of witnesses, the rule is that unless
there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that
would have affected the result of the case, the appellate court will not
disturb the factual findings of the lower court. For, having had the
opportunity of observing the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses
while testifying, the trial court, more than the reviewing tribunal, is in a
better position to gauge their credibility, and properly appreciate the
relative weight of the often conflicting evidence for both parties."
(People vs. Ablaza, 30 SCRA 173,176)
31
 In the case at bar, We find no justification to overturn the
judgment of the trial court giving credence to the declarations of five (5)
witnesses, three (3) of whom are policemen who did not know appellant
before the incident. The records of the case are convincing enough that
Mercado forcibly brought Yvonne from place to place so that the latter
would reveal the whereabouts of Susan, his common-law-wife. For
almost five (5) hours, he held Yvonne in a store before he was subdued.
Pictures of the incident (Exhibits D, D-1 to D-4) clearly show appellant's
hand around the neck of complainant, with a knife poked at it. On the
other hand, as correctly observed by the trial court, "[i]f it was true that
it was the complainant who tried to stab the accused and it was the latter
who succeeded in subduing the complainant, the incident would not
have lasted several hours and attracted a throng of onlookers and
policemen." (p. 43, Rollo)
We agree, however, with appellant that he should be credited
with the period of his preventive detention. He has been detained since
September 2, 1979 and, therefore, in accordance with Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, the period of his preventive detention should be
deducted from the term of his sentence.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with
costs. Appellant should be credited with the full time of his preventive
imprisonment upon a showing that he agreed to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall
be credited with four-fifths (4/5) of the time of such preventive
imprisonment.
128 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LETICIA SANIDAD DE DEL
SOCORRO
G.R. No. 84048. February 15, 1990
Padilla, J.;
Facts:
That on or about the 11th day of February, 1984, in the Municipality of
Mandaluyong, the above-named accused, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap CLAIRE SANCHEZ, a minor below
seven (7) years old, for the purpose of permanently separating said child
from EVELYN SANCHEZ y TEJERO and ANTONIO SANCHEZ, the parents
of the said child and thereafter sold to one DRA. APOLONIA
VILLAMAYOR, in the amount of P700.00.
The lady physician declared that at about 10:30 o'clock in the evening of
11 February 1984, a woman, whom she later identified to be the accused,
Leticia Sanidad de Del Socorro, came to her clinic with a baby girl. She
asked the accused what was wrong with the child and the accused
answered that nothing was wrong with the child but that she wanted the
lady physician to take care of the child, whom she referred to as her
daughter, because her husband had died just two (2) months ago and she
could not afford to feed her brood of four (4) girls and two (2) boys. The
accused also asked for the amount of P700.00, as a "donation to enable
her to open a small sari-sari store. Feeling pity and compassion for the
child, she gave the accused P400.00 which she had at the time, and told
her to come back the following Saturday for the balance. After the
accused had left, she gave the child to her spinster aunt, Lourdes
Saguinsin, who lived in E. de la Paz St., Angono, Rizal. The lady physician
advised the mother and the policemen however, not to leave
immediately as the woman who brought the child to her was coming
back on that day to collect the balance of P300.00. At about 10:00 o'clock
in the evening, sure enough the accused came back to the clinic. Dr.
Villamayor pointed out the accused to the policemen who then arrested
her and brought her to the municipal building for investigation. The
accused admitted having brought the child, Claire Sanchez, to Dr.
Villamayor in Angono, Rizal. But she denied having kidnapped the child
or having sold her to the doctor.
Trial Court Judge Domingo R. Garcia found the defendant guilty of the
crime charged and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with the accessory penalties. The defendant has appealed to
the Supreme Court.
Issue:Whether or not the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution
is reliable and credible.
Ruling: Yes.
The SC held that the variance between the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses in court and their sworn statements, as well as the alleged
contradictions and inconsistencies pointed out by the appellant in her
32
Brief, are not substantial as to destroy their credibility. The alleged
variance refers to minor details which would tend to show the sincerity
of the witnesses and the absence of connivance between them. The
testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, unlike the denial of the
defendant-appellant, appears to be consistent with the truth and the
natural course of things. Furthermore, these witnesses had no motive to
falsify the truth and impute to the defendant-appellant, whom they met
only on the occasion complained of, the commission of so grave an
offense as kidnapping of a minor child.
The claim of the defendant-appellant that the child, Claire Sanchez, went
voluntarily with her, cannot be given credence. Besides, the defendant-
appellant herself testified that when she picked up the child in
Mandaluyong, her only thought was to bring the child to Dr. Villamayor
in Angono, Rizal. She did not bring the child to her (defendant's) own
home in Muzon, Taytay, Rizal even if this place is nearer than Angono,
because, according to the defendant, she already has many children of
her own and they have no food to eat. And if she really pitied the child
whom she described as crying on the sidewalk, she did not bring her to
the nearest police station in Mandaluyong instead think only of Dr.
Villamayor who, according to her, she did not even know personally, but
only in name.
The SC opined and held that the evidence adduced during the
trial is sufficient to justify the conclusions of the trial court that the
defendant is guilty of the crime of kidnapping.
Judgment appealed is AFFIRMED.
129 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARMEN LIM @ “MAMENG
LIM”
G.R. No. 86454, October 18, 1990
Gutierrez, Jr., J.;
FACTS:
Sisters Aida and Avelyn, both minors, went to Helen Theater,
located across the store and residence of the appellant, to look at the
pictures displayed outside. They then proceeded to the appellant's store
which the latter was tending at that time. When the latter inquired as to
the whereabouts of their parents, Aida and Avelyn claimed that their
parents were separated and that they were driven away by their father.
The appellant offered to shelter the sisters. Avelyn eventually
ended up living in the house of the appellant’s sister on the condition that
she and Aida could meet every week.
On the other hand, Aida stayed in the appellant's residence for
about two weeks. To help in the house, she would run errands in the
market and would occasionally watch over the appellant's store.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is guilty of committing the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
RULING: No, the appellant is not guilty of committing the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The essential element or act which makes the offense of
kidnapping is the deprivation of an offended party’s liberty under any of
the four instances enumerated under Art. 267, par. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In this case, The two minors voluntarily entered the appellant's
residence through the front entrance. The appellant's residence, located
near a movie house, and having a store fronting the street where many
customers presumably come and go can be classified as a busy place.
Hence, the fact of detention which is an essential element in the
crime charged, was not clearly established. There was also no showing
that there was actual confinement or restriction of the person of the
offended party and that one of the minors was locked up, physically
restrained of her liberty or unable to communicate with anyone.
Therefore, the appellant is not guilty of committing the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
130 People vs Ramos
Facts:
Herein Petitioner was charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom
and murder. Ramos wanted to receive P200,000 from Abanilla to pay for
the birth of his child. Alicia Abanilla was allegedly the godmother of
Ramos. One day in 1994, a certain American Pastor named Malcolm
Bradshaw was riding his car, when he saw the victim Abanilla being
physically restained by Ramos in a Bus Stop at EDSA White Plains.
Bradshaw realized that there was something wrong with the situation
33
and immediately called Alicia Abanilla’s attention and wanted to for her
to board the vehicle and escape. Unfortunately, Ramos also managed to
squeeze himself into the vehicle when Alicia Abanilla boarded the same.
Armed with a gun, Ramos asked the driver Bradshaw to proceed to
Katipunan Avenue where Ramos forcibly brought with him the Victim
Abanilla. Ramos and Abanilla then boarded a taxi and went to Bocaue
Bulacan. The taxi driver was forced to obey the orders of the armed
Ramos. In the process, the taxi driver managed to ask help from a traffic
enforcer who was also armed with a gun. The taxi driver went out of the
taxi cab and ran, while there were gunshots exchanged between the
traffic enforcer and Ramos.
Ramos went to the driver’s seat and tried to escape with Alicia still inside
the taxi cab. Alicia Abanilla tried to escape by opening the left rear door.
Unfortunately, Alicia’s blouse was caught in the process and was not able
to escape as she was dragged by the moving taxi cab. Ramos then
stopped the taxi cab, went out of the vehicle and shot Alicia Abanilla at
the back of her head. Alicia Abanilla died as a result of the gunshot.
Ramos averred that all throughout the incident the victim was not under
detention at any moment nor was she deprived in any manner of her
liberty; that if there was some kind of pressure or force employed upon
the victim, such pressure or force did not amount to a deprivation of
liberty but was merely a matter of persuasion that moved the victim to
go with him voluntarily.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is deprivation of the victim’s liberty, which
constitutes kidnapping YES
(2) Whether or not the kidnapping and murder should be treated as two
separate crimes NO
Ruling:
(1) Yes. We resolve. The essence of the crime of kidnapping as
defined and penalized under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Sec. 8 of RA No. 7659 is the actual deprivation of the
victim's liberty coupled with an indubitable proof of intent on the part of
the malefactor to effect such restraint on the offended party's
liberty. The term "actual deprivation of liberty" consists not only of
placing a person in an enclosure but also of detaining a person or
depriving him in any manner of his liberty.
In the instant case, actual restraint of the victim's liberty was
evident from the moment she was forcibly prevented by accused-
appellant from going to at Meralco and taken instead against her will to
Bulacan. Her freedom of movement was effectively restricted by her
abductor who, armed with a .22 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver
which instilled fear in her, compelled her to go with him to Bulacan.
(2) No. Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the
detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was
merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no
longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes,
but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last
paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.
Alicia Abanilla was indeed kidnapped for ransom and then murdered by
accused-appellant. But the kidnapping for ransom and murder should
not be treated as separate crimes for which two (2) death penalties must
as a consequence be imposed. Instead, under Art. 267 of The Revised
Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659, accused-appellant should be
convicted of the special complex crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM
WITH MURDER and impose upon him the maximum penalty of DEATH.
Note: When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention,
or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed.
131 People vs Sabardan
G.R. No. 132135, 21 May 2004
Callejo, Sr. J.;
Facts:
Appellant Domingo Sabardan, a 56-year old cathechist, was
convicted of serious illegal detention with rape. From 15-31 of Sept
1991, the accused detained and locked Richelle Banluta, a 12-year old
girl in his rented apartment in Binangonan, Rizal. Around 10pm on 15
Sept 1991, Richelle left their house after she was berated by her mother.
The appellant saw her and inquired where she was going and later
invited her to stay in his apartment, which was only 15 meters away
from the Banluta residence. One day, Richelle told the appellant that she
wanted to go home but the latter dissuaded her. When the appellant left
the apartment, she found out that the door was locked from the outside.
34
On the fourth day of her detention, appellant forced her to drink a glass
of ice cold beer. Appellant then started to embrace and kiss Richelle who
was resisting at first but later on felt dizzy and fell unconscious. The
following day, she woke up naked and felt severe pains in her vagina. She
also found the appellant beside her completely naked. The appellant
forced Richelle to drink either juice or beer on four other occassions and
she would always felt dizzy afterwards. During those period, accused
had carnal knowledge of Richelle while she was unconscious due to drug
which he administered to her. Richelle was only able to leave the
apartment of the accused when she was rescued by her brothers and the
police.
Issue: Whether the appellant is guilty of illegal detention with rape.
Ruling: No, accused is guilty of rape and not of the complex crime of
serious illegal detention with rape.
In serious illegal detention, offender kidnaps or detains another, or in
any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty for more than 3 days.
In this case, the evidence on record shows that the original and
primordial intention of the appellant in keeping Richelle in his
apartment was to rape her and not to deprive her of her liberty.
Richelle did not leave the appellant’s apartment. She had just
surreptitiously left their house in a rebellious mood and had nowhere to
go. She believed, at that time, that she was safe with the appellant, who
was their neighbor and her brother’s friend. However, when the
appellant sat on her bed in the evening of the same day, completely
naked, Richelle decided to leave the next day. She balked at leaving only
when the appellant warned her that her mother would berate her for
sleeping at his apartment. Obviously, in warning Richelle of what to
expect from her mother, the appellant wanted to instill fear in her mind
to force her to remain in his apartment. Richelle should have left the
apartment and returned home that day, and contend with her mother’s
anger for leaving their house and sleeping in the appellant’s apartment.
However, Richelle, then barely twelve years old and a mere grade six
pupil, cannot be expected to react and decide like an adult would. She
could not have foreseen the appellant’s evil intent of raping her.
Moreover, even if she wanted to leave the appellant’s apartment, she
could not do so because the appellant did not allow her to leave.
Frustrated in his first attempt, the appellant was determined to deflower
Richelle. And the appellant succeeded, because on the fourth day of
Richelle’s stay in the appellant’s apartment, the appellant forced her to
drink beer which caused her to feel dizzy and rendered her unconscious.
The appellant forthwith raped her. Moreover, Richelle could not have
escaped from the appellant’s apartment during her stay because the
door was locked. Richelle could move around the house, but the
windows on the ground and second floors had grills with smoked glass.
Richelle tried to open the windows, but she could not.
Thus, the appellant is guilty only of rape under Art. 335, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, and not of the complex crime of serious illegal
detention with rape under Art. 267, in relation to Arts. 335 and 48 of the
Code.
132 Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
People vs. Joel Baluya Y Notarte (G.R. No. 181822, 13 April 2011)
Appeal from a decision of the CA
Peralta, J:
Facts:
 While in the midst of playing, the victim, Glodil Castillon, 9 yrs
old, was called by the Appellant and summoned him to come
forth. Immediately thereafter, appellant seized him by twisting
his right arm, pointed a knife at him and told him that if
appellant’s wife, Marissa, would not show up, Glodil’s mother
would not see him anymore.
 Appellant and Glodil then boarded a jeepney and went to
Blumentritt. When they were in Blumentritt, appellant called up
Glodil’s mother, Gloria, telling her to show him his wife so that
she will also be able to see Glodil. Gloria then asked appellant to
allow her to talk to her son as proof that Glodil was indeed with
him. Appellant then passed the telephone to Glodil, but the latter
was only able to momentarily talk with his mother because
appellant immediately grabbed the telephone from him.
 Thereafter, Glodil’s mother reported the incident to the police.
Meanwhile, appellant and Glodil again boarded a jeepney and
went to Novaliches. It was Glodil’s first time to reach Novaliches.
Upon reaching Novaliches “Bayan,” they headed straight to a
barbershop where they fetched appellant’s 3 minor children.
35
 They then proceeded to a church where appellant left his
children and Glodil in the playground within the church
premises. Glodil played, ate and slept with appellant’s children
until the afternoon of the same day. During that period,
appellant returned from time to time to check on them and bring
them food. At 3:30 p.m. of the same day, appellant again called
up Gloria and, while shouting, asked if his wife was already
there. He then threatened Gloria by saying that “kapag hindi mo
ipakita sa akin si Marissa, hindi mo na makikita ang anak mo.”
Subsequently, Gloria was able to talk to Marissa and convince
her to meet with appellant at the Novaliches public market.
Unknown to appellant, the police already had a plan to arrest
him, which they did when he showed up to meet with his wife.
 In the meantime, around 4:00 p.m. of 31 Aug 2003, Glodil was
able to seize an opportunity to escape while appellant was away.
He walked from the place where appellant left him in Novaliches
until he reached their house and it took him around 4 hours to
do so. He was able to trace back their house by reading the
signboard of the jeepneys and following the route of those that
pass by his place of residence.
 On the other hand, the defense interposed the defense of denial
alleging that on 31 Aug 2003, appellant went to the house of his
common-law-wife’s aunt, Gloria, at Laon Laan St. in Sampaloc,
Manila for the purpose of asking the latter if his wife, with whom
he has been separated, has been there. Gloria told him that his
wife went to their house once but has not seen her since then.
After an hour of talking with Gloria, appellant bid her goodbye.
Appellant and Glodil then proceeded to the former’s house in
Novaliches. After taking lunch, appellant took his children and
Glodil to the playground and left them there. When he returned
around 4:30 p.m., Glodil was no longer there. His children told
him that Glodil’s aunt, by the name of Rosaly, fetched him.
Appellant then brought home his children. Around 6:00 p.m. of
the same day, the police, together with Gloria and his wife,
arrived at his house wherein he was apprehended and brought
to a police station in Novaliches. After having been subjected to
a medical examination, he was turned over to Police Station
where he was subsequently charged with kidnapping.
Appellant alleges that his wife and her aunt came up with the
scheme of accusing him with kidnapping so that his wife would
be able to take their children from him. Appellant also claims
that Gloria is angry with “warays” and because he is a “waray”
she is also angry with him.
 In its Decision, the RTC found the version of the prosecution
credible and, accordingly, rendered judgment finding accused
Joel Baluya GUILTY of the crime of Kidnapping with Serious
Illegal Detention and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by
law and to pay the costs.
 Aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, appellant appealed his
conviction to the CA which rendered its Decision, affirming the
RTC decision, subject to the modification that accused JOEL
BALUYA y NOTARTE is ordered to pay to victim Glodil M.
Castillon the amounts of P30,000.00 as moral damages and of
P15,000.00 as nominal damages.
Issue: Whether the court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Ruling: NO.
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are:
(1) the offender is a private individual;

(2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives
the latter of his liberty;

(3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and

(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances are present:
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or
(b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or
(c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
(d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a
public officer.
36
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.—Any private Appellant’s arguments that the victim is free to go home if he
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner wanted to because he was not confined, detained or deprived of his
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua liberty and that there is no evidence to show that Glodil sustained any
to death; injury, cannot hold water. The CA is correct in holding that for
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim
days.
 2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
 3. in an enclosure or treated him harshly. Where the victim in a kidnapping
case is a minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the offender
If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the
forcibly restrained the victim. As discussed above, leaving a child in a
person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been
place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the
made.
freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
deprivation of liberty. For under such a situation, the child’s freedom
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
remains at the mercy and control of the abductor. It remains undisputed
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was
that it was his first time to reach Novaliches and that he did not know his
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any
way home from the place where he was left. It just so happened that the
other person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were
victim had the presence of mind that, when he saw an opportunity to
presented in the commission of the offense.
escape, he ran away from the place where appellant left him. Moreover,
he is intelligent enough to read the signboards of the passenger jeepneys
In the instant case, the Court is convinced that the
he saw and follow the route of the ones going to his place of residence.
prosecution has adequately and satisfactorily proved all the
Appellant alleges that Glodil was not forcibly taken, but instead
aforesaid elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
voluntarily went with appellant to Novaliches. The general rule is that
The presence of the first element is not in issue as there is no dispute
the prosecution is burdened to prove lack of consent on the part of
that appellant is a private individual. As to the second element of the
the victim. However, where the victim is a minor, lack of consent is
crime, the deprivation required by Article 267 of the RPC means not only
presumed. Aside from his self-serving testimony, appellant failed to
the imprisonment of a person, but also the deprivation of his liberty in
present competent evidence to overcome such presumption. Thus, the
whatever form and for whatever length of time. It involves a situation
presumption stands that Glodil, being only nine (9) years old on 31 Aug
where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention
2003, is incapable of giving consent and is incompetent to assent to his
or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move. If the victim is a child,
seizure and illegal detention.
it also includes the intention of the accused to deprive the parents of the
The defense further argues that appellant had no intention to
custody of the child. In other words, the essence of kidnapping is the
detain Glodil and that his purpose is to merely use him as “a leverage
actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with indubitable
against Glodil’s mother, who refused to produce Marissa, his live-in
proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. In the
partner.” The Court, however, cannot fathom how appellant could have
present case, Glodil was in the control of appellant as he was kept in a
used Glodil as leverage or bargaining tool to force Marissa to meet with
place strange and unfamiliar to him. Because of his tender age and the
him without depriving him of his liberty. In any case, appellant’s motive
fact that he did not know the way back home, he was then and there
is not relevant, because it is not an element of the crime.
deprived of his liberty. The intention to deprive Glodil’s parents of his
With respect to the third element of the offense charged, the prosecution
custody is also indicated by appellant’s actual taking of the child without
proved that appellant’s act of detaining the victim was without lawful
the permission or knowledge of his parents, of subsequently calling up
cause.
the victim’s mother to inform her that the child is in his custody and of
As to the last element of the crime, appellant contends that
threatening her that she will no longer see her son if she failed to show
the victim’s minority was not sufficiently proven. However, the
his wife to him.

37
Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the
victim’s minority was alleged by the prosecution in the information
and was not disputed. During his direct examination, the victim
testified as to his minority claiming that, at the time that he was
presented at the witness stand, he was only 10 years old. This fact was
affirmed by his mother who also testified as to his minority at the time
that he was abducted. As correctly contended by the OSG, appellant did
not raise any issue as to the victim’s minority when the victim’s and his
mother’s testimonies were offered.
Central to the issues raised in the Brief filed by appellant is a
question of the factual findings of the RTC. More particularly, appellant
questions the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution claiming
that it is easy for the victim to fabricate his story and falsely claim that
he was forcibly taken at knife point.
However, the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of
Glodil and his mother finding them to be trustworthy and believable. The
age-old rule is that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of
witnesses and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court
which forms its first-hand impressions as witnesses testify before it. It is
thus no surprise that findings and conclusions of trial courts on the
credibility of witnesses enjoy, as a rule, a badge of respect, for trial courts
have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they
testify. Further, factual findings of the trial court as regards its
assessment of the witnesses’ credibility are entitled to great weight and
respect by this Court, particularly when the CA affirms the said findings,
and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court
overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could substantially
affect the outcome of the case. In the instant case, the Court finds no
reason to depart from this rule. Appellant failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove that the RTC and the CA overlooked certain facts and
circumstances which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.
Also, against the categorical testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, appellant can only offer the defense of denial. However, denial
is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be given greater weight
than that of the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on
affirmative matters. Like alibi, denial is an inherently weak defense,
which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Denial cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who, as in this case, were not
shown to have any ill motive to testify against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the CA, finding appellant Joel Baluya y
Notarte guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, is AFFIRMED.
133 PEOPLE vs. ARNULFO ASTORGA
FACTS: The accused allegedly took Yvonne Traya while promising to buy
her candy. They walked inside the perimeter fence of a school and
eventually in the direction of Tagum. Yvonne started crying when she
told the accused that she wanted to go home but he continued bringing
her to the opposite direction. As they were crossing a bridge, they met a
group who noticed the accused’s suspicious actions. The accused then
carried Yvonne and ran with her. The group overtook them and brought
them to the house of Yvonne’s grandparents. The accused was charged
with and convicted of kidnapping.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be held liable for kidnapping
Ruling: No. The elements of kidnapping are as follows: That the offender
is a private individual. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any
other manner deprives the latter of his liberty. That the act of detention
or kidnapping must be illegal. That in the commission of the offense, any
of the following circumstances is present: That the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than five (5) days; or That it is committed
simulating public authority; or That any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him
are made; or That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female,
or a public officer.
In this case, no detention occurred. The accused should be held liable for
grave coercion.
II. Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor
134 PEOPLE vs. TY (KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR)
263 SCRA 745 (G.R. No. 121519, 30 Oct 1996)
FACTS:
 On 8 Nov 1987, complainant brought her sick daughter, then
only 7 months old, for treatment to the Sir John Michael Maternity Clinic,
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which was owned and operated by the accused. The baby was diagnosed
with bronchitis and pneumonia, and thus, complainant was advised to
confine the child at the clinic for speedy recovery. 3 days later, the baby
was well and ready to be discharged but complainant was not around to
take her home. A week later, complainant came back but did not have
enough money to pay the hospital bill, and likewise confided to the
accused that no one would take care of the baby as she is working. She
then inquired about the rate of nursery and decided to leave her child
there. From then on, nothing was heard from the complainant and she
did not even visit the child. the hospital staff then agreed to give the baby
to her aunt, who would giver the baby needed love and affection. 5 years
later, complainant came back to claim the daughter which she
abandoned but the clinic was not able to return the child as she was
outside of their custody. She then filed the present case against the
accused.
Issue:
 Whether the accused should be liable for Kidnapping and
failure to return a minor.
Ruling: NO. Under Article 270, to be convicted of kidnapping and failure
to return a minor, the following essential requisites must concur: 1.) the
offender has been entrusted with the custody of the minor, and 2.) the
offender deliberately fails to restore the minor to his parents or
guardians. The word deliberate must imply something more than mere
negligence and must be premeditated, obstinate, headstrong, foolishly
daring, or intentionally and maliciously wrong. In the case at bar, it is
evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the
accused to restore the custody of the child. The accused even tried their
best to help the complainant to look for their child whom they
abandoned since the child is no longer under the clinic’s custody. The
accused event went necessary length in order to stay in touch with the
guardians who took the child to inform them that the complainant was
looking for the child.
135 People vs. Aida Marquez (G.R. No. 181440, 13 April 2011)
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Topic
Title VIII: Crimes Against Persons - Kidnapping and Failure to Return a
Minor
Facts: On 6 Sep 1998, accused-appellant Aida Marquez (Marquez),
borrowed three-month old baby girl, Justine Bernadette C. Merano
(Justine), from Carolina Cunanan Merano (Merano). Marquez borrowed
Justine from Merano to buy her (Justine) some clothes, milk and food.
Merano agreed because according to her, it was not unusual for Marquez
to bring Justine some things whenever she came to the parlor where she
was working as a beautician. When Marquez failed to return Justine in
the afternoon as promised, Merano went to her employers’ house to ask
for Marquez’s address. However, her employers just assured her that
Justine will be returned to her soon. Merano searched for her daughter
but her efforts were unsuccessful.
On 11 Nov 1998, Merano received a call from Marquez. Marquez
told Merano that she will return Justine the following day and that she
was not able to return Justine immediately because her own son was sick
and confined at the hospital. Marquez also asked Merano for P50,000.00
for the expenses she incurred while Justine was under her care. When
the supposed return of Justine did not happen, Merano went to the house
of Marquez using a sketch she got from her employers’ driver. However,
Marquez was not home. Merano left a note for Marquez telling her that
she will file a case against Marquez if Justine is not returned to her.
On 17 Nov 1998, Merano gave her sworn statement and filed a
complaint against Marquez. On 11 February 1999, Marquez called
Merano and told he her to pick up Justine from the house of one Modesto
Castillo (Castillo). Merano, accompanied by police, went to the house of
Castillo. Castillo told her that Marquez sold Justine to him and his wife
and that they gave Marquez P60,000.00 supposedly for Merano who was
asking for money. Castillo even gave Merano a photocopy of a
handwritten “Kasunduan” wherein Merano purportedly gave Justine to
the Castillo spouses. Merano was not able to take Justine home with her
because the police advised her to go through the proper process as the
Castillos might fight for their right to retain custody of Justine. Marquez,
in her defense, alleged that Merano left Justine with her for Justine to be
adopted by the Castillo spouses.
On 21 Jan 2004, the RTC found Marquez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Failure to Return a
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Minor as defined and penalized under Article 270 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act. No. 18.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision with modification on the
damages awarded. Hence, this appeal from a decision of the CA
Issue: Whether Aida Marquez is guilty for the crime of kidnapping and
failure to return a minor.
Ruling: Yes, Marquez is guilty for the crime of kidnapping and failure to
return a minor.
The RPC considers it a crime when a person who has been
entrusted with the custody of a minor later on deliberately fails to return
said minor to his parent or guardian. Article 270 provides,
“Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor.— The penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who, being entrusted
with the custody of a minor person, shall deliberately fail to restore the
latter to his parents or guardians.”
Kidnapping and failure to return a minor has two essential elements.
They are:
1. The offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and
2. The offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents
or guardians.
The SC further stated that while one of the essential elements of
the crime is that the offender was entrusted with the custody of the
minor, what is actually being punished is not the kidnapping but the
deliberate failure of that person to restore the minor to his parents or
guardians.
In the case at bar, it is clear that Marquez was entrusted with the
custody of Justine, whether based on Merano’s allegation that Marquez
borrowed Justine or wether based on Marquez’s version that Merano left
Justine at her house. In both versions, Marquez temporarily took custody
of Justine. The Supreme Court held that it does not matter how long the
custody lasted because it cannot be denied that Marquez was the one
entrusted with the custody of minor Justine. Hence, the first element is
satisfied.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that whether the custody
lasted form months or only a couple of days, the fact remains that
Marquez, at one point, had physical and actual custody of Justine and that
the she deliberately failed to return the minor when the Merano
demanded her to do so. Hence, the second element is likewise present in
the case.
Therefore, Marquez is guilty for the crime of kidnapping and
failure to return a minor.
III. Abandonment of One’s Victim
136 Lamera v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 93475, June 5 1991
Davide, Jr., J.
Facts:
- On March 14, 1985 in Pasig City, Metro Manila, a jeep, driven by
Petitioner, allegedly hit a tricycle driven by Ernesto Reyes
resulting in damages to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto
Reyes and Paulino Gonzal.
- Petitioner, after the impact, failed to render any assistance to
Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal, who were unconscious after
the impact.
- Two cases were filed against petitioner. One for reckless
imprudence leading to damage to property with multiple
physical injuries under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code; and
one for Abandonment of one’s Victim under Art. 275 of the
Revised Penal Code.
- MTC of Pasig rendered decision on June 29 1987 finding
petitioner guilty of abandonment of one’s victim under Art. 275
of the Revised Penal Code only. Ernesto Reyes was in fact the
negligent cause of the accident.
- Petitioner appealed to RTC of Pasig and entered a plea of not
guilty on April 27 1989. RTC affirmed with modification,
reducing the penalty.
40
 - Petitioner filed at Court of Appeals on August 31 1989 a petition
for review. CA affirms RTC ruling.
Issue:
- Whether there could be a charge and conviction of
abandonment of victim under Art. 275 when Petitioner has been
acquitted of Reckless Imprudence.
Ruling: Yes. There is no Double Jeopardy.
- Art. 275 falls under chapter 2, Title IX, Crimes against personal
liberty and security while Art. 365 falls under Title XIV, Quasi
Offences. They are clearly separate offenses.
- Art. 275 provides that anyone who fails to render help or
assistance to anyone who has been injured shall be liable under
this article. Reckless Imprudence is not necessary.
IV. Grave Threats
137 PEOPLE vs TIMBOL
CA- G. R. Nos 1741-R and 1741-R, April 8, 1949
Endencia, J.;
A consolidated case of acts of lasciviousness and grave threats.
Facts:
The earlier complaint stated that the accused willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously committed acts of lasciviousness upon
Francisca Garcia, embracing her, kissing her and touching her private
parts without her consent.
According to the complainant, she was introduced to the
accused Nicolas Timbol
by her husband in their abode in Antonio Riviera. Later, the accused
identified himself as
a member of the CID and told Flores that he would like to be alone with
the latter’s wife.
He interrogated her if the husband is a member of HUKS and she denied.
At the same time he came near her with intention of kissing her.
Francisca pushed him but he threatened her that if she shouts, the
husband will be killed by his companion. He tried to lift her skirt and
touch her private parts but she ran to the door wherein the accused held
her hands. He then again tried to kiss her and embrace her. Noting the
resistance of Francisca, he stroked a deal that he will leave the husband
alone if she meets him at Cine Illusion the following day. She declined as
she doesn’t know where that is.
The accused then went downstairs and took hold of Rufino and
was in the act of taking him along with him when Francisca approached
the accused asked for forgiveness. She then promised to meet the
accused to the theatre the next day.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of grave threats
Ruling: No. The threats were not made by the accused to Rufino Flores,
but to his wife Francisca Garcia while he was abusing her and that such
threats form part of the element of intimidation that appellant employed
to succeed in his lewd designs. Said threats, therefore, cannot be
considered separate and independent from the crime of abuse against
chastity to constitute another crime of threats. Since the accused was
convicted for the crime of lasciviousness, he is then acquitted of the
crime of threats for it formed part of the intimidation made upon the
offended party during the perpetration of the crime of lasciviousness.
138 REYES VS. PEOPLE
Nos. L-21528 & L-21529. March 28, 1969.
Makalintal, J.:
Facts:
Reyes was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange,
Cavite City, whose services were terminated by one Augustine Hallare.
He led a group of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration which
followed Hallare to his residence. Reyes got posted himself at the gate
and he shouted repeatedly, “Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala
ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita.” He argues that there was a
substantial amendment in the information for grave threat against him
different from the original information on which he was arraigned.
41
Issue: Whether the amended information was substantially different
from the original information for grave threat by the deletion of the word
“orally.”
Ruling: No.
The particular manner in which the threat is made not a
qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the deletion of the word
“orally” did not affect the nature and essence of the crime as charged
originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution that
the accused threatened to kill the complainant so as to require the
petitioner to undergo any material change or modification in his defense.
The deletion of the world “orally” was effected in order to make the
information conformable to the evidence to be presented during the
trial. It was merely a formal amendment which in no way prejudiced
petitioner’s rights.
V. Grave Coercion
139 G.R. No. L-62050 November 25, 1983
Jose "Pepito" Timoner vs. People and CA
FACTS:
At about 10:00 in the evening of December 13, 1971, petitioner, then
Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, accompanied by two policemen and six
laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway, the main
thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of petitioner, these laborers
proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs to fence off the stalls
which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway. Among the
structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the
complaining witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes.
Subsequently, petitioner and the two policemen, Morena and Quibral,
were charged with the offense of grave coercion before the Municipal
Court of Daet.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of grave coercion.
RULING:
No. We find merit in this contention. In the case at bar, petitioner, as
mayor of the town, merely implemented the aforesaid recommendation
of the Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the
performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal liability.
140 Lee vs. CA (G.R. No. 0423, 6 Sep 1991)
Facts:
At about 10am of 20 June 1984, Francis Lee, Bank manager of Pacific
Banking Corp (PBC), instructed one of the bank employees Ataracio
Lumba to pick up Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin, 23 years old, was
fetched from her house. When Lee Saw Maria at the bank, he yelled and
insulted her by informing her that her check was forged and instructed
her to return all the money equivalent of the subject cashier check, if not,
he threatened to file charges against her. Petitioner denied that he
shouted at Maria and threatened to file charges against her
Issue: Whether Shouting at the complainant and threatening to file
charges against her constitutes grave coercion
Ruling: No. Grave coercion did not exist in the facts of the case provided.
There is nothing unlawful on the “threat to sue” in his demand that
respondent to return the proceeds of the check. Absence of intimidation
was proven when the complaints refused to sign the promissory note in
spite of the alleged threats of petitioner. Court ruled that coercion did
not occur and accused must be acquitted.
141 SARABIA vs. PEOPLE (GRAVE COERCION) 361 SCRA 652
FACTS:
 On 23 June 1991, complainant Josephine and her then
boyfriend Anastacio were dating in one of the grandstands inside the
Garcia Sports Complex in Tagbilaran City when petitioner Sarabia, a
member of the city police force, saw them. Sarabia, with intimidation,
pointed his gun at the lovers and forced them to perform sexual acts
against their will. He even extorted money from them and asked
Anastacio to buy him a cigarette and while the latter was gone, petitioner
forced Josephine to masturbate his penis. Afterwards, petitioners
allowed the lovers to leave with the threat that he would kill them if they
reported the incident to anyone. During the pendency of this case for
grave coercion, another case for robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons was also filed against him and is already in the
Court of Appeals
ISSUE:
 Whether the petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy should be
42
appreciated.
Ruling: NO. To raise the merit of double jeopardy, the following
elements must concur:
1.) a first jeopardy must have attached to the prior,
2.) the first jeopardy must have been terminated, and
3.) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
Under the third element, the test is whether one offense is identical with
the other or whether it is an attempt or frustration of the other offense.
Such element is absent in this case.The crime of grave coercion is not the
same as the crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons for which he was convicted. Neither is grave coercion an attempt
or frustration to commit the robbery.
VI. Unjust Vexation
142 People vs.Procopio Reyes, Policarpio Nacana, Florentino
Clemente, Hermogenes Mallari, Marcelino Mallari, Castor Alipio,
And Rufino Matias (G.R. No. L-40577, 23 Aug 1934)
Hull, J
Facts:
 Appellants were convicted in the CFI of a violation of article 133
of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 133. Offending the religious feelings.—The penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon
anyone who, in a place devoted to religious ceremony, shall
perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.
 In the barrio of Macalong, municipality of La Paz, Province of
Tarlac, there is a chapel where it is customary to hold what is
known in local parlance as a pabasa.
 While the pabasa was going on the evening of 10 April 1933,
between 11 and 12 o'clock, the defendants Procopio Reyes,
Policarpio Nacana, Florentino Clemente, Hermogenes Mallari,
Marcelino Mallari, Castor Alipio, and Rufino Matias arrived at
the place, carrying bolos and crowbars, and started to construct
a barbed wire fence in front of the chapel.
 Alfonso Castillo, who was chairman of the committee in charge
of the pabasa, tried to persuade them to refrain from carrying
out their plan, by reminding them of the fact that it was Holy
Week and that it was highly improper to construct a fence at that
time of the evening. A verbal altercation ensued.
 When the people attending the pabasa in the chapel and those
who were eating in the yard thereof noticed what was
happening, they became excited and left the place hurriedly and
in such confusion that dishes and saucers were broken and
benches toppled over.
 The pabasa was discontinued and it was not resumed until after
an investigation conducted by the chief of police on the
following morning, which investigation led to the filing of the
complaint appearing on pages 1 and 2 of the record.
 Many years ago the Clemente family by informal donation gave
the land on which the old chapel was erected. When it was
destroyed, the present chapel was erected, and there is now a
dispute as to whether the new chapel is not now impinging on
the land that belongs to the Clemente family. The appellants are
partisans of the Clemente family.
Issue: Whether the proper crime was unjust vexation instead of
Offending Religious Feeelings (Art. 133)
Ruling: Yes
It is to be noted that article 133 of the Revises Penal Code punishes acts
"notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful." The construction of
a fence, even though irritating and vexatious under the circumstances to
those present, is not such an act as can be designated as "notoriously
offensive to the faithful", as normally such an act would be a matter of
complete indifference to those not present, no matter how religious a
turn of mind they might be.
The disturbance or interruption of any ceremony of a religious character
under the old Penal Code was denounced by article 571 and was
punished by arrest from one to ten days and a fine of from 15 to
125 pesetas. But this article was omitted from the RPC and the offense, if
43
any was committed by the appellants, is denounced in article 287 as an
"unjust vexation" and punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from
5 to 200 pesos or both.
It is urged upon us that the act of building a fence was innocent and was
simply to protect private property rights. The fact that this argument is
a pretense only is clearly shown by the circumstances under which the
fence was constructed, namely, late at night and in such a way as to vex
and annoy the parties who had gathered to celebrate the pabasa and is
further shown by the fact that many of the appellants saw fit to introduce
as their defense a false alibi.
Appellants are therefore acquitted of a violation of article 133 of the
Revised Penal Code but found guilty of a violation of article 287 of the
Revised Penal Code and are sentenced each to a fine of P75 with
subsidiary confinement in case of insolvency, together with the costs in
both instances. So ordered.

143 People vs Anonuevo

36 OG 2018 (1937)

Facts: The victim Rosita Tabia was attending a religious service. While
inside the chapel, the accused Teodulo Anonuevo forcibly embraced her,
kissed her left cheek and held her breasts. The accused tried to drag her
out of the chapel, but he failed to do so. The court of First Instance
convicted him of abuse against chastity.

Issue: Whether the crime committed was abuse against chastity?

Held: No. The crime committed by the accused was unjust vexation. The
court held that the crime of abuse of chastity requires lewd designs. In
the case at bar, the court stressed that because it was done in a religious
atmosphere and there were people present, lewd designs could not take
place. Hence, the crime committed was unjust vexation. The accused
either performed an act of bravado (in defiance of the alleged threats of
Rosita’s boyfriend on an act of force so Rosita will accept Anonuevo as a
lover).

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