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ART 559

95. DIZON VS. SUNTAY


G.R. No. L-30817, September 29, 1972, 47 SCRA 160
FACTS: Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3 carat diamond ring. She entered into a transaction with
Clarita Sison, wherein said ring was delivered to the latter for sale on commission. Upon receiving the
ring, the receipt was delivered to Suntay. After a lapse of a considerable amount of time, the ring was not
yet returned and so Suntay demanded for its return from Sison but the latter could not comply as she had
already pledged it with Dizon’s pawnshop for P 2,600.00. After insistent demands, Sison delivered the
pawnshop ticket to Suntay. Suntay through her counsel, wrote to Dizon asking for the delivery of the ring
pledged but, the latter refused. She filed an action for recovery with P 500 as attorney’s fees and costs.
She asked for the remedy of replevin upon filing the requisite bond pending final determination of the
action. The CFI of Manila issued the writ and Suntay was able to regain possession during the pendency
of the action. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Suntay. On appeal, Dizon sought the
reversal of the lower court’s decision and invoking estoppel. CA affirmed the lower court’s decision. SC
affirmed CA decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of the ring may recover its possession from the pawnshop owner.

HELD: Yes. Owner of a diamond ring may recover the possession of the same from a pawnshop where
another person had pledged it without authority to do so. Art. 559 of the civil code applies and the
defense that the pawnshop acquired possession of the without notice of any defect in the title of the
pledgor is unavailing. Neither the promptings of equity nor the mandates of moral right and natural justice
come to his rescue. Dizon is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would manifest
itself to ascertain whether or not an individual who is offering a jewelry by way of a pledge is entitled to do
so. If no such care be taken he should be the last to complain if thereafter the right of the true owner of
such jewelry should be recognized.

96. ADLAWAN VS. ADLAWAN


FACTS:
A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the name of Dominador Adlawan, the father of (petitioner)
Arnelito Adlawan. He is the acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who is claiming that he is the
sole heir. He then adjudicated to himself the said house and lot to himself and out of generosity allowed
the siblings of his father to occupy the property provided that they vacate when asked. Time came when
he demanded that they vacate and when they refused he filed an ejectment suit against them.
His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70) and Emeterio (59) denied his allegations claiming that
the said lot was registered in their parents name and they had been living in the said house and lot since
birth. The only reason why the said house and lot was transferred in Dominador’s name was when their
parents were in need of money for renovating their house, their parents were not qualified to obtain a loan
and since Dominador was the only one who had a college education, they executed a simulated deed of
sale in favor of Dominador.
The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that Arnelito’s filiation and the settlement of the estate are
conditions precedent for the accrual of the suit. And since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana,
her legal heirs are entitled to their share in the lot. The RTC ordered Narcisa and Emeterio to turn over
the possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also granted the motion of execution which was opposed by the
nephew and nieces of Graciana who claim that they have a share in the lot.
The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding that Arnelito and the heirs of Graciana are co-heirs
thus he cannot eject them from the property via unlawful detainer. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the ejectment suit

HELD:
NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that he is not the sole heir of Dominador.
Since he was survived was his wife, upon his death, Arnelito and Graciana became co-owners of the lot.
Upon her death, her share passed on to her relatives by consanguinity thus making them co-owners as
well.
Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant petition. (Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners
may bring an action in ejectment.) It is true that a co-owner may bring such an action w/o necessity of
joining all the co-owners as plaintiffs because it is presumed to be instituted for the benefit of all BUT if
the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.
Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit alone and his repudiation of the ownership
of the other heirs, the instant petition should be dismissed.
ART 559

97. BALOLOY VS HULAR


FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari on the decision of the CA. The respondent Alfredo Hular filed a
complaint for quieting of title of real property with damages against the children and heirs of Iluminado Baloloy and
petitioners Reynaldo and Adelina. The respondent alleged in his complaint that his father, Astrologo Hular, was the
owner of a parcel of residential land located in Juban, Sorsogon, with an area of 287 square meters, and that such lot
was part of Lot No. 3347 of the Juban Cadastre. The respondent alleged that Iluminado Baloloy, the petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest, was able to secure a Free Patent over the property through fraud on March 1, 1968, on the
basis of which the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-16540 in his name.
Subsequently, the respondent later discovered that in the cadastral survey of lands in Juban, the property of his
father, which actually consisted of 1,405 square meters was made to form part of Lot No. 3353, the property of
Iluminado Baloloy. According to the respondent, even if the residential land was made to form part of Lot No. 3353
registered under the name of Iluminado Baloloy, he had acquired ownership of the property by acquisitive
prescription, as he and his predecessors had been in continuous, uninterrupted and open possession of the property
in the concept of owners for more than 60 years.

ISSUE: Whether all the indispensable parties had been impleaded by the respondent in the trial court?

RULING: It is the contention of the respondent that the subject property was sold by Lagata to his father,
Astrologo Hular, in 1961. Hence, when his parents died intestate, they were survived by their children.
Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the
deceased. Until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-
owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in
addition to the use and enjoyment of the same.
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This
article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a
reinvindicatory action. A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other
co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject property
and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other co-owners had
waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners
were aware of the case in the trial court. Hence, the petition is granted.

98. HEIRS OF ALBINA AMPIL V. SPS. MANAHAN


SUMMARY: Exequiel, as representative of the heirs of Albina Ampil filed a
complaint for ejectment against the Manahans. In the complaint, it was alleged
that Albina was the owner of two lots, as evidenced by tax declarations, and that
Albina had allowed Perfecto and his family to occupy a portion of the properties,
on the condition that they would vacate the same, should the need arise. The
Manahans filed their answer, averring that the lots belonged to them, their
predecessor-in-interest having been in peaceful and continuous possession
thereof since time immemorial. The MTC ruled in favor of the Heirs. The RTC
affirmed. The CA reversed. The SC upheld the MTC/ RTC.

DOCTRINE: In an action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, any one of the
Art. 487, CC provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for
ejectment, without joining the others. The action is not limited to ejectment cases
but includes all kinds of suits for recovery of possession, because the suit is
presumed to have been instituted for the benefit of all.

FACTS:
 Exequiel Ampil, as representative of the heirs of Albina Ampil filed a complaint for ejectment against the
Manahans (Perfecto, Virginia, Teresita, Almario, and Irene). In the complaint, it was alleged that Albina was
the owner of two adjoining residential lots in Bulacan, as evidenced by tax declarations, and that Albina had
allowed Perfecto and his family to occupy a portion of the properties, on the condition that they would vacate
the same, should the need arise.
 After the death of Albina, Exequiel and the rest of the heirs requested Perfecto and family to vacate the
property, but the latter refused.
 The matter was brought to the Lupong Tagapamayapa, who issued a Certification to File an Action for
failure of the parties to amicably settle their dispute.
 The Heirs sent a demand letter to the Manahans to surrender possession of the lands, but to no avail. So,
the Heirs filed a complaint for ejectment before the MTC.
 The Manahans filed their answer, averring that the lots belonged to them, their predecessor-in-interest
having been in peaceful and continuous possession thereof since time immemorial, and that Albina was
never the owner of the property.
 The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the Heirs, on the basis of the tax declarations.
 The RTC affirmed.
 The CA reversed, ruling that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive proof of ownership or right of
possession, and only becomes strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by proof of actual
possession. The CA denied the Heirs’ motion for reconsideration.
ART 559

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE + RATIO: Who has the better right to the physical possession of the disputed
property? THE HEIRS.

As a rule, petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules Court are limited only to questions
of law and not of fact. The rule, however, admits of several exceptions. Here, the factual findings of the
CA are contrary to those of the MTC and the RTC. Hence, a review of the case is imperative.

In an unlawful detainer case, the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of
any claim of ownership by any of the parties, is the sole issue for resolution. But where the issue of
ownership is raised, the courts may pass upon said issue in order to determine who has the right to
possess the property. This adjudication, however, is only an initial determination of ownership for the
purpose of settling the issue of possession, the issue of ownership being inseparably linked thereto. As
such, the lower court’s adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional and would
not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.

In the case at bar, the Court sustains the findings of both the MTC and the RTC. The bare allegation of
the Manahans, that they had been in peaceful and continuous possession of the lot in question because
their predecessor-in-interest had been in possession thereof in the concept of an owner from time
immemorial, cannot prevail over the tax declarations and other documentary evidence presented by
petitioners. In the absence of any supporting evidence, that of the Heirs deserves more probative value.
A perusal of the records shows that Manahans’ occupation of the lot in question was by mere tolerance.
To prove ownership over the property, the Heirs presented the tax declarations covering the properties
and a certification issued by the Municipality, showing that their mother, Albina, had been paying the
corresponding real property taxes thereon. The Heirs also submitted a survey plan, in support of Albina’s
application for land registration over the disputed lots. In fact, the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan issued
Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo conferring title over the lot in the names of the heirs of Albina.
Also, one of the Heirs verbally demanded that the Manahans vacate the property and when the latter
refused, they filed a complaint before the Barangay Lupon. From the minutes of the meeting in the
Barangay Lupon, Perfecto admitted Albina allowed them temporary use of the lots and that they could not
leave the premises because they had nowhere else to go. When the parties failed to reach a settlement,
the Heirs, in order to protect their rights to the lot in question, filed a case for violation of P.D. No. 772, an
Act Penalizing Squatting and other Similar Acts against Perfecto, before the Regional Trial Court. In the
said case, Perfecto executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay, wherein he admitted that Albina was the owner of
the lots in question and that he was merely allowed by her to use the property on condition that they
would vacate it on demand. As a result, the court dismissed the complaint because it found out that
Perfecto and his family’s stay in the questioned lots was lawful because Albina permitted them to use the
lots on the condition that they would vacate the same should Albina need it.
On the other hand, the Manahans could not present proof that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
openly and continuously possessed the subject land since time immemorial. Granting that the Manahans
or their predecessors-in-interests had been in possession in the concept of an owner since time
immemorial, none of them declared the disputed lots for taxation purposes and, thus, never paid taxes
thereon. The Manahans' allegation that they were in peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the
lots in question, unsupported by any evidence, is not substantial to establish their interest over the
property.
Well established is the rule that ownership over the land cannot be acquired by mere occupation. While it
is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they, nevertheless, constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. It strengthens one's bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.

PROCEDURAL ISSUE + RATIO: Does Exequiel have authority to file the complaint on behalf of his co-
heirs? YES.
Art. 487, CC provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment, without
joining the others. The action is not limited to ejectment cases but includes all kinds of suits for recovery
of possession, because the suit is presumed to have been instituted for the benefit of all.
Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago – As co-owner of the properties, each of the heirs
may properly bring an action for ejectment, forcible entry, or any kind of action for the recovery of
possession of the subject properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such an action, even without
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all.
Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman – Only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed
the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other
co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete
relief can be afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to
have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.

In the case at bench, the complaint clearly stated that the disputed property was held in common by the
Heirs; and that the action was brought to recover possession of the lots from respondents for the benefit
of all the heirs of Albina. Hence, Exequiel, a co-owner, may bring the action for unlawful detainer
even without the special power of attorney of his co-heirs, for complete relief can be accorded in the suit
even without their participation because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all the co-
owners. RULING: CA reversed; MTC/ RTC reinstated. (Judgment in favor of the Heirs

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