272 All England Law Reports [1981] 2 AILER Grappelli and another v Derek Block a (Holdings) Ltd and another COURT OF APPEAL, CIVIL, DIVISION LORD DENNING MR, TEMPLEMAN AND DUNN 1} roth, 20th January 1981 Libel and slander — Innuendo — Extrinsic facts ~ Facts coming to light after publication complained of - Whether such facts capable of supporting innuendo. Libel and slander — Publication — Limited publication — Innuendo — Extrinsic facts supporting innuendo ~ Identification of persons knowing extrinsic facts ~ Whether plainiff must identify persons knowing extrinsic facts when publication complained of is limited. ° The plaintiff was a well-known professional musician with an international reputation who employed the defendants as his managers or agents. In June 1976 the defendants arranged for the plaintiff to give concerts at various venues in England on certain specified dates. However the bookings were made without the plaintiff's authority and accordingly had to be cancelled. When informing the managers of concert halls in September that the plaintiff's concerts had to be cancelled a representative of the defendants falsely stated that the plaintiff was very seriously ill and it was doubtful if he would ever tour again. That reason for the cancellation was passed on to members of the public who inquired about the cancelled concerts. On 28th November a notice appeared in a national newspaper and other newspapers giving the dates of forthcoming concerts by the plaintiff during a concert tour of England. The forthcoming concerts included concerts on the same dates as the cancelled ones but in different towns. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendants alleging, inter alia, that the false statement made by the defendants that he was seriously ill and would never tour again was a slander on him since, having regard to the announcement on 28th November of a different series of concerts, it gave rise to an innuendo that the plaintiff had given a reason in September for cancelling concerts which he knew to be false. The defendants applied to have the claim struck out as disclosing no cause of action in defamation because (i the subsequent publication of certain facts which enabled a person to read a defamatory meaning into otherwise innocent material did not make the writer of the material liable in defamation and (ii) the plaintiff had not identified in his pleadings any members of the public who were alleged to have put a defamatory meaning on the statement when they read the announcement of 28th November. The registrar and the judge dismissed the defendants’ application and they appealed. a Held — The appeal would be allowed for the following reasons— (1) Since the cause of action in defamation arose as soon as the words complained of fp were published, any extrinsic facts which were relied on to support a legal innuendo had to be known at the time of publication by the person to whom the words were published. Accordingly, inferences put on the words complained of asa result of facts coming to light after the publication did not make the words defamatory (see p 274 g to 75 cand toh, pa78 hand p79, pos) Simons Pty Lid v Riddell [1941] NZLR 913 applied. (2) Where there was limited publication to a limited number of persons a plaintift / pleading a legal innuendo in a defamation action was required to identify in his pleading the person or persons who knew of the special facts which enabled them to understand the innuendo (see p 275 d toh and p 278 band g to p 279 a, post); dicta of Lord Denning MR in Fullam v Newcastle Chronicle and Journal Ltd [1977] 3 All ER at 35, 37 applied.» ° CA Grappelli v Derek Block Ltd (Lord Denning MR) 273 Notes For pleadings in defamation actions, see 28 Halsbury’s Laws (4th Edn) paras 171-172, 179-180, and for cases on the subject, see 32 Digest (Reissue) 158-161, 1394-1414. For particulars required in support of an innuendo, see 28 Halsbury’s Laws (ath Edn) paras 175-178, and for cases on the subject, see 32 Digest (Reissue) 166~171, 1460-1491. Cases referred to in judgments Astaire v Campling [1965] 3 All ER 666, [1966] 1 WLR 34, CA, 32 Digest (Reissue) 166, 1458. Bata v Bata [1948] WN 366, CA, 50 Digest (Repl) 353, 770. Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1929] 2 KB 331, [1929] All ER Rep 117, 98 LJKB 595, 141 LT 4o4, CA, 32 Digest (Reissue) 157, 1390. Consolidated Trust Co Ltd v Browne (19.48) 49 SR (NSW) 86. Fullam v Newcastle Chronicle and Journal Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 32, [1977] 1 WLR 651, CA, 32 Digest (Reissue) 161, 1414. Hayward v Thompson (1978, unreported). Hough v London Express Newspapers Ltd [1940] 3 All ER 31, [1940] 2 KB 507, 109 LJKB 524, 163 LT 162, CA, 32 Digest (Reissue) 161, 1413. Russell v Kelly (1872) 13 Amer 169, 44 Cal 641. Sadgrove v Hole [1901] 2 KB 1, 70 LJKB 455, 84 LT 647, CA, 32 Digest (Reissue) 235, 1997. ‘Simons Pty Ltd v Riddell [1941] NZLR 913. Tolley vJ S Fry & Sons Ltd [1931] AC 333, [1931] All ER Rep 131, 100 LJKB 328, 145 LT 1, HL, 32 Digest (Reissue) 119, 717. Cases also cited Chubb v Westley (1834) 6 C & P 436, 172 ER 1309, NP. Hulton (E) & Co v Jones [1910] AC 20, [1908-10] All ER Rep 29, HL. Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 151, [1964] AC 234, HL. Interlocutory appeal The defendants, Derek Block (Holdings) Ltd and Ray Nedas, appealed against the decision of Hodgson J on 1st December 1980 dismissing their appeal from the refusal of Master Waldman to strike out those paragraphs alleging libel and slander in the statement of claim served on the defendants by the plaintiffs, Stephane Grappelli and William Charles Disley. The facts are set out in the judgment of Dunn LJ. Peter Bowsher QC and Adrienne Page for the defendants. Richard Rampton for the plaintiffs. LORD DENNING MR. Mr Grappelli_is a professional jazz violinist with an international reputation. Mr Disley is a professional guitarist. He is the leader of a trio which accompanied Mr Grappelli as part of his team. It appears that they had as their managers or agents at one time a company called Derek Block (Holdings) Ltd. About June 1976 these managers or agents purported to book concerts for Mr Grappelli and his team at various places in England. They were fixed for some months ahead. For instance, in June a concert was fixed at Milton Keynes to be held on 4th December 1976. At Huddersfield an arrangement was made for a concert to be held on roth December 1976, And so forth. Mr Grappelli says that the agents acted without his authority when they booked him for those engagements. The agents had to cancel the bookings they had made. So on zist September 1976 they telephoned the people concerned, and put forward this excuse: ‘The Stephane Grappelli concert has been cancelled because Stephane Grappelli is very seriously ill in Paris and I would be surprised if he ever toured again.”274 All England Law Reports [1981] 2 AIIER Mr Grappelli says that that was an entirely false statement about his health: it was known by the agents to be false. They put it forward as an excuse to get themselves out of the unauthorised engagements. If it was a false statement, maliciously made, which would cause damage, it would give rise to a cause of action for injurious falsehood. A cause of action has been brought accordingly. ‘Not content with a cause of action for injurious falsehood, Mr Grappelli and Mr Disley also allege that the statement was a slander as being defamatory of Mr Grappelli.It is obviously not defamatory as it stands, It is not defamatory of a person to say that he isp seriously ill. But Mr Grappelli says that it became actionabie thereafter. He says that late in November there was a notice in the Sunday Times (and other papers) saying that Mr Grappelli was performing in various concert halls. Not at the concert halls previously arranged but at others. For instance, the notice in the Sunday Times said that he was going to appear at St Albans on 4th December. Not at Milton Keynes. It also said that he was going to appear somewhere else on roth December. Not at Huddersfield. a It is said on behalf of Mr Grappelli that when people read in November 1976 in the Sunday Times that these other new engagements had been made for him, they would read an innuendo into the statement made in September 1976. They would say to themselves, ‘That was a put-up job. He was not really ill. He gave a reason which he knew to be false.’ It is said that that subsequent knowledge would lead people to think that the original statement about Mr Grappelli being ill was a put-up job. The plaintiffs allege a legal innuendo that the words were understood to mean that the plaintiffs had given a reason for cancelling the concerts which they knew to be false. That is the pleading as it stands. An application was made by the defendants, not to strike out the malicious falsehood part of the claim, but to strike out the claim in regard to slander on the ground that there was no cause of action in defamation. The case raises two quite interesting points on the law of libel. I summarised the law @ about innuendo in Fullam v Newcastle Chronicle and Journal Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 32, [1977] t WLR 651. There is a cause of action for words in their natural and ordinary meaning. That is not alleged here. The other cause of action is one which is based on a legal innuendo, In it the plaintiff relies on special circumstances which convey to some particular person or persons, knowing those circumstances, a special defamatory meaning other than the natural and ordinary meaning, That is a separate cause of action. The question which arises in this case is as to legal innuendo. When the plaintiff relies on special circumstances known to another person, have those special circumstances to be in his knowledge at the time when he reads or hears the words? Or is it sufficient that, because of some later facts, he puts a defamatory meaning on them? On this point we heard an interesting discussion on both sides. 1 would go by the principle, which is well established, that in defamation, be it libel or slander, the cause of g action is the publication of defamatory words of and concerning the plaintiff. The cause of action arises when those words are published to the person by whom they are read or heard. The cause of action arises then, and not later. Counsel for the plaintiffs urged us to say that in slander it may be different. He suggests that the cause of action there does not arise until there is damage, like actions in negligence and the like. h prefer to go by the principle that in defamation a cause of action arises (and a writ can be issued) as soon as the words are published to a person then knowing all the material facts. If there are extrinsic facts, he must know them then, at the time of publication, That is when a cause of action arises. It cannot be made into a cause of action by reason of facts subsequently coming to the knowledge of the reader or hearer. We were referred to a New Zealand case, which was not cited to the judge below. It is Simons Pty Ltd v Riddell [1941] NZLR 913. BlairJ seems to me to put the position quite accurately when he said (at 932): ~ ‘On the authorities—see Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers ([1929] 2 KB 331, [1929] All ER Rep 117) and Tolley v. J. S. Fry and Sons, Ltd. ([1931] AC 333, [1931]~ CA Grappelli v Derek Block Ltd (Lord Denning MR) 275 AILER Rep 131)—innocent matter may be given a defamatory meaning by readers with knowledge of facts not known to the writer. But those cases do not lay down that a writer of innocent matter can by reason of certain facts coming into existence subsequent to publication of his innocent matter become liable in damages for libel because persons learning of that subsequent material are able to read into the innocent matter a defamatory meaning.’ (My emphasis.) That seems to me to be correct. He emphasised it by saying that, if the person was liable in damages in those circumstances, it would mean a great extension in the law of libel. He said it would be extending it much too far— ‘to ascertain whether the next day or the next week or the next year some one may not say or do something that will enable a defamatory meaning to be given to otherwise innocent statements.’ That principle seems to me to be applicable here. The inferences which were put on the statements after the publication (by facts subsequently learnt) do not render them defamatory in the beginning. The second point arises on the pleadings. The plaintiffs do not identify any of the readers of the Sunday Times, or other publications, who, by reason of the later facts, may have put a defamatory meaning on the statement. The question is whether particulars should be given identifying the persons concerned. Again, on this point it seems to me that it can be dealt with in principle. 1 ventured to put it myself in Fullam v Newcastle Chronicle and Journal Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 32 at 35, [1977] 1 WLR 651 at 655 in the case of secondary meanings: *, he must in his statement of claim specify the particular person or persons to whom they were published and the special circumstances known to that person or persons ... there is no exception in the case of a newspaper . ..” Ic seems to me that that general principle of pleading applies here. In the case of these secondary meanings, even innuendos, the plaintiff ought to specify the persons who have the particular knowledge from which they drew a defamatory meaning. So on both these points it seems to me that we ought to give leave to appeal. 1 can understand the judge's difficulty: he was not referred to all the cases to which we were referred, He was referred to a ruling of O'Connor J at first instance (in Hayward v Thompson (1978), unreported). That seems tome to be understandable on other grounds, but of no assistance here. I would give leave to appeal, allow the appeal and strike out the causes of action in so far as they rely on defamation, but leave intact completely the causes of action in relation to malicious or injurious falsehood, because it seems to me that that is really what the plaintiffs should depend on. I would allow the appeal accordingly. TEMPLEMAN LJ. I have had the advantage of some discussion with Lord Denning MR and Dunn LJ. For the reasons given by Lord Denning MR and for the reasons which Dunn LJ is about to give, I too would allow the appeal, and cannot usefully add anything. DUNN LJ. | agree that the appeal should be allowed. The learned judge, in giving leave to appeal, said that this appeal raised a novel point of law. The principal question of law is whether, when extrinsic facts are relied on in support of an innuendo which arose after the publication, the original words, not defamatory in their ordinary and ; natural meaning, can have the defamatory meaning alleged in the innuendo. Both the master and the judge held that they could. The defendants in this appeal have submitted that they could not. For the purposes of the appeal we must assume that all the facts alleged in the statement of claim are proved. The statement of claim is complicated and only parts of it are material to this appeal. The plaintiff is a well-known jazz violinist with an276 All England Law Reports [1981] 2 AIlER international reputation. The first defendants are promoters of concerts. In May or June 1976, without the authority of the plaintiffs, they purported to arrange a number of 9 concerts by the first plaintiff and the second plaintiff, his accompanist. The only concerts to which Ineed refer in this judgment are those fixed at Milton Keynes eventually on ath December 1976 and at Tameside fixed for 26th November 1976. ‘On 21st September, or perhaps just before, the second defendant, who was an employee of the first defendants, told a Miss Collard, who was the manager of the Milton Keynes entertainment authority, that (and I quote from para 4 of the statement of claim): “The Stephane Grappelli concert has been cancelled because Stephane Grappelli is very seriously ill in Paris and I would be surprised if he ever toured again.’ Miss Collard passed on that information to a subordinate of hers, a Mrs Gormly; and between 21st September and 4th December 1976 Mrs Gormly informed over the telephone a large number of members of the public both of the cancellation and the reason for it. A substantial number of members of the public were informed before 28th November and ¢ some after. The importance of the date, 28th November, will appear in a moment. According to a letter sent by the plaintiffs’ solicitors to the defendants’ solicitors on 18th November 1980, between the end of September 1976 and the date of the concert, 4th December 1976— ‘Mrs Gormly answered no less than 100 and possibly as many as 250 enquiries g from members of the public about the concert. On each occasion, she told the person concerned that the concert had been cancelled because Stephane Grappelli was seriously ill and would probably never tour again. She was still answering enquiries in that way during the week before the concert (ie. the week beginning the 28th November 1976), but she is unable to be precise about the number of enquiries she received during that week.’ e The relevance of the date, 28th November, is that on that day there appeared in the issue of the Sunday Times an advertisement announcing that concerts would be given by ‘the legendary Stephane Grappelli with the Diz Disley trio’ led by the second plaintiff ‘at the following venues on the following dates: Odeon Theatre, Hanley, 2nd December 1976, {and this is the material one] Royal Exchange Theatre, Manchester, 3rd December 1976’. Then there were other concerts advertised: at the City Hall, St Albans on ath December, the Central Hall, Chatham on sth December, and the Civic Hall, Guildford on 6th December. What is alleged in the action as a result of those facts is that they give rise to an innuendo that the plaintiffs had given a reason for cancelling the concert which they knew to be false. That isthe allegation which is claimed to be defamatory and on which g this action so far as it relates to slander and libel is based. It will be observed that in the case of Milton Keynes some members of the public were informed of the cancellation before the Sunday Times advertisement and others after the Sunday Times advertisement, and consequently different considerations may apply to each of those two categories. The other concert which illustrates the points of law which arise in the case is the p Tameside concert. In that case the same words, namely that the concert had been cancelled because Stephane Grappelli was very seriously ill and the second defendant would be surprised if he ever toured again, were published to a Mr Booth, who was the manager of the Tameside Theatre in Ashton-under-Lyne on or before 21st September. Mr Booth republished those words toa Mr Clark, who was his assistant manager, and Mr Clark passed on the information to a number of members of the public who had inquired when the concert was going to take place. The plaintiffs’ concert at the Royal Exchange Theatre, Manchester, for 3rd December had been advertised in the weeks prior to that concert by posters in Manchester, by a press release dated 15th November, and in programmes for forthcoming events in Manchester, which of course is quite close to Tameside and Ashton-under-Lyne, for thee > Q ® > CA Grappelli v Derek Block Ltd (Dunn LJ) 277 four weeks before the concert. There had also been advertisements in the Manchester Evening News of 12th, 18th and rgth November and 3rd December. The relevance of the Tameside example is that knowledge of the special circumstances about the Ashton-under-Lyne slander existed, it is said, before the Sunday Times advertisement and probably from early November. In that respect, by further and better particulars, which were subsequently delivered, of the innuendo, it was said that on 2 date in November one of the members of the public to whom Mr Clark had republished the words informed Mr Clark— ‘that she had seen an advertisement in the Manchester Evening News for a concert by the Plaintiffs at the Royal Exchange Theatre on the 3rd December 1976. Thereafter, Mr Clark republished the said words to members of the public on about six occasions and on each occasion he informed the member of the public concerned that, although the Plaintiffs’ concert at Tameside had been cancelled for the reason given, it nonetheless appeared that the Plaintiffs were due to give a concert at the Royal Exchange Theatre on the 3rd December.’ ‘And the same innuendo was alleged as for the previous allegation. On that basis of fact counsel for the defendants submitted, first, that at the time of the publication or republication to Mrs Gormly and Mr Clark there was no slander because the extrinsic facts constituting the innuendo were not known to the public. Second, he submitted that any republication by Mrs Gormly or Mr Clark to members of the public at the time before information was available that the reason given by the plaintiffs for cancelling the concert was false was likewise no slander in the case of Milton Keynes before 28th November and in the case of Tameside before early November when the Royal Exchange concert was first publicised. He submitted accordingly that the paragraphs alleging libel and slander based on those new publications before those dates should be struck out. He submitted in the alternative, and in any event, that the paragraphs alleging libel and slander should be struck out because the pleadings did not identify those members of the public who were alleged to have knowledge of the extrinsic facts supporting the innuendo, He submitted that the plaintiffs should be left to their remedy for damages for injurious falsehood in respect of the false statement by the defendants. As to his first submission, counsel for the defendants submitted that publication was an essential ingredient of the torts of libel and slander. Once there was publication, he submitted, the cause of action was complete and the relevant knowledge of the publishes to support the innuendo was their knowledge at the date of the publication and not thereafter acquired knowledge. In support of that submission he cited to us the cases of Bata v Bata [1948] WN 366, Sadgrove v Hole[ 1901} 2KB 1, Astaire v Campling [1965] 3 All ER 666 at 668-669, [1966] 1 WLR 34 at 41 per Diplock LJ, and in particular a New Zealand case, Simons Pty Ltd v Riddell [1941] NZLR 913. That was a case in which the appellants were a brewery company, and the manager published in a newspaper on 6th June an advertisement that H and R ‘are no longer in our employ and are not authorized to canvass for us or collect cash or empties on our behalf’. Then in a later issue, a week later, there was a report of the conviction of H on a charge of issuing a valueless cheque with intent to defraud. It was held by the whole Court of Appeal firstly that the words of the advertisement were not by themselves capable of a defamatory meaning. It was also held by the whole court that the news item published a week later was inadmissible, and accordingly they ordered a new trial. Lord Denning MR has read extracts from the judgment of Blair J, who dealt with the matter most fully and who concluded his judgment with these words (at 932-933): ‘If chat be a correct summary of the law as it now stands, then, with respect, I venture to say that it would be widening the net of liability of writers too far by enunciating the doctrine that the inquiry . . . must go still further by looking into the future to ascertain whether the next day or the next week or the next year some278 All England Law Reports [1981] 2 AIER one may not say or do something that will enable a defamatory meaning to be given to otherwise innocent statements.’ a As to his second point, the pleading point, counsel for the defendants adopted as part of his argument a statement in Duncan and Neill on Defamation (1978, p 37, para 8.04), where it is said: “Where the plaintiff relies on a true innuendo meaning [sometimes called a legal innuendo] the general rule is that it is necessary for the plaintiff to plead and prove: (@) that the words were published to a specific publishee or to specific publishes; and (b) that the publishee or publishees knew of specific facts which would enable them to understand the words in the innuendo meaning or to understand the words to refer to the plaintiff” He relied on two cases mentioned in Duncan and Neill: Hough v London Express Newspapers Ltd( 1940] 3 All ER 31,[1940] 2. KB 507, and an Australian case, Consolidated © Trust Co Ltd v Browne (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 86. He submitted accordingly that, the plaintiffs having said in the statement of claim in terms that they could not identify the members of the public with the special knowledge, those paragraphs should be struck out. ‘sto that second point, counsel for the plaintiffs has said, firstly that Fullam v Newcastle Chronicle and Journal Ltd [1977] 3 All ER 32, [1977] 1 WLR 651, to which Lord Denning @ MR has referred, was a very special case, and that, in any event, this case falls within the exception stated by Scarman LJ when he said ([1977] 3 All ER 32 at 39, [1977] 1 WLR 651 at 659): *.. the facts may be very well known in the area of the newspaper’ distribution— in which event I would think it would suffice to plead merely that the plaintiff will @ rely on inference that some of the newspaper's readers must have been aware of the facts which are said to give rise to the innuendo.’ Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that that was this case; that there was the allegation that Mr Clark had passed on the information to a number of persons who had rung up asking for the date of the original Ashton-under-Lyne concert, and from the pleading point of view that was sufficient. Difficult questions might arise on questions of f admissibility of evidence when it came to trial, but counsel for the plaintifis submitted that this court should not adopt the draconian course of striking out the allegations at this stage because he was unable to identify the persons with special knowledge. Tagree with Lord Denning MR that the law is fully set out in Fullam v Newcastle Chronicle and Journal Ltd, especially in the passage of the judgment to which he has referred and later where he said ([1977] 3 All ER 32 at 37,[1977] 1 WLR 651 at 656): 9 “In such cases as those [that is to say, cases of legal innuendo] the identity of the person (who has knowledge of the special circumstances) is a most material fact in the cause of action. It is the publication to him which is the very foundation of the cause of action. So he should be identified in the pleading itself or in particulars under it.” h agree that that is the general rule as stated by Duncan and Neill in the passage which Thave quoted from their book on defamation. I would only add this, that I agree also with Scarman LJ that there may be cases which are exceptions to that rule, such as the cases that he refers to where the publication is in a national newspaper with a very wide circulation, and the only reasonable inference is that some of the readers of that newspaper must have knowledge of the facts which are said to give rise to the innuendo. But that is not this case. In this case there was a very much more limited publication toa very much more limited number of publishees. It involved them connecting up in the first instance the reason given for the cancellation with either the advertisement in the Sunday Times or one of the advertisements which appeared in Manchester. In> ~ a > CA Grappelli v Derek Block Ltd (Dunn LJ) 279 circumstances of that kind, I agree with Lord Denning MR that the general rule should prevail and that those persons should be identified in the pleadings. That would be sufficient to dispose of this case by allowing the appeal; but, so far as the general question is concerned, counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the cause of action for libel or slander was complete when all the facts were in existence and not before. He submitted that it was one thing to say that once alll the facts were in existence the cause of action was complete, but another thing to say that once there was publication the cause of action was complete and that it was impossible for further facts to arise which might give rise to a cause of action subsequent to publication. He pointed out that there are three elements in a cause of action, There must be publication; the publication must refer to the plaintiff; and the words must have a defamatory meaning. Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that there was no cause of action until the necessary meaning had been supplied. Once that occurred, then the cause of action was complete. He relied in support of that submission on the American case of Russell v Kelly (1872) 13 Amer 169. That was a case in which in the original publication the name of the plaintiff had not been mentioned. Evidence was called, including a subsequent publication by the defendant, in which the plaintiff’s name was mentioned; and it was held that that evidence was admissible so as to make the original publication referable to the plaintiff and so defamatory. Crockett J (at 171) referred to the rule as laid down in Starkie on Slander (vol 2, p 51)— ‘that the application of the slanderous words to the plaintiff, and the extrinsic matters alleged in the declaration, may be shown “by the testimony of witnesses who knew the parties and circumstances, and who can state their judgement and opinion on the application and meaning of the terms used by the defendant”.” Holding that the evidence was admissible, he said: ‘It is equally clear that the subsequent publication was admissible for the same purpose, and this was the only purpose for which it was offered or admitted.’ Counsel for the plaintiffs said that there was no English authority directly in point, apart from a ruling of O'Connor J in the very recent case of Hayward v Thompson (1978, unreported) in which, in the course of the trial before the jury, he allowed to stand an allegation that a second article had been published referring by name to the plaintiff, who had been the subject of an article the previous week which did not refer to him by name. The learned judge appears to have relied on Russell v Kelly (he referred to it as the most useful case which had been cited to him), but at the end of the notes of his judgment, with which we have been helpfully provided, he appears to have dealt with the case as a republication of the original defamatory statement; and certainly it appears from the transcript of his summing up to the jury that that indeed was how he dealt with it. Speaking for myself, | do not derive a great deal of assistance from that case. Like Lord Denning MR, I would prefer to deal with this on principle. I agree that a publication is an essential part of the case of action; that once there is publication the cause of action is complete, and there is no room for the doctrine that the cause of action can, so to speak, be allowed to be inchoate or lie dormant until such time as some fact emerges which would transform an otherwise innocent statement into a defamatory one. That I believe to be the principle underlying the judgment of Blair J in the New Zealand case of Simons Pty Ltd v Riddell [1941] NZLR 913; and on that ground I too would hold that these paragraphs alleging libel and slander cannot stand. 1 think the plaintiffs should rely on the allegation of injurious falsehood, and I would allow the appeal. Appeal allowed. Solicitors: Ingledew, Brown, Bennison é& Garrett (for the defendants); Marsh, Regan (for the plaintifis). Sumra Green Barrister.