Judicial Review Case Digests

Constitutional Law 1
Political Questions
• political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of government
• grave abuse of discretion to mean the capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment that is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility
Article VIII
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Case Summary of Marbury v. Madison
▪ Madison failed to finalize the former president’s appointment of William Marbury
as Justice of the Peace.
▪ Marbury directly petitioned the Supreme Court for an equitable remedy in the
form of a writ of mandamus.
▪ The Supreme Court held that although Marbury was entitled to a remedy,
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 expanding the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction was unconstitutional.
▪ Prior to this case, no law had been rendered unconstitutional. The major
significance of Marbury v. Madison is that it helped define the
original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court.
Marbury v. Madison Case Brief
Statement of the Facts:
Towards the end of his presidency, John Adams appointed William Marbury as
Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia. After assuming office, President
Thomas Jefferson ordered James Madison not to finalize Marbury’s
appointment. Under Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Marbury brought
an action against Madison in the United States Supreme Court requesting the
Court to issue a writ of mandamus to force delivery of the appointment.
Procedural History:
Marbury directly approached the Supreme Court to compel Madison, Jefferson’s
Secretary of State, to deliver the commission to Marbury.
Issues and Holdings:
1. Does Marbury hold a right to his judicial appointment? Yes
2. Is Marbury entitled to a remedy under U.S. law? Yes
3. Is Marbury entitled to a writ of mandamus under Section 13 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789? No
Political Questions
Judgment:
Chief Justice John Marshall denied issuing a writ of mandamus.
Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:
The United States Supreme Court has the authority to review both the legislative
acts of congress and laws to determine if they comply with the Constitution.
Reasoning:
▪ Justice Marshall held that although Marbury was entitled to his commission,
the United States Supreme Court could not hear the case because it lacked
original jurisdiction.
1. Marbury was lawfully appointed as Justice of the Peace through the president’s
(Adams) signing of Marbury’s commission and Senate confirmation.
2. Under federal law, Marbury is entitled to a remedy. Whether or not Marbury may
receive a remedy is contingent upon whether the appointment made Marbury an
agent of the president or assigned a duty by law. If appointed as a political agent
of the president, Marbury is not entitled to a remedy. However, if Marbury was
deprived of the ability to carry out a duty assigned to him by law, Marbury is
entitled to a remedy. Here, Adams gave legal title to the office of Justice of the
Peace to Marbury for the length of the appointment. Madison interfered with
Marbury’s legal title when he refused to finalize Marbury’s appointment. As a
result, Marbury is entitled to a remedy.
3. Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorizing the United States Supreme
Court jurisdiction to provide the remedy of a writ of mandamus is
unconstitutional. The Judiciary Act of 1789 permits the Supreme Court to
exercise original jurisdiction over causes of actions for writs of mandamus. The
problem is the provision directly conflicts with the Constitution, specifically
Article III. Article III serves as a limitation on the types of cases the Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction over. Cases not within the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction may fall under the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. In short,
Section 13 of The Act is unconstitutional since it attempts to expand the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Concurring/Dissenting Opinions:
Unanimous decision
Significance:
The holding of Marbury v. Madison established the United States Supreme
Court’s power to determine whether a law passed by Congress was constitutional
(Judicial Review). Prior to this case, it was clear that laws conflicting with the
Constitution were invalid, but the branch of government who determined validity
had not been established.
The government pursued a policy of deregulation by enacting Republic Act No.
8180 (R.A. No. 8180) or the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.
However, the law was decided to be invalid because its provisions on tariff
differential, inventory requirements, and predatory pricing inhibited fair
competition, encouraged monopolistic power, and interfered with the free
interaction of market forces. Congress enacted a new oil deregulation law, R.A.
No. 8479. This time, Congress excluded the offensive provisions found in the
invalidated law. Nonetheless, petitioner Garcia again sought to declare the
Political Questions
new oil deregulation law unconstitutional on the ground that it violated Article
XII, Section 19 of the Constitution. He specifically objected to Section 19 of R.A.
No. 8479 which prescribed the period for removal of price control on gasoline
and other finished petroleum products and set the time for the full deregulation
of the local downstream oil industry. He averred that Section 19 of R.A. No.
8479 is "glaringly pro-oligopoly, anti-competition, and anti-people", and thus
asked the Court to declare the provision unconstitutional.
For the second time, petitioner Garcia presents petition for certiorari and raises
the same issue of the constitutionality of Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479.
Issue:
Is the Court bound to decide for the unconstitutionality of the said law?
Ruling:
It bears reiterating at the outset that the deregulation of the oil industry is
a policy determination of the highest order. It is unquestionably a priority
program of Government. The Department of Energy Act of 1992 expressly
mandates that the development and updating of the existing Philippine energy
program "shall include a policy direction towards deregulation of the power and
energy industry."
This is outside our jurisdiction. The judgment on the issue is a settled
matter and only Congress can reverse it.
Petitioner Garcia invokes the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial
review, which power is expressly recognized under Section 4 (2), Article VIII of
the Constitution. 10 The power of judicial review is the power of the courts to
test the validity of executive and legislative acts for their conformity with the
Constitution. 11 Through such power, the judiciary enforces and upholds the
supremacy of the Constitution. 12 For a court to exercise this power, certain
requirements must first be met, namely:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Garcia didn’t meet 1st requirement. He invoked that the removal of price
controls would ensure monopoly and said that this violates Article XII, Section
19 of the Constitution. This Section states:
The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest
so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be
allowed.
Congress, by enacting R.A. No. 8479, determined that this objective is better
realized by liberalizing the oil market, instead of continuing with a highly
regulated system enforced by means of restrictive prior controls. This legislative
determination was a lawful exercise of Congress' prerogative and one that this
Court must respect and uphold. Regardless of the individual opinions of the
Members of this Court, we cannot, acting as a body, question the wisdom of a
Political Questions
co-equal department's acts. The courts do not involve themselves with or delve
into the policy or wisdom of a statute; it sits, not to review or revise legislative
action, but to enforce the legislative will. For the Court to resolve a clearly
nonjusticiable matter would be to debase the principle of separation of powers that
has been tightly woven by the Constitution into our republican system of
government.
The immediate implementation of full deregulation of the local downstream oil
industry is a policy determination by Congress which this Court cannot overturn
without offending the Constitution and the principle of separation of powers.
BIRAOGO VS PTC
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by thirdlevel
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all
the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena
powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their
arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC
from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code
of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the
President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an
Political Questions
entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth
Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the
“Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding,
those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and
the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those
of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and
argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in
any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No.
141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the
President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasijudicial
body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s
jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it
was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E.
O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping
the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices,
agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as
a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a
body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are
Political Questions
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right
to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they
are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of
E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”
In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It
provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff
who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does
so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to
seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or
“taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that
the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise
of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers
under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine
if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the
President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in
the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the
laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing
funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive
of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the
amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever
funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very
source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to
the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.
Political Questions
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement
those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing
of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and
the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that
it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined
in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person
within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state’s duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at
least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which
all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights
determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to
the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
Political Questions
Joseph Estrada v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
GR. 146710
Facts:
During the 1998 elections Joseph Estrada an Gloria Macapagal Arroyo were
elected as president and vice-president, respectively. Both of them would were to
serve a six-year term.
From the beginning, the petitioner, Joseph Estrada’s administration had been
plagued with a plethora of problems. But his sharp descent in power started on
October 4, 2000, when Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis “Chavit” SIngson, a long-time
friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and
friends of receiving 10 million pesos from the jueteng lords.
The expose immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day October 5, 2000,
Senator Teofisto Guingona Jr., then senate Minority leader, delivered a privilege
speech of which accusing the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng
money from Gov. Singson from November 1998 to August 2000 and subsequently
received, 70 million on excise tax on cigarettes. The privilege speech was then
referred to the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice for joint
investigation.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air.
Timeline of Events
October 11 – Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf

of the Presbyteral council of the Archdiocese of manila calling for the resignation
of the petitioner
October 12 – respondent Arroyo resigned as Sec. of the Department of Social

Welfare
October 13 – Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines also joined the cry
for the resignation
October 17 – former Pres. Cory Aquino and Fidel Ramos also joined the call for
the resignation
-------petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign ----------------

-
November 1 – four economic advisers, members of the council of senior economic

advisers resigned
Political Questions
November 2 – Sec. Mar Roxas II also resigned from the DTI
November 3 – Sen. Pres. Franklin M. Drilon and House Speaker Manuel Villar
together with the 47 representatives defected the ruling coalition.
November 13 – House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of impeachment

signed by 115 representative, more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of
Rept to the Senate.
November 20 – SENATE formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner
December 7 – the impeachment trial started
The dramatic point of the December hearing was the testimony of Clarissa
Ocampo, senior vice-president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was
one foot away from the petitioner when he affixed the signature “Jose Velarde” on
documents involving a 500 million peso investment agreement.
January 11 – Atty.Edgardo Espiritu took the witness stand and alleged that the
petitioner was facing charges of insider trading
January 16 – by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of

the second envelope, which allegedly contained evidence, showing that petitioner
held 3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde”.
The public and private prosecutors walked out in the protest of the ruling. Senator
Pimentel resigned as Senate President. The ruling at 10pm was met by
spontaneous outbursts.
By 12md thousands had assembled at the EDSA shrine.
January 17 – public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella

tendering their collective resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of
Withdrawal of Appearance. Sen. Roco moved to the indefinite postponement of
the impeachment trial.
January 18 - the army of people gathered in protest at the streets almost filled up
a 10km mark.
January 19 – the fall from power of the petitioner was inevitable. At 1:20pm the
petitioner informed the Exec. Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo
Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had defected.
2:30 pm – petitioner agreed to hold a snap election wherein he would not be a

candidate.
Political Questions
3:00 pm – Sec. of National Defense and the Chiefs of the Armed Forces went to
the EDSA Shrine. More people have resigned from their positions calling for the
resignation of the petitioner
January 20 - turned out to be the day of surrender
12:20 AM – the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of
power started
12:00 noon - Justice Davide administered the oath to represent Arroyo as Pres.
Of the Philippines. Other countries have also taken recognition of the Arroyo
administration.
2:30 pm – petitioner and his family hurriedly left malacanang palace and issued a
press statement stating the fact that Arroyo took her oath as the Pres. Of the
Philppines. Subsequently, he also signed a letter transmitting the duties of his
office as he is unable to do so at the moment.
January 22 – Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the

Presidency.
January 24 – house passed resolution no. 175 “expressing the full support of the
House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo, President of the Philippines.”
Also passed resolution 176 – “expressing support of the House of Representative

to the assumption into office by Vice President Arroyo.”
February 7- the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment
court is functus officio and has been terminated.
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared
in clusters. Several cases previously led against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman were set in motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any
further proceedings in or in any other criminal complaint that may be led in his
office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally
warranted."
February 6 - filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment
Political Questions
"confrming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of

the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution."
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of
resolution and press statement for "Gag Order" on respondent Ombudsman led by
counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20,
2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief
Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court
under pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or
discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending
decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the
respondent Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending
investigation in his office against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the
cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman may
immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days
after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at
bar moot and academic."
Issue: WON the cases at bar involved a political question
Ruling:
The case is legal and not political.

Political Questions
The respondents raised that the cases at bar pose a political question. Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo became the President through the People Power revolution and
that she has exercised the powers of the presidency. Furthermore, her legitimacy
as president was also accepted by other nations. Thus, they consider that the
following shall serve as political thicket that the court cannot enter.
However, the court says otherwise. A political question has been defined as “those
questions which, under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. It is connected with
the issued dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
Respondents allege that the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration should be

treated similarly with the Aquino administration since the circumstance in how they
obtained the Presidency is similar. However, the Court said that the two cases are
not.
With the Aquino administration the following were observed:

1. Government was a successful result of the revolution
2. Freedom of the constitution, it was stated the Aquino government was
instilled directly by the people in defiance of the 1973 constitution as
amended.
With the Arroyo admin:
1. Government was a result of a peaceful revolution

2. Arroyo took oath of the 1987 constitution. She discharged her authority
under the 1987 consti.
Furthermore, the court argued that the legitimacy of the Arroyo government was
instituted by a successful revolution by people power, which is beyond the power
of the judiciary since it is out of the constitutional loop. But the court found out 2
distinct differences.
EDSA I
1. Extra constitutional.
“… in defiance of the 1973 constitution—cannot be subject of judicial review. “
3. Exercise of the people power revolution which overthrew the whole

government .
EDSA 2
Political Questions
1. Intra-constitutional. Hence, the oath of the respondent as President
includes the protection and upholding the 1987 constitution—resignation of
the president makes it a subject for judicial review.
2. Exercise of the people power of freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the
president.
Thus, with the following distinctions the court held that the case at bar is a legal
question.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora

GR. NO. 141284
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, President of the Philippines in a verbal directive, ordered

the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime
prevention and suppression. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP
Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of
Instruction 02/2000 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint
visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force
Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines
to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The
President also declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign
are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") led the instant petition to annul
LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void
and unconstitutional, arguing that the deployment of marines in Metro Manila is
violative of the Constitution because no emergency situation obtains in Metro
Manila as would justify, even only remotely, the deployment of soldiers for law
enforcement work; hence, said deployment in derogation of Article II, Section 3 of
the Constitution.
Political Questions
Issue: WON the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review.
Ruling:
The PETITION was DISMISSED.
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise
its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with,
namely:
(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
It must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a
suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount
interest is involved. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to
Political Questions
the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that "
[T]he Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government." Under this definition, the Court cannot agree
with the Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political question beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional
or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or
conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable — the problem
being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. When political questions
are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from
the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule
the President's wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion.
Franciso v. House of Representatives

GR. NO. 160261
On October 23, 2003 – Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix Funtabella

filed a second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide on the
latter disbursements and expenditures of the Judiciary Development Fun (JDF).
Political Questions
Such impeachment complaint comes after the first one filed on June 2003 by
former President Estrada. Article XI Section 3 Par. 5 of the 1987 constitution
provides that “no impeachment complaint shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within the period of one year.”
Petitioner’s argument that
Number 1: it is in violation of article 11, section 3(5) – “impeachment proceeding

shall be initialed against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.
Number 2: doctrine of political question (article 11, section 3(6) – “the Senate shall
have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.” Therefore, all
constitutional issues arising from impeachment proceedings are not within the
power of judicial review of the courts.
RULE V  BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
11th congress: stipulated rules on initiating impeachments pursuant to the

aforementioned article.
Section 14. Scope of Bar. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against

the same official more than once within the period of one (1) year
12th congress: revised such rules to stipulate that no impeachment complaints

can be initiated within one year for the initiation of a former complaint.
Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. Within a period of

one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as
provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be
initiated against the same official.(Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied
ISSUES:
WON the Supreme Court decide on an issue of political nature in reference to the
rules stipulated by congress for their proceedings in the exercise of their power of
Judicial Review?
Therefore,  What is Judicial Review and its requisites?

Political Questions
Is there an actual case or controversy?  Are the petitioners actual parties involved
in the case at bar? Was the case ripe for adjudication?  Is there a need for the
Supreme Court decide the case at bar?
Issues:
a) Locus standi of petitioners;
b) Ripeness (prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) Houses exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senates sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) Constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of

Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) Judicial restraint
Ruling:
1. That the Supreme Court can decide an issue of Political Nature in reference to
the rules made by Congress as to their Impeachment Proceedings provided that
the requisites of Judicial Review are present.
2. The requisites of Judicial Review are the following with each decision included:
2a. That there is an actual case or controversy because the new rules of
th
impeachment proceedings as drafted by the 12 Congress contravenes the
constitutional bar on the filing of impeachment complaints against a public official
within 1 year.
2b. That the petitioners are actual parties involved in the case because the parties
are  1. Taxpayers where an impeachment proceeding involves the use of public
funds 2. Citizens  3. Lawyers who are in the legal profession
Political Questions
3. That the case is ripe for adjudication because the impeachment complaints have
already been filed thereby contravening the constitutional provision that no
impeachment proceedings against a public official shall ensue within one year of
a former impeachment complaint.
4. That there is a need for the Supreme Court to decide on the case at bar
because such case places the Supreme Court and Congress at ends with each
other in terms of separation of powers as well as on the checks and balances of
both branches of government. Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality
of the government.
Courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.
Salonga v. Pano, 18 Feb 1985

Facts:
After a series of bombings in Metro Manila from August to October 1980, Jovito Salonga was
accused among others of having violated Republic Act No. 1700, as amended by P.D. 885 and
Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 in relation to Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code.
A certain Victorn Burns Lovely, Jr. was arrested after a bomb set off in his room injuring
himself and his brother. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were
several pictures of Lovely, Salonga and his wife, and other guests attending a birthday party
in Los Angeles.
On October 21, 1980, elements of the military went to his hospital room where he was
confined due to his chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest.
Petitioner claimed that he was taken into an isolation room against his will, uninformed
with the charges against him. 25 days later he was released for humanitarian reason
and placed under housed arrest
There were two witnesses against him: Col. Balbino Diego and Victor Lovely. However the
former’s testimony was solely based on Lovely’s sworn statement before him. Lovely testified
that:
- He and petitioner were in contact because he was tasked by Psinakis (one of the alleged
members of a subversion group formed in the united states) to get an attache case.
- The petitioner’s house was the place were the attache case was delivered; it was their
contact point
Political Questions
- The case was filled with explosives
- In the birthday party were the picture was taken (in LA), there was a political
discussion. Of which Salonga “mentioned some kind of violent struggle in the
Philippines being most likely should reforms be not instituted by President Marcos
immediately."
Issue:
1. Were the evidences against the petitioner uncontradicted and if they were unexplained
or uncontradicted, would they, standing alone, sufficiently overcome the presumption
of innocence and warrant his conviction?
2. Did the court exercise their function as prescribed by their judicial function?
HELD:
The court dismissed the case for having become moot and academic.
The prosecution evidence fails to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner, either as a
co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader
of any subversive organization.
"prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is
sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to
counterbalance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction
1. The testimony of Col Balbino, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely
hearsay, can hardly qualify as prima facie evidence of subversion. Hearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value as the affiant could not
have been cross-examined on the facts stated therein. (See People v. Labinia, 115
SCRA 223; People v. Valero, 112 SCRA 661
2. In the case at bar, the prosecution cannot even present a credible version of the
petitioner's role -there was no definite link between the petitioner and the bombings
3. Political discussion is within the protective clause of freedom of speech and
expression and cannot be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of
membership in a subversive organization. Under Presidential Decree No. 885,
Section 3, paragraph 6, political discussion will only constitute prima facie evidence of
membership in a subversive organization if such discussion amounts to:
(6) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or
organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof."
Hence, salonga’s statement is not tantamount to prima facie evidence
Developments in the case serve to focus attention on a not too well known aspect of the
Supreme Court's functions.
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas
reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where
Political Questions
even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the
Court's functions.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
David v Macapagala-Arroyo
FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5,
declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents
stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some
military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army, and some members of the
political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.They considered the
aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and
present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on
their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was
perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February
25, 2006. Seized from the premises – in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except
the security guard of the building – were several materials for publication. The law enforcers,
a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the
warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless
violence.
On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of
national emergency has ceased to exist.
Arguments
Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites ((1)there must be an actual case or
controversy; (2) petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality) are absent.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal

claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interest;" a real and substantial controversy admitting
of specific relief.
Petitioner argued that the police officers committed illegal acts in implementing PP
1017. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the
Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public's
Political Questions
interest, involving as they do the people's basic rights to freedom of expression, of
assembly and of the press
The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending
that the present petitions were rendered "moot and academic" by President Arroyo's
issuance of PP 1021.
Issues:
1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic (according to
the Solicitor General)
Moot and Academic Principle
The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of
all political authority. It confers limited powers on the national government.
If the government consciously or unconsciously oversteps these limitations
there must be some authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart its
unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will
of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts exercise.
This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review.
But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity."
Requisites to exercise this power:
1. there must be an actual case or controversy;
2. petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality;
3. the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
4. the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of
the case itself.
The Court finds that the petition is not moot and academic; PP 1021 did not render
the present petitions moot and academic.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value which necessitates courts to decline jurisdiction over such case or
dismiss it on ground of mootness. The "moot and academic" principle is not a
magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if (standards of declaring a petition
moot and academic):
1. there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2. the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved;
3. when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
4. the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court's assumption of
jurisdiction over the instant petitions.
Political Questions
1. the police officers committed illegal acts in implementing PP 1017.
2. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the
Constitution.
3. the issues being raised affect the public's interest, involving as they do the people's
basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press
4. the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts,
doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar,
and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the
protection given by constitutional guarantees.
5. respondents' contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are
subject to judicial review.
Mootness Rule by Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban's Separate Opinion in

Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary:
Respondents failed to take into account the exception that an otherwise "moot" case may
still be decided "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or
damaged as a direct result of its issuance."
The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by
the Chief Justice.
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS
Facts:
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec when ABS CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a
project, an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for
President and Vice President, results will be reported immediately.
On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order. We directed the
Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution
or the restraining order.
The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11,
1998 election has already been held and done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any actual
controversy before us.
Issues
In his Memorandum, the solicitor general, in seeking to dismiss the Petition, brings up
additional issues: (1) mootness and (2) prematurity, because of petitioner's failure to seek a
reconsideration of the assailed Comelec Resolution.
Political Questions
Held
Mootness and Prematurity (Relevant to the topic)
The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution may have passed the date when
it could be enforced--the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental
freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a
basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with
elections.
To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task
that could well crop up again in future elections.
In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate
that it "also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees."
 Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press
are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the
guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the
holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived
therefrom.
The solicitor general further contends that the Petition should be dismissed for petitioner's
failure to exhaust available remedies before the issuing forum, specifically the filing
of a motion for reconsideration.
The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on
April 21, 1998, only twenty days before the election itself. Besides, the
petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the
circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a
reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the May 11, 1998
elections.
Dissenting opinion of KAPUNAN, J.: states that
the case is technically moot. Since the Comelec has not declared exit polls to be illegal and
neither did the petitioner present its methodology or system of conducting the exit polls to
the poll body, the nullification of the Comelec's questioned resolution is bereft of empirical
basis.
On Other Issues:
ABS-CBN maintains that it is a responsible member of the mass media, committed to
report balanced election-related data
valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press
Political Questions
Comelec gravely abused its discretion and grossly violated the petitioner's constitutional
rights
COMELEC argues that
the issuance was pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean,
honest, orderly and credible
exit polls violate the protection, preservation and maintenance of the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot
exit polls confuse and influence the voters
exit polls pose a "clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of
the electoral process,"
The Court Resolves that:
The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is
sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the
equally vital right of suffrage.
cannot support any ruling or order "the effect of which would be to nullify so
vital a constitutional right as free speech."[
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls --
disorder and confusion in the voting centers -- does not justify a total ban on them. too
broad, since its application is without qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive
or not.
Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of
voting is not at issue here.
WHO MAY EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW
Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 74457
Facts:
The petitioner transported carabao in a pump boat from

Masbate to Iloilo. The animals were confiscated by the
police in violation of EO 626-A. The order was signed by
Marcos and imprisons the inter-provincial movement of
carabaos and carabeef. Any violation will result in the
confiscation of the said animals, to be given to charitable
institutions or deserving farmers, as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission and the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit.
Political Questions
The petitioner argues for the unconstitutionality of EO

626-A due to its outright confiscation of animals,
disregarding the right to due process. Both the RTC and
the CA dismissed the petition, hence, the appeal to the
SC.
Issue:
Should EO 626-A be declared unconstitutional due to the

lack of due process?
Ruling:
Yes. While the protection of the general welfare restrains

due process, EO 626-A penalizes offenders with outright
confiscation, without regard for his Constitutional rights
to trial or due process. It is an encroachment of judicial
powers when administrative authorities immediately judge
the guilt of the offender. Judicial power affords the court
the right to probe the constitutionality of a law and this
right should be exercised without fear of retaliation or
censure. The due process clause is kept intentionally vague
for it to remain conveniently resilient. Any person caught
in the midst of the law should be afforded the right to a
fair and open hearing of the case.
Garcia v. Drilon
G.R. No. 179267
Facts:
The wife is a long-time victim of physical, emotional, and

psychological abuse, and economic violence by her husband.
He is dominant and controlling in all aspects of her life
and of their three children. The husband has full control
over the three family corporations, of which they are both
stockholder, and earns significantly more than the wife.
The abuse got worse when the husband had an affair with
their bank manager, who was also one of their children’s
godmother. The violence against the wife and children
escalated to the point where the wife attempted suicide
and had to undergo therapy, taking anti-depressant
medications.
Political Questions
The RTC granted the Temporary Protection Order (TPO)

against her husband but he has constantly changed the date
of the hearing due to various reasons (e.g. did not receive
a copy), thereby amending the TPOs. He called the exercise
futile and appealed to the CA, challenging the
unconstitutionality of RA 9262. The CA issued a TRO on all
TPOs but dismissed his case when he failed to raise the
constitutionality issue, hence the appeal to the SC.
Issue:
Does the Family Court have the authority and jurisdiction

to consider the constitutionality of RA 9262?
Ruling:
Yes. Family Courts are special courts that are co-equal to

the RTC but have been granted the exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide on cases of VAWC. The RTC of Bacolod
City was designated to be a Family Court but still has the
jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation. The
Constitution does not only grant the power of judicial
review to the SC but to all RTCs.
Sps. Mirasol v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 128448
Facts:
The Mirasols are sugar land owner and planters who availed
of a crop loan financing scheme with the Philippine
National Bank (PNB). This authorised PNB to sell the sugar
and apply the proceeds to payment of their loans. By then,
Marcos had issued PD 5792 authorising the Philippine
Exchange Commission (PHILEX) to purchase the sugar
allocated for export. Believing that PNB’s sales from the
crops was more than enough to cover their obligation, they
asked for an accounting of the sales. However, PNB did not
acknowledge the request. However, it continued to finance
Political Questions
the Mirasols’ sugar production and they in turn continued
to avail of other loan offers from the bank.
When PNB asked them to settle their due accounts, they

turned over 1.4M in properties, through dacion en pago.
Ultimately, the Mirasols’ owed the bank nearly 12M. They
insist that the sales of the sugar could offset the
outstanding obligation but PNB claims that under PD 5792,
there was nothing to account as all sugar sales were
subjected to the government.
The RTC ruled in their favour, declaring PD 5792

unconstitutional but did not nullify the dacion en pago
and mortgage contracts. They appealed to the CA which
reversed the RTCs decision, hence the appeal to the SC.
Issue:
Does the RTC have jurisdiction to declare PD 5792

unconstitutional without submitting a notice to the
Solicitor General?
Ruling:
No. While the RTC does have the power to exercise judicial
review, it was improper for them to do so when the Mirasols’
had not complied with Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court. This rule species that the Solicitor General should
be notified of any action which involves the validity of a
statute, executive order, or regulation. This is in
accordance with Section 1 of PD 478, where the Solicitor
General is vested with the power and function to be heard
and appear when the validity of laws, executive order, or
regulations are called into question. Both these provisions
enable the Solicitor General to decide when his
intervention is necessary.
As a rule, courts will not resolve the constitutionality

of a law if the issue can be settled on other grounds. This
is to presume that the acts of the legislative and
executive branches are valid and were found to be in
accordance with the Constitution.
Topic: CONDITIONS FOR THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEIW.

Political Questions
Title: Funa v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 184740, [February 11, 2010], 626
PHIL 218-254)
Provision: Sec 13 of Article VII 1987 Constitution is being violated.
Facts:
Oct. 4, 2006 Former Pres. Arroyo appointed Maria Elena H. Bautista as Undersecretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
Oct. 23, 2006 Bautista was designated as USEC for Maritime Transport of the Department
under Special Order No. 2006-171.
Sept. 1, 2008 Bautista was designated as OIC Office of the Administrator, MAIRNA, in
concurrent capacity as DOTC-USEC.
Jan. 5, 2009 During the pendency of the petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of
the MARINA.
Feb. 2, 2009 Assumed her duties and responsibilities
PETITIONER
Oct 21, 2008 Dennis A. B. Funa filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of
Bautista appointments in accordance to Art. VII Sec. 13 of the Constitution.
The MARINA Administrator position is not ex-officio to the post of DOTC-USEC in the
provisions of PD No. 474 as amended by EO No. 125-A. (Note: There is a Marina Industry
Authority under Sec 12 of EO No. 125-A)
- In his reply regarding the people vs. green, DOTC USEC for Maritime Transport and
administratorship of MARINA are "closely related" and is governed by Section 7, paragraph
2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution rather than by Section 13, Article VII.
 The fact that Bautista was extended an appointment naming her as OIC of MARINA
shows that she does not occupy it in an e x- o fficio capacity since an e x- o fficio
position does not require any "further warrant or appoint."
- no maximum duration
- appointing USEC can open Pandora's Box to feast on choice gov't position.
- (1) or (2) Deputy/ies Administrators should be the OIC in vacancy of the position
which knowledgeable and experienced in capacity to run the office.
RESPONDENT
 Petitioner lacks legal standing for the suit. Clearly from the standard set in Public
Interest Center is the requirement that the party suing as a taxpayer must prove that
he has sufficient interest in preventing illegal expenditure of public funds, and more
particularly, his personal and substantial interest in the case.
 Neither has he claimed that public funds were actually disbursed in connection with
respondent Bautista's designation as MARINA OIC. It is to be noted that respondent
Bautista did not receive any salary while she was MARINA OIC
 cite the test laid down in P e o p le v. G r e e n , 17 17 which held that "[T]he offices
must subordinate, one [over] the other, and they must, p e r s e, have the right to
interfere, one with the other, before they are compatible at common law."
- concerns of MARINA Administrator does not go to the USEC for Maritime Transport
but to the MARINA Board.
 The other objection raised by the respondent is that the resolution of this case had
been overtaken by events considering the effectivity of respondent Bautista's
appointment as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and her
Political Questions
relinquishment of her former position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport.
Issue:
Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with
the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been
appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple oces for Cabinet
Members and their deputies and assistants.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power.
2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as
a result of its enforcement
(Respondent: This is absent in the side of the petitioner)
3)the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4)the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case
In D a vid v. M a c a p a g al- A r r o y o, summarizing the rules called from jurisprudence, we

held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to
sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law
in question;
(4) for concerned citizens concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised
are of transcendental importance are of transcendental importance which must be settled
early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon
their prerogatives as legislators. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
-Moot and academic case declined because it has no practical use and value. However, as an
exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is
"capable of repetition yet evading review".
-Held Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma supervening events, whether intended or accidental,
cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the
Constitution to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar, and public.
 Undersecretary Bautista's Designation as MARINA OIC falls under the stricter

prohibition under Sec. 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. And cannot invoke
the exception in Sec.7 (2), Article IX-B
- Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads: SEC. 7. . . . Unless otherwise allowed
by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
Political Questions
office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
 MARINA was created by virtue of PD. No. 474 by Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos in which
The Administrator shall be directly responsible to the Maritime Industry Board,
MARINA's governing body, and shall have powers, functions and duties as provided
in P .D. No. 474, which provides, under Sections 11 and 12.
 DOTC was created by virtue of EO NO. 546 on July 23, 1979 which EO No. 1011
abolished the Board of Transportation and transferred the quasi-judicial functions
pertaining to water transportation to MARINA, and reorganized by EO. 125-A. Then
strengthen MARINA's regulatory powers and function through RA No. 9295.
 Finally, the Court similarly contends respondents' theory that being just a
"designation," and temporary at that, respondent Bautista was never really
"appointed" as OIC Administrator of MARINA, untenable. In B in a mir a v. G a r r u c
h o, J r., 35 35 we distinguished between the terms a p p oin t m e n t and d e sig n a
tio n, as follows:
Appointment may be dened as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office office.
Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties
on an incumbent official.
In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment,
which does not confer security of tenure on the person named. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and
temporary capacity, the words "hold the office" were employed. Such holding of office
pertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate
performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual
or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not
to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section
13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To "hold" an office means to
"possess or occupy" the same, or "to be in possession and administration," which
implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
As to respondents' contention that the concurrent positions of DOTC Undersecretary for

Maritime Transport and MARINA OIC Administrator are not incompatible offices, we find no
necessity for delving into this matter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista
as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a
concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
Title: SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC vs .
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL.
Provision: Challenging the Constitutionality of RA No. 9372 “An Act to Secure
the State
Political Questions
and Protect our People from Terrorism” – also known as Human
Security Act
of 2007.
FACTS:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372
(RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism," otherwise
known as the Human Security Act of 2007, 1 signed into law on March 6, 2007.
July 15, 2007 The effectivity of the RA 9372.

July 16, 2007 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc, a gov't org, and Atty.
Soliman Santos, a concerned citizen, taxpayer, and lawyer filed a petition and prohibition
as docketed as G.R. No. 178552, followed by the same petition on the same day of (KMU),
(NAFLU-KMU), and (CTUHR) represented by their respective officers docketed as G.R.
178554.
July 17, 2007 BAYAN, GABRIELA. KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAT, SCW, LFS,
PAMALAKAYA, ACT, HEAD, AGHAN and joined by concern attys and other personality
as citizens and taxpayers file the same petition docketed as G.R. No. 178581
August 6, 2007 (G.R.1No. 791657), Aug. 29, 2007 (G.R. No. 178890), Sept 19, 2007
(G.R. No.178581) - same petitions were filed.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council.

The petitions fail.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitions failed on challenging the constitutionality of R.A. 9372?
Ruling:
PETITIONERS' REPORT TO CERTIORARI IS IMPROPER
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how
respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting

requisites, viz.:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy.
Political Questions
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. (Ruled in Angara v. Electoral Commission)
[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable — definite and
concrete, touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must
show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial
thereof on the other hand; that is, it must concern a real and not merely a theoretical
question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid
constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do regarding the
"surveillance", and "communist fronts". No demonstrable threat has been
established, much less a real and existing one.
(b) petitioners must possess locus standi;

Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and
personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid,
but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it
suffers thereby in some indefinite way to be subjected to some burdens or penalties
by reason of the
statute or act complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that
(1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government,
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
-Petitioners invoke the "transcendental importance doctrine on their alleged that

they have been subjected to "close security serveillance by state securtiy forces",
however, the petitioner should has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering
direct and personal injury, and failed to connect surveillance and implementation
of RA 9372 and none of the petitioners faced any charge under RA 9372.
- Tagging as communist party of the Philippines together with the NPA is a

tantamount to the effects proscription without following the procedure under the
Political Questions
law in which the Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of
petitioners.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:

(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
( 2 ) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of
the court.
The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially

known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially
noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either:
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Thus, a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on
the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive
knowledge.
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from
Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has
alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law.
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion

of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal
interest is key
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein

certain
rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness

and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply
only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct (a penal statute), not
speech.
The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to

control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms
Political Questions
"a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the Act would be
valid."
For the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its
face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. A statute or act suffers from
the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372,
the following elements may be culled:
(1) the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special penal laws;
(2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and
(3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand.
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a

credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of
the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court
reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling
on a statute's future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be
used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Specific: A. Actual Case or Controversy, Moot, and Academic; Exceptions
to the
Moot and Academic Rule; Premature Controversies
Title: Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa Jr.
Provision: The Unconstitutionality of RH LAW
Facts:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law.
And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is
"designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good.”
PETITIONERS
Political Questions
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and,
Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and
on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a
domestic,
privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong); then followed by 15 petitions.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioner
ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very
essence
of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the
State is
mandated to protect and promote.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of
RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn in violation of Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception.
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products.
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom violates the constitutional guarantee
respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives.
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law
discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government
program that promotes contraceptive use.
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is
vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH
Law.46
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority.
The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List
(EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI
of the Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM) under the Local Government Code and
R.A . No. 9054.
Respondents
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for
the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or
controversy and,
therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack
standing to
question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over
which
Political Questions
the Court has no original jurisdiction.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the
Status
Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation
for a
period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to
determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by
which these
issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August
6, 13,
and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was
ordered
extended until further orders of the Court.
The Status Quo Ante
Prior to the RH Law: Population, Contraceptive, and Reproductive Health Laws
R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969,
contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional
substances and devices.
R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National
Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. "
R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No.
79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad
educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care,"
and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino
citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies." R.A. No. 9710 or "The
Magna Carta for Women- family planning and sex education
The RH Law
To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor
and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family planning
methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive
health be achieved
Issues:
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has
synthesized
and refined them to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review 2] Actual Case or Controversy 3] Facial Challenge 4] Locus
Standi 5] Declaratory Relief 6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life 2] Right to Health 3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech 4]
The Family 5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom 6] Due Process 7] Equal
Political Questions
Protection 8] Involuntary Servitude 9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA 10] Autonomy of
Local Govemments/ARMM
1) Whether or not the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review

The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by
certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional
policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It
further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-
Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the
petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering
that the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government
has yet
to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot
be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.
To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of

government, which
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of
the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme
within its
own sphere.
In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts
performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at
the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and
specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative
branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. Thus,
while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH
Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results. The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished
rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may
be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
"judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of
powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of
Political Questions
government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority
and control between them.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) the petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case
Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the sub ect petitions do not present any actual case
or
controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the
questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one
has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of
the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended
that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.

For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the
same is
ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have
already
taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it
is
evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier,
when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Facts and Fallacies and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to
provide
access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality
reproductive
healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the
religious
freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes
to
achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man
stands
accountable to an authority higher than the State.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order,
dated
Political Questions
July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have
been
herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
BELGICA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

[G.R. No. 208566. November 19, 2013]|||
FACTS
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
 The term “pork barrel”, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to an

appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured
solely or primarily to bring money to a representative’s district.
 The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044,
otherwise known as the Public Works Act of 1922. Under this provision, release of
funds and realignment of unexpended portions of an item or appropriation were
subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House
of Representatives.
 In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives of the people,
also became involved in project identification.
 The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was
declared.
 It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (“GAA”)
called “Support for Local Development Projects” (“SLDP”). SLDP started the giving
of lump-sum allocations to individual legislators. The SLDP also began to cover
not only public works project or “hard projects” but also covered “soft projects” such
as those which would fall under education, health and livelihood.
 After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the
pork barrel was revived through the “Mindanao Development Fund” and the
“Visayas Development Fund”.
 In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed “Countrywide Development Fund” (“CDF”).
The CDF was meant to cover small local infrastructure and other priority
community projects.
 CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released directly to
implementing agencies subject to the submission of the required list of projects
and activities. Senators and congressmen could identify any kind of project from
“hard projects” such as roads, buildings and bridges to “soft projects” such as
textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.
 In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to be
made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by
individual legislators. This was also the first time when the Vice-President was
given an allocation.
 The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the
Department of Budget and Management was required to submit reports to the
Political Questions
Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations
regarding the releases made from the funds.
 Congressional insertions (“CIs”) were another form of congressional pork barrel
aside from the CDF. Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund,
the Congressional Initiative Allocations, and the Public Works Fund, among others.
 The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior consultation
with the representative of the legislative district concerned and the legislators had
the power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent.
 In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate
forms of CIs: (i) Food Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund,
and (iii) Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund. All three
contained a provision requiring prior consultation with members of Congress for
the release of funds.
 In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (“PDAF”) appeared in the GAA.
PDAF required prior consultation with the representative of the district before the
release of funds. PDAF also allowed realignment of funds to any expense category
except personal services and other personnel benefits.
 In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list
of general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF
project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. This was retained
in the GAAs from 2006-2010.
 It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-
governmental organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was
introduced.
 The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for
individual legislators.
 In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-
sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also
contained a provision on realignment of funds but with the qualification that it may
be allowed only once.
 The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies.
Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects outside of his
legislative district. Realignment of funds and release of funds were required to be
favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance, as the case may be.
HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL IN THE PHILIPPINES
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present cases and the recent
controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the term's usage has
expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds
and the Presidential Social Fund.
Political Questions
 The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of
Presidential Decree (“PD”) No. 910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on
March 22, 1976.
 The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the Charter of
the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (“PAGCOR”), as amended by
PD No. 1993. The PSF is managed and administered by the Presidential
Management Staff and is sourced from the share of the government in the
aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
CONTROVERSIES IN THE PHILIPPINES
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased

tremendously, owing in no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly used
the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support.
 In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums
of money regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.
 In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the
Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal
misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks.
 In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a
syndicate defrauded the government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel
of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects. The
investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation — "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles)
— had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using
no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were
supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared
that the money was diverted into Napoles' private accounts.
 In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-year
audit investigation detailing the irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007
to 2009.
The total releases covered by the audit amounted to P8.374 Billion in PDAF and
P32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total PDAF
and VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit
period. Accordingly, the CoA's findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA
Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were made public, the highlights
of which are as follows:
• Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number
of legislators significantly exceeded their respective allocations.
• Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts
of sponsoring members of the Lower House.
• Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount
appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.
Political Questions
• Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without
these having been turned over to the government.
• Significant amounts were released to [implementing agencies]
without the latter's endorsement and without considering their
mandated functions, administrative and technical capabilities to
implement projects. SAHITC
• Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by
the [implementing agencies] themselves but by [NGOs] endorsed by
the proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.
• The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of
any appropriation law or ordinance.
• Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.
• Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven
hundred seventy two (772) projects amount to [P]6.156 Billion were
either found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious
documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of
the Funds.
• Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing
agencies, of goods and services reportedly used in the projects were
not compliant with law.
 Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds
had gone into a dummy NGO.
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles
controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that
the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Procedural Issues:
W/N the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy.
W/N the issues raised are matters of policy subject to judicial review.
W/N petitioners have legal standing to sue.
W/N the 1994 Decision of the SC on PCA v. Enriquez (PHILCONSA) and the 2012
Decision of the Court on LAMP bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality
of the “pork barrel system” under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
RULING
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and
decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, 117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
Political Questions
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case. 118 Of these requisites, case law states that the
first two are the most important 119 and, therefore, shall be discussed
forthwith.|||
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy (There exists an actual and

justiciable controversy)
1. By virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable . . .
2. Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which involves
a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.
3. The Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these
cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the
antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System. Also, the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization
– such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD
1869 for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational;
hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of
the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
4. As for PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto had
been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken. Neither will the
President’s declaration that he had already abolished the PDAF render the issues
on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. However, even on the
assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the 'moot and
academic' principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first,
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of
the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review
- Applicability of first exception: clear from the fundamental posture

of petitioners — they essentially allege grave violations of the
Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of
powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances,
accountability and local autonomy.||| (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos.
208566, 208493, 209251 & L-20768, [November 19, 2013], 721
PHIL 416-732)
Political Questions
- Applicability of second exception: apparent from the nature of the
interests involved — the constitutionality of the very system within
which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to
be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of
exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public
interest.||| Moreover, if only for the purpose of validating the
existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the
Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient. To
the Court's mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts
of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government's own recognition
that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF" 130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which
only underscores the importance of the matter.|||
- Applicability of third exception: largely due to the practical need
for a definitive ruling on the system's constitutionality. Accordingly,
there is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative
to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated
disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government
may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance
with constitutional principles.
- Applicability of fourth exception: called for by the recognition that
the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by
constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. |||
B. MATTERS OF POLICY: THE POLITICAL QUESTION

DOCTRINE (PBS is a legal issue)
1. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue
dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of the government but
rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to
act upon.
2. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary
the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed
therewith under the expanded concept of judicial power under Section1,
Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution
3. It must also be borne in mind that "when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature
[or the executive], but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution.”
C. LOCUS STANDI (Petitioners have sufficient locus standi)

Political Questions
Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the
operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.
1. Petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the requisite standing to question the

validity of the existing Pork Barrel System under which the taxes they pay
have been and continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds.
2. Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing
requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as
matters of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.
D. Res Judicata (doesn’t apply)

Res judicata means “a matter adjudged”. The focal point of res judicata is the
judgment. The res judicata principle states that a judgment on the merits in a
previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a
subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity
of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
1. The res judicata principle cannot apply in this case. The required identity is
not present since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively, involved constitutional
challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas
the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire Pork
Barrel System. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on
a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits.
E. Stare Decisis (doesn’t apply)

The stare decisis principle, entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes
the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the
same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle
of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought
to be decided alike.
(Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork
Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly
understand its context, petitioners' posturing was that "the power given to the
[M]embers of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded
by the [CDF] is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said
power in an appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal
and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal
and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the
Constitution." 154In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached
the following main conclusions:one, under the Constitution, the power of
Political Questions
appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of
appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded
under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants
it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of
Congress are merely recommendatory).
1. The Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of

powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-
enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the
contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of the
entire Pork Barrel System. The complexity of the issues and the
broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore,
considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale
application of the stare decisis principle.
2. The Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled
with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly
countervail against a full resort to stare decisis.
JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION V. LIM

[G.R. No. 119775. October 24, 2003.]|||
FACTS
 Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise known as the “Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992,” set out the policy of the government to
accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive
uses of the former military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States
of America Military Bases Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic Military
reservations as well as their extensions including John Hay Station in
Baguio.
 RA No. 7227 created public respondent Bases Conversion and
Development Authority 2 (BCDA), vesting it with powers pertaining to the
multifarious aspects of carrying out the ultimate objective of utilizing the
base areas in accordance with the declared government policy.
 It granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free
importations, exemption of businesses therein from local and national
taxes, to other hallmarks of a liberalized financial business climate.
 And RA No. 7227 expressly gave authority to the President to create
through executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local
government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in
Political Questions
the areas covered respectively by the Clark military reservation, the Wallace
Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay.
 On Aug. 16, 1993, BCDA entered into an agreement into a Memorandum
of Agreement and Escrow Management with private respondents TUNTEX,
ASIAWORLD, and private corporations preparatory to the formation of a
joint venture for the development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John
Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers.|||
 Four months later or on December 16, 1993, BCDA, TUNTEX and
ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture Agreement 6 whereby they bound
themselves to put up a joint venture company known as the Baguio
International Development and Management Corporation.
 Meanwhile, Baguio City government meanwhile passed a number of
resolutions in response to the actions taken by BCDA as owner and
administrator of Camp John Hay, one of which is Resolution No. 255,
seeking and supporting, subject to its concurrence, the issuance by then
Pres. Ramos of a presidential proclamation declaring an area of 288.1
hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance with the provisions of R.A.
No. 7227.
 On July 5, 1994, then Pres. Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420 which
established a SEZ on a portion of Camp John Hay, and in effect, granted
tax exemptions pursuant to R.A No. 7227 to Subic SEZ extends to other
SEZs.
 The issuance of Proclamation No. 420 spawned the present petition for
prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief which was filed on April 25,
1995 challenging, in the main, its constitutionality or validity as well as the
legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement
between public respondent BCDA and private respondents TUNTEX and
ASIAWORLD.
Petitioners’ grounds for allowance of petition:

 Pres. Proclamation No. 425 in so far as it grants tax exemptions is invalid
and illegal as it is an unconstitutional exercise by the President of a power
granted only to the legislature.
 The memorandum of agreement entered into by and between private and
public respondents bases conversion development authority having
been entered into only by direct negotiation is illegal.|||
Respondents’ arguments:
 contend that by extending to the John Hay SEZ economic incentives similar
to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ which was established under R.A. No.
7227, the proclamation is merely implementing the legislative intent of said
law to turn the US military bases into hubs of business activity or
Political Questions
investment. They underscore the point that the government's policy of
bases conversion can not be achieved without extending the same tax
exemptions granted by R.A. No. 7227 to Subic SEZ to other SEZs.|||
 allege as moot and academic the issues raised by the petition, the
questioned Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement
having already been deemed abandoned by the inaction of the parties
thereto prior to the filing of the petition as in fact, by letter of November 21,
1995, BCDA formally notified TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD of the revocation
of their said agreements.
 Finally, respondents seek the outright dismissal of the petition for having
been filed in disregard of the hierarchy of courts and of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the case at bar is subject to SC’s primary jurisdiction
2. Whether the petition complies with the requirements for this Court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over constitutional cases.
3. Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and
local tax exemption within and granting other economic incentives to the
John Hay Special Economic Zone.
RULING
This Court declares that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of tax exemption and
other privileges to the John Hay SEZ is void for being violative of the Constitution.
(WHEREFORE, the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No.
420 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID and is accordingly declared of no legal
force and effect.
Proclamation No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and
effective.)
1. As it is only this Court which has the power under Section 21 23 of R.A. No.
7227 to enjoin implementation of projects for the development of the former
US military reservations, the issuance of which injunction petitioners pray
for, petitioners' direct filing of the present petition with it is allowed. Over and
above this procedural objection to the present suit, this Court retains full
discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly to it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. 24 Besides, remanding the case to the lower courts now would just
unduly prolong adjudication of the issues.
2. It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are raised, the
court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites
Political Questions
are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case:
- (1) There is in the present case a real clash of interests and rights
between petitioners and respondents arising from the issuance of a
presidential proclamation that converts a portion of the area covered
by Camp John Hay into a SEZ, the former insisting that such
proclamation contains unconstitutional provisions, the latter claiming
otherwise.
- (2) Petitioners' locus standi parallels that of the petitioner and other
residents of Bataan, specially of the town of Limay, in Garcia
v. Board of Investments 35 where this Court characterized their
interest in the establishment of a petrochemical plant in their place
as actual, real, vital and legal, for it would affect not only their
economic life but even the air they breathe. Moreover, petitioners
Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected
councilors of Baguio at the time, and whose duties included deciding
for and on behalf of their constituents the question of whether to
concur with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp
John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, petitioners Claravall and
Yaranon, as city officials who voted
against 36 the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994)
supporting the issuance of the now challenged Proclamation No.
420, have legal standing to bring the present petition.
- (3) & (4) As to the third and fourth requisites of a judicial inquiry, there
is likewise no question that they have been complied with in the case
at bar. This is an action filed purposely to bring forth constitutional
issues, ruling on which this Court must take up. Besides,
respondents never raised issues with respect to these requisites,
hence, they are deemed waived.
3. It is clear that under Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 it is only the Subic SEZ
which was granted by Congress with tax exemption, investment incentives
and the like. There is no express extension of the aforesaid benefits to other
SEZs still to be created at the time via presidential proclamation evidenced
by the deliberations of the Senate confirming the exclusivity to Subic SEZ
of the tax and investment privileges. More importantly, the nature of most
of the assailed privileges is one of tax exemption. It is the legislature, unless
limited by a provision of the state constitution, that has full power to exempt
any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to
exempt being as broad as its power to tax. 42 Other than Congress,
the Constitution may itself provide for specific tax exemptions, 43 or local
governments may pass ordinances on exemption only from local taxes. If it
Political Questions
were the intent of the legislature to grant to the John Hay SEZ the same tax
exemption and incentives given to the Subic SEZ, it would have so
expressly provided in the R.A. No. 7227. This Court no doubt can void an
act or policy of the political departments of the government on either of two
grounds-infringement of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion.
ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO, petitioner, vs. JOSEPH "ERAP"

EJERCITO ESTRADA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 191988. August 31, 2010.]|||
 Private respondent was elected President of the Republic of

the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11,
1998. |||
 He sought the presidency again in the general elections held
on May 10, 2010.
 Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private
respondent's candidacy and filed a petition for
disqualification. However, his petition was denied by the
Second Division of public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). 1 His motion for reconsideration
was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.
 Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari 3 on May 7,
2010. However, under the Rules of Court, the filing of such
petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final
order or resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be
reviewed. 4 Besides, petitioner did not even pray for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent was able
to participate as a candidate for the position of President in
the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second
highest number of votes. |||
ISSUE: W/N the issue of private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada

covered by the ban on the President from "any reelection” is moot and
therefore non-justiciable.
Political Questions
RULING:
Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since
the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be
premised on a person's second (whether immediate or not) election as
President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No
live conflict of legal rights exists. 6 There is in this case no definite, concrete,
real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. 7 No specific relief may conclusively be
decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties
herein. 8 As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the
power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is
sorely lacking in this case.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing

controversies. 9 The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or
abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect
the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. 10 In other words, when
a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. 11
An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or
when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not
entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again
between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the
determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events. 12
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the
proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010
elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that
elections, private respondent was not elected President for the second time.
Thus, any discussion of his "reelection" will simply be hypothetical and
speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
Accordingly, the petition is denied due course and is hereby DISMISSED.

Political Questions
Philippine Associations of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of

Education
[G.R. No. L-5279, 31 October 1995]
FACTS:
Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities assailed the constitutionality of
Act No. 2706, known as the “Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private
schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction.”
PACU contended that the Act is unconstitutional based on the following reasons:
A. It deprives owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents
of liberty and property without due process of law.
B. It deprives parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children for
civic efficiency.
C. Its provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited
power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an
unlawful delegation of legislative power.
The petitioner further contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a
school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous
governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right,
amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to the system of
law and government—referring to Sec. 3 of Act. No. 2706.
The petitioner then questioned statutes on Sec 1 of Act. No. 2706 "conferring on
the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and
standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power."
The association also grieved about the assessment of 1 per cent levied on gross
receipts of all private schools for additional Government expenses in connection
with their supervision and regulation—referring to section 11-A of Act No. 2706 as
amended by Republic Act No. 74.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act. No. 2706 is unconstitutional.
RULING: Act, No. 2706 is constitutional.

As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if,
and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable
controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties
concerned. (16 C. J. S., p. 207.)
The petition fails to constitute a justiciable controversy.

Political Questions
On Sec. 3 of Act. No. 2706--- none of petitioners has cause to present the issue,
because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue
of their permits. And they do not assert that the respondent Secretary of Education
has threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the
terms of the law. Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law" upon the
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Courts do not
sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein
however intellectually solid the problem may be.
On Sec 1 of Act. No. 2706--- petitioners do not show how these standards have
injured any of them or interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no reason exists
for them to assail the validity of the power nor the exercise of the power by the
Secretary of Education. Thus there has been no undue delegation of legislative
power.
On Sec 211-A of Act. No. 2706- insofar as petitioners' action attempts to restrain
the further collection of the assessment, courts have no jurisdiction to restrain the
collection of taxes by injunction, and in so far as they seek to recover fees
already paid the suit, it is one against the State without its consent. According to
the Solicitor General, action involving "the legality of any tax impost or
assessment" falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance.
The Petition for prohibition is denied.

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Constitutional Law 1

Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air.

October 11 – Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf

October 12 – respondent Arroyo resigned as Sec. of the Department of Social

-------petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign ----------------

November 1 – four economic advisers, members of the council of senior economic

November 13 – House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of impeachment

November 20 – SENATE formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner

December 7 – the impeachment trial started

January 16 – by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of

By 12md thousands had assembled at the EDSA shrine.

January 17 – public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella

2:30 pm – petitioner agreed to hold a snap election wherein he would not be a

January 20 - turned out to be the day of surrender

January 22 – Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the

Also passed resolution 176 – “expressing support of the House of Representative

"confrming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of

Issue: WON the cases at bar involved a political question

The case is legal and not political.

Respondents allege that the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration should be

With the Aquino administration the following were observed:

With the Arroyo admin:

1. Government was a result of a peaceful revolution

“… in defiance of the 1973 constitution—cannot be subject of judicial review. “

3. Exercise of the people power revolution which overthrew the whole

Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora

Joseph Ejercito Estrada, President of the Philippines in a verbal directive, ordered

The PETITION was DISMISSED.

(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case;

(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.

Franciso v. House of Representatives

On October 23, 2003 – Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix Funtabella

Petitioner’s argument that

Number 1: it is in violation of article 11, section 3(5) – “impeachment proceeding

RULE V BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT

11th congress: stipulated rules on initiating impeachments pursuant to the

Section 14. Scope of Bar. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against

12th congress: revised such rules to stipulate that no impeachment complaints

Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. Within a period of

Therefore, What is Judicial Review and its requisites?

a) Locus standi of petitioners;

b) Ripeness (prematurity; mootness);

d) Houses exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senates sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

f) Constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of

Salonga v. Pano, 18 Feb 1985

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal

Mootness Rule by Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban's Separate Opinion in

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

WHO MAY EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court

The petitioner transported carabao in a pump boat from

The petitioner argues for the unconstitutionality of EO

Should EO 626-A be declared unconstitutional due to the

Yes. While the protection of the general welfare restrains

The wife is a long-time victim of physical, emotional, and

The RTC granted the Temporary Protection Order (TPO)

Does the Family Court have the authority and jurisdiction

Yes. Family Courts are special courts that are co-equal to

Sps. Mirasol v. Court of Appeals

When PNB asked them to settle their due accounts, they

The RTC ruled in their favour, declaring PD 5792

RULE V  BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT

Therefore,  What is Judicial Review and its requisites?