Republic of the Philippines v.

Manalo
G.R. No. 221029

Facts
Manalo, a Filipina, married a Japanese national here in the Philippines. She later filed
for divorce in Japan, which was granted by their courts. She filed this petition to cancel
the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan. Since she is no longer married,
she wishes to return to her maiden surname.
The RTC denied Manalo’s petition for lack of merit, ruling that the nationality
principle will govern Filipinos living abroad. Art. 26 of the Family Code notes that
since divorce is not recognized in the country, her divorce is not valid.
The CA reversed the decision, stating that the intent of the framers for Art. 26 of the
Family Code allows her to divorce her husband, who, under his country, was no longer
married to her.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied, hence the appeal to the
SC
Issue
Under Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code, should the Court allow a Filipino citizen
the capacity to remarry after initiating divorce proceedings abroad and obtaining
favourable judgment?
Petitioner’s Argument
Par. 2 of Art. 26 states that divorce between a Filipino and a foreigner is only
recognized when it was validly obtained by the alien spouse. This provision should
be interpreted verba legis.
Respondent’s Argument

Held
The petition is denied and the SC partially affirms the CA’s decision. The case is
remanded back to the CA for the respondent to prove the Japanese law on divorce.
Ruling
Yes. Applying verba legis or strict literal interpretation may render the statute
meaningless or create a situation of injustice. Since legislative intent is not always
accurately reflected, the principle intended by the framers should be given utmost
consideration. When the literal interpretation of the statute veers away from the
purpose of the legislature, it should instead be construed according to its spirit.
The purpose of Par. 2 of Art. 26 was to avoid a situation where Filipino who married
a foreigner, after a divorce decree was rendered in a foreign country, would still be
considered married in the Philippines but the alien spouse would be considered
single. Whoever initiated the divorce proceeding is irrelevant—the Filipino spouse
will effectively be without a husband or wife.
The nationality principle is not absolute and Par. 2 of Art. 26 is one such exemption.
Not recognizing Filipino citizens who obtained and initiated foreign divorce has social
consequences.

Chavez v. JBC
G.R. No. 202242

Facts
When CJ Corona left, Francisco Chavez, was nominated to be his successor in the
Judicial and Bar Council. The JBC is a seven-member body tasked with scrutinizing
the appointment of judges and justices. Chavez filed a petition, questioning the
current practice of having 2 members of Congress sitting in the JBC.
The Court granted Chavez’ petition and declared the act unconstitutional, in
accordance with Sec. 8, Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents’ motion for
reconsideration suspended the Courts’ immediately executory decision.
Issue
Under Art. 8, Sec. 8 of the Constitution, should the Court allow the continuation of the
practice of having 2 members of Congress in the JBC?
Petitioner’s Argument
Sec. 8, Art. 8 of the 1987 provided that the JBC only be comprised of 7 members: the
Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor
of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
Respondent’s Argument
They contend that the (1) presence of only 1 representative from Congress is absurd
considering its bicameral nature, and (2) it was a failure of the Framers to make the
proper adjustment for the shift from unicameralism to bicameralism
Held
The respondents’ motion for reconsideration is denied.
Ruling
No. The Court cannot participate in judicial activism, it can only interpret the
Constitution. Rulings based on personal opinion rather than on law is an act in
defiance to the Constitution.
The Court cannot add a new member into the JBC because that would entail remaking
the constitutional provision—a clear violation of its duty to safeguard the
Constitution. Hence, the current eight-member composition of the JBC is
unconstitutional.
ESSENTIAL REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Francisco v. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261

Facts
The House of Representatives adopted a resolution which directed the Committee on
Justice to investigate the disbursement and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Judiciary Development Fund.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and 7 associate
justices on June 2, 2003. The House Committee deliberated on October 13, 2003 that
it was sufficient in form but later, on October 22, 2003, they found it to be lacking on
substance. Hence, the complaint was dismissed.
A second impeachment complaint was then filed on October 23, 2003 by
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella on the alleged results of the investigation.
Issue
Does the Court have the power to exercise judicial review to determine the validity of
the second impeachment complaint?
Petitioner’s Argument
Petitioners file as lawyers and members of the IBP, citizens, taxpayers, and legislators,
point out the unconstitutionality of the second impeachment filed against Davide—it
is a violation of Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution.
Respondent’s Argument
Respondents point out the lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the impeachment
proceedings. Pursuant to Article 11 of the Constitution, it is the sole power, authority,
and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide all cases of
impeachment, including the Davide’s.
Ruling
Yes. According to Sec.1, Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution grants the judicial power and
duty to not just settle controversies but to determine grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction of any branch of the government. Courts
have the duty to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. The mediation to
allocate constitutional boundaries is not an assertion of judicial supremacy but of
Constitutional supremacy. This power is inherent in all courts.
The Court has identified four requisites for judicial review:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have legal standing to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; avfnd
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Actual Case or Controversy

LAMP v. Secretary of Budget and Management
G.R. No. 164987

Facts
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) assail the constitutionality and
legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
as provided for in RA 9206 of the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA OF 2004).
LAMP seeks to issue a TRO against the Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) from releasing budgetary allocations to individual members of
Congress as "pork barrel" funds out of PDAF. LAMP likewise aimed to stop the
National Treasurer and the Commission on Audit (COA) from enforcing the
questioned provision.
The GAA of 2004 allotted P8.3 billion on priority development programs and projects
that are to be released directly to LGUs
Issue
Does the petition fulfil the essential requisite of judicial review of an actual case or
controversy?
Petitioner’s Argument
PDAF does not provide for an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to
individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects nor does it empower
individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and
projects to be funded out of PDAF. They allege that DBM illegally made and directly
released budgetary allocations out of PDAF in favor of individual Members of
Congress—this is contrary to the separation of powers.
Respondent’s Argument
Contend that the petition miserably lacks legal and factual grounds. PDAF should not
be equated to pork barrel. Further, the petition is only based mere speculations from
the media and LAMP failed to present evidence that the DBM Secretary has been
releasing lump sums from PDAF directly or indirectly to individual Members of
Congress.
Ruling
Yes. The case-or-controversy requirement requires ripeness, which has a twofold
aspect: (1) fitness of the issues for judicial decision and (2) hardship to the parties
entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness
is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe
for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it.
The unconstitutionality of PDAF, which involves the misapplication of public funds,
causes injury or hardship to taxpayers. Even allegations of illegal expenditure of
public funds reflects a concrete injury, and the possibility that the injury was
committed cannot be discounted. This is sufficient reason to say that there exists an
actual controversy before the Court.
However, the petition is dismissed for failure to show a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution. The allegations lack substantiation because even if the GAA of
2004 lacks the express provision of allocating PDAF funds to Congress, there was no
convincing proof showing direct releases of the funds.

Ripeness and prematurity, justiciability

Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261

Facts
The House of Representatives adopted a resolution which directed the Committee on
Justice to investigate the disbursement and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Judiciary Development Fund.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and 7 associate
justices on June 2, 2003. The House Committee deliberated on October 13, 2003 that
it was sufficient in form but later, on October 22, 2003, they found it to be lacking on
substance. Hence, the complaint was dismissed.
A second impeachment complaint was then filed on October 23, 2003 by
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella on the alleged results of the investigation.
Issue
Is the case considered ripe and mature, and justiciable?
Petitioner’s Argument
Petitioners file as lawyers and members of the IBP, citizens, taxpayers, and legislators,
point out the unconstitutionality of the second impeachment filed against Davide—it
is a violation of Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution.
Respondent’s Argument
Respondents point out the lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the impeachment
proceedings. Pursuant to Article 11 of the Constitution, it is the sole power, authority,
and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide all cases of
impeachment, including the Davide’s.
Ruling
Yes. For a case to be considered ripe, something should have been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court can come into the picture. Once an act has
been committed, only then may the courts decide on its validity if the act was
challenged in the appropriate legal proceeding. In the present case, the issue is on the
validity of the second impeachment complaint which was filed with the House of
Representatives in accordance with the enforcement of the Impeachment Rules of the
12th Congress. Hence, the case is ripe since the act was committed before the suit was
filed.
Since the goal is to prevent premature adjudication, one where a dispute is insufficiently
developed, any potential injury or stake is too speculative to warrant judicial action. This case is
not premature.

Political questions are those that questions under the Constitution that are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch
of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
It is also a justiciable question since the answer to the validity of the second
impeachment complaint can be found in the Section 3, Article 11 of the 1987
Constitution, where it is considered to be unconstitutional. There are two species of
political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions. Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the
reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the
other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-
justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch
or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.

Locus standi
Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261

Facts
The House of Representatives adopted a resolution which directed the Committee on
Justice to investigate the disbursement and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Judiciary Development Fund.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and 7 associate
justices on June 2, 2003. The House Committee deliberated on October 13, 2003 that
it was sufficient in form but later, on October 22, 2003, they found it to be lacking on
substance. Hence, the complaint was dismissed.
A second impeachment complaint was then filed on October 23, 2003 by
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella on the alleged results of the investigation.
Issue
Does the petitioner have the legal standing to assail the validity of the second
impeachment complaint?
Petitioner’s Argument
Petitioners file as lawyers and members of the IBP, citizens, taxpayers, and legislators,
point out the unconstitutionality of the second impeachment filed against Davide—it
is a violation of Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution.
Respondent’s Argument
Respondents point out the lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the impeachment
proceedings. Pursuant to Article 11 of the Constitution, it is the sole power, authority,
and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide all cases of
impeachment, including the Davide’s.
Ruling
Yes. Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. This is different from pearl party in interest since it merely refers to the
party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.
Locus standi as citizen
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of
a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law
or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person
complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is
lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement
of personal interest.
Locus standi as taxpayer
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds
are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review,
however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained.
Locus standi as legislator
Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. A member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.
Locus standi as association
IBP v. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160343

Facts
12th Congress new Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House
Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001 superseded the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. The new rules consider
impeachment proceedings to be deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such
verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General. On the
other hand, the old rule barred all impeachment proceedings initiated against the
same official more than once within the period of one (1) year.
Issue
Does the petitioner have the legal standing to assail the constitutionality of the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress?
Claim on legal standing
- duty-bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution
Issue
Do they have legal standing – as an association - to sue?
Ruling
No.
 mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more may be
true
o but it does not suffice to constitute legal standing
 because interest is too general
1. shared by other groups and the whole citizenry
But even if they don’t:
 Their petition had advanced constitutional issues which deserve attention, because
of
o Seriousness
o Novelty
o Weight as precedents
It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues
presented by it.

Locus standi as minors

Oposa v. Factoran
G.R. No. 101083
Facts
Oposa, minors who were represented by their parents, sued the Secretary of DENR in
a taxpayers’ class suit. They represent their generation and generations yet unborn,
calling for the cancellation of all existing timber license agreements (TLA) and to
cease and desist from renewing or approving the same. The Philippines’ rainforest
was once comprised roughly 53% of the country’s land mass but the grant of TLAs to
various corporations has resulted in a loss of around 200,000 hectares per annum.
The RTC dismissed the petition which led the plaintiffs to file a civil action for
certiorari.
Issue
Do the petitioners have the legal standing to file for the cancellation, cessation, and
desistance of all Timber License Agreements?
Petitioner’s Argument
Oposa espoused the idea of intergenerational responsibility and justice, where they
have the clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. They maintain that
(1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is
dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.
Respondent’s Argument
Factoran filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely:
(1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the
plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government.
Ruling
Yes. While minors, petitioners represent those of their generation and future
generations to come. The subject of the complaint is of common and general interest
not just to several but to all citizens of the Philippines. The concept of
intergenerational responsibility allows them to sue on behalf of succeeding
generations insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of
nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time,
the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.

Requisites of a class suit

Oposa v. Factoran
G.R. No. 101083
While the respondents did not take issue that the petitioners instituted a class suit,
the court rules it as such. The present case fulfils the requisites of a class suit, where
any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest:
(1) the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest not
just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines;
(2) the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible,
to bring all of them before the court’
(3) the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests may sue or defend for the benefit of all.

Locus standi as marine mammals, inanimate objects, river

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Reyes
G.R. No. 180771

Facts
The respondents referred to as the Resident Marine Mammals (RMM) are the toothed
whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in
and around the Tañon Strait. They are represented by Ramos and Eisma-Osorio as
their Stewards.
The DOE entered into a contract with JAPEX, termed SC-46, for the exploration,
development, and production of petroleum resources in the Tañon Strait. JAPEX
committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the
project. Since Tañon Strait is a protected seascape, JAPEX complied with
environmental laws.
However, the RMM protests the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration
activities in the Tañon Strait, citing that a study made after the seismic survey showed
that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent. This reduced fish catch
was due to the destruction of the payao also known as the fish aggregating device or
artificial reef.
The RMM seeks to prevent the implementation of Service Contract No. 46 for violating
Sec. 2, Article 7 of the Constitution which states that: “The State shall protect the
nations’ marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens…
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according
to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions
to the economic growth and general welfare of the country.”
Issue
Do the petitioners have the legal standing to question the constitutionality of Service
Contract No. 46?
Petitioner’s Argument
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, claim legal standing since they
stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit. The Stewards contend
that there should be no question of their right to represent the RMM as they have
stakes in the case as forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among the affected
residents of Tañon Strait and as stewards of the environment since the primary
steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to protect the environment pursuant
to the public trust doctrine. Petitioners RMM and Stewards also aver that this Court
may lower the benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction.
Respondent’s Argument
The OSG contends that the RMM has no legal standing to file the petition because
Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to be either natural
or juridical persons. They challenge their claim of legal standing on the ground that
they are representing animals, which cannot be parties to an action. Moreover, the
public respondents argue that the Stewards are not the real parties-in-interest for
their failure to show how they stand to be benefited or injured by the decision in this
case.
Ruling
Yes. Locus standi has been given a more liberalized approach in Philippine courts.
Section 5 of The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases permits any Filipino
citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, to file
an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. The rationale for
this rule is based on the principle that humans are stewards of nature.

Earliest Opportunity
Umali v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 131124

Facts
 Umali was appointed Regional Director of the BIR by Fidel Ramos.
 Ramos later received a confidential memorandum
o contained alleged violations by petitioner of internal revenue laws,
rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director,
 such as malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.
 Ramos authorized the RD’s preventive suspension and referred the complaint
to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for
investigation.
 Upon PCAGC’s recommendation, Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152
dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all
benefits under the law.
 Umali’s motion for reconsideration was denied so he filed a case with the RTC
but the RTC dismissed the petition.
 He fled a motion for reconsideration, this time theorizing the PCAGC as an
unconstitutional office without jurisdiction to conduct the investigation
against him. The RTC reversed its decision.
  The respondents the appealed to the CA who reversed the RTC’s decision, and
Umali’s motion for reconsideration was again denied. Hence, the petition to
the SC.
Issue
Can the petitioner raise the issue of constitutionality of the Presidential Commission
on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of
the trial court’s decision?
Ruling
No. The issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC was only posed by petitioner in his
motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly
too late to raise for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings below.
However, the petition was granted and Administrative Order No. 152 is considered
LIFTED, allowing petitioner to retire with full benefits. This is because the
Commissioner of the BIR sent a letter to the Solicitor General informing the latter that
"the Bureau of Internal Revenue is no longer interested in pursuing the case against
Atty. Osmundo Umali" on the basis of the comment and recommendation submitted
by the Legal Department of the BIR.

Exception to earliest opportunity

 Criminal cases
o the question can be raised at any time at the discretion of the
court;
 Civil cases
o the question can be raised at any stage of the proceedings if
necessary for the determination of the case itself;
 in every case, except when there is estoppel
o it can be raised at any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the
court

Lis mota
Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261

Facts
The House of Representatives adopted a resolution which directed the Committee on
Justice to investigate the disbursement and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Judiciary Development Fund.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and 7 associate
justices on June 2, 2003. The House Committee deliberated on October 13, 2003 that
it was sufficient in form but later, on October 22, 2003, they found it to be lacking on
substance. Hence, the complaint was dismissed.
A second impeachment complaint was then filed on October 23, 2003 by
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella on the alleged results of the investigation.
12th Congress new Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House
Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001 superseded the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. The new rules consider
impeachment proceedings to be deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such
verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General. On the
other hand, the old rule barred all impeachment proceedings initiated against the
same official more than once within the period of one (1) year.
Issue
Does unconstitutionality of Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules adopted by the 12th Congress constitute the lis mota of the case?
Petitioner’s Argument
Petitioners file as lawyers and members of the IBP, citizens, taxpayers, and legislators,
point out the unconstitutionality of the second impeachment filed against Davide—it
is a violation of Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution.
Respondent’s Argument
Respondents point out the lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the impeachment
proceedings. Pursuant to Article 11 of the Constitution, it is the sole power, authority,
and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide all cases of
impeachment, including the Davide’s.
Ruling
Yes. An issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided
whenever possible unless the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to
the decision of the case itself. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality
unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
The Court holds that the resolution of the constitutionality of Sections 15 and 16 of
Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress constitute the
very lis mota of the instant controversy because its resolution will determine
whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution.
The Court thus finds Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on
November 28, 2001 to be unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint filed against Davide is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of
the Constitution.