Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc v Robredo

Facts

 The members of petitioners Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and Corazon de Jesus
Homeowners’ Association as well as the individual petitioners were/are occupying parcels of land owned
by and located in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon (collectively, the LGUs).
 These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a) and (b) of
RA 7279 in order to give way to the implementation and construction of infrastructure projects in the
areas illegally occupied by the petitioners.
 Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions and demolitions without any court order when:
persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; and
persons or entities occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available funding are
about to be implemented.
The Petition

Petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the Court, seeking to compel the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government, et al. (the public respondents) to first secure an eviction and/or
demolition order from the court prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.
The petitioners justify their direct recourse before this Court by

1. generally averring that they have no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
2. respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279
which are patently unconstitutional.
3. They are injured by the respondents’ threats of evictions and demolitions.
4. transcendental public importance of the issues raised in this case clothes them with legal standing.
5. The petitioners argue that Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 offend their constitutional right to due
process because they warrant evictions and demolitions without any court order
 They point out that Section 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits the
impairment of liberty of abode unless there is a court order.
 Moreover, Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 violate their right to adequate housing, a
universal right recognized in Article 25 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
Section 2 (a) of RA 7279.
 The petitioners further complain that the respondents had previously conducted evictions
and demolitions in a violent manner, contrary to Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987
Constitution

The Respondents’ Case

Mayor of Navotas, Mayor of San Juan, Mayor of Quezon and Secretary of Interior and Local
Government and the General Manager of the National Housing Authority

1. the petitioners ignored the hierarchy of courts when they directly filed a Rule 65 petition before the
Court (SC)
 2. petitioners incorrectly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition and mandamus in assailing the
constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279; petition is procedurally infirm and that the
liberty of abode is not illimitable and does not include the right to encroach upon other person
properties.
3. the petitioners failed to particularly state the grave abuse of discretion that the Mayor of Navotas
allegedly committed.
4. the petition does not present any justiciable controversy since the City of Navotas had already
successfully evicted the petitioners in San Roque, Navotas on November 28, 2011.
a) Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution allows evictions and demolitions to be
conducted even without a court order provided they are done in accordance with the
law and in a just and humane manner. RA 7279 is precisely the law referred to by
Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution.
b) The Mayor also disputes the petitioners’ claim that RA 7279 does not afford the informal
settlers procedural due process prior to evictions and demolitions.
 They argued that they were faithful implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of
RA 7279, which are presumed to be constitutional, cannot be equated to grave
abuse of discretion.

Issues
(1) Whether the petition should be dismissed for serious procedural defects; and
(a) Whether the petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts;
(b) Whether the petitioners correctly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition and mandamus;
(2) Whether Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 are violative of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution (relevant to the topic)
- Can the court judicial review?

The Court’s Ruling

The Court DISMISS the petition for its serious procedural defects

1. The petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts when they directly filed the petition
before the Court.

2. The petitioners wrongly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition and mandamus.

3. The resolution of the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 is not the lis mota of
the case.

The petition assails the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279, the petition failed to show the
essential requisites that would warrant the Court’s exercise of judicial review. It is a rule firmly entrenched in
our jurisprudence that the courts will not determine the constitutionality of a law unless the requisites are
present.

 this case no longer presents a justiciable controversy with

respect to the Mayors of Navotas and San Juan
 1. What further constrains this Court from touching on the issue of constitutionality is the fact that this
issue is not the lis mota of this case.
 Lis mota literally means “the cause of the suit or action”; it is rooted in the
principle of separation of powers and is thus merely an offshoot of the
presumption of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of our co-
equal branches of the government.
 This means that the petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has
the burden of showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless the
disposition of the constitutional question that he raised is unavoidable. If there
is some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course
will be adopted and the question of constitutionality should be avoided. Thus, to
justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.

2. The petitions failed to compellingly show the necessity of examining the constitutionality of
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution.

In Magkalas v. NHA, this Court had already ruled on the validity of evictions and demolitions without any
court order. In that case, we affirmed the validity of Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1472 which
authorizes the NHA to summarily eject all informal settlers’ colonies on government resettlement projects as
well as any illegal occupant in any homelot, apartment or dwelling unit owned or administered by the NHA.
In that case, we held that Caridad Magkalas’ illegal possession of the property should not hinder the NHA’s
development of Bagong Barrio Urban Bliss Project.

The court noted that Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that urban or rural poor
dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and
humane manner. Paragraph 1, Section 28 of RA 7279 allows summary evictions and demolition in cases
where persons or entities occupy danger areas and when persons or entities occupy areas where government
infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented.

 To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a just and humane manner, paragraph 2,
Section 28 of RA 7279
 This Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council carry out the provision.
- In short, stare decisis on the case at bar provides that Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 are
constitutional; eviction and demolition are exercise of their constitutional rights provided that it is
conducted in a just and humane manner
3. The petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations that the public respondents gravely abused
their discretion in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. Instead, they merely
imputed jurisdictional abuse to the public respondents through general averments in their pleading,
but without any basis to support their claim.
 To justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally the domain of the executive
department, the petitioners must establish facts that are necessarily linked to the
 jurisdictional problem they presented in this case, i.e., whether the public respondents
exercised their power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.

Republic v N. Dela Merced & Sons, Inc.

The Facts
 The Guadalupe Commercial Complex is a commercial building owned and operated by Dela Merced
& Sons. Situated alongside the Pasig River, the complex operates a wet market and houses eateries or
kitchenettes in the same building.
 On 13 July 2006, the Environmental Management Bureau-National Capital Region (EMB-NCR) of
the DENR inspected the Guadalupe Commercial Complex. The inspection team found that Dela
Merced & Sons had violated the following:
1. Section 1 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2004-26 for operating air pollution source installations
(generator set) without a permit to operate; and
2. Section 27(i) of R.A. 9275 for operating a facility that discharged regulated water pollutants without a
discharge permit.
 Thus, the EMB-NCR served a notice of violation (NOV) upon Dela Merced & Sons, ordering the
latter to comply with the requirements. Dela Merced & Sons requested and was granted an extension
of time to comply with the NOV requirements.
 The EMB-NCR conducted another inspection of the building to check its compliance with R.A.
8749 (The Clean Air Act of 1999) and R.A. 9275, as well as their respective Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRRs)
 the sample failed to conform to the DENR Effluent Standards.
 Consequently, on 6 February 2007, the DENR Secretary, upon the recommendation of the EMB-
NCR, issued a cease and desist order
 execute the CDO by sealing the kitchen sinks of the locators identified as sources of wastewater
 On 9 August 2007, the EMB-DENR issued a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) to Dela Merced &
Sons pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1586 (Philippine Environmental Impact Statement
System).
 By 14 November 2007, another inspection was conducted but now effluent conformed to the
DENR Effluent Standards.
 Held a discussion of the imposition of fines during the period of violation of R.A. 9275
 Dela Merced & Sons prayed that the fine be discarded for being imposed without due process of law.
It argued that the fine was violative of Sections 1 and 19(1), Article III of the Constitution (Bill of
Rights). It also contended that the period from the issuance of the TLO (3 July 2007) up to the date
it had complied with the requirements (13 November 2007) should not be included in the
computation. (very important fact related to the topic)

Petition Before This Court

The DENR-PAB filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court on 5 June 2012/. The petition is
contesting the downgraded fine imposed by the CA on Dela Merced & Sons. In turn, the latter party filed its
own Petition for Review on Certiorari
 petition is questioning the fine imposed upon it and is contesting the constitutionality of the
provision on the imposition of the fine.
Issues
1. Whether Dela Merced & Sons was denied due process.
2. Whether the issuance of a CNC means exemption from compliance with R.A. 9275.
3.Whether Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 on the imposition of fines is unconstitutional under Section 19(1), Article III
of the Constitution for being excessive.
4. Whether the amount of the fine imposed was correct, assuming that its imposition was proper.
Our Ruling (points 3 and 4 are the only relevant but i included other points para makasagang ta)

We deny Dela Merced & Sons' petition, but grant that of the DENR-PAB.
 The Ruling of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to
the amount of fine imposed.
1. Respondents were Not Denied Due Process
SC quotes CA on this matter:
The opportunity to be heard was made completely available to petitioner, Dela Merced & Sons who
participated in all stages of the administrative proceeding before the DENR-PAB. The respondent [PAB]
after issuing the notice of violation and possible imposition of fines to the petitioner, gave it time to comply
with the requirements of the environmental laws

Subsequent inspection of the facility showed that the petitioner still failed to comply with the DENR effluent
standards despite the extension given by respondent. Thus, the respondent was compelled to issue a cease
and desist order.

Whatever procedural defect there may have been in the subject proceedings was cured when Dela Merced & Sons moved for
reconsideration.

2. No Exemption from Compliance with Environmental Laws, Even if Issued a CNC

 Dela Merced & Sons contends that it was exempt from complying with the environmental
requirements of R.A. 9275 because it was issued a CNC.
 The CNC only exempts Dela Merced & Sons from securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate. It does not exempt it from complying with other environmental laws. Section 5 of P.D.
1586 is clear on this matter:
Based on the law, environmentally non-critical projects such as the Guadalupe Commercial Complex
are still expected to provide additional environmental safeguards as deemed necessary. Hence, Dela
Merced & Sons is still bound to abide by environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act, even if it
possesses a CNC.
3. (Relevant to the topic) The Constitutionality of Section 28 of R.A. 9275 Was Not Properly
Questioned
Another main contention of Dela Merced & Sons is that Section 28 of R.A. 9275 violates Section 19 (1),
Article III of the Constitution, because the former section provides for the imposition of excessive fines.

 the attempt to assail the constitutionality constitutes a collateral attack

 issues of constitutionality must be pleaded directly

Even if the issue of constitutionality was properly presented, Dela Merced & Sons still failed to
satisfy the fourth requisite for this Court to undertake a judicial review.
 the issue of constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 is not the lis mota of this case.
The lis mota requirement means that the petitioner who questions the constitutionality of a law must
show that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question is
unavoidable. Consequently, if there is some other ground (i.e. a statute or law) upon which the court
may rest its judgment, that course should be adopted and the question of constitutionality avoided.
In this case, Dela Merced & Sons failed to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the
constitutional issue it has raised is resolved. Hence, the presumption of constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A.
9275 stands.
4. The Fine Imposed Is Not Excessive Under the Constitution
a) Even if the court were to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 despite the procedural
lapses, Dela Merced & Sons' petition would still be denied.
 The constitutional prohibition on the imposition of excessive fines applies only to criminal
prosecutions. In contrast, this case involves an administrative proceeding and, contrary to the
supposition of Dela Merced & Sons, the fine imposed is not a criminal penalty. Hence, the
proscription under Article III, Section 19 is inapplicable to this case.
 Even if the Bill of Rights were applicable, the fines under R.A. 9275 still cannot be
classified as excessive.

 In questioning the constitutionality of the fine, Dela Merced & Sons merely alleges that the amount is
"exorbitant” and "too excessive as to cause grave impact on the business operations, the very survival
of petitioner as a business entity and its employees as a whole."
 unsubstantiated allegations are not enough to strike down the fine as unconstitutional
for being excessive.
b) Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 cannot be declared unconstitutional simply because the fine imposed may cause grave
impact on Dela Merced & Sons' business operations.
 the possibility that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional.

c) the basis for the amount of fine imposed by the PAB and the CA (i.e. P10,000 per day of violation) is the
minimum imposable amount under the law. Since penalties are prescribed by statute, their formulation is
essentially and exclusively legislative.
 Having no authority to modify the penalties already prescribed, the courts can only interpret
and apply them.

U.S. v. Borromeo:

"the fixing of penalties for the violation of statutes is primarily a legislative function, and the courts hesitate to
interfere, unless the fine provided for is so far excessive as to shock the sense of mankind."

During the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2115 (which was the origin of R.A. 9275), one of the senators
made the following statement:
The lack of usable, clean water resources is a problem that confronts us today. This is the reason, Mr.
President, this committee thought of submitting this measure as our humble contribution in finding alternative
solutions. This bill is not lacking in incentives and rewards and it has muscle to penalize acts that further
pollute all our water sources as well. We increased the fines so that with strict implementation, we can curb the
damage we continue to inflict, ironically, to our life source.

Clearly, the legislature saw the need to protect and conserve our water resources. To this end, it
formulated rules with concomitant penalties to ensure compliance with the law. We will not interfere
with its wisdom in drafting the law, especially since the presumption of its constitutionality has not
been overturned.

Laude v Ginez-Jabalde
Facts
  On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude (Jennifer) was killed in Olongapo City
allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton
 Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer's sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton
before the Olongapo City Office of the City Prosecutor. Pemberton was detained in Camp
Aguinaldo, the general headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
 On the same day, Marilou S. Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of
the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to
Allow Media Coverage.
 On December 23, 2014, Judge Ginez-Jabalde denied petitioners' Urgent Motion for lack of
merit
 Petitioners argued that Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount
to an excess or absence of jurisdiction when she dismissed the Urgent Motion to Compel the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail
based on mere technicalities.
 Petitioners advance that Philippine authorities ought to "have primary jurisdiction over
Respondent Pemberton's person while he is being tried in a Philippine Court" in accordance
with Article V, paragraph (3)(b) of the Visiting Forces Agreement:
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules
shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction
over all offenses committed by United States personnel . . .

Petitioner’s Arguments (1 is relevant)

1. Petitioners argue that the custody of Pemberton must be ordered transferred to the Olongapo
City Jail, considering that the crime involved is murder, which is non-bailable.

"undermines the Constitutional Powers of [the Court] to hear a jurisdictional matter brought before
it" and to promulgate rules for the practice of law.

even though the Visiting Forces Agreement gives the United States the "sole discretion" to decide
whether to surrender custody of an accused American military personnel to the Philippine
authorities, "the Court still has control over any proceeding involving a jurisdictional matter brought
before it, even if it may well involve the country's relations with another foreign power."
2. Petitioners argue that the Public Prosecutor's refusal to sign the Urgent Motion to Compel the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail
rendered the requirement for conformity superfluous and quoted Justice Secretary Leila De Lima:
Pemberton should be under the custody of Philippine authorities, following the filing of
charges.
 in cases of extraordinary circumstances, the Philippine government can insist on
the custody
3. Petitioners pray in this Petition that procedural requirements be set aside.

Respondent’s Arguments (1 and 2 are relevant)

 1. Pemberton further argues that the custody over him "rightfully remained with the [United
States authorities"
Section 6 of the Visiting Forces Agreement:
"custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise
jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military authorities, if they so
request, from the commission of the offense, until completion of all judicial
proceedings."
2. As for the issue of custody under the Visiting Forces Agreement, Pemberton argues that
there is a difference between "jurisdiction" and "custody."
jurisdiction is "the power and authority of a court to try, hear and decide a case."
 Pemberton does not dispute that "Philippine authorities have the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed by a United States personnel
 the case is being tried a Philippine court.
custody "pertains to actual physical control over the person of the accused and under the
Visiting Forces Agreement
 Pemberton argues that custody shall reside with the United States Military authorities,
since the Visiting Forces Agreement expressly provides that "the custody of any United
States personnel . . . shall immediately reside with United States military authorities . . .
from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings."
3. Judge Ginez-Jabalde did not commit grave abuse of discretion when she denied the Urgent
Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to
the Olongapo City Jail.
 Marilou S. Laude, being only the private complainant, lacks the legal personality to file
the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender
Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration "without the conformity of the Public Prosecutor
Issue
1. Whether the jurisdiction and custody of respondent a challenge to the constitutionality
when it is in accordance with VFA
2. WON the constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement is the lis mota of this
Petition
Decision
The Court dismiss the Petition.
I. Petition failed to comply with notice requirement. Failure to comply with this notice
requirement renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party's
right to procedural due process.
II. The obligation contemplated by Article 2, paragraph (3) is for the State Party to establish
a system of accessible and effective remedies through judicial and administrative
mechanisms. Marilou S. Laude, as a private complainant, indicates that there is a legal
system of redress for violated rights. That petitioners chose to act on their own, in total
disregard of the mechanism for criminal proceedings established by this court, should
not be tolerated under the guise of a claim to justice. The accused also enjoys the
protection of these rights.
 III. Procedural law basically mandates that "all criminal actions commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control
of a public prosecutor." The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case
and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in
the CA or in this Court.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the
criminal case since the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal
aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause.
IV (relevant part) Petitioners argue that the Visiting Forces Agreement should be declared
"unconstitutional insofar as it impairs the . . . power of the Supreme Court[.]"
 Declare the VFA unconstitutional insofar as it impairs the constitutional power
of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for practice before it, including the
Rules of Criminal Procedure
The constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement is not the lis mota of this Petition.
 Petitioners started their Petition with a claim that their right to access to justice was violated,
but ended it with a prayer for a declaration of the Visiting Forces Agreement's
unconstitutionality.
 attempted to create the connection between the two by asserting that the Visiting Forces
Agreement prevents the transfer of Pemberton to Olongapo City Jail, which allegedly is
tantamount to the impairment of this court's authority.
Why is the constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement not the lis mota of this
Petition?
1) this Petition is not the proper venue to rule on the issue of whether the Visiting Forces
Agreement transgresses the judicial authority of this court to promulgate rules pertaining to
criminal cases
2) the issues of criminal jurisdiction and custody during trial as contained in the Visiting Forces
Agreement were discussed in Nicolas v. Secretary Romulo, et al:
The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of
international law to abide by its terms and provisions.
The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the members of the US Armed Forces in
the Philippines, the Article V of Criminal Jurisdiction rules apply:
1. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction
shall immediately reside with United States military authorities, if they so request, from the
commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings.
2. United States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and
without delay, make such personnel available to those authorities in time for any investigative or
judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been charged
3. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the United States shall
be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph.
Petitioners contend that these undertakings violate another provision of the Constitution:
a. The exclusive power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure for all courts in the
Philippines (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5])
  The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one's
territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon.
 The principle is the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the
sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.

b. To allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a

different rule of procedure for that accused; violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution (Art. Ill, Sec. 1)

 The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a
different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our
territory and all other accused.
The situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or
violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered around the world, the laws of one State do not
extend or apply — except to the extent agreed upon — to subjects of another State due to the recognition of
extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.

Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some
aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads
of State, diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another
State's territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).

However, in the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that the moment the accused has to be
detained, e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs is Article V of Criminal Jurisdiction of the
VFA:
 Sec. 10 states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed
on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be "by
Philippine authorities."
In any case, Pemberton is confined, while undergoing trial, in Camp Aguinaldo, which by
petitioners' own description is the "General Head Quarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
"Their claim that the detention facility is under the "control, supervision and jurisdiction of
American military authorities" is not substantiated.