4. ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 178512; November 26, 2014

Facts: December 24, 1997, at about 10pm, Alexander Flojo fetching water below his rented house in Mandaluyong
City when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman, the brother of his land lady, Lucila Bautista, hit him on the nape.
Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying, "Pasensya ka
na Mang Alex" and told the latter to just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two
hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While
pouring water into a container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left face
and chest. Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left portion of his body and
begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino immediately loaded Alexander into
his motorcycle and brought him to the Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors
immediately rendered medical assistance to Alexander. Then, he was confined in the hospital for two days.
Alexander sustained two stabbed wounds. One of which was on the zygoma, left side, and about one (1) cm. long.
The other is on his upper left chest which penetrated the fourth intercostal space at the proximal clavicular line
measuring about two (2) cm. The second stabbed wound penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung of the victim
which resulted to blood air in the thoracic cavity thus necessitating the insertion of a thoracostomy tube to remove
the blood. According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the physician who treated the victim at the Mandaluyong City
Medical Center, the second wound was fatal and could have caused Alexander’s death without timely medical
intervention.

Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on December 25,1997 at around midnight, he passed
by Alexander who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At that point, he accidentally hit Alexander’s back, causing the
latter to throw invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fist fight ensued between them. They even
rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander on the cheek causing blood to ooze from the latter’s face.

RTC found Alfredo beyond reasonable doubt guilty of Frustrated Homicide. On appeal, the petitioner contended that
intent to kill, the critical element of the crime charged, was not established; that the injuries sustained by
Alexander were mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger during the fist fight between them; that he did not
inflict the stab wounds, insisting that another person could have inflicted such wounds; and that he had caused
only slight physical injuries on Alexander, for which he should be accordingly found guilty. CA affirmed the RTC.

Issue: WON Alfredo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

Held: Yes, he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill the victim
immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned
by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the
assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People, we considered the following factors to determine the
presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of
wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing
of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused.

Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present. We concur with them. Contrary
to the petitioner’s submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of
anger or as the result of a fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault on
Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his
upper left chest and the other on the left side of his face. The petitioner’s attack was unprovoked with the knife
used therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his submission, and firmly proving the presence of intent to kill.
There is also to be no doubt about the wound on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to result into his death were it
not for the timely medical intervention.

Thus, the petitioner already performed all the acts of execution that should produce the felony of homicide as a
consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical attention
accorded to Alexander, he was properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on September 27, 2006 finding petitioner Alfredo De
Guzman, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four years of prision correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision
mayor, as the maximum; ORDERS the petitioner to pay to Alexander Flojo civil indemnity of ₱30,000.00; moral
damages of ₱30,000.00; and compensatory damages of Pl4,170.35, plus interest of 6% per annum on all such
awards from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
 21. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO LAPORE
G.R. No. 191197; June 22, 2015

Facts: For the prosecution: The victim, AAA, is thirteen (13) years old and illiterate. She lives with her parents in
Municipality of Quezon, Palawan. On 1 October 1998, when AAA’s parents went to Puerto Princesa City, AAA was
left at their house with her older brother, two (2) younger siblings, and accused-appellant Lapore who was staying
at their house as a guest. Lapore was a pastor in their church. One evening, AAA’s older brother left the house to
go fishing while AAA was asleep. Lapore went inside AAA’s room and removed AAA’s panty. Lapore then removed
his underwear and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA cried. When she tried to shout, Lapore pointed a knife at
her neck and threatened to kill her. With his penis still insider her vagina, Lapore made push and pull movements
and then left. On 20 October 1998, when AAA’s parents returned home, AAA reported her ordeal to her parents.
When AAA’s parents confronted Lapore, Lapore admitted to the rape and promised to marry AAA. After the
confrontation, Lapore left. Three (3) months passed. Lapore failed to return. Thus, AAA and her mother reported
the incident to the Barangay Chairman and to the police. AAA was brought to Dr. Josieveline M. Abiog-Damalerio,
the Municipal Health Officer of Quezon, Palawan, for medical examination. On 23 December 1998, AAA filed the
instant criminal complaint for the crime of rape against Lapore.

For the defense: Lapore first knew AAA in April 1999 when he began helping AAA’s family by doing apostolic work
for them for six (6) months. In the evening of one Sunday, while the mother, BBB, was having a drink with the
locals, AAA approached Lapore. They talked for several hours. After the conversation, AAA offered herself to Lapore
in marriage but he advised AAA to instead pray. Since then, AAA offered herself to Lapore for marriage for two (2)
more occasions. On the first two attempts, Lapore pitied AAA. However, on her third attempt, Lapore finally
accepted AAA’s proposal but told her that they had to wait until AAA gives birth as she was four (4) months
pregnant then. Lapore spoke to AAA’s parents regarding their plan to marry, but the marriage did not pursue
because AAA filed a criminal case accusing Lapore of rape.

RTC found La pore guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
death, in view of the presence of the special aggravating circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon and the
generic aggravating circumstance of the abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness. CA modified RTC ruling: to
justify the imposition of death penalty, the two qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must concur
as provided in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and must be alleged in the information and duly proven
during the trial by the quantum of proof required for conviction".16 Thus, there being no modifying circumstances to
be appreciated, the Court of Appeals ruled that the crime committed is only simple rape, punishable by reclusion
perpetua.

Issue: WON the circumstances which qualify the act of rape and the aggravating circumstances be appreciated in
this case

Held: No. Although the prosecution has duly proved the presence of abuse of confidence and obvious
ungratefulness, minority, and use of a deadly weapon, they may not be appreciated to qualify the crime from
simple rape to qualified rape. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provide that for
qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be appreciated, it must be alleged in the complaint or
information. This is in line with the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Even if the prosecution has duly proven the presence of the circumstances, the Court
cannot appreciate the same if they were not alleged in the Information. Hence, although the prosecution has duly
established the presence of the aforesaid circumstances, which, however, were not alleged in the Information, this
Court cannot appreciate the same. Notably, these circumstances are not among those which qualify a crime from
simple rape to qualified rape as defined under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Thus even if
duly alleged and proven, the crime would still be simple rape.

Therefore, as all the elements necessary to sustain a conviction for simple rape are present: (1) that Lapore had
carnal knowledge of AAA; and (2) that said act was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation, we find
Lapore guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12 October 2009 in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 02771, entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Rodrigo Lapore alias ‘Diging’" finding accused-appellant Rodrigo Lapore GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
 33. COVERDALE ABARQUEZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 150762 JANUARY 20, 2006

Facts: Abarquez is charged with two felonies: 1) for Homicide, for conspiring with Alberto Almojuela and killing one
Ricardo Quejong, and 2) for Attempted Homicide, for conspiring with Almojuela and attempting to kill Jose Buenjijo
Paz.

On 21 November 1993 at 2:00 p.m., Paz, Quejong and their friends were in the house of one Boyet at Sta. Mesa,
Manila, drinking liquor in celebration of the birthday of Boyet’s son. About 7:45 p.m., Paz and Quejong decided to
go home. Boyet Tong, Abarquez’s son Bardie, and Masula joined Paz and Quejong. About six or seven meters away
from Boyet’s house, Alberto Almojuela, a certain Ising and Abarquez Dale, were likewise drinking liquor in front of
Almojuela’s house. As the group of Paz was passing towards the main road, Almojuela and his companions blocked
their path. Almojuela asked Paz, "Are you brave?" Paz replied, "Why?" Almojuela got angry and attacked Paz with a
knife. Paz parried the attack with his left arm but sustained an injury. Abarquez held Paz on both shoulders while
Bardie pacified Almojuela. Paz asked Abarquez, "What is our atraso, we were going home, why did you block our
way?" Abarquez answered, "Masyado kang matapang. Tumigil ka na, tumigil ka na." Almojuela then confronted
Quejong and they had an altercation, followed by a scuffle. Paz tried to get away from Abarquez who continued
restraining him. Upon seeing Almojuela and Quejong fall on the ground, Paz struggled to free himself from
Abarquez. Paz approached Quejong and found him already bloodied. It turned out the Almojuela stabbed Quejong
with a knife. Paz left Quejong and ran instead towards the exit of San Jose St. to ask for help. While Paz was
running away, he heard Abarquez shout, "You left your companion already wounded!" When Paz and his
companions returned, they found Quejong still on the ground. Almojuela and Abarquez were still in the area. Paz
and his companions brought Quejong to the UST Hospital. Paz then had his injury treated by Dr. Vic Managuelod at
Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital. The medico-legal certificate showed that Paz sustained a 3-cm. lacerated wound on
his left forearm. Later, Abarquez would voluntarily appear at WPD police station. Almojuela voluntarily surrendered
to Police Station No. 10 and was turned over to the WPD Homicide Division.

RTC only found Abarquez guilty as an accomplice in the crime of homicide. The trial court held that the prosecution
failed to prove that Abarquez was a co-conspirator of Almojuela in the killing of Quejong. However, the trial court
ruled that Abarquez, in holding and restraining Paz, prevented the latter from helping Quejong and allowed
Almojuela to pursue his criminal act without resistance – an accomplice. CA affirmed RTC. Abarquez alleges that
the prosecution’s evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support his conviction
as an accomplice.

Issue: WON Abarquez is an accomplice

Held: No, he is not. Article 18, RPC defines accomplices as "those persons who, not being included in Article 17,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.” It has the following elements: (1)
community of design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that
are not indispensable to the commission of the crime. To be deemed an accomplice, one needs to have had both
knowledge of and participation in the criminal act. In other words, the principal and the accomplice must have
acted in conjunction and directed their efforts to the same end. Thus, it is essential that both were united in their
criminal design.

Paz’s testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuela’s criminal design. "Tumigil" literally means
"stop." Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fray, not from helping Quejong. Paz interpreted
Abarquez’s action as an attempt to prevent him from helping Quejong. Yet, in his testimony, Paz admitted that
while restraining him, Abarquez was scolding or reprimanding him and telling him to stop. Abarquez’s act of trying
to stop Paz does not translate to assistance to Almojuela. Moreover, the prosecution argues that Abarquez was
remiss in his duties as a barangay kagawad in not extending assistance to the then wounded Quejong. This,
however, does not necessarily show concurrence in Almojuela’s criminal act. When Paz ran away, Abarquez
shouted at him that he left his wounded companion. Apparently, Abarquez was not aware of the extent of
Quejong’s injury and he expected Paz to look after his own companion.

When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt should be resolved in his favor. We apply in this case the
equipoise rule. Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in issue or there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 23 June 2000 Decision and 7 November 2001 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450, which affirmed the 30 September 1997 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56. We ACQUIT Coverdale Abarquez y
Evangelista as an accomplice in the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055. No pronouncement as to
costs.