Q1:

Mahoney will succeed in his defense against Geis for entering his property.

Under Code § 10, a person may not: search for or gather any plants or fungi upon privately
owned land without having the consent of the landowner. To hold Mahoney liable in a common
law jurisdiction, Geis must prove that Mahoney acted intentionally, unless there is some strong
reason to believe that this is a strict liability crime. In this case, each element of the statue is not
satisfied, and Geis’s claim will not succeed.

Since this is a common law jurisdiction, we construe the statue according to its plain meaning.
The statue does not define the required state of mind as to the conduct. Usually, the Plaintiff here
must prove the Defendant acted intentionally unless there is some strong reason to believe that
this is a strict liability crime, which there is not. Since the statue requires only intent to do the
conduct, this is a general intent crime. The common-law standard of general intent focuses only
on the conduct element of a statue, not circumstantial or result element. Since Mahoney
inadvertently wandered onto the adjacent, unmarked private property of Geis, we can argue that
he did not intentionally act in the way proscribed by statue, and he is not guilty of the offense.
We can argue a mistake of fact defense. A mistake-of-fact defense to a general-intent crime
requires that the mistake be both honest and reasonable. Reasonableness is assessed by an
objective standard. A reasonable person would not have taken additional steps to confirm that the
area was effectively private given there was no sign that would indicate to such that an ordinary
person can anticipate whether certain acts would or would not violate the statute. Mahoney had a
honest belief that he was not on private land because there was no at the time constitutes a valid
defense. Also, since he did not flee when the authorities arrived and was still present indicates
that Mahoney was not aware, he committed any crime and honestly believed he was not on
private property. Given this, he has an affirmative defense and it is unlikely the Plaintiff can
prove that he acted intentionally.

Q2

The statue here contains an explicit mens rea term “knowingly.” In analyzing the grammatical
structure of the statue the term could be held to apply to every other material element of the
statue. The knowingly applies to “transfers,” “possesses,” “uses,” “without lawful authority,” and
“a means of identification of another person.” If we are just apply knowingly to the just the
following verb then it would be against the underlying social policy. The X-Citement Video
approach as the most correct interpretation of legislative intent. We can principally carry the
culpability term throughout the statue like in the X-Citement Video. The Court applies
knowingly to entire statute in order to avoid implicating innocent actors and required the state
must show actor knew the age of the minor in the video. The innocent Actor Concern (Mistake of
Fact) is present in our case as well. Removing the mens rea requirement might criminalize
people who are truly innocently and accidentally possess an identification of another. In an
example where someone has dropped a fake license is another vehicle, an innocent actor like the
owner of a vehicle may be criminalized for possessing the license, while not knowingly.
However, we can analyze the policy argument from Jones that Judge Wilkinson decided that
“knowingly” modifies only “transports.” The defendant’s interpretation would strip the statute of
its clear purpose: the protection of minors. People would just lie about their knowledge of the
minor’s age. However, the most correct interpretation of legislative intent would be to apply
“knowingly” to every element of the statue. If are just to apply knowingly to transfer, it would
not make sense to “use” a means of identification of another person without knowingly using it.
This statue cannot be fairly characterized as describing a “public welfare” offense because it
does not prohibit conduct cause harm to a broad range of people but rather to a single person. We
can contrast this to Dotterweich where Court did not require a mens rea to be proven at trial,
namely, public welfare offenses that are designed to protect the public at large. Congress had
chosen to put the blame on people who were violating the laws because the public at large has
little opportunity to inform itself of conditions that could be dangerous. The prosecution that
Dotterweich was subjected to comes from legislation that doesn’t require for there to be
awareness of some wrongdoing in order for someone to be guilty of a crime. There is also a risk
of criminalizing a broad range of apparently innocent conduct. In Staples, the court ruled that
absent a clear statement from Congress that there is no mens rea requirement, federal felony
statutes should not be interpreted to eliminate the mens rea element. We’re worried about
innocent actors. People might not know that the activity is regulated. They’re not necessarily on
notice that the activity is regulated based on the nature of the activity. Similarly, Staples didn’t
necessarily know that the gun was regulated based on the nature of the gun. In contrast,
Dotterweich knew that his activity was highly regulated. This is not a public welfare offense.
Possession of a fake identification with a random license number does not endanger the public at
large. A felony carrying a 2-year prison sentence is harsh. This factor weighs against the crime as
a “public welfare” offense. The court shouls interpret the statue to require that the defendant
have knowledge of the circumstantial or legal elements that make the conduct a crime. The
mistake-of-fact and mistake-of-law defenses are preserved.

If he only had to knowingly transport someone, then it wouldn’t matter whether they’re a minor
or not. If he had to knowingly transport a minor, he could just lie and say he didn’t know the
person was a minor.
If he only had to knowingly transport someone, then it wouldn’t matter whether they’re a minor
or not. If he had to knowingly transport a minor, he could just lie and say he didn’t know the
person was a minor. Compared with X-Citement: The transportation of any individual for
purposes of prostitution or other criminal sexual activity is already unlawful under federal law.

Compared with X-Citement: The transportation of any individual for purposes of prostitution or
other criminal sexual activity is already unlawful under federal law.

The adverbs modify verbs, so knowingly transport not knowingly attained age of 18. Policy, we
want this to be illegal and we don’t want people to get out of it by claiming they knew the person
was 18. Finally, we already criminalize the act of transporting with the intent to engage in
prostitution, so we are not worried about criminalizing what is otherwise legal.

This is not a public welfare offense and need a mens rea term on minor for a couple reasons.
First, we punish it through a felony which is too extreme a penalty for a regulatory offense.
Second, it is legal to ship pornography so saying you don’t have to know it’s a minor
criminalizes what is a seemingly legal activity. You’re allowed to ship pornography so if you
don’t know it’s a minor you don’t know of anything illegal.
Ideas used to interpret