Political Cleavage: A Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis

Author(s): Alan Zuckerman

Source: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Apr., 1975), pp. 231-248
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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B.J.Pol.S. 5, 23-248
Printed in Great Britain

Political Cleavage:
a Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis
ALAN ZUCKERMAN*

Abraham Kaplan in his 'paradox of conceptualization' draws attention to the

fundamental problem of concept-formation: 'The proper concepts are needed to
formulate good theory, but we need a good theory to arrive at the proper
concepts'.' On this view, concepts are neither right nor wrong but are more or
less useful; their utility is determined by the twin and mutually dependent
requirements of empirical precision and theoretical importance. 'Empirical
precision' has to do with a concept's ability to 'carve up' the world of phenomena
without unnecessary ambiguities; 'theoretical importance' has to do with the
utility of a concept in the development of statements of wide explanatory and
predictive power.
The empirical precision and theoretical importance of the concept 'political
cleavage' will be examined in this article with regard to three related problem
areas: (I) theoretical context - the researchproblems for which political cleavage
has typically been employed; (2) definitional specificity: the particular kinds of
political behavior referredto by the concept; and (3) theoretical importance: the
evaluation of explanatory hypotheses making use of the idea of political cleavage.
The concept political cleavage carries with it a problem of 'semantic baggage'.
In general usage, the word 'cleavage' has particular associations which serve to
delimit its meaning. It denotes a specific kind of division, one that is distinctive
because of its shape or source.2 It seems necessary to maintain this semantic
distinction and to establish a distinction between political 'cleavage'and the more
general category of political 'division'. The absence of this distinction would
violate a rule of simplicity: that it is inutile and a cause of confusion to employ
two terms to refer to the same concept.
As a final note of introduction, I would like to clarify further the goals of this
paper. No attempt at surveyingthe entire body of literaturedealing with political
* Brown University. I would like to thank Ira Strauber, Brian
Barry and Irving Spitzberg
for criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper and for their intellectual encouragement. This is
a revised version of a paper presented to the Committee on Conceptual and Terminological
Analysis of the International Political Science Association, IX World Congress, Montreal, I973.
I am grateful to the Committee, especially its Chairman, Giovanni Sartori, and to its Secretary,
Fred Riggs, for their assistance.
Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Press, I964), p. 53.
2 A
dictionary definition of the verb 'to cleave' is as follows: 'To split along natural lines of
division'. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, College Edition (New York:
Random House, 1968), p. 251.
232 ZUCKERMAN

cleavage has been made. The scope of the paper is narrower;a limited collection
of sources which analyze the same problems and therefore 'speak' to one another
has been chosen for examination. Nor does the paper contain an original contri-
bution to the development of a 'proper'concept of political cleavage. Its particular
focus is not on the semantic analysis of the concept but on the examination of its
use in the analysis of specific research problems.

VARIATIONS IN CONCEPTUALIZATION

The literature on political cleavage exhibits competing definitions of the concept

embedded in contrasting approaches to analysis. It also presents, however,
considerable overlapsin researchinterest. The most frequentlyaddressedproblem
is the specification of the links between political cleavage and the characteristics
of political conflict. The central assumption of all such analyses is that the
particular manner in which members of a society divide from and associate with
one another in regard to political issues has major, direct and specifiable con-
sequences for political conflict. In contradistinction to this position, I will argue
for the independent explanatory power of the characteristicsof political elites in
this researchproblem.
Before we proceed to analyze the explanatory power of propositions linking
political cleavage and political conflict, it is useful to categorize differing strands
of conceptual usage and problem orientation. As with much of contemporary
social science, Marx and Weber provide some of the most important intellectual
starting points - as well as the bases of later scholarly divisions - in the analysis
of political cleavage.
In Marx's usage, the concept social class points to a particulartype of political
division and it is used within a specific set of related theoretical statements. In
The Eighteenth Brumaire, he outlines the necessary characteristics of a social
class:
In so faras millionsof familiesliveundereconomicconditionsof existencethatseparate
theirmode of life, theirinterests,and theirculturefrom those of otherclasses,and put
them in hostile oppositionto the latter,they form a class. In so far as thereis merelya
local inter-connectionbetweenthese small-holdingpeasants,and the identityof their
interestsbegets no community,no nationalbond and no politicalorganization,they
form no class.3
Marx's conceptualization of social class does not limit it to economic or social
categories or associations but provides as a key definitional trait the link to
political organization and behavior. As Ralf Dahrendorf contends:
Thismaybe the most importantstep in Marx'stheoryof classformation.Classesdo not
constitutethemselvesas such until they participatein political conflictsas organized
groups...
3 Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels, Selected Works (New York: International Press, I962),
P. 334.
 Political Cleavage: a Conceptualand TheoreticalAnalysis 233

For Marx,this last stage of class formationhas two complementaryaspects.On the

factuallevel of social structure,it involvesthe associationof peoplewho sharea class
situationin a strictgroup, partyor politicalorganization... On the normativeideo-
logicallevelof socialstructureit involvesthearticulationof 'classconsciousness',i.e. the
transformationof 'objective'classinterestsinto subjectivelyconscious,formulatedgoals
of organizedaction. The complete class is characterizednot by a common though
unconsciousdirectionof behavior,but by its conscious action toward formulated
goals.4
Classes, then, are to be distinguished from the general category of social and
political division by their membershipsources (perceptions of mutual interest
derived from similar relationships to the means of production), by their size
(they necessarily encompass large portions of the national society), by their
organization (as formally articulated political movements) and by their goals
(they engage in political conflict in order to effect the 'objective' interests of the
membership).
The resultant limited denotation of the concept social class is conditioned by
Marx's theoretical purposes. He does not contend that the only empirically
extant groups are those engaged in revolutionary social change. Rather, given
his theoretical (and practical) concern with the problem of social and political
transformation, he argues for the importance of social classes in that process.
Thus, in his study of France duringthe events of 1848and after, Marx distinguishes
between two types of political groups present in the French legislature: one linked
to social class differences and another associated with intra-class divisions. The
latter dominated the assembly and were of major short-runimportance, while the
former were, in Marx's analysis, the ultimate contestants, whose time for combat
had not yet arrived.5
Weber criticizes Marx's definition of social class for being too complex. In its
place, he posits distinctions between the three components of Marx's concept -
the economic, social-status and political components - and he assigns to each a
different conceptual label. He writes that '"classes" are not communities; they
merely represent possible and frequent bases for communal action.'6 Class, for
Weber, is an 'objective' factor determined by position in the economy. It is to be
kept conceptually separate from 'status group' which is indicated by position in
the hierarchy of the distribution of social honor. Each or both may serve as the
basis of a social group and be linked, in turn, to political associations. He writes:
'Whereas the genuine place of "classes" is within the economic order, the place
of "status groups" is within the social order, that is, within the sphere of the
distribution of "honor". From within these spheres, classes and status groups
influence the legal order and are in turn influenced by it. But "parties" live in a
house of power'.7
4 Ralf Dahrendorf,Class and Class Conflictin IndustrialSociety (Stanford,Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 1967), p. 25.
5 Karl Marx, Class Struggles in France (New York: International
Press, I964), pp. 88 if.
6 Hans Gerth and C. WrightMills, eds., FromMax Weber(New York: Oxford University
Press, 1958), p. i8 .
7 Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber, p. 194.
234 ZUCKERMAN

As related to the study of political conflict, Marx's legacy resides in the

argument for the existence of causal links between a particular type of political
cleavage, social class, and the presence of violent political conflict and revolution.
Though Weber shares Marx's presumption that the variable distribution of
economic and social positions will affect the characteristicsof political conflict,
the two men differ about the explanatory power of any single political
cleavage and about the necessary links between social, economic and political
divisions.
The approach, established by Marx and Weber, which seeks the sources of
political cleavage in social divisions and then relates political cleavage to the
characteristics of political conflict characterizes numerous studies. Lipset and
Rokkan use the term 'cleavage' to refer to conflict groups based on perceptions
of association in opposition to other such groupings among large segments of a
population.8 Cleavages 'originate' in the social realm. They are politicized, how-
ever, as they become issues of large-scale conflict and become tied to political
parties. Implicit here is the conceptualization of political cleavage as a type of
political division based on major social divisions.
Lipset and Rokkan's research goal is the specification of the pattern of
historical interaction in Europe between cleavages, as they define them, and
political institutions and behavior - in particular, political parties and electoral
behavior. From these concerns follow the core problems of their analysis: (I) the
establishment of a hierarchy of cleavages; (2) the specification of the links
between cleavages and the formation and persistence of political parties and party
systems; and (3) the analysis of the role of political parties in the structuringand
freezing of cleavages and voter choices. Thus, the number and kinds of cleavages
established by Lipset and Rokkan extend the analysis of political cleavage
significantly beyond Marx's presumption that the only cleavage that matters is
that of social class and Weber's implicit contention that there exists an unlimited
number of potential cleavage bases.9
Perhaps the most ambitious synthesis of Marx and Weber is Dahrendorf's
Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society.l" Dahrendorf retains Marx's
concern with the explanation of revolutionary social change as well as Marx's
focus on mass social divisions as the source of the political movements causing
such transformations. Though he also retains Marx's distinction between
'objective' social divisions and classes, he substitutes Weber's focus on the
8
Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter
Alignments', in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments
(New York: Free Press, 1967), 1-64, pp. 6ff.
9 Rokkan has developed this argument in more detail in Stein Rokkan, Citizens, Elections and
Parties (New York: David McKay, 1970). Other examples of this usage may be found in the
work of Juan Linz, 'The Party System of Spain; Past and Future' and 'Cleavage and Consensus
in West German Politics', in Lipset and Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments, 197-282
and 283-324, and Morris Janowitz and David Segal, 'Social Cleavage and Party Affiliation:
Germany, Great Britain and the United States', in Guiseppe Di Palma, ed., Mass Politics
(Chicago: Markham, 1972), 200-25.
10 Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society.
 Political Cleavage: a Conceptualand TheoreticalAnalysis 235

analysis of the variabledistribution of authority for Marx's emphasis on economic

position. Dahrendorf notes:
One of the centraltheses of this studyconsistsin the assumptionthat this differential
distributionof authorityinvariablybecomesthe determiningfactorof systematicsocial
conflictsof a typethatis germaneto classconflictsin the traditional(Marxian)senseof
this term.The structuredoriginof such groupconflictsmust be soughtin the arrange-
ments of social roles endowed with the expectationsof dominationor subjection.
Wheneverthere are such roles, group conflicts of the type in question are to be
expected.1'

The sources referredto suggest a conceptualization of political cleavage linked

to large-scalesocial divisions. An explicit developmentof this position is presented
by Eckstein in one of the rare typologies of political divisions. Cleavage or, as
Eckstein labels it, 'segmental cleavage' is a particular 'kind' of political division.
He writes: 'This exists where political divisions follow very closely, and especially
concern lines of objective social differentiation, especially those particularly
salient in a society.'12'Segmental cleavage' is separated from the other 'kinds' of
political division: 'specific disagreements' (divisions over policy or procedural
issues) and 'cultural divergence' (differences resulting from different modes of
interpretingthe political world).13
It is not the case, however, that the conceptual tie between political cleavage
and social divisions is maintained in all uses of the concept. Daalder, in his
development of five historically important political cleavage-types in Europe,
locates two - nationality and regime cleavages - with no necessary ties to social
divisions.14 In his analysis of French and Italian political cleavages, Dogan
differentiates political cleavage from the more general category of political
division by the former's persistence over time and extensiveness of membership
as shown in electoral behavior.In his usage, political cleavageshave no definitional
tie to social divisions. With regardto France, he labels as political cleavages those
political divisions derived from particularcrucial events in French history. In the
passing of these crises, he notes, 'They leave layers of opinions, analogous to
geological sediments. In the year 2000, there will be Gaullists, as there were
Orleanists, Legitimists, and Bonapartists in the i880s.'15 Dahl explicitly defines
cleavages as differences in political attitudes and behavior. His analysis of their
presence in American politics sustains a conceptualization of political cleavage as
persistent over long periods of time and contributing to periodic bouts of severe

Dahrendorf,Classand Class Conflictin IndustrialSociety,p. 165.

12
Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, I966), p. 34.
13 Eckstein,Divisionand Cohesionin Democracy,p. 33.
14 Hans Daalder, 'Parties,Elites and PoliticalDevelopmentsin WesternEurope',in Joseph
LaPalombaraand Myron Weiner,eds., PoliticalPartiesandPolitical Development(Princeton,
N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), 43-78, pp. 66-7.
15MatteiDogan, 'PoliticalCleavageand Social Stratificationin Franceand Italy', in Lipset
and Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments, 129-97, pp. I82-3.
236 ZUCKERMAN

conflict. 6 Common to all of these formulations is a conceptualization of political

cleavage such that the tie to social divisions is left to hypothesis.17
It is possible to derive from the literaturesurveyed the beginnings of a typology
of political cleavage. In almost all instances, the usage indicates the presence of,
at a minimum, extensive (in terms of membership size) and persistent political
divisions. As such, it is distinguished from the more general category of political
divisions. The conceptual disagreementin the literatureconcerningthe definitional
link between political cleavage and social division may serve to commence the
distinction of types of political cleavage. Using this bifurcation, Allardt and
Pesonen locate the presence of'structural' and 'nonstructural'political cleavages.
They note: 'some political cleavages correspond to ones differentiating social
groups within which solidarity and cohesion already exist on other than purely
political grounds, while certainother such cleavages lack any such correspondence.
Because the latter can be perceived only in the sphere of politics, they are here
referred to as nonstructural.'18Central to the distinction is that 'structural'
political cleavages reflect a 'division of the body politic into social groups that
are characterized by a personal feeling among their members of belonging
together in most walks of life'.19
The historical studies of cleavages in European history allow for the further
specification of sub-types of political cleavage. Thus the studies cited above of
Lipset and Rokkan and Daalder seem to agree on the presence of the following
'real types' of 'structural' political cleavages: religious, ethnic, regional and
social-class. Rose and Urwin develop a hierarchy of the importance of cleavages
for political parties and voting behavior in which religion and social-class far
outweigh the other types.20Daalder's two 'real types' of nonstructural political
cleavages, nationality and regime, are also found in the country-specificanalyses
noted earlier of Dogan on France and Dahl on the United States. In addition,
Dahl's specification of foreign policy differences as a 'type' of political cleavage
in the United States is also found in Allardt and Pesonen's analysis of Finland.
In sum, though in embryonic form, the literature exhibits a modicum of over-
lapping usage which permits the development of a typology of political cleavage
as well as the distinction of political cleavage within the general category of
political division.
The suggested typology of political cleavage, however, imposes a degree of

16
Robert Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1965), pP. 48ff.
17 In his
terminological dictionary, Geoffrey Roberts defines 'cleavage': 'The condition of
division between members of a political group or political system, and thus the opposite of
"consensus"'. Geoffrey Roberts, A Dictionary of Political Analysis (New York: St Martin's
Press, I971), p. 33.
18 Eric Allardt and Pertti Pesonen, 'Cleavages in Finnish Politics', in Lipset and Rokkan,

Party Systems and Voter Alignments, 325-66, p. 325.

19Allardt and Pesonen, 'Cleavages in Finnish Politics', p. 325.
20 Richard Rose and Derek Urwin, 'Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes',

Comparative Political Studies, II (I969-70), 7-67, pp. 12-13.

 Political Cleavage: a Conceptualand TheoreticalAnalysis 237

unity that is not present in the literature.It is necessary to note, therefore, some
of the most important areas of conceptual divergence.
(I) Perhaps the most obvious point of scholarly disagreement concerns the
definitional tie between political cleavage and social division.
(2) Among those who link political cleavage and social division definitionally
there still exist areas of conceptual division. In one usage, akin to Weber's social-
class definition, cleavage refers to differences in 'objective' social and economic
positions. As Di Palma notes, 'In this sense, every society presents cleavages, for
its members belong to categories or groups that differ in social or economic
characteristics.'21 Allardt and Pesonen's conceptualization ties 'structural
political cleavages' to social divisions perceived to be bases of subjective
identification.
(3) A related area of divergence informs the problem of the empirical links
among social divisions, political organizations and the formation of political
cleavages. Of majorinterestis the importanceattributedto political organizations.
The competing positions may be summarizedas follows:
(a) social divisions are a necessary and a sufficientcondition for the emergence
of political cleavages;
(b) social divisions are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the
emergence of political cleavages;
(c) social divisions are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the
emergence of political cleavages.
Dahl has summarizedthe basic assumptions of the first two of these proposi-
tions: (I) social and economic differences are associated with the variable
distributions of rewards; and (2) these differences stimulate cohesion among
those who are socially similar and conflict among those who are different.22The
argumentsof Marx and Dahrendorf exemplify the causal characterof proposition
(a). The presence of specified social divisions determinethe presence of particular
political cleavages. In this argument, the role of institutions like political parties
is an ambiguous one. At best, they serve to hasten an inevitable process.
The arguments related to proposition (b) deny the causal character of the
relationship and posit the independent and crucial importance of political parties.
In their analysis of political cleavages in contemporary Europe, Lipset and
Rokkan do not presume the direct translation of social cleavages into political
ones. Rather, they associate this process with the interactiveeffects of perceptions
of variations in the distribution of social and economic positions and the
organization and activities of political parties. In an argument closely tied to that
of Lipset and Rokkan, Rose and Urwin demonstrate the absence of a direct link
between the number and kind of social cleavages and political parties. They

21
GiuseppeDi Palma, The Study of Conflictin WesternSociety: A Critiqueof the End of
Ideology (Morristown, N. J.: General Learning Press, 1973), p. 3.
22
Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, p. 367.
238 ZUCKERMAN

note: 'If each permutation of four groups in a society gave birth to a party, then
each society would have at least 16 parties. In fact, in the 17 countries surveyed,
the average number of parties is 4-5.'23
That there frequently exist no direct links between social divisions and political
cleavages has given rise to the third proposition. Sartoriprovides a critique of the
first and second propositions while developing the third. Class voting in particular
and class behavior in general, he contends, is less a function of perceived 'social'
divisions than of political factors: 'To put it bluntly, it is not the "objective"
class (class conditions) that creates the party, but the party that creates the
"subjective" class (class consciousness) . . . The party is not a "consequence" of
the class. Rather, and before, it is the class that receives its identity from the
party.'24Lipset argues similarly by noting the importance of political parties in
institutionalizing past bases of opinion cleavage and therebypreservingthem even
after the original social conflicts have declined.25 Finally, Converse takes this
position to its logical conclusion by analyzing the freezing of political cleavages
solely in terms of the effects of political parties.26
(4) Another locus of scholarly division concerns the particular aspects of
political conflict to which the study of political cleavage is related. Again Marx
and Dahrendorf serve to exemplify a particular research strand in the literature.
Their rather limited focus on revolution sets them apart from other more
broad-gauged studies.

POLITICAL CLEAVAGE AND POLITICAL CONFLICT

These divisions in conceptualization to the contrary notwithstanding, the

literature exhibits marked agreement concerning a fundamental area of research
interest: the links between political cleavage and political conflict. Indeed, in
almost all cases the analysis of political cleavage finds its theoretical raison d'etre
in the explanation of the characteristicsof political conflict. In the section below,
this literature will be divided into two clusters: that which focuses on the effects
of a particular cleavage type, and that which examines the consequences of
variations in the distribution in cleavage membership in a society.
There seems to exist general agreement that cleavage-membershipperceptions
that are highly intense will result in a polarized cleavage system and thereby in
violent political conflict. Differences emerge concerning which of the cleavage
types is most likely to be held 'intensely' and to result in 'polarization'.
23
Rose and Urwin, 'Social Cohesion,PoliticalPartiesand Strainsin Regimes',p. 20.
24
GiovanniSartori,'From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology',in SeymourM.
Lipset, ed., Politics and the Social Sciences (New York: Oxford University Press, I969), 65-100,
p. 84.
25
SeymourM. Lipset,Revolution and Counterrevolution(GardenCity,N.Y.: AnchorBooks,
1970), p. 228.
26 Philip Converse, 'Of Time and Partisan Stability', Comparative Political Studies, II (1969),
I39-71.
 Political Cleavage: a Conceptualand TheoreticalAnalysis 239

It is not unfair to say that the greatest amount of scholarly attention has been
devoted to exploring the effects on political conflict of social-class cleavages. Once
again, Marx provides the startingpoint. As we noted above, he links the presence
of violent political conflict resulting in major social transformationsto the pres-
ence and behavior of political movements based on social classes. However,
Marx's conceptualization of social-class raises difficulties. By presuming the
presence of members with intense political opinions ready for violent, purposive
action, he secures the link between social class and revolutionary violence by
making it difficult to test the hypothesis.
Attempts to broaden the denotation of social class by replacing Marx's
subjective criterion with a conceptualization of social class as an 'objective'
characteristichave not fared well when applied to western Europe. As a result,
alterations have occurredin hypotheses linking social class and the characteristics
of political conflict. Lipset relates the variation in intensity of perceptions of
social-class membershipto the rigidity of status demarcation lines.27A decline in
the rigidity of the barriersbetween the classes in western Europe, argues Lipset,
has led to a reduction in the intensity of class-relatedfeelings and, therefore, to a
politics of bargaining rather than of revolution.28
Rose and Urwin replace Marx's hypothesis with its converse. After noting that
religion is a more frequent basis of socially cohesive parties than is social class in
western Europe and the United States, they posit that:
If class cohesive partiespredominate,then regime strainsare likely to be low. This
hypothesisassumesthat class cohesionmakesfor bargainingpolitics.Class is defined
by occupation, an economic characteristic,and reflects the significanceof market
consideraiions... While social scientistshave arguedthat these economic consider-
ationsoughtto lead to politicalconflict,it wouldbe moreparsimoniousto assumethat
economicdifferencesshouldlead to economicconflict.29
If recent analyses argue that Marx's hypothesis finds little support - that
political cleavages based on social class are not likely to become intense, to lead
to polarization and to revolutionary violence - are there other cleavage types
with a greater probability of producing these consequences? The literature
provides no ready answers. The profound impact of Marx on the literature of
the social sciences has generally limited scholarly attention to social class and its
consequences.
There have, however, been recent efforts to explore the consequences for
political conflict of other cleavage types. Particular interest has been given to
'cultural differences'. In an analysis contrasting cleavages in 'developed' and
'developing' areas, Lipset generalizes:
If we now turn to an examinationof the sources of party cleavagein contemporary
democraticcountries,it is clear that the role relationshipswhich have proved most
likely to generatestable lines of party supportare largelyaspects of stratification,as
27 Lipset, Revolutionand Counterrevolution,
pp. 321 ff.
28 Lipset,Revolutionand
pp. 270 ff.
Counterrevolution,
29 Rose and Urwin, 'SocialCohesion,PoliticalPartiesand Strainsin Regimes',p. 39.
240 ZUCKERMAN

betweenhigherand lower ordersof status, income and power, or aspects of cultural

differences,as betweenspecifiedgroupswhichvary widelyin theirviews of the nature
and valuesof the good society.30
He relates each type of cleavage to its 'prototypical political party' - the class
party and the religious party in turn - and to a mode of 'political controversy'.
Class parties are likely to engage in the 'politics of collective bargaining'; the
conflict of religious parties leads to instability.31Though Lipset associates each
prototype with societies at different levels of development (class parties pre-
dominate in economically developed stable polities, religiousparties in developing
areas) other scholars make no such link. Rose and Urwin argue, for example, that
the predominance of parties based upon religious and communal ties is likely to
lead to regime strains regardless of the level of economic development present.32
While there exists evidence that conflict between religious, communal or ethnic
groups is difficult to resolve without violence, there are also indications that the
presence of specific political conditions will result in the politics of bargaining
and compromise between such groups.33
In sum, contrasting hypotheses linking types of political cleavage with the
characteristics of political conflict are present. There exists, however, no
preponderance of evidence in support of any one of them.
An important problem with attempts to link political cleavage types and
political conflict is that societies are rarely characterizedby the presence of one
type. Partly as a result, there exists a large body of analysis which relates the
characteristicsof political conflict to the pattern of the distributionof membership
in the differentcleavages.34Rae and Taylor summarizethe arguments of Simmel,
Ross and Coser concerningthe conflict reducingeffects of cross-cuttingcleavages:
This reductionof conflictcould occurin two ways. One is throughthe modificationof
individualattitudesand behavior- not onlythroughcross-pressures at electiontime ...
but by reducingthe intensityof individualpoliticalfeelingsin general... Secondly,the
morecross-cuttingthereis, the smallerthenumberof personswho arein the samegroup
in both cleavages,and hence the more difficultit is to build a coalition or potential
conflictgroupcontainingonlyindividualswho haveno linkwiththe opposition,i.e. who
agreeon all theirmembership.35
Lipset's work on the subject highlights the classic argumentas well as some of
its more recent emendations. In his analysis, the prime determining factor of
30
Lipset,Revolutionand Counterrevolution, pp. 242-3.
31 Lipset,Revolutionand Counterrevolution, p. 243.
32 Rose and
Urwin, 'Social Cohesion,PoliticalPartiesand Strainsin Regimes',pp. 40-2.
33 See, for example,ArendLijphart,'Typologiesof DemocraticSystems',in Arend Lijphart,

ed., Politics in Europe (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), 46-80 and Eric A.
Nordlinger,ConflictRegulationin DividedSocieties(Cambridge,Mass.:Centerfor International
Affairs, 1972).
34The literatureon 'cross-cuttingcleavages'is voluminous.In additionto those cited in the
text, see also, David Truman,TheGovernmentalProcess (New York: Knopf, 1951)and William
Kornhauser,ThePolitics of Mass Society (Glencoe,Ill.: The Free Press, 1959).
35 Douglas Rae and MichaelTaylor, The Analysisof Political Cleavage(New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1970), pp. 87-8.
 Political Cleavage: a Conceptualand TheoreticalAnalysis 241

political violence and instability is the presence of intensely held political attitudes
and beliefs. Intensity, in turn, is determined by the pattern of the distribution of
political opinions throughout a society: the tendency to adopt an 'extremist'
position varies inversely with the individual's frequency of interaction with those
of opposing political views and, consequently, the intensity of political conflict
will decline as the frequency of interaction increases.
A result of the described pattern in the distribution of political opinions,
argues Lipset, is that this situation is conducive to stable democracies. 'The
available evidence suggests that the chances for stable democracy are enhanced
to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of cross-cutting,
politically relevant affiliations. To the degree that a significant proportion of the
population is pulled among conflicting forces, its members have an interest in
reducing the intensity of political conflicts.'36More recently, Lipset has added the
independent significance of the number of political parties to the analysis. He
associates two-party systems with low political intensity and the politics of
compromise and multi-party systems with the magnification of political differ-
ences and ideological political conflict.37
Thus, present in the literature are arguments linking a cross-cutting cleavage
membership pattern with political conflict characterizedby bargaining, compro-
mise, stability and the absence of violence. A reinforcing cleavage system is
associated with intensely held political attitudes, extremist positions, inability to
compromise, instability and violence. In all, this literatureproduces a rich harvest
of explanatory hypotheses. If these propositions are to be tested, however, it is
necessary that the types of cleavage distribution systems describe particular
cases. This has proved difficult.
In the final sections of Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, Dahl
summarizes the results of studies of the pattern of political-cleavage distribution.
Distinguishing between the social, psychological and political dimensions of
cleavage, he concludes: 'None of the countries examined in this book closely
approaches the pattern... [of] full-scale political polarization, where sharp
political, socioeconomic and psychological dualisms all coincide.'38In addition,
Rae and Taylor contend that examples of cross-cuttingcleavagesareequally diffi-
cult to find: 'Unfortunately, it is evident that virtually all extant cleavage systems
result in some cross-cutting and that none result in complete cross-cutting; the
pertinent question is not whether cleavages cross-cut each other, but rather how
much they cross-cut each other.'39
Thus it would seem that no matter how intuitively plausible the hypotheses
specifying the contrastingconsequences of cross-cuttingand reinforcingcleavages
may appear, this approach to theory-buildingneeds emendation. One suggestion
offered by Dahl and Rae and Taylor is the further development of empirically
precise concepts. This would permit the necessary but more complex task of
36 SeymourM. Lipset,PoliticalMan (GardenCity, N.Y.: AnchorBooks, 1963),pp. 77-8.
37 Lipset, Revolution and Counterrevolution,pp. 276 ff.
38
Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, p. 385.
39 Rae and Taylor, The Analysis of Political Cleavage, p. I4.
16
242 ZUCKERMAN

measuring the degrees and kinds of partially cross-cutting and reinforcing

cleavage systems.
While it is certainly useful to be able to make exact distinctions in the analysis
of political cleavage, this must follow further clarification of what it is that is
being measured. Here there are some problems. Research linking political
cleavage and political conflict has proceeded under some crucial simplifying
assumptions. A particularlyimportant one concerns who and what to study. Here
the prevailing decision has been to analyze the most frequently exhibited political
behavior and attitudes of large segments of a population. As studied, no single
act or type of act indicates political cleavage. Rather, its presence is based on
interpretations of clusters of acts or characteristics,generally those portrayed in
electoral behavior and in responses to survey questions.
An obvious problem with this decision to approach cleavage through electoral
behavior and mass survey responses is that it is inapplicable in societies without
competitive elections and survey organizations. Even where those institutions are
present, however, the phenomena studied are particularly narrow aspects of
political behavior. Elections are occasional political acts and survey responses, at
best, indicate stated views not behavior. Most importantly, other kinds of political
behavior not necessarily tied to voting are frequently ignored by this approach.
Examples that readily come to mind are personal contacts with government and
political leaders, small-group behavior, the structuring of political clienteles,
letter-writing campaigns and mass demonstrations. All are based on decisions
about political division and association but are generally overlooked in the study
of political cleavage. The result has been an 'operational definition' of political
cleavage by a very limited set of factors.
The recent increase in scholarly analysis of political clienteles provides a
related criticism of the political cleavage literature.40Given the variable distri-
bution of social, economic and power positions, political cleavage analysis has
generally presumed that individuals perceive their political interests and engage
in joint political behavior with those seen as occupying similar positions and in
opposition to those occupying other positions. This contention, characteristicof
the literature at least since Marx and Weber, is questioned by the widespread
presence and importance of clienteles. The latter are social groupings formed by
those who occupy markedly unequal positions in opposition to those perceived
to be of similar positions.
It is suggested, therefore, that the descriptive study of political cleavage must
not be equated with the analysis of electoral behavior and responses to mass
surveys. Required are researchfoci that examine choices of political divisions and
association in the perception and behavior of individuals and small groups of
individuals - how they seek to influence government officials as well as how they
40
Examples of this growing literatureare Ren6 Lemarchandand Keith Legg, 'Political
Clientelismand Development',Comparative Politics, Iv (1972), 149-78; CarlLande,'Networks
and Groupsin SoutheastAsia: Some Observationson the GroupTheoryof Politics',American
Political Science Review, LXVI (1973), 103-28 and James Scott, 'Patron-Client Politics and
Political Change in Southeast Asia', American Political Science Review, LXVI (1972), 428-44.
 Political Cleavage: a Conceptualand TheoreticalAnalysis 243

vote. This will not only add new indicators to the study of political cleavage; it
will permit the development of a concept with greatergeneral utility and empirical
precision than heretofore proposed.41
It has been argued, however, that the problems with the hypotheses linking
political cleavage and political conflict are not that the concepts used are imprecise
but that the proper concepts are absent in the theorizing. Allardt and Pesonen
argue that violent political conflict is associated less with the presence of a
particularcleavage type or with a specific distribution of the cleavage system than
with the absence or presence of a cleavage's 'institutionalization'.In their analysis
of Finnish politics, they contend:
Theassumptionof the conflict-lessening effectsof cross-cuttingcleavagelinesdisregards
the natureof socialinstitutions.It canjustifiablybe statedthatanycleavagewhichlacks
institutionalrolesfor handlingconflictscan leadto crisesof legitimacy.Cleavageswhich
haveresultedin institutionsconcernedwith instrumentaladaptationand the solvingof
conflict accordingto rules, tend to diminishthe chances for strong conflicts and a
completechangeof the system.42
Analyses of the Dutch and other examples apparently lend support to this
argument. The Netherlands is reportedly characterized by the presence of
intensely held political cleavages which have been 'institutionalized' to allow
for the politics of bargaining.43Though the concept of 'institutionalization'itself
lacks empirical precision as yet, its development is indicative of a movement to
emend the theorizing on political cleavage and political conflict.
The problems found in attempts to link the characteristicsof political cleavage
and conflict are developed in a most telling manner by Daalder. He lists and then
criticizes the fundamental arguments of this literature.The view that the political
universe is by nature dualistic and therefore that the two-party system leads to
bargaining, stability and the orderly solution of successive political issues while
the multi-partysystem is fragmentedand leads to immobilism is, he contends, an
unwarrantedassumption based upon slender evidence, bias and ignorance of the
smaller European democracies.44Daalder suggests supplementingthe description
of the cleavagepatternswith 'qualitative'studies specifyingcleavages' 'importance
for political stability or effective decision making'.45

POLITICAL CLEAVAGE AND POLITICAL CONFLICT: THE PLACE OF

POLITICAL ELITES
The typology of political cleavage developed earlier allows for the side-stepping
of some of the difficulties engendered by the literature's contrasting uses of the
41 In his analysisof culturalanthropology,Goodenoughcallsfor the developmentof concepts
such that descriptions of particular cases take place along dimensions of cross-national utility.
This is a crucial initial step for political science as well. Ward Goodenough, Description and
Classification in Cultural Anthropology (Chicago: Aldine, 197 ).
42
Allardt and Pesonen, 'Cleavages in Finnish Politics', p. 345.
43 See Lijphart, 'Typologies of Democratic Systems', and Hans Daalder, 'The Netherlands:
Opposition in a Segmented Society', in Robert Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democ-
racies, I88-236.
44
Daalder, 'Parties, Elites and Political Developments', p. 68.
45 Daalder, 'Parties, Elites and Political
Developments', p. 67.
244 ZUCKERMAN

concept. The theory-related problems, however, are less easily avoided. In

general, hypotheses specifying direct and major links between political cleavage
types and patterns of membership distribution and the characteristicsof political
conflict have not fared well. As noted, in some instances, the concepts lack the
empirical precision necessary for proper testing. In others, the arguments linking
the two phenomena need the support of interveningvariables:levels ofinstitution-
alization, the geographic characteristics of the political structure and time
variations in the activation of the cleavage.46 Rather than proceed with the
analysis by elaborating on the descriptiveand theoretical complexities of political
cleavage, I will, in the remainder of this paper, place primary emphasis on the
characteristicsof the political elite.
As an initial step, I will make explicit a distinction between elite and mass
political conflict and thereby separate for analysis phenomena frequently treated
together. Reflecting, however, the research concerns of the literature, I will
examine mass political conflict in terms of its violent/non-violent character
(Mv/Mnv) and elite political conflict in terms of its co-operative/non-co-operative
aspect (Ec/Enc).47The rationale behind this distinction is not only that mass and
elite political conflict refer to the behavior of differentindividuals and groups but
that it is unnecessary and of dubious theoretical utility to presume that the
empirical association is always: Ec, Mnv and Enc, Mv.
Given this distinction, one potential mode of accounting for the characteristics
of political conflict is by the selection of particularexplanatory variables for each
dimension. Thus, elite characteristicsmay be utilized to explain the presence of
Ec or Enc and the types and membershipdistributionpatternsof political cleavage
utilized to explain the type of mass political conflict present. Studies of cabinet
coalition behavior, which focus less on the political cleavages as viewed through
electoral behavior and more on the characteristicsof parliamentaryparty leaders
and activists, exemplify this approach. Leites and MacRae in their studies of the
French Fourth Republic link the high rate of cabinet instability to the competitive
goals and ideological divisions of the political elites.48Similarly, the analysis of
Italian cabinet coalition behavior benefits from the distinction between electoral
competition in which the political parties are the relevant actors and competition

46 In addition to the
already cited literature,Henry Kerr, 'Social Cleavagesand Partisan
Conflict in Switzerland',paper presentedto the IX World Congress,InternationalPolitical
ScienceAssociation,Montreal, 1973,presentsa detailedargumentspecifyingthe essentialrole
played by these intervening variables in the analysis of political cleavage and political
conflict.
47For the purposes of this essay the nominal distinctionbetweentypes of elites and mass
politicalconflictis most useful. Note, however,that each is easily transformedinto an interval
measure.For a veryusefuland suggestiveanalysiswhichprovidesan intervalmeasurefor these
dimensions see Ted Robert Gurr and Muriel McClelland,Political Performance:A Twelve
Nation Study (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics,
I971).
48 Nathan Leites, On the Gameof Politics in France(Stanford,Calif.: StanfordUniversity
Press, 1959) and Duncan Macrae,Parliament,Partiesand Society in France: 1946-I958 (New
York: St Martin'sPress, I967).
 Political Cleavage: a Conceptualand TheoreticalAnalysis 245

for the control of cabinet positions in which the appropriateunits of analysis are
the factions of a sub-set of the national parties.49
There exist a number of problems, however, with the research decision to
analyze as unrelated mass and elite political conflict. (I) It runs counter to the
generaltheoretical presumptionthat there is a close empiricalassociation between
the characteristicsof elite and mass political conflict. (2) The counter-assumption
that there exists no correlation between types of elite and mass political conflict
resultsin a more complex approach to the problem of the determinantsof political
conflict. (3) There is evidence that, while it is not the case that Mv and Enc, on the
one hand, and Mnv and Ec, on the other, are always associated, neither is it the
case that there is no association. Rather, the characteristicsof a particularcase do
not vary far from one another.50There is reason, therefore, to attempt to account
for the characteristics of both mass and elite political conflict within the same
theoretical argument.
Thus, if there is a positive correlation between Ec and Mnv and between Enc
and Mv, and if it has been demonstrated that the characteristics of political
cleavage alone do not account for the characteristics of political conflict, it is
useful to examine the attributes of political elites as a dominant focus of one's
research effort. As noted earlier, there are a number of sources which reflect this
researchposition. They differ, however, in regardto the theoretical independence
attached to elite attitudes and behavior. Sartorihas contended that not only is the
type of elite conflict dependent on the attitudes and goals of the elites but so are
the types of political cleavage present and the characteristicsof mass conflict.51
Similarly, Di Palma has emphasized the autonomous position of political elite
characteristicsas determinantsof political conflict and the activation of cleavages
into mass divisions.52It is not the case, however, that analyses of elite character-
istics ignore the theoreticalimportance of political cleavage types and membership
distribution patterns. Lijphart in his study of consociational democracies links
Mnv and Ec, the latter in turn being associated with elite willingness to compro-
mise. This willingness to compromise, argues Lijphart,is in turn dependent upon
the characteristics of political cleavage.53 In a more detailed and complex
argument, Nordlinger accounts for the presence of Mnv and Ec in sharply
divided societies by elite willingness to avoid conflict, and partially explains the
latter by the characteristicsof the elite-mass relations within the segments.54
Although of relatively recent importance, this research focus is characterized
by areas of theoretical agreement. It is generally hypothesized that Ec is a crucial
determinant of Mnv and that elite attitudes and competitive goals and the
particular'decision rules' present are major determinantsof the presence of Ec or
49 Alan Zuckerman, 'Social Structure and Political Competition: The Italian Case', World
Politics, xxrv (I972), 428-44.
50 Gurr and McClelland, Political Performance.
51 Sartori, 'From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology'.
52 Di
Palma, The Study of Conflict in Western Society.
53 Lijphart, 'Typologies of Democratic Systems'.
54 Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies.
246 ZUCKERMAN

Enc. The literature is also characterized by areas of theoretical disagreement,

especially concerning the importance of political cleavage characteristics as
determinants of elite attitudes and goals, and by conceptual imprecision.
Theoretical progress requires empirical specificity of such concepts as elite
'willingness to compromise' as well as a typology of elite attitudes and com-
petitive goals based on careful logical and empirical underpinnings. It also
requires the elaboration of hypotheses interrelatingthe concepts.
By viewing this division in the literature from the perspective of Allardt and
Pesonen's classification of political cleavage types into structural and non-
structural, it is possible to avoid unnecessary theoretical conflict. The view that
elite factors are the sole determinants of political conflict is best applied to cases
of nonstructural political cleavage. The contention that mass factors condition
elite behavior is most descriptive of cases of structural political cleavage. With
this in mind, it is now possible to suggest some interrelatedexplanatoryhypotheses.
(I) When Ec, then most frequently Mnv.
Furthermore, in conditions of nonstructuralpolitical cleavage the presence of
Ec is a sufficientcondition for Mnv. The relationship will be weakest in cases in
which all cleavages are structural.
(2) Elite political goals and attitudes are major determinants of Ec/Enc.

By distinguishingbetween attempts to control governing positions, policies and

regime structure,it is possible to set out explanatory hypotheses for the presence
of the two types of elite political conflict examined here.
(2.1) When the political elites seek as their primary goals regime structure
changes, then Enc.
(2.2) When the political elites are primarily concerned with controlling
governing positions, then Enc.
(2.3) Ec is most likely in conditions in which political elites are primarily
concerned with affecting policy.
The first proposition is based on the generally accepted argument that when
fundamental values such as regime structure are the objects of competition,
compromise is most difficult. Though contrary to some widely held arguments,
the second hypothesis rests on increasing amounts of evidence that political
groups primarily interested in occupying governing positions typically engage in
constant maneuveringfor strategic advantage.55This results in elite agreement to
keep the game going, joined to an unwillingness and inability to maintain stable
alliances. The foundation for the third hypothesis is the evidence that it is conflict
over easily divisible policy items that most readilylends itself to elite co-operation.
The frequency of the predominance of each of three types of political goals may
be related to the types of political cleavage present. Elites seeking to effect regime
s5Alan Zuckerman,'On the Institutionalizationof PoliticalClienteles:Party Factions and
CabinetCoalitionsin Italy', paperpresentedto the Meetingsof the AmericanPoliticalScience
Association, New Orleans, 1973.
 Political Cleavage: a Conceptualand TheoreticalAnalysis 247

change are most likely to occur in cases of structuralpolitical cleavage. In addition,

there exists apparent agreementthat the type of structuralpolitical cleavage most
frequently associated with attempts to effect regime change is that of ethnicity,
religion or 'culture'.Cleavagesbased on social class are most frequentlyassociated
with predominant concern for controlling policy outcomes. Finally, cases of
nonstructural political cleavages are hypothesized to be conditions most fre-
quently linked to the presenceof political groups primarilyinterestedin occupying
governing positions.
In sum, it is argued that the characteristicsof mass and elite political conflict
are related to each other and to the complex interaction of a limited and
specifiable set of factors.
I. Mnv is most likely in conditions of Ec, elite concern with effecting policy
goals and nonstructuralpolitical cleavage of a particulartype.
11. Mv is most likely in conditions of Enc, in which elites seek to effect regime
structurechange, and structuralpolitical cleavage of a particulartype.
III. Ec is most likely in conditions of Mnv and structuralpolitical cleavage of
a particulartype.
iv. Enc is most likely in conditions of Mv in which elites seek to effect regime
change and structural political cleavage of a particular type, or Mnv in
which elites seek to control governing positions and nonstructural political
cleavage.

CONCLUSIONS

As a means of summary and conclusion, it is useful to return to the fundamental

assumptions of much of the literatureon political cleavage and political conflict.
For Marx, the relevant actors in the process of revolutionarypolitical conflict are
large segments of a population tied by perceived common economic interests and
'led' by political parties. The methods of conflict vary. At times, they are violent
and at times peaceful. Students of political cleavage are no longer interestedsolely
in revolutionary political conflict. However, they have maintained Marx's view
of the political actors as large groupings of a population 'represented'by political
parties. Lipset sets out clearly the theoretical assumptions of recent studies of
political cleavage and political conflict: 'In every modern democracy conflict
among different groups is expressed through political parties which basically
represent a "democratic translation of the class struggle." Even though parties
renounce the principle of class conflict or loyalty, an analysis of their appeal and
their support suggests that they do represent the interests of different classes.'56
On this view, the conflict of large social groupingsis necessarilypresentin a society
and elections are the means by which this conflict is carried out.

56
Lipset, Political Man, p. 230. As noted above, Lipset's later work incorporates social
segments in addition to social class.
248 ZUCKERMAN

The contrasting view of the links through elections between political cleavage
and political conflict is set forth by Gaetano Mosca. Writing in the I88os he
argued:
Whoeverhas participatedin an election knows very well that it is not the voterswho
elect the deputy,but,ordinarily,the deputythathas himselfelectedby the voters... It is
certainthata candidacyis alwaysthe workof a groupof individualsunitedby a common
interest,of an organizedminority,which,as always,imposesitself on the disorganized
majority.57
Mosca's analysis, based as it is on the workings of the Italian Liberal govern-
ment, is not necessarily descriptive of all cases of political conflict. It provides,
however, a useful corrective. Generalized, this position argues that the masses are
not always politically involved; conflict between large segments of a society is not
always present; political cleavages and divisions are not reflections of social
divisions but may be formed and organized by political activists.
If it is correct to contend that the relevant literature has typically produced
hypotheses in which the characteristics of political cleavage are the sole inde-
pendent variables, then it has been insufficiently fertile. Hypotheses examining
the independent affects of elite attitudes and behavior as well as the interactive
affects of the variables noted need to be developed and tested. Taken together
with the suggestions concerning the description of political cleavages, this will
result in a more complex body of literature. Hopefully, it will also produce an
interrelated set of theoretical propositions with wide explanatory power.
57Gaetano Mosca, TeoricaDei Governie Del GovernoParlamentare(Milan: Giuffe, I968),
pp. 246-7 (my translation).