IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, v. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, HON LUIS C.

VICTOR AND ERICH

EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.

Facts:

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino citizen) and respondent and respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, German national, were married at Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate,
Manila and had a child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling.

The private respondent initiated divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. The local court in Germany
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouse.

On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in Manila.

After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed the complaint for adultery before the prosecutor
of Manila alleging that the petitioner had an affair William Chia and Jesus Chua while they were still married.

Petitioner filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking to set aside the cases filed against her and be dismissed.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary
Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.

Issue:

Is the action tenable?

Ruling:

Yes. The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon sworn
written filed by the offended spouse. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes that the marital relationship
is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is logical consequence since
the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the
spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. It is indispensable that the status and
capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, such status or capacity must
indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. Thus, the divorce decree is valid not only in his country, may
be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned – in view of the nationality principle
under the Civil Code on the matter of civil status of persons. Private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case. The criminal case filed against petitioner is
dismissed.

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS & ALICIA F. LLORENTE, G.R. No. 124371. November 23,
2000

FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted
serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization, he became a US Citizen.
Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother and a child was born. The child
was registered as legitimate but the name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California, which
later on became final. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last
will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate
that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s estate. The
trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever
properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Law shall apply.

RULING:
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation when he
married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided that they are validly required in their National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because
the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he
became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorente’s will
and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.

1
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, GR No. 193707, 2014-12-10

Facts:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Orders[1] dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court... of
Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman
Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise
known as the Anti-Violence Against

Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland
on September 25, 1990.[2] On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem,
who at the time of the filing of the... instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.[3]

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate
Court of Holland.[4] At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.[5] Thereafter, petitioner and her
son... came home to the Philippines.[6]

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then,
have been residing thereat.

To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.[11]

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
However, respondent refused to receive the letter.[12]

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City

Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.[16] Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.

Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order

Subsequently,... respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,[21] dismissing the instant criminal case
against respondent

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order[25] denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration

Issues:

Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law

Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
support his minor child

Ruling:

We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner's contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal
obligation to support exists.

we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195[34] of the New Civil Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent
is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country,
not to Philippine law, as to whether... he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so.[37]

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner's son under Article 195 of
the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland.

This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support... petitioner's son altogether.

In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is... the same as our local or domestic or internal law.[44] Thus, since the

2
law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the
instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which... enforces the obligation of parents to
support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

The Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is not liable to give support to
his son after the divorce decree was issued.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents
have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still
not find applicability,... Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a... foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing
the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Principles:

the doctrine of processual presumption

Republic v. Manalo (Case Digest), G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce in
Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to
cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her
maiden surname, Manalo.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly

obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have

capacity to remarry under Philippine law

Issues:

1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead of the

foreign spouse?

2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?

Ruling:

1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into consideration. According to

Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid

the absurd situation of having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no

longer married to the former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the

Family Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not discriminate as to who

should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo

that the provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the

Court will not follow such interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.

In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if Manalo should

be bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause unjust

discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.

3
The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection clause. They said that

the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The violation

of the equal protection clause in this case is shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a

foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had initiated

the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction between them as regards to the

validity of the divorce decree obtained would give one undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino family but also to

defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other

conditions prejudicial to their development. The State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26

of the Family Code is limited to only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a

vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it

and leaves the bond in full force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that the decree is valid or

constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must

still be proved.

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence

as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.