ALVAREZ V CA

section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the English text of which reads:

SEC. 120. Interpleading. — Whenever conflicting claims are or may be made

upon a person for or relation personal property, or the performance of an
obligation or any portion thereof, so that he may be made subject to several
actions by different person, unless the court intervenes, such person may bring an
action against the conflicting claimants, disclaiming personal interest in the
controversy, to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among
themselves, and the court may order the conflicting claimants to interplead with
one another and thereupon proceed to determine the right of the several parties
to the interpleading to the personal property or the performance of the obligation
in controversy and shall determine the right of all in interest.

The action of interpleader, under section 120, is a remedy whereby a person who
has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or
partially, without claiming any right in both, comes to court and asks that the
persons who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled
to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing.
The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to
protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability.

WACKWACK V WON

"stakeholder" means a person entrusted with the custody of property or money

that is subject of litigation or of contention between rival claimants in which the
holder claims no right or property interest.

A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to

court. He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him
before filing a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a
reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of
the contending claimants.
Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay.
But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental
circumstances, the remedy is not barred.
It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed
after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending
claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the
rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse
claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be so, because once
judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the latter.
In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had
already been made independently liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its
present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the
final judgment in the said civil case;

LIM V CDC

Rule 63, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court tells us when a cause of action exists
to support a complaint in interpleader:
Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made
against a person, who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an
interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the complainants to compel
them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves (Italics
supplied).
This provision only requires as an indispensable requisite:
that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against
the plaintiff-in- interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter
or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants

An interpleader merely demands as a sine qua non element

... that there be two or more claimants to the fund or thing in dispute through
separate and different interests. The claims must be adverse before relief can be
granted and the parties sought to be interpleaded must be in a position to make
effective claims
Additionally, the fund, thing, or duty over which the parties assert adverse claims
must be one and the same and derived from the same source

BOC V PLANTERS

The remedy of an action of interpleader is designed to protect a person against

double vexation in respect of a single liability.
Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single
proceeding to determine conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to
the possibility of having to pay more than once on a single liability.

When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, in reality a
new action arises, where the claims of the interpleaders themselves are brought to
the fore, the stakeholder as plaintiff is relegated merely to the role of initiating the
suit. In short, the remedy of interpleader, when proper, merely provides an avenue
for the conflicting claims on the same subject matter to be threshed out in an
action.

PASRICHA V DON LUIS

an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom
payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or
on the right to collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against
double liability but to protect him against double vexation in respect of one
liability.

BELTRAN V PHHC

Plaintiffs entirely miss the vital element of an action of interpleader. Rule 63,
section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court (formerly Rule 14) requires as an
indispensable element that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or
may be made" against the plaintiff-in-interpleader "who claims no interest
whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the claimants.”

ARREZA V DIAZ

in a case for interpleader, the court shall determine the respective rights and
obligations of the parties and adjudicate their respective claims.

NUNAL V COA

It may be added that the Writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is a prerogative Writ, never demandable as a matter of right, "never issued
except in the exercise of judicial discretion."
PNB V TORRES

appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of
the appellee" upon the ground, among others, of "failure of the appellant ... to
serve and file the required number of copies of his brief," within the reglementary
period. Manifestly, this provision confers a power and does not impose a duty.
What is more, it is directory, not mandatory.
the Court of Appeals had, under said provision of the Rules of Court, discretion to
dismiss or not to dismiss respondents' appeal. Although said discretion must be a
sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play,
having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case, the presumption is that
it has been so exercised.

SORIANO V ATIENZA
. . . [G]rave abuse of discretion" means such capricious and arbitrary exercise of
judgment as is equivalent, in the eyes of the law, to lack of jurisdiction
An error of judgment committed by a court in the exercise of its legitimate
jurisdiction is not the same as "grave abuse of discretion". As a matter of fact even
an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of
certiorari. For that purpose, the abuse of discretion must be grave and patent, and
it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically . . .

MERCADO V CA

Now, jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost by any error in the exercise thereof
that might subsequently be committed by the court. Where there is jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is
but an exercise of that jurisdiction . And when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an
error committed while engaged in that exercise does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercise when the error is committed. If it did, every error
committed by a court would deprive it of jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. This, of course, can not be allowed. The
administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Moreover, any error that
the Court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, being merely an error of
judgment, is reviewable only by appeal, not by the special civil action of certiorari
or prohibition.

The remedy available to the petitioners against such a final judgment, as

repeatedly stated, was an appeal in accordance with the aforementioned Rule 41
of the Rules of Court
 But as observed in an analogous case recently resolved by this Court.
. . instead of resorting to ordinary remedy of appeal, ... (the petitioners) availed of
the extraordinary remedy of a special civil action of certiorari in the ... (Court of
Appeals), under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The choice was clearly wrong. The
availability of the right of appeal obviously precluded recourse to the special civil
action of certiorari. This is axiomatic. It is a proposition made plain by Section 1
of Rule 65 which lays down as a condition for the filing of a certiorari petition
that there be 'no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

GARCIA V CA

A certiorari proceeding is limited in scope and narrow in character. The special

civil action for certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari will issue only
to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings
or conclusions of the lower court.
As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in
the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of
judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, and not a petition for certiorari.

In a petition for certiorari, the public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it

does not have the legal power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction
where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case,
oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion
where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.


Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an

act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer is not
authorized, and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the
conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it
are wanting. The supervisory jurisdiction of the court to issue a certiorari writ
cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to its
intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case. In the absence of
a showing that there is reason for the Court to annul the decision of the
concerned tribunal or to substitute its own judgment, it is not the office of the
Court in a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed
decision or resolution.


SRMO V CHIONLO SIA

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides in full:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order
or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in
the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

The "aggrieved party" referred to in the above-quoted provision is one who was a
party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for certiorari
under Rule 65. In Tang v. Court of Appeals,29 we explained:
Although Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that the special civil action of certiorari
may be availed of by a "person aggrieved" by the orders or decisions of a tribunal,
the term "person aggrieved" is not to be eonstrued to mean that any person who
feels injured by the lower court's order or decision can question the said court's
disposition via certiorari.
In a situation wherein the order or decision being questioned underwent
adversarial proceedings before a trial court, the "person aggrieved" referred to
under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari
pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. The
correctness of this interpretation can be gleaned from the fact that a special civil
action for certiorari may be dismissed motu proprio if the party elevating the case
failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order or decision
before the lower court. Obviously, only one who was a party in the case before the
lower court can file a motion for reconsideration since a stranger to the litigation
would not have the legal standing to interfere in the orders or decisions of the
said court. In relation to this, if a non-party in the proceedings before the lower
court has no standing to file a motion for reconsideration, logic would lead us to
the conclusion that he would likewise have no standing to question the said order
or decision before the appellate court via certiorari.
The general rule, therefore, is that a person not a party to the proceedings in the
trial court cannot maintain an action for certiorari in the CA or the Supreme Court
to have the order or decision of the trial court reviewed.

CORDOVA V PATHFINDER

While there exists a settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final
order when appeal is available, a petition for certiorari may be allowed when:
(a) the broader interest of justice demands that certiorari be given due course to
avoid any grossly unjust result that would otherwise befall the petitioners; and
(b) the order of the RTC evidently constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,4 the Court has declared that
"the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law admits of exceptions, such as:
(a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party;
(b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment;
(c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice;
(d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient;
(e) where the issue raised is one purely of law;
(f) where public interest is involved;
(g) and in case of urgency.

If appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy,

the availability of appeal as a remedy cannot constitute sufficient ground to
prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari. It is mere inadequacy,
not the absence of all other legal remedies, and the danger of failure of justice
without the writ, that must determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is said
to be plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency.

SANTOS V ORDA

It is elementary that the special civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a
substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available, as it was in this
case. A special civil action under Rule 65 cannot cure a party’s failure to timely
appeal the assailed decision or resolution. Rule 65 is an independent action that
cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an
ordinary appeal.
To be sure, a petition for certiorari is dismissible for being the wrong remedy.
Indeed, we have noted a number of exceptions to this general rule, to wit:
1) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate;
2) when the broader interest of justice so requires;
3) when the writs issued are null and void;
4) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority;
5) when, for persuasive reasons, the rules may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of
an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure;
6) in other meritorious cases


ARAULLO V AQUINO

Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a
duty to pass judgmenton matters of this nature.

What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government may be determined under the Constitution?
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and
correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are
governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the
remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the
same as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise
of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the
instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue
the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the requirements
for that purpose, viz:
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction,
which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the
issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either
that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge,
tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction,
certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective
remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is
directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself,
while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is
directed to the court itself.

The Court expounded on the nature and function of the writ of prohibition in
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:
-A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in
the exercise of a quasi-legislative function.
-Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when
said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction,
or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
-Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative
or quasi-legislative functions.
Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within
the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in
orderly channels.
Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against
1 usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court,
2 or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within
its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed
to it by the law,
3 or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of
law by which such relief can be obtained.

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition
may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal,
corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of
Section 1, supra.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative
and executive officials.

VILLANUEVA V JBC

It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should

have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty
of the respondent to perform the act required.
The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer
to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.
Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually
exclusive.
AGUINALDO V AQUINO

Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court particularly identifies who can file a special
civil action of Quo Warranto, to wit:
Sec. 1. Action by Government against individuals. - An action for the usurpation
of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law,
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without
being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act

Sec. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. -

The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, must commence such action.
1 when directed by the President of the Philippines,
2 or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that
any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof,

Sec. 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may commence action with
permission of court. -
The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the permission of the court
in which the action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the request and
upon the relation of another person; but in such case the officer bringing it may
first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the action in an amount
approved by and to be deposited in the court by the person at whose request and
upon whose relation the same is brought.
xxx x

Sec. 5. When an individual may commence such an action. -

A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor in his own
name.
In Topacio v. Ong, the Court pronounced that:
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or
title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is
brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or
unlawfully held or exercised the public office, and may be commenced by the
Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person
claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held
or exercised by another.

Nothing is more settled than the principle, which goes back to the 1905 case of
Acosta v. Flor, reiterated in the recent 2008 case of Feliciano v. Villasin, that for a
quo warranto petition to be successful, the private person suing must show a clear
right to the contested office. In fact, not even a mere preferential right to be
appointed thereto can lend a modicum of legal ground to proceed with the action.

"Grave abuse of discretion" denotes:

such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.

"Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged;
while "interest" refers to material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected
by the decree or act assailed, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. The interest of the plaintiff must be
personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional
right of some third and unrelated party.

Just like any rule, however, there are recognized exceptions to the strict
observance of the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari, viz.: REGLAM
P2ICOS2 (Relieve. Exercise. Goodfaith. Lack. Accident. Merits. Persuasive.
Peculiar. Importance. Cause. Other. Special. Substantial)
(1) most persuasive and weighty reasons;
(2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to
comply with the prescribed procedure;
(3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable
time from the time of the default;
(4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(5) the merits of the case;
(6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored
by the suspension of the rules;
(7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
(8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby;
(9) fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence without appellant's fault;
(10)peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case;
(11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play;
(12) importance of the issues involved; and
(13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances.

DE CASTRO V CARLOS

Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides
that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of this
Court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals and
regional trial court and does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum. The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.
Settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so
remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
fundamental charter and immemorial tradition.”
A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright
dismissal of a petition.
A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are
special and important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a
petition. The rationale behind this policy arises from the necessity of preventing
(1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the Court, which is better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (
(2) further overcrowding of the Court’s docket.

"A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to
use or exercise a franchise or an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment,
thereof, if the claim is not well-founded, or if his right to enjoy the
privilege has been forfeited."Where the action is filed by a private person, in his
own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position,
otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the
office.
NPC V POSADA

Expropriation proceedings for national infrastructure projects are governed by

Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and Republic Act No. 8974.
The power of eminent domain is an inherent competence of the state. It is
essential to a sovereign. Thus, the Constitution does not explicitly define this
power but subjects it to a limitation: that it be exercised only for public use and
with payment of just compensation.
Whether the use is public or whether the compensation is constitutionally just will
be determined finally by the courts.
Expropriation, the procedure by which the government takes possession of private
property, is outlined primarily in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
It undergoes two phases.
The first phase determines the propriety of the action.
The second phase determines the compensation to be paid to the landowner.

There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation.

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of
the action, "of condemnation declaring, that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take
the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in
the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to
be taken. " This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three
(3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would
finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done
by the Court regarding the issue.
Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in
its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too,
such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order by taking an appeal
therefrom
The first phase of expropriation commences with the filing of the complaint. It
ends with the order of the trial court to proceed with the expropriation and
determination of just compensation. During the pendency of the complaint before
the trial court, the state may already enter and possess the property subject to the
guidelines in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, however, is not the only set of rules that governs
the first phase of expropriation. On November 7, 2000, Congress enacted Republic
Act No. 8974 to govern the expropriation of private property for national
government infrastructure projects. The law qualifies the manner by which the
government may enter and take possession of the property to be
expropriated.
Rule 67, Section 2 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government
depositary. — Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after
due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon
the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized
government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of
the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court
authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the
Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government
depositary.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, on the other hand, mandates:

Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. - Whenever it is necessary to
acquire real property for the right-of-way or location for any national government
infrastructure project through expropriation, the appropriate implementing
agency shall initiate the expropriation proceedings before the proper court under
the following guidelines:
(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant,
the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property
the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the
value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau
of Internal Re venue. (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or
structures as determined under Section 7 hereof;
...
Upon compliance with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall
immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the
property and start the implementation of the project. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, unlike Rule 67, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, requires immediate payment to the landowner of 100% of the value of
the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. It is the Bureau of Internal Revenue, not the court, which
determines the zonal value.
The law also requires the immediate payment of the value of the improvements
and/or structures on the land before the trial court can issue the Writ of
Possession.

Just compensation as required by the Constitution is different from the provisional

value required by Republic Act No. 8974.
In Capitol Steel Corporation v. PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority:
Upon compliance with the requirements, a petitioner in an expropriation case ... is
entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right and it becomes the ministerial
duty of the trial court to forthwith issue the writ of possession. No hearing is
required and the court neither exercises its discretion or judgment in determining
the amount of the provisional value of the properties to be expropriated as the
legislature has fixed the amount under Section 4 of R.A. 8974.
To clarify, the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of
a writ of possession differs from the payment of just compensation for the
expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on the current relevant
zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of
the property. As the appellate court-explained:
The first refers to the preliminary or provisional determination of the value of the
property. It serves a double-purpose of pre-payment if the property is fully
expropriated, and of an indemnity for damages if the proceedings are dismissed.
It is not a final determination of just compensation and may not necessarily be
equivalent to the prevailing fair market value of the property. Of course, it may be
a factor to be considered in the determination of just compensation.
Just compensation, on the other hand, is the final determination of the fair
market value of the property. It has been described as "the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by
reason of the expropriation.”

There is no need for the determination with reasonable certainty of the final
amount of just compensation before the writ of possession may be issued.71
(Emphasis and underscoring in the original, citation omitted)
The statutory requirement to pay a provisional amount equivalent to the full
Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation does' not substitute for the judicial
determination of just compensation. The payment to the property owner of a
preliminary amount is one way to ensure that property will not be condemned
arbitrarily.
In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner being
really without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of the expropriating agency.
In other words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against
his will. Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly
followed, such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an
exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be specifically
alleged or least reasonably deducible from the complaint.

A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in
the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the
new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property
to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep
the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor
the judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of fair play[.]
It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to initiate expropriation
proceedings, seize a person's property, allow the judgment of the court to become
final and executory and then refuse to pay on the ground that there are no
appropriations for the property earlier taken and profitably used. We condemn in
the strongest possible terms the cavalier attitude of government officials who
adopt such a despotic and irresponsible stance.

The rule, therefore, is that expropriation proceedings must be dismissed when it is

determined that it is not for a public purpose, except when:
First, the trial court's order already became final and executory;

Second, the government already took possession of the property; and
Lastly, the expropriation case already caused prejudice to the landowner.
The expropriation case is not automatically dismissed when the property ceases to
be for public use. The state must first file the appropriate Motion to Withdraw
before the trial court having jurisdiction over the proceedings. The grant or denial
of any Motion to Withdraw in an expropriation proceeding is always subject to
judicial discretion.

HACIENDA LUISITA V PARC

Just compensation has been defined as “the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator.” The measure is not the taker’s
gain, but the owner’s loss.
In determining just compensation, the price or value of the property at the time it
was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government shall be the basis.
If the government takes possession of the land before the institution of
expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking
of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint.
“the ‘time of taking’ is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and
benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic.”
It should be noted, however, that “taking” does not only take place upon the
issuance of title either in the name of the Republic or the beneficiaries of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). “Taking” also occurs when
agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and approved by PARC
for CARP coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in the instant case..

CORDOVA V PATHFINDER

Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private

property to particular uses to promote public welfare. It is an indispensable
attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to
serve the common need and advance the general welfare.8 The power of
eminent domain is inseparable in sovereignty being essential to the existence of
the State and inherent in government. Its exercise is proscribed by only two
Constitutional requirements:
first, that there must be just compensation, and
second, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.

The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature but may be

validly delegated to local government units. The basis for its exercise by the
Municipality of Cordova, being a local government unit, is granted under Section
19 of Republic Act 7160,
Judicial review of the exercise of the power of eminent domain is limited to the
following areas of concern:
(a) the adequacy of the compensation,
(b) the necessity of the taking, and
(c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.

DAR V ROMANA

Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is still incomplete, as in
this case where the just compensation for the subject land acquired under PD 27
has yet to be paid, just compensation should be determined and the process
concluded under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 having mere suppletory
effects. This means that PD 27 and EO 228 only apply when there are gaps in RA
6657; where RA 6657 is sufficient, PD 27 and EO 228 are superseded.
For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of
taking.
1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title
is transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.

[T]he determination of just compensation is a judicial function; hence, courts

cannot be unduly restricted in their determination thereof. To do so would deprive
the courts of their judicial prerogatives and reduce them to the bureaucratic
function of inputting data and arriving at the valuation. While the courts should
be mindful of the different formulae created by the DAR in arriving at just
compensation, they are not strictly bound to adhere thereto if the situations
before them do not warrant it.

REPUBLIC V GINGOYON

NAPOCOR V SPS DELA CRUZ

Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, reveals the following:

SEC. 6. Proceedings by commissioners.—Before entering upon the performance of
their duties, the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will
faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court
with the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may be introduced by either
party before the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on
hearings before them, and the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to
the contrary, after due notice to the parties to attend, view and examine the
property sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the
same, after which either party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The
commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the property not taken
and deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits to be
derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the
operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of
the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the
consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or
the owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken.

SEC. 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon.—The court may order

the commissioners to report when any particular portion of the real estate shall
have been passed upon by them, and may render judgment upon such partial
report, and direct the commissioners to proceed with their work as to subsequent
portions of the property sought to be expropriated, and may from time to time so
deal with such property. The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report
to the court of all their proceedings, and such proceedings shall not be effectual
until the court shall have accepted their report and rendered judgment in
accordance with their recommendations. Except as otherwise expressly ordered by
the court, such report shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date the
commissioners were notified of their appointment, which time may be extended
in the discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of the court
shall serve copies thereof on all interested parties, with notice that they are
allowed ten (10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the report,
if they so desire.

SEC. 8. Action upon commissioners’ report.—Upon the expiration of the period of

ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of
such period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections to the
report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing,
accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause
shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts;
or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept
the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such
judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of
his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the
property so taken.

Based on these provisions, it is clear that in addition to the ocular inspection

performed by the two (2) appointed commissioners in this case, they are also
required to conduct a hearing or hearings to determine just compensation; and to
provide the parties the following: (1) notice of the said hearings and the
opportunity to attend them; (2) the opportunity to introduce evidence in their
favor during the said hearings; and (3) the opportunity for the parties to argue
their respective causes during the said hearings.

mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. In the instant expropriation case,

where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a hearing
before the commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence
on the issue of just compensation.
PNOC V MAGLASANG

this Court held that there is a "taking" when the expropriator enters private
property not only for a momentary period but for a more permanent duration, for
the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

REPUBLIC V SPS CANCIO

In Capitol Steel Corporation v. PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority,16 we clarified that

the payment of the provisional value as a condition for the issuance of a writ of
possession is different from the payment of just compensation for the
expropriated property.
While the provisional value is based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just
compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of the property.
Just compensation, on the other hand, is the final determination of the fair
market value of the property. It has been described as "the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by
reason of the expropriation.”

ROLDAN V SPS BARRIOS

However, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. A strict

application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases
brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.
Since petitioner raises a pure question of law pertaining to the court's
jurisdiction on complaint for judicial foreclosure of sale, we would allow
petitioner's direct resort to us.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of
the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. It is conferred by
law and an objection based on this ground cannot be waived by the parties. To
determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it is
important to determine the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought.

From the foregoing, the RTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in civil
actions where the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
It is worthy to mention that the essence of a contract of mortgage indebtedness is
that a property has been identified or set apart from the mass of the property of
the debtor-mortgagor as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of
an obligation to answer the amount of indebtedness, in case of default in
payment.
Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of non-payment of the mortgage
indebtedness. In a real estate mortgage when the principal obligation is not paid
when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the
property seized and sold with the view of applying the proceeds to the payment of
the obligation. Therefore, the foreclosure suit is a real action so far as it is against
property, and seeks the judicial recognition of a property debt, and an order for
the sale of the res.
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.

If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered

capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.

However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum
of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific

performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also
actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or
conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission, which is a
counterpart of specific performance.

METROPOLITAN BANK V MIRANDA

We take this occasion to reiterate that the object of a notice of sale is to inform the
public of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time,
place, and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of securing bidders
and preventing a sacrifice sale of the property.
The goal of the notice requirement is to achieve a "reasonably wide publicity" of
the auction sale. This is why publication in a newspaper of general circulation is
required. The Court has previously taken judicial notice of the "far-reaching
effects" of publishing the notice of sale in a newspaper of general circulation.
Thus, the publication of the notice of sale was held essential to the validity of
foreclosure proceedings. 


While the law recognizes the right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the
mortgagor's failure to pay his obligation, it is imperative that such right be
exercised according to its clear mandate. Each and every requirement of the law
must be complied with, lest, the valid exercise of the right would end. It must be
remembered that the exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it
disappears when it is abused especially to the prejudice of others.

PBCOM V YEUNG

The relevant provision, Section 4 of Rule 68 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,

mandates that:
Section 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale. – The amount realized from the
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of the
sale, be paid to the person foreclosing the mortgage, and when there shall be any
balance or residue, after paying off the mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid
to junior encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be ascertained by the
court, or if there be no such encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue after
payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his duly authorized agent, or to the
person entitled to it. [emphases and underscores ours)

Thus, in the absence of any evidence showing that the mortgage also covers the
other obligations of the mortgagor, the proceeds from the sale should not be
applied to them.

HUERTA V CA

"The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different from and should not be
confused with the right of redemption.

The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage – understood in the sense of a

prerogative to re- acquire mortgaged property after registration of the foreclosure
sale – exists only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No
such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure except only where the mortgagee
is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or banking institution.
Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor
the right of redemption within one (1) year from the registration of the sheriff’s
certificate of foreclosure sale.

Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of

redemption exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale ‘when
confirmed be an order of the court. . . . shall operate to divest the rights of all the
parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights
of redemption as may be allowed by law.’

Such rights exceptionally ‘allowed by law’ (i.e., even after confirmation by an

order of the court) are those granted by the charter of the Philippine National
Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337). These
laws confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor
of the mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure — after
confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale — which right may be exercised
within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date of registration of the
certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.

But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of

a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or banking institution. In
such a case, the foreclosure sale, ‘when confirmed by an order of the court. . .
shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their
rights in the purchaser.’ There then exists only what is known as the equity of
redemption. This is simply the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the
mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within
the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68,
or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.

Section 2, Rule 68 provides that —

‘. . If upon the trial . . the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be
true, it shall ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or
obligation, including interest and costs, and shall render judgment for the sum so
found due and order the same to be paid into court within a period of not less
than ninety (90) days from the date of the service of such order, and that in
default of such payment the property be sold to realize the mortgage debt and
costs.’
This is the mortgagor’s equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated,
may be exercised by him even beyond the 90-day period ‘from the date of service
of the order,’ and even after the foreclosure sale itself, provided it be before the
order of confirmation of the sale. After such order of confirmation, no redemption
can be effected any longer." 8 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner failed to seasonably invoke its purported right under Section 78 of R.A.
No. 337.
"But we never made any pronouncement on the one-year right of redemption of
petitioner because, in the first place, the foreclosure in this case is judicial, and as
such. the mortgagor has only the equity. not the right of redemption . . . While it
may be true that under Section 78 of R.A. 337 as amended, otherwise known as
the General Banking Act, a mortgagor of a bank, banking or credit institution,
whether the foreclosure was done judicially or extrajudicially, has a period of one
year from the auction sale within which to redeem the foreclosed property

ORIBELLO V CA

Before going further, it is relevant to relive the nature of the remedy of judicial
partition. The proceeding under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is a judicial
controversy between persons who, being co-owners or coparceners of common
property, seek to secure a division or partition thereof among themselves, giving
to each one of them the part corresponding to him. The object of partition is to
enable those who own property as joint tenants, or coparceners, or tenants in
common to put an end to the joint tenancy so as to vest in each a sole estate in
specific property or an allotment in the lands or tenements.
According to American jurisprudence:
The right of compulsory partition, in the case of coparceners was the gift of the
common law, but in the case of joint tenants and tenants in common it was first
given by statutes. The common law, having established this right in favor of
coparceners, because their relationship being created by it, and not by an act or
choice of their own, as in the case of joint tenants and tenants in common,
thought it reasonable that it should endure no longer than the parties should be
pleased with it; but at the same time deemed it expedient as well as just, that they
should not be placed in worse condition by the partition, than if they had
continued to enjoy their respective interests in the lands or property without a
division. x x x

To accord with the nature of the remedy of judicial partition, there are two stages
defined under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
The first relates to the determination of the rights of the parties to the property
held in common.
The second concerns the physical segregation of each party's just share in the
property held in common.
The second stage need not be gone into should the parties agree on the physical
partition.
As Justice Regalado discussed in De Mesa v. Court of Appeals:
The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned
with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a
partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be made
by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase
may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition
either because a co-ownership does not exist or a partition is legally prohibited. It
may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in
truth exist, that partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of
rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in
order. In the latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition
among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall
confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties." In either case, whether
the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a
final one and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition ordered by the court. In that event, partition shall be effected for the
parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
This second phase may also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its
approval by the Court after the parties have been accorded the opportunity to be
heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto
entitled of their just shares in the rents and profits of the real estate in question.
Such an order is, to be sure, also final and appealable.

DIVINAGRACIA

An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action
in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had.
The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so
inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party
to the proceeding is an absolute necessity.
With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
requires that all persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants,
viz.:
SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. – A person having the right
to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting
forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate
description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as
defendants all other persons interested in the property. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr.,39 the Court definitively explained that in
instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties, the proper remedy is to implead
them and not to dismiss the case, to wit:
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just,
parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal
concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the
order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure
to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable. x x x40 (Underscoring supplied; emphases in the original)

RESTAR

Article 494 of the New Civil Code expressly provides:

ART. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned.
xx x
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners
or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a
co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription [21] where there exists a
clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the
claim of adverse and exclusive ownership. [22]
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and
with just title for a period of ten years. Without good faith and just title,
acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires
uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years.
Thus, the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be
ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and
with just title for the time fixed by law.
ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired
by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of
title or of good faith.

DELACRUZ

A person who claims ownership of real property is duty bound to clearly identify
the land being claimed in accordance with the document on which he anchors his
right of ownership. When the record does not show that the land subject matter of
the action has been exactly determined, such action cannot prosper. Proof of
ownership together with identity of the land is the basic rule. (Citations omitted,
Emphasis supplied)

TABASONDRA

According to Article 493 of the Civil Code, each co-owner "shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved," but "the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership."

With respect to properties shared in common by virtue of inheritance, alienation

of a pro indiviso portion thereof is specifically governed by Article 1088 that
provides:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before
the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within
the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by
the vendor.
Although the CA correctly identified the co-owners of the three lots, it did not
segregate the 100,352- square meter property into determinate portions among
the several co-owners. To do so, the CA should have followed the manner set in
Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 11. The judgment and its effect; copy to be recorded in registry of deeds.
If actual partition of property is made, the judgment shall state definitely, by
metes and bounds and adequate description, the particular portion of the real
estate assigned to each party, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in
each party to the action in severalty the portion of the real estate assigned to him.
xxxs (Bold emphasis supplied.)

Section 2. Order for partition, and partition by agreement thereunder. - If after the
trial the court finds that the plaintiff has the right thereto, it shall order the
partition of the real estate among all the parties in interest. Thereupon the parties
may, if they are able to agree, make the partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed
upon by all the parties, and such partition, together with the order of the court
confirming the same, shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in
which the property is situated.(2a)