Kripke and the Mind-Body Problem

Author(s): Dale Jacquette

Source: Dialectica, Vol. 41, No. 4 (1987), pp. 293-300
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/42970584
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 Kripke and the Mind-Body Problem

by Dale J acquette*

Summary
Mind-body identity theories are standardly supposed to be logically contingent. Kripke
defends a quasi-Cartesian property dualism by observing that bodies and minds or mental and
neurophysiological events or event-types can always be assigned distinct rigid designators. The
concept of rigid designation implies that possibly nonidentical rigidly designated bodies and
minds are necessarily and therefore actually nonidentical. But Kripke's argument does not refute
materialist reductions that affirm the actual identity of minds and bodies while admitting only the
possible nonidentity of no/frigidly designated mental and material entities. This limits the
adequate expression of contingent materialist theories, but does not defeat materialism per se.
The mind-body problem like other genuine ontological issues resists stipulative semantic-philo-
sophical resolution.
Résumé

Dans le problème corps-esprit, les théories identitaires sont supposées être logiquement con-
tingentes. Kripke défend un dualisme quasiment cartésien des propriétés en observant qu'aux
corps et aux esprits (ou aux événements ou types d'événements mentaux et neurophysiologiques)
peuvent toujours être associés des désignateurs rigides distincts. Le concept même de désignation
rigide implique que des corps et des esprits qui peuvent ne pas être identiquement rigidement dési-
gnés sont pour cette raison nécessairement non identiques. Mais l'argument de Kripke ne réfute
pas les réductions matérialistes qui affirment l'identité effective du corps et de l'esprit tout en
admettant la non-identité possible d'entités mentales et matérielles non rigidement désignées.
Ceci limite l'expression adéquate de théories matérialistes contingentes, mais ne réfute pas le
matérialisme en soi. Comme d'autres points véritablement ontologiques, le problème corps-esprit
n'admet pas de solution reposant sur une stipulation sémantico-philosophique.

Zusammenfassung
Theorien der Geist-Körper Identität werden üblicherweise für logisch kontingent ausgege-
ben. Kripke vertritt einen quasi-Cartesianischen Eigenschaftsdualismus, indem er dafür hält, dass
Körpern und Seelen oder mentalen und neurophysiologischen Ereignissen oder Ereignistypen
immer verschiedene starre Designatoren zugeordnet werden können. Der Begriff der starren
Designation impliziert, dass möglicherweise nicht identische, starr bezeichnete Körper und Seelen,
notwendigerweise und deshalb tatsächlich nicht identisch sind. Kripkes Argument widerlegt
jedoch nicht materialistische Reduktionen, die die tatsächliche Identität von Körpern und Seelen
behaupten, während sie nur die mögliche Nichtidentität von nicht starr bezeichneten, mentalen
und materialen Entitäten zulassen. Dies schränkt die adäquate Formulierung von Kontingenten
materialistischen Theorien ein, zerstört aber nicht den Materialismus als solchen. Das Geist-Kör-
perproblem - wie andere echt ontologischen Fragen - widersetzt sich einer Lösung durch
semantisch-philosophische Stipulation.

* Department of Philosophy, The Pennsylvania State University, 246 Sparks Building,

University Park, PA 16802 USA.

Dialéctica Vol. 41, N° 4 (1987)

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 294 Dale J acquette

I . Identity and Rigid Designation

Saul A. Kripke in his lectures on Na

concept of rigid designation. Rigid des
same individual in every logically possibl
Nonrigid designators by contrast desig
worlds1.
Kripke argues that names in ordinar
that descriptive terms or definite desc
nonrigid2. The man that corrupted Ha
ent individuals in different logically pos
cumference of a circle to its diameter' is
properties of mathematical objects ar
circumference to its diameter exists
description in every logically possible wo
The concept of rigid designation com
semantics of modal logic. The problem
stipulating that an individual rigidly
world also exists and has different non
cally possible worlds. Logically possib
through high-powered telescopes to see
If this were necessary it would be diff
recognize the same objects with radic
logically possible worlds. The concept of rigid designation resolves the
problem by making transworld identity a matter of decision rather than dis-
covery4.
It is a consequence of Kripke's concept of rigid designation that rigidly
codesignative identity statements are logically necessary and never merely
contingent. Kripke distinguishes between identities and identity statements.
Identities are necessary, but identity statements involving distinct nonrigid
designators are contingent. Kripke claims: "If ' a ' and are rigid desig-
nators, it follows that 4 a = V if true, is a necessary truth. If 'a* and ť6' are
not rigid designators, no such conclusion follows about the statement ' a = V

1 Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980),
pp. 48-49. Kripke, "Identity and Necessity", Identity and Individuation , edited by Milton
K. Munitz (New York: New York University Press, 1971), pp. 144-149. Kripke's view of logically
possible worlds is criticized on conceptual grounds by Stanley Rosen, The Limits of Analysis
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 52-97.
2 Naming and Necessity , pp. 48-53, 57-63, 102-110.
3 Ibid., pp. 24, 28, 48-49, 60.
4 Ibid., pp. 42-53.

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 Kripke and the Mind-Body Problem 295

(though the objects designated by kď and ' b ' will be necessarily identical)"
is logically necessary that Mark Twain = Samuel Clemens, given that th
codesignation holds in the actual world and therefore in at least one lo
possible world. But it is merely contingent that Mark Twain = the aut
Pudďnhead Wilson . Kripke argues that nonrigidly designating descrip
like 'the author of Pudďnhead Wilson ' do not give the meaning but 'f
referent' of the rigidly designating term 'Mark Twain'6.

II. Modalities of Cartesian Dualism

Kripke's concept of rigid designation underwrites a semantic argument

quasi-Cartesian dualism. Materialism and especially reductive materiali
mind-body identity theory is standardly regarded as contingent, and the i
tity of mental and neurophysiological events is supposed to be discover
confirmed by empirical scientific investigation. Mind-body ident
theoretical, like the identity of temperature and mean kinetic energ
lightning and atmospheric electrical discharge. The materialist reduct
mental to physical events is not intended to explain the meaning of m
phenomena in terms of physical phenomena, and reductive mind-body
tity statements are not offered as expressions of logically necessary synon
Identity theorists believe that mind-body dualism is logically possib
actually and perhaps even causally necessarily false7.
If mind-body dualism is logically possible, then there is at least one
cally possible world in which the mind is not identical to any material
and mental events are not identical to physical events. Kripke adopt
straightforward expedient of assigning rigid designators to all possibly dis
bodies and minds or correlated mental and neurophysiological events.
lows from the concept of rigid designation that rigidly designated bod
minds or mental and physical events, if nonidentical in any logically p
world, are necessarily distinct or nonidentical in every logically possible w
in which they exist, and therefore a fortiori actually distinct or nonident
the actual world. The argument rejects contingent mind-body identity the
as necessarily false and internally inconsistent. Kripke writes:

5 Ibid., p. 3.
° lbia., pp. 13, 33-ou, õi-iõõ.
7 U.T. Place, "Is Consciousness a Brain Process? , British Journal of Psychology,
Vol. XLVII, 1956, pp. 44-50. J.J.C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes", The Philosophical
Review, Vol. LXVIII, 1959, pp. 141-156. Hilary Putnam, "Minds and Machines", Dimensions of
Mind, edited by Sidney Hook; rpt., Minds and Machines, edited by Alan R. Anderson (Engle-
wood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 85-88. D.M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the
Mind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968).

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 296 Dale J acquette

Descartes, and others following him, argue

his body, since the mind could exist with
argued the same conclusion from the premi
the mind. Now the one response which I r
which cheerfully accepts the Cartesian prem
Let 'Descartes' be a name, or rigid designato
designator of his body. Then if Descartes
identity, being an identity between two r
Descartes could not exist without B and B co

The contingent materialist identity

resources of stipulative rigid designat
mind-body nonidentity is logically pos
tive materialism is held to be logically n
then Kripke's refutation proceeds in p
adducement of grounds for the ration
identity is at least logically possible. If
contradicts the necessity of mind-bod
then retreat to a contingent version of m
inal criticism.
Descartes' evidence for the possible nonidentity of body and mind
includes the conceivability of simultaneous existence of mind and nonex-
istence of body, the better knowability of mind than body, and the divisibility
of body and nondivisibility of mind or ineliminable unity of consciousness9.
These are supplemented in Kripke's discussion by the commonsense observa-
tion that after death the body can exist without the mind10. Descartes' treat-
ment of the mind-body problem appears committed to something like the
derivation of essential or logically necessary mind-body distinctions from
actual or logically possible mind-body distinctions. In the Meditations on
First Philosophy, Descartes maintains: "... just because I know certainly that
I exist, and meanwhile I do not remark that any other thing necessarily per-

8 Naming and Necessity, pp. 144-145. See Michael E. Levin, "Kripke's Arguments Against
the Identity Thesis", The Journal of Philosophy , Vol. LXXII, 1975, pp. 149-167. Robert J.
Titiev, "Kripke, Rigid Designators, and Cartesian Dualism" Philosophical Studies , Vol. XXVI,
1974, pp. 357-375. Lawrence F. Mucciolo, "On Kripke's Argument Against the Identity Thesis",
Philosophia, Vol. V, 1975, pp. 499-506. J.B. Blumenfeld, "Kripke's Refutations of Mate-
rialism", Australasian Journal of Philosophy , Vol. LIII, 1975, pp. 151-156. Grover Maxwell,
"Rigid Designators and Mind-Brain Identity" in Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Founda-
tions of Psychology , Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. IX, edited by C. Wade
Savage (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978), pp. 365-403.
9 René Descartes, Discourse on Method , The Philosophical Works of Descartes , Vol. I,
translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1975), Part IV, p. 101. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy , ibid., Meditation II,
pp. 149-150; Meditation VI, pp. 190, 196-197.
1U Naming and Necessity, pp. 144-145.

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 Kripke and the Mind-Body Problem 297

tains to my nature or essence, excepting that I am a thinking thing,

conclude that my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a think
..." 11 (Kripke's quasi-Cartesian refutation of materialism is not
provide an explication of Descartes' reasoning, and Descartes ne
understood as adopting an implicit rigid designation thesis in his
viated statements of the proof. Kripke does not subscribe to Desc
or mental-material substance dualism, but seems to accept a less c
property-aspect dualism or nonreductive materialism I2.)

Ill . Rigid and Nonrigid Mind-Body Identity Statements

What happens if Descartes' mind is rigidly, but his body nonri

nated? At first it might appear that this could not possibly mak
ference. The fact that Descartes 'body and mind can be rigidly de
are distinct or nonidentical in at least one logically possible world see
cient to carry Kripke's inference. But the nonrigid designation
objects emphasizes an important limitation in Kripke's semantic
the mind-body problem. Kripke's argument does not refute material
tions that affirm the actual identity of minds and bodies while adm
the possible nonidentity of nonúg'à'y designated mental and mate
This limits the adequate expression of contingent materialist t
does not defeat materialism perse .
Kripke offers arguments against three forms of reductive mat
mind-body identity theory: (i) Token-token identifications of partic
and material bodies (Descartes = body B)' (ii) Token-token ident
particular mental and neurophysiological events (pain sensation
state B)' (iii) Type-type identifications of kinds of mental and ph
(pain = C-fiber stimulation)13. Type-type identifications in (iii)
problems about Kripke's doctrine of natural kinds, and the rigid
of properties by natural kind terms14. For present purposes it w
consider in detail Kripke's attack on token-token materialist iden
The conclusions reached here apply with slight modification to K
ments directed against materialist identities in (ii) and (iii).

11 Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditation VI, p. 190.

12 Naming and Necessity, p. 144. Kripke explicitly disclaims Cartesian substanc
note 77, p. 155.
13 Ibid., pp. 144-145. See Fred Feldman, "Kripke on the Identity Theory", Th
Philosophy, Vol. LXXI, 1971, pp. 665-676.
14 Naming and Necessity , pp. 134-144.

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298 Dale Jacquette

John Locke's fable about body excha

suggests that nonrigidly designated m
identical rigidly designated minds in al
an exchange of bodies is postulated ac
times within a world, then the terms
body' might each nonrigidly designate
sonage in some but not all logically po
specimen of peasant day-laborer in oth
designations of Descartes' body. It mu
nator 'Descartes' body' or 'the body
material entities in different logically
of such descriptions as 'the mind of De
than nonrigid).
Let '£>' rigidly designate Descartes or
designate Descartes' body. If it is l
Kripke's theory of rigid designation it
body of Descartes can be nonrigidly d
'ixCx' ('C' for 'corpus' to avoid confu
'5'). It may be actually though only co
SxCx' designates different material en
some but not all logically possible w
necessary that D By and logically cont
low (even by transitivity of identity) t
sarily Descartes' mind (rigidly designa
body (nonrigidly designated). There ar
Modal contexts are referentially opaque
ally codesignative term 'ixCx' for '/?' i
invalid and non-truth-value-preserving
straightforward modal grounds, since
rigidly designative identity in B - ixC
that it is logically contingent that D i

IV. Materialism Undefeated

This seems to play right into Krip

(though merely contingent) nonidenti
designated body. In the stipulative spir

15 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human

York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959), Vol. I, pp.

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 Kripke and the Mind-Body Problem 299

that anyone's nonrigidly designated body ixC*x, supposedly contingent

identical to that person's mind, can also be rigidly designated by some t
' B*' If it is logically possible that D ^ Z?*, and if it is contingently true by s
pulation that B* = ixOx, then it follows that contingently D ^ ixC*x.
All that is needed to restore Kripke's quasi-Cartesian dualism in full g
erality and logical necessity is a recursive procedure for assigning arbitr
rigid designators to every nonrigidly designated material body the reduc
materialist might try to identify with any rigidly or nonrigidly designated
son or mind. Kripke takes something like this attitude toward the problem in
related context involving type-type mind-body identity theory, when
writes: "... if 'C-fibers' is not a rigid designator, simply replace it by o
which is ..." 16 There is no way for the materialist to outrun this strategy, b
there is an alternative tactic that blocks Kripke' s conclusions and indicates th
error and limitations of his argument.
Reductive materialists are expected to admit that mind-body identity is n
more that contingently true, and that it is logically possible for the mind to
distinct from or nonidentical with any material object. But the material
concession need not be expressed in terms of rigid designators. It is un
cessary and highly imprudent for the materialist to acknowledge the log
possibility of mind-body dualism for rigidly designated minds and rigid
designated bodies. Kripke's refutation is undermined if the materialist h
only that mind-body dualism is logically possible in the sense that the m
may be distinct from and nonidentical with any nonrigidly design
material body. The materialist in Kripke's rigid designation idiom is fre
hold that identities between some rigidly designated minds and bodies
logically necessary. The inconsistency problem cannot arise if the materi
qualifies mind-body identity as empirically contingent by granting only
although Descartes' mind is actually identical with Descartes' brain or cen
and peripheral nervous system, it is logically possible that Descartes' min
not identical with Descartes' nonrigidly designated brain or central and p
pheral nervous system. This is not to say and clearly does not entail that
logically possible that Descartes' mind is distinct from or nonidentical w
any rigidly designated material entity.
The question of mind-body identity or nonidentity then reverts to t
empirical problem of demonstrating or repudiating a theoretical identit
mental and neurophysiological events by scientific inquiry, as materialists an
mind-body identity theorists have maintained from the start. Kripke's r
designation gambit was designed to circumvent the plodding and potent

16 Naming and Necessity, p. 149.

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 300 Dale Jacquette

inconclusive empirical resolution of th

list can stalemate Kripke's conclusions by
carefully in terms of the distinction b
admitting that the identity thesis is c
minds are possibly distinct from nonr
new terminology, but one to which the m
modate Kripke's objection. The reformu
change the substance of the materiali
whether the identity thesis is true or fals
There is a straightforward transposi
Kripkean mode. The materialist can h
sibly D 5* ixCx. It can then be stipula
from this it does not follow that poss
invalid substitution of the rigid design
'ixCx' in the ineliminably intensional o
'Possibly D 5* ixCx17. The intensionalit
sibility contexts constitutes a final lin
reductive materialism or mind-body id
linguistic suberfuge. Materialism is u
involving rigid designators provided the
the logical possibility of rigidly designat
Kripke's argument therefore has diff
sometimes been supposed. Kripke does
tain versions of reductive materialism
designation. Materialism does not require rigid designators to advance
theoretical mind-body or mental-neurophysiological event identities, nor to
acknowledge the empirical contingency of materialism or logical possibility of
mind-body dualism. The mind-body identity problem like other genuine
ontological issues resists stipulati ve semantic-philosophical resolution. The
identity of mind and body may stand or fall as an empirical scientific
hypothesis only by the accumulation and interpretation of experimental
evidence.

17 The intensionality or referential opacity of modal contexts is demonstrated by W.V.O.

Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1960), pp. 191-232; "Three Grades of
Modal Involvement", The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays , revised enlarged edition (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 158-164; "Reference and Modality". From a Logical
Point of View , second revised edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 139-144.

Dialéctica Vol. 41 , N° 4 (1987)

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