G.R. No.
154380 October 5, 2005 The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry
under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel
question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion
for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated
to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason
of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry
under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer
Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married
a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue,
San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was
denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE 4
because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and
an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits
that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. 6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated
by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. 7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a
petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. 8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens
where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The
interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was
the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known
as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2
signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
26. As so amended, it now provides: marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases
not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 12
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the
instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It
seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
residing in the U.S.A.
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them
abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that
validly divorce them abroad can.
has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed
foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re- to remarry.
marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a
petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and
Legislative Intent in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the
badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever
the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article
spouse.
26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning
the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were
other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were,
as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No.
and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in
the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based
on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 221029
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
RESOLUTION
peralta, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside
the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of Entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing
were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial
hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts Order dated
January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012,
February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines
authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and
Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that based on the allegations
therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended Petition,
which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO
as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die proceedings, a divorce
decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband are no
longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former
husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila
cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in
order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no
longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of
marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage
between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that
she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment. Among
the documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in
substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12,
2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of
Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by
Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the
Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or
in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws
shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of
their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because
the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be
based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height
of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to
her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as
similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino
was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two types: (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad. 13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. 14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise
known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988. 16 Shortly thereafter , E.O.
No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second
paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision
Committee (Committee),but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed
E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the where
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree
to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. 20 It
authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does
not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a
divorce case.22 Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the
spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or
property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts. 23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the
absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer
married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national
law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code,
are still considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them
under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign
citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held
in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were,
as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954
and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2
of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
xxx
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the
instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to
remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment
against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition
of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of
marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said
Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she]
decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her
maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property
relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor
daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging
that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack
of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule"
prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by
his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not
to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked
jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino
spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not
bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an
alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien
divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission
that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband
, who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a
conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she
initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree
issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared
national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to
public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the
case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.
The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot
sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce
is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs.
Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction
are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the
bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or
a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former
marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have
no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
As he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support
to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized
and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v.
Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a
judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who
is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a
prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between
his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil
status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to
cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of
the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in
the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record
of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve,
in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to
be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and
Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was
granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on
the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to
obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v.
Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the
case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and
resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a
foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on
the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one
of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer
a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist,
the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the
marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine
law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law
cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that
that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino
peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the
legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a
divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the
words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouth of lawmakers. 37 The legislature is presumed to
know the meaning of the words to have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there
should be departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute
when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. 40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils.
et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched.
Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to
inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that
the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law control its
letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it
was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry
under the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or
not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will
have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated
a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving
end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos
whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed by
operation on the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the City
Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a
testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality
principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce
as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional. 43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial
review.44 The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution. 45 When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its
primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence
to constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required
since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those
basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech, political
expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote. 49 On the other hand, what
constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution
and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties
must give way, such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare. 51 It essentially
involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former
to take precedence over the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect to the
acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this
case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites 53 of the equal protection
clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse
is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign
citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural,
and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino
national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien
against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner. 55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes
of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations
in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both
are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction
between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or
not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a
foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would
not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code. 56 In filing
for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim,
tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's
comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her
martial ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything
but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed
in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who
are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the
reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding
is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to marry
foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or
initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support what he intends
to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence,
it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is
innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns, 59 that acquiescence resulted
from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, 61 and that the law
has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a
Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that
interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or
profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in
nature and that they are more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to
prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictated on the kind
of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right
to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married couples to
structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no
children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all
the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the
only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage. 63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce
because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas
during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point. 65 Their
exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer specifically to
the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His
intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to
encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned
the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could
grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the
husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority
conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with
the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141
("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as
intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by
deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living together
impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth
Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed. 69 From August
30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by
Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized. 70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute
absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B.
No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or
the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in
favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are
as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a
child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
 c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of a petitioner,
to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if
pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or
abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse during
the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in
vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of a petitioner;
and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or both spouses
can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years of
age or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the
parents guradian or personl having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless
after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived
together as husband and wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full knowledge
of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same
having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such
incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or appears to
be incurable.
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or supervening
after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition for absolute
divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or not
the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to another,
the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as respondent,
or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the marriage
beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to
enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked
upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also
limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the
citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they are good
for country.77 While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are
governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a
legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other
constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally
mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of
children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We
limit the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is
not amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic
abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the
menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No.
9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No.
10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the
Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional
mandate to value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen
who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him
or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he
or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any
child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these
are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a
restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under
Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not
formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to
families formed according to indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of
communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system that
almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon.
Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often
than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the
attainment of the individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context
of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time,
brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his
or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It
is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in
its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as
to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the
same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the sord and the
will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking
too closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a
policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every
one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in ever case
brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts
warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker,
to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to cases
not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's petition to
recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage
in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven. 90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can
be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented
and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports
to be written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office. 92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing
the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of
the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese
national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these
documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the
Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible a a
written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG;
neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the
ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so. 95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material defendants
have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts,
they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. 96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well
as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family
relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and October
12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant
Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch
11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada
soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was
shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on
January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying
his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered
the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce
decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and
Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but
submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s
petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to
Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not
the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of
the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the
provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in
Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino
spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case,
as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The
Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both
cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at
the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens. 18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, 19 enacted
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no
rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss
Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity
with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for
the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law
upon the title of the thing; and
this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused
to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the
alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that: evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice
spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 22
the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a
divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. 27
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." 28 This
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. 24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino
herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; 25 Article 17 of the Civil
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a
foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or
spouse and his or her alien spouse. her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated
remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.
by the seal of his office.
No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that
already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national
law.26 The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. 31 Under this
situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
with the Canadian divorce law.
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served
and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition
other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of
for its recognition in this jurisdiction
a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. (j) changes of name.
Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is
made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as
xxxx
provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books,
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign
in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper
basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same
effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the (1) Birth and death register;
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree and dissolved marriages.

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded (3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and
the bar to what had been done. But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the
decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus,
shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the
produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, decree presented by Gerbert.
such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of
that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage,
registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry: can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being
contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently
void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
entered:
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
(a) births;
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
(b) deaths;
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without
(c) marriages; judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule
108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied
(d) annulments of marriages;
with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also
requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
(e) divorces; corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present
(f) legitimations; case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
(g) adoptions;
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings
(h) acknowledgment of natural children; for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree
and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of
the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(i) naturalization; and (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the
REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy
of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition
assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2
March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and
the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3)
for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment
on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of
the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and
withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or
the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-
resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions.
The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to
comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or
Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil
actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A
petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right
or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention
or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and
concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese
Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy.
The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of
the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article
36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would
be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in
having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki
had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The
applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality
where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the
civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring
connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished.
marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC sought
Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that
(among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between
they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
Marinay and Maekara.
should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is
venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case protected by the Constitution.34
on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-
empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be
case."20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition
made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the
under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court
stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper
venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events
the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court,
and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the
which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground
Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for
consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly
dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec.
bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
2(a) x x x."24

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction
marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy
and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on
collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x." 27 the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to
Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay. 44 On the other hand, Marinay
wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and
anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. 46
Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition. 28 Moreover, the
verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under
Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under The Issues
the same provision.
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and
Maekara
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review. 30 The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed (2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
a Manifestation and Motion.31
bigamy.

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial
court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court
held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." 48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under
the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is
in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. 50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that
the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,51 the
service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the
judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." 57 The interpretation
of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that
"[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on
his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of
its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public
policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine
State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a
fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person
creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to
delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine
court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of
efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce
involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the
extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not
have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign
spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family
Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are
facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As
noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." 67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil
status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to
cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of
the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in
the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record
of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve,
in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to
be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and
Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right
of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the
validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a]
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—
it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous
marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor
the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect
of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone
can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of
crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he
is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is
therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the
aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect
of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in
interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he
can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as
a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment
to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court
has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to
nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as
a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action
to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct
action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the
recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment
is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define
the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article
26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try
the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a
marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce.
The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry
under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the
foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen
who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file
a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized
in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a
situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry.
Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts
have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal
prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how
a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine
courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts
only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article
15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground
to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence
of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and
the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition
of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status,
right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between
the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the
Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the
crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on
venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March
2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED