Philippine National Bank v.

Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 57757

FACTS:
During the lifetime of Clodualdo Vitug he married two times.
The second wifeof Clodualdo Vitug was Donata Montemayor with
whom he had 8 children. Clodualdo Vitug died intestate o his estate
was settled and distributed. Donata Montemayor executed a
contract of lease of Lot No. 24, in favor of her children Pragmacio
and Maximo both surnamed Vitug Pragmacio and Maximo subject
of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim to be the
conjugal property of the spouses Donata Montemayor and
Clodualdo Vitug of which they claim a share. They assailed the
mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of the properties as
null and void. The lower court dismissed the complaint. The CA
reversed. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the presumption of conjugality of properties
acquired by the spouses during coverture provided for in Article
160 of the Civil Code apply to property in the name of the widow.

RULING:
The petition is impressed with merit. When the property is
registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as
to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an
indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And
this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail
 when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of
innocent third parties are involved.

ECETA VS. ECETA,

G.R. NO. 428 SCRA 928

FACTS:
Petitioner and her husband acquired several properties, among
which is the disputed property. They begot a son who sired an illegitimate
daughter, herein respondent. Upon his death, petitioner and respondent
are his compulsory heirs. Respondent filed a case before RTC for
Partition and Accounting with Damages against petitioner alleging that by
virtue of his father’s death, she became petitioner’s co- heir and co-owner
of the disputed property.

ISSUE:
Whether the admission made by petitioner that respondent is her
granddaughter is enough to prove respondent’s filiation with the only son
of petitioner.

RULING:
 The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by:
1. the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or
2. an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by:

1. the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate

child; or
2. any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

RODRIGUEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS,

509 SCRA 113

FACTS:
On October 15, 1986, respondent Clarito Agbulos brought an action
for compulsory recognition and support before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 9, Baguio-Benguet against Bienvenido Rodriguez, petitioner
herein. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother, Felicitas Agbulos
Haber, as first witness. The plaintiff filed before this Court a petition for
review on certiorari questioning the said order in UDK 8516.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner should be compelled to recognize the natural
child on the testimony of the mother on the identity of the putative
father.

RULING:
Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation of legitimate
children is
by any of the following:

The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the

following:

1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;

or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
 VERCELES VS. POSADA,
522 SCRA 518

FACTS:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada was offered work by petitioner
Teofisto I. Verceles, Mayor of Pandan. On December 22, 1986, she went
to Catanduanes Hotel on instructions of petitioner who asked to be
briefed on the progress of her mission.Sometime in January 1987, when
she missed her menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner that she
feared she was pregnant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action
for damages with support pendente lite.

HELD:
The Court held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of
the child, and no further court action is required. A perusal of the
Complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption states
"Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite," Clarissa's averments
therein, her meeting with petitioner, his offer of a job, his amorous
advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of her child,
his letters, her demand for support for her child, all clearly establish a
case for recognition of paternity.
 TAYAG V. TAYAG-GALLOR
GR No. 174680 / MAR. 24, 2008
FACTS:
On September 7, 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind
two real properties both of which are in the possession of petitioner,
and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on October 10, 2000
preparatory to the settlement of the decedent‘s estate. On 15 January
2001, respondent Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag.
She alleged in the petition that she is one of the three illegitimate
children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester C. Angeles. The decedent
was married to petitioner Victoria C. Tayag, but the two allegedly did
not have any children of their own.etitioner asserts that respondent
should not be allowed to prove her filiation in the settlement of Ismael
Tayag's estate.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not respondent's petition for the issuance of letters of
administration sufficiently states a cause of action considering that
respondent merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate child of the
decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized
as such by the latter.

RULING:
Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration must be filed by an interested
person. Essentially, the petition for the issuance of letters of
administration is a suit for the settlement of the intestate estate of Ismael
Tayag. The right of respondent to maintain such a suit is dependent on
whether she is entitled to successional rights as an illegitimate child of
the decedent which, in turn, may be established through voluntary or
compulsory recognition. Voluntary recognition must be expressed such
as that in a record of birth appearing in the civil register, a final
judgment, a public instrument or private handwritten instrument signed
by the parent concerned.

JOEY D. BRIONES VS. MARICEL P. MIGUEL

G.R. NO. 156343. OCTOBER 18, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner Joey D. Briones had an illegitimate son by Loreta P.
Miguel in the latter’s custody. In the school year 2000-2001, the
petitioner enrolled him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels
L.A. School, Inc. Respondents came to the house of the petitioner
in Caloocan City .They promised him that they will bring him back
in the afternoon. However, the respondents did not bring him back
as promised. After efforts to recover custody of the child proved
futile, Petitioner filed a petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel,
to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner, as the natural father, should have
custody of the child.

RULING:
Pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him resides
in his mother, respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his father’s
recognition of him. Obviously, Michael is a natural illegitimate,
under the Family Code child. Both acknowledge that Michael is
their son. There is no question that Respondent Loreta, is entitled to
have custody of him. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she
may not even renounce or transfer it "except in the cases
authorized by law. Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family
Code is the caveat that, generally, no child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds
cause to order otherwise. Only the most compelling of reasons,
such as the mother's unfitness to exercise sole parental authority,
shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of
custody to someone else.

MACANDANG VS. CA, 100 SCRA 73

FACTS:
Elizabeth Mejias, married to Crispin Anahaw, had sex with
Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March 1967. Because of the
affair, she and her husband allegedly separated. On October 30, 1967,
she gave birth to a baby boy named Rolando Macadangdang. Elizabeth
filed with the CFI a recognition and support against Antonio. The lower
court dismissed the complaint, applying the provisions of Articles 255
and 256 of the Civil Code. CA reversed the decision and declared
Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio. CA denied Vicente's
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate
child of Elizabeth and Crispin.

RULING:
Under Art. 255 of the CC the child is conclusively presumed to be
the legitimate child of the spouses. This presumption becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility
of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which
preceded the birth of the child.The presumption of legitimacy is based on
the assumption that there is sexual union in marriage, particularly
during the period of conception. In order to overthrow the presumption
it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as
could have enabled the husband to be the father of the child. Sexual
intercourse is to be presumed when personal access is not disproved.
 Villaranda vs. Villaranda
G.R. No. 153447, February 23, 2004
FACTS:
On July 6, 1976, the two brothers executed the assailed Deed of
Exchange. Under this instrument, Vicente agreed to convey his inherited
portion to Honorio, in exchange for a property in Macasandig, Cagayan
de Oro City, which was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
2138.7 .Vicente averred that he was not bound thereby contending that
because the property had not been delivered, the Deed had not been
consummated and had already been revoked by both parties.

ISSUE:
Whether the Deed of Exchange which was not signed by the wife of
Respondent Honorio G. Villaranda is valid and enforceable.

RULING:
The Deed was entered into on July 6, 1976, while the Family Code
took effect only on August 3, 1998. Laws should be applied prospectively
only, unless a legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.
Hence, the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code, are
applicable to the present case. The Macasandig lot was part of Honorio
and Ana’s conjugal properties. According to Article 166, the husband
cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wife’s consent. This provision, however, must be
read in conjunction with Article 173 of the same Code. The latter states
that an action to annul an alienation or encumbrance may be instituted
by the wife during the marriage and within ten years from the
transaction questioned. Videlicet, the lack of consent on her part will not
make the husband’s alienation or encumbrance of real property of the
conjugal partnership void, but merely voidable.

Brigido Quiao vs. Rita Quiao

GR No. 176556, July 4, 2012

FACTS:
Brigido Quiao and Rita Quiao contracted marriage in 1977. They
had no separate properties prior to their marriage. In 2000, Rita filed a
complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with
another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005
declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55.
Save for one child - already of legal age, the three minor children
remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs
the couple’s property relations.
HELD:
Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the
time of exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the NCC and
since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations
between them is the system of relative community or the conjugal
partnership of gains. Under this property relation, “the husband and
wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
income from their work and industry. The husband and wife also own in
common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.

Noveras vs. Noveras

GR No. 188289, August 20, 2014

Facts:
In Dec. 1988, David and Leticia got married. They lived in
California and eventually were granted with American citizenship. Out
of this marriage, they produce two children and also several properties
both in USA and Philippines. In 2001, David returned to the Philippines
to supervise their business. But after a year, Leticia learned that David
had an extra-marital affair. She filed a petition for divorce in California
and in 2005 the court granted the decree of nullification of their
marriage and granted her custody of her two minor children and
couple’s property in USA. In Aug. 2005, Leticia filed for Judicial
Separation of Conjugal property in Baler, Aurora. In his answer, David
filed for a petition to grant him all of their properties in the Philippines
considering that Leticia got all of their properties in USA.

Issue:
Whether or not David can claim all of their properties in the
Philippines ?

Ruling:
NO, David cannot claim all of the properties in the Philippines.
Article 91 of this Code, provides that property owned before and during
marriage are under ACP of Absolute Community Property. In this case
their marriage contracted in Dec. 1988, therefore ACP governs. But,
considering that they are both American citizen, the California court
decision with regards to their property in USA governs. The property in
the Philippines will be equally divided between them.
 Wong vs. IAC
200 SCRA 792
FACTS:
Romario Henson married Katrina in January 1964. They had
3 children; most of the time living separately. Katrina consigned
from Anita Chan pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95. The
spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of
the sum of money against Katrina and her husband Romarico.
The trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of
execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all
in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson.

ISSUE:
WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband
can be satisfied through the conjugal property.

HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered
into the business deal with Anita. The husband had nothing to do
with the business transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to
enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during
the marriage with unclear proof where the husband obtained the
money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the
conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are
exclusive property of the husband and even though they had been
living separately. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only
when she purchases things necessary for support of the family.
The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the
execution of judgments extends only over properties belonging to
the judgment debtor. The conjugal properties cannot answer for
Katrina’s obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter
without the consent of her husband nor they did redound to the
benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that
the administration of the partnership had been transferred to
Katrina by Romarico before said obligations were incurred.

JOCSON vs. CA
170 SCRA 333

FACTS:
Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-
Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio
Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. Alejandra Poblete predeceased her
husband without her intestate estate being settled. Subsequently,
Emilio Jocson also died intestate on April 1, 1972. Petitioner
Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be
declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be
partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their
deceased parents the properties in question being a conjugal
property of both.

ISSUE:
 Are the properties involved conjugal properties of the
parents, therefore entitles Moises to claim his share and
make the sale void?

HELD:
Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under
Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed
properties were acquired during the marriage of the parents.
The fact that the properties were registered in the name of
“Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete” is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson. Acquisition of
title and registration thereof are two different acts. Therefore,
the Court ruled that the properties under Exhibit 3 are the
exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.

Dela Pena vs. Avila, et al.

GR No. 187490, February 8, 2012

FACTS:
Antonia Dela Pena, who was married to Antegono Dela Pena,
obtained a loan from Aguila Sons and Co. As a security for the payment
of the said loan, Antonia executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in
favour of Aguila on their residential lot in Marikina. However, Antonia
also executed a Deed Of absolute sale in favour of Gemma Avila over the
same property because of Antonia’s failure to pay her obligation from
Aguila. Gemma Avila also mortgaged the same property to Far East
Bank and Trust Company to secure a loan from the bank.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the said property that was sold is part of the
Conjugal Partnership.

HELD:
The presumption mentioned in the Art. 160 of the Civil Code
applies only for the property acquired during marriage and does not
operate when there is no showing as to when the property was acquired.
Moreover, the presumption in favour of the conjugality is rebuttable, but
only with strong, clear and convincing proof of exclusive ownership. As
the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Art. 160 of the
Civil Code, the Dela Penas did not even come close to proving that the
subject property was acquired during the Marriage between Antonia and
Antegono. The record is bereft of evidence that from which the actual
acquisition of the property by Antonia was during the Marriage.
Although the title stated in its registration that it is under the name of,
Antonia “Dela Pena, married to Antegono dela Pena,” such is merely a
description of the civil status of the wife and cannot mean that the
husband is also a registered owner. The reason for the inconclusiveness
of the said description is that it is possible that the property was acquired
when she was single but only registered when she got married.
 Rodriguez vs. CA, 509 SCRA 113
G.R. No. 85723 June 19, 1995
Facts:
An action for compulsory recognition and support was
brought by respondent Alarito Clarito Agbulos against Bienvenido
Rodriguez, petitioner. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his
mother, Felicitas Agbulos Haber, as first witness who was asked by
counsel to reveal the identity of the plaintiff's father. Petitioner
contended that Felicitas should not be allowed to reveal the name
of the father of private respondent because such revelation was
prohibited by Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Private respondent argued that his mother should be allowed to
testify on the identity of his father, pursuant to paragraph 4, Article
283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and Section 30, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not, in an action for compulsory recognition, the
testimony of the mother of a natural child on the identity of the
putative father is allowed.
Ruling:
Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation of legitimate
children is by any of the following: 1) The record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or 2) An
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by: 1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or 2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. Of interest is that Article 172 of the Family
Code adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, that filiation may be proven by "any evidence or proof
that the defendant is his father." The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court is DIRECTED to
PROCEED with dispatch in the disposition of the action for
compulsory recognition.

Briones vs. Miguel

G.R. No. 156343, October18, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Joey D. Briones had an illegitimate son by Loreta P.
Miguel in the latter’s custody. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is
now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in
Japan. In the school year 2000-2001, the petitioner enrolled him at
the nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan
City, where he finished the nursery course. As alleged by
Petitioner, respondents came to the house of the petitioner in
Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child
and requested that they be allowed to bring the said child for
recreation at a mall. They promised him that they will bring him
back in the afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However, the
respondents did not bring him back as promised by them. After
efforts to recover custody of the child proved futile, Petitioner filed
a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda
Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his
minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.
ISSUE:
What is the status of Michael Kevin?
RULING:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is
deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta.
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides
that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless
of whether the father admits paternity. Under Article 176 of the
Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under
one category, without any distinction between natural and
spurious. The concept of "natural child" is important only for
purposes of legitimation. Without the subsequent marriage, a
natural child remains an illegitimate child.

Mangonan vs. CA
494 SCRA 1
Facts:
On 17 March 1994, Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of
her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of
Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite.
In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner
and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City
Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time,
petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only
19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required
consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11
August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court. On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the
annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and
Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second
husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private
respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the
institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college
in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with
her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled
in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst)
while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western
New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities,
Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing
collegiate education.
Issue:
Whether Francisco is obliged to support Rica and Rina.
Ruling:
Yes. Francisco is obliged to support his granddaughters Rica
and Rina in default of the father.

Lim vs. Lim, 604 SCRA 691

G.R. No. 163209, October 30, 2009.
Facts:
 In 1979, respondent Cheryl married Edward Lim, son of
petitioners. They had 3 children, respondents Lester Edward,
Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their
children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati
City. Edward’s family business, which provided him with a monthly
salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no
steady source of income.In 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes
Park residence, bringing the children with her then all minors,
after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with
the in-house midwife of his grandmother in a very compromising
situation. Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners,
Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano -defendants for support. The
defendants sought reconsideration, questioning their liability.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to
provide support to respondents.
Decision:
YES. By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of
ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond
cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their petition
to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if
they are liable. Relying on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil
Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that
their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority,
conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the
children’s minority. Because at the time respondents sued for
support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their
children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the
latter’s offspring ends with them.
 David vs. CA & Ramon Villar, 250 SCRA 82
G.R. No. 111180, 16 November 1995

Facts:

Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private

respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City.
Private respondent is a married man and the father of four
children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship
between petitioner and private respondent developed into an
intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was
born on March 9, 1985. Christopher J. was followed by two
more children, both girls, Christine, born on June 9, 1986,
and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.On July 30, 1991, Daisie
filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mother has the rightful custody of
the child.
RULING:
Yes. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code,
Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother
who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have
custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been
deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private
respondent; she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

Briones vs. Miguel

G.R. No. 156343, October18, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Joey D. Briones had an illegitimate son by Loreta P.
Miguel in the latter’s custody. Therespondent Loreta P. Miguel is
now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in
Japan. In the schoolyear 2000-2001, the petitioner enrolled him at
the nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in
CaloocanCity, where he finished the nursery course. After efforts
to recover custody of the child provedfutile, Petitioner filed a
Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda
Miguel and Francisca PinedaMiguel, to obtain custody of his
minor child Michael Kevin Pineda

ISSUE:
Whether or not who should have custody of the child?
RULING:
Obviously, Michael is a natural child, as there is nothing in
the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal
impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge
that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to
Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his mother,
Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his father’s recognition of
him. David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an
illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering the
latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. She has the
right to keep him in her company. She cannot be deprived of that
right, and she may not even renounce or transfer it “except in the cases
authorized by law.
 Silva vs. CA & Suzanne Gonzales
275 SCRA 604
Facts:
Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales cohabited without the
benefit of marriage and they had two children. A rift surfaced and
the two eventually separated. They agreed that Carlitos would have
the children in his company on weekends.The RTC ruled in favor
of Carlitos giving him visitorial rights to his children during
Saturdays and/or Sundays. The court however explicitly stated that
in no case should Carlitos take the children out without the written
consent of Suzanne.
Issue:
Should Carlitos be denied visitorial rights?
Held:
NO. The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a
noncustodial parent to his or her child or children. There is, despite
a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition on the
inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Indeed,
although in varying degrees, the laws on support and successional
rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate
members of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate
relationships as well. The allegations of respondent against the
character of petitioner, even assuming as true, cannot be taken as
sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father. It seems
unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue
designs more than a parents natural desire to be able to call on,
even if it were only on brief visits, his own children. The trial court,
in any case, has seen it fit to understandably provide this
precautionary measure, i.e., in no case take out the children
without the written consent of the mother. RTC decision reinstated.

Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs

614 SCRA 281/G.R. No. 169202, 5 March 2010
FACTS:
Maria Virginia V. Remo is a Filipino citizen, married to
Francisco R. Rallonza. Her Philippine passport, which was to
expire on 27 October 2000, showed “Rallonza” as her surname,
“Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle
name. While her marriage was still subsisting, she applied for the
renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs
office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her
maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. When her
request was denied, she made a similar request to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs..
ISSUE:
Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husband’s
surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of her
maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence
of her marriage.
RULING:
 No. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement
passport while her marriage subsists. Indeed, under Article 370 of
the Civil Code and as settled in the case of Yasin v Honorable
Judge Shari’a District Court married woman has an option, but not
an obligation, to use her husband’s surname upon marriage. She is
not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because
when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her
civil status. In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman
may either adopt her husband’s surname or continuously use her
maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in
her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of
an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. However, once a
married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her
passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name.

Matabuena v. Cervantes
G.R. No. L-28771 , March 31, 1971, 148 PHIL 295-300

Facts:
The plaintiff, Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased
Felix, maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally
without benefit of marriage to defendant, Petronila Cervantes, was
void. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a time before
defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latter's stand.
Hence this appeal and the Court not having had as yet the
opportunity of ruling on it. The conclusion reached therein is that
a donation between common-law spouses falls within the
prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public policy.
Issue:
Whether or not the ban on a donation between the spouses
during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship.
Decision:
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. While
Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between
the spouses during the marriage," policy considerations of the most
exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the
same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
However, the lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased
to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in
plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property.

Agapay v. Palang
G.R. No. 116668, July 28, 1997, 342 PHIL 302-314

FACTS:
 Miguel Palang had his first maariage with Carlina, with their
only child Herminia Palang. Miguel, then 63 years old, contracted
his second marriage with Erlinda Agapay, 19, herein petitioner.
Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda purchased a piece of
riceland and a house and lot purchased by Erlinda. With their
cohabitation, they had produced a son, Kristoper Palang. Miguel
and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage. Two years later,
Miguel died. The legal wife, Carlina and her daughter instituted an
action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages
against petitioner.The lower courts dismised the complaint.The CA
reversed the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the validity of two deeds of absolute sale
covering the riceland and the house and lot, in favor of the
petitioner.
RULING:
The SC affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. While
Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, the said union is void
because of the previous marriage, still subsisting. Under Article
148, it must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this
provision, in contrast to Article 147. Since petitioner failed to prove
that she contributed money to purchase the said properties, there is
no basis to justify her co-ownership.
 Spouses Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.
G.R. No. 12707, August 10, 1918, 38 PHIL 464-475

Facts:
This was an action by plaintiffs to recover from defendant the
sum of P3,000 and interest, alleged to be due under the terms of a
policy of insurance. The trial court gave plaintiffs judgment for the
amount demanded, with interest and costs, and from that decision
the defendant appeals. Appellant contends that Mrs. Harding was
not the owner of the automobile at the time of the issuance of the
policy, and, therefore, had no insurable interest in it.

Issue:
Whether not plaintiff is not the owner of the automobile at the
time of the issuance of the policy, and, therefore, had no insurable
interest in it.
Ruling:
SC holds that plaintiff was the owner of the automobile in
question and had an insurable interest therein; that there was no
fraud on her part in procuring the insurance; that the valuation of
the automobile, for the purposes of the insurance, is binding upon
the defendant corporation. Even assuming that defendant might
have invoked article 1334 as a defense, the burden would be upon it
to show that the gift in question does not fall within the exception
therein established. The defendant is not in a position to challenge
the validity of the transfer.

Spouses Docena v. Lapesura

G.R. No. 140153, March 28, 2001, 407 PHIL 1007-1022

Facts:
Private respondent Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery
of a parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio
and Alfreda Docena. The trial court ruled in favor of the
petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. The CA reversed the
judgement of the trial court. A Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the Court of Appeals,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
judge in issuing the said Orders and of the sheriff in issuing the
alias Writ of Demolition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Ruling:
 The petition is meritorious. SC held that the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition has been timely filed. Under the Family
Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the
husband and the wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation
or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required,
joint management or administration does not require that the
husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly
exercise full power of management alone, subject to the
intervention of the court in proper cases as provided under Article
124 of the Family Code.

Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 57757, August 31, 1987
Facts:
During the lifetime of Clodualdo Vitug he married two times.
The second wife of Clodualdo Vitug was Donata Montemayor with
whom he had 8 children. Clodualdo Vitug died intestate o his estate
was settled and distributed. Donata Montemayor executed a
contract of lease of Lot No. 24, in favor of her children Pragmacio
and Maximo both surnamed Vitug. Pragmacio and Maximo subject
of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim to be the
conjugal property of the spouses Donata Montemayor and
Clodualdo Vitug of which they claim a share. They assailed the
mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of the properties as
null and void. The lower court dismissed the complaint. The CA
reversed. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired
by the spouses during coverture provided for in Article 160 of the
Civil Code apply to property in the name of the widow

RULING:
The petition is impressed with merit. When the property is
registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as
to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an
indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And
this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail
when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of
innocent third parties are involved.

Spouses Uy v. Court of Appeals

 G.R. No. 109557, November 29, 2000, 400 PHIL 25-36
Facts:
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. suffer from stroke, leaving him
bereft of motor or mental faculties. Respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza
filed to assume sole powers of administration of conjugal properties
regarding the incapacity of Ernesto. She alleged that she urgently
needed to sell one piece of real property to cover hospitalization
expenses. The RTC affirmed the decision. Teodoro, filed his
opposition. The CA reversed. Hence, this appeal

Issue:
Whether petitioner Gilda, as the wife of Ernesto who suffered
a stroke and could not manage their conjugal partnership property,
may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property
under Article 124 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
The SC affirmed the appellate court's decision. Rules on
summary proceedings under the family code IS not applicable to
cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent. proper remedy is judicial
guardianship proceedings.
 Ansaldo vs. Sheriff
64 Phils. 115
FACTS:

The Philippine Trust Company granted Romarico Agcaoili a

credit in current account of P20,000 with Fidelity andSurety Company
of the Philippine Islands as guarantor. Ansaldo, in turn, agreed to
indemnify the Fidelity and Surety Company.. However, Agcaoili
defaulted, and the surety company, as his guarantor, paid the
Philippine Trust Company the sum of P19,065.17. Subsequently,
Ansaldo instituted an action against the Surety Company in the CFI to
have the execution levied declared null and void. The court granted the
relief prayed for and sentenced the appellants, jointly and severally, to
pay the appellees the sum of P636.80 with interest thereon at the rate of
ten per centum per annum from June 6, 1934 until paid, and the costs
of suit.

ISSUE:

Whether a joint savings account and a joint current account, in

a bank, of a husband and his wife are liable for the payment of the
obligation of the husband.

RULING:

No. The sum of P636.80 was derived from the paraphernal

property of the appellee, Margarita Quintos de Ansaldo, the wife of
the other appellee Angel A. Ansaldo. It therefore belongs to the
conjugal partnership of the said spouses. The provision of article
1408 of the Civil Code to the effect that the conjugal partnership as
subject to the qualifications established by article 1386 of the same
Code, which provides that: “The fruits of the paraphernal property
cannot be subject to the payment of personal obligations of the
husband, unless it be proved that such obligations were productive
of some benefit to the family.

JOSEPHINE AND HENRY GO vs. LEONARDO YAMANE

FACTS:
In the civil case “Florence Pucay De Gomez, Elsie Pucay
Kiwas and Muriel Pucay Yamane v. Cypress Corporation”, Atty.
Guillermo F. De Guzman was the counsel who handled the
plaintiffs in the said case. To satisfy the lien for attorney's fees, a
parcel of land, registered in the name of Muriel Pucay Yamane
wife of Leonardo Yamane, was scheduled to be sold at public
auction on August 11, 1981. Spouses Josephine and Henry Go,
herein petitioners, were awarded the said land as the highest
bidders in the auction. Respondent Leonardo Yamane filed a
complaint for annulment and cancellation of Sale to petitioners,
invoking a third-party claim. Respondent contended that the land
was a conjugal property and could not be held responsible for the
personal obligations of Muriel and the two other Pucays. RTC
ruled against respondent, reasoning that the subject parcel of land
was the paraphernal property of the late Muriel Pucay Yamane -
spouse of respondent -- and was not their conjugal property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property in Muriel Pucay’s name was a
conjugal property and should not be held responsible for the
obligations of Muriel Pucay and her sisters.
HELD:
The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decisions. Article 160
of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. As a
general rule, all property acquired by the spouses, regardless of in
whose name the same is registered, during the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

Abalos vs. Macatangay

439 SCRA 649
FACTS:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners
of a parcel of land with improvements. Arturo made a Receipt and
Memorandum of Agreement in favor of Macatangay, binding
himself to sell to latter the subject property and not to offer the
same to any other party within 30 days from date. Full payment
would also be effected as soon as possession of the property shall
have been turned over to Macatangay. Macatangay gave an
earnest money amounting to P5,000.00 to be deducted from the
purchase price of P1,300,000.00 in favor of the spouses . She
agreed to surrender the property to Macatangay within 20 days
along with the deed of absolute sale upon full payment.
Macatangay was ready to pay the amount in full. The couple failed
to deliver the property so he sued the spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of property is valid.
RULING:
No. Arturo and Esther, married before the effectivity of the
Family Code with no indication that they adopted a different
property regime, would automatically be under the conjugal
partnership of gains. The subject land, acquired during
marriage, forms part of their conjugal partnership. Similarly,
the wife cannot do the same. The right of the husband or wife to
one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution
and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution
of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after
settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which
can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.

Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank vs. Dallo

453 SCRA 283
FACTS:
 Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were
married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the spouses
purchased a house and lot in San Pablo City, registered in the
name of Marcelino Dailo to the exclusion of his wife. In 1993,
through a grant of Special Power of Attorney to Lilibeth
Osmundo, Marcelino obtained a loan from petitioner
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank, secured by the property in
San Pablo. Gesmundo also executed a Real Estate Mortgage
constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner without
the knowledge and consent of respondent. The loan matured and
remained outstanding which led to the foreclosure of the
mortgage. In 1993, Marcelino died. Respondent found out later
about the mortgage and claimed that she had no knowledge of it.
She further claims that the property was conjugal in nature and so
she consequently filed for the Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and
Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed
of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mortgage entered into by respondent’s
husband without her knowledge was valid.
HELD:
The court held that the property relations of respondent and her
late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the
rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the
former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership
apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter. Marcelino
and Miguela Dailo were married before the effectivity of the Family
Code. In the absence of a marriage settlement, their properties were
governed by the system of Conjugal Partnership of gains, which was
made also made applicable after the effectivity of the Code.

Felipe vs. Heirs of Aldon

120 SCRA 628
Facts:
During the marriage of Maximo Aldon and Gemina
Almorasa, they bought several pieces of land. The lands were
divided into three lots. Subsequently, Gemina sold the lots to the
spouses Eduardo Felipe and Hermogena Felipe without the
consent of her husband. Maximo died. Afterwhich, his heirs,
namely Gemina and their children Sofia and Salvador filed a
complaint against the Felipes alleging that they are the owners of
the lots. The Felipes asserted that they had acquired the lots from
the plaintiffs by purchase and subsequent delivery to them. The
trial court sustained the claim of the defendants. The CA reversed
the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the lots by Gemina without the
consent of the husband is defective.

Held:
 The sale made by Gemina is certainly a defective contract,
that is, a voidable contract

Valdez vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221
Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971.
Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court granted
the petition. It also directed the parties to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147
of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles
50, 51 and 52 of the same code. Gomez asserted that the Family
Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation
of common property in unions without marriage. In the
liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by
the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found
in the Civil Code shall apply.

Issues:
 Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the
disposition of property in the case at bar.

Held:

Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the

property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as
the case may be, of the Family Code.

Mercado vs. Fehr

414 SCRA 288
FACTS:
In 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, Elna
moved in to Bruno's residence and lived with him. During the
time they lived together, they purchased Suite 204, at LCG
Condominium on installment. They got married in 1985.Elna
filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. The court held
in an order that Art. 147 of the Family Code should apply, being
the marriage void ab initio. However, the court reminded Elna
of the previous agreement in dividing properties and/or proceeds
from the sale thereof proportionately among them. It also
affirmed the previous ruling regarding Suite 204. Elna filed a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court
of Appeals. The CA in its Decision dismissed the petition for
review for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Suite 204 of LGC Condominium is the

exclusive property of Bruno Fehr.

RULING:
No. SC held that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a
common property of Elna and Bruno and the property regime of
the parties should be divided in accordance with the law on co-
ownership. Suite 204 was acquired during the parties’
cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code,
said property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Buenaventura vs. CA
454 SCRA 261
FACTS:
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito
are the parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and
Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita,
Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The married
Joaquin children are joined in this action by their respective
spouses. Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain
deeds of sale covering 6 parcels of land executed by defendant
parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their
co-defendant children and the corresponding certificates of title
issued in their names. In seeking the declaration of nullity of the
aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of title, plaintiffs, in their
complaint, aver that the purported sale of the properties in litis was
the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive
the rest of the compulsory heirs plaintiffs herein of their legitime.
ISSUE:
Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties
subject of the Deeds of Sale
RULING:
Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties
subject of the Deeds of Sale. As the appellate court stated,
petitioners’ right to their parents’ properties is merely inchoate
and vests only upon their parents’ death. While still living, the
parents of petitioners are free to dispose of their properties. In
their overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime,
petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their
siblings does not affect the value of their parents’ estate. While the
sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value
replaced the lots taken from the estate.
 Mallilin vs. Castillo
333 SCRA 628
FACTS:
Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to
be both married and with children but separated from their
respective spouses and cohabited in 1979 while respective
marriages still subsist. They established Superfreight Customs
Brokerage Corporation during their union of which petitioner was
the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and
Treasurer. They likewise acquired real and personal properties
which were registered solely in respondent’s name. Due to
irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992. Petitioner
then demanded his share from respondent in the subject properties
but the latter refused alleging that said properties had been
registered solely in her name. Petitioner filed complaint for
partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed a motion
for summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and
granted the latter.
ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner can validly claim his share in the

acquired properties registered under the name of the respondent
considering they both have subsisting relationship when they
started living together.

HELD:
The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not
capacitated to marry each other and were living together could not
have owned properties in common. Hence, there is co-ownership
even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry
each other. Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioner’s
complaint for partition on grounds of due process and equity, his
right to prove ownership over the claimed properties was denied.
Such dismissal is unjustified since both ends may be served by
simply excluding from the action for partition the properties
registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo,
not parties in the case. The case was remanded to lower court for
further proceedings.

Metrobank vs. Pascual

547 SCRA 24
Facts:
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were
married. During the union, Florencia bought from a lot with a
three-door apartment. Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code and was
granted on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
Nicholson. RTC, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-
spouses' conjugal... partnership of gains. Florencia, obtained a
PhP 58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Co. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia, covered the conjugal
properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally
include the lot in question. Metrobank, in its Answer with
Counterclaim and Cross-Claim,alleged that the disputed lot, being
registered in Florencia's name, was paraphernal. Metrobank also
asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith.
Issue: Whether or not the subject property is conjugal.
Ruling:
Art. 160 of the Civil Code, is the applicable legal provision
since the property was acquired prior to the enactment of the
Family Code. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all
property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership,
unless it be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife." This article does not require proof that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership.

Matabuena vs. Cervantes

38 SCRA 284
Facts:
In 1956, Felix Matabuena donated a property to his
common-law spouse, Petronila Cervantes. In March 1962, Felix
and Petronila got married. After five months, Felix died intestate,
survived by Petronila and Cornelia, Felix's sister. Subsequently,
Cornelia, being the only sister and the nearest collateral relative
of the deceased, filed a case to recover the property which was
donated Petronila on the ground that under Art.133 of the Civil
Code, “every donation between the spouses during the marriage
shall be void." The trial court ruled that the case was not covered
by the prohibition because the donation was made at the time
Felix and Petronila were not yet married and were simply
cohabitating.

Issue:

Does the ban on donation between spouses during the

marriage apply to common-law relationships?

Held:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction
that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law
as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations
between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of
undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one
spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall
not apply also to common-law relationships.

Agapay vs. Palang

276 SCRA 341
FACTS:
 Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in
Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months
after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May
1950. In 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii.
When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with
Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with
19 year old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier,
they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at
Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was
likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina
executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property
consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia.

ISSUE:

Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot

should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.

HELD:
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor
of Miguel and Erlinda. However, their marriage is void because of
the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired
by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be
owned by them in proportion to their respective contributions. It is
required that there be an actual contribution. If actual
contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.
 Harding vs. Commercial Union Assurance Co.
38 Phil 464
Facts:
Henry Harding bought a car for 2T in 1915. He then gave the
car to his wife Mrs. Harding. While Mrs. Harding was having the
car repaired at the Luneta Garage Luneta was an agent of Smith
Bell and Co., which in turn is Commercial Unions agent), the
latter induced Mrs. Harding to insure the care with Commercial.
Mrs. Harding agreed, and Smith Bell sent an agent to Luneta
Garage, who together with the manager of LUneta, appraised the
car and declared that its present value was P3T. This amt was
written in the proposal form which Mrs. Harding signed.
Subsequently, the car was damaged by fire. Commercial refused to
pay.
Issue:
Whether or not Commercial is liable.
Held:
YES. Commercial is liable. Although certain transfers from
husband to wife or from wife to husband are prohibited in the
article referred to, such prohibition can be taken advantage of only
by persons who bear such a relation to the parties making the
transfer or to the property itself that such transfer interferes with
their rights or interests. Unless such a relationship appears the
transfer cannot be attacked.
 Docena vs. Lapesura,
G.R. No. 140153, March 28, 2001
FACTS:
Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a complaint for the
recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses,
Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The spouses claimed ownership of the
land based on the occupation since time immemorial. The petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in issuing orders and
that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of demolition. CA dismissed the
petition on the ground that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day
period provided in the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and that the
certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by
only one of the petitioners.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum
shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners.

HELD:

In view of the property involved which is a conjugal property, the

petition questioning the writ of demolition thereof originated from an
action for recovery brought against the spouses and is clearly intended
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and the wife as point out was
in the province of Samar whereas the petition was prepared in Metro
Manila, a rigid application of the rules on forum shopping that would
disauthorize a husband’s signing the certification in his behalf and that
of his wife is too harsh. Hence, petition is granted and the case is
remanded to CA for further proceedings.

Uy vs. CA
G.R. No. 109557, November 29, 2000

FACTS:

Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose.

Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole
administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same
as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his functions. She
further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that
would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to
meet such necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such
decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon
are governed by the rules on summary proceedings. During the pendency of
the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law. Upon
the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke,

a cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose, without motor and
mental faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the
conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.

HELD:

SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does

not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent. In this case, trial court found that subject
spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a
diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial
guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law
provides that a wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the
same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires
to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe
the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial
guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC further
held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to
be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.

Villaranda vs. Villaranda

G.R. No. 153447, February 23, 2004
FACTS:
On July 6, 1976, the two brothers executed the assailed Deed of
Exchange. Under this instrument, Vicente agreed to convey his
inherited portion to Honorio, in exchange for a property in
Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City, which was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2138.7 After the execution of the
Deed, Honorio took possession of the said property. Honorio and
his wife, Respondent Ana Maria Y. Villaranda,brought an action
for specific performance before the RTC to compel Vicente to
comply with his obligations under the Deed of Exchange: Vicente
had yet to identify and delineate his undivided portion of the
property before the spouses could not fully use or dispose of the
property Vicente averred that he was not bound thereby
contending that because the property had not been delivered, the
Deed had not been consummated and had already been revoked
by both parties. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent
spouses and was affirmed by CA.

ISSUE: Whether the Deed of Exchange which was not signed

by the wife of Respondent Honorio G. Villaranda is valid and
enforceable.

RULING:
The Deed was entered into on July 6, 1976, while the Family Code
took effect only on August 3, 1998. Laws should be applied
prospectively only, unless a legislative intent to give them
retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied
from the language used.47 Hence, the provisions of the Civil Code,
not the Family Code,48 are applicable to the present case. Hence,
the assailed Deed is still valid and enforceable.
 Brigido Quiao vs. Rita Quiao
GR No. 176556, July 4, 2012
FACTS:

Brigido Quiao and Rita Quiao contracted marriage in 1977. They

had no separate properties prior to their marriage. In 2000, Rita filed a
complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with
another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005
declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55.
Save for one child already of legal age, the three minor children
remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse. However,
Brigidos share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership
shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of
Article 129 of the FC. A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for
execution, which was granted by the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid
Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially
executed. However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside
the last ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains

governs the couple’s property relations.

HELD:
 Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at
the time of exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the NCC
and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property
relations between them is the system of relative community or the
conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property relation, “the
husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate
property and the income from their work and industry. The husband
and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal
partnership of gains.

Noveras vs. Noveras

GR No. 188289, August 20, 2014

Facts:

In Dec. 1988, David and Leticia got married. They lived in

California and eventually were granted with American citizenship.
Out of this marriage, they produce two children and also several
properties both in USA and Philippines. In 2001, David returned to
the Philippines to supervise their business. But after a year, Leticia
learned that David had an extra-marital affair. She filed a petition
for divorce in California and in 2005 the court granted the decree of
nullification of their marriage and granted her custody of her two
minor children and couple’s property in USA. In Aug. 2005, Leticia
filed for Judicial Separation of Conjugal property in Baler, Aurora.
In his answer, David filed for a petition to grant him all of their
properties in the Philippines considering that Leticia got all of their
properties in USA.

Issue:
Whether or not David can claim all of their properties in the
Philippines?
Ruling:
NO, David cannot claim all of the properties in the
Philippines. Article 91 of this Code, provides that property owned
before and during marriage are under ACP of Absolute Community
Property. In this case their marriage contracted in Dec. 1988,
therefore ACP governs. But, considering that they are both
American citizen, the California court decision with regards to their
property in USA governs. The property in the Philippines will be
equally divided between them.

Wong vs. IAC

200 SCRA 792
FACTS:

Romario Henson married Katrina in January 1964. They

had 3 children; most of the time living separately. Katrina
consigned from Anita Chan pieces of jewelry valued at
P321,830.95. The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed
action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her
husband Romarico. The trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs
then a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in
Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson married to
Katrina Henson.

ISSUE:

Whether or not debt of the wife without the knowledge of

the husband can be satisfied through the conjugal property.

HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered
into the business deal with Anita. The husband had nothing to do
with the business transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to
enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the
marriage with unclear proof where the husband obtained the
money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the
conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive
property of the husband and even though they had been living
separately. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when
she purchases things.
 Jocson vs. CA
170 SCRA 333
FACTS:
Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and wife.
The wife died first intestate then the husband followed. Moises and
Agustina are their children. Ernesto Vasquesz is the husband of
Agustina.The present controversy concerns the validity of three
documents executed by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime.
Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and
4 are the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot validly sell.
They say it is conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete, because they were registered in the name of Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property registered under the name of

“Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete” is conjugal
property or exclusive property.

HELD:
Exclusive. Article 60 of the CC proveides that All property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife. The party who invokes this presumption must first prove
that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage.
In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in
favor of conjugal ownership.

Dela Pena vs. Avila, et al.

GR No. 187490, February 8, 2012
FACTS:
Antonia Dela Pena, who was married to Antegono Dela Pena,
obtained a loan from Aguila Sons and Co. As a security for the
payment of the said loan, Antonia executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage in favour of Aguila on their residential lot in Marikina.
However, Antonia also executed a Deed Of absolute sale in favour
of Gemma Avila over the same property because of Antonia’s
failure to pay her obligation from Aguila. Gemma Avila also
mortgaged the same property to Far East Bank and Trust
Company to secure a loan from the bank. Antonia, together with
her son Alvin John, filed against Gemma praying for the
annulment of the said deed of sale. She claims that the said
property was conjugal property and was sold without the consent of
his husband who already died by that time. She also invokes the
presumption of Conjugality under Art. 160 of the Civil Code. The
RTC ruled in favour of Antonia and upheld the presumption of
conjugality. The CA ruled otherwise. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the said property that was sold is part of the
Conjugal Partnership
HELD:
The presumption mentioned in the Art. 160 of the Civil Code
applies only for the property acquired during marriage and does
not operate when there is no showing as to when the property was
acquired. Moreover, the presumption in favour of the conjugality is
rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing proof of
exclusive ownership.

Fransisco Munoz, Jr. vs. Erlinda Ramirez, et.al.

GR No. 156125, August 25, 2010

FACTS:

Subject of the present case is residential house and lot, covered by

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7650 in the name of the petitioner. The
residential lot in the subject property was previously covered by TCT, in
the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos ,respondents.
On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee,
mortgaged it with Erlinda’s consent, to the GSIS to secure a housing
loan. The respondents then constructed a residential house on the lot.

ISSUE:
Whether the subject property is paraphernal or conjugal
RULING:

As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage,

whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved.34. In the present case, clear
evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has
sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership.35
Pursuant to Articles 9236 and 10937 of the Family Code, properties
acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the marriage,
shall be excluded from the community property and be the exclusive
property of each spouse.38 The residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda’s
exclusive paraphernal property.

Alipio vs. CA
341 SCRA 441
FACTS:
 Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare
fishpond in Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a
period of five years ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987,
he subleased the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the
spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the Manuel Spouses. The
sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance
of P50,600.00. Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that her husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1,
1988.

ISSUE:
Whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection
of a debt which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains, or

RULING:
Surviving spouse is not liable. The conjugal partnership of gains
is liable. It is clear that Climaco had a cause of action against the
persons named as defendants therein. It was, however, a cause of
action for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of money and the
corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that does not survive upon
the death of the defendant, in accordance with the provisions of Section
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
 Melania Roxas vs. CA, et al.
GR No. 92245, June 26, 1991

FACTS:
Petitioner Melania Roxas "Melania" is married to Antonio
Roxas "Antonio", although they are already estranged and living
separately. Melania discovered that Antonio leased to Respondent
Antonio Cayetano "Mr. Cayetano"their conjugal lot in Novaliches
without her knowledge and consent. Thus, Melanie filed a case before
the RTC praying for the annulment of the contract of lease between
Antonio and Mr. Cayetano. Mr. Cayetano moved to dismiss the
complaint on the sole ground that the complaint states no cause of
action. The RTC Judge resolved said Motion by dismissing Melania's
complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband, may legally enter into a long-term
contract of lease involving conjugal real property without the consent
of the wife.
RULING:
No. Even if the husband is administrator of the conjugal
partnership, administration does not include acts of ownership. For
while the husband can administer the conjugal assets unhampered, he
cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty. Thus, in case the
wife's consent is not secured by the husband as required by law, the
wife has the remedy of filing an action for the annulment of the
contract.