Perkins v Perkins

Facts:

The parties of this case are husband and wife, duly married in the Philippines on January 3, 1914, and
the dispute occurs over the custody of the one child of that marriage, a daughter who was born on the
16th of October, 1914. Appellant amended her suit for separate maintenance and other relief by asking
that the daughter, Dora, be placed in her custody.

A separate hearing was had without delay as to the custody of the minor child, and the trial court awarded
the custody to the father.

The minor child has expressed a preference to live with her mother. There is no question of habitual
drunkenness or poverty. After the marital difficulties had resulted in litigation, the husband discovered a
bundle of old letters written to appellant by a young man, named Chambers, during the summer of 1921.
The trial court held that these letters show that appellant was guilty of infidelity to her husband. This
finding of the court is denied and fiercely attacked in the brief of the appellant. An act of infidelity so many
years ago would not be conclusive at this time as to the moral fitness of a mother to the custody of a
minor daughter. The treasuring of such erotic letters does, however, throw some light upon the mental
and moral state of mind of appellant.

in order to attain her own ends she went as far as to make statements absolutely contrary to the truth;
and while testifying before this court on the trial of this incident she could not but reveal how unscrupulous
she is by stating one thing for another notwithstanding the fact that she was then testifying under an oath
to tell the truth and nothing but the truth. She said for example, under oath, in order to succeed in her
desire to obtain an allowance for support from the defendant, that the latter had abandoned her and had
gone to live at the Army and Navy Club, when in truth and in fact that never happened; that the defendant
had abandoned her in the months of May, June, July, and August, in Europe and in America, without
having written to her even once, when the truth is that her very letters written to the defendant during that
time (Exhibits 52, 52-A et seq.) , which show that said defendant had been writing to her almost daily,
with the exception of the time when he was on his journey from Europe to America; that said defendant
had authorized her to engage in stock speculations in the New York market, when she knew that the
contrary was true as she herself in her diary attached to this record as Exhibit 24. The plaintiff attempted
to take advantage of the innocence and youth of her daughter Dora to attain her own ends by inducing
the latter to think ill of her own father and to testify against him. These facts are shown by documentary
evidence for the defendant marked Exhibits 53, 54, and 56. It may well be said that she considered any
means tending to the attainment of her own ends as good and proper."cralaw vi

Issue: WON Idonah Perkins is eligible for receiving support from her husband

Held: No. the latter had abandoned her and had gone to live at the Army and Navy Club, when in truth
and in fact that never happened; that the defendant had abandoned her in the months of May, June, July,
and August, in Europe and in America, without having written to her even once, when the truth is that her
very letters written to the defendant during that time (Exhibits 52, 52-A et seq.) , which show that said
defendant had been writing to her almost daily, with the exception of the time when he was on his journey
from Europe to America; that said defendant had authorized her to engage in stock speculations in the
New York market, when she knew that the contrary was true as she herself in her diary attached to this
record as Exhibit 24. The plaintiff attempted to take advantage of the innocence and youth of her
daughter Dora to attain her own ends by inducing the latter to think ill of her own father and to testify
against him. These facts are shown by documentary evidence for the defendant marked Exhibits 53, 54,
and 56. It may well be said that she considered any means tending to the attainment of her own ends as
good and proper."cralaw virtua1aw library

It also appears in evidence that the appellant, over the objection of the father, removed Dora from school
and took her daily to the court where she could listen to the charges and counter charges that her parents
were making against each other. The father desired the custody primarily to remove her from such
atmosphere and place her in a young ladies’ school in Switzerland, which school had tentatively been
selected by the parents while living in the state of domestic tranquillity. There is no question in the mind of
this court that the welfare of the child will be served by this action. The welfare of the minor is normally the
controlling consideration in the matter of its custody, and where the evidence, as it does in this case,
shows that the exception set forth in section 771 in the Code of Civil Procedure exists, the court will look
for the future welfare of the minor. In our opinion this has been done by the trial judge.

This case was submitted to this court by stipulation of the attorneys on January 23, 1932. Two days
thereafter appellant requested leave to file an additional memorandum which was denied by the court. On
March 14, 1932, appellant filed a motion for new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence, and
attached to said motion certain affidavits which show on their face that they were made on the 26th day of
May, 1931. They related to matters of no consequence, are not newly discovered evidence, and the
motion was not filed at a proper time. The motion for new trial is therefore not entitled to serious
consideration. The order appealed from is affirmed with costs against appellant. So ordered.

Pelayo v Lauron

Facts:

Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella
setting forth that on or about the 13th of October of said year, at night, the plaintiff was called to the house
of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas, and that upon arrival he was requested by them to render
medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a child; that therefore, and after
consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escaño, it was found necessary, on account of the difficult
birth, to remove the fetus by means of forceps which operation was performed by the plaintiff, who also
had to remove the afterbirth, in which services he was occupied until the following morning, and that
afterwards, on the same day, he visited the patient several times; that the just and equitable value of the
services rendered by him was P500, which the defendants refuse to pay without alleging any good
reason therefor; that for said reason he prayed that the judgment be entered in his favor as against the
defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500 and costs, together with any other relief that might be
deemed proper.

In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation therein contained and
alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said childbirth,
and that when she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate house without
any relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the
defendants, her stay there was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances.

Issue: WON the father and mother-in-law of the patient, or the husband of the latter is bound to pay the
medical expenses incurred?

Held: In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees
due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants
during her childbirth, is the husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law, the defendants
herein. The fact that it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and requested his assistance for his
wife is no bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger, to
which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was
urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services of a
physician at such critical moments is specially established by the law, as has been seen, and compliance
therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who believes that he is entitled to recover his fees, must
direct his action against the husband who is under obligation to furnish medical assistance to his lawful
wife in such an emergency.
From the foregoing it may readily be understood that it was improper to have brought an action against
the defendants simply because they were the parties who called the plaintiff and requested him to assist
the patient during her difficult confinement, and also, possibly, because they were her father and mother-
in-law and the sickness occurred in their house. The defendants were not, nor are they now, under any
obligation by virtue of any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any contract
entered into between them and the plaintiff from which such obligation might have arisen.

In applying the provisions of the Civil Code in an action for support, the supreme court of Spain, while
recognizing the validity and efficiency of a contract to furnish support wherein a person bound himself to
support another who was not his relative, established the rule that the law does impose the obligation to
pay for the support of a stranger, but as the liability arose out of a contract, the stipulations of the
agreement must be held. (Decision of May 11, 1897.)

Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation
that devolves upon the husband to provide support, among which is the furnishing of medical assistance
to his wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it does not appear that a contract
existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician, for which reason it is obvious that the former
can not be compelled to pay fees which they are under no liability to pay because it does not appear that
they consented to bind themselves.

The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first and second errors assigned to the judgment below are
unfounded, because, if the plaintiff has no right of action against the defendants, it is needless to declare
whether or not the use of forceps is a surgical operation.

Therefore, in view of the consideration hereinbefore set forth, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed
from should be affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Sanchez v Zulueta

Facts:

Josefa Diego and Mario Sanchez are plaintiffs and Feliciano Sanchez is defendant, the plaintiffs ask that
the defendant be sentenced to pay them a monthly allowance for support.

It was alleged that defendant Feliciano Sanchez, since 1932, refused and still refuses to support the
plaintiffs; that the latter have no means of subsistence, while the defendant receives from the United
States Army a monthly pension of P174.20; that the defendant abandoned the plaintiffs without any
justifiable cause and now refuses to allow them to live with him.

The defendant alleges, as special defense, that the plaintiff Josefa Diego abandoned the conjugal home
on October 27, 1930, without his knowledge or consent, because she committed adultery with Macario
Sanchez, with whom she had, as a result of the illicit relations, a child which is the other plaintiff Mario
Sanchez.

The plaintiffs asked the court to compel the defendant to give them, by way of allowance pendente
lite, the sum of P50 a month. In opposition to his petition, the defendant alleged that Mario Sanchez is not
his legitimate child but is the adulterous child of the plaintiff with Macario Sanchez, and he asked for an
opportunity to adduce evidence in support of this defense. The court, without acceding to this petition of
the defendant to adduce evidence, favorably acted upon the application of the plaintiffs and ordered the
defendant to pay a monthly allowance pendente lite of P50 to the plaintiffs, from July 1, 1936. In view of
these facts, the defendant filed a petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals against the judge of
the Court of First Instance and the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals denied the petition, and from this
resolution, the defendant comes to this court on certiorari.
Issue: WON the Plaintiff is entitled for support pendente lite?

Held: We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to present his
evidence for the purpose of determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the application.
Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24
Phil., 285). Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous
relations, for in that case, it would not be the child of the defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to
support as such. But as this defense should be established, and not merely alleged, it would be
unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It is not of course necessary to go fully into the merits of the
case, it being sufficient the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient
to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional
character of the resolution to be entered.

Although mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application, nevertheless, the failure to
accompany the opposition therewith did not justify the court in ignoring said opposition, just because of
this omission, inasmuch as an opportunity to present evidence has been asked. It may be that the
defendant could not get hold of affidavits in support of his opposition, but he may have on hand other
evidence of greater weight.

If the defendant has a valid defense which calls for proof, and he asks for an opportunity to present
evidence, it is error to deny him this opportunity.

The decision rendered by the Court Appeals is reversed, and it is ordered that the petitioner be given an
opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense against the application for support pendente lite,
to the extent which the court determine, without special pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.

De Asis v CA

FACTS:

Private respondent, in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis,
brought an action for maintenance and support against petitioner before the RTC of Quezon City, alleging
that petitioner is the father of subject minor, and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the
maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands. Petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor
alleged and that he cannot be required to provide support for him. The mother’s child sent in a
manifestation stating that because of petitioner’s judicial declarations, it was futile and a useless exercise
to claim support from him. Hence, she was withdrawing her complaint against petitioner subject to the
condition that the latter should not pursue his counterclaim. By virtue of the said manifestation, the parties
mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint. The motion was granted by the trial court,
which then dismissed the case with prejudice.

Subsequently, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against petitioner, this time in
the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian, herein private respondent.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. The trial court denied the motion,
ruling that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of
future support is prohibited by law. The trial court likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. CA dismissed the same.

ISSUE:

WON an action for support can be barred by res judicata?

RULING:
No, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and cannot bar the filing of another action, asking for
the same relief against the same defendant.

The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional because the amount may be
increased or decreased depending upon the means of the giver and the needs of the recipient (Art. 297);
and that the right to receive support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person;
neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligator (Art. 301). Furthermore, the right
to support cannot be waived or transferred to third parties and future support cannot be the subject of
compromise (Art. 2035).

In the case at bar, respondent minors mother, who was the plaintiff in the first case, manifested that she
was withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who denied his paternity
over the child. Since the right to claim for support is predicated on the existence of filiation between the
minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe that such manifestation admitting
the futility of claiming support from him puts the issue to rest and bars any and all future complaint for
support.

The manifestation sent in by respondent’s mother in the first case, which acknowledged that it would be
useless to pursue its complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that
gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner.
Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondent’s mother for the
dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the
counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition
against any compromise of the right to support.

It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon a compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as it
does the civil status of persons and future support, cannot be the subject of compromise.

Rondina v People

Facts:

On March 29, 1999, the City Prosecution Office of Ormoc City filed with the RTC an Information3 charging
Victor as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of July 1998, at around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at "DDD", [Ormoc
City], and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused: VICTOR RONDINA,
being then armed with a knife and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of] the complainant herein, "AAA"4 - a sixteen (16) year
old lass, against her will.5

On arraignment, Victor pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged. 6 Pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.

In 1998, "AAA" was a young girl of 16 who was in second year high school. The youngest and the only
girl among a brood of four, she lived with her parents and siblings in a rented house located in "DDD,"
Ormoc City.

On July 15, 1998, "AAA," upon arriving home from school at around 4:00 p.m., immediately proceeded to
the toilet to defecate. The said toilet, constructed of hollow blocks with G.I.-sheet roofing, had only a tie-
wire as lock. It was located outside "AAA’s" house and was being used as a communal toilet by the
occupants of nearby houses.
Once inside, "AAA" immediately took off her panty and relieved herself, forgetting to lock the door. 7 After
washing her anus, "AAA" was surprised when Victor, a neighbor, suddenly entered the toilet with only a
towel covering himself from the waist down. Victor immediately removed the towel from his waist as well
as his brief. He then poked a knife on "AAA’s" neck, covered her mouth and threatened her by saying
"[d]on’t ever tell anybody otherwise I will kill your parents, your siblings including yourself." 8 Because her
mouth was covered, "AAA" was not able to shout.9

Victor ordered "AAA" to stand against the wall with her hands on both sides 10 and forcefully inserted his
penis into "AAA’s" vagina.11 "AAA" felt pain.12 After a while, she felt a liquid-like substance discharged
from Victor’s penis.13 When Victor had already satisfied his bestial desire, he again wrapped the towel
around his waist14 and before getting out of the toilet uttered "do not tell your mother or else I will kill
you."15

"AAA" did not immediately tell anyone of her misfortune and just kept on crying. However, it came to the
point where she could no longer keep silent so that a few months after the incident, "AAA" finally told her
mother "BBB" that Victor raped her.16

When "BBB" had "AAA" examined by physicians, it was discovered that aside from having healed
hymenal lacerations, "AAA" was more or less six months pregnant. Victor was charged with the crime of
rape. During the pendency of the proceedings and after about nine months from the date of the alleged
incident, "AAA" gave birth to a baby girl, "CCC," on May 1, 1999.

Issue: WON CCC is entitled for support against the Victor Rondina

Held: All told, we hold that neither did the RTC err in finding Victor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape nor did the CA in affirming said conviction. As aptly declared by the appellate court, the
prosecution has sufficiently established that Victor had carnal knowledge of "AAA" against her will and
consent. We subscribe to the same.

Support of the offspring "CCC"

The RTC ordered Victor to acknowledge "AAA’s" offspring "CCC" and give her support. "Article 345 of the
Revised Penal Code provides for three different kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the
offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from
so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code, the
classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and
they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of
the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion
perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise parental authority over his children, no ‘further positive
act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the child’s status’. Hence, [Victor] should only be
ordered to indemnify and support the victim’s child."70 "The amount [and terms] of support shall be
determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 71 of the Family
Code."72

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 24, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00185 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:

1) Petitioner Victor Rondina is ordered to pay "AAA" ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

2) Interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from
the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
 3) Petitioner Victor Rondina is further ordered to give support to "AAA’s" offspring, "CCC," in such
amount and under such terms to be determined by the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City in a
proper proceeding with support arrears to be reckoned from the finality of this Decision.

Gotardo v Buling

Facts:

On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the RTC of Maasin, Southern
Leyte, for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the Charles Gotardo is the
father of her child Gliffze. (answer) Petitioner denied the paternity. Parties failed to amicably settle the
dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings. Trial on the merits ensued. Evidence for Divina
(casual employee) showed that she met Charles (accounting supervisor) on December 1, 1992 at the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch. Charles courted Divina in the
third week of December 1992 and they became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993. Charles
gave the respondent greeting cards on special occasions, (Valentines Day and her birthday); she
reciprocated his love and took care of him when he was ill. In September 1993, Charles started intimate
sexual relations with the respondent in the formers rented room in the boarding house managed by
Rodulfo (Divinas uncle). Rented the room from March 1, 1993 to August 30, 1994. The sexual encounters
occurred twice a month and became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, she got
pregnant. Charles was happy and made plans to marry Divina. BUT, Charles backed out of the wedding
plan. (Divina filed for damages for breach of promise to marry but was amicably settled). Divina gave birth
to Gliffze on March 9, 1995. (When Charles did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze,
Divina sent him a demand letter on July 24, 1995 for recognition and support of their son) Due to
unanswered demand, Divina took her demands in Court. Charles denied being Gliffzes father in Court.

RTC approved monthly child support. RTC (appeal) reversed former decision CA ordered Charles to
recognize Gliffze and give monthly child support

ISSUE: WON Gliffze is entitled to receive child support and to be recognized as Charles son.

HELD: YES

RATIO: One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.32 We
have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family bible in which [his] name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree,
admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares supported by
corroborative proof that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of
evidence shifts to the putative father. We explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to
the putative father are:

(1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that
the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.In this case, the respondent
established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that
she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. Rodulfo
corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship. On the other
hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred
on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the
respondent to have been three
 (3) months pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy.40 However,
the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His
allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioners denial
cannot overcome the respondents clear and categorical assertions.

Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support
his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on
the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the
giver and the necessities of the recipient.47 It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to
the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person
obliged to support.

Perla v Baring

FACTS: Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and petitioner Antonio Perla (Antonio) were allegedly
neighbors. Eventually, they became sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio allegedly
assured her that he would support her. However, Antonio started to evade her.

Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the RTC a Complaint for support
against Antonio. Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy. During the
trial, Mirasol presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating her and
Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the information in the said
certificates. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Antonio to support Randy, which was affirmed by CA.

ISSUE: Is Randy entitled for support from Antonio?

HELD: Mirasol and Randy's Complaint for support is based on Randy's alleged illegitimate filiation to
Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with sufficient
certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation.
An order for x xx support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the
lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.

In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The
Certificate of Live Birth and baptismal certificate of Randy have no probative value to establish Randys
filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. A certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Also, while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the
date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's paternity. Thus, x xx baptismal
certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly
as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.

***

Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court. However,
this rule admits of certain exceptions such as when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures or when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts. As this
case falls under these exceptions, the Court is constrained to re-examine the factual findings of the lower
courts. GRANTED.
Lerma v CA

FACTS: Teodoro E. Lerma and Concepcion Diaz were married on May 19, 1951. On August 22, 1969 the
petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez and on
September 26, 1972 the court of First Instance of Rizal decided the adultery case of the respondent and
found her and her co-accused, Teodoro Ramirez, guilty of the charge, sentencing them to a term of
imprisonment. During the pendency of the adultery case against the respondent, wife On November 18,
1969 the respondent filed with the lower court, a complaint against the petitioner for legal separation
and/or separation of properties, custody of their children and support, with an urgent petition for support
pendente lite for her and their youngest son, Gregory, who was then and until now is in her custody. The
respondent's complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt against
her life. The application for support pendente lite was granted in an order dated December 24, 1969,
which was amended in an order dated February 15, 1970. The petitioner filed his opposition to the
respondent's application for support pendente lite, setting up as defense the adultery charge he had filed
against the respondent. On March 12, 1970 the petitioner filed with respondent Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the aforementioned orders on the
ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion. The next day the respondent court gave due
course to the petition and issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano from enforcing said
orders. The respondent court, in its decision of October 8, 1970, set aside the assailed orders and
granted the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence before the lower court in support of his defense
against the application for support pendente lite.The respondent moved to reconsider the decision on the
ground that the petitioner had not asked that he be allowed to present evidence in the lower court. The
respondent court, in its resolution of January 20, 1971, set aside the decision of October 8 and rendered
another, dismissing the petition. This is now the subject of the instant proceeding for review.

ISSUE: W/N the lower court acted with grave abused of discretion in granting the respondent’s
application for support pendente lite without giving the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in
support of his defense against the said application.
HELD:
Court of Appeals January 20, 1971 resolution and the orders of respondent Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court herein complained of, dated December 24, 1969 and February 15, 1970, all are set aside
and their enforcement enjoined, without prejudice to such judgment as may be rendered in the pending
action for legal separation between the parties. The right to separate support or maintenance, even from
the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse
claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that after
the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each
other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which
constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as
within the intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code the
obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some
act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse
is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the substantive right to support in
such a situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite.