RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ de ARROYO
Facts:
Spouses Mariano Arroyo and
Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were
married in 1910 and have lived
together as husband and wife until July
4, 1920. However, the Dolores went
away from their common home with the
intention of living separate from
Mariano. Mariano’s efforts to induce
her to resume marital relations were all
in vain. Thereafter, Mariano initiated
an action to compel her to return to the
matrimonial home and live with him as
a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way
of defense and cross-complaint that she
had been compelled to leave because of
the cruel treatment of her husband.
She in turn prayed that a decree of
separation be declared and the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership
as well as permanent separate
maintenance.
Accordingly, she in turn prayed
for affirmative relief, to consist of (1) a
decree of separation; (2) a liquidation
of the conjugal partnership; (3) and an
allowance for counsel fees and
permanent separate maintenance.
Lower court ruled in favor of Dolores.
The trial judge, upon consideration of
the evidence before him, reached the
conclusion that the husband was more
to blame than his wife and that his
continued ill-treatment of her furnished
sufficient justification for her
abandonment of the conjugal home and
the permanent breaking off of marital
relations with him.
Issue:
Can compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with each other?
Held:
No.
It is not within the province of the
courts of this country to attempt to
compel one of the spouses to cohabit
with, and render conjugal rights to, the
other. Of course where the property
rights of one of the pair are invaled, an
action for restitution of such rights can
be maintained. But we are disinclined
to sanction the doctrine that an order,
enforcible by process of contempt, may
be entered to compel the restitution of
the purely personal rights
of consortium. At best such an order
can be effective for no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live
under the same roof; and the
experience of these countries where
the court of justice have assumed to
compel the cohabitation of married
people shows that the policy of the
practice is extremely questionable.
Court was unable to hold that
Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is
entitled to the unconditional and
absolute order for the return of the wife
to the marital domicile, which is sought
in the petitory part of the complaint;
though he is, without doubt, entitled to
a judicial declaration that his wife has
presented herself without sufficient
cause and that it is her duty to return.
Therefore, reversing the
judgment appealed from, in respect
both to the original complaint and the
cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores
Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself
from the marital home without
sufficient cause; and she is admonished
that it is her duty to return. The
plaintiff is absolved from the cross-
complaint, without special
pronouncement as to costs of either
instance.
ARTURO PELAYO, plaintiff-
appellant, vs. MARCELO
LAURON, ET AL., defendants-
appellees.
 G.R. No. L-4089, January 12,
1909, TORRES, J.
Key Doctrine: Within the meaning of
the law, the father and mother-in-law
are strangers withrespect to the
obligation that devolves upon the
husband to provide support, among
which is the furnishing assistance to his
wife at the time of her confinement.
FACTS:
Arturo Pelayo, a physician
residing in Cebu, filed a complaint
against Marcelo Lauron and Juana
Abella setting forth that on October of
said year, at night, the plaintiff was
called to the house of the defendants
and that upon arrival he was requested
by them to render medical assistance to
their daughter-in- law who was about to
give birth to a child; that therefore, and
after consultation with the attending
physician, Dr.Escaño, it was found
necessary, on account of the difficult
birth,to remove the fetus by means of
forceps which operation was performed
by the plaintiff, and that afterwards, on
the same day, he visited the patient
several times; that the just and
equitable value of the services
rendered by him was P500, which the
defendants refuse to pay without
alleging any good reasontherefor.
In answer to the complaint
counself or the defendants denied all of
the allegation therein contained and
alleged as a special defense, that their
daughter-in-law had died
inconsequence of the said child birth,
and that when she was alive she lived
with her husband independently and in
a separate house without any relation
whatever with them, and that, if on the
day when she gave birth she was in the
house of the defendants, her stay there
was accidental and due to fortuitous
circumstances.
Judgment was entered by
thecourt below,whereby the defendants
were absolved,on account of the lack of
sufficient evidence to establish a right
of action against the defendants.
Issue: who is bound to pay the bill,
whether the father and mother-in-law
(defendants) of the patient, or the
husband of the latter
Ruling: The husband is bound to pay,
not the defendants.
The rendering of medical assistance in
case of illness is comprised among the
mutual obligations to which the spouses
are bound by way ofmutual support.
If every obligation consists in giving,
doing or not doing something (art.
1088), and spouses are mutually bound
to support each other, there can be no
question but that, when either of them
by reason of illness should be in need of
medical assistance, the other is under
the unavoidable obligation to furnish
the necessary services of a physician in
order that health may be restored, and
he or she may be freed from the
sickness by which life is jeopardized.
In the face of the above legal precepts
it is unquestionable that the person
bound to pay the fees due to the
plaintiff for the professional services
that he rendered to the daughter-in-law
of the defendants during her childbirth,
is the husband of the patient and not
her father and mother- in-law, the
defendants herein. The fact that it was
not the husband who called the plaintiff
and requested his assistance for his
wife is no bar to the fulfillment of the
said obligation, as the defendants, in
view of the imminent danger, to which
the life of the patient was at that
moment exposed, considered that
medical assistance was urgently
needed, and the obligation of the
husband to furnish his wife in the
indispensable services of a physician at
such critical moments is specially
established by the law, as has been
seen, and compliance therewith is
unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff,
who believes that he is entitled to
recover his fees, must direct his action
against the husband who is under
obligation to furnish medical assistance
to his lawful wife in such an
emergency.
ILUSORIO v ILUSORIO
FACTS:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year
old of age, possessed extensive
property valued at millions of pesos.
For many year, he was the Chairman of
the Board and President of Baguio
Country Club. He was married with
Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for
30 years and begotten 6 children
namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner
(defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta
and Shereen. They separated from bed
and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at
Makati every time he was in Manila and
at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country
Club when he was in Baguio City. On
the other hand, the petitioner lived in
Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from
US, he stayed with her wife for about 5
months in Antipolo city. The children,
Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this
time their mother overdose Potenciano
which caused the latter’s health to
deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda
filed with RTC petition for guardianship
over the person and property of
Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced
age, frail health, poor eyesight and
impaired judgment. In May 1998, after
attending a corporate meeting in
Baguio, Potenciano did not return to
Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium in Makati. In March
1999, petitioner filed with CA petition
for habeas corpus to have the custody
of his husband alleging that the
respondents refused her demands to
see and visit her husband and
prohibited Potenciano from returning to
Antipolo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned
writ of habeas corpus should be issued.
HELD:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all
cases of illegal confinement or
detention, or by which the rightful
custody of a person is withheld from
the one entitled thereto. To justify the
grant for such petition, the restraint of
liberty must an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The
illegal restraint of liberty must be
actual and effective not merely nominal
or moral.
Evidence showed that there was no
actual and effective detention or
deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that
would justify issuance of the writ. The
fact that the latter was 86 years of age
and under medication does not
necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. He still has the capacity
to discern his actions. With his full
mental capacity having the right of
choice, he may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, he will be deprived of his
right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the
right of a parent to visit a minor child
but the right of a wife to visit a
husband. In any event, that the
husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat or any penalty attached
to the exercise of his right. Coverture,
is a matter beyond judicial authority
and cannot be enforced by compulsion
of a writ of habeas corpus carried out
by the sheriffs or by any other process.
That is a matter beyond judicial
authority and is best left to the man
and woman’s free choice.

G.R. No. 11263             November 2,
1916
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA
FACTS:
The parties married on 1915 and lived
together in Manila for about a month,
when the plaintiff returned to the home
of her parents. Plaintiff alleged that the
defendant demanded of her that she
perform unchaste and lascivious acts
on his genital organs. She refused to
perform such acts. When plaintiff kept
on refusing, he maltreated her by word
and deed and inflicted injuries upon her
lips, her face and different parts of her
body. Plaintiff then left the conjugal
abode and took refuge in the home of
her parents. She filed a complaint
against defendant for support outside
the conjugal home.
CFI: The defendant cannot be
compelled to support the plaintiff,
except in his own house, unless it be by
virtue of a judicial decree granting her
a divorce or separation from the
defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband can be
compelled to support his wife outside
the conjugal home.
HELD:
Yes.Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil
Marriage of 1870, in force in the
Peninsula, were extended to the
Philippine Islands by royal decree on
April 13, 1883. Articles 44, 45, and 48
of this law read:
ART. 44. The spouses are obliged
to be faithful to each other and to
mutually assist each other.
ART. 45. The husband must live
with and protect his wife.
ART. 48. The wife must obey her
husband, live with him, and
follow him when he charges his
domicile or residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of
the foregoing paragraph, the
court may for just cause relieve
her from this duty when the
husband removes his residence to
a foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil
Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are
obliged to support each other
reciprocally to the whole extent
specified in the preceding article.
1. The consorts.
xxx     xxx     xxx
ART. (149) The person obliged to
give support may, at his option,
satisfy it, either by paying the
pension that may be fixed or by
receiving and maintaining in his
own home the person having the
right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the
instances when the obligation to give
support shall cease. The failure of the
wife to live with her husband is not one
of them.
The mere act of marriage creates an
obligation on the part of the husband to
support his wife. The law provides that
the husband, who is obliged to support
the wife, may fulfill the obligation
either by paying her a fixed pension or
by maintaining her in his own home at
his option.  However, this option given
by law is not absolute.  The law will not
permit the husband to evade or
terminate his obligation to support his
wife if the wife is driven away from the
conjugal home because of his wrongful
acts.  In the case at bar, the wife was
forced to leave the conjugal abode
because of the lewd designs and
physical assault of the husband, she
can therefore claim support from the
husband for separate maintenance even
outside the conjugal home.
PROPERTY RELATIONS
JOCSON VS CA
All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife.
FACTS:
Emilio Jocon and Alejandra
Jocson were husband and wife. The
wife died first intestate then the
husband followed. Moises and Agustina
are their children.  Ernesto Vasquesz is
the husband of Agustina.
The present controversy concerns
the validity of three (3) documents
executed by Emilio Jocson during his
lifetime. These documents purportedly
conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-
Vasquez what apparently covers almost
all of his properties, including his one-
third (1/3) share in the estate of his
wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails
these documents and prays that they be
declared null and void and the
properties subject matter therein be
partitioned between him and Agustina
as the only heirs of their deceased
parents.
Petitioner claimed that the
properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and
4 are the unliquidated conjugal
properties of Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete which the former,
therefore, cannot validly sell. They say
it is conjugal properties of Emilio
Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because
they were registered in the name of
“Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete”.
The trial court ruled in favor of
Moises. It declared the properties
mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 as
conjugal properties of Emilio and
Alejandra, because they were
registered in the name of "Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete"
and ordered that the properties subject
matter of all the documents be
registered in the name of Moises and
Agustina. On appeal, the CA reversed
the trial court’s ruling because the
action has already prescribed pursuant
to the settled rule that an action for
annulment of a contract based on fraud
must be filed within four years from the
discovery of the fraud, which is deemed
to be the date of the registration of said
document with the RD. Here, the action
was brought almost five years after the
registration of the document.
ISSUE:
Whether the properties covered
by Exhibits 3 and 4 conjugal?
RULING:
No. It is the position of Moises
that since the properties sold to
Agustina under Exhibit 3 were
registered in the name of "Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete,"
the certificate of title he presented as
evidence were enough proof to show
that the properties covered therein
were acquired during the marriage of
their parents, and, therefore, under
Article 160 of the Civil Code, presumed
to be conjugal properties.
As interpreted by this Court, the
party who invokes this presumption
must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during the
marriage, In other words, proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership. According to law
and jurisprudence, it is sufficient to
prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage in order that the
same may be deemed conjugal
property. In the recent case of
Maramba vs. Lozano, et. al., this Court,
thru Mr. Justice Makalintal, reiterated
that the presumption under Article 160
of the Civil Code refers to property
acquired during the marriage, and then
concluded that since there is no
showing as to when the property in
question was acquired, the fact that the
title is in the wife's name alone is
determinative.
It is thus clear before Moises may
validly invoke the presumption under
Article 160 he must first present proof
that the disputed properties were
acquired during the marriage of Emilio
and Alejandra. The certificates of title,
however, upon which Moises rests his
claim is insufficient. The fact that the
properties were registered in the name
of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete" is no proof that the properties
were acquired during the spouses'
coverture. Acquisition of title and
registration thereof are two different
acts. It is well settled that registration
does not confer title but merely
confirms one already existing. It may be
that the properties under dispute were
acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was
still a bachelor but were registered only
after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete,
which explains why he was described in
the certificates of title as married to the
latter. Contrary to petitioner's position,
the certificates of title show, on their
face, that the properties were
exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the
registered owner. This is so because
the words "married to" preceding
"Alejandra Poblete" are merely
descriptive of the civil status of Emilio
Jocson. In other words, the import from
the certificates of title is that Emilio
Jocson is the owner of the properties,
the same having been registered in his
name alone, and that he is married to
Alejandra Poblete.
We are not unmindful that in
numerous cases we consistently held
that registration of the property in the
name of only one spouse does not
negate the possibility of it being
conjugal. But this ruling is not
inconsistent with the above
pronouncement for in those cases there
was proof that the properties, though
registered in the name of only one
spouse, were indeed conjugal
properties, or that they have been
acquired during the marriage of the
spouses, and therefore, presumed
conjugal, without the adverse party
having presented proof to rebut the
presumption.
BENIGNO TODA, JR. vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ROSE MARIE
TUASON-TODA,
FACTS:
Benigno Toda, Jr. (Benigno for brevity)
and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda (Rose
Marie for brevity) were married on June
9, 1951 and were blessed with two
children. Individual differences and the
alleged infidelity of Benigno, however,
marred the conjugal union thereby
prompting Rose Marie to file on
December 18, 1979 in the former Court
of First Instance of Rizal, 2 as Civil Case
No. 35566, a petition for termination of
conjugal partnership for alleged
mismanagement and dissipation of
conjugal funds against Benigno.
After hearings were held, the parties in
order to avoid further "disagreeable
proceedings," filed on April 1, 1981 a
joint petition forjudicial approval of
dissolution of conjugal partnership
under Article 191 of the Civil Code.
This petition which was signed by the
parties on March 30, 1981, embodied a
compromise agreement allocating to
the spouses their respective shares in
the conjugal partnership assets and
dismissing with prejudice the said Civil
Case No. 35566. The said petition and
the compromise agreement therein
were approved by the trial court in its
order of June 9, 1981. Thereafter,
several orders were issued by the lower
court pertaining to the interpretation
and implementation of the compromise
agreement, as follows:
1. Order, dated November 20, 1981,
ordering Benigno, inter alia, to pay
Rose Marie the cash dividends on
the shares declared on April 25,
1981 amounting to P37,126.30;
that declared on July 25, 1981
amounting to P40,196.12; that
declared on July 1, 1981, given on
September 25, 1981 amounting to
P2,191.62; and the payment of
P360,095.12 to Rose Marie which
is the balance of P2 million paid on
April 4, 1981;  separation of property.
XXX
Ironically, the said agreement failed to
fully sub serve the intended amicable
settlement of all the disputes of the
spouses. Instead, as lamented by the
counsel of one of them, the compromise
agreement which was designed to
terminate a litigation spawned two new
petitions, with each party initiating one
against the other.  From the judgement
of CA, Rose Marie argue that it erred In
holding that the compromise
agreement of the parties herein
became effective only after its judicial
approval on June 9, 1981 and not upon
its execution on March 30,1981, among
others.
ISSUE: When did the compromise
agreement become effective?
RULING: It became effective when
only when it was judicially approved.
We are in agreement with the holding
of the Court of Appeals that the
compromise agreement became
effective only on June 9, 1981, the date
when it was approved by the trial court,
and not on March 30,1981 when it was
signed by the parties. Under Article
190 of the Civil Code,  "(i)n the absence
of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of
property between spouses during the
marriage shall not take place save in
virtue of a judicial order." Hence, the
separation of property is not effected
by the mere execution of the contract
or agreement of the parties, but by the
decree of the court approving the same.
It, therefore, becomes effective on y
upon judicial approval, without which it
is void.15 Furthermore, Article 192 of
said Code explicitly provides that the
conjugal partnership is dissolved only
upon the issuance of a decree of
Consequently, the conjugal partnership
of Benigno and Rose Marie should be
considered dissolved only on June 9,
1981 when the trial court approved
their joint petition for voluntary
dissolution of their conjugal
partnership. Conformably thereto, the
cash dividends declared on July 1, 1981
and July 25,1981 in the amount of
P2,191.62 and P40,196.12,
respectively, should pertain to Rose
Marie; and that declared on April 2,5,
1981 in the amount of P37,126.30
ought to be paid to Benigno, pursuant
to Paragraph 4 (c) of the compromise
agreement which awards to Benigno
the conjugal assets not otherwise
specifically assigned to Rose Marie.
SPOUSES RICKY WONG AND
ANITA CHAN, et al. v. IAC AND
ROMARICO HENSON
G.R. No. 70082, 19 August 1991
FACTS
Respondent Romarico Henson
and Katrina Pineda were married on
January 6, 1964 but thereafter lived
most of the time separately. It was
during their marriage that respondent
bought a parcel of land in Angeles City
from his father with money he
borrowed from an officemate.
In 1972, Anita Chan consigned
pieces of jewelry to Katrina valued at
P321,830.95 which, however, Katrina
failed to return within the 20-day
period they agreed upon. Katrina
issued a check in favor of Anita which
was dishonored for lack of funds. A
criminal case for estafa was filed
against Katrina but it was subsequently
dismissed by the court. Because of said
decision, Anita Chan and her husband
Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and
her husband respondent, an action for
collection of a sum of money. The
records of the case show that Atty.
Gregorio Albino, Jr. filed an answer
with counterclaim but only in behalf of
Katrina. When the case was called for
pre-trial, Atty. Albino once again
appeared as counsel for Katrina only.  did not redound to the benefit of the
The lower court ruled in favour of
the Wongs and issued a writ of
execution. Levied upon were 4 lots in
Angeles City all in the name of
Romarico Henson married to Katrina
Henson. The lots were then sold at a
public auction.
Aggrieved, respondent filed an
action for annulment of the decision of
the lower court, the levy and auction of
the properties. He alleged, among
others, that he was "not given his day
in court" because he was not
represented by counsel as Attys. Albino
and Yumul appeared solely for Katrina;
that although he did not file an answer
to the complaint, he was not declared
in default in the case and that the
properties levied on execution and sold
at public auction by the sheriff were his
capital properties and therefore, as to
him, all the proceedings had in the case
were null and void.
The trial court, found that there
was no basis for holding the conjugal
partnership liable for the personal
indebtedness of Katrina, ruled in favor
of reconveyance in view of the
jurisprudence that the interest of the
wife in the conjugal partnership
property being inchoate and therefore
merely an expectancy, the same may
not be sold or disposed of for value
until after the liquidation and
settlement of the community
assets. The CA affirmed the decision
and further stated that the properties
are respondent's exclusive capital
having been bought by him with his
own funds. But granting that the
properties are conjugal, they cannot
answer for Katrina's obligations as the
latter were exclusively hers because
they were incurred without the consent
of her husband, they were not for the
daily expenses of the family and they
family.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject
parcels of land are conjugal properties
RULING:
YES. Having been acquired
during the marriage, they are still
presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership even though Romarico and
Katrina had been living separately.
The presumption of the conjugal
nature of the properties subsists in the
absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome said
presumption or to prove that the
properties are exclusively owned by
Romarico. While there is proof that
Romarico acquired the properties with
money he had borrowed from an
officemate, it is unclear where he
obtained the money to repay the loan. If
he paid it out of his salaries, then the
money is part of the conjugal assets
and not exclusively his. Proof on this
matter is of paramount importance
considering that in the determination of
the nature of a property acquired by a
person during covertrue, the
controlling factor is the source of the
money utilized in the purchase.
The conjugal nature of the
properties notwithstanding, Katrina's
indebtedness may not be paid for with
them her obligation not having been
shown by the petitioners to be one of
the charges against the conjugal
partnership. In addition to the fact that
her rights over the properties are
merely inchoate prior to the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership, the consent
of her husband and her authority to
incur such indebtedness had not been
alleged in the complaint and proven at
the trial.
Furthermore, under the Civil
Code (before the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988), a wife
may bind the conjugal partnership only
when she purchases things necessary
for the support of the family or when
she borrows money for the purpose of
purchasing things necessary for the
support of the family if the husband
fails to deliver the proper sum; when
the administration of the conjugal
partnership is transferred to the wife
by the courts or by the husband and
when the wife gives moderate
donations for charity. Having failed to
establish that any of these
circumstances occurred, the Wongs
may not bind the conjugal assets to
answer for Katrina's personal
obligation to them.
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,  of that portion of the decision directing
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
102, QUEZON CITY, and
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-
VALDEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996
Co-ownership applies when a
man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband
and wife under a void marriage or
without the benefit of marriage. Under
this property regime, property acquired
by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules
on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts.
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez
were married on 05 January 1971 and
had five children. In a petition, dated
22 June 1992, Valdez sought the
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
THE MARRIAGE pursuant to Article
36 of the Family code before the
Quezon City RTC. The trial court
granted the petition on the ground of
their mutual psychological
incapacity. The three older children,
Carlos, Antonio and Angela were given
the option to choose which parent they
would want to stay with while Stella
and Joaquin were placed in the custody
of their mother. The petitioner and the
respondent were directed to start
proceedings on the liquidation of
their common properties as defined
by Article 147 of the Family Code,
and to comply with the provisions
of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same
code.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification
compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52
of the Family Code asserting that the
Family Code contained no provisions on
the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in "unions without
marriage." During the hearing of the
motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing their desire to
remain with their father, Antonio
Valdez.
The trial court clarified that the
property regime of petitioner and
respondent shall be governed by the
rules on ownership considering that
their marriage has already been
declared as null and void ab initio
pursuant to Art. 147.
Petitioner’s MR was denied. Hence this
petition involving a pure question of
law, submitting that Articles 50, 51 and
52 of the Family Code should be held
controlling and arguing that Article 147
of the Family Code does not apply to
cases where the parties are
psychologically incapacitated.
ISSUE:
WON the court a quo has failed to
apply the correct law that should
govern the disposition of a family
dwelling in a situation where a
marriage is declared void ab
initio because of psychological
incapacity on the part of either or both
parties in the contract.
HELD:
The trial court correctly applied the
law. In a void marriage, regardless of
the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed by
the provisions of Article 147 or Article
148, such as the case may be, of the
Family Code.
Art. 147. When a man and a
woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them
in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
In the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained
by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party
who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof in the former's
efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of
the household.
Neither party can encumber or
dispose by acts inter vivos of his
or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and
owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after
the termination of their
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a
void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in
the ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children.
In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children
or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture
shall take place upon the
termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership
applies when a man and a woman,
suffering no illegal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live
together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. The term "capacitated" in the
provision (in the first paragraph of the
law) refers to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage, i.e., any
"male or female of the age of eighteen
years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37
and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property
acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union
is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family household." Unlike the
conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits
of the couple's separate property are
not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the
substance and to the above extent, has
clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code;
in addition, the law now expressly
provides that —
(a) Neither party can dispose or
encumber by act intervivos his or
her share in co-ownership
property, without consent of the
other, during the period of
cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage,
any party in bad faith shall forfeit
his or her share in the co-
ownership in favor of their
common children; in default
thereof or waiver by any or all of
the common children, each
vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants,
or still in default thereof, to the
innocent party. The forfeiture
shall take place upon the
termination of the cohabitation or
declaration of nullity of the
marriage. 
When the common-law spouses suffer
from a legal impediment to marry or
when they do not live exclusively with
each other (as husband and wife), only
the property acquired by both of them
through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be
owned in common and in proportion to
their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding
shares, however, are prima
facie presumed to be equal. The share
of any party who is married to another
shall accrue to the absolute community
or conjugal partnership, as the case
may be, if so existing under a valid
marriage. If the party who has acted in
bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner already
heretofore expressed. 11
A court which has jurisdiction to
declare the marriage a nullity must be
deemed likewise clothed in authority to
resolve incidental and consequential
matters. The trial court did not commit
a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own
the "family home" and all their common
property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that, in the liquidation and
partition of the property owned in
common by them, the provisions on co-
ownership under the Civil Code, not
Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to
Articles 102 and 129,  of the Family
Code, should aptly prevail. The rules
set up to govern the liquidation of
either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the
property regimes recognized for valid
and voidable marriages (in the latter
case until the contract is annulled), are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that exists between
common-law spouses. The first
paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family
Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4)
and 95) of Article 43, relates only, by
its explicit terms, to voidable marriages
and, exceptionally, to void marriages
under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent
marriage contracted by a spouse of a
prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void.
Void marriages are inexistent from the
very beginning and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish their nullity. In
now requiring for purposes of
remarriage, the declaration of nullity by
final judgment of the previously
contracted void marriage, the present
law aims to do away with any
continuing uncertainty on the status of
the second marriage. It is not then
illogical for the provisions of Article 43,
in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the
Family Code, on the effects of the
termination of a subsequent marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a
previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other
cases, it is not to be assumed that the
law has also meant to have coincident
property relations, on the one hand,
between spouses in valid and voidable
marriages (before annulment) and, on
the other, between common-law
spouses or spouses of void marriages,
leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the
ordinary rules on co-ownership subject
to the provisions of the Family Code on
the "family home," i.e., the provisions
found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the
Family Code, remain in force and effect
regardless of the property regime of
the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders of
the trial court are AFFIRMED.
SPS. TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA and
PAULINO ESTONINA, petitioners,  sale and transfer certificate of title with
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. CELSO
ATAYAN
A parcel of land in Barrio Santisima
Cruz, Sta. Cruz, Laguna was in the
name of Santiago Garcia who died on
October 2, 1967. Some six years after
Santiago Garcia's death, or on March
10, 1973, the CFI of Manila issued an
order granting Trinidad Estonina's
application for a writ of preliminary
attachment. Consequently, a notice of
attachment was inscribed as a
memorandum of encumbrance at the
back of TCT in favor of Trinidad
Estonina covering all the rights, title,
interest, and participation that
Consuelo Garcia, the widow of Santiago
Garcia, may have in and to the parcel of
land covered by the said title.
A prior sale was made by Santiago
Garcia to Anselmo Balasoto of a sixty
square meter portion of the said parcel
of land. On June 27, another sale
purportedly made during his lifetime by
Santiago Garcia to his wife's niece,
Ofelia Garcia.
From 1977-1980, the heirs of Santiago
Garcia from his first and second wives,
sold their accumulated
9/10 pro indiviso share over the parcel
of land in favor of the Atayan Spouses.
A favorable decision obtained by
Trinidad Estonina against Consuelo
Garcia. An execution pending appeal
was made on the parcel of land and the
said parcel of land was sold at a public
auction where Trinidad Estonina was
the highest bidder. Consuelo Garcia
appealed but the appellate court, ruled
in favor of Estonina
In 1985, the spouses Atayan filed a
complaint for annulment of sheriff's
damages before the (RTC) of Santa
Cruz, Laguna.

RTC rendered a decision finding that
the property was acquired during the
marriage of Santiago Garcia and
Consuelo Gaza, and is presumed to be
conjugal in nature.
RTC said that upon the death of
Santiago Garcia his conjugal share of
one-half (l/2) of the said parcel of land
was transmitted to his heirs by
intestate succession. By the law on
intestate succession, his nine children,
five by his first wife and four out of the
subsequent marriage, and Consuelo
Garcia, his second wife and widow,
inherited the same at one-tenth (1/10)
each pro indiviso. The remaining one-
half (1/2) pertained to the conjugal
share of Consuelo Garcia. Thus,
inasmuch as Consuelo Garcia inherited
one-tenth (1/10) of her husband's
conjugal share in the said property and
is the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as
her conjugal share, she owns a total of
55% (or 1/10 plus 1/2) of the said
parcel of land.
Finding as such, the RTC held that
what could be attached by the spouses
Estonina was only Consuelo Garcia's
rights and interests which is fifty five
per cent (55%) of the property.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals
concluded that, contrary to the finding
of the RTC, the parcel of land in
question was not the conjugal property
of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia, but
was the former's exclusive property.
When Santiago Garcia died, his nine
children and Consuelo Garcia inherited
the said property each to the extent of
one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share.
Hence, it was only Consuelo Garcia's
one-tenth(l/l0) pro indiviso share in the
parcel of land in question which could
be validly attached. The CA, gave
credence to the unrebutted testimony
of Consuelo Garcia that the said parcel
of land was inherited by Santiago
Garcia from his deceased mother
Eugenia Clemente and that it used to
be part of a big tract of land which was
divided among Santiago and his sisters.
ISSUE
Is the phrase “married to” in the title
determinative of the conjugal nature of
the property?
RULING
The evidence on record as well as
established jurisprudence on the
matter, lead us to concur with the
finding of the Court of Appeals that the
property involved in this dispute is
indeed the exclusive property of the
deceased Santiago Garcia. Court
emphasized that the presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code that all
property of the marriage belong to the
conjugal partnership applies only when
there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage.
Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition
during the marriage is a condition sine
qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. 
The petitioners have been unable to
present any proof that the property in
question was acquired during the
marriage of Santiago and Consuelo.
They anchor their claim solely on the
fact that when the title over the land in
question was issued, Santiago was
already married to Consuelo as
evidenced by the registration in the
name of "Santiago Garcia married to
Consuelo Gaza". This, according to the
spouses Estonina, suffices to establish
the conjugal nature of the property.
However, the words "married to" are
merely descriptive of the civil status of
the husband, and does not determine
the conjugal nature of the property.
Being the exclusive property of
Santiago Garcia, it was the entire
parcel of land in question that formed redound to the benefit of the said
part of his estate and which passed to conjugal partnership.
his ten heirs by compulsory succession
upon his death. And as correctly held
by the Court of Appeals, what could ISSUE:
therefore be attached and sold at public  Is a surety agreement or an
auction in Civil Case No. 88430 was accommodation contract entered into
only the one-tenth (1/10)  pro by the husband in favor of his employer
indiviso  share of Consuelo Garcia in the considered for the benefit of the
said parcel of land. The sale at public conjugal partnership which is
auction of the disputed property in its chargeable against the conjugal
entirety by the Sheriff in favor of partnership?
Trinidad Estonina over and above the
one-tenth (1/10) share of Consuelo RULING:
Garcia is null and void, belonging as it
does to the other heirs of Santiago No.
Garcia and later to the spouses Atayan. In all our decisions involving
accommodation contracts of the
AYALA INVESTMENT & husband,[18] we underscored the
DEVELOPMENT CORP. and requirement that: there must be the
ABELARDO MAGSAJO, petitioners, requisite showing x x x of some
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and advantage which clearly accrued to the
SPOUSES ALFREDO & welfare of the spouses or benefits to his
ENCARNACION family or that such obligations are
CHING, respondents. productive of some benefit to the
family. Unfortunately, the petition did
FACTS: not present any proof to show: (a)
Philippine Blooming Mills (as PBM) Whether or not the corporate existence
obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from of PBM was prolonged and for how
petitioner Ayala Investment and many months or years; and/or (b)
Development Corporation (AIDC).As Whether or not the PBM was saved by
added security for the credit line the loan and its shares of stock
extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo appreciated, if so, how much and how
Ching, Executive Vice President of substantial was the holdings of the
PBM, executed security agreements Ching family. Here, the property in
making himself jointly and severally dispute also involves the family
answerable with PBMs indebtedness to home. The loan is a corporate loan not
AIDC. a personal one. Signing as a surety is
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, on certainly not an exercise of an industry
July 30, 1981, AIDC filed a case for sum or profession nor an act of
of money against PBM and respondent- administration for the benefit of the
husband Alfredo Ching. Private family.
respondents filed a case of injunction
against petitioners with the then Court SPOUSES ANTONIO AND
of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), LUZVIMINDA GUIANG v. CA
Branch XIII, to enjoin the auction sale G. R. No. 125172, 26 June 1998,
alleging that petitioners cannot enforce FIRST DIVISION, (PANGANIBAN,
the judgment against the conjugal J.)
partnership levied on the ground that,
among others, the subject loan did not
“It is thus clear that any alienation or
encumbrance made after August 3,
1988 when the Family Code took effect
by the husband of the conjugal
partnership property without the
consent of the wife is null and void.”
FACTS:
Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz (herein
respondent) and defendant Judie
Corpuz are legally married. The couple
have three children. The couple with
plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as vendee
bought a lot in South Cotobato from
Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor
through a conditional deed of sale.
Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple
Gilda and Judie Corpuz sold one-half
portion of their Lot to the defendants-
spouses Antonio and Luzviminda
Guiang (herein petitioners). Plaintiff
Gilda Corpuz left for Manila in June
1989. She was trying to look for work
in the Middle East. Unfortunately, she
became a victim of an unscrupulous
illegal recruiter thus she was not able
to go abroad. However, Harriet Corpuz
(one of the children) learned that her
father intended to sell the remaining
one-half portion including their house,
of their home lot to defendants
Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her
mother informing her in which the
latter objected.
Despite the absence of his wife
Gilda Corpuz, defendant Judie Corpuz
pushed through the sale. He sold to
defendant Luzviminda Guiang thru a
document known as Deed of Transfer of
Rights. Transferor Judie Corpuz’
children Junie and Harriet signed the
document as witnesses. To cure the
defect in Judie Corpuz’ title over the
lot, defendant Luzviminda executed
another agreement this time with
Manuela Callejo, a widow of the
original registered owner from whom
the couple Judie and Gilda Corpuz
originally bought the lot who signed as
vendor for a consideration of
P9,000.00. Defendant Judie Corpuz
signed as a witness to the sale
When Gilda returned home, she
found out that her children were
staying with other households. Her
husband was nowhere to be found. She
was informed by her children that their
father had a wife already. Plaintiff was
then complained for trespassing by
Spouses Guiang for staying in the
house sold by her husband Judie before
the Barangay authorities. On March 16,
1990, the parties thereat signed a
document known as amicable
settlement in order that Gilda will leave
voluntarily the house. However plaintiff
went to the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Paulino Santos to question
her signature on the amicable
settlement. She was referred however
to the Officer-In-Charge at the time, a
certain Mr. de la Cruz. The latter in
turn told her that he could not do
anything on the matter. Annulment not
having been made, plaintiff stayed put
in her house and lot.
Respondent Court found no
reversible error in the trial court’s
ruling that any alienation or
encumbrance by the husband of the
conjugal property without the consent
of his wife is null and void as provided
under Article 124 of the Family Code. It
also rejected petitioners contention that
the amicable settlement ratified said
sale, citing Article 1409 of the Code
which expressly bars ratification of the
contracts specified therein, particularly
those prohibited or declared void by
law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract of
sale of a conjugal property without the
consent of the wife is void.
RULING:
Yes. The said contract properly falls
within the ambit of Article 124 of the
Family Code, which was correctly
applied by the two lower courts:
ART. 124. The administration
and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the
husband’s decision shall prevail,
subject to recourse to the court
by the wife for proper remedy,
which must be availed of within
five years from the date of the
contract implementing such
decision.
In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of
administration. These powers
do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority
of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such
authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as
a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
Under Article 166 of the Civil
Code, the husband cannot generally
alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership
without the wife’s consent. The
alienation or encumbrance if so
made however is not null and void. It
is merely voidable. The offended wife
may bring an action to annul the said
alienation or encumbrance. Thus,
the provision of Article 173 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:
Art. 173. The wife may,
during the marriage and
within ten years from the
transaction questioned,
ask the courts for the
annulment of any
contract of the husband
entered into without her
consent, when such
consent is required, or
any act or contract of the
husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal
partnership property.
Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or
her heirs after the
dissolution of the
marriage, may demand
the value of property
fraudulently alienated by
the husband.(n)
This particular provision giving
the wife ten (10) years x x x
during [the] marriage to annul
the alienation or encumbrance
was not carried over to the
Family Code. It is thus clear that
any alienation or encumbrance
made after August 3, 1988 when
the Family Code took effect by
the husband of the conjugal
partnership property without the
consent of the wife is null and
void.
Furthermore, it must be noted that
the fraud and the intimidation referred
to by petitioners were perpetrated in
the execution of the document
embodying the amicable settlement.
Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that
barangay authorities made her sign
said document through
misrepresentation and coercion. its
execution does not alter the void
character of the deed of sale between
the husband and the petitioners-
spouses.
By the specific provision of the
law (Art. 1390) the Deed of Transfer
of Rights cannot be ratified, even by
an amicable settlement. The
participation by some barangay
authorities in the amicable
settlement cannot otherwise validate
an invalid act. Moreover, it cannot
be denied that the amicable
settlement entered into by plaintiff
Gilda Corpuz and defendant spouses
Guiang is a contract. It is a direct
offshoot of the Deed of Transfer of
Rights. By express provision of law,
such contract is also void. Thus, the
legal provision, to wit:
Art. 1422. A contract
which is the direct result
of a previous illegal
contract, is also void and
inexistent.
The settlement, however, does
not mention a continuing offer to
sell the property or an
acceptance of such a continuing
offer. Its tenor was to the effect
that private respondent would
vacate the property. By no
stretch of the imagination, can
the Court interpret this
document as the acceptance
mentioned in Article 124.
JOSEFA BAUTISTA FERRER v. SPS.
MANUEL M. FERRER & VIRGINIA
FERRER and SPS. ISMAEL M.
FERRER and FLORA FERRER
G.R. No. 166496, November 9, 2006
Facts:
In her Complaint for payment of
conjugal improvements, sum of money,
and accounting with prayer for
injunction and damages, petitioner
alleged that she is the widow of Alfredo
Ferrer (Alfredo), a half-brother of
respondents Manuel M. Ferrer
(Manuel) and Ismael M. Ferrer
(Ismael). Before her marriage to
Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of
lot. He applied for a loan with the
Social Security System (SSS) to build
improvements thereon, including a
residential house and a two-door
apartment building. However, it was
during their marriage that payment of
the loan was made using the couple’s
conjugal funds. From their conjugal
funds, they constructed a warehouse on
the lot. Moreover, Manuel occupied one
door of the apartment building, as well
as the warehouse; however, later on, he
stopped paying rentals thereon,
alleging that he had acquired
ownership over the property by virtue
of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in
favor of respondents, Manuel and
Ismael and their spouses. 
 
When her husband was already
bedridden, Ismael and Flora Ferrer
made him sign a document, purported
to be his last will and testament. The
document, however, was a Deed of Sale
covering Alfredo’s lot and the
improvements thereon. Learning of this
development, Alfredo filed with the
RTC of Pasig, a Complaint for
Annulment of the said sale against
respondents, docketed as Civil Case
No. 61327. The RTC dismissed, the CA
affirmed, and the SC affirmed.
Petitioner alluded to a portion of the
Decision of the RTC, which stated, to
wit:
x x x Since Article 120 of the Family
Code provides the rule that the
ownership of accessory follows the
ownership of the principal, then the
subject lot with all its improvements
became an exclusive and capital
property of Alfredo with an obligation
to reimburse the conjugal partnership
of the cost of improvements at the time
of liquidation of [the] conjugal
partnership. x x x
 
According to petitioner, the ruling of
the RTC shows that she had the right to
be reimbursed for the cost of the
improvements on Alfredo’s lot. She
alleged that the cost of the
improvements amounted
to P500,000.00; hence, one-half thereof
should be reimbursed and paid by
respondents as they are now the
registered owners of Alfredo’s lot.  as the exclusive property of Alfredo on
 
Issue:
Whether the respondents are the
proper parties against whom the
subject action for reimbursement must
be directed to.
Ruling:
The allegations contained in petitioners
Complaint failed to state a cause of
action.
  
Petitioner was not able to show that
there is an obligation on the part of the
respondents to respect or not to violate
her right. While we could concede that
Civil Case No. 61327 made a reference
to the right of the spouse as
contemplated in Article 120 of the
Family Code to be reimbursed for the
cost of the improvements, the
obligation to reimburse rests on the
spouse upon whom ownership of the
entire property is vested. There is no
obligation on the part of the purchaser
of the property, in case the property is
sold by the owner-spouse.
 
Indeed, Article 120 provides the
solution in determining the ownership
of the improvements that are made on
the separate property of the spouses at
the expense of the partnership or
through the acts or efforts of either or
both spouses. Thus, when the cost of
the improvement and any resulting
increase in value are more than the
value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of
one of the spouses shall belong to the
conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the
time of the improvement; otherwise,
said property shall be retained in
ownership by the owner-spouse,
likewise subject to reimbursement of
the cost of the improvement. The
subject property was precisely declared
the basis of Article 120 of the Family
Code.
 
What is incontrovertible is that the
respondents, despite the allegations
contained in the Complaint that they
are the buyers of the subject premises,
are not petitioner’s spouse nor can they
ever be deemed as the owner-spouse
upon whom the obligation to reimburse
petitioner for her costs rested. It is the
owner-spouse who has the obligation to
reimburse the conjugal partnership or
the spouse who expended the acts or
efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise
stated, respondents do not have the
obligation to respect petitioner’s right
to be reimbursed.
 
SPOUSES ONESIFORO and
ROSARIO ALINAS v. SPOUSES
VICTOR and ELENA ALINAS
G.R. No. 158040, April 14, 2008,
THIRD DIVISION (AUSTRIA-
MARTINEZ, J.)
The sale of a conjugal property
requires the consent of both the
husband and wife. Thus, the absence of
the consent of one renders the entire
sale null and void, including the portion
of the conjugal property pertaining to
the husband who contracted the sale
Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario
Alinas (petitioners) separated sometime
in 1982, with Rosario moving to
Pagadian City and Onesiforo moving to
Manila. They left behind two lots
identified as Lot 896-B-9-A with a
bodega standing on it and Lot 896-B-9-
B with petitioners' house. These two
lots are the subject of the present
petition.
Petitioner Onesiforo Alinas
(Onesiforo) and respondent Victor
Alinas (Victor) are brothers. Petitioners
allege that they entrusted their
properties to Victor and Elena Alinas
(respondent spouses) with the
agreement that any income from
rentals of the properties should be
remitted to the Social Security System
(SSS) and to the Rural Bank of
Oroquieta City (RBO), to pay off
petitioners' loans with said institutions.
Lot 896-B-9-A with the bodega was
mortgaged as security for the loan
obtained from the RBO, while Lot 896-
B-9-B with the house was mortgaged to
the SSS. Onesiforo alleges that he left
blank papers with his signature on
them to facilitate the administration of
said properties.
Sometime in 1993, petitioners
discovered that their two lots were
already titled in the name of
respondent spouses.
Records show that after Lot 896-
B-9-A was extra-judicially foreclosed,
TCT No. T-11853 was issued in the
name of mortgagee RBO on November
13, 1987. On May 2, 1988, the duly
authorized representative of RBO
executed a Deed of Installment Sale of
Bank's Acquired Assets4conveying Lot
896-B-9-A to respondent spouses.
RBO's TCT over Lot 896-B-9-A was then
cancelled and on February 22, 1989,
TCT No. T-12664 covering said lot was
issued in the name of respondent
spouses.
Lot 896-B-9-B was also foreclosed
by the SSS and on November 17, 1986.
However, pursuant to a Special Power
of Attorney7 signed by Onesiforo in
favor of Victor, dated March 10, 1989,
the latter was able to redeem, on the
same date, Lot 896-B-9-B from the SSS
for the sum of P111,110.09.
Onesiforo's signature also
appears in an Absolute Deed of Sale
likewise dated March 10, 1989, selling
Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent spouses.
On March 15, 1993, by virtue of said
documents, TCT No. 1739411 covering
Lot 896-B-9-B was issued in the name
of respondent spouses.
On June 25, 1993, petitioners
filed with the RTC of Ozamis City a
complaint for recovery of possession
and ownership of their conjugal
properties with damages against
respondent spouses. RTC ruled in their
favor. CA, however, ruled that
Onesiforo's sale of Lot 896-B-9-B
together with the house standing
thereon to [respondents] in so far as
Rosario Alinas, his wife's share of one
half thereof is concerned, of no force
and effect.
ISSUE: Is the sale valid?
RULING:
No. Lot 896-B-9-B (with house),
the Court finds it patently erroneous for
the CA to have applied the principle of
equity in sustaining the validity of the
sale of Onesiforo’s one-half share in the
subject property to respondent spouses.
Although petitioners were
married before the enactment of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, the
sale in question occurred in 1989. Thus,
their property relations are governed
by Chapter IV on Conjugal Partnership
of Gains of the Family Code.
The CA ruling completely
deviated from the clear dictate of
Article 124 of the Family Code which
provides:
Art. 124. The administration
and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly.
xxx
In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the
administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do
not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of
the court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or
consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void.  spouses' allegation that they spent
The absence of the consent of
one renders the entire sale
null and void, including the
portion of the conjugal
property pertaining to the
husband who contracted the
sale.
Thus, pursuant to Article 124 of
the Family Code and jurisprudence, the
sale of petitioners' conjugal property
made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is
void in its entirety.
It should be noted that
respondent spouses were well aware
that Lot 896-B-9-B is a conjugal
property of petitioners. They also knew
that the disposition being made by
Onesiforo is without the consent of his
wife, as they knew that petitioners had
separated, and, the sale documents do
not bear the signature of petitioner
Rosario. The fact that Onesiforo had to
execute two documents, namely: the
Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10,
1989 and a notarized Agreement
likewise dated March 10, 1989, reveals
that they had full knowledge of the
severe infirmities of the sale. Verily, the
sale of Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent
spouses is entirely null and void.
Court agrees with the CA that
petitioners should reimburse
respondent spouses the redemption
price paid for Lot 896-B-9-B in the
amount of P111,110.09 with legal
interest from the time of filing of the
complaint
Respondent spouses, having
knowledge of the flaw in their mode of
acquisition, are deemed to be
possessors in bad faith under Article
52628 of the Civil Code. However, they
have a right to be refunded for
necessary expenses on the property as
provided under Article 54629 of the
same Code. Unfortunately, there is no
credible proof to support respondent
more than P400,000.00 to repair and
make the house habitable.
THELMA A. JADER-
MANALO, petitioner, vs. NORMA
FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and
EDILBERTO
CAMAISA, respondents.
G.R. No. 147978, January 23, 2002
KAPUNAN, J.:
DOCTRINE/S:
 The disposition of a conjugal
property by the husband as
administrator in appropriate
cases must be with the written
consent of the wife, otherwise,
the disposition is void.
 Article 124 of the Family Code
provides:
 Art. 124. The administration and
enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband’s
decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for
a proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing
such decision. In the event that one
spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of
administration.
These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court
or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before
the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerers.
 Even granting that the wife
actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the
properties, her written consent to
the sale is required by law for its
validity; being merely aware of a
transaction is not consent.
 The court authorization under
Article 124 of the Family Code is
only resorted to in cases where
the spouse who does not give
consent is incapacitated.
FACTS:
Petitioner Thelma A. Jader-Manalo
allegedly came across an advertisement
placed by respondents, the Spouses
Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and
Edilberto Camaisa, in the Classified Ads
Section of the newspaper BULLETIN
TODAY, for the sale of their ten-door
apartment in Makati, as well as that in
Taytay, Rizal.
Petitioner was interested in buying the
two properties so she negotiated for the
purchase through a real estate broker,
Mr. Proceso Ereno, authorized by
respondent spouses. Petitioner made a
visual inspection of the said lots with
the real estate broker and thereafter,
petitioner met with the vendors who
turned out to be respondent spouses.
She made a definite offer to buy the
properties to respondent Edilberto
Camaisa with the knowledge and
conformity of his wife, respondent
Norma Camaisa in the presence of the
real estate broker. After some
bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto
agreed upon the purchase price of
₱1,500,000.00 (for the Taytay property)
and ₱2,100,000.00 (for the Makati
property) to be paid on installment
basis.
The agreement was handwritten by
petitioner and signed by Edilberto.
When petitioner pointed out the
conjugal nature of the properties,
Edilberto assured her of his wife's
conformity and consent to the sale. The
following day, petitioner, the real estate
broker and Edilberto met in the latter's
office for the formal signing of the
typewritten Contracts to Sell. After
Edilberto signed the contracts,
petitioner delivered to him two checks
totaling Php 300,000. The contracts
were given to Edilberto for the formal
affixing of his wife's signature.
Subsequently, petitioner received a call
from respondent Norma, requesting a
meeting to clarify some provisions of
the contracts. During the meeting,
handwritten notations were made on
the contracts to sell, so they arranged
to incorporate the notations and to
meet again for the formal signing of the
contracts.
When petitioner met again with
respondent spouses and the real estate
broker at Edilberto's office for the
formal affixing of Norma's signature,
she was surprised when respondent
spouses informed her that they were
backing out of the agreement because
they needed "spot cash" for the full
amount of the consideration. Petitioner
reminded respondent spouses that the
contracts to sell had already been duly
perfected and Norma's refusal to sign
the same would unduly prejudice
petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign
the contracts.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages
against respondent spouses before the
RTC (Makati) to compel Norma
Camaisa to sign the contracts to sell.
In their Answer, respondents alleged
that it was an agreement between
herein petitioner and respondent
Edilberto Camaisa that the sale of the
subject properties was still subject to
the approval and conformity of his wife
Norma Camaisa; that the latter’s
refusal was duly communicated by
Edilberto to petitioner; that the checks
issued by petitioner were returned to
her by Edilberto and she accepted the
same without any objection.
Respondent further claimed that the
acceptance of the checks returned to
petitioner signified her assent to the
cancellation of the sale of the subject
properties. Respondent Norma denied
that she ever participated in the
negotiations for the sale of the subject
properties and that she gave her
consent and conformity to the same.
Respondent Norma Camaisa filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment
asserting that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact on the basis of
the pleadings and admission of the
parties and, considering that the wife's
written consent was not obtained in the
contract to sell for the subject conjugal
properties, the contract between them
was null and void.
RTC:
Dismissed the complaint on the ground
that under Art. 124 of the Family Code,
the court cannot intervene to authorize
the transaction in the absence of the
consent of the wife since said wife who
refused to give consent had not been
shown to be incapacitated.
Court of Appeals:
Affirmed the trial court’s decision,
explaining that since the properties
subject of the contracts were conjugal
properties, the consent of both spouses
is necessary to give effect to the sale.
Since private respondent Norma
Camaisa refused to sign the contracts,
the sale was never perfected. It
stressed that the authority of the court
to allow sale or encumbrance of a
conjugal property without the consent
of the other spouse is applicable only in
cases where the said spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the
conjugal property.
ISSUE:
Whether the contract to sell involving
conjugal properties was valid without
the written consent of the wife.
RULING:
NO.
Article 241 requires that the disposition
of a conjugal property by the husband
as administrator in appropriate cases
requires the written consent of the
wife, otherwise, the disposition is void.
In this case, the properties subject of
the contracts were conjugal; hence, for
the contracts to sell to be effective, the
consent of both husband and wife must
concur.
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly
did not give her written consent to the
sale. Even granting that respondent
Norma actively participated in
negotiating for the sale of the subject
properties, which she denied, her
written consent to the sale is required
by law for its validity. Significantly,
petitioner herself admits that Norma
refused to sign the contracts to sell.
Respondent Norma may have been
aware of the negotiations for the sale of
their conjugal properties. However,
being merely aware of a transaction is
not consent.
Petitioner’s argument
Since respondent Norma unjustly
refuses to affix her signatures to the
contracts to sell, court authorization
under Article 124 of the Family Code is
warranted.
SC Ruling
1
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail,
subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority
of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall
be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
The argument is bereft of merit. While
petitioner is correct insofar as she
alleges that if the written consent of
the other spouse cannot be obtained or
is being withheld, the matter may be
brought to court which will give such
authority if the same is warranted by
the circumstances, it should be
stressed that court authorization under
Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases
where the spouse who does not give
consent is incapacitated. In this case,
petitioner failed to allege and prove
that respondent Norma was
incapacitated to give her consent to the
contracts. In the absence of such
showing of the wife's incapacity, court
authorization cannot be sought.
IMELDA RELUCIO, PETITIONER,
VS. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ,
RESPONDENT
Facts
On 15 September 1993, herein
respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez filed
a petition for “APPOINTMENT AS
SOLE ADMINISTRATRIX OF
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF
PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC.,”
against defendant Alberto Lopez and
petitioner Imelda Relucio. According to
Angelina, sometime in 1968, Alberto
Lopez, who is married to the Angelina,
abandoned the her and their four
legitimate children and maintained an
illicit relationship with Imelda Relucio.
He arrogated unto himself full and
exclusive control and administration of
the conjugal properties, spending and
using the same to the total exclusion of
the Angelina and their four children.
During the period of cohabition of
Alberto and Imelda, they amassed
several stockholdings in Lopez
owned/controlled corporations using
allegedly, the conjugal properties of
Alberto and Angelina. It was further
alleged that such stockholdings were
acquired with minimal, if not, nil
participation of Imelda. To avoid his
responsibilities as a father, Alberto
transferred/concealed the conjugal
properties by naming them to Imelda.
Imelda maintains that angelina has no
cause of action against her however,
the trial court dismissed
her motion to dismiss on the ground
that that she is impleaded as a
necessary or indispensable party
because some of the subject properties
are registered in her name and Alberto,
or solely in her name. The CA affirmed
the denial of the TC of the motion to
dismiss.
Issue
Was the TC correct in denying the
motion to dismiss of Imelda in the
petition for administration?
Ruling
No, first cause of action is for judicial
appointment of respondent as
administratrix of the conjugal
partnership or absolute community
property arising from her marriage to
Alberto Lopez, Imelda is a
complete stranger to this cause of
action under Art. 1281. The
administration of the property of the
marriage is entirely between them, to
the exclusion of all other persons.
Angelina alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is
her husband. Therefore, her cause of
action is against Alberto. There is no
right-duty relation between Imelda and
Angelina that can possibly support a
cause of action.
The second cause of action is for an
accounting “by respondent husband.”
The accounting of conjugal partnership
arises from marriage. Imelda has
nothing to do with the marriage
between respondent
Alberto. Hence, no cause of action can
exist against Imelda on this ground.
The third cause of action is essentially
for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez’ share
in property co-owned by him and
Imelda. It does not involve the issue of
validity of the co-ownership. The issue
is whether there is basis in law to
forfeit Alberto J. Lopez’ share, if any
there be, in property co-owned by him
with Imelda. The Angelina also sought
support.
Support cannot be compelled from a
stranger.
As to the moral damages, respondent’s
claim for moral damages is against
Alberto, not Imelda. To
sustain a cause of action for moral
damages, the complaint must have the
character of an action for
interference with marital or family
relations under the Civil Code such was
not made in this case.
1 Art. 128 - If a spouse without just
cause abandons the other or fails to
comply with his or her obligations to
the family, the aggrieved A real party in
interest is one who stands “to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of
the suit.” In this case, Imelda would not
be affected by any judgment by the
petition of Angelina.
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS and
LOAN BANK, versus MIGUELA C.
DAILO,
Facts:
During their marriage, respondent
Miguela and Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
purchased a house and lot in San Pablo
City. The Deed of Absolute Sale,
however, was executed only in favor of
Marcelino as vendee thereof to the
exclusion of his wife. Thereafter,
Marcelino executed a Special Power of
Attorney in favor of one Lilibeth,
authorizing the latter to obtain a loan
secured by the spouses Dailo's house
and lot. Lilibeth obtained a loan in the
amount of P300,000.00 from petitioner
Homeowners Bank and as its security,
she executed a Real Estate Mortgage
constituted on the subject property. All
these transactions, including the
execution of the SPA, were without the
knowledge and consent of Miguela.
Upon maturity, the loan remained
outstanding, thus the property was
extrajudicially foreclosed. Homeowners
was the highest bidder at the
foreclosure sale. The ownership was
consolidated in its favor after the
property was not redeemed within the
redemption period. In the meantime,
Marcelino died. Miguela learned that
Homeowners had already employed a
certain Brion to clean its premises and
that her car was razed because Brion
allowed a boy to play with fire within
the premises.
She instituted with the RTC an action
for nullity of REM, certificate of sale,
affidavit of consolidation of ownership,
deed of sale, reconveyance with prayer
for WPI and Damages against
Homeowners. The latter prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the property was the
exclusive property of Marcelino. The
RTC ruled in favor of Miguela. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s
finding that the subject property was
conjugal in nature, in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence to rebut
the presumption that the subject
property acquired during the marriage
of spouses Dailo belongs to their
conjugal partnership. The appellate
court declared as void the mortgage on
the subject property because it was
constituted without the knowledge and
consent of Miguela, in accordance with
Article 124 of the Family Code. Hence,
this petition.
Homeowners contends that the
mortgage is valid up to the extent of
the late Marcelino’s share in the
conjugal partnership. It argues that
although Article 124 of the Family Code
requires the consent of the other
spouse to the mortgage of conjugal
properties, the framers of the law could
not have intended to curtail the right of
a spouse from exercising full ownership
over the portion of the conjugal
property pertaining to him under the
concept of co-ownership.
ISSUE: Is the mortgage void for being
contracted without Miguela’s consent?
RULING:
YES. In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it
was held that the sale of a conjugal
property requires the consent of both
the husband and wife. In applying
Article 124 of the Family Code, this
Court declared that the absence of the
consent of one renders the entire sale
null and void, including the portion of
the conjugal property pertaining to the
husband who contracted the sale.
Miguela and Marcelino were married
on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a
marriage settlement, the system of
relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains governed the
property relations between Miguela
and her late husband. With the
effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains in the Family Code
was made applicable to conjugal
partnership of gains already
established before its effectivity unless
vested rights have already been
acquired under the Civil Code or other
laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even
apply to their property relations even in
a suppletory manner. The regime of
conjugal partnership of gains is a
special type of partnership, where the
husband and wife place in a common
fund the proceeds, products, fruits and
income from their separate properties
and those acquired by either or both
spouses through their efforts or by
chance. Unlike the absolute community
of property wherein the rules on co-
ownership apply in a suppletory
manner, the conjugal partnership shall
be governed by the rules on contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict
with what is expressly determined in
the chapter (on conjugal partnership of
gains) or by the spouses in their
marriage settlements.
The basic and established fact is that
during his lifetime, without the
knowledge and consent of his wife,
Marcelino constituted a real estate
mortgage on the subject property,
which formed part of their conjugal
partnership. By express provision of
Article 124 of the Family Code, in the
absence of (court) authority or written
consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the
conjugal property shall be void.
Moreover, Homeowners imposes the
liability for the payment of the principal
obligation obtained by the late
Marcelino on the conjugal partnership
to the extent that it redounded to the
benefit of the family. Under Article 121
of the Family Code, “The conjugal
partnership shall be liable for: x x x (3)
Debts and obligations contracted by
either spouse without the consent of
the other to the extent that the family
may have been benefited; x x x" For the
subject property to be held liable, the
obligation contracted by the late
Marcelino must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
burden of proof that the debt was
contracted for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains lies with
the creditor-party litigant claiming as
such. Homeowner’s sweeping
conclusion that the loan obtained by
the late Marcelino to finance the
construction of housing units without a
doubt redounded to the benefit of his
family, without adducing adequate
proof, does not persuade this Court.
Other than petitioner's bare allegation,
there is nothing from the records of the
case to compel a finding that, indeed,
the loan obtained by the late Marcelino
redounded to the benefit of the family.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership
cannot be held liable for the payment of
the principal obligation.
WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner vs.
AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 195670               December
3, 2012
FACTS:
 Willem (Beumer), a Dutch
national, married Avelina (Amores)
on March 29, 1980.
 Their marriage was declared null
by the RTC on November 10, 2000
by reason of psychological
incapacity, thus Buemer filed a
petition for dissolution of conjugal
partnership and distribution of
properties which he claimed were
acquired during their marriage.
BY PURCHASE:
a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the
consolidated survey of Lots
2144 & 2147 of the
Dumaguete Cadastre,
including a residential house
constructed thereon
b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete
Cadastre, including a
residential house constructed
thereon
c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete
Cadastre
d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the
consolidated survey of Lots
2144 & 2147 of the
Dumaguete Cadastre
BY INHERITANCE:
 a. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the
Dumaguete Cadastre (the area
that appertains to the conjugal
partnership is 376.45 sq.m.)
b. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the
Dumaguete Cadastre (the area
that appertains to the conjugal
partnership is 24 sq.m.)
 The respondent averred that she
and petitioner did not acquire any
conjugal properties during their
marriage, the truth being that she
used her own personal money to
purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4
out of her personal funds and Lots
2055-A and 2055-I by way of
inheritance.
 During trial, petitioner testified
that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4
were registered in the name of
respondent, these properties were
acquired with the money he
received from the Dutch
government as his disability benefit
since respondent did not have
sufficient income to pay for their
acquisition.
 He also claimed that the joint
affidavit they submitted before the
Register of Deeds of Dumaguete
City was contrary to Article 89 of
the Family Code, hence, invalid.
 During trial, petitioner testified
that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4
were registered in the name of
respondent, these properties were
acquired with the money he
received from the Dutch
government as his disability
benefit12 since respondent did not
have sufficient income to pay for
their acquisition.
 He also claimed that the joint
affidavit they submitted before the
Register of Deeds of Dumaguete
City was contrary to Article 89 of
the Family Code, hence, invalid.
 RTC Ruling:
a. Granted the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of
gains between the parties
considering the fact that their
marriage was previously
annulled. The parcels of land
covered by TCT Nos. 22846,
21974, 21306, 21307, 23567
and 23575 are hereby
declared paraphernal
properties of respondent
Avelina Amores due to the
fact that while these real
properties were acquired by
onerous title during their
marital union, Willem
Beumer, being a foreigner,
is not allowed by law to
acquire any private land in
the Philippines, except
through inheritance.
b. The personal properties,
i.e., tools and equipment
mentioned in the complaint
which were brought out by
Willem from the conjugal
dwelling are hereby declared
to be exclusively owned by
the petitioner.
c. The two houses standing on
the lots covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 21974
and 22846 are hereby
declared to be co-owned by
the petitioner and the
respondent since these were
acquired during their marital
union and since there is no
prohibition on foreigners
from owning buildings and
residential units. Petitioner
and respondent are, thereby,
directed to subject this court
for approval their project of
partition on the two houses
aforementioned.
 CA Ruling:
a. Petitioner contested only the
RTC’s award of Lots 1, 2142,
5845 and 4 in favor of
 respondent. He insisted that
the money used to purchase
the foregoing properties came
from his own capital funds and
that they were registered in
the name of his former wife
only because of the
constitutional prohibition
against foreign ownership.
Thus, he prayed for
reimbursement of one-half
(1/2) of the value of what he
had paid in the purchase of
the said properties, waiving
the other half in favor of his
estranged ex-wife.
b. On October 8, 2009, the CA
affirmed the judgment
rendered by the RTC. The CA
stressed the fact that
petitioner was "well-aware of
the constitutional prohibition
for aliens to acquire lands in
the Philippines." Hence, he
cannot invoke equity to
support his claim for
reimbursement.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner entitled to assail the
decision of the RTC and CA?
HELD:
The petition lacks merit. Firstly,
foreigners may not own lands in the
Philippines. However, there are no
restrictions to the ownership of
buildings or structures on lands of
foreigners. As such, the two houses on
Lots 1 and 2142 are considered co-
owned by the parties.
While admitting to have previously
executed a joint affidavit that
respondent’s personal funds were used
to purchase Lot 1, he likewise claimed
that his personal disability funds were
used to acquire the same. The Court
cannot, even on the grounds of equity,
grant reimbursement to petitioner
given that he acquired no right
whatsoever over the subject properties
by virtue of its unconstitutional
purchase.
A contract that violates the Constitution
and the law is null and void, vests no
rights, creates no obligations and
produces no legal effect at all.
IN RE: PETITION FOR
SEPARATION OF PROP, Of Muller
Facts:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura
Muller and respondent Helmut Muller
were married in Hamburg, Germany on
September 22, 1989. The couple
resided in Germany at a house owned
by respondent’s parents but decided to
move and reside permanently in the
Philippines in 1992. By this time,
respondent had inherited the house in
Germany from his parents which he
sold and used the proceeds for the
purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo,
Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the
construction of a house amounting to
P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property
was registered in the name of
petitioner, Elena Buenaventura Muller.
Due to incompatibilities and
respondents alleged womanizing,
drinking, and maltreatment, the
spouses eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994,
respondent filed a petition for
separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
The court granted said petition. It also
decreed the separation of properties
between them and ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located
within the country, excluding those
acquired by gratuitous title during the
marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was
acquired using paraphernal funds of
the respondent. However, it ruled that
respondent cannot recover his funds
because the property was purchased in
violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution.
The respondent elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals, which reversed
the decision of the RTC.  It held that
respondent merely prayed for
reimbursement for the purchase of the
Antipolo property, and not acquisition
or transfer of ownership to him. It
ordered the respondent to REIMBURSE
the petitioner the amount of
P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the
land and the amount of P2,300,000.00
for the construction of the house
situated in Antipolo, Rizal.
Elena Muller then filed a petition
for review on certiorari.
Issue:  to have been obtained by their joint
Is respondent Helmut Muller is
entitled to reimbursement?
Held:
No. This is so as there is an
express prohibition against foreigners
owning land in the Philippines. Art. XII,
Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution
provides: “Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.” Here, the
respondent willingly and knowingly
bought the property despite a gave birth to their daughter, Joan
constitutional prohibition. And to get
away with that constitutional
prohibition, he put the property under
the name of his Filipina wife. He tried
to do indirectly what the fundamental
law bars him to do directly.
He who seeks equity must do
equity, and he who comes into equity
must come with clean hands
The SC ruled that respondent
cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity. It has been held that
equity as a rule will follow the law and
will not permit that to be done
indirectly which, because of public
policy, cannot be done directly.
Salas vs. Aguila
G.R. No. 202370, September 23,
2013, CARPIO, J:
DOCTRINE: In Diño v. Diño, the court
held that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the union of parties
who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless declared void under Article
36 of the Family Code, as in this case.
Furthermore, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed
efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who
did not participate in the acquisition by
the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former’s
efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the
household.
FACTS:
On 7 September 1985, petitioner
Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. (Salas) and
respondent Eden Villena Aguila (Aguila)
were married. On 7 June 1986, Aguila
Jiselle. Five months later, Salas left
their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he
no longer communicated with Aguila or
their daughter.
On 7 October 2003, Aguila filed a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage (petition) citing psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The petition states that
they "have no conjugal properties
whatsoever." The summons was
received by Salas’ mother, Luisa.

RTC: It ruled in favor of Salas, and
further ordered the dissolution of the
conjugal property.
Aguila filed a manifestation and
motion stating that she discovered
several real properties in Quezon City
and Tondo. The registered owner of the
same is "Juan S.Salas, married to
Rubina C. Salas." On 8 February 2008,
Salas filed an Opposition to the
Manifestation alleging that there is no
conjugal property to be partitioned
based on Aguila’s petition. According to
Salas, Aguila’s statement was a judicial
admission and was not made through
palpable mistake. Salas claimed that
Aguila waived her right to the
Discovered Properties. Further, Salas
said that he waived some properties in
favour of Aguila.
The RTC held that pursuant to
the Rules,14 even upon entry of
judgment granting the annulment of
marriage, the court can proceed with
the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the conjugal partnership
of gains if it has not been judicially
adjudicated upon, as in this case. The
RTC found that the Discovered
Properties are among the conjugal
properties to be partitioned and
distributed between Salas and Aguila.
Rubina filed a Complaint-in-
Intervention, claiming that: (1) she is
Rubina Cortez, a widow and unmarried
to Salas; (2) the Discovered Properties
are her paraphernal properties; (3)
Salas did not contribute money to
purchase the Discovered Properties as
he had no permanent job in Japan
CA: Affirmed RTC decision. The CA
pointed out that the petition was filed
on 7 October 2003, it further held that
Aguila should not be punished on
matters beyond her control. The facts
provide that she discovered the
properties only on on 17 April 2007 or
before the promulgation of the RTC
decision. Salas was given the
opportunity to be heard, and his failure
to be present during trial cannot delay
the proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether the discovered
properties are CO-OWNED by Salas
and Aguila
HELD: YES.
ART. 147. When a man and a woman
who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Under this property regime, property
acquired during the marriage is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained
through the couple’s joint efforts and
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the present case, Salas did not rebut
this presumption. In a similar case
where the ground for nullity of
marriage was also psychological
incapacity, we held that the properties
acquired during the union of the
parties, as found by both the RTC and
the CA, would be governed by co-
ownership. Accordingly, the partition of
the Discovered Properties as ordered
by the RTC and the CA should be
sustained, but on the basis of co-
ownership and not on the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains.
RUBINA: Rubina failed to prove her
title or her legal interest in the
Discovered Properties, she has no right
to intervene in this case. The Rules of
Court provide that only "a person who
has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of
the parties, or an interest against both,
or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action."
DISCUSSION ON PARAPHERNAL
PROPERTY (The Court did not apply
this in the case at bar)
It is property that solely belongs to
either the husband or the wife only.
Paraphernal Property is not part of the
conjugal property or absolute
community property. If the property
regime of the husband and wife is
complete separation of property, all
properties brought and acquired by
each of the spouses before and during
the marriage belongs only to either the
husband or the wife and not by both of
them. In case of inherited properties
within the marriage, the inherited
properties remain paraphernal to the
heir. The fruits of a Paraphernal
Property redounds solely to the owner
thereof. Even if the fruits accrued
during the marriage.
AGAPAY v PALANG
Case Doctrines:
● Under Article 148, only the
properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be
stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast
to Article 147 which states that efforts
in the care and maintenance of the
family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If
the actual contribution of the party is
not proved, there will be no co-
ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.
● Article 87 of the Family Code
expressly provides that the prohibition
against donations between spouses now
applies to donations between persons
living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage, for otherwise,
the condition of those who incurred
guilt would turn out to be better than
those in legal union.
● Separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not
take place except by judicial order or
without judicial conferment when there
is an express stipulation in the
marriage settlements.
● Questions as to who are the heirs of
the decedent, proof of filiation of
illegitimate children and the
determination of the estate of the latter
and claims thereto should be ventilated
in the proper probate court or in a
special proceeding instituted for the
purpose and cannot be adjudicated in
the instant ordinary civil action which
is for recovery of ownership and
possession.
Facts:
Miguel Palang married Carlina in 1949.
He left to work in Hawaii a few months
after the wedding. Their only child
Herminia was born in 1950. When
Miguel returned for good in 1972, he
refused to live with Carlina.
In 1973, Miguel who was then 63 years
old contracted a subsequent marriage
with 19-year old Erlinda Agapay. Two
months earlier, they jointly purchased a
riceland. A house and lot was likewise
purchased, allegedly by Erlinda as the
sole vendee. Miguel and Erlinda’s
cohabitation produced a son named
Kristopher.

1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a
Deed of Donation as a form of
compromise agreement to settle and
end a case filed by the latter. The
parties therein agreed to donate their
conjugal property consisting of six
parcels of land to their only child,
Herminia.
In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were
convicted of concubinage upon
Carlina’s complaint. Two years later,
Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia
instituted a case for recovery of
ownership and possession with
damages against Erlinda, seeking to get
back the riceland and the house and lot
allegedly purchase by Miguel during
his cohabitation with Erlinda. The
lower court dismissed the complaint
but CA reversed the decision.
Erlinda claimed that: (1) The Court of
Appeals erred in not sustaining the
validity of two deeds of absolute sale
covering the riceland and the house
and lot, the first in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda and the second, in favor of
Erlinda alone. (2) The CA erred in not
declaring Kristopher as Miguel’s
illegitimate son and thus entitled to
inherit from Miguel’s estate. (3) The
CA erred “in not finding that there is
sufficient pleading and evidence that
Kristoffer should be considered as
party-defendant in Civil Case No. U-
4625 before the trial court and in CA-
G.R. No. 24199.
Issues:
1. Who owns the riceland?
2. Who owns the house and lot?
3. Does the trial court’s decision
adopting the compromise agreement
partake the nature of judicial
confirmation of the separation of
property between spouses and the
termination of the conjugal
partnership?
4. Can Kristopher’s status and claim as
an illegitimate son and heir be
adjudicated in an ordinary civil action
for recovery of ownership and
possession?
Held:
1. The sale of the riceland on May 17,
1973, was made in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda. The provision of law
applicable here is Article 148 of the
Family Code providing for cases of
cohabitation when a man and a woman
who are not capacitated to marry each
other live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage.
While Miguel and Erlinda contracted
marriage on July 15, 1973, said union
was patently void because the earlier
marriage of Miguel and Carlina was
still susbsisting and unaffected by the
latter’s de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be
stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast
to Article 147 which states that efforts
in the care and maintenance of the
family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If
the actual contribution of the party is
not proved, there will be no co-
ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to
establish by her testimony that she is
engaged in the business of buy and sell
and had a sari-sari store but failed to
persuade us that she actually
contributed money to buy the subject
riceland. Worth noting is the fact that
on the date of conveyance, May 17,
1973, petitioner was only around
twenty years of age and Miguel Palang
was already sixty-four and a pensioner
of the U.S. Government. Considering
her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to
conclude that in 1973 she contributed
P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase
price of subject property, there being
no proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland
was bought two months before Miguel
and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the
nature of an afterthought, said added
assertion was intended to exclude their
case from the operation of Article 148
of the Family Code. Proof of the
precise date when they commenced
their adulterous cohabitation not
having been adduced, we cannot state
definitively that the riceland was
purchased even before they started
living together. In any case, even
assuming that the subject property was
bought before cohabitation, the rules of
co-ownership would still apply and
proof of actual contribution would still
be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she
contributed money to the purchase
price of the riceland, we find no basis
to justify her co-ownership with Miguel
over the same. Consequently, the
riceland should, as correctly held by
the Court of Appeals, revert to the
conjugal partnership property of the
deceased Miguel and private
respondent Carlina Palang.
2. With respect to the house and lot,
Erlinda allegedly bought the same for
P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975
when she was only 22 years old. The
testimony of the notary public who
prepared the deed of conveyance for
the property reveals the falsehood of
this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun
testified that Miguel Palang provided
the money for the purchase price and
directed that Erlinda’s name alone be
placed as the vendee.
The transaction was properly a
donation made by Miguel to Erlinda,
but one which was clearly void and
inexistent by express provision of law
because it was made between persons
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the
time of the donation, under Article 739
of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87
of the Family Code expressly provides
that the prohibition against donations
between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living
together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage, for otherwise, the
condition of those who incurred guilt
would turn out to be better than those
in legal union.
3. No. Separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not
take place except by judicial order or
without judicial conferment when there
is an express stipulation in the
marriage settlements. The judgment
which resulted from the parties’
compromise was not specifically and
expressly for separation of property
and should not be so inferred.
4. No. Questions as to who are the heirs
of the decedent, proof of filiation of
illegitimate children and the
determination of the estate of the latter
and claims thereto should be ventilated
in the proper probate court or in a
special proceeding instituted for the
purpose and cannot be adjudicated in
the instant ordinary civil action which
is for recovery of ownership and
possession. Kristopher, not having been
impleaded, was not a party to the case
at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be
called his guardian ad litem for he was
not involved in the case at bar.
G.R. No. 137650. April 12, 2000
GUILLERMA TUMLOS vs. SPOUSES
MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES
FERNANDEZ
FACTS:
Spouses Fernandez filed an action for
ejectment before the MTC of
Valenzuela against Guillerma Tumlos,
Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their
complaint dated 1996, said spouses
alleged that they are the absolute
owners of an apartment building and
that through tolerance they had
allowed the Tumlos to occupy the
apartment building for the last 7 years,
since 1989, without the payment of any
rent. It was agreed upon that Guillerma
will pay P1,600.00 a month while the
other defendants promised to pay
P1,000.00 as rental which was not
complied with. They have demanded
several times for the defendants to
vacate the premises as they are in need
of the property for the construction of a
new building.
Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who
filed an answer to the complaint. She
averred therein that the Fernandez
spouses had no cause of action against
her, since she is a co-owner of the
subject premises as evidenced by a
Contract to Sell wherein it was stated
that she is a co-vendee of the property
in question together with Mario. She
then asked for the dismissal of the
complaint.
Upon appeal to the RTC, Tumlos
alleged that Mario and Guillerma had
an amorous relationship, and that they
acquired the property in question as
their love nest. It was further alleged
that they lived together in the said
apartment building with their 2
children for around 10 years, and that
Guillerma administered the property by
collecting rentals from the lessees of
the other apartments, until she
discovered that Mario deceived her as
to the annulment of his marriage. It
was also during the early part of 1996
when Mario accused her of being
unfaithful and demonstrated his
baseless jealousy.
RTC: Guillerma Tumlos was a co-owner
of the subject property and could not be
ejected therefrom. Guillerma and Mario
acquired the property during their
cohabitation as husband and wife,
although without the benefit of
marriage. The Contract to Sell
submitted by the Fernandez spouses
appeared not to be authentic, as there
was an alteration in the name of the
wife of Mario. The Contract to Sell
originally named Guillerma as the
spouse of Mario. A new Contract to Sell
was issued by the sellers naming the
Fernandez spouses as the buyers after
the latter presented their marriage
contract and requested a change in the
name of the vendee-wife.
CA: Reversed the Order of RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Guillerma is a
co-owner of the said apartment.
HELD:
No. The claim of co-ownership was not
satisfactorily proven by Guillerma. No
other evidence was presented to
validate her claim, except for the said
affidavit. As previously stated, it was
only on appeal that Guillerma alleged
that she cohabited with the petitioner-
husband without the benefit of
marriage, and that she bore him 2
children. Attached to her memorandum
on appeal are the birth certificates of
the said children. Such contentions and
documents should not have been
considered by the RTC, as they were
not presented in her affidavit before the
MTC.
However, even if the said allegations
and documents could be considered,
the claim of co-ownership must still fail.
As Mario is validly married to Lourdes,
Guillerma and Mario are not
capacitated to marry each other. Thus,
the property relations governing their
supposed cohabitation is that found in
Article 148 of the Family Code.
It is clear that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast
to Article 147 of the Family Code which
states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and
household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of
common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry.
The care given by one party to the
home, children, and household, or
spiritual or moral inspiration provided
to the other, is not included in Article
148. Hence, if actual contribution of the
party is not proved, there will be no co-
ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.
In the instant case, no proof of actual
contribution by Guillerma Tumlos in the
purchase of the subject property was
presented. Her only evidence was her
being named in the Contract to Sell as
the wife of Mario. Since she failed to
prove that she contributed money to
the purchase price of the subject
apartment building, We find no basis to
justify her co-ownership with Mario.
The said property is thus presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership
property of Mario and Lourdes
Fernandez, it being acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage and there
being no other proof to the contrary.
VENTURA V. ABUDA
In cases of cohabitation wherein the
parties are incapacitated to marry each
other, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their
respective contributions.
FACTS:
Socorro Torres (Socorro) and
Esteban Abletes (Esteban) were
married. Although Socorro and Esteban
never had common children, both of
them had children from prior
marriages: Esteban had a daughter
named Evangeline Abuda, and Socorro
had a son, who was the father of
Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr, the petitioner
in this case.
Evidence shows that Socorro had a
prior subsisting marriage to Crispin
Roxas when she married Esteban. This
marriage was not annulled, and Crispin
was alive at the time of Socorro’s
marriage to Esteban. Esteban’s prior
marriage, on the other hand, was
dissolved by virtue of his wife’s death in
1960. In 1968, Esteban purchased a
portion of a lot situated at Vitas, Tondo,
Manila (Vitas property). The remaining
portion was thereafter purchased by
Evangeline on her father’s behalf
sometime in 1970.  Also, Evangeline
and Esteban also operated small
business establishments located at 903
and 905 Delpan Street, Tondo, Manila
(Delpan property).
On 6 September 1997, Esteban
sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to
Evangeline and her husband, Paulino
Abuda. Later on, Edilberto discovered
the sale through his mother.
Represented by Leonora, filed a
Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale
before the RTC-Manila. Edilberto
alleged that the sale of the properties
was fraudulent because Esteban’s
signature on the deeds of sale was
forged. Respondents, on the other
hand, argued that because of Socorro’s
prior marriage to Crispin, her
subsequent marriage to Esteban was
null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor
her heirs can claim any right or interest
over the properties purchased by
Esteban and respondents.
The RTC ruled that the marriage
between Socorro and Esteban was void
from the beginning. Article 83 of the
Civil Code, which was the governing
law at the time Esteban and Socorro
were married, thus, Vitas and Delpan
properties are not conjugal, and are
governed by Articles 144 and 485 of the
Civil Code.
CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC applied Article 148 of the Family
Code, and not Articles 144 and 485 of
the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Socorro nor her
heirs can claim any right or interest
over the properties purchased by
Esteban and respondents.
Ruling:
No. It is necessary for each of the
partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to be able to lay claim
to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-
ownership and equal contribution do
not apply.
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation
wherein the parties are incapacitated
to marry each other, only the
properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares
are presumed to be equal. The same
rule and presumption shall apply to
joint deposits of money and evidences
of credit.
If one of the parties is validly
married to another, his or her share in
the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another,
his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph
of the preceding Article
Applying the foregoing provision,
the Vitas and Delpan properties can be
considered common property if: (1)
these were acquired during the
cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro;
and (2) there is evidence that the
properties were acquired through the
parties’ actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry.
Edilberto argues that the
certificate of title covering the Vitas
property shows that the parcel of land
is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro
because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of
Title was issued on 11 December 1980,
or several months after the parties
were married; and (2) title to the land
was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal
age, married to Socorro Torres."
We disagree. The title itself
shows that the Vitas property is owned
by Esteban alone. The phrase "married
to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive
of his civil status, and does not show
that Socorro co-owned the property.
The evidence on record also shows that
Esteban acquired ownership over the
Vitas property prior to his marriage to
Socorro, even if the certificate of title
was issued after the celebration of the
marriage. Registration under the
Torrens title system merely confirms,
and does not vest title. This was
admitted by Edilberto in his petition.
Edilberto claims that Esteban’s
actual contribution to the purchase of
the Delpan property was not
sufficiently proven since Evangeline
shouldered some of the
amortizations. Thus, the law presumes
that Esteban and Socorro jointly
contributed to the acquisition of the Del
pan property.
We cannot sustain Edilberto s claim.
Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found
that the Delpan property was acquired
prior to the marriage of Esteban and
Socorro. Furthermore, even if payment
of the purchase price of the Delpan
property was made by Evangeline, such
payment was made on behalf of her
father. Article 1238 of the Civil Code
provides payment made by a third
person who does not intend to be
reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to
be a donation, which requires the
debtor s consent. But the payment is in
any case valid as to the creditor who
has accepted it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline
paid on behalf of her father, and the
parties intended that the Delpan
property would be owned by and
registered under the name of Esteban.
During trial, the Abuda spouses
presented receipts evidencing
payments of the amortizations for the
Delpan property. On the other hand,
Edilberto failed to show any evidence
showing Socorro’s alleged monetary
contributions.
Settled is the rule that in civil
cases the burden of proof rests upon
the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts the affirmative of an issue. Here
it is Appellant who is duty bound to
prove the allegations in the complaint
which undoubtedly, he miserably failed
to do so.
EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN,
JR., petitioner, vs. MA. ELVIRA
CASTILLO, respondent.
FACTS:
 Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint
]
for "Partition and/or Payment of Co-
Ownership Share, Accounting and
Damages" against respondent Ma.
Elvira Castillo. The complaint alleged
that petitioner and respondent, both
married and with children, but
separated from their respective
spouses, cohabited after a brief
courtship sometime in 1979 while their
respective marriages still subsisted.
During their union, they set up the
Superfreight Customs Brokerage
Corporation, with petitioner as
president and chairman of the board of
directors, and respondent as vice-
president and treasurer. The business
flourished and petitioner and
respondent acquired real and personal
properties which were registered solely
in respondents name. In 1992, due to
irreconcilable differences, the couple
separated. Petitioner demanded from
respondent his share in the subject
properties, but respondent refused
alleging that said properties had been
registered solely in her name.
Respondent filed a Motion for
Summary Judgement in accordance
with Rule 34 of the Rules of Court. She
alleged that issues raised in the
pleading were sham and not genuine,
to wit: Can plaintiff validly claim
the partition and/or payment of co-
ownership share, accounting and
damages, considering that plaintiff
and defendant are admittedly both
married to their respective spouses
under still valid and subsisting
marriages?  In other words, can the
parties be considered as co-owners of
the properties, under the law,
considering the present status of the
parties as both married and incapable
of marrying each other, even assuming
that they lived together as husband and The marriage of petitioner Elna
wife? Fehr and respondent Bruno Fehr was
declared by the court to be void ab
RTC granted said Motion and further initio on the ground of psychological
ruled that since the parties herein were incapacity of respondent. The crux of
not capacitated to marry each other, the present petition is the order of the
they could not have owned the trial court which states that:
properties in common.
“Furthermore, Suite 204, LCG
ISSUE: Condominium with an area of 113.54
Is the RTC correct? sq. m. and covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title NO. 14735 is hereby
RULING: declared the EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY of
No. CASE REMANDED TO RTC. respondent, BRUNO FRANZ
FEHR. Accordingly, petitioner is
It was error for the trial court to rule hereby directed to transfer ownership
that, because the parties in this case of Suite 204 in the name of
were not capacitated to marry each respondent, covered by Condominium
other at the time that they were alleged Certificate of Title No. 14735, being
to have been living together, they could respondents exclusive property,
not have owned properties in common. acquired prior to his marriage.”
The Family Code, in addition to
providing that a co-ownership exists Petitioner assailed the order of
between a man and a woman who live the trial court more particularly, the
together as husband and wife without ownership of Suite 204, LCG
the benefit of marriage, likewise Condominium. She argues that the
provides that, if the parties are suite was purchased on installment
incapacitated to marry each other, basis during the time petitioner and
properties acquired by them through respondent were living exclusively with
their joint contribution of money, each other as husband and wife. As
property or industry shall be owned by such, the rules on co-ownership should
them in common in proportion to their apply in accordance with Article 147 of
contributions which, in the absence of the Family Code.
proof to the contrary, is presumed to be
equal. There is thus co-ownership even ISSUE:
though the couple are not capacitated Whether or not Suite 204, LGC
to marry each other. In this case, there condominium is conjugal property
may be a co-ownership between the
parties herein. Consequently, whether RULING:
petitioner and respondent cohabited YES. It appears from the facts, as
and whether the properties involved in found by the trial court, that in March
the case are part of the alleged co- 1983, after two years of long-distance
ownership are genuine and material. courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and
moved in with respondent in the latters
ELNA MERCADO-FEHR v. BRUNO residence in Metro Manila. Their
FEHR relations bore fruit and their first child,
G.R. No. 152716, 23 October 2003 Michael Bruno Fehr, was born
on December 3, 1983. The couple got
FACTS married on March 14, 1985. In the
meantime, they purchased on
installment a condominium
unit, Suite 204, at LCG Condominium,
as evidenced by a Contract to Sell
dated July 26, 1983 executed by
respondent as the buyer and J.V. Santos
Commercial Corporation as the
seller. Petitioner also signed the
contract as witness, using the name
Elna Mercado Fehr. Upon completion
of payment, the title to the
condominium unit was issued in the
name of petitioner.[19]
In light of these facts, we give more
credence to petitioners submission
that Suite 204 was acquired during the
parties cohabitation. Accordingly,
under Article 147 of the Family Code,
said property should be governed by
the rules on co-ownership. The Family
Code provides: “Article 147. When a
man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who
did not participate in the acquisition by
the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly to
the acquisition thereof if the formers
efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of their family and of the
household. Xxx”
Article 147 applies to unions of
parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage
is nonetheless void, as in the case at
bar. This provision creates a co-
ownership with respect to the
properties they acquire during their
cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership
applies when a man and a woman,
suffering no legal impediment to marry
each other, so exclusively live together
as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. The term capacitated in the
provision (in the first paragraph of the
law) refers to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage, i.e., any
male or female of the age of eighteen
years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Article 37
and 38 of the Code. Under this property
regime, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules
on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. 
Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the
man and the woman: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each other;
(2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and (3) their union is
without the benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void. All these elements are
present in the case at bar. It has not
been shown that petitioner and
respondent suffered any impediment to
marry each other. They lived
exclusively with each other as husband
and wife when petitioner moved in with
respondent in his residence and were
later united in marriage. Their
marriage, however, was found to be
void under Article 36 of the Family
Code because of respondent’s
psychological incapacity to comply with
essential marital obligations.

The disputed property, Suite 204 of
LCG Condominium, was purchased on
installment basis on July 26, 1983, at
the time when petitioner and
respondent were already living
together. Hence, it should be
considered as common property of
petitioner and respondent. We hold
that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is
a common property of petitioner and
respondent and the property regime of
the parties should be divided in
accordance with the law on co-
ownership.
JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner,  earnings as an entertainer and fish
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE AND
GINA S. REY, respondents.
G.R. No. 150611. June 10, 2003
The regime of limited co-
ownership of property governing the
union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but
who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only
be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money,
property or industry. Absent proof of
the extent thereof, their contributions
and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
FACTS:
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was
married, but separated de facto from
her husband, when she met petitioner
Jacinto Saguid in July 1987.  The two
decided to cohabit as husband and
wife. Jacinto made a living as the
patron of their fishing vessel "Saguid
Brothers." Gina, on the other hand,
worked as a fish dealer, but decided to
work as an entertainer in Japan from
1992 to 1994 when her relationship
with Jacinto’s relatives turned sour. In
1996, the couple decided to separate
and end up their 9-year cohabitation.
In 1997, private respondent filed a
complaint for PARTITION AND
RECOVERY OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY WITH RECEIVERSHIP
against the petitioner with the RTC.
She alleged that from her salary of
$1,500.00 a month as entertainer in
Japan, she was able to contribute
P70,000.00 in the completion of their
unfinished house. Also, from her own
dealer, she was able to acquire and
accumulate appliances, pieces of
furniture and household effects, with a
total value of P111,375.00. She prayed
that she be declared the sole owner of
these personal properties and that the
amount of P70,000.00, representing her
contribution to the construction of their
house, be reimbursed to her.
In his answer to the complaint,
petitioner claimed that the expenses for
the construction of their house were
defrayed solely from his income as a
captain of their fishing vessel and that
the disputed personal properties were
purchased from his savings deposited
in their joint account.
Petitioner was declared in default and
private respondent was allowed to
present evidence ex parte.
The trial court ruled in favor of private
respondent, ordered the partition of the
house; directed petitioner to return
and/or reimburse to private respondent
the amount of P70,000,00; declared
private respondent as the exclusive
owner of the disputed personal
properties; and ordered petitioner to
pay P50,000 as moral damages plus
costs of suit. The CA affirmed this
decision but deleted the award of
damages for lack of basis.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court’s
decision is supported by evidence.
HELD:
It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto
were not capacitated to marry each
other because the former was validly
married to another man at the time of
her cohabitation with the latter. Their
property regime therefore is governed
by Article 148 of the Family Code,
which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships
in a state of concubinage, relationships
where both man and woman are
married to other persons, and multiple
alliances of the same married man.
Under this regime, "…only the
properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their
respective contributions ..." Proof of
actual contribution is required.
In the case at bar, although the
adulterous cohabitation of the parties
commenced in 1987, which is before
the date of the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148
thereof applies because this provision
was intended precisely to fill up the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code. Before Article 148 of the Family
Code was enacted, there was no
provision governing property relations
of couples living in a state of adultery
or concubinage. Hence, even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the Family
Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
As in other civil cases, the burden of
proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be
proved by competent evidence and
reliance must be had on the strength of
the party’s own evidence and not upon
the weakness of the opponent’s
defense. This applies with more vigor
where, as in the instant case, the
plaintiff was allowed to present
evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not
automatically entitled to the relief
prayed for. The law gives the defendant
some measure of protection as the
plaintiff must still prove the allegations
in the complaint. Favorable relief can
be granted only after the court is
convinced that the facts proven by the
plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the
party alleging a fact has the burden of
proving it and a mere allegation is not
evidence.
Both parties claim that the money used
to purchase the disputed personal
properties came partly from their joint
account with First Allied Development
Bank. While there is no question that
both parties contributed in their joint
account deposit, there is, however, no
sufficient proof of the exact amount
of their respective shares therein.
Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family
Code, in the absence of proof of extent
of the parties’ respective contribution,
their share shall be presumed to be
equal. Here, the disputed personal
properties were valued at P111,375.00,
the existence and value of which were
not questioned by the petitioner.
Hence, their share therein is equivalent
to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
The Court of Appeals thus erred in
affirming the decision of the trial court
which granted the reliefs prayed for by
private respondent. On the basis of the
evidence established, the extent of
private respondent’s co-ownership over
the disputed house is only up to the
amount of P11,413.00, her proven
contribution in the construction
thereof. Anent the personal properties,
her participation therein should be
limited only to the amount of
P55,687.50.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64166
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Private respondent Gina S. Rey is
declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto
Saguid in the controverted house to the
extent of P11,413.00 and personal
properties to the extent of P55,687.50.
Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the
amount of P67,100.50 to private
respondent, failing which the house
shall be sold at public auction to satisfy
private respondent’s claim.
LUPO ATIENZA vs. YOLANDA DE
CASTRO
Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo
Atienza, then the President and General
Manager of Enrico Shipping
Corporation and Eurasian Maritime
Corporation, hired the services of
respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as
accountant for the two corporations.
 
The relationship between Lupo and
Yolanda became intimate. Despite Lupo
being a married man, he and Yolanda
eventually lived together in consortium
beginning the later part of 1983. Out of
their union, two children were born.
However, after the birth of their second
child, their relationship turned sour
until they parted ways.
On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed a
complaint against Yolanda for the
judicial partition between them of a
parcel of land with improvements
located in Bel-Air
Subdivision, Makati City. Lupo alleged
that the subject property was acquired
during his union with Yolanda as
common-law husband and wife, hence
the property is co-owned by them.
Lupo averred that the property in
question was acquired by Yolanda
sometime in 1987 using his exclusive
funds and that the title thereto was
transferred by the seller in Yolandas
name without his knowledge and
consent. He did not interpose any
objection thereto because at the time,
their affair was still thriving. It was
only after their separation and his
receipt of information that Yolanda
allowed her new live-in partner to live
in the disputed property, when he
demanded his share thereat as a co-
owner.
In her answer, Yolanda denied Lupos
allegations. According to her, she
acquired the same property for Two
Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P2,600,000.00) using her exclusive
funds. She insisted having bought it
thru her own savings and earnings as a
businesswoman.
The trial court rendered judgment for
Lupo by declaring the contested
property as owned in common by him
and Yolanda and ordering its partition
between the two in equal shares.
The CA ruled the property is excusively
owned by Yolanda, that under the
provisions of Article 148 of the Family
Code vis--vis the evidence on record
and attending circumstances, Yolandas
claim of sole ownership is meritorious,
as it has been substantiated by
competent evidence. To the CA, Lupo
failed to overcome the burden of
proving his allegation that the subject
property was purchased by Yolanda
thru his exclusive funds.
Lupo argued before the SC that
pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil
Code, he was not burdened to prove
that he contributed to the acquisition of
the subject property because with or
without the contribution by either
partner, he is deemed a co-owner
thereof, adding that under Article
484 of Civil Code, as long as the
property was acquired by either or both
of them during their extramarital union,
such property would be legally owned
by them in common and governed by
the rules on co-ownership, which apply
in default of contracts, or special
provisions.
ISSUE: Is the disputed property
considered a co-owned property
between Lupo and Yolanda?
RULING: NO.
It is not disputed that the parties herein
were not capacitated to marry each
other because petitioner Lupo Atienza
was validly married to another woman
at the time of his cohabitation with the
respondent. Their property regime,
therefore, is governed by Article 148 of
the Family Code, which applies to
bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of
concubinage, relationships where both
man and woman are married to other
persons, and multiple alliances of the
same married man.Under this
regime, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their
respective contributions ... Proof of
actual contribution is required.
The regime of limited co-ownership of
property governing the union of parties
who are not legally capacitated to
marry each other, but who nonetheless
live together as husband and wife,
applies to properties acquired during
said cohabitation in proportion to their
respective contributions. Co-ownership
will only be up to the extent of the
proven actual contribution of money,
property or industry. Absent proof of
the extent thereof, their contributions
and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
 
Here, although the adulterous
cohabitation of the parties commenced
in 1983, or way before the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1998,
Article 148 thereof applies because this
provision was intended precisely to fill
up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code. Before Article 148 of the Family
Code was enacted, there was no
provision governing property relations
of couples living in a state of adultery
or concubinage. Hence, even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the Family
Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
 
The party alleging a fact has the
burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence.
 
It is the petitioner’s posture that the
respondent, having no financial
capacity to acquire the property in
question, merely manipulated the dollar
bank accounts of his two (2)
corporations to raise the amount
needed therefor. Unfortunately for
petitioner, his submissions are
burdened by the fact that his claim to
the property contradicts duly written
instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell
dated March 24, 1987, the Deed of
Assignment of Redemption
dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of
Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all
entered into by and between the
respondent and the vendor of said
property, to the exclusion of the
petitioner.
Rather than presenting proof of his
actual contribution to the purchase
money used as consideration for the
disputed property, [Lupo] diverted the
burden imposed upon him to [Yolanda]
by painting her as a shrewd and
scheming woman without the capacity
to purchase any property. Instead of
proving his ownership, or the extent
thereof, over the subject property,
[Lupo] relegated his complaint to a
mere attack on the financial capacity of
[Yolanda]. He presented documents
pertaining to the ins and outs of the
dollar accounts of ENRICO and
EURASIAN, which unfortunately failed
to prove his actual contribution in the
purchase of the said property. The fact
that [Yolanda] had a limited access to
the funds of the said corporations and
had repeatedly withdrawn money from
their bank accounts for their behalf do
not prove that the money she used in
buying the disputed property, or any
property for that matter, came from
said withdrawals.

On one side, there is [Lupo], a retired

sea captain and the President and
General Manager of two corporations
and on the other is [Yolanda], a
Certified Public Accountant.

The respondent sufficiently established

that she derived the funds used to
purchase the property from her
earnings, not only as an accountant but
also as a businesswoman engaged in
foreign currency trading, money
lending and jewelry retail. She
presented her clientele and the
promissory notes evincing substantial
dealings with her clients. She also
presented her bank account statements
and bank transactions, which reflect
that she had the financial capacity to
pay the purchase price of the subject
property.