PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – FINAL EXAM
CASE DIGESTS FROM THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. DIZON
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND
AND WIFE
(ARTICLES 68-73 OF THE FAMILY CODE)
GOITIA VS CAMPOS-RUEDA
35 PHIL 252
1916
FACTS:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for
support outside of the conjugal domicile. It was urged in
the first instance, and the court so held, that the
defendant cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff,
except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a
judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from
the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on
January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter established
their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they
lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff
returned to the home of her parents.
The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows:
"That the defendant, one month after he had contracted
marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she
perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands
of the defendant and refused to perform any act other
than legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant,
since that date had continually on other successive
dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on
his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which
just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant
and induced him to maltreat her by word and deed and
inflict injuries upon her lips, her f ace and different parts
of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any
means to induce the defendant to desist from his
repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she
was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge
in the home of her parents.
ISSUE:
WON the wife living separately shall not be given
support. (NO)
RULING:
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when
the obligation to give support shall cease. The failure of
the wife to live with her husband is not one of them.
1
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The provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil
Code fix the duties and obligations of the spouses. The
spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each
other. The husband must live with and protect his wife.
The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow
him when he changes his domicile or residence, except
when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband
who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do
so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and
maintaining her in his own home.
Accordingly it had been determined that where the wife
is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart
from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel
him to make provision for her separate maintenance.
ARROYA VS VAZQUEZ DE ARROYO
42 PHIL 54
(1921)
FACTS:
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo
were united in the bonds of wedlock by marriage in the
year 1910, and since that date, with a few short intervals
of separation, they have lived together as man and wife
in the city of Iloilo. until July 4, 1920, when the wife went
away from their common home with the intention of living
thenceforth separate from her husband.
After efforts had been made by the husband without
avail to induce her to resume marital relations, this action
was initiated by him to compel her to return to the
matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife.
The wife alleges that she had been compelled to leave
by cruel treatment on the part of her husband.
Accordingly she in turn prayed for affirmative relief, to
consist of (1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of
the conjugal partnership; (3) and an allowance for
counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance.
ISSUE:
WON the courts may compel the wife to cohabit with her
husband. (NO)
RULING:
Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced
that it is not within the province of the courts of this
country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other.

Of course where the property rights of one of the pair
are invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be
maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the
doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of
contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of
the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an
order can be effective for no other purpose than to
compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the
experience of these countries where the court of justice
have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married
people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable.
We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo
in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute
order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile,
which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint;
though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial
declaration that his wife has presented herself without
sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in
respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it
is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has
absented herself from the marital home without sufficient
cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to
return.
ILLUSORIO VS BILDNER
GR NO 139789 & 139808
MAY 12, 2000
FACTS:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age,
possessed extensive property valued at millions of
pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the
Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was
married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30
years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin
Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta
and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in
1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in
Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club
when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the
petitioner lived in Antipolo City. In 1997, upon
Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for
about 5 months in Antipolo city.
The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time
their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the
latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda
filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person
2
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and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced
age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In
May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio,
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at
Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999,
petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to
have the custody of his husband alleging that the
respondents refused her demands to see and visit her
husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to
Antipolo.
Fun facts haha: Ilusorio filed parricide charges that made
headlines to the news hahaha.
ISSUE:
WON he petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be
issued to compel her husband to live with her.
RULING:
The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and
living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the
extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody
of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty
must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom
of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual
and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and
effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the
writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86
years of age, or under medication does not necessarily
render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind
does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the
capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the
capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial
choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts
to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal
to some of his family members but these are choices
which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear
before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented
from leaving his house or seeing people. With that
declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty,
we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of
Appeals.

TENCHAVEZ VS ESCANO
GR NO L-19671
NOVEMBER 29, 1965
FACTS:
Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do
and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish
ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged
marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age,
without the knowledge of her parents. Mamerto and
Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never
asked for the hand of Vicenta, and were disgusted
because of the great scandal that the clandestine
marriage would provoke.
The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought
priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration
to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage,
from the standpoint of the Church. The recelebration did
not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto
Escaño was handed by a maid, a letter disclosing an
amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and
Pacita Noel; Vicenta thereafter would not agree to a new
marriage.
As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already
estranged. Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis
Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage
stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a
petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to
annul her marriage.
She did not sign the petition and the case was dismissed
without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the
hearing. On 24 June 1950, she applied for a passport,
indicating in her application that she was single, that her
purpose was to study, that she was domiciled in Cebu
City. The application was approved, and she left for the
United States.
On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for
divorce against the Tenchavez in the Second Judicial
District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the
County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character". On 21 October 1950, a
decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in
open court by the said tribunal. In 1951 Mamerto and
Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of
Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor. On 10
September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of
her marriage On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married
an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now
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lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten
children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August
1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the
proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her
parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged
with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and
against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through
its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the
marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million
pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from
plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present
husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied
that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts,
and counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUE:
WON the plaintiff is entitled to be declared legally
separated from the defendant Vicenta F. Escaño, and
the latter liable for damages amounting to 1 million
pesos.
RULING:
YES, plaintiff is entitled to a decree of legal separation
from the defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño. But on the
liability for damages amounting to 1 million pesos, the
latter is required only to pay plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and
attorneys' fees. Neither party to recover costs.
It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely
duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of
her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through
her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the
corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither
an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous
letter charging immorality against the husband
constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell
Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not
her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and
entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of
"legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery"
Note: In this case, the court declared that the divorce
decree acquired by Vicenta cannot be valid as she
acquired it while she was still a Filipino citizen.
Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens,
sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present
Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition
as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage
contracted with another party by the divorced consort,
subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to
validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-
habitation with a person other than the lawful husband
entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation
conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce
decree by one consort entitles the other to recover
damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the
parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of
proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND
WIFE
(ARTICLES 74-87 OF THE FAMILY CODE)
PANA VS HEIRS OF JUANITE SR.
GR NO 164201
DECEMBER 10, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and
others were accused of murder. Melecia was found guilty
as charged while Efren was acquitted.
Then the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting
in the levy of real properties registered in the names of
Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a
notice of sale on execution were issued.
Petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to
quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied
properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets
of Melecia.
Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, given that
they were married prior to the enactment of the
Family Code and that they did not execute any
prenuptial agreement. Although the heirs of the
deceased victims do not dispute that it was the Civil
Code, not the Family Code, which governed the
marriage, they insist that it was the system of absolute
community of property that applied to Efren and
Melecia.
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Both RTC and CA also applied Art 256 of the Family
Code in arguing that upon effectivity of the family
code, their regime of conjugal partnership of gains was
changed to absolute community.
Note:
In marriages before the Family Code (August 30, 1950 -
August 3, 1988), if there is no marriage settlement (also
known as prenuptial agreement), the default regime of
property is Conjugal Partnership of Gains. However,
in marriages after the Family Code (After August 3,
1988), if there is no marriage settlement, the default
regime of property is absolute community.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not RTC and CA are correct that default
property of Conjugal Partnership will change to Absolute
Community upon the effectivity of the Family Code
applying Art. 256 of the Family Code.
RULING:
Both RTC and CA are in error.
The Supreme Court ruled that "Article 256 of the Family
Code does not intend to reach back and automatically
convert into absolute community of property relation all
conjugal partnership of gains that existed before 1988
excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.”
Consequently, to automatically change the marriage
settlements of couples who got married under the Civil
Code into absolute community of property in 1988 when
the Family Code took effect would be to impair their
acquired or vested rights to such separate properties.
Furthermore, The Family Code itself provides in Article
76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except
prior to marriage.
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage
settlements may be valid, it must be made before the
celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of
Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136. Clearly, therefore, the
conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage
between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to
1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of
that marriage.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can
take place only where:

(a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was
dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal
separation;
(b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled
and agreed to revive their former property regime;
(c) judicial separation of property had been had on the
ground that a spouse abandons the other without just
cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family;
(d) there was judicial separation of property under Article
135;
(e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary
dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains.
None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren
and Melecia.
In this case, it was clear that Efren and Melicia were
married prior to 1988. Therefore, Efren and Melicia’s
property is of Conjugal Partnership.
RE: the payment and what property it should use for its
satisfaction.
Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code
provisions in deciding whether or not the conjugal
properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer
for the civil liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder
case. Its Article 122 provides:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by
the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal properties
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities
imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by
either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and
indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support
of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced
against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered,
if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of
the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be
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charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-
mentioned.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that
Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the above
applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the
murder case imposed on her may be enforced against
their conjugal assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been
covered.
VALENCIA VS LOCQUIAO
GR NO 122134
OCTOBER 3, 2003
FACTS:
Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao owns a parcel of
land. In 1944, they executed a deed of donation propter
nuptias called “Inventario Ti Sagut” (Ilokano dialect) in
favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao (Benito)
and his prospective bride, respondent Tomasa Mara
(Tomasa) in consideration of the impending marriage of
the donees. Both got married in 1944 as well.
Note: Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter
nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are those
"made before its celebration, in consideration of the
same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses."
Romana, the sibling of Benito, and mother of Constancia
(Both Petitioners). Sometime in 1983, Constancia filed
an action for annulment of title against the respondents,
however it was dismissed.
Benito filed a complaint seeking the ejectment of
Constancia, then the Municipal Trial Court rendered a
decision ordering Constancia to vacate the land in
question. Petitioners Romana and Constancia countered
with a Complaint alleging that the donation is spurious or
fake and that the donation did not observe the form
required by law as there was no written acceptance on
the document itself or in a separate public instrument.
Petitioners insist that based on a provision of the Civil
Code of Spain (Old Civil Code), the acceptance by the
donees should be made in a public instrument.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an acceptance is needed to make the
donation propter nuptias valid?
RULING:

No, an acceptance is not needed to make the donation
propter nuptias valid.
According to the Supreme Court, “Under the Old Civil
Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a
public instrument in which the property donated must be
specifically described. However, Article 1330 of the
same Code provides that "acceptance is not necessary
to the validity of such gifts". In other words, the
celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary
couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed
form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter
nuptias under the Old Civil Code.
In this case, the donation propter nuptias was made
before the effectivity of the New Civil Code, the laws of
Old Civil Code shall apply.
Therefore, the celebration of marriage is enough to make
the donation propter nuptias valid, which implied the
acceptance.
Even if the provisions of the New Civil Code were to be
applied, the case of the petitioners would collapse just
the same. As earlier shown, even implied acceptance of
a donation propter nuptias suffices under the New Civil
Code. (lol sooo moot na diba same lang man pala rules
huhu)
RULE: It is settled that only laws existing at the time of
the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not
later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended
to have retroactive effect.
MATABUENA VS CERVANTES
GR NO L-28771
MARCH 31, 1971
FACTS:
Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix
Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he
was living maritally without benefit of marriage to
defendant-appellee, Petronila Cervantes was void. The
donation was executed on February 20, 1956 during
cohabitation.
Petronila argues that since they were not married, the
donation is valid. Petronila and Felix got married on
March 28, 1962.
NOTE: Cohabitation is also known as a “common-law
relationship”. Art 133 of the Civil Code provides: "Every
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donation between the spouses during the marriage shall
be void.
ISSUE:
WON the prohibition or ban on a donation between the
spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship.
RULING:
Yes, a donation between common-law spouses falls
within the prohibition.
While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
"donation between the spouses during the marriage",
policy considerations of the most exigent character as
well as the dictates of morality require that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. A
1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v.
Bautista, interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil
Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in
the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L.
Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the
other consort and his descendants because of fear of
undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law”.
In this case, the donation propter nuptias was made
during cohabitation. Being novel in Character, the
Supreme Court relied on the rationale “Ne mutuato
amore invicem spoliarentur” which means “lest they
should be impoverished by each other through their
mutual affection”
The prohibitive policy applies to common-law
relationships. Therefore, the donation is null and void.
ARCABA VS VDA. DE BATOCAEL
GR NO 146683
NOVEMBER 22, 2001
FACTS:
 Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima
Montallana became the registered owners of a lot.
 Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, the
latter's cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian, and petitioner
Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take care of his
house.
 A few months before his death, Francisco
executed an instrument denominated "Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos," of the lot and together with his
house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the
same instrument.

 Erlinda Tabancura (respondent), another niece
of Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her that
Cirila was his mistress.
 respondents filed a complaint against petitioner
for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter
vivos
 Alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of
Francisco and the donation inter vivos made by
Francisco in her favor is void under Article 87 of the
Family Code.
 Both RTC and CA decided in favor of
respondents.
ISSUE:
WON CA correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code.
RULING:
Yes, Art. 87 of the Family Code was correctly applied by
CA.
Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct
or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage
shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses
may give each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.
In this case, it was proven that Cirila and Francisco
cohabited with each other. The Supreme Court said:
Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle
told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other
indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law
spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented documents
apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille."
As previously stated, these are an application for a
business permit to operate as a real estate lessor, a
sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a
health certificate, and the death certificate of Francisco.
These documents show that Cirila saw herself as
Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise, she would
not have used his last name.
Since it was proven by a preponderance of evidence that
Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage, the donation made by
Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of
the Family Code.
PEREZ JR VS PEREZ-SENERPIDA
GR NO 233365
MARCH 24, 2021
7
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(Landmark case)
FACTS:
Spouses Eliodoro Q. Perez (Eliodoro) and Adelita M.
Perez (Adelita) were the registered owners of a parcel of
land. Out of the marriage, were born two children,
Avegail and Adonis Perez (Adonis). Prior to his marriage
with Adelita, Eliodoro had a child named Nicxon Perez,
Sr. (Nicxon) (Child by his first marriage). Nicxon Sr. also
had a child name Nicxon (Grandson of Eliodoro).
On July 27, 2004, Eliodoro donated the said parcel of
land to Nicxon without the consent or conformity of
Adelita.
On February 1, 2005, Eliodoro filed against Adelita a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code before the RTC. On June 15,
2005, RTC rendered a Decision (Marriage Nullity
Decision) declaring the marriage between Eliodoro and
Adelita void ab initio. The Marriage Nullity Decision
became final and executory as of July 6, 2005.
On September 30, 2010, Avegail brought an action
before RTC for Annulment of Donation and Title with
Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against Nicxon. Avegail]
contended that her mother, Adelita, was a part owner of
the [subject property] considering that the [RWR] she
executed in favor of the late Eliodoro was null and void
as it was not supported by any valid consideration; that
[Nicxon] exerted undue influence on the late Eliodoro in
the execution of the [DoD]; that she and her mother were
clearly prejudiced by the execution of the [RWR] and the
[DoD]; that she filed the instant case in good faith in
order to protect her interest arising from the malicious
and illegal execution of the said [DoD]
The CA in the present Case dated April 7, 2017, noted
that at the time of the donation made by Eliodoro in favor
of his grandson Nicxon, he was still legally married to
Adelita given that Eliodoro died on June 28, 2008. As
such, Eliodoro should have first secured the consent or
conformity of his wife, Adelita, as expressly required
under Article 98 of the Family Code, which provides that:
"Neither spouse may donate any community property
without the consent of the other."
ISSUE:
WON the donation is void.
RULING:

Yes. Since the Marriage Nullity Decision became final
and executory on July 6, 2005, as confirmed with finality
in the CA Decision in the Annulment of Judgment
Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 120119, prior to Eliodoro's
death, then the marriage between him and Adelita, which
was celebrated on December 10, 1975 at Infanta,
Pangasinan, was null and void ab initio pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code as declared in the Marriage
Nullity Decision.
Since the marriage between Eliodoro and Adelita was
celebrated on December 10, 1975 and the CPG was
then the applicable property regime between validly
married spouses, absent any contract executed before
the marriage, then that property regime continued.
Nicxon is thus correct in his contention that the lower
courts in the present case erred in applying Article 89 of
the Family Code, which provides in part that: "No waiver
of rights, interests, shares and effects of the absolute
community of property during the marriage can be made
except in case of judicial separation of
property." Unquestionably, Article 89 cannot justify the
nullification of Adelita's RWR since Adelita and Eliodoro
were not validly married.
Nicxon correctly cites Article 147 of the Family Code as
the applicable provision and the rules on co-ownership
govern the property acquired during the cohabitation or
"common law" marriage of Eliodoro and Adelita.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
8
COMPILED BY: EGINA, MENDEZ, MAROHOM, PASCUAL, KIWAHKO, CLEMENCIA, VILLENA, ANHORES, MACARAMBON,
DELA CRUZ, COGAY, ANDES, VILLEGAS, HABANA, MUROS, DINO, ALCALA, ASPA, ROXAS, ESPERIDA, NANDANG.
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during cohabitation and owned in common, without
the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in
good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of
the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
It must be noted that the subject property was registered
in the names of Eliodoro and Adelita, as spouses, and
there being no proof to the contrary, the subject property
is presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry, and was owned in equal shares by
them pursuant to Article 147.
What then is the effect of the Marriage Nullity Decision
(in CA-G.R. SP No. 120119) on the RWR executed in
1995 by Adelita in favor of Eliodoro over the subject
property?
Nicxon contends that the RWR is valid on the ground
that Eliodoro and Adelita, being mere co-owners of the
subject property, either of them could donate or waive
their respective shares therein provided that the consent
of either partner was obtained.
On this score, Nicxon is mistaken. The RWR is void
pursuant to Article 87 of the Family Code, which
provides:
ART. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous
advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses
during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts
which the spouses may give each other on the occasion
of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to
persons living together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage.
As correctly found by the trial court, no material
consideration was given to Adelita in exchange of the
execution of the Renunciation and Waiver of Rights. It
thus partakes the nature of a donation or grant of
gratuitous advantage between spouses which is
prohibited under [Article 87 of the Family Code, which
provides "every donation or grant of gratuitous
advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses
during the marriage shall be void x x x."] Clearly,

Adelita's waiver of her rights over the subject property
through the [RWR] is not allowed.
Parenthetically, the Court takes this opportunity to dispel
the notion that assuming the marriage between Eliodoro
and Adelita was valid at the time the RWR was executed
and it had valuable or material consideration the RWR
would have been valid. The RWR would still be void
because the sale between the spouses during their
marriage is proscribed under Article 1490 of the Civil
Code,
ART. 1490. The husband and the wife cannot sell
property to each other, except:
(1) When a separation of property was agreed
upon in the marriage settlements; or
(2) When there has been a judicial separation of
property under Article 191. (1458a)
The reason behind the prohibition is to protect third
persons who may have contracted with a spouse,
believing in the existence of certain properties, and who
could easily be defrauded by removing such property by
transfer to the other spouse.
The jurisprudence on the nullity of donations between
the parties of a common-law relationship or exclusive
cohabitation or union of a man and a woman without a
valid marriage found its way into the present Article 87 of
the Family Code.
Given the express prohibition under Article 87 of the
Family Code, the RWR executed by Adelita in favor of
Eliodoro in respect of the subject property is void.
Proceeding to the third issue, given the nullity of the
RWR, is the DoD that Eliodoro executed in favor of
Nicxon over the subject property valid?
If the marriage between Eliodoro and Adelita was valid
and their property regime was either the ACP or the
CPG, the donation would definitely be void pursuant to
Articles 98 and 125 of the Family Code, which provide:
ART. 98. Neither spouse may donate any community
property without the consent of the other. However,
either spouse may, without the consent of the other,
make moderate donations from the community property
for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family
distress.
COMPILED BY: EGINA, MENDEZ, MAROHOM, PASCUAL, KIWAHKO, CLEMENCIA, VILLENA, ANHORES, MACARAMBON,
DELA CRUZ, COGAY, ANDES, VILLEGAS, HABANA, MUROS, DINO, ALCALA, ASPA, ROXAS, ESPERIDA, NANDANG.
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Thus, among married couples wherein the ACP or the
CPG is their property regime, the consent of both
spouses is required under the Family Code whether the
disposition is gratuitous or onerous.
Under a regime of separation of property, pursuant to
Article 145 of the Family Code, each spouse shall own,
dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or own
estate, without need of the consent of the other.
Understandably, each spouse can donate or alienate
onerously his or her own estate without the need of
obtaining the other spouse's consent.
MODULE 4:
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY
ARTICLES 88-104 OF THE FAMILY CODE
NOBLEZA VS NUEGA
GR NO 193038
MARCH 11, 2015
FACTS:
Prior to their marriage, Rogelio purchased the subject
house. Respondent Shirley B. Nuega (Shirley) was
married to Rogelio A. Nuega (Rogelio) on September 1,
1990 and lived in the subject property.
The following year, Shirley received information that
Rogelio brought Monica Escobar, into the family home.
Shirley filed for Legal Separation and Liquidation of
Property against Rogelio, but later withdrew, then re-
filed again (NOTE: this is only a separation of property
thus the marriage and the property regime still subsist).
In between the filing, Shirley learned that Rogelio had
the intention of selling the subject property to Josefina v.
Nobleza (Petitioner). Shirley advised interested buyers
about the existence of the case filed against Rogelio. In
December 29, 1992, Rogelio sold the property without
Shirley’s consent. In a decision of the RTC in May 16,
1994, RTC granted the petition for legal separation and
ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the regime of
absolute community property. Shirley instituted a
Complaint for Rescission of Sale and Recovery of
Property against petitioner and Rogelio.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its
decision in favour of Shirley.
Petitioner sought recourse with the CA, while Rogelio did
not appeal the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE:
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – FINAL EXAM
CASE DIGESTS FROM THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. DIZON

(1) WON petitioner is a buyer in good faith. (NO) subject property - in Ladislao Diwa Village, Marikina City.
Had petitioner been more prudent as a buyer, she could
(2) Whether the deed of sale made by Rogelio to have easily checked if Rogelio had the capacity to
Petitioner is void? (YES) dispose of the subject property. Had petitioner been
more vigilant, she could have inquired with such facility -
considering that her sister lived in the same Ladislao
RULING:
Diwa Village where the property is located - if there was
any person other than Rogelio who had any right or
(1) An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the interest in the subject property.
property of another, without notice that some other
person has a right or interest in the property, for which
In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992,
a full and fair price is paid by the buyer at the time of the
the civil status of Rogelio as seller was not stated, while
purchase or before receipt of any notice of claims or
petitioner as buyer was indicated as
interest of some other person in the property.
"single," viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To successfully invoke and be considered as a buyer in
ROGELIO A. NUEGA, of legal age, Filipino citizen and
good faith, the presumption is that first and foremost, the
with postal address at 2-A-2 Ladislao Diwa St.,
"buyer in good faith" must have shown prudence and
Concepcion, Marikina, Metro Manila, hereinafter referred
due diligence in the exercise of his/her rights. It
to as the VENDOR
presupposes that the buyer did everything that an
ordinary person would do for the protection and defense
And
of his/her rights and interests against prejudicial or
injurious concerns when placed in such a situation. The
JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
prudence required of a buyer in good faith is "not that of
single and with postal address at No. L-2-A-3 Ladislao
a person with training in law, but rather that of an
Diwa St., Concepcion, Marikina, Metro Manila,
average man who 'weighs facts and circumstances
hereinafter referred to as the VENDEE.32cralawlawlibrary
without resorting to the calibration of our technical rules
of evidence of which his knowledge is nil.
It puzzles the Court that while petitioner has repeatedly
claimed that Rogelio is "single" under TCT No. 171963
To be more specific, such prudence can be shown by
and Tax Declaration Nos. D-012-04723 and D-012-
making an ocular inspection of the property, checking
04724, his civil status as seller was not stated in the
the title/ownership with the proper Register of Deeds
Deed of Absolute Sale - further creating a cloud on the
alongside the payment of taxes therefor, or inquiring into
claim of petitioner that she is an innocent purchaser for
the minutiae such as the parameters or lot area, the type
value.
of ownership, and the capacity of the seller to dispose of
the property, which capacity necessarily includes an
inquiry into the civil status of the seller to ensure that if (2) Actual contribution is not relevant in determining
married, marital consent is secured when necessary. whether a piece of property is community property for
the law itself defines what constitutes community
etitioner argues, among others, that since she has property.
examined the TCT over the subject property and found
the property to have been registered under the name of Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:
seller Rogelio alone, she is an innocent purchaser for
value and "she is not required to go beyond the face of
the title in verifying the status of the subject property at Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in
the time of the consummation of the sale and at the date the marriage settlements, the community property shall
of the sale. – the court disagrees. consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the
time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired
A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for thereafter.
value by merely relying on the TCT of the seller while The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those
ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances relevant excluded from the absolute community by the Family
to the sale. Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage
settlement.
First, petitioner's sister Hilda Bautista, at the time of the
sale, was residing near Rogelio and Shirley's house - the Under the first exception are properties enumerated in
10

COMPILED BY: EGINA, MENDEZ, MAROHOM, PASCUAL, KIWAHKO, CLEMENCIA, VILLENA, ANHORES, MACARAMBON,
DELA CRUZ, COGAY, ANDES, VILLEGAS, HABANA, MUROS, DINO, ALCALA, ASPA, ROXAS, ESPERIDA, NANDANG.
SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW

Article 92 of the Family Code, which states:
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the
community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous
title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the
income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by
the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of
the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either
spouse; however, jewelry shall form part of the
community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either
spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former
marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of
such property.
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute
community, the husband and the wife becomes joint
owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever
property each spouse brings into the marriage, and
those acquired during the marriage (except those
excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the
common mass of the couple's properties. And when the
couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that
common mass is divided between the spouses, or their
respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties
have established, irrespective of the value each one may
have originally owned.
Since the subject property does not fall under any of
the exclusions provided in Article 92, it therefore
forms part of the absolute community property of
Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective
contribution to its acquisition before their marriage,
and despite the fact that only Rogelio's name
appears in the TCT as owner, the property is owned
jointly by the spouses Shirley and Rogelio.
Respondent and Rogelio were married on September 1,
1990. Rogelio, on his own and without the consent of
herein respondent as his spouse, sold the subject
property via a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December
29, 1992 - or during the subsistence of a valid contract of
marriage. Under Article 96 of Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines,
the said disposition of a communal property is void, viz.:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the
community property shall belong to both spouses jointly.
In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five
11
COMPILED BY: EGINA, MENDEZ, MAROHOM, PASCUAL, KIWAHKO, CLEMENCIA, VILLENA, ANHORES, MACARAMBON,
DELA CRUZ, COGAY, ANDES, VILLEGAS, HABANA, MUROS, DINO, ALCALA, ASPA, ROXAS, ESPERIDA, NANDANG.
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years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the common properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
without the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
It is clear under the foregoing provision of
the Family Code that Rogelio could not sell the
subject property without the written consent of
respondent or the authority of the court. Without
such consent or authority, the entire sale is void.
QUESTION: what happens now to the paid amount by
the buyer? Although not in good faith.
NOTE: Finally, consistent with our ruling that Rogelio
solely entered into the contract of sale with petitioner and
acknowledged receiving the entire consideration of the
contract under the Deed of Absolute Sale, Shirley could
not be held accountable to petitioner for the
reimbursement of her payment for the purchase of the
subject property. Under Article 94 of the Family Code,
the absolute community of property shall only be "liable
for x x x [d]ebts and obligations contracted by either
spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that
the family may have been benefited x x x." As correctly
stated by the appellate court, there being no evidence on
record that the amount received by Rogelio redounded
to the benefit of the family, respondent cannot be made
to reimburse any amount to petitioner.
FLORES VS SPOUSES LINDO JR.
GR NO 183984
APRIL 13, 2011
FACTS:
Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Arturo Flores
amounting to ₱400,000 payable on 1 December 1995
with 3% compounded monthly interest and 3%
surcharge in case of late payment. To secure the loan,
Edna executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
covering a property in the name of Edna and her

husband Enrico Lindo, Jr. Edna also signed a
Promissory Note and the Deed for herself and for Enrico
as his attorney-in-fact.
Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the
loan. All checks were dishonored for insufficiency of
funds, prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for
Foreclosure of Mortgage with Damages against
respondents.
RTC: petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of
the mortgage The Deed was executed by Edna without
the consent and authority of Enrico. The Deed was
executed on 31 October 1995 while the Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) executed by Enrico was only dated 4
November 1995. Petitioner was not precluded from
recovering the loan from Edna as he could file a
personal action against her.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with
Damages against respondents. Respondents filed their
Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims,
they admitted the loan but stated that it only amounted to
₱340,000 and that Enrico was not a party to the loan
because it was contracted by Edna without Enrico’s
signature.
ISSUE:
WON the REM is valid. (REM is void)
RULING:
Since the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed
by defendant Edna Lindo lacks the consent or authority
of her husband Enrico Lindo, the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage is void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family
Code, BUT this does not mean that the plaintiff cannot
recover the ₱400,000 loan plus interest which he
extended to defendant Edna Lindo. He can institute a
personal action against the defendant for the amount
due.
The real estate mortgage executed by petition Edna
Lindo over their conjugal property is undoubtedly an act
of strict dominion and must be consented to by her
husband to be effective. In the instant case, the real
estate mortgage, absent the authority or consent of the
husband, is necessarily void. Indeed, the real estate
mortgage is this case was executed on October 31, 1995
and the subsequent special power of attorney dated
November 4, 1995 cannot be made to retroact to
October 31, 1995 to validate the mortgage previously
made by petitioner.
12
COMPILED BY: EGINA, MENDEZ, MAROHOM, PASCUAL, KIWAHKO, CLEMENCIA, VILLENA, ANHORES, MACARAMBON,
DELA CRUZ, COGAY, ANDES, VILLEGAS, HABANA, MUROS, DINO, ALCALA, ASPA, ROXAS, ESPERIDA, NANDANG.
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In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the deed of real estate mortgage as void in the
absence of the authority or consent of petitioner’s
spouse therein. The liability of petitioner on the principal
contract of loan however subsists notwithstanding the
illegality of the real estate mortgage.
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to
conjugal partnership property, is a reproduction of Article
96 of the Family Code which applies to community
property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code
provide that the powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without the written consent of the other
spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without the
written consent shall be void. However, both provisions
also state that "the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x
x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors."
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995.
The Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4
November 1995. The execution of the SPA is the
acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the
continuing offer as a binding contract between the
parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a
valid contract.
However, as the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner
allowed the decisions of the RTC, Branch 33 and the
RTC, Branch 93 to become final and executory without
asking the courts for an alternative relief. The Court of
Appeals stated that petitioner merely relied on the
declarations of these courts that he could file a separate
personal action and thus failed to observe the rules and
settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing
petitioner’s avenue for recovery of the loan.
DELA CRUZ VS DELA CRUZ
GR NO L-19565
JANIARY 30, 1968
FACTS:
The plaintiff and defendant were married in Bacolod City on
1938. Six children were born to them namely, Zenia, Ronnie,
Victoria, Jessie, Bella and Felipe. During their coverture they
acquired seven parcels of land of the Bacolod Cadastre, all

assessed at P 45, 429, and three parcels of the Silay Cadastre,
all assessed at P 43, 580. All these parcels are registered in
their names. The HACIENDA in Silay yielded for the year
1957 a net profit of P 3, 390. 49.
They are also engaged in varied business ventures with fixed
assets valued as of December 1956 at P 496, 006.92, from
which they obtained for the year a net profit P 75, 655. 78. The
net gain of the Philippine Texboard Factory, the principal
business of the spouses was P 90, 454. 48 for the year 1957.
As of December 1959, the total assets of the various
enterprises of the conjugal partnership were valued at P 1, 021,
407. 68 not including those at the Top Service Inc., of which
firm the defendant has been the president since its
organization in 1959 in Manila with a paid-up capital P
50,000, P 10,000 of which was contributed by him. This
corporation owns the Beverly Hills Subdivision in Antipolo,
Rizal, the Golden Acres Subdivision and Green Valley
Subdivision in Rizal and a lot and building located at M.H del
Pilar purchased for P 285,000, an amount borrowed from the
Manufacturer’s Bank and Trust Company.
The spouses are indebted to Philippine National Bank and the
Development Bank of the Philippines for loans obtained, to
secure which they mortgaged the Philippine Texboard Factory,
the Silay HACIENDA, their conjugal house, and all their
parcels of land located in Bacolod City.
ISSUE(S):
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE SEPARATION OF THE
DEFENDANT FROM THE PLAINTIFF CONSTITUTE
ABANDONMENT IN LAW THAT WOULD JUSTIFY
A SEPARATION OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
PROPERTIES?
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT’S
FAILURE AND/ OR REFUSAL TO INFORM THE
PLAINTIFF OF THE STATE OF THEIR BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES SUCH AS ABUSE OF HIS POWERS
OF ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP AS TO WARRANT A DIVISION OF
THE MATIMONIAL ASSETS?
RULING(S):
1. NO. THE DEFENDANT IS NOT GUILTY OF
ABANDONMENT.
The court held that the plaintiff’s prayer that her plea for
separation of conjugal partnership properties under
ARTICLES 167 and 178 of the NEW CIVIL CODE requires
13
COMPILED BY: EGINA, MENDEZ, MAROHOM, PASCUAL, KIWAHKO, CLEMENCIA, VILLENA, ANHORES, MACARAMBON,
DELA CRUZ, COGAY, ANDES, VILLEGAS, HABANA, MUROS, DINO, ALCALA, ASPA, ROXAS, ESPERIDA, NANDANG.
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a presentment of real abandonment and not mere
separation. The abandonment must not only be physical
estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion.
Physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term
“abandonment”, if the husband despite his voluntary departure
from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the
management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give
support to his wife. The Court further believed that the
defendant did not intend to leave his wife and children
permanently despite his absence from the conjugal home, as
shown by the evidence on record that he continued to give
support to his family. Futhermore, the evidence on record fails
to preponderate in favour as to whether Severino kept Nenita
as a concubine. Credible evidence is needed, which the
plaintiff failed to show and is negatived by her testimony that
she had not seen Nenita’s handwriting before.
(2) NO. THE DEFENDANT IS NOT GUILTY OF ABUSING
HIS POWERS OF ADMINISTRATION OVER THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES.
There is no evidence on the record to show that he has
squandered the conjugal assets. The refusal or failure of the
husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to
inform the wife of the progress of the family businesses
does not constitute in abuse.
PRINCIPLES:
* CIVIL LAW; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP;
SEPARATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTIES;
ABANDONMENT DEFINED; CASE AT BAR. — To
constitute abandonment of the wife by the husband, as the
term is used in Article 178 of the New Civil Code, there must
be absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and
rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The
abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also
amount to financial and moral desertion. In the case at bar, the
evidence shows that the defendant did not intend to leave his
wife and children permanently for he continued to give
support to his family despite his absence from the conjugal
home. This fact negatives any intent on his part not to return to
the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights.
Where there is only physical separation between the spouses
engendered by the husband's leaving the conjugal abode, but
the husband continues to manage the conjugal properties with
the same zeal, industry and efficiency as he did prior to the
separation, and religiously gives support to his wife and
children, as in the case at bar, the wife's petition for separation
of property must be denied.
* ABUSE OF ADMINISTRATION DEFINED. — Mere
refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the
conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the
family businesses does not constitute abuse of administration.
For "abuse" to exist, it is not enough that the husband perform
an act or acts prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he

commits acts injurious to the partnership, for these may be the
result of mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse
connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the
partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts
and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter.
* ATTORNEY'S FEES; ACTIONS FOR LEGAL
SUPPORT. — Because defendant, by leaving the conjugal
abode, has given cause for the plaintiff to seek redress in the
courts, and ask for adequate support, an award of attorney's
fees is proper. Ample authority for such award is found in
paragraphs 6 and 11 of the new Civil Code which empower
courts to grant counsel's fees "in actions for legal support" and
in cases "where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees . . . should be recovered."
SPOUSES ZAPANTA VS RUSTAN COMMERCIAL
CORPORATION
GR NO. 248063
SEPTEMBER 15, 2021
FACTS:
Rustan Commercial Corporation (RCC) operates a chain of
department stores and sells gift certificates that may be used to
pay for goods and merchandise in any of the stores owned by
Rustan Group of Companies. Nilda was RCC's credit and
collection manager. She was responsible for processing and
approving applications for credit accommodations, discount
card applications, guarantor's applications, and checking,
monitoring, and implementing credit and debt collection
processes, policies, and regulations. German is being sued in
his capacity as Nilda's husband.
In 2001, RCC conducted an audit on its Credit & Collection
Department then headed by Vice President for Internal Audit,
Edna G. De Leon. The Audit Department found discrepancies
between the general and subsidiary ledgers, and differences
between the balances in the subsidiary ledger and the aging
reports that the Credit and Collection Department submitted.
The Audit Department recommended that a daily
reconciliation of transactions and a monthly reconciliation of
balances be made. From the daily reconciliation of
transactions, De Leon noticed that there were gift certificates
purchased on charge basis, where the charge chit documents
(CCGC) were not forwarded to the Accounting Department.
The Audit Department conducted an investigation and
summoned the personnel who issued said gift certificates.
After the audit, it was discovered that the irregularities and
discrepancies in the ledgers were from the gift certificate
purchases under the account name of a certain Rita Pascual.
Flocerfida M. Vergara, then Vice President for Administration
and Finance of RCC, accompanied by De Leon, Head of Store
14
COMPILED BY: EGINA, MENDEZ, MAROHOM, PASCUAL, KIWAHKO, CLEMENCIA, VILLENA, ANHORES, MACARAMBON,
DELA CRUZ, COGAY, ANDES, VILLEGAS, HABANA, MUROS, DINO, ALCALA, ASPA, ROXAS, ESPERIDA, NANDANG.
SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – FINAL EXAM
CASE DIGESTS FROM THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. DIZON
Operations Vida Estrella, and Atty. Romeo Alcantara, went to
Nilda's house to ask if she needed help collecting from the
Rita Pascual account. At that time, Nilda had not been
reporting to work. Nilda told them that she was having
problems with Rita Pascual and could not locate her as the
latter went into hiding. When asked whether Rita Pascual
actually existed, Nilda turned over Rita Pascual's Charge
Account Application Form. There was an annotation on the
form stating "old applicant/customer" handwritten by Nilda
with a check mark on the space for "Approved."
When Nilda was asked about the gift certificates she ordered
on January 2003 amounting to P600,000.00, Nilda said that
the gift certificates and the CCGCs were still with her and
turned them over to the team. Nilda told them that she would
be submitting a letter of explanation concerning the Rita
Pascual account.
The team proceeded with the investigation and summoned
several RCC employees. According to Pilita Guerra, concierge
clerk, Nilda did not follow the standard operating procedure
for purchases of gift certificates when the purchase was made
under the account of Rita Pascual.
Ricky Munoz, posting clerk at the Credit and Collection
Department, had the duty of posting all transactions into
ledgers, except the Rita Pascual transactions. Nilda instructed
Munoz that she would personally report and handle all
documents, including CCGCs pertaining to the Rita Pascual
account.
It was also discovered that Nilda entered into many
transactions in excess of her authority as manager of the Credit
and Collection Department. In violation of the standard
operating procedure, the copies of the CCGCs for purchases
under the Rita Pascual account that should be left at the store
were never returned by Nilda after she got hold of them.
Between December 1999 and January 2003, various purchases
of gift certificates through the account of Rita Pascual
amounting to P78,120,000.00 were made under Nilo Cabrante,
messenger of the Credit and Collection Department, and
Nilda's watch. The team tried to look for Rita Pascual but
could not find her in the address stated in the charge account
application form.
When the investigation team traced the gift certificates ordered
by Nilda through their control numbers, they discovered that
she sold the gift certificates to third persons who used them to
make purchases from Rustan's. Among those people were Sps.
Alberto and Lucita Flores. Alberto Flores testified that
between 1998 and 2003, Nilda sold them gift certificates at
discounted rates of up to seven to eight percent amounting to
more than P60,000,000.00. Sps Flores showed the team their
bank book, which reflected the withdrawals on dates very
close to Nilda's acquisition of gift certificates from the store.
Alberto Flores added that beginning 1998, Nilda stopped

issuing receipts either from her or from RCC for his
purchases. Nilda also allegedly instructed him that should
anyone ask him where he got his gift certificates, he should
say that they came from Rita Pascual.
RCC issued a memorandum to Nilda, giving her an
opportunity to explain. Instead of explaining, Nilda submitted
her retirement letter, expressing her desire to leave the
company for health reasons. This was not accepted by RCC.
Thereafter, RCC sent Nilda a demand letter. Failing to heed
RCC's demand for payment, RCC filed a complaint for
payment of sum of money and damages with prayer for
issuance of writ of preliminary attachment.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an Order, granting the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment of RCC. Subsequently, the RTC issued a writ of
preliminary attachment, instructing the branch sheriff to
"attach the estate, real and personal, not exempt from
execution of the defendants NILDA ELERIA ZAPANTA and
husband GERMAN V. ZAPANTA." Among the personal
properties levied upon were two Honda Civic motor vehicles
with plate numbers HYP 888 and WAR 342 that turned out
to be registered under the name of Sps. Zapanta's son,
Gerard Angelo E. Zapanta.
The CA denied the appeal of Sps. Zapanta and affirmed the
Decision of the RTC. For the RTC, RCC was able to establish
the fraud perpetrated by Nilda. The CA denied the Motion for
Reconsideration Sps. Zapanta filed.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HUSBAND (GERMAN) WAS
CORRECTLY IMPLEADED IN THE COLLECTION
SUIT?
RULING:
YES. THE HUSBAND OF NILDA, WAS CORRECTLY
IMPLEADED IN THE COLLECTION SUIT.
While the allegations in the Complaint mainly fault Nilda for
the unpaid account of one Rita Pascual, the plaintiff was
correct in including German, Nilda's husband, in the
collection suit instituted against her.
Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules states:
Section 4. Spouses as parties. — Husband and wife shall
sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.
As a general rule, the husband and wife shall sue or be sued
jointly as they are co-administrators of the community
property under the system of absolute community of property
regime, as well as the conjugal partnership regime under the
Family Code. In this case, impleading German was proper
as RCC prayed for the attachment of properties that may
form part of the absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of Nilda and German. However, this does not
15
COMPILED BY: EGINA, MENDEZ, MAROHOM, PASCUAL, KIWAHKO, CLEMENCIA, VILLENA, ANHORES, MACARAMBON,
DELA CRUZ, COGAY, ANDES, VILLEGAS, HABANA, MUROS, DINO, ALCALA, ASPA, ROXAS, ESPERIDA, NANDANG.
SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – FINAL EXAM
CASE DIGESTS FROM THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. DIZON
mean that they are equally liable for the obligation that may
arise out of the collection suit.
While the Court is bereft of information as to which property
regime is observed by Sps. Zapanta, it is worthy to point out
that both the absolute community of property and conjugal
partnership regime impose similar restrictions with respect to
obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of
the other. Article 94 (3) and Article 121 (3) of the Family
Code state:
Article 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable
for:
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without
the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
been benefitted;
Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without
the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
been benefitted;
To bind the absolute community of property or the
conjugal partnership, actual benefit to the family must be
proved. The party asserting their claim against the absolute
community of property or the conjugal partnership has the
burden of proving that it is chargeable against the property
regime of the spouses.
In this case, German cannot escape the joint and solidary
liability to pay the obligation arising from Nilda's fraudulent
scheme in pocketing the proceeds from the sale of the gift
certificates of RCC. Without any evidence to the contrary, it is
presumed that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the
benefit of their family. Hence, their conjugal partnership
or community property is liable.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and the Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioners Nilda Eleria Zapanta and German V. Zapanta are
ORDERED.
The respective attachments made on the Honda Civic LXI
2000 and Honda Civic SIR 2001 registered under the name of
Gerard Angelo E. Zapanta, who is not a party in this
collection suit, are LIFTED.
MODULE 5:
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
(ARTICLE 116-133 OF THE FAMILY CODE)
VILLANUEVA VS CA
GR NO 143286
APRIL 14, 2004
FACTS: