Effects of Filing Petition Art.
61-62 FC Celia filed for legal separation against her husband Manuel due to his
De La Viña v. Villareal| GR No. L-13982| 07/31/1920| Johnson, J.
Si Diego na nga ang may babae, siya pa nagpalayas sa asawa niya. Oh di
nag iba ng residence si wife, iba na rin domicile niya. Not the same with her
husband na.
Balak pa niya ibenta/isanla properties nila. (Prelim Injunction mag apply)
FACTS:
Narcissa Geopan filed a complaint for divorce in RTC Iloilo against her
husband, Diego de la Vina, on the ground of concubinage. Due to said illicit
relationship between her husband and one Ana Calog, she was ejected from
the conjugal home in Guijulngan, Negros Occidental, and thereafter forced to
establish her habitual residence in the city of Iloilo, with no means to support
herself other than through the expense of one of her daughters. Thus, she
prayed for a decree of divorce, partition of conjugal property, and alimony
pendente. After filing the complaint, she presented a motion for preliminary
injunction to restrain her husband, who was the sole administrator of their
conjugal property, from alienating or encumbering the same. Respondent
Judge Villareal granted the motion, prompting the husband to file this
present case of petition for certiorari on the ground that the judge had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action and that exceeded his power and
authority in issuing the preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wife validly acquired a residence or domicile separate
from that of her husband during the subsistence of their marriage. (YES)
Whether or not in an action for divorce, where conjugal property is
concerned, a preliminary injunction may be issued to restrain a spouse from
alienating/encumbering conjugal property during the pendency of the action.
(YES)
RULING: Petition DENIED
YES. The general rule that the domicile of the wife follows that of the
husband is not an absolute rule. Here, De La Vina unlawfully ejected
Geopano from the conjugal home to have illicit relations with another
woman, giving Geopano more than enough justification to establish her
domicile elsewhere, lest her continued cohabitation give the impression of
condonation to said illicit affairs. It is well established in various
jurisprudence that the wife may acquire a separate residence where the
husband has given cause for divorce, which in this case, is De La Vina’s having
committed concubinage. Having established this, it follows that the Geopano
could file the case of divorce to the RTC of Iloilo, instead of the RTC that has
jurisdiction over De La Vina’s residence, which the latter insisted and which
the court rejected.
YES. While the law grants the husband the power to solely administer the
conjugal property without the consent of the wife, this legal maxim only
holds true as long as a harmonious relationship between them exists. When
such relation ceases, the husband’s powers of administration should be
curtailed during the pendency of action to protect the interests of the wife.
The preliminary injunction prayed for by Geopano is well within paragraphs 2
and 3 of section 164 of Act No. 190, and thus, the RTC judge didn’t commit
any breach of jurisdiction in granting the same.
Reyes v. Ines-Luciano| GR No. L-48219| 02/28/19799| Fernandez, J.
Dalawang beses ba naman ni-attempt ni Manuel patayin si Celia, sinong di
makikipahgiwalay. Haha!
Multi-million contracts naman pala hawak ng corporations na controlled ni
Manuel e, tapos sasabhin pa excessive yung support. Tama lang yun.
FACTS:
attempts to her life cited in 2 instances:
First, Manuel pummeled her with fist blows that floored her, then
held her head and, with intent to kill, bumped it several times
against the cement floor. Were it not for plaintiff's father, he
would have succeeded killing her.
Second, when she went to their house to get her overnight bag.
Upon seeing her, defendant yelled at her to get out. When she did
not mind him, he suddenly doused her with a glass of grape juice,
kicked her several times that landed at her back and nape, and
was going to hit her with a steel tray as her driver, Ricardo
Mancera, came due to her screams for help.
Celia asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children but
Manuel opposed this, alleging adultery on the part of Celia.
Respondent judge granted P5,000 which was reduced to P4,000 because the
children are in the custody of the husband upon motion for reconsideration
of Manuel. Manuel filed for certiorari at the CA but the CA affirmed the RTC.
Hence the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not alimony pendente lite should be granted to the wife while
the legal separation case is pending given that there is an allegation of
adultery on her part?
RULING: Petition DENIED. Support is 4k per month
That while adultery is a defense in an action for support, the alleged adultery
must be established by competent evidence. During the hearing, Manuel did
not present any evidence to prove the allegation. The adultery may still be
proved in the hearing of the legal separation.
That in determining the amount, it is not necessary to go to the full merits of
the case. It is sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of
evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the
application, in view of the provisional character of the resolution.
NOTE: Celia was not asking for support from the husband’s personal funds
but from the conjugal property of which Manuel is the president, manager
and treasurer. It is also cited that the husband can afford the support given
that they have various corporations.
Gandionco v. Hon. Peñaranda| GR No.79284| 11/27/1987| Padilla, J.
Di maaapektuhan nung CrimCase for Concubinage yung Civil Case for Legal
Separation kasi hindi naman siya yung “civil liability arising from the criminal
offense”. Magkaiba yun.
Preponderance of evidence lang need sa decree of legal separation. No crim
proceeding/conviction is nnecessary
FACTS:
29 May 1986: Teresita filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de
Oro City, presided over by respondent Judge, a complaint against petitioner
for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage.
13 October 1986: Teresita also filed a criminal case to the MTC of General
Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for concubinage.
Froilan claims that the civil action for legal separation and the application for
support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for
concubinage filed against him the private respondent
He cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure:
- SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from offenses. — Whenever the offended
party shall have instituted the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising
from the offense. as contemplated in the first Section 1 hereof, the following
rules shall be observed: (a) After a criminal action has been commenced the
pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be suspended, in
whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the criminal case for concubinage should be settled before
the civil case for legal separation can proceed. (NO)
RULING: Petition DISMISSED
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal
separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously
with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one
"to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil
and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense
Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is specific that it refers to civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c),
Rule 107 simply referred to "Civil action arising from the offense."
- Sec. 1 of Rule 107:
Sec. 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses. Except as
otherwise provided by law, the following rules shall he observed:
(c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from
the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered.
This action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but
is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each
other
Froilan says that his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured
before the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed
- Court says that his assumption is erroneous
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued
upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation.
No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
Effects of Decree Art. 63-64 FC
Bañez (Aida) v. Bañez (Gabriel)|GR No. 132592/ 133628| 01/23/2002|
Quisumbing, J
Regarding ‘to sa execution of judgment pending appeal at multiple appeals
sa Legal Separation. Both NOT applicable sa case
FACTS:
That on September 23, 1996, Cebu RTC made the following decisions:
The legal separation of Aida Bañez and Gabriel Bañez on the
ground husband’s sexual infidelity
The dissolution of their conjugal property relations and the
division of the net conjugal assets
The forfeiture of husband’s one-half share in the net conjugal
assets in favor of the common children
The payment to wife’s counsel of the sum of P100,000 as
attorney’s fees to be taken from her share in the net a ssets
The surrender by husband of the use and possession of a Mazda
motor vehicle and the smaller residential house located at Maria
Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to wife and the common children
within 15 days from receipt of the decision
Aida then filed an urgent ex-parte motion to modify the decision, specifically
on the payment attorney’s fees, which was granted by the RTC. She also filed
a motion for moral and exemplary damages, which was denied by the court,
and another motion for execution pending appeal regarding the husband’s
expulsion from the conjugal residential house and the surrender of the
Mazda vehicle, which was granted by the court.
Gabriel elevated the case to the CA, which set aside RTC’s ruling on the
execution of judgment pending appeal of the assets and denied Aida’s
motion for reconsideration, which gave rise to the instant petitions.
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not execution of judgment pending appeal was justified. (NO)
(2) Whether or not multiple appeals are allowed in an action for legal
separation. (NO)
RULING:
(1) No. Based on the court’s prior ruling in the case Echaus vs. Court of
Appeals, execution pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances
demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may result from the issuance
of the writ. In this case, court sees that there is no superior or urgent
circumstance that outweighs the damage which Gabriel would suffer if he
were ordered to vacate the house, as Aida has, according to the husband,
two houses and lots in the US where she is a permanent resident.
(2) No. Legal separation is not subject to multiple appeals. The effects of legal
separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation
of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor
children, follow from the decree of legal separation. They are mere incidents
of legal separation, not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by
Dissolution & Liquidation of ACP/ACPG
Quiao (Brigido) v. Quiao (Rita)| GR No. 176557| 07/04/2012| Reyes, J.
Hindi na entitled si Brigido sa net profit ng conjugal property kasi siya yung
guilty spouse as per Art. 63 (2) of the Family Code
FACTS:
Respondent Rita Quiao, the offended spouse, filed a legal separation against
the petitioner Brigido Quiao on October 26, 2000 before the RTC. The
decision of the court dated October 10, 2005 declared the legal separation,
custody of children to Rita, equal partition on the personal and real
properties, and forfeiture on the part of Brigido the net profits earned from
the conjugal properties in favor of the common children. Neither party filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and appealed within the required period for legal
separation.
December 12, 2005, Rita filed a Motion for Execution and was later on
granted. Brigido file a Motion for Clarification on the “net profit earned”. The
Court defined it asthe remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts
basing on Articles 63 and 43 of the Family Code. Brigido filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on September 8, 2006. Though the petition was after the
required prescriptive period, the court granted the petition since its purpose
was to clarify the meaning of the “net profit earned”. With that on
November 8, 2006 the court ordered that the “net profit earned” be based
on the Article 102 of the family Code.
November 21, 2006, the respondent, Rita, filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(MR) praying for the reversal of the Nov. 8, 2006 court order. The Court then
granted the MR. Brigido then filed a Petition for Review questioning the
following: dissolution and liquidation of the common properties, meaning of
the “net profit earned”, and the law governing the property relation between
him and Rita.
ISSUE/S:
 1. Whether or not Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or
Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains isapplicable
in this case. ART 129 WILL GOVERN.
2. Whether or not the offending spouse acquired vested rights over
½ of the properties in the conjugal partnership. NO
3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal
partnership of gains the same with the computation of “net
profits” earned in the absolute community? NO.
RULING: RTC Decision AFFIRMED
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of
the current family code, the default rule is that Inthe absence of
marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community or conjugalpartnership of gains as established
in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband
and wife.
Second, since at the time of the di ssolution of the spouses’
marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, thesame
applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets andliabilities is
concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article
63(2) of the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between
the spouses is governed by the regime of ConjugalPartnership of
Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights
over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains,
pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All
property of the conjugalpartnership of gains is owned in common
by the husband and wife.”
While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose
the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded
in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due
process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in
her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to
her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitionerprayed that the trial court
divide the community assets between the petitioner and the
respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the
accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the
parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was
promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s
ruling forfeitingwhat the trial court termed as “net profits,”
pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner
cannotclaim being deprived of his right to due process.
3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the
husband and the wife become joint owners of all theproperties of
the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those
excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common
mass of the couple’s properties. And when the couple’s marriage
or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between
the spouses, or theirrespective heirs, equally or in the proportion
the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one
may haveoriginally owned.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial
court that the spouses have no separate properties, thereis
nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are
considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what
remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally
between the spouses and/or theirrespective heirs. However, since
the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from
the net profits of theconjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of
the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family
Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community
regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the
conjugalpartnership regime, because there is no separate
property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
Support & Custody Art 213 FC
Matute v. Hon. Macadaeg| GR No. L-9325| 05/30/1956| Concepcion, J.
Sabi ni Rosario pupunta lang daw sa Manila para makipaglibing sa father
niya kaya pumayag si Armando na isama mga bata. Kaso hindi niya
ibinalik.
Poor si Rosario at nakikitira lang sa mga brothers niya
FACTS:
Rosario Matute was found guilty of adultery in an action for legal separation
filed by her husband, Armando Medel, on Nov. 6, 1952. Armando was
awarded the custody of their four children, ages 4, 8, 10 and 12. Armando
then left for the US, leaving the care of his children to his sister in Davao City.
Rosario came to live with them so she could be with her children.
Armando came back in 1954, and in Mar 1955 the children joined him in
Cebu. With Armando's consent on the condition that they will return in 2
weeks, Rosario brought the children to Manila for her father's funeral in April
1955. She didn't return.
She subsequently filed a prayer asking for the court to:
(1) Award her the custody of her children because her children, three of
whom were already above 10 years old, preferred to be with her and that
she was not “unfit to take charge” of them “by reason of moral depravity,
habitual drunkenness, incapacity or poverty” (in deference to Sec 6, Rule
100, Rules of Court) and
(2) For Armando to pay for support for the children's schooling.
On June 29, 1955 Judge Macadaeg denied her prayer and ordered her to
return the custody of the children to Armando within 24 hours.
She then filed an action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, arguing that Judge Macadaeg had issued the decision with grave
abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosario Matute is fit to be awarded custody of her children
pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 100, Rules of Court. (NO)
RULING: Petition DENIED, Case DISMISSED
Children at least 10 years of age may choose their preferred parent according
to Sec. 6, Rule 100, Rules of Court unless the parent is “unfit to take charge”
of them “by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity or
poverty.”
Rosario Matute is without means of livelihood and depends on her brothers
for money and shelter. She is thus unfit by reason of her poverty.
RE: Grave Abuse of Discretion
A petition for certiorari and prohibition is a question of whether the
respondent acted "in excess or without jurisdiction" or "with grave abuse of
discretion".
There is no question that respondent judge had jurisdiction. If he had made a
mistake, and he did not, then it would at best only be an "error in
judgement" and not an "error in jurisdiction".
Neither did he act with grave abuse of discretion because the June 29, 1955
order merely enforced the award made in the Nov. 6, 1952 which was
already final and executory. Unless the Nov. 6, 1952 decision is reviewed and
modified, the award of custody must stand.
Wife’s Surname Art 372, CivCode
Laperal v. Republic| GR No. L-18008| 10/30/1962| Barrera, J.
Di naman affectd yung married status sa legal separation. Art 372, need pa
rin gamitin surname ng husband kahit after legal separation.
FACTS:

Elisea Santamaria petitioned for the use of her maiden name Elisea Laperal
after obtaining legal separation from her husband. She also supported said
petition on the fact that she has ceased to live with him for many years.

Prior to the decree of legal separation, she has been using her married name,
Elisea Santamaria.

The lower court used Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, Change of Name, and
granted the petition.

The rationale of the lower court was that to continue using her married
name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual
liquidation of the conjugal assets.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court may use Rule 103 despite the specific stipulations
in Art. 372 of the Civil Code. (NO)

RULING:

She is still married and there was no severance of the vinculum.

Art. 372 should prevail because it specifically qualified its application to

married women legally separated from their husbands thus, this applies to
Elisea. Even if the Court were to apply Rule 103, it is the opinion of the
Supreme Court that it is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the
name for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of
the mandatory provisions of Art. 372.

On the lower court’s justification above, the Supreme Court held that it was
not sufficiently proven that there will be confusion in her finances. Secondly,
with the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, the conjugal
partnership between petitioner and her husband had automatically been
dissolved and liquidated. Consequently, there could be no more occasion for
an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

*Related case is Dunn v. Palermo- Palermo wants to retain her maiden name
even after marriage. This was allowed by the Court. The legal name of any
person is the one written in the birth cert