GROUNDS
of the other.
Felicidad Munoz V. Jose Del Barrio 1955
Felicidad Munoz and Jose del Barrio were married civilly in
1942 and canonically later that same year. They lived
together and had two children, Felix Luis Del Barrio(11) and
Maria Teresa Del Barrio(9). During their married life, they had
frequent quarrels wherein Jose maltreated Felicidad.
Felicidad was unable to take the abuse and they ended up
separating.
Notwithstanding such separation, the wife claimed that her
husband maltreated her in several more occasions (Dec. 1950
or Jan. 1951 and September 1951). She filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan and alleged that their
marriage was governed by the system of conjugal partnership
and no property was acquired during the marriage except for
one portion of land. She prayed for legal separation, custody
of their children, support of respondent for their children,
and for the conjugal property to pay for the costs of this case.
Respondent denied petitioner's accusations. The court tried
to for them to reconcile, pursuant to Art. 98 CC but failed.
The Court proceeded to try the case and the plaintiff
presented witnesses testify:
(1) Jovita Faustino (a tenant of the apartment owned by her
father who witnessed their fights)
(2) Felix Munoz (her father)
(3) Faustino Mallari (patrolman who was called to intervene
in a fight and saw evidence of scratches andcchymosis on the
appellant)
(4) Atty. Manuel Macias (stopped respondent when he boxed
his wife and twisted her neck in a quarrel)
The Court however, dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Art. 98. In every case the court must take steps, before
granting the legal separation, toward the reconciliation of the
spouses, and must be fully satisfied that such reconciliation is
highly improbable. Petitioner appealed the said judgment.
Whether the maltreatments that the appellant suffered at the
hands of the respondent after their separation of dwelling,
which allegedly occurred in Dec. 1950 or Jan. 1951 and
September 1951, furnish ground for legal separation applied
for under Art. 97(2) CC.
NO. In the case at hand, we only look at the alleged
maltreatments that occurred after the separation as the ones
previous couldn't have amounted to attempts on the life of
the wife because she didn't institute any action for legal
separation then.
Art. 97 NCC states that: A petition for legal separation may be
filed: (1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for
concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the
Penal Code; or (2) An attempt by one spouse against the life
An attempt on the life of another requires the intention to
kill. Without proof of such, a person cannot be convicted of
attempted or frustrated murder. It is absolutely necessary
that the homicidal intent be evidenced by adequate acts to
produce the death of the victim."
We see here that the respondent only used are his bare fists
at most and desisted from giving further chastisement after
the first blows were given at the spur of the impulse.
The Court points out that this being a civil case, only
preponderance of evidence is necessary, however, the
petitioner should have filed a case against her husband for
attempted parricide and have him prosecuted.
ONG ENG KIAM v. LUCITA G. ONG 2006
Spouses got married at San Agustin church and begot 3
children; all in majority ages now. Lucita filed a complaint for
legal separation under Art. 55 paragraph 1 of the FC before
the RTC because her life with William was marked with
physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive
conducts after 3 years of their marriage. These are but not
limited to quarrel with shouting PUTANG INA MO, would slap
her and bang her head against a concrete wall. He also hit
their children using the buckle of his belt. December 09, 1995,
she protested with Williams decision to allow their eldest son
to go to Bacolod. Quarrel ensued and she was hit in her head,
stomach and was bent on pain. She was pointed with a gun
and asked to leave. She went to her sister’s house and to her
parent’s doctor for treatment of her injuries.
William denied but admitted the quarrel in December but he
also left and stayed at Greenhills Condominium.
The RTC decreed the legal separation with dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties. It was
indubitable that the circumstances made their life miserable
and hellish. No day without quarrel and he blamed his wife
for reporting his wrongdoings. It was always punctuated with
physical violence, threat and intimidation on her and their
children. That in December 14, 1995, she reached the limits
of her endurance and sacrificed the 20 years of their marriage
as there was already no harmony, love and peace.
The CA affirmed the decision en toto as her testimonies were
credible and straightforward. Dr. Elizano’s testimony showed
the injuries she sustained as supported by medical certificate.
These grossly abusive conducts was even done in front of
their employees. General denial of William can not stand. MR
was denied.
WON the CA erred.
William argues that this was done for her to have control of
the conjugal partnership. These were obtained through his
sole effort and her parents would benefit from it while the
decree would taint his reputation in the Chinese community.
The beating over their children was means of imposing
discipline and marriage being a social contract cannot be
impaired by mere verbal disagreements. There must be clear
and convincing evidence. Lucita never complained in 20 years
and she was the one abandoned their family abode.
Lucita countered that the SC is a trier of fact. She will not just
forgo the 20 years being together with their children.
In his reply, he averred that since Lucita is guilty of
abandonment, legal separation shoul be denied under Art.
56.4 of he FC. Respondent reiterated her position.
PETITION DENIED. SC cannot review factual finding on appeal
which are based on substantial evidence. The CA affirmed RTC
decision and was supported by records. William admitted of
no day without quarrel making his life miserable. Lucita and
her sister gave numerous accounts that William has violet
temper against his family: shouting and hitting regardless of
the people present. Injuries she received on December 14,
1995 was not the first. William and his witness offered only
denials. Relationship alone between Lucita nad her witnesses
is NOT CONTROLLING. The doctor’s finding bolstered
credence and not tainted with bias.
What benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for her
parents' and siblings' financial interests at the expense of her
marriage? What is more probable is that there truly exists a
ground for legal separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had
to seek redress from the courts. It would be unthinkable for
her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon
the comforts of her home and be separated from her children
whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is already
beyond her endurance.
The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would
taint his reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-
abuser also does not elicit sympathy because he gave Lucita
reason to go to court in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since
Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation
should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family
Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied
when both parties have given ground for legal separation.
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one
year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his
abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated by the said provision.
DENIED
People v Guadalupe Zapata 1951
Andres Bondoc filed before the CFI a complaint for adultery
against respondent and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour for
cohabiting and repeated sexual intercourse from 1946 to
March 14, 1947, the filing of the complaint. Dalmacio know
her to married woman. Defendant wife was sentenced 4
months of arresto mayor after a plea of guilty and served the
same.
On September 17, 1948, another complaint for adulterous
acts committed from March 15, 1947 to September 17, 1948.
The RTC quashed of the information on the ground of double
jeopardy upon motion of the defendants. Prosecution has
appealed. The trial court held that the 2 complaints must be
deemed one and continuous offense there being the same
and identical persons and the two sets of unlawful acts
constitute one and the same offense.
WON the TC erred
YES.
Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, as the
Supreme Court of Spain has held; it is an instantaneous crime
which is consummated and exhausted or completed at the
moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse
constitutes a crime of adultery.
Identity of the offended party, status and society does not
argue against the commission of the crime of adultery as
many times as there were carnal acts consummated, for as
long as the status remain unchanged, the nexus undissolved
and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass upon that status
constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional or legal
provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for
adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each
constituting one crime.
The paramour can be acquitted if he has no knowledge that
the woman is married but it cannot be acquitted the second
time because it is already known to him upon the filing of the
first complaint. Pardon cannot stand as an excuse for
committing subsequent adulterous acts.
TRIAL SHOULD PROCEED.
FROILAN C. GANDIONCO v. SENEN C. PENARANDA 1987
Wife filed with the RTC a complaint for legal separation on
the ground of concubinage with petition for support and
payment of damages. Petitioner contends that the support
pendente lite should be suspended in view of the criminal
complaint citing Art. 111, Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure stating that all proceedings related to legal
separation will have to be suspended to await conviction or
acquittal for concubinage.
WON petitioner is correct
NO. Section 1 of Rule 107 provides that after a criminal action
has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted; and the same shall be suspended,
in whatever stage it may be found, until proceeding has been
rendered.
The provisions last quoted did not clearly state, as the 1985
Rules do, that the civil action to be suspended, with or upon
the filing of a criminal action, is one which is "to enforce the
civil liability arising from the offense.
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for
legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead
of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage,
because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil
liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and
criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense.
Civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of
offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from
the innocent spouse, among others.
Governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which refers to "civil actions to enforce
the civil liability arising from the offense. The old Sec. 1(c),
Rule 107simply referred to "Civil action arising from the same
offense. Note that this action for legal separation is not to
recover civil liability.
Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will
have to be first secured before the action for legal separation
can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the actionfor legal
separation is his alleged offense of concubinage.
ERRONEOUS. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of
evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal
proceeding or conviction is necessary. Under such former law,
that the guilt of defendant spouse had to be established by
final judgment. Such requirement has not been reproduced
or adopted by the framers of the present Civil Code. Support
pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for
legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If
petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered
as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or
reduce the same.
DISMISSED.
Estrella dela Cruz vs. Severino dela Cruz 1968
Estrella filed a complaint alleging her husband not only
abandoned her but also mismanaging their conjugal
partnership praying separation of property, monthly support
and atty. fees. TC rendered judgement ordering separation
and division of conjugal assets. Defendant appealed before
the CA.
Facts are not controverted. They got married on Feb 01, 1938
and got 6 children. They acquired 7 parcels of land and all
were registered in their names. They were also indebted to
the PNB and DBP which they mortgaged the Phil. Textboard
Factory, Silay hacienda, conjugal house and all lands in
Bacolod.
Plaintiff evidence that her husband was sleeping in his office
although occasionally returned to Bacolod, their conjugal
home situated. He only paid short visits and engaged only in
brief conversation. She also found a letter in his polo pocket
revealing illicit relationship. He tore the same upon
confrontation. It is alleged that they call each other DARLING
and should meet at Baguio. The cook testified that she saw
defendant only once. He also concealed progress of the
business in favor of his concubine.
Defendant denied allegations but admitted living separately
since 1957, a year before filing of the complaint. He
contended that he did not abandon his family but only to
teach her a lesson of her jealousy. He could not concentrate
working at home and he manage the expansion of their
business. He also gave monthly support of 500 and
continuously drew allowances from the office. He financed
also the education of their children. His wife is used to play
majong and waste money. Manager of the company
corraborated with him. He denied having mistress. On the
matter of failure to inform her of the progress of their
business, he argues that he devoted his time for the
expansion.
WON their separation constitute abandonment and would
justify separation of conjugal partnership properties.
NO.
Plaintiff did not ask for legal separation and the allegation of
concubinage is just to bolster her claim that he abandoned
her that would justify separation of their conjugal assets
under 178 of the NCC which provides that the separation in
fact between husband and wife without judicial approval,
shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that . . . if the
husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at
least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership,
or administration by her of the conjugal partnership property,
or separation of property.
167 of the NCC provides; "In case of abuse of powers of
administration of the conjugal partnership property by the
husband, the courts, on the petition of the wife, may provide
for a receivership, or administration by the wife, or
separation of property.
Defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife, nor of
such abuse of his powers. Under article 178, there must be
real abandonment, and not mere separation. The
abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but
also amount to financial and moral desertion. 178 was
intended to protect the conjugal assets from waste and
dissipation rendered imminent by the husband's continued
absence from the conjugal abode, and to assure the wife of a
ready and steady source of support. Therefore, physical
separation alone is not the full meaning of the term
"abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary
departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the
management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give
support to his wife.
The act of a husband must be involuntarily leaving his wife
with intention to forsake her entirely, never to return to her,
and never to resume his marital duties towards her, or to
claim his marital rights. The act of the husband or the wife
who leaves his or her consort must be wilfully, and with an
intention of causing per perpetual separation. There must be
absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and rights,
with the intention of perpetual separation.
Defendant did not intend to leave his wife and children
permanently. He continued to give support to his family. No
showing that the plaintiff and the children were living in
want. After leaving his wife, he continued to make small
contributions at intervals to her support and that of their
minor child, he was not guilty of their "abandonment",
The plaintiff failed to connect authorship of the said letter
with Nenita. The sender merely signed as "D" and the
addressee was one unidentified "Darling". NO CONCUBINAGE
There is absolutely no evidence to show that he has
squandered the conjugal assets.
Abuse connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of
the partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts
and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter. Husband continues
to manage the conjugal properties with the same zeal,
industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and
religiously gives support to his wife and children.
Articles 167 and 178 are not to be construed as condonation
of the husband's act but are designed to protect the conjugal
partnership from waste and shield the wife from want.
Civil Code (both old and new) requires that separation of
property shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in
marriage settlements before the union is solemnized or by
formal judicial decree during the existence of the marriage.
Judgment ordering the division of conjugal assets where
there has been no real abandonment, the separation not
being wanton and absolute, may altogether slam shut the
door for possible reconciliation.
REVERSED
Carmen Lapuz Sy v Eufemio Eufemio 1972
On August 1953, Carmen filed a petition for legal separation
against respondent alleging that they were civilly married and
canonically. They lived together in about 9 years until 1943
when her husband abandoned her. They had no child but
acquired properties during their marriage. He allegedly
cohabited with Go Hiok.
He countered a declaration of nullity of marriage with
Carmen on the ground of his subsisting marriage with Go
celebrated under Chinese customs and law.
Trial could be completed when she got a vehicular accident
and the court was notified of her death. Eufemio moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that it prescribed under 102
of the CC and that her death abated the action for legal
separation. Macario, her father, moved for her substitution
but the trial court did not act on it.
The court dismissed the petition as well as the counterclaim.
WON an action for legal separation converted by the
counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity of a
marriage
NO.
The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to
declare the nullity of the same marriage can stand
independent and separate adjudication. They are not
inseparable nor was the action for legal separation converted
into one for a declaration of nullity by the counterclaim. Legal
separation presupposes a valid marriage, while the petition
for nullity has a voidable marriage as a precondition.
WON the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an
action for legal separation, abate the action
YES.
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more
than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there
being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely
personal. It follows that the death of one party to the action
causes the death of the action itself, actio personalis moritur
cum persona. Article 100 supports this by allowing only the
innocent spouse to file the petition. Article 108, by providing
that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation
already rendered.
When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for
divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. Review of the
resulting changes in property relations between spouses
shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal
separation; hence, they cannot survive the death of the
plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree.
The decree of legal separation shall have the effects under Art
106 of the CC.
Civil Code article vested exclusively in the persons of the
spouses; and by their nature and intent, such claims and
disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or
transmissible.
Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of
marriage can be deemed fairly included in the enumeration
for substitution under section 1, Rule 87.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated
by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved, is that these rights are mere effects of a decree of
separation, their source being the decree itself; without the
decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before
the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation.
Declaration for nullity of marriage is likewise moot and
academic.
Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of
Article 144 of the Civil Code could be resolved and
determined in a proper action for partition by either the
appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
Action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of
the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87,
paragraph 2, of the Code, annulment should be done during
the lifetime of the parties. Liquidation of any conjugal
partnership that might have resulted from such voidable
marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse," as expressly provided
in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceeding.
DENIED.
Manuel G. Almenor v. RTC Las Pinas 2008
Manuel and Leonida married on 198 at Manila cathedral.
They had 3 children and both spouses are medical
practitioners. After 11 years, she filed a petition to annul their
marriage under Art 36 of the FC. They met at the hospital as
medical student clerk. They soon became sweetheart and got
married after 3 years. She averred that his husband goodness
in the public eye is different in personal. He is a disciplinarian
and unreasonably meticulous and easily angered.
Unreasonable imposing discipline on their children led to
frequent fights. Manuel had deep attachment to his mother.
He also concealed his homosexuality but was caught in
indiscreet telephone conversation and some pornographic
materials. He also kissed another man in lips, Dr. Nograles.
She took her children and left the conjugal abode. Manuel did
not give support.
Clinical psychologist interviewed him once and his eldest
child. He concluded psychological incapacity marked by
antecedence existed before marriage and incurable.
Manuel admitted petty arguments but was surprised. The
action was because he and her family are business rivals. He
denied being cruel and averred that she is the one very
jealous. His brother corroborated that there was harmonious
relationship he observed while living with them. He denied
the kissing and no expert presented.
The RTC granted her petition with forfeiture of his share in
favour of their children but was awarded visitorial rights and
to give monthly support. It nullified not under 36 but under
45 of the FC. Being homosexual is not in consonance with
man and woman. Notice of appeal was denied due course.
CA affirmed the decision in toto.
WON the CA erred.
YES. Rules are relaxed to serve justice. Petition under rule 65
before the CA instead of appeal is proper.
Concealment of homosexuality is proper to annul a marriage
not homosexuality per se.
Trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had no
basis at all because the supporting grounds relied upon
cannot legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Failure in the performance of some marital obligations
does not suffice to establish psychological incapacity. Lower
court should have dismissed outright the petition for not
meeting the guidelines set in Molina.
Trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and
Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud.
When there is smoke, surely there is fire. Although
vehemently denied by defendant, there is preponderant
evidence enough to establish with certainty that defendant is
really a homosexual based on the totality of evidence. His
own close friends doubted his true sexual preference.
Defendant threatened to sue those people spreading rumour
but nothing happened
Simple reason of professional rivalry advanced by the
defendant is certainly not enough to justify.
It is very untoward infidelity at the expense and humiliation
of their children and family as a whole
HOWEVER, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate
the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he
concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The
law is clear -a marriage may be annulled when the consent of
either party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of
homosexuality. Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by
preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at
the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such
fact to his wife. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and
intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the
marriage.
Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but
one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental
element that respondent failed to prove.
Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and
its alleged incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are
not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in our
jurisdiction.
Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
marriage
In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer
and enjoy their community or conjugal property, Art 96 of the
FC. Since the declaration of nullity decree by the RTC is
improper, it follows that the forfeiture of his properties is also
unwarranted.
GRANTED.
DEFENSES
JOSE DE OCAMPO V SERAFINA FLORENCIANO 1960
Action for legal separation was filed by Jose against Serafina
on the ground of adultery. CFI dismissed it on the ground of
confession of judgment, condonation or consent to adultery
and prescription.
Records show that on July 1955, a complaint for legal
separation was filed. Their marriage was performed in 1938
and committed adultery in 1951 with Jose Arcalas and in 1955
with Nelson. Defendant made no answer and was defaulted.
No collusion found by the fiscal. Plaintiff then presented
evidence.
CA found that they got married in religious ceremony on April
1938. They lived as H and W and begot several children. He
discovered an illicit affair with Jose in 1951. Plaintiff then sent
her to Manila. Again, she made to go out with several men.
When she finished her studies in 1952, she left plaintiff and
lived separately.
On June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife with an illicit affair
with Nelson. Plaintiff signifies his intention to file legal
separation which she conformed in lieu of adultery charge.
The CA held that the action for legal separation has
prescribed in 1 year after his discovery of the first illicit affair,
102 of NCC.
As with Nelson, CA found that she conformed and even
admitted sexual relation.
WON the conformity amounts to confession under Art 101 in
which legal separation cannot be decreed.
NO. Art 101 merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a
confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually
happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses
the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly
agreeing to the plaintiff's demand.
The decree may and should be granted, since it would not be
based on her confession, but upon evidence presented by the
plaintiff.
The law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly
on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action
ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will
immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it.
The mere circumstance that defendant told the Fiscal that
she "liked also" to be legally separated from her husband, is
no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action.
Collusion implies more than consent or lack of opposition to
the agreement. This agreement, if not express, may be
implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying
the divorce. Collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact
that the guilty party confesses to the offense. Offense of
adultery had really taken place, according to the evidence.
Plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her
does not constitute condonation or consent. It was not his
duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the
obligation to return. It was the wife who "left" her husband.
DECREED.
Bugayong vs. Ginez/G.R. No. L-10033/December 28,
1956/Felix, J.
SUMMARY:
According to I Bouver's Law Dictionary, p. 585,
condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission" of a
matrimonial offense committed by a husband or wife. The act
of the husband in persuading her to come along with him,
and the fact that she went with him and consented to being
brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong, and the
fact that they slept there as husband and wife for one day
and one night, and the further fact that on the second night
they again slept together in their house, likewise as husband
and wife. All these facts have no other meaning in the opinion
of this court than that a reconciliation between them was
effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the
husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after
he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to
adultery.
FACTS:
On 1949, Benjamin Bugayong married Leonila Ginez in
Asingan, Pangasinan. He and Leonila stayed with his sisters in
Sampaloc, Manila, before he left to continue his work as a US
Navy serviceman. By July 1951, Leonila left the dwelling of her
sister-in-law and informed her husband she would be with
her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan. Later, she went to
Dagupan City to study at a local college.
 Benjamin has been receiving letters since July 1951
that Leonila is having an affair with another man, a certain
"Eliong". In 1952, Benjamin returned to the Philippines, went
to Pangasinan and sought for his wife, whom he met in the
house of Leonila’s godmother. They lived again as husband
and wife and stayed in the house of Pedro Bugayong, cousin
of the plaintiff-husband. On the second day, he tried to verify
from his wife the truth of the information he received, but
instead of answering, Leonila packed up and left him, which
Benjamin concluded as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity.
He tried to locate her and, upon failing, he went to Ilocos
Norte.
 Benjamin filed in the Court of the First Instance (CFI)
of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against
Leonila, who timely filed an answer vehemently denying the
averments of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts charged in line with the truth of
allegations of the commission of acts of infidelity amounting
to adultery have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband.
HELD:
Yes. Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery
were committed by the wife, the act of the husband in
persuading her to come along with him and the fact that she
went with him and together they slept as husband and wife
deprives him as the alleged offended spouse of any action for
legal separation against the offending wife because his said
conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of Civil
Code.
Condonation is the conditional forgiveness or remission,
by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the
latter has committed
Matubis vs. Praxedes/G.R. No. L-11766/October 25,
1960/Paredes, J.
FACTS:
In 1943, Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were
legally married. In 1948, they entered into a contract wherein
they agreed that they should live separately and that they
should not prosecute each other for adultery, concubinage,
or any other crime or suit arising from their separation. In
January 1955, Zoilo began cohabiting with Asuncion, who
later gave birth to their child. In April 1956, Socorro filed a
complaint for legal separation on the ground of abandonment
and concubinage against Zoilo. The lower court dismissed the
complaint on the grounds of prescription and
condonation/consent.
ISSUES
1.) Whether or not the action will prescribe?
2.) Whether or not Socorro consented to the commission of
concubinage by her husband?
HELD:
1.) Yes. Under Art. 102 of the Code, an action for legal
separation cannot be filed except within one year from and
after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the
cause and within five years from after the date when cause
occurred (now 5 years under Art. 57, FC). The complaint was
filed outside the periods provided for by the above Article. By
the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground
(concubinage) for the legal separation in January, 1955. She
instituted the complaint only on April 24, 1956.  have taken actions despite his absence from the country had
2.) Yes. The very wording of the agreement gives no room for
interpretation other than that given by the trial judge.
Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are
necessarily the import of paragraph 6(b) of the agreement.
The condonation and consent here are not only implied but
expressed. The law specifically provides that legal separation
may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there
has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing,
the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy. 
People vs. Sensano and Ramos/G.R. No. 37720/March 07,
1933/Butte, J.
FACTS:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married
in 1919. Shortly after the birth of their child, Mariano went to
the Province of Cagayan and remained there for three years.
During his three-year stay, he did not write to his wife nor did
he give support to her or the child. Ursula was poor and
illiterate and had no relatives upon whom she could call. Then
Marcelo Ramos took her and the child to live with him. When
Mariano returned in 1924, he filed a case against Ursula and
Marcelo for adultery. They were sentenced to four months
and one day. After completing the service of the sentence,
Ursula asked for forgiveness from Mariano, to which the
latter replied that she could do whatever she wanted and that
he wanted nothing to do with her. Mariano then left for
Hawaii, where he stayed for seven years. He knew that his
wife had lived again with Marcelo. Upon his return to the
Philippines, he again filed a case for adultery. The court of
first instance sentenced Ursula and Marcelo to 3 years, 6
months, and 21 days in prison. They contended that the court
of first instance erred in not considering that Mariano had
already consented to the adultery.
The Solicitor General contended that Mariano’s
absence from the Philippines made it impossible for him to
take any action.
ISSUE:
WON Mariano consented to his wife’s adulterous
acts?
HELD:
Yes. The fact that he told his wife that he had
nothing to do with her and that she can do whatever she
wants is considered as consent for the adultery. He did not
interfere with his wife’s relations for seven years despite
knowing that the latter was staying again with her lover. The
Solicitor General’s contention has no merit. He could still
he wanted to.
Llave vs. Republic/G.R. No. 169766/March 30, 2011/Del
Castillo, J.
FACTS:    marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano
married Estrellita twice: initially under Islamic law and
tradition and then in a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC
Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur. In their marriage contracts,
Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as divorced. Private
respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano and her son Adib
Ahmad A. Tamano filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon
City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between
Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous.
It was further alleged that since Zorayda and the
deceased were married when the NCC was already in effect,
the subsequent marriage to Estrellita was void ab initio since
divorce is not allowed under the NCC. The trial court denied
Estrellitas' motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case
for a declaration of nullity. Thus, Estrellita filed a certiorari
petition before the SC questioning the denial of her Motion to
Dismiss, which was referred to and subsequently denied by
the CA. This prompted Estrellita to file a petition for review
on certiorari before the SC. Subsequent to the promulgation
of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her
evidence, but she asked for postponement. Unhappy with the
delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib
moved to submit the case for decision, reasoning that
Estrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed,
on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still
awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603. The RTC rendered
the aforementioned judgment, declaring Estrellitas' marriage
to Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.
On appeal to the CA, Estrellita argued that she was
denied due process as the RTC rendered its judgment even
without waiting for the finality of the Supreme Court's
decision in G.R. No. 126603. The CA denied the appeal as she
was given ample opportunity to be heard but simply ignored
it by asking for numerous postponements. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Estrellita and Tamano was
bigamous.
HELD:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda
and late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never
invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage
to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and
Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was
the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except
during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not
availed of during its effectivity. As far as Estrellita is
concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that
codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that
the law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both parties
are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and
the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code in any part of the Philippines.” However, article 13
of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties
were married both in civil and Muslim rites.”
The petition is DENIED.
Brown vs. Yambao/G.R. No. L-10699/October 18,
1957/Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
On 1955, William Brown filed a suit in the Court of
First Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his
lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while
he was interned by the Japanese invaders at the University of
Sto. Tomas internment Camp, his wife engaged in adulterous
relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl
that Brown learned of his wife’s misconduct only in 1945.
Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court subsequently
declared the wife in default, for failure to answer in due time,
despite service of summons; and directed the City Fiscal or his
representatives to investigate, in accordance with Article 101
of the Civil Code, whether or not a collusion exists between
the parties and to report to this Court the result of his
investigation within fifteen (15) days from receipt of copy of
this order. The City Fiscal or his representative is also directed
to intervene in the case in behalf of the State. (Rec. App. p. 9).
Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him
with regard to his marital relation with Lilia Deito, who was
not his wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as counsel for the
defaulting wife, "when the power of the prosecuting officer is
limited to finding out whether or not there is collusion, and if
there is no collusion, which is the fact in the case at bar, to
intervene for the state which is not the fact in the instant
case, the truth of the matter being that he intervened for
Juanita Yambao, the defendant-appellee, who is private
citizen and who is far from being the state.".
ISSUES:
 WON the Court erred in declaring that there was
condonation of or consent to the adultery.
HELD:
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code,
calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of
annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize
that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its
continuation or interruption cannot be made depend upon
the parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs,
Cheong Gee, 43 Phil, 43; Ramirez vs. Gmur 42 Phil. 855; Goitia
vs. Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It is consonant with this policy that
the injury by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any
relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings
for separation or annulment are fully justified or not.
The court below also found, and correctly held that
the appellant's action was already barred, because Brown did
not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years
after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his
release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the
new Civil Code, action for legal separation cannot be filed
except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became
cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after
the date when such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does
not even contest the correctness of such findings and
conclusion.
PRESCRITION
Contreras vs. Macaraig/ G.R. No. L-21938/May 29,
1970/Dizon, J.
FACTS
In 1952, Contreras and Macaraig were married in the
Catholic Church of Quiapo, Manila. In September, 1962,
Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told the plaintiff that
the defendant was living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala.
Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told the plaintiff that
the defendant was living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala.
When defendant, the following October, returned to the
conjugal home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos' report
from defendant in her desire not to anger nor drive
defendant away. In 1963, the plaintiff instituted the present
action for legal separation. The Trial Court dismissed the
complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the period of one year provided for in
article 102 of the Civil Code should be counted, as far as the
instant case is concerned from September 1962 or from
December 1963.
HELD:
Yes. The Court eld in the case at bar that it was only
on the occasion mentioned when her husband admitted to
her that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann
to return to his legitimate family that appellant must be
deemed to be under obligation to decide whether to sue or
not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the
legal period of one year must be deemed to have
commenced.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside
and another is hereby rendered holding that appellant is
entitled to legal separation as prayed for in her complaint;
and the case is hereby remanded to the lower court for
appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.
WHEN TO TRY ACTIONS
Somosa – Ramos vs. Vamenta Jr./G.R. No. L-34132/July 29,
1972/Fernando, J.
FACTS
Lucy filed a case for legal separation against
Clemente on the grounds of concubinage and an attempt by
him to take her life. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of
what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive
property, then under the administration and management of
Clemente. Clemente opposed the motion based on Article
103 of the Civil Code, which provides: "An action for legal
separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall
have elapsed since the filing of the petition" (now Art 58,
Family Code). He said that if the motion were heard, the
prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would become
even more dim. Judge Vamenta granted the motion of
Clemente and suspended the hearing of the petition for a writ
of mandatory preliminary injunction. Thus, Lucy filed a
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting
the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse
of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise
preclude the Court from acting on a motion for preliminary
mandatory injunction applied for as ancillary remedy to such
a suit.
HELD
No. Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar
to the hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior to the
expiration of the six-month period.
The court where the action is pending according to
Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone
in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. That
the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain
cases for judicial power to assert itself is discernible from
what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After
the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall
be entitled to live separately from each other and manage
their respective property. The husband shall continue to
manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court
deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said
property, in which case the administrator shall have the same
rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to
dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance
with the orders of the court." (Now Art. 61, Family Code)
There would appear to be then a recognition that the
question of management of their respective property need
not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An
administrator may even be appointed for the management of
the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute
limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding
article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be
heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's
insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory
injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is
all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge,
considering that the husband whom she accused of
concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the
meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed
to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not
specifically denied by him.
Ocampo vs. Florenciano/G.R. No. L-13553/February 23,
1960/Bengzon, J.
FACTS:
The record shows that on July 5, 1955, the complaint for
legal separation was filed. As amended, it described their
marriage performed in 1938, and the commission of adultery
by Serafina, in March 1951 with Jose Arcalas, and in June
1955 with Nelson Orzame. Because the defendant made no
answer, the court defaulted her, and pursuant to Art. 101
above, directed the provincial fiscal to investigate whether or
not collusion existed between the parties. The fiscal
examined the defendant under oath, and then reported to
the Court that there was no collusion. The plaintiff presented
his evidence consisting of the testimony of Vicente Medina,
Ernesto de Ocampo, Cesar Enriquez, Mateo Damo, Jose de
Ocampo and Capt. Serafin Gubat. ART. 100. The legal
separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders,
a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them.
Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall
cause the dismissal of the petition.
ART. 101. —No decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether
or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the
State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is
not fabricated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art 101 completely prohibits decree
of legal separation upon confession or stipulation of facts.
HELD:
No. As we understand the article, it does not
exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by
the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a
decree of separation upon a confession of judgment.
Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant
appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to
judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the
plaintiff’s demand.
Yet, even supposing that the above statement of
defendant constituted practically a confession of judgment,
inasmuch as there is evidence of the
adultery independently of such statement, the decree may
and should be granted, since it would not be based on her
confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff.
What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or
mainly on defendant’s confession. If a confession defeats the
action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation
will immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it.
The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that
she “like also” to be legally separated from her husband, is no
obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When
she refused to answer the complaint, she indicated her
willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the
dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes
precautions against collusion, which implies more than
consent or lack of opposition to the agreement.
EFFECTS OF FILING PETITION
De la Vina vs. Villareal/G.R. No. L-13982/July 31,
1920/Johnson, J.
FACTS:
 The wife of Villareal, Geopano, filed a complaint of
divorce on Sept. 17, 1917 in RTC Iloilo against her husband,
de la Vina, on the ground of concubinage, which had allegedly
been occurring since 1913. When she learned of the illicit
relationship, she was ejected from the conjugal home. She
prayed for a decree of divorce, the partition of conjugal
property, and alimony pendente. After filing the complaint,
she presented a motion for a preliminary injunction to
restrain her husband from alienating or encumbering the
conjugal property. Respondent Judge Villareal granted the
motion. The husband filed the present case of petition for
certiorari on the ground that the judge had no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the action and exceeded his power and
authority in issuing a preliminary injunction.

ISSUES:

(1) WON a married woman may ever acquire a

residence or domicile separate from that of her
husband during the existence of a subsisting
marriage.
(2) WON in an action for divorce, where conjugal
property is concerned, a preliminary injunction may
be issued to restrain a spouse from
alienating/encumbering conjugal property during the
pendency of the action.

HELD:

1. Yes. The general rule of law that the domicile of the

wife follows that of the husband is not an absolute
rule. The husband unlawfully ejected the wife from
the conjugal home to have illicit relations with
another woman. Continued cohabitation would give
the impression of the wife’s condonation. A wife
may acquire a separate residence where the
husband has given cause for divorce.
2. Yes. Plaintiff contends that husband is granted
power to alienate and encumber the conjugal
property without the consent of the wife. This only
holds true as long as a harmonious relationship
exists. When such relation ceases, the husband’s
powers of administration should be curtailed during
the pendency of action to protect the interests of
the wife.