Teresita Francisco v. CA
Leonardo Yamane
Teresita is the legal wife of respondent Eusebio by his second
marriage while Conchita, Araceli and Antonio were his children by
his first marriage. Teresita alleged that they acquired properties: sari
sari store; residential house and lots; and apartment house. She
added that these were administered by Eusebio until he became
unfit due to tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer. General power
of atty was made authorizing Conchita to administer the house and
lot and apartment. She claims that the respondents convinced him
which prompted her to file a suit for damages and for annulment of
the said general power of atty and that she should be declared as
administratix.
The trial court held that Teresita failed to adduced proof that said
properties were acquired during the second conjugal partnership
and these belong to Eusebio exclusively who has the capacity to
administer. It was affirmed by the CA en toto.
WON the subject properties are conjugal and not exclusively belong
to Eusebio
NO. 158 and 160 of the NCC have been repealed by the FC but it
cannot be invoked because vested rights may be impaired pursuant
to 256 in relation to 105.2 of the FC. It shall be resolved by the NCC.
Teresita is incorrect in saying that the properties are conjugal. 160 of
the NCC provides that all property of marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proven that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or wife. A party who invoke presumption
must prove that properties were acquired during marriage.
Presumption is rebuttable by clear, strong and convincing evidence
which requires strict proof of exclusive ownership.
Teresita failed to prove with ample evidence that the properties
have been acquired during their marriage. He inherited the land
from his parents. Pursuant to 148 of the NCC, properties prior to his
second marriage belong exclusively to Eusebio. Even Eusebio
acquired these properties during his second marriage, these are still
his exclusive properties by lucrative titles: inheritance; devise;
legacy; or donation.
Teresita also erred in relying on the business license issued in her
name alone for the sari sari store and on the building permits for the
house and apartment issued stating that she was the applicant in the
name of Eusebio. These documents do not in any way determine
whether the properties are conjugal or not.
The fact that the land in San Isidro was registered in the name of
Eusebio married to Teresita is inadequate. Acquisition and
registration are distinct wherein the latter does not confer title but
merely confirms one already existing. It is merely descriptive of
Eusebio civil status.
Eusebio shall retain as the administrator because these belong to
him exclusively. He is also not incapacitated as the court found him
not suffering from serious illness.
DENIED.
Spouses Josephine and Henry Go v.
750 sq. meters parcel of land was registered in the name of Muriel,
Leonardo's wife. The land was levied and sold to satisfy the Atty.
fees of one Atty. Guillermo. Leonardo filed a third party complaint
seeking to annul the sale contending that it belong to their
CONJUGAL PROPERTY and should not be made answerable for the
personal obligation of the Pucay sisters.
The RTC held that the land is paraphernal which belongs exclusively
to Muriel as indicated in the TCT. There being no legal standing, the
case was dismissed for lack of merit. MR was denied.
The CA reversed the ruling and held it to be conjugal because was
acquired during their marriage, presumption shall apply. Petitioners
failed to prove that it belong exclusively to Muriel
WON the land is conjugal
YES. The purchase was made on 1967, NCC shall apply. 160 provides
that all properties is presumed to belong to conjugal unless contrary
is proven. They acquired it form Eugene Pucay on Feb 27, 1967
during their marriage.
WON properties are conjugal is determined by law not by will.
Petitioners insist that it is paraphernal to Muriel because he never
denied the claim, DOD carries only the name of Muriel and failure of
Leonardo to redeem the land within the period. HOWEVER, no
unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the character of
conjugal property. Her name alone does not in any way destroy its
conjugal nature. Regardless of to whom it was named, presumption
can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioners
failed to overcome the presumption that she purchased the land
using her exclusive funds. Non redemption is in no way indicate the
absence of his right or title to it. Redemption would have served an
implied admission of the regularity of the sale and estopped him
from later impugning its validity on that ground.
Whatever expenses incurred by Muriel in litigation for her and her
sister's private and exclusive interest are their exclusive
responsibilities. There must be a showing that some advantage or
benefits accrued to the conjugal partnership. Under the NCC, wife
may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things
necessary for the support of the family, borrows money for
husband's failure to deliver needed sum, administration is
transferred to the wife by the court or she gives moderate
donations. Properties being conjugal, cannot be levied upon.
DENIED