1.
Spouses Laperal vs Spouses Katigbak
GR 16991, March 31, 1964
FACTS:
CFI Manila declared the property covered by
TCT No.57626 as separate or paraphernal
property of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak. The
spouses Laperal disagree with this finding
reiterating that its improvements and income
are conjugal assets of the Spouses Katigbak.
When the spouses Katigbak got married,
neither of them brought properties unto the
marriage. Ramon’s occupation rendered him a
monthly income of P200.00. The property in
question was registered in the name of “Evelina
Kalaw-Katigbak married to Ramon
Katigbak”. The latter declared that her mother
was the one who bought the property for her
and had placed it only in her name as the
practice of her mother in buying properties and
placing them directly in the names of her
children. The husband having no interest with
the property only signed the document for the
purpose of assisting his wife.
In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case and
was granted by the trial court against the
Katigbaks in recovery of P14,000 and jewelry
amounting to P97,500 or in lieu thereof, to pay
such amount. A month after the decision was
rendered, Evelina filed a complaint against her
husband for judicial separation of property and
separate administration which was granted by
the court and was sought for annulment by the
Laperals.
ISSUE: WON the property in question
constitutes the paraphernal property of Evelina.
HELD:
All properties acquired during the marriage are
presumed conjugal. It is however not
conclusive but merely rebuttable, unless it be
proved that the property belongs exclusively to
the husband and wife. In the case at bar, the
deed of the land is under the name of the
wife. At the time it was purchased, the
property was of substantial value and as
admitted, the husband by himself could not
have afforded to buy considering the singular
source of income.
Hence, the property covered by TCT 57626 is
considered a paraphernal property of the wife.
2. Teresita Francisco vs Hon. Court of Appeals
and Conchita Evangelista and Her Husband
Simeon Evangelista
GR 102330 November 25, 1998
Petition for conjugal property administration
FACTS:
1. Petitioner is the legal wife of private
respondent Eusebio Francisco by his
second marriage.
2. Private respondents Conchita
Evangelista, Aracelli Marilla and
Antionio Francisco are children of
Eusebio by his first marriage.
3. Petitioner alleges that since their
marriage on Feb. 10, 1962, they owned
conjugal properties, such as; (1) sari-sari
store, (2) a house and lot in Rizal.
4. These properties were administered by
Eusebio, but since he was invalidated
due to Tubercolosis, heart disease and
cancer, thereby rendering him unfit.
The children of Eusebio were able to
execute a SPA for Conchita Evangelista
to administer the properties in
question.
5. Teresita filed a suit for damages and for
annulment of SPA. She also sought to
be the administratix of respondent’s
properties.
6. However, the RTC denied her petition
on the ground that said properties were
acquired during the existence of the
second conjugal partnership, or that
 they pertained to EXCLUSIVELY to the
petitioner. Hence, the court ruled that
those properties belong exclusively to
Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to
administer them.
7. The CA affirmed in toto the decision of
the RTC.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA committed reversible error in
affirming the RTC’s ruling that the properties,
subject matter of controversy are not conjugal
but the capital properties of Eusebio exclusively
RULING:
-Yes. Pursuant to the Article 148 of the NCC,
acquisitions by lucrative title refers to
properties acquired gratuitously and include
those acquired by either spouse during the
marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or
donation. Hence, even it be assumed that
Eusebio’s acquisition by succession of the land
took place during his second marriage, the land
would still be his “exclusive property” because
it was acquired by him, ‘during the marriage, by
lucrative title’.
-In Petitioner’s contention that she should be
the administratix of the properties in question,
the nature of the property regime is on
Conjugal Property of Gains (before FC
marriage), the premise of the Article 160 of the
NCC, “all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be provided that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife”. However, whoever
invokes the presumption must first prove that
the property in question was acquired during
the marriage. In this case, petitioner failed to
show the properties she claimed to be conjugal
were acquired during her marriage to Eusebio.
-Lastly, the court found that Eusebio is well,
except for his leg injury due to petitioner’s
aggravated release, she pushed him during their
occasional quarrels, thus it did not render him
to be unfit to administer his properties.
Petition is denied.
3. Bobby Tan vs Grace Andrade
GR 171904 August 7, 2013
FACTS:
1. Rosario Vda. De Andrade was the registered
owner of four parcels of land situated in Cebu
City, which she mortgaged to and were
subsequently foreclosed by one Simon Diu.
2. When the redemption period was about to
expire, Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby
Tan who agreed to redeem the subject
properties. Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to
Bobby and her son, Proceso Andrade, Jr.,
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
3. Thereafter, Proceso, Jr. executed a Deed of
Assignment, ceding unto Bobby his rights and
interests over the subject properties in
consideration of P50,000.00.
4. The Deed of Assignment was signed by,
among others, Henry Andrade, one of Rosario &
sons, as instrumental witness. Notwithstanding
the aforementioned Deed of Assignment,
Bobby extended an Option to Buy the subject
properties in favor of Proceso, Jr., giving the
latter until 7:00 in the evening of July 31, 1984
to purchase the same for the sum of
P310,000.00. When Proceso, Jr. failed to do so,
Bobby consolidated his ownership over the
subject properties, and the TCTs therefore were
issued in his name.
5. On October 7, 1997, Rosario's children,
namely, Grace, Proceso, Jr., Henry, Andrew,
Glory, Miriam Rose, Joseph, Jasmin Blaza, and
Charity A. Santiago, filed a complaint for
reconveyance and annulment of deeds of
conveyance and damages against Bobby before
the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB 20969.
6. In their complaint, they alleged that the
transaction between Rosario and Bobby was
not one of sale but was an equitable mortgage
which was entered to secure Rosario’s
indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed
that since the subject properties were inherited
by them from their father, Proceso Andrade,
Sr., the subject properties were conjugal in
nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to
dispose of their respective shares therein.
7. In this light, they argued that they remained
as co-owners of the subject properties together
with Bobby, despite the issuance of the TCTs in
his name. Bobby contended that the subject
properties were solely owned by Rosario per
the TCTs issued in her name and that he had
validly acquired the same upon Proceso, Jr.
failure to exercise his option to buy back the
subject properties.
The RTC ruled for Bobby. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether the properties were exclusive
properties of Rosario
RULING:
Pertinent to the resolution of this issue is
Article 160 of the Civil Code which states that
“all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife”. For this presumption
to apply, the party invoking the same must,
however, preliminarily prove that the property
was indeed acquired during the marriage. As
held in Go v. Yamane:
. . . As a condition sine qua non for the
operation of [Article 160] in favor of the
conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the
presumption must first prove that the property
was acquired during the marriage.
In other words, the presumption in favor of
conjugality does not operate if there is no
showing of when the property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the
presumption may be rebutted only with strong,
clear, categorical and convincing evidence.
There must be strict proof of the exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses, and the
burden of proof rests upon the party asserting
it.
Corollarily, as decreed in Valdez v. CA, the
presumption under Article 160 cannot be made
to apply where there is no showing as to when
the property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired:
. . . The issuance of the title in the name solely
of one spouse is not determinative of the
conjugal nature of the property, since there is
no showing that it was acquired during the
marriage of the Spouses Carlos Valdez, Sr. and
Josefina L. Valdez. The presumption under
Article 160 of the New Civil Code, that property
acquired during marriage is conjugal, does not
apply where there is no showing as to when the
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
The presumption cannot prevail when the title
is in the name of only one spouse and the rights
of innocent third parties are involved.
Moreover, when the property is registered in
the name of only one spouse and there is no
showing as to when the property was acquired
by same spouse, this is an indication that the
property belongs exclusively to the said
spouse.
In this case, there is no evidence to indicate
when the property was acquired by petitioner
Josefina. Thus, we agree with petitioner
Josefina’s declaration in the deed of absolute
sale she executed in favor of the respondent
that she was the absolute and sole owner of the
property. . . .
In this case, records reveal that the conjugal
partnership of Rosario and her husband was
terminated upon the latter’s death on August 7,
1978 while the transfer certificates of title over
the subject properties were issued on
September 28, 1979 and solely in the name of
“Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of legal age, widow,
Filipino” Other than their bare allegation, no
evidence was adduced by the Andrades to
establish that the subject properties were
procured during the coverture of their parents
or that the same were bought with conjugal
funds. Moreover, Rosario’s declaration that she
is the absolute owner of the disputed parcels of
land in the subject deed of sale was not
disputed by her son Proceso, Jr., who was a
party to the same. Hence, by virtue of these
incidents, the Court upholds the RTC’s finding
that the subject properties were exclusive or
sole properties of Rosario.
4. Mariano Veloso vs Lucia Martinez
(administratrix of the estate of Domingo
Franco
GR L-8715 October 24, 1914
FACTS:
1. Domingo Franco borrowed from
plaintiff the sum of P4500, and gave as
security for the payment of said sum of
the jewelry. The money was borrowed
on the 7th day of April 1911, the
premise was to repay the same, with
12% interest.
2. During the trial it was revealed that
Domingo pawned the jewels to Veloso,
without the consent of his wife Lucia
Martinez.
ISSUE:
W/N the jewels are to be returned to the
defendant as it is her paraphernal property and
her right to administer the same
RULING:
-Yes. She has the exclusive control and
management of the same, until and unless she
had it delivered to her husband, before a notary
public, with the intent that the husband might
administer it properly. (Article 1384 of the Civil
Code). There is no proof in the record that she
had ever delivered the same to her husband in
any manner, of for any purpose. That being
true, she could not be deprived of the same by
any act of her husband, without her consent,
without compliance to the provisions of the
Civil Code.
Defendant is entitled to her jewels or the
amount thereof.
5. Amalia Plata vs Hon. Nicasion Yatco RTC
Judge Rizal
GR L-20825 December 28, 1964
FACTS:
1. Amalia Plata bought a parcel of land in
Caloocan, Rizal, in the name Amalia
Plata, single, Filipino citizen.
2. She sold the property to one Celso
Saldana, then 7 months afterwards,
Saldana resold it to Amalia Plata
married to Gaudencio Begosa.
3. The newlyweds obtained a loan from
Cesarea Villanueva married to Gregorio
Leano, then mortgaged the property
and its improvements.
4. Plata failed to pay the mortgage thus, it
was sold through auction with an
Absolute Deed of Sale. However, Plata
refused to leave the premises, thus she
was held in contempt due to illegal
detaining.
5. Even though petitioner renounced her
marriage to Begosa, she repeatedly
acknowledged being married to Begosa.
6. However, respondents cannot ignore
the paraphernal nature of the property.
ISSUE:
W/N the property in question is paraphernal in
nature.
RULING:
-Yes. Even if Gaudencio Begosa signed the
mortgage, the circumstance would not convert
the land to be conjugal in nature. Considering
that it was paraphernal in origin.
The petition is granted.
7. Elenita Dewara vs Sps. Ronnie and Gina
Lamela
GR 179010 April 11, 2011
FACTS:
1. Eduardo and Elenita were married
before the FC. Thus, the NCC governs
their marital relations. They are
separated as Elenita went to work in
California, while Eduardo stayed in
Bacolod.
2. Eduardo hit respondent Ronnie while
driving his jeep. Ronnie filed for a
criminal case of serious physical injury
and reckless imprudence against
Eduardo. The latter needs to pay civil
indemnity of P62,598.70 as actual
damages and P10,000 as moral
damages.
3. The liability was served but unsatisfied
as Eduardo does not have any property.
Ronnie requested to levy the Bacolod
property of Elenita. The lot was sold in
public auction.
4. The property was sold without the
consent of Elenita. She contended that
her property was paraphernal in nature.
Thus it cannot be held liable for the
husband’s obligation.
5. The RTC declared the property to be
paraphernal in nature, however, the CA
ruled that the property was conjugal in
nature and acquired by onerous title
during their marriage through their
common fund. Thus, it is CPG and may
be levied upon to answer for civil
liabilities adjudged against Eduardo.
ISSUE:
W/N the subject property is
paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or
the conjugal property of Sps.
RULING:
-Property was deemed conjugal. There is no
dispute that the subject property was
acquired during the marriage. Their
marriage is governed by the CPG, thus, the
legal presumption of the conjugal nature of
the lot in question. It may be rebutted with
strong, clear, categorical, and convincing
evidence—there must be strict proof of the
paraphernal ownership, of one of the sps.
And the burden of proof rests upon the
party asserting it.
-Therefore, the conjugal property is liable
for the debts and obligations contracted by
the husband (Article 161 of the Civil Code).
8. Antonia and Alvin Dela Pena vs Gemma
Remilyn Avila and Far East Bank
February 8, 2012
FACTS:
1. The suit concerns a parcel of land with
improvements in Marikina. Registered
in the name of the petitioner Antonia
married to Antegono Dela Pena.
2. Antonia obtained a loan of P250K from
AC Aguila & Sons Co. on May 6, 1996,
payable on July 7, 1996 with interest
pegged at 5% per month. Antonia
executed a notarized Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over the purposes of
securing the payment of said loan
obligation. The deed provided that it
contract is for a period of Three (3)
months from the date of this
instrument.
3. Antonia executed a notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale over the property in favor
of respondent Gemma Remilyn C. Avila
(Gemma), for the stated consideration
of ₱600,000.00.
4. Gemma also constituted a real estate
mortgage over said parcel in favor of
respondent Far East Bank and Trust
Company [now Bank of the Philippine
 Islands] (FEBTC-BPI), to secure a loan
facility with a credit limit of
₱1,200,000.00
5. Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds
of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim to the effect, among others, that
she was the true and lawful owner of
the property which had been titled in
the name of Gemma under TCT No.
32315; and, that the Deed of Absolute
Sale Gemma utilized in procuring her
title was simulated.
6. Antonia and her son filed to the RTC of
Marikina that the property in question
is in conjugal in nature, therefore, it
was mortgaged without the consent of
the husband.
7. Antonia who was misled into believing
that the transfer was necessary for the
loan the former promised to procure on
her behalf from FEBTC-BPI. In addition
to the annulment of said Deed of
Absolute Sale for being simulated and
derogatory of Alvin’s successional
rights, the Dela Peñas sought the
reconveyance of the property as well as
the grant of their claims for moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees
and the costs.
8. December 2007, the RTC went on to
render a Decision finding that the
subject property was conjugal in nature
and that the 4 November 1997 Deed of
Absolute Sale Antonia executed in favor
of Gemma was void as a disposition
without the liquidation required under
Article 130 of the Family Code.
9. CA’s Second Division rendered the
herein assailed decision, reversing the
RTC’s appealed decision, upon the
following findings and conclusions: (a)
the property was paraphernal in nature
for failure of the Dela Peñas to prove
that the same was acquired during
Antonia’s marriage to Antegono; (b)
having misled Gemma into believing
that the property was exclusively hers,
Antonia is barred from seeking the
annulment of the 4 November 1997
Deed of Absolute Sale; (c) Antonia’s
claim that her signature was forged is
belied by her admission in the pleadings
that she was misled by Gemma into
executing said Deed of Absolute Sale.
ISSUE:
W/N the property in question is conjugal in
nature
RULING:
-Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Although it is not necessary to prove that the
property was acquired with funds of the
partnership,30 proof of acquisition during the
marriage is an essential condition for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership.
-Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. The party who asserts this
presumption must first prove said time
element. Needless to say, the presumption
refers only to the property acquired during the
marriage and does not operate when there is
no showing as to when property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this
presumption in favor of conjugality is
rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and
convincing evidence; there must be a strict
proof of exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses.
-Invoking the presumption of conjugality under
Article 160 of the Civil Code, the Dela Peñas did
not even come close to proving that the subject
property was acquired during the marriage
between Antonia and Antegono.
-Petition is denied.
9. Manotok Realty Inc. vs CA
April 30, 1987
FACTS:
1. Private respondent Felipe Madlangawa
claims that he has been occupying a
parcel of land in the Clara de
Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision
since 1949 upon permission being
obtained from Andres Ladores, then an
overseer of the subdivision, with the
understanding that the respondent
would eventually buy the lot.
2. The owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting,
died and her entire estate, including her
paraphernal properties which covered
the lot occupied by the private
respondent were placed under custodia
legis.
3. The private respondent made a deposit
for the said lot in the sum of P1,500.00
which was received by Vicente Legarda,
husband of the late owner.
4. The private respondent did not pay or
5. was unable to pay this balance because
after the death of the testatrix, Clara
Tambunting de Legarda, her heirs could
not settle their differences. Apart from
the initial deposit, no further payments
were made from 1950.
6. The private respondent was one of the
many occupants who refused to vacate
the lots they were occupying, so that on
April 26, 1968, the petitioner filed the
action below to recover the said lot.
7. The trial court dismissed the
petitioner's action after finding that the
Identity of the parcel of land described
in the complaint had not been
ufficiently established as the very same
piece of land in the material and
physical possession of the private
respondent.
8. Court of Appeals found the Identity of
the lot sought to be recovered by the
petitioner to be the same as that in the
physical possession of the private
respondent and ruled that the only
right remaining to the petitioner is to
enforce the collection of the balance
because accordingly, it stepped into the
shoes of its predecessor; and that since
the area now in possession of the
petitioner which is that involved in the
present case is only 115 square meters,
the balance after deducting the deposit
of P1,500.00 is P2,551.85, and as per
order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, the said balance should be paid
in 18 equal monthly installments.
9. The petitioner contends that since
there is no dispute that the property in
question was the paraphernal property
of Clara Tambunting, who died on April
2, 1950, Vicente Legarda had no
authority whatsoever to sell the said
property to the private respondent on
May 12, 1950 since the former was
appointed as administrator of the
estate of Clara Tambunting only on
August 28, 1950. Therefore, the
questioned sale could not have bound
Clara Tambunting's estate because the
vendor Vicente Legarda neither acted
as the owner nor the administrator of
the subject property when the alleged
sale took place.
ISSUE:
In what capacity did the husband of the
deceased, Don Vicente Legarda, dispose of the
lot?

RULING:

Articles 136 and 137 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines provide:

Art. 136. The wife retains the ownership of the

paraphernal property.

Art. 137. The wife shall have the

administration of the paraphernal property,
unless she delivers the same to the husband by
means of a public instrument empowering him
to administer it.

In this case, the public instrument shall be

recorded in the Registry of Property. As for the
movables, the husband shall give adequate
security.

There is nothing in the records that wig show

that Don Vicente Legarda was the administrator
of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara
Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter.
Thus, it cannot be said that the sale which was
entered into by the private respondent and Don
Vicente Legarda had its inception before the
death of Dona Clara Tambunting and was
entered into by the former for and on behalf of
the latter, but was only consummated after her
death. Don Vicente Legarda, the refore, could
not have validly disposed of the lot in dispute as
a continuing administrator of the paraphernal
properties of Dona Clara Tambunting.