SUCCESSION DIGESTS
62. MANONGSONG V. ESTIMO [FALLO]
[TOPIC FROM THE SYLLABUS]
LEGITIME AND RESERVA TRONCAL; LEGITIME; CONCEPT: As
opposed to a dispositioninter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a
valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of
the seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is
no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values, that
is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary
consideration.
[FACTS]
Petitioner filed an action for partition of a parcel of land before the
RTC claiming that Manongsong is a co-owner or co-heir of the
property by inheritance, more specifically as the heir of her father,
Vicente Lopez.
According to petitioner, Agatona Guevarra was the original owner of
the said property and that upon her death, her children inherited the
property. Each of the children, including Vicente Lopez, the father of
petitioner, inherited from her one-fifth interest in the property.
Respondent have been in possession of the property for as long as
they can remember. Only petitioners are the only descendants not
occupying any protion of the property.
Petitioners and most of the respondents entered into a compromise
agreement and agreed that each group of heirs would receive an
equal share in the Property. Gamaya ra bitaw ani yutaa. 152 sq m
ragud nya daghan kaayo sila gatunga hahahaha barog nalang haha.
Respondents, the Jumaquio sisters, opposed petitioners' claim and
contended that Justina Navarro, the mother of Agatona Guevarra,
sold the property to the latter's daughter Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio.
Respondent presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG
LUPA, which controverted petitioners’ claim of ownership.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
RTC: ruled in favor of petitioners. It held that the Kasulatan was
void, even absent evidence attacking its validity. RTC denied
respondents MR. Thus, respondents appealed to the CA.
CA: reversed the RTC decision. It held that the petitioners were
bound by their admission that Navarro was the original owner of the
property. Petitioners filed a MR, but was denied. Thus, petitioners
appealed to the SC.
[ISSUE/S]
WON Manongsong is a co-owner of the property and therefore
entitled to demand for its partition.
[HELD]
NO. The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a
notary public, is a public document and prima facie evidence of its
authenticity and due execution.
Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it would be deemed an
ancient document and thus still presumed to be authentic. The
Kasulatan is: (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper
custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any
circumstance of suspicion. It appears, on its face, to be genuine.
There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired
the Property during her marriage. There is no basis forapplying the
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to the present case.
On the contrary, Tax Declaration No. 911 showed that, as far back
as in 1949, the Property was declared solely in Navarro's name. This
tends to support the argument that the Property was not conjugal.
We likewise find no basis for the trial court's declaration that the sale
embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of
Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a dispositioninter vivos by
lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration
does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the disposition is for
valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but
merely a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is replaced
by the equivalent monetary consideration.
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
Decision is AFFIRMED.
63. SPS. JOAQUIN V. CA
[FACTS]
Parents Joaquin are the parents of both the plaintiffs and the
defendants. Plaintiff-heirs are contesting certain deeds of sale
issued by the Parents Joaquin to the defendant-heirs.
They allege, among other things, that these deeds attempt to
deprive them of their legitime.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
RTC- dismissed the case, plaintiffs have no cause of action to
demand legitime as the parents had not yet died.
CA- affirmed RTC.
[ISSUE]
WON plaintiffs are being deprived of their legitime.
[RULING]
NO.
Petitioners’ right to their parents’ properties is merely inchoate and
vests only upon their parents’ death. While still living, the parents of
petitioners are free to dispose of their properties. In their
overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime, petitioners
forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings
does not affect the value of their parents’ estate.
(Naa pud issue diri about lack of consideration for the price of the
lands, but as we know, inadequacy of price is not the same as lack
of consideration; prices need not be equivalent to the actual value of
the property for them to be valid.)
64. RAYMUNDO V. VDA. DE SUAREZ
Facts
Marcelo and Teofista Isagon Suarez were married and begot herein
respondents, Danilo, Eufrocina, Marcelo Jr., Evelyn, and Reggineo,
all surnamed Suarez. Their marriage was governed by conjugal
partnership, to which they acquired the parcels of land in different
barrios in Pasig, Rizal (subject properties).
After the death of Marcelo, Sr. in 1955, his wife, Teofista and herein
respondents, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate,
partitioning Marcelo Sr.'s estate. In the partition, the parties have
agreed that Teofista, as surviving spouse of decedent, gets one half
(1/2) interest in all the subject properties aforementioned. The
children, on the other hand, gets a share equivalent to one-seventh
(1/7) of the estate of their father, with a proviso therein, that their title
to the properties mentioned shall be in common and the share of
each heir being pro indiviso. However, despite that partition, title of
the subject properties remained in the couple’s name. All the
properties were held pro indiviso by Teofista and her children;
and respective titles thereto were not changed, with Teofista as
de facto administrator thereof.
In 1975, Rizal Realty Corp and Teofista, the latter owning 90% of the
former’s shares of stock, were sued by herein petitioner Valente
Raymundo for Rescission of Contract and Damages, for which the
CFI therein rendered a decision holding the Teofista and Rizal
Realty liable for damages in the amount of P700,000. Thus, to
satisfy the judgment against Teofista and Rizal Realty, the subject
properties were levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 to
Raymundo, being the highest bidder. Consequently, a certificate of
sale was issued to him and the Sheriff issued a final deed of sale in
his name.
The civil action that triggered the present action- Civil Case No.
51203
However, before expiration of the redemption period, or on June 21,
1984, herein respondents, children of Teofista, filed a revindicatory
action against petitioner Valente Raymundo et al, for the annulment
of the auction sale and recovery of ownership of the levied
properties. Respondent heirs alleged that they couldn’t be held
liable for the judgment against their mother, for they have not been
impleaded therein; and consequently, the subject properties, which
they own pro indiviso with their mother, can neither be levied nor be
sold on execution.
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS
CFI: Denied revindicatory action.
CA: Affirmed CFI’s decision. Dismissed respondents’ MR.
 What the respondent heirs should have done was to
immediately file a third party claim. The moment levy was
made on the parcels of land, which they claim are theirs
by virtue of hereditary succession, they should have
seasonably filed such claim to protect their rights. As the
record discloses, however, the children chose to remain
silent, and even allowed the auction sale to be held, filing
almost a year later a half-hearted complaint to annul the
proceedings which they allowed to be dismissed by not
diligently prosecuting it.
Pursuant to Civil Case No. 51203, a writ of preliminary injunction
was subsequently issued by the RTC Pasig enjoining petitioners
Raymundo from transferring to third parties the levied properties
based on its preliminary finding that the auctioned properties are co-
owned by Teofista and herein respondents.
Thus, Raymundo et al filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
CA: Granted. Questioned RTC order [above] is annulled.
Respondent heirs therefore appealed the case to the SC titled:
“Suarez vs. CA, G.R. No. 94918”
SC: REVERSED CA’s decision.
 The proprietary interest of petitioners [herein respondents]
in the levied and auctioned property is different from and
adverse to that of their mother [Teofista]. Petitioners
[herein respondents] became co-owners of the property
not because of their mother [Teofista] but through their
own right as children of their deceased father [Marcelo
Sr.]. Therefore, petitioners [herein respondents] are not
barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the
auction sale to protect their own interest
 Disposition:
o WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as well as its
Resolution of August 28, 1990 are hereby
REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No.
51203 is reinstated only to determine that
portion which belongs to petitioners and to
annul the sale with regard to said portion.
Upon reinstatement of Civil Case No. 51203, petitioner Valente,
repeatedly filed a Motion to Dismiss for the purported failure of
herein respondents to prosecute the case. Most of these Motions to
Dismiss were denied. After miles and miles of pleadings, in
resolving this latest crossfire between the parties:
RTC: DISMISSED the Case (to the detriment of Suarez heirs)
 RTC, in its decision, cited the case of "Yaptinchay, et al.
vs. Del Rosario”, which held that “the declaration of
heirship must be made in an administration proceeding,
and not in an independent civil action, xxx inasmuch as
the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a
status or right.”
o Respondents filed a petition for certiorari before
the CA.
CA: SET ASIDE the RTC decision.
Finally, here we are. The denial of petitioner Valente's Motion for
Reconsideration prompted the filing of this present petition for
certiorari.
Before the SC, Valente posits that the
 CA ruling "is unfair and it amounts to a trickery to prevent
an appeal against a final order by claiming that the
appealed order is merely interlocutory and later maintain
that the same order has become final after declaring it to
be interlocutory”
 CA ignored and violated the Supreme Court's ruling in
Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario which held that a
declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding and not in a civil action.
On Matters of Procedure, the SC ruled:
 Petitioner Valente incorrectly filed a petition for certiorari to
appeal the CA decision. Petitioner should have filed a
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
 We reject petitioner's paltry contention. Petitioner
apparently does not comprehend the distinction between
an interlocutory order which is final and executory, and a
final order which disposes of the controversy or case;
much less, understand the available remedies therefrom.
 In fine, petitioner Valente erroneously sought relief through
reversed remedies. He tried to appeal the interlocutory
orders of the RTC which are unappealable. Thus, the RTC
properly denied his Notice of Appeal, and the CA correctly
upheld the RTC. He should have filed a petition for
certiorari; under Rule 65. On the other hand, from the final
order of the CA, he comes before this Court on a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper remedy is an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.
Independently of this procedural infirmity, even on the merits of the
case, the petition does not fare otherwise:
Re: Succession- Petitioner Valente insists that, following our ruling
in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, herein respondents must first
be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an action to
annul the judicial sale of what is, undisputedly, conjugal property of
Teofista and Marcelo Sr.
ISSUE: W/N HEIRS MUST FIRST BE DECLARED BEFORE THEY
CAN FILE AN ACTION TO ANNUL A JUDICIAL SALE OF THEIR
LEGITIME
HELD: NO. Yaptinchay is not applicable.
In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of certain TCTs was dismissed for failure of the
petitioners to demonstrate "any proof or even a semblance of it" that
they had been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple, the
spouses Yaptinchay. In stark contrast, the records of this case
reveal a document, an Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s
estate, which explicitly recognizes herein respondents as Marcelo
Sr.'s legitimate children and heirs. Plainly, there is no need to re-
declare herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this
case interminably.
Petitioner Valente et al, became owners of the subject properties
only by virtue of an execution sale to recover Teofista's judgment
obligation. This judgment obligation is solely Teofista's, and payment
therefor cannot be made through an execution sale of properties not
absolutely owned by her. These properties were evidently conjugal
properties and were, in fact, even titled in the name of Marcelo, Sr.
married to Teofista. Thus, upon Marcelo Sr.'s death, by virtue of
compulsory succession, Marcelo Sr.'s share in the conjugal
partnership was transmitted by operation of law to his
compulsory heirs.
Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of succession, albeit not
categorized as such in Article 778 of the Civil Code. It reserves a
portion of the net estate of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or
group of heirs, or combination of heirs, prevailing over all kinds of
succession. The portion that is so reserved is the legitime. Article
886 of the Civil Code defines legitime as "that part of the testator's
property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it
for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Herein
respondents are primary compulsory heirs, excluding secondary
compulsory heirs, and preferred over concurring compulsory heirs in
the distribution of the decedent's estate.
Even without delving into the Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo
Sr.'s estate in 1957, it must be stressed that herein respondents'
rights to the succession vested from the moment of their father's
death. Herein respondents' ownership of the subject properties is no
longer inchoate; it became absolute upon Marcelo's death, although
their respective shares therein remained pro indiviso. Ineluctably, at
the time the subject properties were sold on execution sale to
answer for Teofista's judgment obligation, the inclusion of herein
respondents' share therein was null and void.
Since Teofista owns only a portion of the subject properties, only
that portion could have been, and was actually, levied upon and sold
on auction by the provincial sheriff of Rizal. Thus, a separate
declaration of heirship by herein respondents is not necessary
to annul the judicial sale of their share in the subject properties.
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS
All told, under the circumstances, in addition to the already settled
status of herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., there is no
need to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203 and require herein
respondents to institute a separate special proceeding for a
declaration of their heirship.
Disposition: Petition, denied.
65. BARITUA V. CA
DOCTRINE: Article 887 of the Civil Code enumerates compulsory
heirs while Article 985 provides that parents and ascendants of a
deceased inherits in default of legitimate children and
descendants.Thus, parents of the deceased succeed only when
the deceased dies without a legitimate descendant.
FACTS:
The tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido Nacario along the
national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines
Sur, figured in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner
Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated by petitioner Jose Baritua.
As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his passenger died, and
the tricycle was damaged. No criminal case arising from the incident
was ever instituted.
Subsequently, petitioners and the bus’ insurer (PFICI) negotiated an
extra-judicial settlement of the matter whereby Bienvenido Nacario's
widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, received P18,500.00. In
consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed a
"Release of Claim" in favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing
and forever discharging them from all actions, claims, and demands
arising from the accident which resulted in her husband's death and
the damage to the tricycle. Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of
desistance in which she formally manifested her lack of interest in
instituting any case, either civil or criminal, against the petitioners.
About a year and ten months from the date of the accident, private
respondents (parents of Bienvenido Nacario) filed a complaint for
damages against the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur. They alleged that during the vigil for their
deceased son, the petitioners through their representatives promised
them that as extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for
the death of their son, for the funeral expenses, and for the damage
to the tricycle. The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise
and instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-
estranged wife of their late son.
LOWER COURT’S RULING:
RTC – dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by the
petitioners to the widow and her child, who are the preferred heirs
and successors-in-interest of the deceased Bienvenido to the
exclusion of his parents, the private respondents, extinguished any
claim against the petitioners.
CA – reversed the judgment of the trial court. It ruled that the release
executed by Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario did not discharge the
liability of the petitioners because the case was instituted by the
private respondents in their own capacity and not as "heirs,
representatives, successors, and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could
not have validly waived the damages being prayed for by the private
respondents since she was not the one who suffered these damages
arising from the death of their son.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are still liable to pay the private
respondents despite the agreement of extrajudicial settlement
between the petitioners and the victim's compulsory heirs.
RULING: NO. Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
enumerates the persons to whom payment to extinguish an
obligation should be made: “…to the person in whose favor the
obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any
person authorized to receive it.”
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the
deceased are the successors in interest referred to in law as the
persons authorized to receive payment. The Civil Code states:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by
those in Nos. 1 and 2. Neither do they exclude one another.
Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the
deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the
exclusion of collateral relatives.
It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only
when the deceased dies without a legitimate descendant. On the
other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As
it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and
that they begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-
in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The
petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with
Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of
their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged from
Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the
disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased
spouse.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of
the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the RTC
is hereby REINSTATED.
66. GONZALES V. CFI
[TOPIC FROM THE SYLLABUS]
LEGITIME AND RESERVA TRONCAL; RESERVA TRONCAL;
REQUISITES: As long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his
death there are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus,
regardless of whether those reservees are common descendants of
the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the
property retains its reservable character. The property should go to
the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of his will,
choose the reservee to whom the reservable property should be
awarded.
[FACTS]
The real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned
in three equal portions by his two daughters and the heirs of his
deceased son Benito Legarda y De La Paz who was survived by his
widow, Filomena Roces y Legarda and their seven children: four
daughters named, Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and their
three sons, named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
Meanwhile. one of the daughters, Filomena, died intestate and
without an issue and her mother Filomena Roces y Legarda who
became her sole heir, partitioned their one-third share in the estate
of Benito Legarda y Tuason with her six surviving children and then
conveyed the properties she inherited from her deceased daughter
by holographic will to her 16 grandchildren.
In opposition thereto, one of the daughters Beatriz Legarda
Gonzales filed a motion in the testate proceeding and an ordinary
civil action in the lower court contending that the disputed properties
are resersable properties. This motion was opposed by the
administrator, Benito Legarda.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
CFI: dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzalez.
Petitioner appealed the decision contending that the lower court
erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable
properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants contend that Mrs. Legarda acquired
the estate of her daughter Filomena Legarda in exchange for her
conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito
Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzalez waived
her right to the reservable properties and that her claim is barred by
estoppel, laches and prescription.
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS
[ISSUE/S]
WON the properties in question are subject to reserve troncal.
WON Mrs. Legarda, as reservoir, could convey the reservable
properties by will or mortis causa to the reserves within the 3 rd
degree (iyang mga apo) to the exclusion of the reserves in the
2nd degree (iyang mga anak).
[HELD]
1st issue: YES. The SC mentioned everything they know about
reserve truncal ughh kapoya bitaw pagkasulat. So here are the
highlights!
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as
he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who
are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came.
In reserva troncal, (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by
gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or
sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is
acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and
(3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the
deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from
which the said property came.
Thus, if there are only 2 transmissions, there is no reserva.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are (1) the ascendant or
brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or
prepositus (propositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor
(reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the
prepositus by operation of law and (4) the reservee (reservatario)
who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs
to the line (linea o tronco) from which the property came and for
whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not
reservees. They cannot even represent their parents because
representation is confined to relatives within the third degree.
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. Illegitimate
relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor
is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it
subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are
revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of
the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees
predecease the reservor.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a
resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the reservor's
death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should
deliver it to the reservees. If there are no reservees at the time of the
reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute.
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably
reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly,
she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the
time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs.
Legarda.
2nd issue: NO. We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her
holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable
properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena
because the reservable properties did not form part of her
estate.The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the
reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be
inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from the
prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property
should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share
therein.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound
to follow in this case the doctrine of the Florentino case. That
doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and
upon his death there are relatives within the third degree of the
prepositus, regardless of whether those reservees are common
descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the
property came, the property retains its reservable character. The
property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by
means of his will, choose the reservee to whom the reservable
property should be awarded.
[FALLO]
Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
67. FLORENTINO V. FLORENTINO
[FACTS]
Apolonio II had 9 children with his first wife. After his first wife died,
he remarried. He had 2 children with his second wife Severina:
Mercedes and Apolonio III (lets call him Thirdy).
Prior to his death, Apolonio II instituted a will naming all his children
and Severina, as his heirs.
Thirdy subsequently died, thus his mother, Severina succeeded all
his property. Upon Severina’s death, she bequeathed all her
property to Mercedes, including that which she inherited from Thirdy.
The plaintiffs are the children of Apolonio’s II children with his first
wife. They allege that Mercedes has been receiving the fruits of the
land herself, without delivering to plaintiffs their share. They pray the
property be declared as reservable property.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
CFI- dismissed case due to demurrer filed by defendants.
CA- dismissed.
[ISSUE]
WON the property is reservable property.
[RULING]
YES.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property,
while there are living, within the third degree, relatives of the
latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the
reservable property received.
When there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree,
the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property
which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should
return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of
representation cannot be alleged when the one claming same as a
reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which such
property came.
But if, afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of the
descendant (from whom came the reservable property) die or
disappear, the said property becomes free property, by operation of
law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir
who can transmit it at his death to his legitimate successors or
testamentary heirs. This property has now lost its nature of
reservable property.
Thus, in this case, all the children from the first marriage are
considered as reservatario. It is true that when Mercedes, took
possession of the property in question, same did not pass into the
hands of strangers. But it is likewise true that the said Mercedes is
not the only reservataria. Thus the other brothers and nephews
should not be deprived of portions of the property which, as
reservable property, pertain to them.
FALLO: CA reversed. The other brothers and sisters of
Mercedes, and their heirs are entitled to a share of the reserved
property.
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS
68. MENDOZA V. DE LOS SANTOS
Doctrine
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the
return of a reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging
to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its
being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.
Facts
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land
located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Lot Nos. 1681-B and 1684 are
presently in the name of respondent Julia Delos Santos
(respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other hand, is also in the name
of respondent but co-owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-
half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.
Before the RTC Bulacan, petitioners filed an action for “Recovery of
Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and
Reconveyance” against respondent Julia De Los Santos.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and
Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Placido and Dominga had four
children: Antonio, Exequiel, married to Leonor, Apolonio and
Valentin. Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of Placido
and Dominga’s properties that were subject of an oral partition and
subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it
passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After
Leonor’s death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died
intestate and without issue. They claimed that after Gregoria’s
death, respondent, JULIA DE LOS SANTOS, who is Leonor’s
sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole
surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim
that the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their
behalf and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the
Civil Code on reserva troncal.
Respondent Julia, however, denies any obligation to reserve the
properties as these did not originate from petitioners’ familial line and
were not originally owned by Placido and Dominga. According to
respondent, the properties were bought by Exequiel and Antonio
from a certain Alfonso Ramos in 1931. It appears, however, that it
was only Exequiel who was in possession of the properties.
(yes, ang SC nay nag provide ani nga diagram)
Lower Courts
RTC: GRANTED the action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva
Troncal;  Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance.
CA: REVERSED RTC Decision; Dismissed the complaint filed by
petitioners. CA also denied their motion for reconsideration.
 Even assuming that Placido and Dominga (grandparents)
previously owned the properties, it still cannot be subject
to reserva troncal as neither Exequiel predeceased
Placido and Dominga nor did Gregoria predecease
Exequiel.
ISSUE:  W/N RESERVA TRONCAL IS APPLICABLE HEREIN
HELD: NO. Article 891 on reserva troncal is not applicable. Julia,
who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant
within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code.
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the
return of a reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its
being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting
ascendant. 
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as
he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which
said property came. (Emphasis ours)
There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal:
1. Transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or
donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called
the prepositus.
2. Transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the
other ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista.
3. Transmission from the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios
who must be relatives within the third degree from which the
property came.
The lineal character of the reservable property is reckoned from
the ascendant from whom the prepositus received the property
by gratuitous title.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was
received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the
property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the
property from the prepositus by operation of law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from
the prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which
the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by
the reservoir.
In the case at bar, it should be pointed out that the ownership of the
properties should be reckoned only from Exequiel’s as he is the
ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom
Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go
farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal
character of the property. It was also immaterial for the CA to
determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or
whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that
Exequiel owned the properties and he is the ascendant from
whom the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on
the other hand, is the descendant who received the properties
from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have
been acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant
by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by
gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return. At
risk of being repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is
that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant).
After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the
properties as inheritance.
ISSUE: W/N RESPONDENT ULIA IS OBLIGED TO RESERVE THE
PROPERTY
HELD: NO.
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property
should be an ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of
the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregoria’s
ascendant; rather, she is Gregoria’s collateral relative.
Gregoria’s ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her
grandparents, great-grandparents and so on. On the other hand,
Gregoria’s descendants, if she had one, would be her children,
grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Not being Gregoria’s
ascendants, both petitioners and Julia, therefore, are her
collateral relatives. In determining the collateral line of relationship,
ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent to the
relative from whom the computation is made. In the case of Julia’s
collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from
Gregoria to her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the
common ancestor, that is, Julia and Leonor’s parents (second
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS
line/degree), and then descent to Julia, her aunt (third line/degree).
Thus, Julia is Gregoria’s collateral relative within the third degree
and not her ascendant.
ISSUE: W/N PETITIONERS MENDOZAS HAVE A RIGHT TO THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON RESERVA
TRONCAL
HELD: NO. Petitioners, Mendoza et al, therefore, cannot be
considered reservees/ reservatarios as they are not relatives
within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties
came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line from which
the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by
descent. It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregoria’s fourth
degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the
prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or
reservatarios.
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors
Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of
reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from whom
the reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is in
the case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the
right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are
the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within the third
degree.
In fact, respondent Julia, as reservista, has the duty to reserve and
to annotate the reservable character of the property on the title. In
reserva troncal, the reservista who inherits from a prepositus,
whether by the latter’s wish or by operation of law, acquires the
inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute
ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to him exclusively.
It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished, that a
reservatario becomes, by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property.
The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the
properties are reservable in character, petitioners cannot benefit
from reserva troncal. First, because Julia, who now holds the
properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of
Article 891 of the Civil Code and second, because petitioners are not
Gregoria’s relatives within the third degree. Hence, the CA’s
disposition that the complaint filed with the RTC should be
dismissed, only on this point, is correct.
Disposition: petition is DENIED.
69. CHUA V. CFI
DOCTRINE: In order that a property may be impressed with a
reservable character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1)
that the property was acquired by a descendant from an ascendant
or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said
descendant died without an issue: (3) that the property is inherited
by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said
property came.
FACTS:
Jose Frias Chua contracted two marriages. The first one with
Patricia S. Militar, with whom he sired three children, namely:
Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua and the
second one (contracted after the first wife died) with Consolacion de
la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanito Frias
Chua. One of his children on his first marriage, Manuel, died without
leaving any issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate.
In the intestate proceeding, the lower court issued an order
adjudicating, among others, (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum
of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la
Torre, the other half of the lot in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son
in the second marriage. By the virtue of said adjudication, a TCT
was issued in their names as owners-pro-indiviso.
Consequently, Juanito Frias Chua died intestate without any issue.
After his death, his mother Consolacion succeeded to his pro-
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which, a TCT
covering the whole lot was issued in her name. Years after,
Consolacion died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the
descending or ascending line except her brother and sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", the petitioners
herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and Dominador and
Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased
Lorenzo Frias Chua, filed the complaint a quo (subsequently
segregated as distinct suit) praying that (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399
which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias Chua but which passed to
Consolacion upon the latter's death, be declared as reservable
property for the reason that the lot in question was subject to reserva
troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil code. Private
respondent as administratrix of the estate of the Consolacion de la
Torre and the heirs of the latter traversed individually the complaint
of petitioners.
LOWER COURT’S RULING:
RTC – dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: WON the lot in question is subject to reserva troncal
RULING: YES. "ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have required by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and belong to the line Iron which said property came."
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be
impressed with a reservable character the following requisites must
exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from
an ascendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that
said descendant died without an issue: (3) that the property is
inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that
there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which said property came.
In the case at bar, all the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as
borne out by the records, Juanito Frias Chua died intestate without
leaving any issue and his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share was acquired by
his mother by operation of law. When Consolacion de la Torre died,
Juanito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third
degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador
Chua and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the
deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first
requisite of reserva troncal — whether the property in question was
acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father gratuitously or not. In
resolving this point, the respondent Court said that the property in
question was not acquired by Consolacion and Juanito gratuitously
but for a consideration, namely, that the legatees were to pay the
interest and cost and other fees resulting from the Civil Case. The
Supreme Court does not agree.
"The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the
recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the
property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges. What
is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an
act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any
obligation on the part of the recipient and that the person
receiving the property gives or does nothing in return or as ably
put by an eminent Filipino commentator, "the essential thing is that
the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure
generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is
evident from the record that the transmission of the property in
question to Juanito Frias Chua upon the death of his father Jose
Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore
gratuitous.
The obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York imposed
upon Consolacion and Juanito was not personally imposed by the
deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by an
order of the court. As long as the transmission of the property to the
heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself
and the property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous. It
does not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs, in this case
Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standard Oil Co. of New York. This
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SUCCESSION DIGESTS
does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the
property to him. As far as the deceased Jose Frias Chua is
concerned the transmission of the property to his heirs is gratuitous.
This being the case the lot in question is subject to reserva troncal
under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code.
FALLO: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed
from is hereby SET ASIDE.
70. EDROSO V. SABIAN
[TOPIC FROM THE SYLLABUS]
LEGITIME AND RESERVA TRONCAL; RESERVA TRONCAL;
REQUISITES: The ascendants who inherits from a descendant,
whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law, acquires the
inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute
ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him
exclusively — use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute
ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in
the least, if there be no relatives within the third degree in the line
whence the property proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir
who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there
should be relatives within the third decree who belong to the line
whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute
ownership would arise.
[FACTS]
Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to 2 parcels of
land.
She was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death. They had a
son named Pedro, and who at his father's death inherited the two
said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and
without issue, and by his decease the two parcels of land passed
through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso.
2 legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan appeared in the case to
oppose the registration.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
Court of Land Registration God this case is old: denied the
registration. The court held that the parcels of land in question
partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and
that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the
names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
[ISSUE/S]
WON the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal.
Appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land
in question have been acquired by operation of law, and that only
property acquired without a valuable consideration, which is by
operation of law, is required by law to be reserved.
[HELD]Petitioner won in this case pero pildi siya sa issue.
YES. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property
which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from
another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to
reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives
who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the
property proceeded.
Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to
reserve them intact for the claimants, who are uncles or relatives
within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and
Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded.
Petitioner also claimed that the respondents renounced their right to
the property to be reserved pero ana SC na whaaaaat? Wala man
sa facts gud.
Pero petitioner won diba? How? Well.. The question asked was
unsa ang rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to
the reservation under the Civil Code?
The ascendants who inherits from a descendant, whether by the
latter's wish or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue
of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes
of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively — use,
enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is
inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property
proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor
and absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives
within the third decree who belong to the line whence the property
proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would arise.
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve
the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct.
He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and
dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has,
under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the
property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who
possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited
and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even
though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right
required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do
anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose
favor the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first
because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in
their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of
ownership or of fee simple which they can transmit to another, on
the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right
should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee
simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of
the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree,
that is to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate
succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy.
In short, yes daw within the rights pa daw si petitioner to register
pero limited iyang rights. Subject to revocation by the heirs na
nakareserve sa property. Mao ra.
[FALLO]
Petition for Review is GRANTED.
71.SEINES V. ESPARCIA
[FACTS]
The property in question originally belonged to Saturnino. By will, he
left the property to his son from his second wife, Francisco.
Francisco died at 20 years old, single, and without any heirs, thus,
his mother inherited the property. She sold the same to the Spouses
Seines (plaintiff).
However, Paulina and Cipriana (daughters of Saturnino from his first
wife) refused to surrender the TCT to the Spouses Seines. They
then sold the property to Spouses Esparcia (defendants).
Thus, Spouses Seines wish to declare the sale to Spouses Esparcia
as void.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
CFI- Declared both sales as void and that the reservable property in
question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana
Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso.
[ISSUE]
WON the sale to Sps Espparcia is void.
[RULING]
NO.
With reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve
creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the
ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his
death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which the property came. This Court has held in connection with this
matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the
reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is
like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may
alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation
transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of
the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being
revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time
of the death of the reservista.
In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still
alive when Fransisco’s mother, the person obliged to reserve, died.
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SUCCESSION DIGESTS
Thus the Cipriana became the absolute owner of the reservable
property. While it may be true that the sale to Spouses Esparcia,
became effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory
condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the appealed
decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property in
question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees —
the Esparcia spouses did — not appeal therefrom.
FALLO: AFFIRMED lower court, without prejudice to whatever
action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate
of Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.
72. DE PAPA V. CAMACHO
Doctrine
RESERVA TRONCAL; RIGHTS OF RESERVATIONS
DETERMINED BY PRINCIPLES OF INTESTACY.
FACTS
Plaintiffs Francisca, Manuel, and Nicolas, all surnamed De Papa are
defendant-Dalisay Camacho’s grandaunt and granduncles. The
parties have as a common ancestor, the late Balbino Tioco (who had
a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great
grandfather of defendant.
Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4)
parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of
plaintiffs).
1914: Toribia Tioco died intestate, survived by her husband,
Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and
Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho)
and leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the
inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.
1928: Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate
children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and
legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon.
 In the partition, 3 parcels of his land were adjudicated as
the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had
predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3)
parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate
children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal
pro-indiviso shares.
o Faustino died intestate, single and without
issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso
share in the seven (7) parcels of land above-
mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his
sole intestate heir, who received the said
property subject to a reserva troncal.
1939: Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and
interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by
her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
1965: Eustacio Dizon also died intestate, survived his only legitimate
descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
 Therefore, Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-
half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land as her
inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
 Pursuant to the death of her father, Dalisay Camacho now
claims the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal
imposed thereon upon the death of her father,
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate
succession.
o However, plaintiffs oppose her said claim
because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the
one-half proindiviso interest in said parcel of
land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio
Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8)
of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their
being also third degree relatives of Faustino
Dizon.
Lower Courts
RTC: declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and
Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho,
entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in
dispute, in equal proportions.
Defendant appealed directly to the SC.
ISSUE: W/N all relatives of the praepositus within the third
degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the
reservable property upon the death of the reservista.
HELD: No.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was
received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the
property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the
property from the prepositus by operation of law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from
the prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which
the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by
the reservoir.
This question before the SC has already been answered in Padura
vs. Baldovino, where the reservatario was survived by eleven
nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin, four of
whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made
that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal
shares. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that
the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a
share double that of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in
accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code.
In a case of reserva troncal where the only reservatarios (reserves)
surviving the reservista, and belonging to the line of origin, are
nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of
the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood,
should the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally,
or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as
large as that of the nephews of the half blood?
The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the
return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives
belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and
avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting
ascendant (reservista).
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property
has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from
this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the
relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree
there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the
respective share of each in the reversionary property should be
governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit
the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that
upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property
should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those
nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding those
reservatarios of more remote degree.
In the case at bar, reversion of the reservable property being
governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-
appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as
aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus),
they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the
defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the
same degree as the latter.  
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SUCCESSION DIGESTS
As held in the case of Abellana v. Ferraris, under the Article 1009,
the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins,
etc.) being called to the succession. Hence, a decedent’s uncles
and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews
and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified
to succeed, similar to the case at hand.
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura,
supra, that as to the reservable property, the reservatarios do not
inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant praepositus:
". . . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate
of the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as there are
reservatarios existing. The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the
reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the
reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they
must survive the reservista.”
W/N INTESTACY PROCEEDING IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE
THE RESERVATARIO’S RIGHTS
HELD: NO.
Intestacy proceedings to determine the right of a reservatario are
not necessary where the final decree of the land court ordering
issuance of title in the name of the reservista over property
subject to reserva troncal identifies the reservatario and there
are no other claimants to the latter's rights.
The reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is
the reservable property part of the reservista's estate; the
reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the
descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of
origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during
the reservista's lifetime
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the
reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes,
automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable
property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of
the reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the latter.
Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus,
there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been
excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate
succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain
simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the
interregnum of the reserva;" i.e., the property took a "detour" through
an ascendant — thereby giving rise to the reservation — before its
transmission to the reservatario.
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited,
the defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the
entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-
appellees.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower
Court is reversed and set aside and the complaint is dismissed,
with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
73. SUMAYA V. IAC
DOCTRINE: Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the
person obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse) had the obligation
to annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable character of
the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who
inherited from a descendant property which the latter inherited
from another ascendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore,
the duty to annotate also.
FACTS:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two different ascendants the two (2)
sets of properties subject of this case: 1) A 1/3 interest, pro-indiviso
in a parcel of land situated in Dita, Liliw Laguna from his father Jose,
Sr., who died; and 2) A 1/7 interest pro-indiviso in ten (10) parcels of
registered lands from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista.
Subsequently, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and
leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as
his sole surviving heir to the real properties above-mentioned.
Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above described properties.
Years later, Consuelo sold the property Raul inherited from his
father, to Mariquita H. Sumaya. The same property was
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
subsequently sold by Sumaya to Villa Honorio Development
Corporation, Inc. Consequently, VHDC transferred and assigned its
rights over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut
Cooperative, Inc. The properties are presently in the name of Agro-
Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the remaining
1/3 share is in the name of Sancho Balantakbo.
Later, Consuelo sold the properties Raul inherited from his
grandmother to VHDC. The latter in turn transferred and assigned all
its rights to the properties in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut
Cooperative, Inc. which properties are presently in its possession.
The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above
described properties do not contain any annotation of its reservable
character. Consequently, Consuelo died.
On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all
surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and
Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving
children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the
first named Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil cases to
recover the properties described in the respective complaints which
they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.
LOWER COURT’S RULING:
RTC – rendered decision in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the
return of the properties.
CA – affirmed RTC decision in toto and denied the MR.
ISSUE: WON the lots in question are subject to reserva troncal
RULING: YES. "ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have required by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and belong to the line Iron which said property came."
Although it was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the
properties in question show that they were free from any liens and
encumbrances at the time of the sale, the fact remains however, that
the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating the
source of the properties showing the reservable nature thereof, was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna. This is sufficient
notice to the whole world in accordance with Section 52 of the
Property Registration Decree which provides:
“Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order,
judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if
registered, Aled or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for
the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be
constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering,
filing or entering."
The failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable
character of the property in the certificate of title cannot be attributed
to Consuelo. Moreover, there was sufficient proof that the petitioners
had actual knowledge of the reservable character of the properties
before they bought the same from Consuelo.
The Court do not agree, however, with the disposition of the
appellate court that there is no need to register the reservable
character of the property, if only for the protection of the reservees,
against innocent third persons. The obligation to reserve rests
upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo as
provided in Article 891 of the New Civil Code on reserva troncal.
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged
to reserve (the widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate in
the Registry of Property the reservable character of the property, in
reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who inherited from
a descendant property which the latter inherited from another
ascendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to
annotate also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of
Property of the right reserved in real property subject of reserva
viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays despite the
abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is
consistent with the rule provided in the second paragraph of Section
51 of P.D. 1529 which provides that: "The act of registration shall be
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS
the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons
are concerned . . . .”
FALLO: ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except
for the modification on the necessity to annotate the reversible
character of a property subject of reserva troncal.
74. SOLIVIO V. CA
[TOPIC FROM THE SYLLABUS]
LEGITIME AND RESERVA TRONCAL; RESERVA TRONCAL;
REQUISITES: The persons involved in reserva troncal are: (1) The
person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista) — the
ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his
descendants; (2) The persons for whom the property is reserved are
the reservees (reservatorios) — relatives within the third degree
counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line
from which the property came. (3) The propositus — the descendant
who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his
other ascendant inherit by operation of law.
[FACTS]
Javellana, Jr. died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are:
(1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-
sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent,
Concordia Javellana- Villanueva, sister of his deceased father,
Esteban Javellana, Sr.
His mother Salustia Solivio and her sister, Celedonia brought up
Javellana Jr. Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal
properties which she had inherited from her mother, but no conjugal
property was acquired during her marriage to Javellana, Sr.
In 1959, Salustia died leaving all her properties to Javellana Jr.
Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia
and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to
honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a
college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on
February 26, 1977 without having set up the foundation.
2 weeks after his funeral, Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's
desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his
mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping
indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out
the plan of the deceased.
Pursuant to their agreement, Celedonia in good faith and upon the
advice of her counsel, filed for her appointment as special
administratix of the estate of Javellana Jr. Later, she filed an
amended petition that she be declared sole heir of the deceased.
After due publication and hearing of her petition, she was declared
sole heir of the estate of Javellana Jr. She explained that this was
done for three reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had
come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's
nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir,
the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation
would be facilitated.
Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and
other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the
"SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which
she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
4 months later, Concordia filed a MR of the court’s order declaring
Celedonia as sole heir because she too was an heir of the
deceased. Betrayal 100. Motion was denied by the court. Thus,
Concordia filed a case for partition, recovery of possession,
ownership and damages.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
RTC: rendered a decision in favor of Concordia. In her motions
for reconsideration, Celedonia averred that the properties of the
deceased had already been transferred to, and were in the
possession of, the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation."
Trial court denied her MRs.
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
[ISSUE/S]
WON the properties in question are subject to reserve troncal in
favor of Celedonia, his relative within the 3 rd degree on his
mother’s side from whom he had inherited them.
Note: daog si Celedonia ani pero pildi siya sa issue na related sa
topic. There are issues on jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud but the
deciding issue is on the agreement between the parties katung
ibutang nila ang estate sa foundation. Ana si SC na mao na
mucontrol.
[HELD]
NO. The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista) — the
ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his
descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees
(reservatorios) — relatives within the third degree counted from the
descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the
property came.
3. The propositus — the descendant who received by gratuitous title and
died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of
law.
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not
reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the
descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited
the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance
subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is
his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva
troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a
descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother or
sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from
his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
[FALLO]
Petition for Review is GRANTED.
75. SEANGIO V. REYES
[FACTS]
Private respondents filed for the settlement of the intestate estate of
Segundo Seangio. Petitioners opposed this on the ground that
Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting one of the private
respondents. In lieu of this, petitioners instituted probate
proceedings for the will.
Private respondents opposed, alleging that the document does not
meet the requirements for a will as it does not dispose of property,
that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir,
hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
RTC- dismissed the probate proceedings as there was preterition.
[ISSUE]
WON disinheritance can be considered a holographic will.
[RULING]
YES.
Segundo's document, although it may initially come across as a
mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by
the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can
be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it
does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter's property, the
disinheritance, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other
words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of
the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the
absence of the disinherited heir.
AS TO PRETERITION - The compulsory heirs in the direct line were
not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court's opinion, Segundo's last
expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with
the sole exception of the one he disinherited.
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SUCCESSION DIGESTS
FALLO: petition to probate the will is GRANTED.
76. FERNANDEZ V. DIMAGIBA
Doctrine
Only the total and absolute revocation of the will can preclude
probate of the revoked testament. If the revocation invoked is merely
implied from later acts of the testatrix it will not affect the will itself
but merely the particular devise or legacy.
Facts:
IsmaelaDimagiba filed for the probate of purported will of the late
Benedicta de los Reyes before the CFI Bulacan.
The will instituted Isabela as the sole heir of the estate of the
deceased. Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes,
and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all
surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent,
filed oppositions to the probate, alleging forgery, vices of consent of
the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent, and revocation of
the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the
estate made by the testatrix.
CFI: Admitted probate.
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration
and/or new trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation
be considered and resolved.
 Trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held the
will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and
unrevoked by the deeds of sale." Whereupon, the
oppositors elevated the case to the CA.
CA: The probate of will became final for lack of opportune appeal.
There was no legal revocation.
On Matters of Procedure:
ISSUE: W/N the order allowing probate should be considered
interlocutory.
HELD: NO. SC agrees with the CA. The probate order is not
anymore interlocutory, making it final and appealable. The probate
decree of the Court below was not appealed on time, thus the same
had become final and conclusive.
ISSUE: W/N THERE WAS REVOCATION
Held: NO.
If the will denied probate, all questions of revocation becomes
superfluous: in law, there is no such will and hence there would be
nothing to revoke. However, the revocation invoked by the
oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied
from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an
abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the
properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect
the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only
the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the
revoked testament.
The revocation at bar is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of
the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which recites:
"ART. 957. The legacy or device shall be without effect: xxx xxxxxx"
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing
bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter
case the legacy or device shall be without effect only with
respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing
should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity
of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid,
unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the
exercise of the right or repurchase;
The subsequent alienations made by the testatrix in 1943 and: 1944
after the execution of her will in 1930 do not necessarily mean a
change or departure from her original intent as expressed in her will,
when, as in this case, the alienations were made in favor of the
legatee herself and the testatrix merely intended to comply in
advance with what she had ordained in her testament.
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
As observed by the CA, the existence of any such change or
departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her
1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the
subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of
the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, "no consideration
whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the
transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in
conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended
to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her testament,
rather than an alteration or departure therefrom.
Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below,
that in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines does not apply to the case at bar.
Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of the
conveyances would not necessarily result in the revocation of the
legacies, if we bear in mind that it was the moral influence,
originating from their confidential relationship, which was the cause
for execution of the 1943 and 1944 conveyances. If the annulment
was due to undue influence, as the quoted passage implies, then the
transferor was not expressing her own free will and intent in making
the conveyances. Hence, it can not be concluded, either, that such
conveyances established a decision on her part to abandon the
original legacy.
Disposition: CA decision is affirmed.
77. BELEN V. BPI
DOCTRINE: The word "descendants" (descendientes) when used in
a will or deed to designate a class to take property in substitution of
named legatees, includes not only children but also
grandchildren. In other words, in the absence of other indications
of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply is that the testator, by
designating a class or group of legatees, intended all members
thereof to succeed per capita, in consonance with Article 846, New
Civil Code.
FACTS:
On November 7, 1944, Benigno Diaz died leaving a codicil which
together with the will, was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. After the proceedings for the administration of his
estate, it was thereafter put under the administration of the appellee
BPI, as trustee for the benefit of the legatees.
One of these legatees, Filomena Diaz died on 1954, leaving two
legitimate children, Milagros Belen de Olaguera, married, with seven
legitimate children, and Onesima D. Belen, single.
Consequently, Onesima filed a petition contending that the amount
that would have appertained to Filomena Diaz under the codicil
should now be divided (equally) only between herself and Milagros
Belen de Olaguera, as the surviving children of the said deceased,
to the exclusion of the seven (7) legitimate children of Milagros
Belen de Olaguera.
LOWER COURT’S RULING:
RTC – denied the petition ruling that the share of Filomena should
be distributed not only between her children, but also among her
other legitimate descendants, if any, for descendientesinclude not
only children but also grandchildren.
Thus this instant petition. Appellant contends that the phrase
“susdescendienteslegitimos” should be taken to mean the relatives
nearest in degree to Filomena Diaz. As authority in support of her
thesis, appellant invokes Article 959 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (reproducing ne varietur Article 751 of the Code of 1889):
"A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's
relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in
degree."
ISSUE: WON"susdescendienteslegitimos" refer conjointly to all living
descendants (children and grandchildren) of the legatee as a class
RULING: YES. The appellant’s argument fails to note that Article
959 is specifically limited in its application to the case where
the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not those of the
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS
legatee. In such an event, the law assumes that the testator
intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the
relatives closest to him.
But the ratio legis (that among a testator's relatives the closest are
dearest) obviously does not apply where the beneficiaries are
relatives of another person (the legatee) and not of the testator.
There is no logical reason in this case to presume that the testator
intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, for he precisely made a
testament and provided substitutes for each legatee. Nor can it be
said that his affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the
legatee to those more distant, since he envisages all of them in a
group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.
The word "descendants" (descendientes) when used in a will or
deed to designate a class to take property in substitution of named
legatees, includes not only children but also grandchildren. In
other words, in the absence of other indications of contrary intent,
the proper rule to apply is that the testator, by designating a class or
group of legatees, intended all members thereof to succeed per
capita, in consonance with Article 846, New Civil Code. So that the
original legacy to Filomena Diaz in question should be equally
divided among her surviving children and grandchildren.
FALLO: The order appealed from is affirmed.
78. ROSALES V. ROSALES
[TOPIC FROM THE SYLLABUS]
INTESTATE SUCCESSION, GENERAL PROVISIONS,
RELATIONSHIPS, AND RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION; WHO
ARE THE INTESTATE HEIRS: There is no provision in the Civil
Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate
heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision
which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by her own
right or by the right of representation.
[FACTS]
Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her
husband, Fortunato, and their 2 children Magna and Antonio.
Another child, Carterio predeceased her, leaving behind a child
MacikequeroxI swear their child is a Decepticonand his widow
Irenea, the herein petitioner.
On 1971, Magna instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased in the CFI. CFI appointed Magna as
administratrix and declared Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox, and
Antonio as the legal heirs of the deceased.
Petitioner insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as
the surviving spouse of the late Carterio claiming that she is a
compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son,
Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, she sought the reconsideration of the orders.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
CFI: denied reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
[ISSUE/S]
WON the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can
inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
[HELD]
HELL NO. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups,
namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit
by the right of representation.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The
entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit
from her mother-in-law either by her own right or by the right of
representation.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with
the provisions of Art. 887.
The aforesaid provision of law refers to the estate of the deceased
spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a
compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by
Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code:
"Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of
which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if
he were living or if he could have inherited.
"Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and
not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the
person represented but the one whom the person represented would
have succeeded."
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to
succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not
succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who
predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom
his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same
right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her
mother-in-law.
[FALLO]
Petition is DENIED.
79. BAGUNU V. PIEDAD
[FACTS]
Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or
ascendants. Pastora is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-
degree relative of the decedent, while Ofelia is the daughter of a first
cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent.
Intestate proceedings of the estate of Augusto H. Piedad were filed
before the RTC. Ofelia moved to intervene as a collateral relative
and she seeks to inherit from the estate of Augusto H. Piedad.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
RTC – denied Ofelia’s petition to intervene.
CA- dismissed the appeal.
[ISSUE]
WON the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application
among collateral relatives?
[RULING]
YES.
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in
degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except
when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply as
provided in Article 962.
Also provided is the rule in Article 971 “… In the direct line, right of
representation is proper only in the descending, never in the
ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may
only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the
decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.”
Thus, Pastora, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the
late Augusto H. Piedad excludes Ofelia, a relative of the fifth degree,
from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.
FALLO: CA AFFIRMED.
80. ABELLANA-BACAYO V. FERRARIS-BORROMEO
Facts
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she
transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided
there continuously until 1944. However, after 10 years of her
unknown whereabouts, she was declared presumptively dead for
purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate
among her heirs.
Melodia left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one third (1/3)
share in the estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00
adjudicated to her. Melodia.left no surviving direct descendant,
ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral
relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, her aunt, and
half- sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by
Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris,
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS
her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only
brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the
decedent). These two classes of heirs (aunt, and nieces and
nephews) claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to
participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.
Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person
when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit:
an aunt or her nieces and nephews? Otherwise, will the aunt
concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the
inheritance or will the former be excluded by the latter?
CFI: Ruled in favor of nieces and nephews, (oppositors-appellees)
as children of the only predeceased brother of the decedent,
exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent,
reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees)
than the latter since nieces and nephew succeed by right of
representation, while petitioner-appellant is three degrees distant
from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded by
brothers or sisters, or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent
in accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code.
In the present appeal, petitioner-appellant AUNT contends that she
is of the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositors-
appellees nieces and nephews, three degrees removed from the
decedent; and that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right
or representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of
the decedent do not concur with an uncle or aunt, as in the case at
bar, but rather the former succeed in their own right.
ISSUE: W/N a decedent’s uncles and aunts may succeed the
former when nephews and nieces are still alive.
HELD: NO.
First, We agree with the with appellant that as an aunt of the
deceased, she is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent
(three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of
relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the
common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art.
966). We also agree that her nephews and nieces alone do not
inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stirpes) unless concurring
with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by
Article 975.
However, under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles
and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews
and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified
to succeed.
In case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all
other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the
succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005,
and 1009 of the Civil Code.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children
of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to
the estate."
Appellants contend that Art. 1009 does not establish a rule of
preference. However, it can be gleaned that under the last article
(1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins,
etc.) being called to the succession.
In fact, Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 of the present Civil
Code does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other
collaterals of equal degree. On the contrary, Tolentino expressly
states:
“The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate
succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or
children of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives
within the fifth degree. Beyond this, we can safely say, there is
hardly any affection to merit the succession of collaterals. Under the
law, therefore, persons beyond the fifth degree are no longer
considered as relatives, for successional purposes.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this
article should be understood in connection with the general rule that
the nearest relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of representation.
They succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
on account of the whole blood relationship."
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession,
a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long
as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed.
Disposition: CA decision is affirmed.
81. CORPUZ V. CORPUZ
DOCTRINE: Under Article 943 of the Old Civil Code, there is no
reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives as it “prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa
between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.”
This rule is now found in Article 992 of the New Civil Code which
provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor
shall such children and relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child”.
FACTS:
Teodoro R. Yangco died with a will and with no forced heirs. He was
an acknowledged natural son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona
Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Cruz. Before Ramona’s union with
Luis Rafael Yangco, she had begotten five children with Tomas
Cruz, one of whom was Jose Corpus. Jose Corpus had a daughter,
Juana Corpus. Herein petitioner, Tomas Corpus is the son of Juana.
As the sole heir of Juana, Tomas Corpus filed an action to recover
his mother’s supposed share in the intestate estate claiming that the
project of partition made pursuant to the order of the probate court
as invalid and hence, the estate should be disposed of under the
rules of intestacy.
LOWER COURT’S RULING:
RTC – dismissed the action on the ground of res judicata stating that
the intrinsic validity of Teodoro’s will had already passed upon in a
special proceeding approving the project of partition.
ISSUE: WON Juanita Corpus was a legal heir of Yangco; and
WON Tomas Corpus has a cause of action to recover his mother's
supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate
RULING:
ISSUE 1 – NO. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco
because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate
and illegitimate relatives as provided under Article 943 of the old
Civil Code which “prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa
between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.”
This rule is now found in Article 992 of the New Civil Code which
provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor
shall such children and relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child".
The rule found in Article 943 of the old Civil Code prohibiting
successional reciprocity between legitimates and illegitimates is
based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
upon by the legitimate family, while the legitimate family is, in turn,
hated by the illegitimate child. The law does not recognize the blood
tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment.
ISSUE 2 – NO. Since the decedent, Teodoro R. Yangco was an
acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita
Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, who himself was a
legitimate child, the Court held that appellant Tomas Corpus has no
cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of
his mother in Yangco's estate.
Furthermore, under Articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code,
"if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without
issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who
acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if
both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share
and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS
legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and
sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate
brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco'shalf brothers on
the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his
estate under the rules of intestacy.
FALLO: WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed.
82. SAYSON V. CA
[TOPIC FROM THE SYLLABUS]
INTESTATE SUCCESSION, GENERAL PROVISIONS,
RELATIONSHIPS, AND RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION;
REPRESENTATION: ARTICLE 981. Should children of the
deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive,
the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
[FACTS]
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson has 5 children, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilio
and Teodoro. Eleno died on 1952 and Rafaela on 1976. Teodoro
died on 1972 and his wife died on 1981. Teodoro’s properties were
left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, who claim to
be their children.
On 1983, petitioners Mauricio, Rosario, Basilia, and Remedios filed
a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The action was resisted by Delia,
Edmundo and DoribelSayson, who alleged successional rights to the
disputed estate as the decedent's lawful descendants. – case for the
estate ni Teodoro and Isabela
Later, respondents Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela
against the couple’s 4 surviving children. They asserted that Delia
and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were
entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of
representation. – case for the estate niEleno and Rafaela
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
RTC: both cases were decided in favor of respondents.
CA: affirmed the Teodoro estate case but modified the Eleno
estate case in that Delia and Edmundo are DQed from inheriting
from the estate.
Hence this petition.
[ISSUE/S]
WON private respondents are capable to inherit from their
alleged parents and grandparents. YES parents, NO sa
grandparents.
Petitioners contend that Delia and Edmundo were not legally
adopted because Doribel had already been born on February 27,
1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967.
The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The
pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among
those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."
Pero weird kaayo kay they also contend that Doribel herself is not
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to
one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the
child that she was her natural mother. ENSEMENJED MO
PETITIONERS.
Since, ila arguments kay on the legitimacy of Doribel and the validity
of the adoption of Delia and Edmundo. Ila giraise ang issue about
validity of adoption and legitimacy. Pero anasi Atty. Valencia-like
voice inside my head na these issues cannot be made collaterally.
[HELD]
YES. Article 979 of the Civil Code:
ARTICLE 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the
parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and
even if they should come from different marriages.
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the
same manner as a legitimate child.
Moreover, in Article 981:
ARTICLE 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of
other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and
thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to
represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate
estate of her grandparents.
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and
Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is
true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child
and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the
right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is
between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does
not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
[FALLO]
Petition is DENIED.
83. MANUEL V. FERRER
[FACTS]
Juan Manuel is an illegitimate child. He had no children of his own,
so he and his wife adopted respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar.
Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of
Sale Con Pacto de Retro over a one-half portion of his land.
Upon the death of Juan and his wife, Modesta executed an Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land of
her parents and transferring such under her name.
Juan Manuel’s siblings (the legitimate ones), herein petitioners,
sought the declaration of nullity over these instruments.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
RTC- dismissed, as petitioners were not heirs ab intestate.
[ISSUE]
WON legitimate siblings may inherit from their illegitimate sibling.
[RULING]
NO.
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly
referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute
separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family."
The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line
between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate
relatives, on other hand.
Petitioners, therefore, not being the real "parties-in-interest" in the
case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the
complaint.
FALLO: RTC decision is AFFIRMED.
84. LEONARDO V. CA
Facts:
Francisca Reyes died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by
two (2) daughters, Maria and SilvestraCailles, and a grandson,
Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter, PascualaCailles who
predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while
SilvestraCailles died in 1949 without any issue.
Here comes Petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the
son of the late Sotero Leonardo, the son of one of the daughters
(Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes. To prove this, he submitted in
evidence his alleged birth certificate showing that his father is Sotero
Leonardo, married to Socorro Timbol, his alleged mother.
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SUCCESSION DIGESTS
Claiming his alleged share of the estate, he filed a complaint for
ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the CFI
Rizal, praying to be declared as one of the lawful heirs of the
deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of
said deceased jointly with defendant, private respondent herein,
Maria Cailles, and to have the properties left by Francisca partitioned
between him and Maria.
However, Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the
subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child
who cannot succeed by right of representation. On the other hand,
private respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said properties
are now his, by virtue of a deed of sale which Maria Cailles had
subsequently executed in his favor. Bracewell already mortgaged
the properties to respondent Rural Bank of Parañaque, Inc.
CFI: Granted in favor of Petitioner;
CA: Reversed CFI’s decision.
 Found the subject properties to be the exclusive
properties of the private respondents Maria Cailles and
Bracewell.
o What really happened was that, Maria Cailles
paid the realty taxes starting from 1918 up to
1948.
o Thereafter when she and her son, Narciso
Bracewell, established their residence in Nueva
Ecija, decedent Francisca Reyes administered
the property and like in the first case, declared
in 1949 the property in her own name.
o Apparently, petitioner thought that Francisca
owned the property so he filed the instant
complaint, claiming a portion thereof as the
same allegedly represents the share of his
father.
ISSUE:W/N petitioner can claim a share by representation.
HELD: NO.
SC didn’t anymore disturb the CA’s findings to the effect that:
Leonardo’s piece of evidence does not in any way lend credence to
his tale (that he was the son of Sotero Leonardo). This is because
the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of
the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on
September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol.
Plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the
'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certiAcate is no other than
he himself. Thus, plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a
fundamental requisite in this action where he is claiming to be an
heir in the inheritance in question.
Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he
cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by
the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by
the CA, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when
he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and
mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's
first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an
illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased
Francisca Reyes, under (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
Disposition: CA decision is affirmed.
85. DIAZ V. IAC
DOCTRINE: Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or
iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. In the case at bar, while Pablo Santero is a legitimate child of
the decedent, the petitioners, however, are his illegitimate children.
FACTS:
Private respondent, Felisa Pamuti Jardin, filed a Petition "In The
Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona PamutiVda. de
Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding letters
of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed as
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
special administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona
PamutiVda. de Santero.
Private respondent Felisa – niece of the decedent Simona
PamutiVda. de Santero and the legitimate child of the decedent’s
sister
Juliana – sister of the decedent, who together with the latter, are
legitimate children
Pablo Santero – legitimate son of decedent
Petitioners – illegitimate children of Pablo Santero
Pablo predeceased his mother, thus petitioners herein sought to
inherit from the decedent, by right of representation of their father.
LOWER COURT’S RULING:
RTC – excluded Felisa from further taking part or intervening in the
settlement of the intestate estate and declared her to be NOT an heir
of the decedent.
IAC – reversed the order, declaring Felisa as the sole heir of the
decedent and ordered herein petitioners not to interfere in the
proceeding for the declaration of heirship
ISSUE: WON petitioners, as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero
could inherit from Simona PamutiVda. de Santero, by right of
representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child
of Simona PamutiVda. de Santero.
RULING: NO, because Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a
barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession
ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. In the case at bar, while Pablo Santero is a legitimate child of
the decedent, the petitioners, however, are his illegitimate
children.They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992.
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family, there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived and the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of
a blemish broken in life. The law does no more than recognize this
truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
It is clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes
Simona PamutiVda. de Santeroas the word "relative" includes
all the kindred of the person spoken of. The record shows that
from the commencement of this case, the only parties who claimed
to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona PamutiVda. de Santero
are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the
provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be
the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona
PamutiVda. de Santero.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the
assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
86. ARADO V. ALCORAN
[TOPIC FROM THE SYLLABUS]
ORDER OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION; ILLEGITIMATE
CHILDREN; BARRIER OR IRON CURTAIN RULE: Under Article
992 of the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; in the same manner, such children or relatives shall not
inherit from the illegitimate child.
[FACTS]
Raymundo Alcoran was married to Joaquina Arado, and their
marriage produced a son named Nicolas Alcoran.In turn, Nicolas
married Florencia Limpahan, but their union had no offspring. During
their marriage, however, Nicolas had an extramarital affair with
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS
Francisca Sarita, who gave birth to respondent AnacletoAlcoran on
July 13, 1951 during the subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to
Florencia.In 1972, Anacleto married ElenetteSonjaco.
Raymundo died in 1939, while Nicolas died in 1954. Florencia died
in 1960, and Joaquina in 1981.
Florencia had 3 siblings, Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica. Joaquina
had 4 siblings, Alejandra, Nemesio, Celedonia and Melania.
Nemesio had 6 children, Jesusa, married to Victoriano; Pedro,
married to Tomasa; Teodorico; Josefina; Gliceria; Felicisima. During
the pendency of the case, Pedro died, and was substituted by his
following heirs: Juditho and his spouse Jennifer; Bobbie and his
spouse Shirly; Juvenil and his spouse Nicetas; Antonieta and her
spouse Nelson; and Nila.
Petitioner filed in the RTC a complaint for recovery of property and
damages against Ancleto and Elenette.
The parties later stipulated that the 1st eight of the subject properties
had previously belonge to Raymundo, while the last 2 had been the
paraphernal properties of Joaquina.
Plaintiffs alleged:
(1) that when Raymundo died in 1939, his properties were
inherited by his son Nicolas alone;
(2) that when Nicolas died in 1954 without issue, half of his
properties were inherited by his wife, Florencia, and the other
half by his mother, Joaquina;
(3) that Florencia was, in turn, succeeded by her siblings Sulpicio,
Braulia and Veronica; that during the marriage of Nicolas and
Florencia, the former had an affair with Francisca, from which
affair Anacleto was born, but it was unknown whether he was
the spurious son of Nicolas;
(4) that Nicolas did not recognize Anacleto as his spurious child
during Nicolas' lifetime; hence, Anacleto was not entitled to
inherit from Nicolas;
(5) that nonetheless, Anacleto claimed entitlement to the
properties as the heir of Nicolas and by virtue of the will
executed by Joaquina; that the will was void for not having
been executed according to the formalities of the law, and the
same did not reflect the true intention of Joaquina;
(6) that the supposed testator did not acknowledge the will, which
was not submitted for probate;
(7) and that they were the rightful heirs to the properties.
Respondents countered:
(1) that Anacleto was expressly recognized by Nicolas as the
latter's son, a fact evidenced by the certificate of birth of
Anacleto;
(2) that Joaquina executed a last will and testament in Anacleto's
favor;
(3) that Joaquina's possession of the properties was for and in
behalf of Anacleto, who had been living with her since his
birth;
(4) that such possession began in 1954 when Nicolas died and
continued until Joaquina's death in 1981;
(5) that Anacleto then took over the possession of the properties
to the exclusion of all others;
(6) that granting for the sake of argument that the plaintiffs had
rights in the properties, the same were already lost through
laches, estoppel and prescription;
(7) and that Anacleto was the rightful owner of the properties, and
his ownership and possession should not be disturbed.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
RTC: dismissed the complaint. It cited the certificate of birth of
Anacletowhich proved that Nicolas had himself caused the
registration of Anacleto's birth by providing the details thereof and
indicating that he was the father of Anacleto.
It further ruled that because there were no legitimate children of
Nicolas who contested Anacleto's right to inherit, the rule on the
separation of the legitimate from the illegitimate family was rendered
irrelevant; and that, accordingly, Anacleto was entitled to possess
the subject properties upon having established that he was the
acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas.
CA: affirmed the judgment of the RTC. It declared that the
plaintiffs were already barred from asserting their rights in the
properties by estoppel by laches; that Joaquina had executed her
last will and testament on April 19, 1978, whereby she bequeathed
her properties to Anacleto; that the properties were thus transmitted
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
to Anacleto upon her death in 1981; that the plaintiffs filed their
complaint in the RTC only on January 14, 1992; that it would be
unjust to award the subject properties to the plaintiffs who had slept
on their rights for a long time; and that the plaintiffs could probably
pursue their claim in the appropriate intestate or testate proceedings.
[ISSUE/S]
WON Anacleto is entitled to the properties in litigation.
[HELD]
YES na NO. Weird. SC ruled in favor of respondent but for a
weird reason.
Isa samga issues kay won illegitimate ug spurious child si
Anacleto.SC said dili spurious kay way proof ang petitioners.The
lack of probative value of the respondents' aforecited corroborative
evidence notwithstanding, Anacleto's recognition as Nicolas'
illegitimate child remained beyond question in view of the showing
that Nicolas had personally and directly acknowledged Anacleto as
his illegitimate son.
With Raymundo having died in 1939, the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
was the governing law on succession. Under Article 807
thereof,Joaquina and Nicolas, i.e., the surviving spouse and the
legitimate son of Raymundo, were the forced heirs who acquired
legal title to Raymundo's estate upon his death. In accordance with
Article 834 thereof,Nicolas was entitled to inherit the entire estate of
Raymundo, while Joaquina was entitled to a portion in usufruct equal
to the one third portion available for betterment.
When Nicolas died in 1954, the Civil Code of the Philippines was
already in effect.Under Article 1000 thereof,the heirs entitled to
inherit from Nicolas's estate were Joaquina (his mother), Florencia
(his surviving spouse), and Anacleto (his acknowledged illegitimate
son). Said heirs became co-owners of the properties comprising the
entire estate of Nicolas prior to the estate's partition in accordance
with Article 1078 of the Civil Code.
Anacleto had an established right to inherit from Nicolas, whose
estate included the first eight of the subject properties that had
previously belonged to Raymundo. Anacleto became a co-owner of
said properties, pro indiviso, when Nicolas died in 1954. Likewise,
Joaquina succeeded to, and became a pro indiviso co-owner of, the
properties that formed part of the estate of Nicolas. When Joaquina
died in 1981, her hereditary estate included the two remaining
properties, as well as her share in the estate of Nicolas. Inasmuch
as Joaquina died without any surviving legitimate descendant,
ascendant, illegitimate child or spouse, Article 1003of the Civil Code
mandated that her collateral relatives should inherit her entire estate.
IMPORTANT (related sa topic): Anacleto was barred by law from
inheriting from the estate of Joaquina. To start with, Anacleto could
not inherit from Joaquina by right of representation of Nicolas, the
legitimate son of Joaquina.Under Article 992 of the Civil Code, an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; in the same
manner, such children or relatives shall not inherit from the
illegitimate child.
Moreover ana sad ang SC na di sad mainherit by last will and
testament kay di probated ang will.
So who are entitled? In favor man untanianacleto ang ruling.
Petitioners ang entitled sa property.
As the petitioners were among the collateral relatives of Joaquina,
they are the ones entitled to inherit from her estate.
PERO this is like Gordon Ramsay in Hell’s Kitchen.
Nonetheless, the petitioners' appeal still fails because the parties did
not establish that the estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina
had been respectively settled with finality through the appropriate
testate or intestate proceedings, and partitioned in due course.
Unless there was a proper and valid partition of the assets of the
respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina, whether
extrajudicially or judicially, their heirs could not adjudicate unto
themselves and claim specific portions of their estates.
[FALLO]
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS
The Court AFFIRMS the decision.
87. PASCUAL V. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA
[FACTS]
So Don Andres Pascual died. He has a brother, Eligio Pascual, who
had two illegitimate children, petitioners Olivia and Hermes. They
were both acknowledged as being the natural children of Eligio.
Don Andres’ wife stated that the petitioners were among the heirs of
the deceased.
The other heirs of Don Andres Pascual entered into a compromise
agreement in regards to Don Andres’ estate, to the objection of
petitioners.
Thus petitioners filed a Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
RTC – denied the motion.
CA – dismissed the appeal.
[ISSUE]
WON recognized natural children can be excluded from the
inheritance of the deceased.
[RULING]
YES.Article 992 of the civil Code, provides: An illegitimate child has
no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate
children. Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, petitioners
herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the
succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent
Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
The right of representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a
legitimate relative.
FALLO: CA decision is AFFIRMED.
88. BICOMONG V. ALMANZA
Facts
Simeon Bagsic had two marriages.
1. First, to SisenandaBarcenas on June 8, 1859, for which they
begot 3 children, Perpetua, Igmedia, and Ignacio.
SisenandaBarcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic.
 Ignacio’s Heir: Plaintiff Francisca Bagsic.
 Igmedia’s Heirs: Plaintiffs Dionisio, Maria and Petra, all
surnamed Tolentino.
 Perpetua’s Heirs: Plaintiffs Gaudencio, Felicidad, Salome,
and Gervacio, all surnamed Bicomong.
2. Second, to SilvestraGlosorio on June 3 1885. Of this second
marriage were born two children, Felipa and Maura. Simeon and
Silvestra died.
Maura Bagsic died leaving no heir. Felipa Bagsic married
Geronimo Almanza. She died and was survived by her husband
defendant Geronimo Almanza, her daughter Cristeta Almanza.
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
Cristeta died survived by her husband defendant
EngracioManese.See above illustration.
The subject matter of Civil Case No. SP-265 is the one half
undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the five (5) parcels of land
[around San Pablo and Quezon] which she inherited from her
deceased mother, SilvestraGlorioso.
After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above described properties
passed on to Cristela Almanza who took charge of the administration
of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested
for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they were
prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet
as the expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had
not yet been paid. Partition was brought out again in 1959. However,
by then, Cristeta already died without the division of the properties
having been effected, thereby leaving the possession to the
defendants.
Thus, before the CFI, three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint
for recovery of their lawful shares left by Maura:
1. The Bicomongs, or the children of Perpetua Bagsic;
2. The Tolentinos, children of IgmediaBagsic; and
3. Francisca, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic.
Plaintiffs filed the said complaint against the defendants Geronimo
Almanza and EngracioMenese for the recovery of their lawful shares
in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.
Lower Courts
CFI: Granted the action; Declared that plaintiffs are entitled to 10/24
share of the 5 parcels of land.
Florentino Cartena, the substitute defendant for Geronimo Almanza,
appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that:
 Arts. 995, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code uses by
CFI are inapplicable to the case.
 Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14, 1952, Felipa
succeeded to Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites
Art. 1004 of the New Civil Code which provides that
"should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the
full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares," and he
concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest in degree
excludes the more distant ones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code)
CA: Certified the case to the SC.
ISSUE: W/N Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are
applicable in the case at bar.
HELD: YES. Thus, the heirs of the half blood brothers and sisters
are able to inherit from the estate left by their half-sister.
"Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of
the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if
they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."
In the absence of descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
a surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an
issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of
her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely
the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her
brother and two (2) sisters of half blood, in accordance with the
provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces
are entitled to inherit in their own right. It is settled that "nephews
and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is per
stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased.
Art. 975 makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces
are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to
whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood,
the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the
ten nephews and nieces of half blood.
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS
The only difference in their right of succession is provided in Art.
1008, N.C.C., in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil Code
(supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood
to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half blood.
"Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive
together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former
shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter."
"Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood
shall succeed per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the
rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood."
The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be
succeeded by Felipa Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion
of the nephews and nieces of half blood citing Art. 1004, N.C.C., is
unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual
assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as
indicated here before, is not true as she died on May 9, 1945, thus
she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.
Disposition: CFI decision is affirmed.
89. ARELLANO V. PASCUAL
DOCTRINE: The purposes of collation are to (1) secure equality
among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and (2) to
determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that
inofficious donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when
there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine
the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir,
there is no legitime to be safeguarded.
FACTS:
Angel N. Pascual, Jr. died intestate leaving as heirs his siblings,
namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her
daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and
respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.
Accordingly, respondents Pascuals assailed the validity of the
donation made by the decent to the petitioner and alleged that such
subject donated property "may be considered as an advance
legitime" of petitioner. However, the probate court held that it was
precluded from determining the validity of the donation.
Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the
donated property only for the purpose of determining whether it
formed part of the decedent's estate, the probate court found the
Deed of Donation valid in light of the presumption of validity of
notarized documents. It thus went on to hold that it issubject to
collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads:
“Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he
may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir,
and in the account of the partition.”
LOWER COURT’S RULING:
CA – sustained the probate court's ruling that the property donated
to petitioner is subject to collation.
ISSUE: WON the property donated to appellant is subject to collation
under Article 1061 of the Civil Code
RULING: NO. The purposes of collation are to (1)secure equality
among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and (2)to
determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that
inofficious donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when
there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine
the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir,
there is no legitime to be safeguarded.
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to
any legitime, was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if
nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His
donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as
donation made to a "stranger," chargeable against the free portion of
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the
donated property is not subject to collation.
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary,
secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by
his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not
entitled to any legitime — that part of the testator's property which he
cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory
heirs.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision ordering the collation of the property donated to
petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate of the deceased Angel
N. Pascual, Jr. is SET ASIDE.
90. VIZCONDE V. CA
[TOPIC FROM THE SYLLABUS]
ACCEPTANCE AND REPUDIATION COLLATION; COLLATION;
RULES AND PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED IN COLLATION:
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced
heirs who intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant
bring into the common mass, the property which they received from
him, so that the division may be made according to law and the will
of the testator.Collation is only required of compulsory heirs
succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or
rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of
the decedent.
[FACTS]
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde
had two children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioner's wife,
Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and
Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud are
Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and
Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents
and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four children.
In 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land in
Valenzuela. In 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Lim
and Chiu. In the same year, Estrellita bought a parcel of land in
Parañaque with improvements using a portion of the proceeds of
sale of the Valenzuela property. The remaining amount of the
proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited
in a bank.
Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed
on June 30, 1991, an incident popularly known as the "Vizconde
Massacre". The findings of the investigation conducted by the NBI
reveal that Estrellita died ahead of her daughters.Accordingly,
Carmela, Jennifer and herein petitioner succeeded Estrellita and,
with the subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer, petitioner was
left as the sole heir of his daughters. Petitioner entered into an
"Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita
Nicolas- Vizconde With Waiver of Shares", with Rafael and Salud,
Estrellita's parents. The extra- judicial settlement provided for the
division of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between
petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. The properties amounted
to 3M pesos.
In 1992, Rafael died. Teresita instituted an intestate estate
proceeding with the RTC praying to be appointed Special
Administratrix of Rafael’s estate. Ramon opposed and averred that
their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties
distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon stated
that herein petitioner is one of Rafael's children "by right of
representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter of
Estrellita."
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
RTC: appointed Ramon as guardian. The order did not include
petitioner in the slate of Rafael’s heirs. Subsequently, the RTC
removed Ramon as guardian for selling his ward’s property
without the court’s knowledge and permission.
Ramon moved to include petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding
and asked that the Parañaque property, as well as the car and the
balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be
collated. – RTC granted.
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS
CA: affirmed the decision. It held that "the jurisdiction of the
probate court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the
exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the
estate of the deceased.”
[ISSUE/S]
WON the Parañaque property can be subject to collation.
[HELD]
NO. Art. 1061:
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory
heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which
he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter,
by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced
heirs who intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant
bring into the common mass, the property which they received from
him, so that the division may be made according to law and the will
of the testator.Collation is only required of compulsory heirs
succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or
rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of
the decedent.The purpose is to attain equality among the
compulsory heirs in so far as possible for it is presumed that the
intention of the testator or predecessor in interest in making a
donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him
something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and that
the predecessors will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence
of any expression to the contrary.Collation does not impose any lien
on the property or the subject matter of collationable donation. What
is brought to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the
value of such property at the time it was donated, the rationale being
that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon
its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any deterioration or
loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.
The facts do not make a case of collation.
First, the probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in
the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is
not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs.
Second, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or
ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the
estate proceedings. Such determination is provisional in character
and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title.In
the case at bench, however, we note that the probate court went
beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine
the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael
and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property
between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of
the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the
presence or absence of consideration, are matters outside the
probate court's jurisdiction.
Third, the order of the probate court subjecting the Parañaque
property to collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate
estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing
herein to indicate that the legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been
impaired to warrant collation.
Fourth, even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this
case the probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in
ordering collation of the Parañaque property. We note that what was
transferred to Estrellita, by way of deed of sale, is the Valenzuela
property. The Parañaque property which Estrellita acquired by using
the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not
become collationable simply by reason thereof. As it stands,
collation of the Parañaque property is improper for, to repeat,
collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent
during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain
anent the transfer of the Parañaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a
public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims, rights,
ownership and participation as heir" in the Parañaque property.
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
Fifth, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the
Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should
be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who
inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the
Valenzuela property. Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela
property may be collated, collation may not be allowed as the value
of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of
Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the
matter serves no valid and binding purpose.
[FALLO]
Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
91. LEGASTO V. VERZOSA
[FACTS]
Sabina Almadin executed a will, devising certain parcels of land
belonging to her, to her sister and four nieces. They were assigned
parcels of land, and deeds of sale were executed in their favor by
Sabina.
Sabina Almadin died thereafter and her will was thus submitted for
probate. The special administrator for Sabina’s estate contested this
as it did not contain all the essential requisites provided by law for its
validity.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
CFI- denied the probate of the will.
[ISSUE]
WON partition is valid in will that has been disallowed.
[RULING]
NO.
ART. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by
an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it
does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.
Thus a testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his property, but
he must first make a will with all the formalities provided for by
law, for without a will there can be no testator. While a person who
disposes of his property gratis inter vivos in not called a testator, but
a donor. In employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired
to distinguish between the one who freely donates his property in life
and one who disposes of it by will to take effect his death.
(Another important distinction discussed is between the disposition
of property and its division. The disposition of the properties is to
take effect after his death, and said act must necessarily appear in
the will and must be surrounded by appropriate formalities. Then
comes the second part, the division in conformity with that
disposition, and the testator may make this division in the same will
or in another will, or by an act inter vivos.)
Since Sabina Almadin's will is null and void for lack of the legal
requisites, consequently, the partition which she made of her estate
among her nieces the defendants-appellants herein, during her
lifetime is likewise null and void.
FALLO: CFI affirmed.
92. MAYUGA V. ATIENZA
Facts
Perfecto Atienza died leaving 3 surviving legitimate compulsory
heirs, namely, petitioner Arceli A. Mayuga, Benjamin Atienza, and
Armando Atienza, represented by his son, Antonio Atienza.
Deceased Perfecto Atienza apparently left two estates located in
Odiongan Romblon, to which the compulsory heirs were entitled to
an equal share of 1/3 each. However, thru the alleged manipulation
and misrepresentation, respondent Antonio Atienza, son of
deceased Armando Atienza; and Benjamin Atienza, were able to
secure Free Patents.
Thus, Petitioner Araceli Mayuga , instituted a petition for
Cancellation and Recall of Free Patent Application (FPA) and
Reconveyance against defendants, [her nephew, Antonio Atienza,
and her brother, Benjamin Atienza]. She also prayed for the division
of the two lots in 3 equal portions among them.
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS
In their Answer, defendants denied the material allegations of the
complaint, and by way of affirmative defenses, averred that, among
others, that the Free Patent Titles have become indefeasible after
the lapse of one year from its issuance in 1992; they also invoked
acquisitive prescription in their favor.
Lower Courts
RTC: GRANTED; Ruled in favor of Petitioner Araceli Mayuga;
Ordered ROD to cancel the FP Certificate; and to reconvey her 1/3
share of the properties.
 The Free Patent application was tainted with fraud
because said application was processed without the
plaintiff's knowledge nor a notice of hearing.
CA: REVERSED and SET ASDE the RTC Decision.
 The free patents issued in favor of the respondents can no
longer be assailed under the rule of indefeasibility and
incontrovertibility of the certificate of title upon the
expiration of one year from and after the date of the entry
of the decree of registration pursuant to Section 32 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529
 RTC erred in ordering the reconveyance of 1/3 of the
subject properties to the petitioner since she failed to
establish her title and ownership over such portion.
Hence, this present petition by Araceli Mayuga.
ISSUE 1: Whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC Decision
and dismissing the amended complaint of the petitioner for
cancellation of free patent and reconveyance.
HELD: NO.
As to the cancellation of free patent
The averment that she was not notified of the applications for the
free patent as well as of the proceedings which transpired leading to
the granting and registration of the land in the respondent’s name is
bare and self-serving. The CA was likewise not convinced with the
petitioner's allegation of fraud and misrepresentation in the
execution of the Confirmation Affidavit of Distribution of Real Estate
by the petitioner's father, the late Perfecto Atienza (Perfecto). Being
a notarized document, the CA imbued it with the legal presumption
of validity, its due execution and authenticity not having been
impugned by the mere self-serving allegations of the petitioner.
Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent
and annulment of title, should never be presumed, but must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence, with mere preponderance
of evidence not being adequate. In this case, the allegations of fraud
were never proven. There was no evidence at all specifically
showing actual fraud or misrepresentation.
As to reconveyance
Petitioner likewise failed to prove that she is entitled to an action for
reconveyance.
Two facts must be alleged in the complaint and proved during the
trial, namely:
(1) the plaintiff was the owner of the land or possessed it in the
concept of owner, and
(2) the defendant illegally divested him of ownership and
dispossessed him of the land.
Such facts, as the CA observed, were not only not alleged in the
amended complaint, the petitioner Araceli Mayuga also failed to
prove that she was entitled to 1/3 of the two lots in dispute by
succession.
Assuming that Perfecto owned the disputed lots and the
Confirmation Affidavit was a deed of partition, Perfecto could have
legally partitioned his estate during his lifetime. Under Article 1080 of
the Civil Code, should a person make a partition of his estate by an
act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as
it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
Since the Civil Code allows partition inter vivos, it is incumbent upon
the compulsory heir questioning its validity to show that his legitime
is impaired. Unfortunately, Araceli has not shown to what extent the
Confirmation Affidavit prejudiced her legitime.
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
ISSUE 2: W/N PETITIONER CAN CLAIM THERE IS PRETERITION
HELD: NO.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of a
compulsory heir in the direct line or anyone of them either because
they are not mentioned therein or although mentioned they are
neither instituted as heir nor expressly disinherited. The act of totally
depriving a compulsory heir of his legitime can take place either
expressly or tacitly. The express deprivation of the legitime
constitutes disinheritance.
Petitioner could not claim preterition by virtue of the Confirmation
Affidavit on the assumption that the disputed two lots pertained to
Perfecto's inheritance, he had only three legal heirs and he left
Araceli with no share in the two lots.
Although Araceli was a compulsory heir in the direct descending line,
she could not have been preterited.
Firstly, Perfecto left no will. As contemplated in Article 854, the
presence of a will is necessary. Secondly, before his death, Perfecto
had properties in Limon, Rizal which was almost 50 hectares, part of
which was developed for residential and agricultural purposes, and
in Odiongan. Araceli could not have been totally excluded in the
inheritance of Perfecto even if she was not allegedly given any share
in the disputed two lots. If Araceli's share in the inheritance of
Perfecto as claimed by her was indeed impaired, she could
have instituted an action for partition or a settlement of estate
proceedings instead of her complaint for cancellation of free
patent and reconveyance.
The free patents having been issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources on February 28, 1992 and
recorded in the Book of Entries at the Office of the Registry of Deeds
in June 1992, the respondents' certificates of title have already
become indefeasible pursuant to Section 32 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 (the Property Registration Decree), which pertinently
provides that upon the expiration of said period of one year from and
after the date of entry of the decree of registration, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible.
Disposition: Petition is denied; CA decision is affirmed.
93. AGRO, INC. V. BALANSAG
DOCTRINE: Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or
iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. In the case at bar, while Pablo Santero is a legitimate child of
the decedent, the petitioners, however, are his illegitimate children.
FACTS:
The present controversy involves a parcel of land known as Lot No.
63 of the BaisCadastre, which was originally registered in the name
of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and Antonia. When Antonia
died, the land was among the properties involved in an action for
partition and damages. Milagros Donio, the second wife of Don
Julian, participated as an intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the
case entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the
partition of all the properties of Don Julian.
On the basis of the compromise agreement and approving the same,
the CFI declared a tract of land known as Hacienda
MedallaMilagrosa as property owned in common by Don Julian and
his two (2) children of the first marriage. The property was to remain
undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. The remainder of the
properties was retained by Don Julian, including Lot No. 63.
Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the heart of the
present dispute, lays down the effect of the eventual death of Don
Julian vis-à-vis his heirs:
That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties
hereinafter adjudicated to his children of the first marriage, Josefa
TevesEscaño and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties
comprised as Hacienda MedallaMilagrosa together with all its
accessories and accessions) shall be understood as including not
only their onehalf share which they inherited from their mother but
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS
also the legitimes and other successional rights which would
correspond to them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian
L. Teves. In other words, the properties now selected and
adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (excluding his share in the Hacienda
MedallaMilagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in
second marriage of Julian L. Teves, namely, Milagros DonioTeves
and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Reyes Teves and
Pedro Reyes Teves, his two acknowledged natural children and his
two legitimated children Maria Evelyn DonioTeves and Jose
CatalinoDonioTeves.
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a
Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor
of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. (petitioner). Less than a year later, Don Julian,
Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument entitled
Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the
Assumption of Liabilities. This instrument which constitutes a
supplement to the earlier deed of assignment transferred ownership
over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of petitioner.
Consequently, Don Julian died intestate.
On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, petitioner
sought the registration of the subject lot in its name. A court, so it
appeared, issued an order cancelling the OCT in the name of
spouses Don Julian and Antonia and a TCT was subsequently
issued in the name of petitioner. Since then, petitioner has been
paying taxes assessed on the subject lot.
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken
possession over the subject lot after the execution of the
Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease
agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday,
respondents herein. On Lot No. 63, respondents temporarily
established their home and constructed a lumber yard.
Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her children executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate. In the deed of partition, Lot No.
63 was allotted to Milagros Donio and her two (2) children, Maria
Evelyn and Jose Catalino. Unaware that the subject lot was already
registered in the name of petitioner in 1979, respondents bought Lot
No. 63 from Milagros Donio.
Thus, respondents, as vendees filed a complaint seeking the
declaration of nullity and cancellation of TCT in the name of
petitioner and the transfer of the title to Lot No. 63 in their names,
plus damages.
LOWER COURT’S RULING:
RTC – dismissed the complaint ruling that the direct adjudication of
the properties listed in the Compromise Agreement was only in favor
of Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage, Josefa and
Emilio. Paragraph 13 served only as an amplification of the terms of
the adjudication in favor of Don Julian and his two children by the
first marriage.
It ruled that at the time of Don Julian's death, Lot No. 63 was no
longer a part of his estate since he had earlier assigned it to
petitioner. Consequently, the lot could not be a proper subject of
extrajudicial partition by Milagros Donio and her children, and not
being the owners they could not have sold it.
CA – reversed the decision of the RTC. It ruled that the Compromise
Agreement incorporated in CFI decision particularly paragraph 13
thereof, determined, adjudicated and reserved to Don Julian's two
sets of heirs their future legitimes in his estate except as regards his
(Don Julian's) share in Hacienda MedallaMilagrosa.
The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and possession of the
properties respectively adjudicated to them in the CFI decision and
Don Julian himself could no longer dispose of the same, including
Lot No. 63. The disposition in the CFI decision constitutes res
judicata. Don Julian could have disposed of only his conjugal share
in the Hacienda MedallaMilagrosa.
ISSUE: WON future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and
reserved prior to the death of Don Julian; and
WON Don Julian had a right to dispose of or assign Lot No. 63 to
petitioner despite reserving the same for his heirs from the
second marriage pursuant to the Compromise Agreement
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
RULING: ISSUE 1 – NO. Under Article 1347, well-entrenched is the
rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the
commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is
that no contract may be entered into with respect to future
inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the partition
inter vivos referred to in Article 1080which reads: “should a
person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will,
such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the compulsory heirs.”
In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the
opinion that if the partition is made by an act inter vivos, no
formalities are prescribed by the Article. The partition will of
course be effective only after death.
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a
testator to partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them
among his heirs, and this partition is neither a donation nor a
testament, but an instrument of a special character, sui generis,
which is revocable at any time by the causante during his lifetime,
and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his death.
ISSUE 2 – YES. Considering that the partition inter vivoswould
become legally operative only upon Don Julian’s death, the right of
his heirs from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to
Don Julian under the compromise agreement was but a mere
expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their
father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its
nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest
to which it related was at the time nonexistent and might never exist.
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment
covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the
owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would
only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his
death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the
absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be
challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it
had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise
agreement.
NOTE: The SC however, still affirmed the CA decision because the
Supplemental Deed appears on its face to be a blatant nullity.
(please refer to the full text regarding this portion of the decision.
Didn’t include it here because it was more LTD than Succession)
94. TUASON V. ARANETA
[TOPIC FROM THE SYLLABUS]
PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE; RIGHT TO
DEMAND PARTITION; EXCEPTIONS: The contract far from
violating the legal provision that forbids a co-owner being obliged to
remain a party to the community, precisely has for its purpose and
object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the community by
selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the
sale among the co- owners. The obligation imposed in the contract
to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall have been sold, is
a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co- ownership.
By virtue of the document, the parties thereto practically and
substantially entered into a contract of partnership as the best and
most expedient means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership, the
life of said partnership to end when the object of its creation shall
have been attained.
[FACTS]
In 1941, Angela I. Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their
brother Antonio Tuason Jr., held a parcel of land each owning an
undivided 1/3 portion. Nieves wanted and asked for a partition of the
common property, but failing in this, she offered to sell her 1/3
portion. The share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio Araneta Inc., a
domestic corporation. The three co-owners agreed to have the
whole parcel subdivided into small lots and then sold, the proceeds
of the sale to be later divided among them. This agreement is
embodied in a document entitled “Memorandum of Agreement.”
Atty. J. Antonio Araneta was acting as the attorney-in-fact and
lawyer of the two co-owners, Angela I. Tuason and her brother
Antonio Tuason Jr. At the same time he was a member of the Board
of Directors of the third co-owner, Araneta, Inc.
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS
In 1944, petitioner revoked the powers conferred on her attorney-in-
fact and lawyer, Araneta. Then in 1946, petitioner notified Araneta,
Inc. that because of alleged breach of the terms of the MOA and
abuse of powers granted to it in the document, she had decided to
rescind said contract and she asked that the property held in
common be partitioned. Later, she filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Manila asking the court to order the partition of the
property in question and that she be given 1/3 of the same including
rents collected during the time that Araneta Inc., administered said
property.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
TC: dismissed the complaint.
[ISSUE/S]
WON the MOA should be declared null and void because it
violated Art. 400 of the Civil Code.
[HELD]
NO. Art. 400:
"ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the
community. Each may, at any time, demand the partition of the thing held
in common.
"Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified
length of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This period may
be a new agreement."
We agree with the trial court that the provisions of Art. 400 of the
Civil Code are not applicable. The contract far from violating the
legal provision that forbids a co-owner being obliged to remain a
party to the community, precisely has for its purpose and object the
dissolution of the co-ownership and of the community by selling the
parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among
the co- owners. The obligation imposed in the contract to preserve
the co-ownership until all the lots shall have been sold, is a mere
incident to the main object of dissolving the co- ownership. By virtue
of the document, the parties thereto practically and substantially
entered into a contract of partnership as the best and most
expedient means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership, the life
of said partnership to end when the object of its creation shall have
been attained.
[FALLO]
Decision is AFFIRMED.
95. CUA V. VARGAS
[FACTS]
A parcel of land was left to heirs, who then executed an Extra
Judicial Settlement partitioning the lot amongst themselves. This
settlement was not signed by all the heirs. Those who did sign it sold
the lot to herein petitioner, Cua.
Upon finding out about the sale, respondent Gloria (one of the heirs
who did not sign the settlement) attempted to redeem the property
from Cua, by exercising her right of redemption as a co-owner to the
lot.
Gloria argues that as co-owners of the property, they may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him the
price of the sale. They likewise alleged that the 30-day period for
redemption had not yet begun, as there was no written notice sent to
them.
[LOWER COURT’S RULING]
MTC- declared the Extra-Judicial Partition as valid.
RTC- affirmedMTC.
CA- reversed RTC, as the settlement is not binding upon
respondents considering the other co-heirs never participated in it or
consent to the same.
[ISSUE]
WON the partition was valid.
JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA
[RULING]
NO.The rule plainly states that persons who do not participate or had
no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It
contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any
deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon. The publication
of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs
because the same was notice after the fact of execution.
This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly
sell their hereditary rights to third persons even before the partition
of the estate. The heirs who actually participated in the execution of
the extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of
their pro indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the
same. Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem
these shares pursuant to Article 1088 of the Civil Code.
FALLO: the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
96. BAUTISTA V. GRINIO-AQUINO
Facts:
The lands in question were registered in the name of Manuel
Bautista for which he inherited this land form his father, Mariano.
This was the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition among the
heirs of the late Juliana Nojadera, the first wife of Manuel Bautista. In
the deed of extrajudicial partition, private respondents were
signatories and Manuel’s signature was supposedly bound to appear
in the deed. However, Manuel denied participation in the
Extrajudicial Partition of Property. Subsequently, after Juliana’s
death, Manuel and his second wife, Emiliana Tamayo married, and
begot Evangeline Bautista. Meanwhile, the parties then submitted
the questioned document (deed of extrajudicial partition) to the NBI
for investigation. NBI concluded that the questioned document was
authentic.
Petitioners instituted a civil action in the CFI Rizal to declare the
deed of extrajudicial partition, deed of absolute sale TCT in question
null and void.
Lower Courts
CFI: Dismissed the action.
CA: Affirmed the CFI decision.
ISSUE:Can the property of the surviving husband be the
subject of an extrajudicial partition of the estate, of the
deceased wife?
Held: NO. The petition is impressed with merit.
Even granting that the signature of Manuel Bautista in the
questioned Extrajudicial Deed of Partition is genuine, an examination
of the document based on admitted and proven facts renders the
document fatally defective. The extrajudicial partition was supposed
to be a partition without court intervention of the estate of the late
Juliana Nojadera, first wife of Manuel Bautista, constituting the
subject property.
However, the property subject matter of said extrajudicial
partition does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera. It is
the exclusive property of Manuel Bautista who inherited the
same from his father Mariano Bautista.
Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial
settlement of the Estate applies only to the estate left by the
decedent who died without a will, and with no creditors, and the heirs
are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives. If the property does not belong to the estate of the
decedent certainly it cannot be the subject matter of an extrajudicial
partition.
As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana
Nojadera, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, is void ab initio being
contrary to law. Moreover, such extrajudicial partition cannot
constitute a partition of the property during the lifetime of its owner,
Manuel Bautista. Partition of future inheritance is prohibited by law.
As said Extrajudicial Partition dated December 22, 1966, of property
belonging exclusively to petitioner Manuel Bautista, is null and void
ab initio it follows that all subsequent transactions involving the same
property between and among the private respondents are also null
and void.
NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY
SUCCESSION DIGESTS

ISSUE: 2: W/N there was preterition

HELD: YES.

The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the

right of Evangeline Bautista as a compulsory heir of Manuel
Bautista, daughter of the latter by his second marriage. The court
finds that her preterition was attended with bad faith hence the said
partition must be rescinded.

ISSUE 3: W/N the action has prescribed

HELD: NO.
Prescription cannot be invoked in this case as the petitioners' right to
sue their co-owners for partition of the property is imprescriptible.
And even assuming that the present action may prescribe as ruled
by the respondent court, petitioners Emiliana Bautista and
Evangeline Bautista who are not parties to the said instrument
asserted that they discovered the same only soon before they filed
the complaint in court. Certainly the action has not prescribed

Disposition: CA ruling set aside. Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated

December 22, 1966, is null and void ab initio.

JOE | CARLY | CZA | BELLA NAUGHTY GIRLS AND CARLY