JOHNNY S.

RABADILLA, petitioner,
VS
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y
BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000

Facts:
Aleja Belleza died but he instituted in his will Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla as a devisee to a 511, 855-hectare land. A
condition was however imposed to the effect that:
1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza,
sister of Aleja, during the lifetime of said Maria Belleza;
3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria
Belleza,the near descendants, shall continue
delivering the fruits to Maria Belleza;
4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged,
or sold only to a relative of Belleza.
In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny
Rabadilla. In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in
order to compel Johnny to reconvey the said land to the estate
of Aleja Belleza because it is alleged that Johnny failed to
comply with the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny
failed to deliver the fruits; and that the land was mortgaged
to the Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near
descendants” in the will of Aleja pertains to the near
descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr.
Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near descendants at the
time of his death, no can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the
obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised land.

Issue:
Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is not obliged to comply
with the terms of the Will left by Aleja Belleza.

Held:
No. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of merit.
The “near descendants” being referred to in the will are the
heirs of Dr. Rabadilla. Ownership over the devised property
was already transferred to Dr. Rabadilla when Aleja died.
Hence, when Dr. Rabadilla himself died, ownership over the
same property was transmitted to Johnny Rabadilla by virtue
of succession.
 Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes
all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not
extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.
Rabadilla had by virtue of the Will were transmitted to his
forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations
not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Will on
the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted
to his compulsory heirs upon his death. It is clear therefore,
that Johnny should have continued complying with the terms
of the Will. His failure to do so shall give rise to an obligation
for him to reconvey the property to the estate of Aleja.
 MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,
VS
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR.,
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and minors,
KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented
by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES, respondents.
G.R. No. 163707 September 15,2006

Facts:
The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of
the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-
respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died
intestate. The minors were represented by their mother
Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration before the RTC of Makati City.
Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with
his surviving spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition
alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be
settled without the issuance of letters administration. The
other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the
certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed
by Remedios and not by counsel.
Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid
and waived by reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating
that in exchange for financial and educational assistance from
the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged
the estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities.
The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as
well as the supplemental motion ruling that the mother is not
the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could
not have validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the
petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the
lower court. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the
inheritance the wards.

Held:
No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and
parents and guardians must necessarily obtain judicial
approval. repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's
scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not
having been authorized by the court, the release or waiver is
therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not
have waived their supposed right as they have yet to prove
their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It would
be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which,
according to the petitioner, the latter do not have.
The court is not precluded to receive evidence to
determine the filiation of the claimants even if the original
petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its
jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and incidental to the
settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship
included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action
may be brought together in one complaint, one a claim for
recognition, and the other to claim inheritance.
 NANCY GO AND ALEX GO, petitioners,
VS
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HERMOGENES ONG
and JANE C. ONG, respondents.
G.R. No. 16191 January 20, 2006

Facts:
Dominador Adlawan, who died without any other issue,
is the owner of a lot and a house built thereon registered in
the Registry of Property. Petitioner (Arnelito Adlawan) is an
acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador.
He executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the house and
lot. Out of respect and generosity to respondents who are the
siblings of his father, he granted their plea to occupy the
subject property provided they would vacate the same should
his need for the property arise. When he verbally requested
respondents to vacate the house and lot, they refused and
filed instead an action for quieting of title with the RTC.
Finally, upon respondents’ refusal to heed the last
demand letter to vacate dated August 2, 2000, petitioner filed
this ejectment case. In response Narcisa and Emeterio, 70
and 59 years of age, respectively, denied that they begged
petitioner to allow them to stay on the questioned property
and stressed that they have been occupying lot and the house
standing thereon since birth. That the lot was originally
registered in the name of their deceased father, Ramon
Adlawan and the ancestral house standing thereon was owned
by Ramon and their mother, Oligia Mañacap Adlawan. The
spouses had nine children including the late Dominador and
herein surviving respondents Emeterio and Narcisa.
Petitioner, on the other hand, is a stranger who never had
possession of the lot. They further alleged that the transfer of
the title to Dominador was simulated. It was done so that
their parents will be able to obtain a loan for the renovation
of their house. Respondents also contended that Dominador’s
signature at the back of petitioner’s birth certificate was
forged, hence, the latter is not an heir of Dominador and has
no right to claim ownership of the lot.
They argued that even if petitioner is indeed
Dominador’s acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to
succeed is doubtful because Dominador was survived by his
wife, Graciana.
The MTC dismissed the complaint. The RTC thereafter
reversed the decision of the MTC. Meanwhile, the RTC granted
petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal which was
opposed by the alleged nephew and nieces of Graciana in their
motion for leave to intervene and to file an answer in
intervention.
They contended that as heirs of Graciana, they have a
share in the lot and that intervention is necessary to protect
their right over the property. In addition, they declared that
as co-owners of the property, they are allowing respondents
to stay in the lot until a formal partition of the property is
made.CA decision: set aside the RTC and reinstated the MTC
decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can validly maintain the
instant case for ejectment.

Held:
Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged
illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador. He in fact
executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the controverted
property. In ruling for the petitioner, the RTC held that the
questioned January 31, 1962 deed of sale validly transferred
title to Dominador and that petitioner is his acknowledged
illegitimate son who inherited ownership of the questioned
lot. The Court notes, however, that the RTC lost sight of the
fact that the theory of succession invoked by petitioner would
end up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226. This
is so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner
but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after
the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987. By intestate
succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot
7226.
The death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make
petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share
of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not
to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations. The Court
of Appeals thus correctly held that petitioner has no authority
to institute the instant action as the sole owner of Lot
7226.Petitioner contends that even granting that he has co-
owners over Lot 7226, he can on his own file the instant case
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action
in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and
unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession
(accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de
reivindicacion). A co-owner may bring such an action without
the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs
because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his
co-owners.
 ANTONIO CASTAÑEDA, plaintiff-appellee,
VS
JOSE E. ALEMANY, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 1439 March 19,1904

Facts:
The evidence in this case shows to the satisfaction of the
court that the will of Doña Juana Moreno was duly signed by
herself in the presence of three witnesses, who signed it as
witnesses in the presence of the testratrix and of each other.
It was therefore executed in conformity with law.

Issue:
Whether or not the last will and testament was executed
in accordance with the requirements of the law

Held:
The court held that there is nothing in the language of
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure which supports the
claim of the appellants that the will must be written by the
testator himself or by someone else in his presence and under
his express direction. That section requires (1) that the will
be in writing and (2) either that the testator sign it himself or,
if he does sign it, that it be signed by someone in his presence
and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical work
of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact that the
will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the
testratrix is of no consequence.
It is claimed by the appellants that there was no
testimony in the court below to show that the will executed
by the deceased was the same will presented to the court and
concerning which this hearing was had. It is true that the
evidence does not show that the document in court was
presented to the witnesses and identified by them, as should
have been done. But we think that we are justified in saying
that it was assumed by all the parties during the trial in the
court below that the will about which the witnesses were
testifying was the document then in court. No suggestion of
any kind was then made by the counsel for the appellants that
it was not the same instrument.
In the last question put to the witness Gonzales the
phrase "this will" is used by the counsel for the appellants. In
their argument in that court, found on page 15 of the record,
they treat the testimony of the witnesses as referring to the
will probate they were then opposing.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, eliminating
therefrom, however, the clause "el cual debera ejecutarse fiel
y exactamente en todas sus partes." The costs of this instance
will be charged against the appellants.
 CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET
AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
VS
DR. MANUEL SINGSON, defendant-appellant.
GR No. L-13876 February 28, 1962

Facts:
This involves a lot and improvements thereon.
Complaint alleged that Singson owned half pro-indiviso of said
prop and that Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the
duly probated last will of Singson (the original owner).
Defendant's defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a
mere usufructuary of, and not owner of one-half proindiviso
of the property in question, and that, therefore, she was not
entitled to demand partition thereof.
Lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff.
Singson appealed. At the time of the execution of the will, the
nearest living relatives of the original owner were her brothers
Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario,
Emilia and Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolation, all
surnamed Florentino.

Issue:
Whether the testamentary disposition provided for
sustitucion vulgar or for sustitucion fideicomisaria

Held:
This case is governed by the old Civil Code. - Testator
may not only designate heirs who’ll succeed him, but also
substitutes in the event that said heirs don’t accept or are in
no position to accept inheritance or legacies, or die ahead of
him. Testator may also bequeath his properties to particular
person w/ obligation, on part of latter, to deliver the same to
another, totally or partially, upon occurrence of particular
event. The particular testamentary clause provides for
substitution of heir in this manner: upon death of Consolacion
Florentino, whether before or after that of testatrix, property
bequeathed to her shall be delivered or shall belong in equal
parts to testatrix's 3 bros, Evaristo, Manuel, Dionisio, or their
forced heirs, should anyone of them die ahead of Consolacion
Florentino. If this created sustitucion vulgar, necessary result
would be that Consolacion Florentino, upon death of testatrix,
became owner of one undivided half of the property, but if it
provided for sustitution fideicomisaria, she would have
acquired nothing more than usufructuary rights over same
half. In the former, she would be entitled to partition, but not
in the latter. As Manresa says, if fiduciary did not acquire full
ownership of property bequeathed by will, but mere
usufructuary rights until time came for him to deliver said
property to the fideicomisario, it’s obvious that nude
ownership over property, upon death of testatrix, passed to
and was acquired by another person, and the person cannot
be other than the fideicomisario. It seems to be of the essence
of a fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be clearly
imposed upon first heir to preserve & transmit to another the
whole or part of estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or
upon happening of particular event.
For this reason, Art 785 of old Civil Code provides that
fideicommissary substitution has no effect unless made
expressly either by giving it such name, or by imposing upon
first heir the absolute obligation to deliver the inheritance to
a substitute or second heir. The substitution of heirs provided
for therein is not expressly made of fideicommissary kind, nor
does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee,
during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over
the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof
being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already
stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death, whether
before or after that of testatrix, her share shall belong to the
brothers of the testatrix.
 TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA
LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
VS
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE
and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982

Facts:
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of
partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among
the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle
Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and
Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski. The
task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a
French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an
Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided
for substitutions. Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national,
died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as
compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria
Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. In
due time she submitted an inventory of the estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project
of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be
divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en
pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part
or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en
nuda propriedad." Furthermore, 1/3 of the free portion is
charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining 2/3 with
a usufruct in favor of Wanda. One of the grounds cited by
Jorge and Roberto for opposing the project of partition is that
the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also
invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second
heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in
Article 863 of the Civil Code. The lower court, however,
approved the project of partition.

Issue:
Whether or not the substitution in its fideicommissary
aspect is void.

Held:
YES. The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace
V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally
instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a
fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does
not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained
by Tolentino as follows: Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas
construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or
transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly
adopted this construction. From this point of view, there can
be only one tranmission or substitution, and the substitute
need not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and
Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word "degree" as
generation, and the present Code has obviously followed this
interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go
beyond one degree "from the heir originally instituted." The
Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be
related to and be one generation from the first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only
be either a child or a parent of the first heir. These are the
only relatives who are one generation or degree from the
fiduciary Further, there is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda
to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts.
865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits
"that the testator contradicts the establishment of a
fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties
subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of
the usufructuaries and the naked owners."
 CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria
Alcantara, plaintiff-appellee,
VS
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of
the Court of First Instance of Manila,defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-31703 February 13, 1930

Facts:
Ana Maria Alcantara (deceased) left P21,428.58 on
deposit in the Carmen's name with the association known as
La Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of her liquidated
credit against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased,
represented by his son, Mariano. Mariano Garchitorena held a
judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin, husband of Carmen.
The sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said
judgment levied an attachment on said amount deposited
with La Urbana. Carmen secured a preliminary injunction
restraining the execution of said judgment on the sum so
attached because the La Urbana deposit belongs to her
children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara.
Pertinent clauses of the Will:
“Ninth. xxx… so that upon my death and after
probate of this will, and after the report of the committee
on claims and appraisal has been rendered and
approved, she will receive from my executrix and
properties composing my hereditary estate, that she
may enjoy them with God's blessing and my own. Tenth.
Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order that
my whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her surviving
children; and should any of these die, his share shall
serve to increase the portions of his surviving brothers
(and sisters) by accretion, in such wise that my estate
shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her
children in so far as it is legally possible. Eleventh.
Should my aforesaid heiress, Carmen Garchitorena, die
after me while her children are still in their minority, I
order that my estate be administered by my executrix,
Mrs. Josefa Laplana, and in her default, by Attorney
Ramon Salinas and in his default, by his son Ramon
Salinas; xxx.”
The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix
has ordered a simple substitution, while the appellee contends
that it is a fideicommissary substitution.
Issue:
Whether or not a fideicommissary exists

Held:
YES. The requisites for a fideicommissary substitution
exists, namely: 1. At first heir primarily called to the
enjoyment of the estate. In this case the plaintiff was
instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate,
according to clause IX of the will. 2. An obligation clearly
imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third
person the whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation
is imposed in clause X which provides that the "whole estate
shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving children;"
thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to dispose of the
estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course in case
she dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of the estate
in favor of the heiress instituted, but also provides for the
disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix.
3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress
instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs both in
clause X and in clause XI. 4. The fideicommissarius be entitled
to the estate from the time the testator dies, since he is to
inherit from the latter and not from the fiduciary. The children
in this case are the owners of the inheritance by virtue of the
testatrix’s death. (TF, the deposit cannot be the subject of
execution by Garchitorena as it doesn’t belong to Carmen.)
This will certainly provides for a substitution of heirs but
not just a simple one considering that clause XI in connection
with clause X provides for a substitution where the heiress
instituted dies after the testatrix. Clause X doesn’t conflict
with the idea of fideicommisary: The word sole does not
necessarily exclude the idea of substitute heirs; and taking
these three clauses together, such word means that the
plaintiff is the sole heiress instituted in the first instance. The
testatrix had in mind a fideicommissary substitution, since she
limits the transmission of her estate to the children of the
heiress in accordance with the limits fixed by A 781 CC which
prescribed that fideicommissary substitutions shall be valid
"provided they do not go beyond the second degree." Another
indication of fideicommissary substitution is this clause
provides that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to the
heiress's children, that is to say the heiress is required to
preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in order to
pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary heirs. The
disposition contained in clause IX is not incompatible with a
fideicommissary substitution (it certainly is incompatible with
the idea of simple substitution, where the heiress instituted
does not receive the inheritance): In fact, the enjoyment of
the inheritance is in conformity with the idea of
fideicommissary substitution, by virtue of which the heir
instituted receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although at
the same time he preserves it in order to pass it on the second
heir. It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the
heiress only the right to enjoy but not the right to dispose of
the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she
may dispose of it. This is an indication of the usufruct inherent
in fideicommissary substitution. Clause XI more clearly
indicates the idea of fideicommissary substitution, when a
provision is therein made in the event the heiress should die
after the testatrix. That is, said clause anticipates the case
where the instituted heiress should die after the testatrix and
after receiving and enjoying the inheritance.
 LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-
appellant,
VS
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of
the testate estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO, defendant-
appellee.
G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962

Facts:
In the will of the testator, he gave certain properties to
his wife for her “use and possession while still living and she
does not remarry, otherwise the properties will pass to my
grandniece.” The widow lived for 34 more years but never
remarried. On the widow’s death, the grandniece wanted to
get said properties. It was contended that since the widow
never remarried, the grandniece cannot get the properties.

Issue:
Whether or not the grandniece has a right over the
subject property.

Held:
The grandniece can get the property, despite the fact
that the widow never remarried. It would have been different
had ownership over the properties been given to the widow.
In such a case, since there was no remarriage, the grandniece
cannot inherit.
However, as will be observed, what had been granted to
the widow were only the “use and possession” of the
properties “while living”, the clear intent or usufructruary
interest- an interest which could have ceased even during her
lifetime had she remarried. Art. 791 of the Civil Code requires
that each word of the will be given effect.
 CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE
PANLILIO and REMEDIOS L. VDA. DE GUINTO, petitioners,
VS
HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch IV and
RODOLFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial
Administrators of the Estate of the late EUSTAQUIA
LIZARES, respondents.
G.R. No. 45425 March 27, 1992

Facts:
Maria Lizares y Alunan died and left her "testamento" in
the possession and custody of her niece, Eustaquia Lizares,
who later filed a petition for the settlement of her estate. The
probate court declared the will probated and appointed
Eustaquia as the executrix of the estate of Maria Lizares.
Eustaquia filed a project of partition, which was granted by
the probate court. Simultaneously, said court declared the
heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries mentioned in the
project of partition as the only heirs, devisees, legatees and
usufructuaries of the estate; adjudicated to them the
properties repectively assigned to them, and ordered the
Register of Deeds to effect the corresponding transfer of
properties. Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the
testate proceedings in order that some properties of Maria
Lizares which had been omitted in the partition be adjudicated
to her.
The Court granted the motion and adjudicated to
Eustaquia certain shares of stocks, a revolving fund
certificate, plantation credits and sugar quota allocations, and
real or personal properties of Maria Lizares which were not
given by her to any other person in her last will and
testament. The heirs executed an agreement of partition and
subdivision, thereby terminating their co-ownership over the
inherited land. Eustaquia Lizares died single without any
descendant. Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares were appointed joint
administrators of her intestate estate. On the strength of the
testamentary provisions contained in pars. 10 and 11 of the
will of Maria Lizares, which were allegedly in the nature of a
simple substitution, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a
motion to reopen once again the testate estate proceedings
of Maria Lizares. They prayed among others that a substitute
administrator be appointed. The intestate heirs of Eustaquia
opposed the motion, alleging that the court had no more
jurisdiction to reopen the testate estate proceedings of Maria
Lizares as the order of closure had long become final and that
the testamentary provisions sought to be enforced are null
and void.
The Court denied the motion to reopen the testate
proceedings. Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a complaint
for recovery of ownership and possession of real property
against the joining administrators of the estate of Eustaquia
Lizares. The joint administrators filed the present petition.
Petitioners contend, among others, that the claim of
petitioners over the properties left by their niece Eustaquia
and which the latter had inherited by will from Maria Lizares,
was groundless because paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria's will
on which Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. base their claim,
conceived of a fideicommissary substitution of heirs.
Petitioners claim that said provisions of the will are not valid
because under Article 863 of the Civil Code, they constitute
an invalid fideicommissary substitution of heirs.

Issues:
1.Whether or not the independent action for
reconveyance should prosper
2. Whether or not petitioners are the conditional
substitute heirs of Eustaquia in the testate estate of Maria
Lizares

Held:
1. NO Ratio A final decree of distribution of the estate of
a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in
the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should be
corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its
binding effect is like any other judgment in rem, unless
properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Any
challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the
authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any
heir, legatee or party interested in a testate or intestate
succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within
the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and
the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the
estate shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch
as when the day comes he will be called upon to make
distribution and adjudication of the property to the interested
parties.
The facts show that the petitioners recognized the
decree of partition sanctioned by the probate court and in fact
reaped the fruits thereof. Hence, they are now precluded from
attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it in the
guise of a complaint for reconveyance. A party cannot, in law
and in good conscience be allowed to reap the fruits of a
partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does
not suit him. Thus, where a piece of land has been included
in a partition and there is no allegation that the inclusion was
affected through improper means or without petitioner's
knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on
said title and operated to bring the property under the control
and jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition
according to the tenor of the partition. - Moreover, when
petitioners. moved for the reopening of the testate estate
proceedings of Maria Lizares, the judicial decree of partition
and order of closure of such proceedings was already final and
executory, then reglementary period of thirty days having
elapsed from the time of its issuance, with no timely appeal
having been filed by them. The only instance where a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the
better practice to secure relief is the opening of the same by
proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an
independent action, the effect of which if successful, would be
for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order
already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of.

2. NO Ratio When a testator merely names an heir and

provides that if such heir should die a second heir also
designated shall succeed, there is no fideicommissary
substitution. The substitution should then be construed as a
vulgar or simple substitution under Art. 859 of the Civil Code
but it shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the
testator.
Although the testatrix intended a fideicommissary
substitution in paragraphs 10 and 11 of her will, the
substitution can have no effect because the requisites for it to
be valid, had not been satisfied. The allegation of the joint
administrators that paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares'
last will and testament conceives of a fideicommissary
substitution under Article 863 of the Civil Code is baseless as
said paragraphs do not impose upon Eustaquia a clear
obligation to preserve the estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de
Kilayko, et al., neither may said paragraphs be considered as
providing for a vulgar or simple substitution.
In this case, the instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived the
testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there can be no substitution
of heirs for, upon Maria Lizares' death, the properties involved
unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia. Under the
circumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit
the estate of Eustaquia by operation of the law of intestacy.
 PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,
Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo), petitioner,
VS
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A.
MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974

Facts:
The spouses Hodges are American citizens living in the
Philippines. Linnie Jane Hodges’ will contained:
“ xxx … I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder [after payment of debts, taxes, and
funeral expenses] of my estate, both personal and real,
wherever situated, or located, to my beloved husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my
said husband, during his natural lifetime. xxx
At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever
situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers
and sisters, share and share alike … xxx”
Charles Newton Hodges’ will was pretty much the same,
including the part about Mrs. Hodges’ brothers and sisters.
Mrs. died 5 yrs. before Mr. Both died in the Philippines. Each
estate had its own administrator.

Issue:
Whether or not there was fideicommisary substitution.

Held:
NO. Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her brothers
and sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with the condition,
however, that the latter would have complete rights of
dominion over the whole estate during his lifetime and what
would go to the former would be only the remainder thereof
at the time of Mr. Hodges' death. In other words, whereas
they are not to inherit only in case of default of Hodges, on
the other hand, Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything
for them.
Clearly then, the essential elements of testamentary
substitution are absent; the provision in question is a simple
case of conditional simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby
the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory
condition the operative contingency of which is coincidental
with that of the suspensive condition of the institution of his
brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner of institution is not
prohibited by law.