Central Asian Survey

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Pan‐Turkism and Europeanism: A note on Turkey's

‘pro‐German neutrality’ during the Second World
War

Şaban Çaliş

To cite this article: Şaban Çaliş (1997) Pan‐Turkism and Europeanism: A note on Turkey's
‘pro‐German neutrality’ during the Second World War, Central Asian Survey, 16:1, 103-114, DOI:
10.1080/02634939708400974

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02634939708400974

Published online: 13 Sep 2007.

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Central Asian Survey (1997), 16(1), 103-114

Pan-Turkism and Europeanism:

a note on Turkey's 'pro-German
neutrality' during the Second
World War
ŞABAN ÇALIŞ

Introduction
Until recently, Turkism in the study of modern Turkish foreign policy has been
a forgotten subject. But with the dismemberment of the ex-Soviet Union, many
observers, particularly in the Western world, have began to think about the
importance of this ideology particularly when they faced the dilemma of the
decline of Communism and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the region. For
the West, such a trend seemed to be dangerous, because it meant the replace-
ment of a rival ideology with a new, but more anti-Western, fanatical and
emotional one. In order to contain the development of such a trend, they,
especially the Turkish experts of the US, have suggested that Turkey could be
a model country for the Turkic republics of the Central Asia.1 But at this point,
there has been the question of what would happen to Turkey's western oriented,
policies if it turns its face to the old cousins in Asia. However, for many, the
answer to such a question is simple: a moderate/secular Turkist policy which
complies with the standards of Western countries would never contradict
Turkey's aspiration to become a European country. Rather, it would help
Turkey, it has also been suggested, since Turkey's leadership would be of benefit
to the Western world as well.2 But this seemed to be a very strange policy
understanding for many students of Turkish studies. However, the combination
of 'Europeanism' and Turkism is not a new approach, even though some actors
have changed. In the following pages, the rise and fall of such a policy under
German influence during the Second World War will be analysed briefly, within
the context of Turkey's pro-German policy and estrangement from the Soviet
Union.

Şaban çaliş MA (Reading University, International Studies), is a PhD candidate in International Relations,
Department of Politics, at the University of Nottingham.

0263-4937/97/010103-12 © 1997 Society for Central Asian Studies

§ABAN £ALI§

Background of modern Turkish-Russian rift

At the root of modern Turkey's estrangement from Russia, there was the
question of the Straits and Ankara's rapprochement with the Western powers
after the Montreux Convention of 1936. This estrangement became visible at
the very beginning of the Second World War, when Turks and Russians had
fallen apart, since they had chosen camps on the opposite sides, through
signing treaties with Germany on the one hand, France and Britain on the
other.3 But at the beginning of the war, Stalin personally appeared to have
given up traditional Russian demands on the Straits, except for the concern of
its defence.4 However, it was not the case in reality. In June 1941, Hitler's
announcement referring to conversations and secret agreements between Ger-
many and the Soviets proved that as far as Turkey was concerned, Russian
demands remained unchanged.5
It is an established fact that one of the most important factors in Turkey's
wartime actions towards the Soviet Union was Moscow's irredentist policy
towards Turkey. According to the documents on German foreign policy covering
the period 1939-41, as the Soviets were ostensibly making overtures towards
Turkey, they at the same time negotiated with the Germans on the future of the
world and the spheres of influence of the Axis powers.6 Whether or not the
Soviets were manipulated by the Germans may be discussed, but it is certain that
in these negotiations taking place at the beginning of November 1940, the
Soviets made plain that their territorial aspirations focused on two points: first
of all, they wanted to reach 'the Indian Ocean', through the line of Iran,
Afghanistan and Pakistan, in the south. But more important than this, they
insisted on 'the replacement of the Montreux Straits Convention ... by another
convention' that would grant the USSR 'the right of unrestricted passage of her
Navy ... at any time', from Turkish soils and waterways.7 At die first secret
meeting of Berlin and Moscow, this second demand was unclarified. But 16 days
later, on 26 November, the general framework of the Soviets' spheres of
influence clarified particularly on the point of establishing a new convention
related to the Straits. According to the new Soviet proposal, the four-power
agreement should be amended so as to stipulate 'the centre of the aspirations of
the Soviet Union south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian
Gulf. In addition, the draft of the agreement should also be amended 'so as to
guarantee a base for the [land] and naval forces of the USSR on the Bosphorus
and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease.8
Fortunately, thanks in part to the end of German-Russian friendship, this plan
had to be shelved.9 In addition, as the Turkish government did not know exactly
what had happened in Berlin behind closed doors, Turkey always tried to keep
up its relations as much as possible with both countries. Indeed, at the beginning
of 1941, as a result of worsening relations between Russia and Germany, Turkey
enjoyed a sort of rapprochement with both of them. In March 1941, the Soviets
made up to the Turks and declared that should Turkey be subject to any sort of
aggression, they would remain neutral.10 Two months later Germany signed a

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 PAN-TURKISM AND EUROPEANISM

treaty of friendship with Turkey on 18 June 1941, only four days before the
Germans attacked the Soviet Union.11

Turkey's pro-German neutrality

But there is also another point which is generally ignored by the students of
Turkish studies about the ambivalent relations between Russia and Turkey
during the Second World War. Just as Russia pursued an irredentist policy, so
did Turkey, at least in some important respects. Although immediately declaring
its neutrality in this war, Turkey was in fact pleased by the German campaign
against Russia. It is true that it was a normal reaction, because Turkey had,
above all, an opportunity to take a deep breath.12 But on the other hand, even
though they cautiously refrained from making enthusiastic official statements
and from taking any action that might irritate the Soviets, Turks showed their
sympathy for Germany in this war, from its very inception.13 They indeed hoped
for a prompt defeat of Russia in the East that would make possible a peace
between Germany and Britain in the West.14 In this respect, the Turco-German
Treaty of 1941 was welcomed by the Turkish government, at the risk of British
and French friendship which was based on the Tripartite Agreement of 1939,
because Turkey essentially regarded the German Treaty as complementary to the
Tripartite Agreement in order to strength its relations with the Western world as
a whole.15
However, this matter would totally change when the relations of Turkey with
Germany were compared with the country's policies towards Russia. As far as
we can grasp from the dispatches of the German Ambassador in Ankara, von
Papen, many Turkish statesmen conveyed their feelings in favour of a German
victory over the Soviets. Among them, there were those men like the Turkish
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sukru Saracoglu, its Secretary-General, Numan
Menemencioglu and the Chief of General Staff, Fevzi Cakmak, who several
times explained how Turkey was 'entirely on Germany's side' in this struggle
against Bolshevism. The Turks made it plain that they expected a total defeat of
Russia which was their sincere desire.16 Perhaps, as a result of such an
expectation, in addition to economic reasons, Turkey did not break its diplomatic
and trade relations with Germany until 1944, despite the huge pressures of the
Western powers during the war.

Turkism as a weapon against Russia

Strangely, Turkish interest in the defeating of Russia went beyond security
concerns. This is certainly not to say that there was not such a reason as security
in Turkey's wartime record against Russia. But probably, for the first time since
the end of the Ottoman state, this Turkish interest had emerged from ideological
and psychological factors, as much as Turkey's fears and suspicions from
Russia's expansionist plans. However, it should be noted here once again that
these ideological and psychological factors have generally been ignored by

105
§ABAN

scholars. Of these factors which usually overlapped and intertwined with each
other, the main ideological one is the resurrection of pan-Turkism or pan-
Turanism.
Although pan-Turkism was also scrapped by Kemalist Turkey as an ideology,
as in the earlier cases of Islamism and Ottomanism, pan-Turkic emotions or the
nostalgia of a united Turkic world had successfully been stimulated by the
Germans since the beginning of their attack on Russia.17 Despite the fact that by
using this ideology as a bargaining chip the Germans could not persuade the
Turkish government to take arms on their side,18 Turkism caused a lively debate
among those intellectuals19 and 'some very senior Turkish cadres [who] felt that
the opportunity should be exploited'.20 Saracoglu and Menemencioglu were
among those leading figures who were delighted by the dreams of a united
Turkic world: the former, Saracoglu, explicitly maintained in a conversation with
von Papen that 'Turkey could not remain disinterested in the fate of 40 million
people of Turkish origin in Russia', in the case of Russia's total defeat that
would permit 'a reorganization of the Russian realm'. To him, 'the union of
these areas with Turkey ... was hardly possible; perhaps, however, the areas
could receive administrative autonomy with a strong cultural affiliation with
Turkey'.21
Despite the existence of such conversations, the question of how far the
Turkish government as a whole was involved with the pan-Turkist activities is
still open to speculation. Weisband argues that neither the Turkish governments
recognized Turkism as a national ideology, nor was there a pan-Turanian
influence in the making of Turkish foreign policy.22 Likewise, Knatchbull-
Hugessen, the British Ambassador in Ankara between 1939-44, maintains the
absence of 'even the slightest justification for the notion that the Turkish
government had irredentist ambitions in regard to Turkish populations'.23 In this
respect, the Germans also seemed to have a very similar impression from the
Turkish government, from the evidence of a memorandum that was circulated by
the German State Secretary, von Weizacker. After having had a talk with one of
the leaders of the pan-Turkist movement, Nuri Pasha, in Berlin, Weizsacker
noted that 'his own (the Turkish) government was pursuing different ideas ... I
therefore wished to ask whether he should not first of all exert influence at home.
Nuri Pasha conceded this; actually he had been trying to do what was necessary
in this regard for a long time.'24 Indeed, some attempts had been made to
persuade top-level decision-makers in Ankara on behalf of a more active policy
in favour of 'slave Turks' in Russia.25 At an unofficial level, these attempts
appeared to be having some effect on such men as Menemencioglu and
Cakmak.26 But they did not work at all on Ismet Inonu, the national chief, who
was the most important decision-maker of that time as the President of the
Republic.27 Perhaps Inonu was not in favour of such a move at home and abroad,
from its very outset, mainly due to his generation's miserable experiences during
the First World War and the following years.28
However, it was also evident from the programmes of the Turkish government
under the control of Saracoglu that this part of the executive was to some extent

106
 PAN-TURKISM AND EUROPEANISM

tempted by the German propaganda machine. In the first programme of his

own government delivered before the members of the Turkish Grand National
Assembly (TGNA), Saracoglu plainly voiced his position vis-a-vis Turkism, as
could be seen in the quotation from his speech: 'Friends! We are Turks and
Turkists. We will remain forever as Turkists. For us, Turkism is a matter of
conscience and culture as much as a matter of blood ... And we will always
work in this direction.'29 Obviously, because Turkism in Turkey had been a
rival ideology to Kemalism, speeches of this sort made by a top-rank politician
cannot be regarded merely as a cheap show to appease some circles. Unless it
was thought seriously, none could dare to speak out in favour of Turkism.
Therefore, Saracoglu's discourse was important, since it officially marked for
the first time from the establishment of the republic frank admiration for a
policy that had been completely and forcefully written out from Turkey's
agenda.
Probably, this speech may be best seen as a one-off. But the effect of Turkism
also began to appear in domestic politics. Therefore, it is very significant to see
that some racist policies in the economic field had been inaugurated by the
Saracoglu government in parallel with some pan-Turkist discourses during the
Second World War. Particularly Varlik Vergisi (Tax on Wealth)30 illustrated this
position at official level clearly. This tax was ostensibly introduced to compel
those wealthy individuals who 'earned a lot of money during the war'31 to pay
more taxes in accordance with their revenues. But it was no secret that this
Varlik Vergisi was in practice implemented as a tool 'to save Turkish markets'
from the domination of such active minorities as Jews and Christians.32 Perhaps
it may be said that economic difficulties and financial circumstances forced the
government to do so so as to be able to shoulder the burden of the war.33 But
it was indeed unfair in essence as much as anti-Semitic in practice, because the
law was used in such a way that minority defaulters were imprisoned and sent
to labour camps in the farthest and least developed regions of the country. As
all their wealth was confiscated, they were denied even the basic human right of
appealing to courts against any official decision, right or wrong.34 This behaviour
of the Turkish government cannot be separated from the issue of pan-Turanism,
that is an irredentist ideology of a nation which was well suited to anti-Semitic
German ideology of Nazi fascism.35
To all of these if we add the Turkish government's attitude permitting some
pan-Turkist circles to flourish, even to make contact with Germans in order to
create a joint army in the regions of the Caucasus and the Central Asia, it is
possible to understand the effects of Turkism in general.36 For example, for such
a joint policy, Germans invited some leading figures such as Nuri Pasha, the
brother of Enver Pasha, and Generals Erkilet and Erden to Berlin. One of the
most interesting results of the conversations to this end was the establishment of
a separate army division annexed to the German Army, that consisted of Turkic
and other Muslim prisoners of war held by Germans.37 Within this context, it
should not be seen unwise to maintain here that at the official level as well,

107
§ABAN

Turkism, and at least kept it at its disposal as an option that could be applied in
the case of German victory.38
One of the strong indicators of the existence and influence of pan-Turanist
aspirations among Turkish decision-makers is that as Turkey was gradually
approaching closer to the Allies in the second half of 1944, it felt necessary to
ban pan-Turanist activities and to take some measures to exclude those people
who were known as pan-Turanists from official posts, in order to appease
particularly the Soviet Union.39 First, Fevzi Cakmak was forced by Inonu40 to
resign from the post of Chief of General Staff. In May 1944, the two open letters
from a leading pan-Turkist, Nihal Atsiz, that accused the Saracoglu government
and its party, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, of being corrupt and acting against this
nation's own values in the name of fighting fascism, gave an opportunity to the
government41 to arrest all leading figures of Turkism.42 They were charged by
the government with setting up secret organisations and taking illegal actions.43
On these arrests, Inonu declared in a speech that (1) above all, those men who
were associated with the movement were harmful to 'the very existence of the
republic'; (2) Turkey did not have an adventurist policy; (3) there was a
historical friendship between Turkey and the Soviet Union.44 In parallel with this
policy, the Varlik Vergisi was also cancelled on 15 March 1944 and all related
penalties were written off.45 Why did Inonu and his colleagues, after all, feel it
necessary to take these very thorough actions if there was not such a movement
as pan-Turkism in Turkey during the war?

The mission of Turkey: Europeanism against Communists

In addition to Turkism, Turkey's reaction in favour of Germany at the expense
of Russia in this war might also be explained as a sign of the existence of
Germanophile circles among influential decision or opinion makers in Ankara.
Yet, to these factors we have to add the Russian image/perceptions of Turks
which was fostered by the centuries old clash between the two nations.46 A sort
of cumulative effect of prejudices and history should have brought these Turks
to the point that they applauded, openly or secretly, the actions of Germany
against Russia. Historically, in the eyes of Turks, whereas Germany was seen as
an indispensable part of the concept 'Western Civilization' and 'Europe', Russia
had always been put somewhere in the opposite pole. It is not an exaggeration
to note here that Russians were seen as the barbarians to the culture of Turks.
The 'Russian bear' and its Communist ideology could never have had a good
reputation for most Turks.47
Ideologically, as already indicated, Kemalist Turkey had excluded not only the
Islamic world outlook from the minds of the ruling elites, but had also
eliminated the Marxist-Leninist ideals of the Soviets. The Kemalist definitions
of such concepts as civilisation in general and Europe in particular did not cover
anything made in Russia or by Russians. In 1932, Kemal himself prophetically
anticipated, seven years in advance of its outbreak, the likelihood of the Second
World War between 1940-1946 and warned mankind about its possible conse-

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 PAN-TURKISM AND EUROPEANISM

quences. He called the Western world to stand united for the future of
civilization against Russia, 'the terrible power', by leaving aside their interest-
oriented policies in order to tackle the enemy.

Today, the problem of Europe is no longer a problem that springs from conflicts between
England, France, and Germany. But it goes well beyond all of these. The great danger of
civilization that Europeans and Americans alike do not know ... lies in the east of
Europe.... The main winner of a war in Europe will be neither England and France nor
Germany, but only Bolshevism. As a nation that is the most fighting one with Russia and
a neighbour country that is the nearest one to it, we, Turks, have closely followed the
events taking place in this country, and openly seen its dangers for centuries.... Bolsheviks
are the most potential power that does not only threaten Europe, but also Asia.48

As clearly seen in the quotation, both historically and ideologically, Turkey

never found Russia a reliable country. That is why, while Turks wished to see
the Soviet state totally defeated, they hoped that the Germans would find a
compromise agreement with the West.
Therefore, in addition to pan-Turkism, German diplomats also tried to use the
idea of a united Europe against Bolshevism in order to keep Turkey on their
side. In a political report sent to the German Foreign Ministry, von Papen related
that he repeatedly pointed out to the Turkish authorities the importance of taking
side with Germany in this war, particularly in terms of European unity and
solidarity.49 To him, soon after defeating the Soviets, 'the Reich would be in a
position to get down to the reorganization of Europe which had been discussed
for such a long time.'50 Indeed, referring to the attempts made particularly
between the two world wars in order to establish a permanent organization for
European nations, von Papen touched upon the weak point of Turkish diplomats.
Turkey was left out of Europe in a proposal that was made by the French
MFA, Briand, in a bid to create a united Europe in the 1930s. The reaction of
Turkish public opinion to this Briand project was one of the most emotional
reactions towards the Western world expressed in the Turkish press since the
establishment of the Turkish Republic. They regretfully asked, 'Are not we
(Turks) a European nation?'.51
Against this background, von Papen in his private conversations with the
Turkish authorities did not forget to insist on the future of Europe and Turkey's
mission to save it from its enemies. After a German victory, to him, 'the moment
would have arrived when Turkey would have to make the decision whether she
belonged to Europe or whether she wanted to remain an appendix to the
British-American and Russian front.'52 He went on to say that 'Churchill's and
Roosevelt's decision to fight side by side with Bolshevism ... had made it plain
to anyone ... that England, who never throughout her history had shown the
slightest interest in European solidarity, must henceforth be reckoned among the
foremost of Europe's declared enemies.'53 After surveying some circles' view-
points, von Papen came to the conclusion that if Germany wanted Turkey on its
side against the Allies, then this should not be done 'by political, let alone
military, pressure upon her, but on the contrary by slowly bringing psychological

109
§ABAN

influence to bear and by emphasizing the 'European' mission which is devolving

upon that country and its peace-minded leader out of the course of historical
events.'54
It is certain that Turkish public opinion showed interest in the future of Europe
and Turkey's place in it, as much as in the fate of the ongoing war between
Germany and the USSR. At the beginning of the war, the prevailing opinion in
favour of Germans that was expressed by newspapers was based on the
assumption that while Germany represented the civilization of Europe no less
than Britain and France, the Soviet Union was the number one enemy of that
civilization.55 In an editorial article the semi-official Ulus newspaper on 11 July
1941, it was stated that:
If Germany should lose this war, all mankind from the Pacific to the Atlantic would be
shaken to its roots. If Germany wins, the Russian world would be divided up and scattered,
and the edifice of the Communist International would be forever overthrown. Those on the
European Continent who but recently were at each others' throats have united to ward off
domination by the Kremlin. Europe has been unified in the mystique of a crusade.56
Obviously, the editor was in the wrong in maintaining that there was a united
Europe against Moscow. Quite the contrary, the representatives of Europe chose
the side of the Soviets that once they called 'enemy number 2'. The change in
British attitude towards Russia from the point of declaring it as its deadly enemy
to the point of helping it with 'all the aid and assistance in their power' was the
last thing Turkish intellectuals and decision-makers alike wished to see.57 Nor
did they actually favour a complete victory of the Axis powers and domination
of Italy over the Eastern Mediterranean region.58 But Turkey's dilemma was
mainly concerned with the future of Russia. Therefore, they most feared what
would happen to their situation in the case of a Soviet victory with the help of
the Western powers.59 In this respect, what they sincerely wished to see was a
compromise peace that would be accepted by Germany and Britain excluding the
Soviets.60 Because, in addition to the factor of civilization image, Turkey
certainly believed Germany to be an essential factor in the balance and peace of
Europe.61 They were very well aware that the future of this continent depended
very much on the future of Germany. That is why they followed the outcome of
the Casablanca Conference declaring that the Allied powers would wage the war
unless Germans surrendered unconditionally, with great anxiety. For the Ankara
government, this was a decision that was not only very far away from finding
solutions for the current problems of the war, but would also further complicate
them.62 It would create a critical power vacuum in Europe that would be filled
by a more perilous state—Communist Russia.63 According to Turkish decision-
makers, the psychology of the Allied powers concerning the Germans was based
on primitive revenge feelings that would cost them a very high price. In this
respect, Erkin notes that the Turkish authorities warned the Western Ambas-
sadors in Ankara about the dangerous future that awaited Europe. In the absence
of a Germany which served as a shield against Communist expansionism, it
would be more than unlikely to stop Stalin in Europe.64 Even on this point, the

110
 PAN-TURKISM AND EUROPEANISM

Western powers, especially London, were seen by Turkish authorities as ignorant

and insensitive.65
For these reasons, until the Casablanca Conference, some attempts had been
made by Turkey to bring together Britain and Germany in order to create a
united front which would be made up of civilized nations. However, Turkish
hopes took a final blow at this Conference.66 Only after the Conference was
Turkey's pro-German policy to shift and the dreams of a united Turkic world to
be shelved, and even Turkists to be oppressed in order not to annoy the Russians
any more.

Conclusion
Turkism in Turkey is neither totally new or simply an ideology of the Young
Ottomans. Whenever Turkists see international conditions as suitable, they begin
to speak out on the ideals of Turkism. But since Turkey economically and
militarily is unable to attain such a goal as unifying an all Turkic world, this
policy surfaces only with the help of an external stimulus. During the Second
World War, Germans both stimulated and facilitated the rise of Turkism, just as
in the case of Islamism in the First World War. But in the former, Germans
combined Turkism with the ideals of Europeanism in order to persuade Turkish
decision-makers. For the sake of Westernization and a European identity in
international relations, Turkey was ready to take an appropriate role during the
Second World War, according to German policies. In order to stimulate Turkey
to adopt a more 'Western', i.e. pro-German position, Turkism was used, even
though it did not become an official ideology in the long run. In this respect, the
attempts of some circles and writers today sound very close to the policy of
Germans during the Second World War. As in the case of the Second World
War, in order to defend Western values and interests in Central Asia, Turkey
has, since the end of the Cold War, been asked to use the card of Turkism
against Iran and Russia. In return, there are some promises that Turkey could
strengthen its relations with the Western countries (Europeanism). So what will
happen then? No one can give a certain answer to the question, but it could be
useful to remember here that Turkey suffered a sense of isolation after the
Second World War and had to struggle alone, at least until 1947, with the
Russians, who did not forget to note some circles' Turkist approaches during the
war.

Notes and References

1. For example see: The Christian Science Monitor, 15-21 May 1992; Financial Times, 11 February 1992;
G. E. Fuller and I. O. Lesser, Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China (Boulder,
San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1993).
2. Since 1989, such a reasoning has became very popular among Turkish politicians as well. For example,
see interviews with ex-foreign ministers, namely, Vahit Halefoglu, Mesut Yilmaz and Ali Bozer: Turkiye,
10-12 April 1991. See also: the statement of Suleyman Demirel, 'Adriyatik'ten Cin Seddine Kadar Dev
Bir Turkluk Dunyasi Kuruldu' (A Turkic world has been established from the Adriatic Sea to the China
Wall), Sabah, 24 February 1992; Milliyet, 22 February 1992.

1ll
§ABAN CALIS

3. F. C. Erkin, who was one of the Turkish diplomats who participated in the Saracoglu delegation, maintains
that Moscow deliberately invited both the German and Turkish foreign ministers at the same time in order
to play one off against the other as a 'scarecrow'. F. C. Erkin, Turk-Soviet Iliskileri ve Bogazlar Meselesi
(Ankara: Basnur Matbaasi, 1968), pp 154-156. According to Deringil, 'This humiliation left its mark on
Saracoglu who became renowned for his anti-Soviet attitude'. S. Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During
the Second World War: An 'Active' Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p 87. On
the other hand, Erkin recalls their days in Moscow as 'unforgettable' in terms of Russian's hospitality.
4. In this chaotic situation, it is a fact that Britain tried to bind severing ties and to improve relations between
these countries. In July 1940, British Ambassadors in Moscow and Ankara, Stafford Cripps and
Knatchbull-Hugessen respectively spent some efforts in order to bring the two neighbours together.
Stalin's announcement in 1940 was a result of these efforts. L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the
Second World War (London, 1962), p 67; N. Sadak, 'Turkey Faces the Soviets', Foreign Affairs, Vol 27,
1948-49, p 455; Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp 95-96.
5. G. Kirk, 'The USSR and the Middle East in 1939-1945: Turkey', in Survey of International Relations, The
Middle East in the War, (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p 353.
6. N. Y. Tschirgi, Laying Foundations of Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy 1945-1952. Unpublished
PhD Dissertation, The University of Toronto: Toronto, 1979, p 121.
7. HMSO, Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 (DGFP), Series D 1937-1945, the War Years,
1 September 1940/31 January 1941, Vol XI (London: HMSO, 1961), pp 509-510; F. A. Vali, Bridge
Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1971), pp 60-61; A. S. Esmer and O. Sander, 'Ikinci Dunya Savasinda Turk Dis Politikasi', in M.
Gonlubol et al., Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi (Ankara: Alkim Yainlari, 1990), pp 156-157.
8. HMSO, DGFP, S.D., Vol XI, pp 714-715. In the famous conversation between Hitler and Molotov,
recalling the Crimean War and the events of the years 1918-19 the latter had explicitly stated that for
reasons of security the Straits and the Black Sea were of great importance for the Soviets, and they needed
particularly the Straits. Ibid, pp 560-561. For a detailed analysis of the conversations from a Turkish
standpoint, see A. Sukru Esmer, 'Hitler-Molotov Mulakati ve Turkiye', Siyasi Ilimler Mecmuasi, Vol
XXIV, No 277, Nisan 1954, pp 88-90.
9. Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy, p 116; Esmer and Sander, 'Ikinci Dunya Savasinda', p 158.
10. Turkiye Cumhuriyeti, Disisleri Bakanligi (TCDB), Arastirma ve Siyaset Genel Mudurlugu, Turkiye Dis
Politikasinda 50 Yil: Ikinci Dunya Savasi Yillari (1939-1946) (Ankara, 1973), pp 72-73; E. Barker, British
Policy in South East Europe in the Second World War (London: Macmillan, 1974), p 23; Kirk, 'Turkey',
p 450. For the text of the Soviet declaration see also: T. C. Basbakanlik Basin ve Matbuat Genel
Mudurlugu, Ayin Tarihi, No 88, March 1941, p 49.
11. TCDB, Ikinci Dunya Savasi Yillari, pp 96-121; Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp 120-122.
12. Esmer and Sander, 'Ikinci Dunya Savasinda', pp 163-165; Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy, p 123.
13. HMSO, Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, the War Years, 23 June 1941/11
December 1941, Vol XIII (London: HMSO, 1964), pp 174-175.
14. Ibid, pp 174-175, 632-633.
15. Throughout the negotiations that led to the Turco-German Treaty, Turkey informed the British Ambas-
sador in Ankara. According to the Ambassador, 'the Anglo-Turkish alliance retained precedence ... The
Turks were driven by hard practical considerations into making their Treaty with Germany. It was in no
sense due to inclination or sentiment they did so.' Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat in Peace and
War (London, 1949), p 170.
16. HMSO, DGFP, S.D. Vol XIII, p 632. See also, pp 174 and 589.
17. C. Warren Hostler, The Turks of Central Asia (Connecticut and London: Praeger, 1993), pp 132-141.
18. For German efforts to bring Turkey into the war in their side see: Esmer and Sander, 'Ikinci Dunya
Savasinda', pp 169-170; Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy, Chapter VII and VIII.
19. For the pro and anti-pan-Turkist debates among intellectuals during the Second World War, see: J. M.
Landau, Pan Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1981), Chapter
IV, particularly pp 108-115.
20. Ibid, p 130.
21. HMSO, DGFP, S.D, Vol XIII, pp 632-633.
22. E. Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics
(Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1973, pp 237-256.
23. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat, p 138.
24. HMSO, DGFP, Series D, Vol XIII, p 473.
25. Hostler, The Turks of Central Asia, pp 134-139.
26. Ibid, p 135. See also: G. Lenczowski, Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press),
p 142.

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27. C. Kocak, Turkiye'de Milli Sef Donemi 1939-1945 (Ankara: Yurt Yayinlari, 1986), p 194.
28. Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp 130-131.
29. N. Dagli-B. Akturk, Hukumetler ve Programlari 1920-1960, Vol I (Ankara: TBMM Basimevi, 1988), p
105. For the program of the first Saracoglu government read on 5.8.1942, and subsequent debates
including the vote of confidence in the TGNA see: Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Buyuk Millet Meclisi (TCBMM),
Zabit Ceridesi, Donera 6, Vol XXVII (Ankara, 1942), pp 21-34.
30. The text of the law (No 4305) can be seen in Duslur, Ucuncu Tertip, Vol XXIV. For the text and the
debates on it see also: TCBMM, Zabit Ceridesi, Donem 6, Vol XXVIII (Ankara, 1942), pp 14-32. B.
Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp 297-303. For an
insider's account of this tax see: F. Okte, Varlik Vergisi Faciasi (Istanbul, 1951).
31. For S. Saracoglu's speech see: TCBMM, Zabit Ceridesi, Donem 6, Vol XXVIII (Ankara, 1942), p 21;
Lewis, The Emergence, p 297.
32. Ibid, p 299; G. Lewis, Turkey (New York, 1960), p 117.
33. Lewis, The Emergence, p 297; Okte, Varlik Vergisi, pp 38-39.
34. US Department of States, Foreign Relations of the United of States 1943, Vol IV, Washington, DC, 1964,
pp 1079-1081. See also: Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, p 233.
35. Lewis, The Emergence, pp 301-302.
36. HMSO, DGFP, S.D, Vol XIII, pp 284, 473, 571, 707; Hostler, The Turks of Central Asia, pp 133-136.
37. Ibid, pp 137-139. See also: Landau, Pan Turkism in Turkey, pp 108-112; Deringil, Turkish Foreign
Policy, pp 130-131.
38. Kocak, Turkiye'de Milli Sef Donemi, pp 191-203.
39. Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, p 242.
40. Ibid, p 249.
41. Ibid, pp 242-243.
42. The Times showed great interest and reported the following events which occurred in Turkey in its issues
of 16, 17, 20, 22, and 26 May 1944. According to The Times, the number of arrested men exceeded
hundreds. However, the official number was around 50. Ayin Tarihi, Vol 126, May 1944, pp 21-23.
43. Ibid, pp 22-23; Kirk, 'Turkey', p 460. The trial of Turkists in May and in September caused much trouble
and led to serious disturbances throughout Turkey, because the security forces overacted and harsh
decisions were taken by the courts. According to a Turkish author, all these were deliberately designed by
the Turkish government under the control of Inonu. Kocak, Turkiye'de Milli Sef Donemi, p 299.
44. Ayin Tarihi, Vol 126, May 1944, pp 23-29. Y. Sarinay, Turkiye'nin Bati Ittifakina Yonelisis ve NATO'ya
Girisi 1939-1952, p 38; Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy, p 174; Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, pp
244-246.
45. Lewis, The Emergence, pp 299-300; Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, p 236; Sarinay, Turkiye'nin, p 38;
Okte, Tarlik Vergisi, pp 197-213. For background information leading to the cancellation of this tax see
also: L. V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye, The United States and Turkey and Iran (Cambridge, MA: 1951),
pp 95-98. Kirk, 'Turkey', p 358.
46. Sadak, 'Turkey Faces', p 457. At the beginning of March 1941, Hitler disclosed to the Turkish
Ambassador in Berlin, Husrev Gerede, some information on his conversation with Molotov and Russian
designs on the Straits in part, and Turkey in general. But the full document concerning the conversation
would be published by Germany upon a Turkish newspaper's urging, in order to prove the existence of
such a Russian design. HMSO, DGFP, S.D. Vol XIII, p 304.
47. Lewis, The Emergence, pp 284, 471, 484.
48. Ataturk Kultur Dil ve Tarih Yuksek Kurumu- Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi, ed., Ataturk'un Soylev ve
Demecleri, Vol I-III (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1989), in Vol III, pp 134-135.
49. For the political report by von Papen addressed to the German Foreign Ministry see: HMSO, DGFP, S.D,
Vol Xm, pp 174-178. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat, p 168.
50. HMSO, DGFP, S.D. Vol XIII, p 175.
51. H. Ulman and O. Sander, 'Turk Dis Politikasina Yon Veren Etkenler 1923-1968', Part II, Siyasal Bilgiler
Fakultesi Dergisi, Vol XXVII, No 1, March 1972, p 4.
52. HMSO, DGFP, S.D. Vol XIII, p 175.
53. Ibid., p 175.
54. Ibid, pp 177-178 (emphasis added).
55. For an excellent review of Turkish newspapers during the Second World War see C. Kocak, 'Ikinci Dunya
Savasi ve Turk Basini', Tarih ve Toplum, No 35, November 1986, pp 29-34.
56. Ulus, 11 July 1941 as cited in HMSO, DGFP, S.D. Vol XIII, pp 175-176.
57. Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy, p 123.
58. H. Howard, Turkey; the Straits and US Policy (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1974), pp 156.

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59. Ibid, pp 167.

60. HMSO, DGFP, S.D. Vol XIII, p 603; Howard, Turkey, the Straits and US Policy, p 166.
61. Erkin, Turk-Soviet, p 190.
62. Ibid, pp 188-190.
63. Ibid, p 191.
64. Ibid, pp 191-192. During his service in Turkey as German Ambassador von Papen was nicknamed the
'Angel of Peace'. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat, p 168. Turkish policy-makers believed him to be a
sincere man and an anti-Bolshevik. Ibid, pp 146, 150-151. Erkin also records that von Papen was alway
as anxious about the future of Bolshevism as much as Germany's own fate. Erkin Turk-Soviet, pp 176,
191-192.
65. Ibid, p 192.
66. Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy, p 134.

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