1) HON. PATRICIA A. STO.TOMAS vs. . REY SALAC (G.R. No.

152642, November 13, 2012)

FACTS: On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995 that, for among other purposes, sets the Government’s policies on overseas employment and establishes a
higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in
distress. Sections 29 and 30 of the Act commanded the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to begin
deregulating within one year of its passage the business of handling the recruitment and migration of overseas Filipino
workers and phase out within five years the regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA).

On January 8, 2002 respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against petitioners. In a parallel case, on February 12, 2002
respondents Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. and others (Arcophil, et al.) filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with application for TRO and preliminary injunction against the DOLE Secretary, the POEA Administrator,
and the TESDA Director-General, before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 220, to enjoin the latter from implementing the
2002 Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Overseas Workers and to cease and desist
from issuing other orders, circulars, and policies that tend to regulate the recruitment and placement of OFWs in violation
of the policy of deregulation provided in Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042.

In another case, respondent Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) filed a petition for declaratory relief
and prohibition with prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Manila, seeking to
annul Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042 for being unconstitutional. Section 6 defines the crime of “illegal recruitment”
and enumerates the acts constituting the same. Section 7 provides the penalties for prohibited acts. Finally, Section 9
of R.A. 8042 (speaks of venue) allowed the filing of criminal actions arising from “illegal recruitment” before the RTC of the
province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense.

ISSUE: Whether RA 8042 is constitutional.

RULING:

As a final note, R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It
aims to curb, if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work abroad. The rule is
settled that every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The Court cannot inquire into the wisdom or
expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative Department. Hence, in the absence of a clear and unmistakable case
that the statute is unconstitutional, the Court must uphold its validity.

In G.R. 167590, the Court SETS ASIDE the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated December 8, 2004 and
DECLARES Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional.

WHEREFORE, in G.R. 152642 and 152710, the Court DISMISSES the petitions for having become moot and academic.

In G.R. 167590, the Court SETS ASIDE the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated December 8, 2004 and
DECLARES Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional.

In G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 as well as in G.R. 167590, the Court HOLDS the last sentence of the second
paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional. The Court, however, RECONSIDERS and SETS
ASIDE the portion of its Decision in G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 that held intervenors Eufrocina Gumabay, Elvira
Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio, and Eddie De Guzman jointly and solidarily liable with respondent Becmen Services
Exporter and Promotion, Inc. to spouses Simplicia and Mila Cuaresma for lack of a finding in those cases that such
intervenors had a part in the act or omission imputed to their corporation. SO ORDERED.

2) NY Times v US (Pentagon Papers) 403 US 713 (1971)

1
 3) PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC. vs. COMELEC, (G.R. No. L-119694 May 22, 1995)

FELICIANO, J.:

The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the constitutional validity of Resolution
No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections ("Comelec") and its corresponding Comelec directive
dated 22 March 1995, through a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit
organization of newspaper and magazine publishers.

FACTS: On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772, which reads in part:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 2. Comelec Space. — The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2)
page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec
Space" from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12,
1995. In the absence of said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine or
periodical of said province or city.

Sec. 3. Uses of Comelec Space. — "Comelec Space" shall be allocated by the Commission, free of
charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated
to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their
platforms and programs of government.

"Comelec Space" shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. — No newspaper or

publication shall allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections of the
newspaper or publication accounts or comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or
political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political party.
However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the
determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the accounts or
views published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest.

Apparently in the implementation of this Resolution, Comelec through Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong sent
identical letters, dated 22 March 1995, to various publishers of newspapers.

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, Petitioner PPI
asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition
imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property
for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec
requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready,
constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.

ISSUES:

i. Whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State.

RULING: No, Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Firstly, there was no effort
(and apparently no inclination on the part of Comelec) to show that the police power — essentially a power of legislation
— has been constitutionally delegated to respondent Commission. Secondly, while private property may indeed be

2
validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the
instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power. A reasonable relationship between that power
and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the
kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes.

To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No.
2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. The
extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; monetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the
advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very
substantial indeed.

The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of expropriation of private
personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need
to be examined here:

1. one is the necessity for the taking;

2. another is the legal authority to effect the taking.

Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a
national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without regard to the individual business
condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in differing parts of the country, to take private property of
newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for
the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable
and calibrated response to such necessity available to the Comelec.

WHEREFORE, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March
1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As such,
Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified.

4) VALENTIN TIO vs. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, (June 18, 1987, G.R. No. L-75697)

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram
operators adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly
referred to as the BOARD).

FACTS: On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No.
1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing, inter alia:

SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback,
regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video
tapes shall be subject to sales tax.

On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters Association, Integrated Movie Producers, Importers and Distributors
Association of the Philippines, and Philippine Motion Pictures Producers Association, hereinafter collectively referred to as
the Intervenors, were permitted by the Court to intervene in the case, over petitioner’s opposition, upon the allegations
that intervention was necessary for the complete protection of their rights and that their “survival and very existence is
threatened by the unregulated proliferation of film piracy.” The Intervenors were thereafter allowed to file their Comment in
Intervention.

Petitioner’s attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a RIDER and
the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof;

3
2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution;
3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by
Amendment No. 6;
4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;
5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and
6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not.

ISSUE: Whether Presidential Decree No. 1987 is constitutional.

RULING: Yes. PD No. 1987 is constitutional.

The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the
general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as
expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a
tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The
express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the
heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra.

The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely
venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the
authority which exercises it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient
security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.

The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization
that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax,
thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers for
every videogram they make available for public viewing. It is similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the
movie industry which the theater-owners pay to the government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the
admission ticket, thus shifting the tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that is imposed uniformly on all
videogram operators.

The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the
video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property
rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect
the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax
was to favor one industry over another.

It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly
held that “inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation”. Taxation has been made the implement of the state’s police power.

At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature.

The Court do not share petitioner’s fears that the video industry is being over-regulated and being eased out of
existence as if it were a nuisance.

Being a relatively new industry, the need for its regulation was apparent. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is
to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering
“the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by
the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent
sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the

4
activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor’s permit and municipal license fees
are required to engage in business.

The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not brought about the “demise” of the video industry. On the
contrary, video establishments are seen to have proliferated in many places notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.

In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the necessity, wisdom and expediency of the DECREE. These
considerations, however, are primarily and exclusively a matter of legislative concern. Only congressional power or
competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to
be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and
confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere.

5) ORTIGAS & CO. LTD. vs. CA and ISMAEL G. MATHAY III, (G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000)

FACTS: On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land known as Lot 1,
Block 21, Psd-66759, with an area of 1,508 square meters, located in Greenhills Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila,
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 0737.

The contract of sale provided that the lot:

…(1) be used exclusively…for residential purposes only, and not more than one single-family residential building
will be constructed thereon,…
xxx
6. The BUYER shall not erect…any sign or billboard on the roof…for advertising purposes…
xxx
11. No single-family residential building shall be erected…until the building plans, specification…have been
approved by the SELLER…
xxx
14….restrictions shall run with the land and shall be construed as real covenants until December 31, 2025 when
they shall cease and terminate…

These and the other conditions were duly annotated on the certificate of title issued to Emilia.

In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now Metropolitan Manila Development Authority) enacted MMC
Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region. The
ordinance reclassified as a commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of
Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is located.

On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty
Corp.. The lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease. Thereupon, private respondent constructed a single
story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.

On January 18, 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Emilia Hermoso. the complaint sought the demolition of the said
commercial structure for having violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. In his answer, Mathay III denied
any knowledge of the restrictions on the use of the lot and filed a cross-claim against the Hermosos.

Ortigas and Company averred that inasmuch as the restrictions on the use of the lot were duly annotated on the title it
issued to Emilia Hermoso, said restrictions must prevail over the ordinance, specially since these restrictions were agreed
upon before the passage of MMC Ordinance No. 81-01.

ISSUE: Whether MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 nullified the building restriction imposing exclusive residential use on the
property in question.

RULING: No.
5
 In general, we agree that laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non
respicit. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later
statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in
any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be given
retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts.

But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of
police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably
impair vested rights or contracts.

Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Nonimpairment
of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power
to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover,
statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract.

Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, we already upheld MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 as a legitimate
police power measure.

Following our ruling in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 (1979), the contractual stipulations
annotated on the Torrens Title, on which Ortigas relies, must yield to the ordinance. When that stretch of Ortigas Avenue
from Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was reclassified as a commercial zone by the Metropolitan Manila Commission in
March 1981, the restrictions in the contract of sale between Ortigas and Hermoso, limiting all construction on the disputed
lot to single-family residential buildings, were deemed extinguished by the retroactive operation of the zoning ordinance
and could no longer be enforced. While our legal system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed law
between the contracting parties, nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene “law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy.” Otherwise such stipulations would be deemed null and void. Respondent court correctly
found that the trial court committed in this case a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of or excess of jurisdiction
in refusing to treat Ordinance No. 81-01 as applicable to Civil Case No. 64931. In resolving matters in litigation, judges are
not only duty-bound to ascertain the facts and the applicable laws, they are also bound by their oath of office to apply the
applicable law.

6) FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
Dir. Gen. HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR as the COP of the PNP, (G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004)

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation. The maintenance of peace and
order and the protection of the people against violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is
to be construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties.

FACTS: In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP
stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed
the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of
Residence (PTCFOR).

Acting on President Arroyo’s directive, respondent Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines.

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request
was denied. Thus, the petition.

ISSUES:
First, whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines;
6
Second, whether the citizens’ right to bear arms is a constitutional right;
Third, whether the revocation of petitioner’s PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines is a violation of his right to
property;
Fourth, whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power; and
Fifth, whether the assailed Guidelines constitute an ex post facto law?

RULING:

I. Authority of the PNP Chief

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, R.A. No. 8294 does not divest the Chief of the Constabulary (now the PNP Chief) of
his authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation of P.D. No. 1866.

Pertinently, the power to make laws – the legislative power – is vested in Congress. Congress may not escape its duties
and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that “delegate potestas non potest delegari” – “delegated power may not be
delegated.”

The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions.
An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing power to certain
persons, municipal corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors.
Such licensing power includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations.

It bears emphasis that P.D. No. 1866 is the chief law governing possession of firearms in the Philippines and that it was
issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative power. By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) absorbed the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the
Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latter’s licensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of
PNP’s powers, the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives in accordance with law. This is in
conjunction with the PNP Chief’s “power to issue detailed implementing policies and instructions” on such “matters as may
be necessary to effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties” of the PNP. Clearly, both P.D. No. 1866 and R.A.
No. 6975 authorize the PNP Chief to issue the assailed guidelines.

II. Right to bear arms: Constitutional or Statutory?

Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the rule. The right to bear arms is
a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is a mere statutory creation.

III. Vested Property Right

In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest
exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor
property right.

In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that “a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property
or a property right, nor does it create a vested right.”

In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that: “Needless to say, all licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution.”

In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that “the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious
cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry
them outside of residence.” Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute
a property right protected under our Constitution.

7
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer
an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be
reasonably imposed.

A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory
conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract,
and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these
words in the Declaration of Rights.

The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: “The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a
necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.”

IV. Police Power

Assuming that petitioner’s PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be
considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of the State’s police power. All property in the state is held
subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare.

In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure, thus:

(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police
power; and
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.

Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates the essence of the constitutional guarantees of substantive due
process, equal protection, and non-impairment of property rights.

It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society.
Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by the New People’s Army (NPA), which tends to disturb
the peace of the community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating
factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.

In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely
the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences
may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated,
necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam
around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them.

Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been upheld as reasonable exercise of the
police power.

V. Ex post facto law

(a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes
such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed; or
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.

Thus, The assailed Guidelines cannot be considered as an ex post facto law because it is prospective in its
application.

8
 7) MMDA vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., (G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000)

PUNO, J.:

Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts solve urgent problems of the people. But even when
government is armed with the best of intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of law. Again, we let the
hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the MMDA to open for public use a private road in a private
subdivision. While we hold that the general welfare should be promoted, we stress that it should not be achieved at the
expense of the rule of law.

FACTS: Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent
Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air
Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside
Bel-Air Village.

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public
vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall
separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the
perimeter wall.

ISSUE: Whether the MMDA can mandate to open for public use a private road in a private subdivision.

RULING: No.

Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and
justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or
body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the
President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government
units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national
lawmaking body.

A local government is a “political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control
of local affairs.” The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a “body politic and corporate.” —
one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the
inhabitants of its territory. Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. They are also
the territorial and political subdivisions of the state.

Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local Government Code of 1991. This
delegation is found in Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare clause.

Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The legislative body of
the provincial government is the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang panlungsod,
that of the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is the sangguniang barangay.

Thus, the Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and
sangguniang bayan to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
[province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code . . . “ The same Code
gives the sangguniang barangay the power to “enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants thereon.”

9
The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is composed of the mayors of the
component 12 cities and 5 municipalities, the president of the Me tro Manila Vice-Mayors’ League and the president of
the Metro Manila Councilors’ League. The Council is headed by Chairman who is appointed by the President and vested
with the rank of cabinet member. As the policy-making body of the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide
plans, programs and projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of said plans; it
approves the annual budget of the MMDA and promulgate the rules and regulations for the delivery of basic services,
collection of service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties.

The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang Bayan. This was composed of the
members of the component city and municipal councils, barangay captains chosen by the MMC and sectoral
representatives appointed by the President. The Sangguniang Bayan had the power to recommend to the MMC the
adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was the MMC itself, however, that possessed legislative powers.
All ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMC’s approval.
Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money, and the power to pass
ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC.

Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a “central government,” i.e., the MMC which fully possessed legislative police powers.
Whatever legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by the
MMC.

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the
Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA’s
functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee deliberations prior to the bill’s presentation to Congress.

Clearly then, the MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R.A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC,
the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting
through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power.

In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering
the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of
Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary.

8) PRC vs. CHAIRMAN HERMOGENES P. POBRE, (G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004)

TINGA, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to nullify the Decision,1 dated May 16,
2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283. The appellate court affirmed the judgment 2 dated December
19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530. The trial court allowed the
respondents to take their physician’s oath and to register as duly licensed physicians.

FACTS: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They
passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure
examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from
Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, A comparison of the performances of the
candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for
Fatima College examinees. On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as
physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine.

On July 5, 1993, respondents filed a special civil action for mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction. Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging respondents with
“immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit” in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations.
It recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified.

10
ISSUE: Whether petitioners should allow the respondents to take their oaths as physicians and register them (which
would enable respondents to practice the medical profession pursuant to Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959).

RULING:

On the Right Of The Respondents To Be Registered As Physicians

The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been established by law. If no legal
right has been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ of mandamus is a legal remedy for a
legal right. There must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded. It is long established rule that
a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government.

It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject
to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by
the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals,
peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people.

Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may
be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes
particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine.

In a previous case, it may be recalled, this Court has ordered the Board of Medical Examiners to annul both its resolution
and certificate authorizing a Spanish subject, with the degree of Licentiate in Medicine and Surgery from the University of
Barcelona, Spain, to practice medicine in the Philippines, without first passing the examination required by the Philippine
Medical Act. In another case worth noting, we upheld the power of the State to upgrade the selection of applicants into
medical schools through admission tests.

It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an
occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A
political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such
privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up ones constitutional
rights as a condition to acquiring the license.

Under the view that the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency
or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a
license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions
for the guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power.

In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are provided for in Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended, which
prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the
board examinations, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a
physician’s license, or revoking a license that has been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice
medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore,
it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing
authority.

Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said
privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that
the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to
secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.

9) JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., vs. CA, (G.R. No. 120095 August 5, 1996)

11
KAPUNAN, J.:p

The limits of government regulation under the State’s police power are once again at the vortex of the
instant controversy. Assailed is the government’s power to control deployment of female entertainers to
Japan by requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any
contract for overseas employment. By contending that the right to overseas employment is a property right
within the meaning of the Constitution, petitioners vigorously aver that deprivation thereof allegedly through the
onerous requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause and constitutes an invalid exercise of the police
power.

12