PEOPLE VS TRINIDAD
G.R. 79123-25
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
G.R. No. 176385, February 26, 2008
FACTS:
On 13 February 1998, three separate informations of
Murder and two counts of Frustrated Murder were filed
before the RTC against appellants, together with
accused Jimmy Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad. The murder
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-0258 while
the two frustrated murder cases were docketed as
Criminal Cases No. 98-0260 and No. 98-0270. The
accusatory portions of the Informations read:
Criminal Case No. 98-0258
For: Murder
That on or about 11:10 o'clock in the evening, more or
less, on the 29th day of August, 1997, at Purok 7,
Barangay San Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to kill,
conspiring, confederating, and helping each other to
attain a common purpose, with treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, while
armed with firearms, assault, attack, and use personal
violence upon one JOSITA FERNANDEZ-NOVELO, by
then and there shooting the said victim on her face
causing upon the latter serious and mortal wounds which
were the direct and proximate cause of the death of the
victim to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
victim.
That the commission of the offense is attended by
aggravating circumstance of nighttime purposely sought
to facilitate the same and dwelling.
Criminal Case No. 98-0260
For: Frustrated Murder
That on or about 11:10 in the evening of the 29th day of
August, 1997, at Purok 7, Barangay San Vicente, Santa
Elena, Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping
each other to attain a common purpose, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to
kill, while armed with firearms and knife, and with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, attack, assault, and use personal violence
upon one ANTONIO BEA, by then and there, poking a
firearm at said private offended party, tying his hands
with a rope and thereafter, stabbing said victim on
different parts of his body, thus causing upon the latter
serious and mortal wounds capable of causing death,
hence, performing all the acts of execution which could
have produced the crime of murder as a consequence,
but nonetheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of their (accused) will, that is, by the timely
and able medical assistance rendered to said victim
which prevented his death, to the damage and prejudice
of herein private complainant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the qualifying circumstances of
treachery, generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling
and nighttime should be appreciated in the cases.
HELD:
The RTC is correct in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of treachery in the killing of Josita Novelo
and in the stabbing of Antonio Bea.
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden
attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or to escape. Frontal attack
can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected
and the victim is unarmed. What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim
to defend himself/herself or to retaliate.
In the killing of Josita Novelo, the victim was at her home
when someone called her. When the victim went
outside, suddenly Jesus Trinidad held her. Thereafter,
Jesus Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad mauled Josita Novelo.
Without warning, Jesus Trinidad shot the helpless victim
on the cheek. Said attack was so sudden and
unexpected that the victim had not been given the
opportunity to defend herself or repel the aggression.
She was unarmed when she was attacked. Indeed, all
these circumstances indicate that the assault on the
victim was treacherous.
The stabbing of Antonio Bea was also attended with
treachery. While Bea, whose hands were tied behind his
back, and the assailants were walking along the dike,
Emelio Tolentino unexpectedly stabbed the victim four
times. The victim could not put up a defense as the
attack was swift and he was not in the position to repel
the same since his hands were tied.
Also affirmed is the ruling of the RTC appreciating the
presence of the generic aggravating circumstance of
dwelling in Criminal Case No. 98-0258. Evidence shows
that Josita Novelo was killed in her own house. When
the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended
party and the latter has not given provocation, dwelling
may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
Here, the crime was committed inside the house of the
deceased victim. Dwelling is considered aggravating
primarily because of the sanctity of privacy the law
accords to human abode. He who goes to another’s
house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he
who offends him elsewhere.
Dwelling, however, cannot be appreciated in Criminal
Case No. 98-0260 considering that the same was not
alleged in the information. Under Section 9, Rule 10 of
the Revised Rules of Court, aggravating circumstances
must be alleged in the information and proved otherwise;
even if proved but not alleged in the information, the
same shall not be considered by the Court in the
imposition of the proper penalty on the accused.
The aggravating circumstance of nighttime in both cases
should not be appreciated. Nighttime is considered an
aggravating circumstance only when it is sought to
prevent the accused from being recognized or to ensure
their escape. There must be proof that this was
intentionally sought to ensure the commission of the
crime and that the perpetrators took advantage of it.
Although the crime was committed at nighttime, there is
no evidence that the appellants and their companions
took advantage of nighttime or that nighttime facilitated
the commission of the crime.
MARTINEZ VS CA
G.R. No. L-31271
ESGUERRA, J.:
Facts:
Dean Dongui was a teacher at the Tubao National High
School, La Union. Petitioner Benjamin Martinez was the
husband of Dean's co-teacher, Lilibeth Martinez.
Petitioner eked out a living as a tricycle driver.
On October 28, 1998, Dean and his wife Freda filed a
complaint for damages against the spouses Martinez in
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tubao, La
Union. They alleged that in March 1998, petitioner, a
suitor of Elvisa Basallo, had been peddling false reports
that
Dean and Elvisa had illicit relations... he even told Freda
that Elvisa was Dean's mistress. This led to a quarrel
between Dean and Freda, and the latter was
hospitalized for her heart ailment.
Dean requested Lilibeth to stop her husband from
spreading lies, and she replied that
Elvisa had been her husband's mistress. They prayed
that they be awarded moral and exemplary damages
and litigation fees in the total amount of P100,000.00.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 226.
For her part, Elvisa also filed a complaint against the
spouses Martinez in the MCTC of Tubao for damages
anchored on Article 26 of the New Civil Code.
Dean was about a step away from an L-300 van which
was parked in front of the building when petitioner,
armed with a bolo, suddenly emerged from behind the
vehicle and stabbed him on the left breast. Dean
instantly moved backward and saw his assailant.
Dean fled to the bank office and was able to gain entry
into the bank. Petitioner ran after him and upon
cornering him, tried to stab him again. Dean was able to
parry the blow with his right hand, and the bolo hit him
on the right elbow. Dean fell to the floor and tried to...
stand up, but petitioner stabbed him anew on his left
breast.
Meantime, SPO1 Henry Sulatre was at the Tubao Police
Station, about 100 meters away.
He was informed that a fight was going on in the bank.
He rushed to the place on board the police car.
He brought petitioner to the police station. On the way,
they passed by the loading area of tricycles, about 40
meters away from the police station.
Petitioner shouted:
I stabbed him, he is just a visitor so he should not act
like a king here in Tubao
SPO1 Sulatre placed Benjamin in jail. Benjamin kept on
shouting:
"Napatay kon, napatay kon”
In the meantime, Dean sustained two stab wounds
On September 13, 2000 the Provincial Prosecutor of La
Union indicted Benjamin for frustrated murder before the
Regional Trial Court
Petitioner declared that he merely defended himself
against Dean's assault. Dean was so jealous of him
because his mistress, Elvisa, had also been his
mistress.
Petitioner declared that the criminal charge against him
was Dean's concoction, and intended solely to harass
him.
He parked his tricycle in front of the building on
the left side of the railing going to the entrance of the
cooperative.
On his way, he met his 82-year-old uncle, who was also
on his way to the cooperative to update his passbook
because he was intending to apply for a loan. Dean
thought that he was blocking his way and shouted
invectives at him and his uncle. Dean kept attacking him,
forcing him to move backward through the railing and
towards his tricycle. He stabbed Dean on his right elbow.
When Barangay Captain he surrendered, along with his
bolo he never boasted on the way to the police station
that he had killed Dean.
Issues:
Petitioner's argument that he should be acquitted
because the criminal complaint against him was not
supported by the victim's sworn statement or by an
affidavit
Petitioner next argues that should he be convicted of any
crime, it should be of less serious physical injuries only,
absence the element of intent to kill.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner is guilty of frustrated murder under Article 248
in relation to Article 6, first paragraph of the Revised
Penal Code which reads
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following
requisites should be present:
(1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the
offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or
the latter's agent; and
(3) the surrender was voluntary. The surrender must
be... spontaneous, made in such a manner that it shows
the interest of the accused to surrender unconditionally
to the authorities, either because he acknowledged his
guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and
expenses that would necessarily be incurred in the
search and capture.
In the case at bar, SPO1 Salutre testified that petitioner
did not voluntarily surrender but was forcibly
apprehended by Barangay Captain
We agree with the trial court that the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation has not been
adequately shown. To properly appreciate the same
The trial court awarded Dean the amount of P92,000.00
representing his hospitalization and medical expenses
which was increased by the CA to P92,715.68.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed
Decision is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
Petitioner is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Frustrated Murder under Article 248 in relation
to Article 6... prision mayor to eclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum.
US vs Valdez
G.R. No. L-14128
TORRES, J.:
Facts:
The wrong done is considered to be the direct, natural
and logical consequence of the felony committed.
The victim, Venancio Gargantel , who was threatened by
the accused, Calixto Valdez y Quiri, with a knife, jumped
into the water and because of the strong current or
because he did not know how to swim, he sank down
and died of drowning.
On the next day one of the friends of the victim posted
himself near the lighthouse to watch for the body, in the
hope that it might come to the surface and could thus be
recovered. Though his friendly vigil lasted three days
nothing came of it. Moreover, Venancio has not returned
to his lodging in Manila, where he lived as a bachelor in
the house of an acquaintance; and his personal
belongings have been delivered to a representative of
his mother who lives in the Province of Iloilo. His friends
and relatives, take it for granted that he is dead.
Issue: WON, the accused is responsible for the death of
the victim.
Held: The victim is presumed dead and that he came to
his death by drowning under the circumstances stated.
The proof is direct that he never rose to the surface after
jumping into the river, so far as the observers could see;
and this circumstance, coupled with the known fact that
human life must inevitably be extinguished by
asphyxiation under water, is conclusive of his death. The
possibility that he might have swum ashore, after rising
in a spot hidden from the view of his companions, we
consider too remote to be entertained for a moment.
As to the criminal responsibility of the accused for the
death thus occasioned the likewise can be no doubt; for
it is obvious that the deceased, in throwing himself in the
river, acted solely in obedience to the instinct of
self-preservation and was in no sense legally
responsible for his own death.
A person who creates in another’s mind an immediate
sense of danger, which causes the latter to do
something resulting to the latter’s injuries is liable for the
resulting injuries.
The accused must, therefore, be considered the
responsible author of the death of the victim, and he was
properly convicted of the offense of homicide. The trial
judge appreciated as an attenuating circumstance the
fact that the offender had no intention to commit so great
a wrong as that committed. (Par. 3, art. 9 Penal Code.)
Dungo v. People
G.R. No. 209464,
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS: Villanueva, a UP Los Baños student, was a
neophyte of the APO – Theta Chapter Fraternity and that
Dungo and Sibal, as members of the said fraternity,
together with the other fraternity members, officers and
alumni, brought and transported Villanueva and two
other neophytes to Villa Novaliches Resort at Barangay
Pansol, Calamba City, for the final initiation rites
conducted inside the resort, performed under the cover
of darkness and secrecy.
Due to the injuries sustained by Villanueva, the fraternity
members and the other two neophytes haphazardly left
the resort, while Dungo and Sibal boarded a tricycle and
brought the lifeless body of Villanueva to JP Rizal
Hospital, where Villanueva was pronounced dead.
The RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of
violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and
Sibal was bereft of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of proof of intent to kill the
victim will affect the liability of the accused.
RULING:
The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum
prohibitum.
R.A. No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995, has
been enacted to regulate hazing and other forms of
initiation rites in fraternities, sororities, and other
organizations. It was in response to the rising incidents
of death of hazing victims.
Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in
themselves called acts mala in se; and acts which would
not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids
them, called acts mala prohibita. This distinction is
important with reference to the intent with which a
wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in
acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala
prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?
When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is
immaterial. When the doing of an act is prohibited by
law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the
doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.
The study of the provisions of R.A. No. 8049 shows that
it is complete and robust in penalizing the crime of
hazing.
It was made malum prohibitum to discount criminal intent
and disallow the defense of good faith. It took into
consideration the different participants and contributors
in the hazing activities.
Recognizing the malum prohibitum characteristic of
hazing, the law provides that any person charged with
the said crime shall not be entitled to the mitigating
circumstance that there was no intention to commit so
grave a wrong.
PEOPLE VS AGUILOS
G.R. No. 121828
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
February 5, 1988 11:30 pm: Elisa Rolan was inside their
store waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa
and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer. Although already
drunk, Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba joined them.
Edmar had a heated argument with Julian. Elisa
pacified Edmar and advised them to go home as she
was already going to close up. Edmar and Odilon left
then returned to block Joselito and Julian. Edmar took
off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in the face. Elisa
shouted: “Tama na. Tama na” but she was ignored as
they continued until they reached the end of the street.
Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow
blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian swapped
punches. As Joselito tried to stop the fight, Odilon pulled
out his knife with his right hand and stepped down from
his perch. He placed his left arm around Joselito’s neck,
and stabbed him. Ronnie and Rene Gayot Pilola, who
were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon
stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. Ronnie
took a knife from the kitchen of Teresita and rushed
together with Pilola to the scene and stabbed Joselito.
As Joeslito was stabbed 11 times (6 fatal stab wounds),
he fell in the canal. Odilon and Pilola fled while Ronnie
went after Julian who ran dear life. When Julian noticed
that Ronnie was no longer running after him, he looked
back and saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block
and bashed Joselito’s head. Then, Ronnie got a piece
of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more before
fleeing from the scene. Joselito died on the spot. Elisa
rushed to Joselito’s house and informed his wife and
brother of the incident.
Agripina Gloria, a female security guard, saw Ronnie
repeatedly stabbed Joselito and fled towards the
direction of the mental hospital. She did not see Odilon.
Elisa cross-examination had an inconsistency, she
stated that it was Edmar who struck the victim (before it
was Ronnie)
RTC: Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
qualified by treachery and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua
ISSUE: W/N Pilola is guilty of murder
HELD: YES. Rene Gayot Pilola GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION
The identity of the person who hit the victim with a
hollow block is of de minimis importance. Elisa’s
testimony is corroborated by the autopsy report of Dr.
Bienvenido Muñoz. No showing of any improper motive
on the part of a witness to testify falsely against the
accused or to falsely implicate the latter in the
commission of the crime. The trial court gave credence
and full probative weight to Elisa’s testimony.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to
commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as
a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved
separately from and with the same quantum of proof as
the crime itself.
Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After
all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a
successful conspiracy. It may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had acted
with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be
implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by
their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined
acts, though apparently independent of each other,
were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment. There may be conspiracy even if an offender
does not know the identities of the other offenders, and
even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan
of operation or was not in on the scheme from the
beginning. One need only to knowingly contribute his
efforts in furtherance of it. One who joins a criminal
conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal
designs of his co-conspirators. If conspiracy is
established, all the conspirators are liable as
co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of
their participation since in contemplation of law, the act
of one would be the act of all. Each of the conspirators is
the agent of all the others.
The mere presence of an accused at the situs of the
crime will not suffice. There must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose.
Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit
homicide or murder, they may be held criminally liable as
principals by direct participation if they perform overt
acts which mediately or immediately cause or accelerate
the death of the victim. Art. 4. Criminal liability. –
Criminal liability shall be incurred:
o 1. By any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
Art. 18. Accomplices. – Accomplices are the persons
who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts.
o To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two
elements must concur:
1. the community of criminal design; that is, knowing the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose;
2. the performance of previous or simultaneous acts
that are not indispensable to the commission of the
crime
Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution
of the principal by direct participation after the principal
has reached the decision to commit the felony and only
then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its
execution. Accomplices do not decide whether the
crime should be committed; they merely assent to the
plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate
in its accomplishment
However, where one cooperates in the commission of
the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves
are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct
participation, and not merely an accomplice
Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim.
However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the
appellant and Ronnie agreed to join. All the overt acts of
Odilon, Ronnie and the Pilola before, during, and after
the stabbing incident indubitably show that they
conspired to kill the victim. Since the victim is not yet
dead, the crime is not yet consummated so Pilola is a
principal by direct participation.
Alibi is a weak, if not the weakest of defenses in a
criminal prosecution, because it is easy to concoct but
hard to disprove. To serve as basis for acquittal, it must
be established by clear and convincing evidence. For it
to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was
absent from the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, but also that it was physically impossible for
him to have been present then.
Pilola knew that he was charged for the stabbing but
instead of surrendering to the police authorities, he
evaded arrest and this flight is evidence of guilt
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. The essence of treachery is the swift and
unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the
slightest provocation on his part - attack on the unarmed
victim was sudden. The aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery
MAMANGUN VS PEOPLE
GR No. 149152
GARCIA, J.:
Facts:
Policeman (PO2) Rufino Mamangun was responding to
a robbery-holdup call, with his fellow police officers, at
Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. A certain Liberty
Contreras was heard shouting, which prompted
residents to respond and chase the suspect, who
entered the yard and proceeded to the rooftop of Antonio
Abacan. Mamangun, with PO2 Diaz and Cruz, each
armed with a drawn handgun, searched the rooftop and
saw a man who they thought was the robbery suspect.
Mamangun, who was ahead of the group, fired his gun
once and hit the man, who turned out to be Gener
Contreras (not the suspect) – Contreras died of the
gunshot wound.
According to the lone witness Crisanto Ayson, he
accompanied the policemen to the lighted rooftop. He
was beside Mamangun when he (Ayson) recognized the
deceased. According to Ayson, Mamangun pointed his
gun at the man, who instantly exclaimed “Hindi ako,
hindi ako!” to which Mamangun replied, “Anong hindi
ako?” and shot him.
The defense rejects this testimony, alleging that they
were the only ones at the dark rooftop when Mamangun
noticed a crouching man who suddenly continued to run.
Mamangun shouted “Pulis, tigil!” whereupon the person
stopped and raised a steel pipe towards Mamangun’s
head. This prompted Mamangun to shoot the person.
The three police claim that Contreras only said “Hindi
ako, hindi ako” only when they approached him.
Mamangun then asked “Why did you go to the rooftop?
You know there are policemen here.” Mamangun
reported the incident to the desk officer who directed
investigator Hernando Banez to investigate the incident.
Banez later on found a steel pipe on the roof.
Issue:
W/N the death of the victim was the necessary
consequence of the petitioner’s fulfillment of his duty
Held:
No. The Court denies the instant petition and affirms
Sandiganbayan’s decision after finding the petitioner’s
testimony to be nothing but a concocted story designed
to evade criminal liability. Per Sandiganbayan’s
observations, the defense was self-serving for the
accused and biased with respect to his
co-policemen-witnesses because:
After supposed introductions and forewarnings uttered
allegedly by Mamangun, it is contrary to human
experience for a man (who is not the suspect) to attack
one of three policemen with drawn guns
Mamangun’s admission that he did not ask the victim
“Why did you try to hit me, if you are not the one?”
clearly belies their claim
The location of the entry of bullet belies their claim
because it appears that the victim instinctively shielded
himself instead
Additionally, petitioner’s pretense that Contreras struck
him was not initially reported to the desk and was only
conveniently remembered when the investigator found a
pipe in the crime scene.
Acts in the fulfillment of duty and self-defense does not
completely justify the petitioner’s firing the fatal gunshot.
The element of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim was absent, which leads to the failure of the
petitioner’s plea. Also, there can only be incomplete
justification (a privileged mitigating circumstance) in the
absence of a necessary justifying circumstance the
injury was caused by necessary consequence of due
performance of duty.
PEOPLE VS BONOAN
G.R. No. L-45130
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:
Celestino Bonoan is charged with the crime of murder
for stabbing Carlos Guison with a knife, which caused
his death three days afterwards. An arraignment was
then called, but the defense objected on the ground that
the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the
time confined at the Psychopatic Hospital. After several
months of summons for doctors, production of the
defendant’s complete record of mental condition from
the hospital and defendant’s admission to the hospital
for personal observation, assistant alienist Dr. Jose
Fernandez finally reported to the court that Bonoan may
be discharged for being a “recovered case”. After trial,
the lower court found Bonoan guilty and sentenced him
to life imprisonment.
The defense now appeals, claiming the lower court
made errors in finding Bonoan suffered dementia only
occasionally and intermittently, did not show any kind of
abnormality, that the defense did not establish the
defendant’s insanity and finding accused guilty.
Issue:
W/N the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty
Held:
Yes. The Court finds the accused demented at the time
he perpetrated the crime, which consequently exempts
him from criminal liability, and orders for his confinement
in San Lazaro Hospital or other hospital for the insane.
This ruling was based on the following evidence:
Uncontradicted evidence that accused was confined in
the insane department of San Lazaro Hospital and
diagnosed with dementia praecox long before the
commission of the offense and recurrence of ailments
were not entirely lacking of scientific foundation
Persons with dementia praecox are disqualified from
legal responsibility because they have no control of their
acts; dementia praecox symptoms similar to manic
depression psychosis
Accused had an insomnia attack, a symptom leading to
dementia praecox, four days prior to act according to Dr.
Francisco
Accused was sent the Psychopatic hospital on the same
day of crime and arrest, indicating the police’s doubt of
his mental normalcy
Defendant suffered from manic depressive psychosis
according to Dr. Joson
Dissenting (Justices Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion):
The dissenting opinions pose that the accused
committed the crime when he was sane, or at least,
during a lucid interval.
The legal presumption is always in favor of sanity; no
positive evidence of accused mental state was
established
Based on expert testimonies, accused was cured of
dementia praecox and later manic depressive psychosis
Based on observance of arresting officer Damaso
Arnoco, corrobating statement of Benjamin Cruz, and
other witnesses, accused appear sane at the time
immediately after commission
There is a motive of aggression on part of accused is
real and positive fact: deceased’s failure to pay
borrowed money
People vs. Puno People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 97471
REGALADO, J.
Facts:
January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused
Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs.
Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao
purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at
Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC
He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred
had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so Isabelo will
temporarily take his place. When it was time for Mrs.
Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got
into her husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving
After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it
stopped and a young man, accused Enrique Amurao,
boarded the car beside the driver. Enrique pointed a gun
at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to
"get money" from her Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her
bag which she handed to the accused. But the accused
said that they wanted P100,000 more.
According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of
the car then crossed to the other side of the
superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's
van, her dress had blood because according to her, she
fell down on the ground and was injured when she
jumped out of the car. The defense does not dispute the
above narrative of the complainant except that according
to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and
freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the car. He
said he even slowed the car down as he drove away,
until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride. He
claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe
while running across the highway
Issue:
1. Whether or not the accused can be convicted of
kidnapping for ransom as charged
2. Whether or not the said robbery can be
classified as "highway robbery" under PD No.
532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law
of 1974)
HELD:
NO.There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had
any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they
committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other
than extortion of money from her under the compulsion
of threats or intimidation.
For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof
that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive
the offended party of her liberty
In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was
merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offenders
This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal
detention. The mere fact that the robbery was committed
inside a car which was casually operating on a highway
does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case. This is
not justified by the accused's intention
Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate
sentence of 4 years and 2 months or prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor.
Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual
damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)
DANDY DUNGO and GREGORIO SIBAL, JR. vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 209464
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
On January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol,
Calamba City, Laguna, the Alpha Phi Omega Fraternity
in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members
and officers conducted initiation rite. MARLON
VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte was subjected to
physical harm.
After the initiation rites, accused Sibal inquired about
Villanueva's condition but he was ignored by Castillo. He
then called co-accused Dungo for help. After Dungo
arrived at the resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought
Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false
name to the security guard as he heard that Dungo had
done the same.
RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of
violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was
bereft of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not herein accused were guilty of violation of
R.A. No. 8049.
Ruling:
Yes, they are guilty of violation of R.A. No. 8049.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an
initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission
into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization
by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing
him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or
activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or
psychological suffering or injury. From the said definition,
the elements of the crime of hazing can be determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a
prerequisite for admission into membership in a
fraternity, sorority or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of
the fraternity, sorority or organization; and
3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in
some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as
forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar
tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical
or psychological suffering or injury.
Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of
offenders in the criminal conspiracy can be proven by
the prima facie evidence due to their presence during
the hazing, unless they prevented the commission of the
acts therein.
People v. Rafanan
G.R. No. L-54135
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS: Complainant Estelita Ronaya was only 14 years
old when hired as a househelper by the mother of the
accused. The accused Policarpio Rafaran and his family
lived with his mother in the same house. Policarpio was
married and has children. One evening, the mother of
the accused called complainant to help him close the
door. When the complainant went near him, he pulled
her inside the store and raped her despite her
resistance. After that, he warned the complainant not to
tell anyone about it or he will kill her. The next day, the
family of the accused knew what happened. Appellant
claimed that he is suffering from schizophrenia when he
inflicted violent intentions to Estelita. Trial court
suspended the tria; and ordered his confinement to
National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong. After 2 years,
he was reported to be behaved and in improved
condition and in mental condition to stand court in trial.
Trial of case resumed.
ISSUE: W/N the reason of insanity is sufficient to relieve
him from criminal liability
HELD: No. The allegation of insanity or imbecility must
be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the
defendant had previously lost his reason or was
demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was
in a normal condition.
PEOPLE V MADARANG
Gr. No. 132319
PUNO, J.:
Appellant was convicted of parricide for stabbing his
wife, causing her death. Appellant alleges he was in a
state of insanity and claims he had no recollection of the
stabbing incident.He insists that he was deprived of
intelligence , making his act involuntary.His psychiatric
evaluation revealed he was suffering from schizophrenia
but after two years in the National Center for Mental
Health his condition improved thus, he was released.
HELD:
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more
stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is
required that there must be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act,i.e., the accused is
deprived of reason; he acted without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the
power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of the
will.Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability.The issue of insanity is a question of
fact.The state or condition of a man's mind can only be
measured and judged by his behavior.Establishing one's
insanity requires testimony of an expert witness, such as
a psychiatrist.The proof must relate to the time
preceding or coetaneous with the commisssion of the
offense with which he is charged.None of the witnesses
declared that he exhibited any of the symptoms
associated with schizophrenia immediately before or
simultaneous with the stabbing incident.Also
schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are
capable of distinguishing right from wrong.
People of the Philippines vs. Anacito Opuran
GR No. 147674-75
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
FACTS:
On Nov. 19, 1998, 6:30 pm at Catbalogan, Samar,
Anacito Opuran, herein accused, stabbed Allan Dacles,
who was lying on a bench. At 7:45 pm of the same day,
Demetrio Patrimonio was walking on the national
highway of Catbalogan, Samar. Thereafter, the accused
emerged from where he was hiding and stabbed
Patrimonio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused can use the exempting
circumstance of insanity as a defense.
RULING:
No. Insanity must exist immediately before or at the
précised moment of the commission of the act. The
accused failed to prove that he was insane at the precise
moment of commission or immediately before said act.
Thus, insanity is not attendant in the case at bar.
People vs. Genosa
G.R. No. 135981
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15 November
1995, attacked and wounded his husband, which
ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant
she did not provoke her husband when she got home
that night it was her husband who began the
provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened that
her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make
sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, The
Appelant had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical
Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and
hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on
December 1, 1995.
The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had
tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that
Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile.
The Apellant said that the reason why Ben was violent
and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was
crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.
The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has
been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman
Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the
killing of her husband, she was then found guilty of
Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.
ISSUES: Whether or not respondent can be granted the
justifying circumstance of self defense of battered
woman syndrome.
HELD:
No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered
woman syndrome, which the appellant has been shown
to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive
partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context
of self-defense.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony
of the appellant there was a sufficient time interval
between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her
fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to
withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their
children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently
ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even
the imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented
an actual threat on her life or safety. Without continuous
aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence
of aggression does not warrant complete or incomplete
self-defense.
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes
against persons by employing means, methods or forms
in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising
from the defense that the offended party might make.
In the present case, however, it was not conclusively
shown, that the appellant intentionally chose a specific
means of successfully attacking her husband without
any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might
make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of
using the gun occurred to her only at about the same
moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the
absence of any convincing proof that she consciously
and deliberately employed the method by which she
committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the
doubt should be resolved in her favor.
PEOPLE VS DOQUENA
G.R. No. 46539
DIAZ, J.:
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was prosecuted
for homicide in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, for having killed Juan Ragojos by stabbing
him in the breast with a knife on November 19, 1938, in
the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan. The court, after
trying the case, held that the accused acted with
discernment in committing the act imputed to him and,
proceeding in accordance with the provisions of article
80 of the Revised Penal Code.
Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November
19, 1938, the now deceased Juan Ragojos and one
Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of the
intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Province
of Pangasinan. The herein accused, who was also in
said yard, intervened and, catching the ball, tossed it at
Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach. For this act of
the accused, Juan Kagojos chased him around the yard
and, upon overtaking him, slapped him on the nape.
Said accused then turned against the deceased
assuming a threatening attitude, for which reason said
deceased struck him on the mouth with his fist, returning
immediately to the place where Epifanio Rarang was in
order to continue playing with him. The accused,
offended by what he considered an abuse on the part of
Juan Ragojos, who was taller and more robust than he,
looked around the yard for a stone with which to attack
the now deceased Juan Ragojos, but finding none, he
approached a cousin of his named Romualdo Cocal, to
ask the latter to lend him his knife. Epifanio Rarang,
who had heard what the accused had been asking his
cousin, told the latter not to give the accused his knife
because he might attack Juan Ragojos with it. The
accused, however, succeeded in taking possession of
the knife which was in a pocket of his cousin's pants.
Once in possession of the knife, Doquena approached
Juan Ragojos and challenged the latter to give him
another blow with his fist, to which the deceased
answered that he did not want to do so because he
(Juan Ragojos) was bigger than the accused. Juan
Ragojos, ignorant of the intentions of the accused,
continued playing and, while he was thus unprepared
and in the act of stopping the ball with his two hands, the
accused stabbed him in the chest with the knife which he
carried."
HELD:
The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the
appealed order, convinces us that the appeal taken from
said order is absolutely unfounded, because it is error to
determine discernment by the means resorted to by the
attorney for the defense, as discussed by him in his
brief. He claims that to determine whether or not a minor
acted with discernment, we must take into consideration
not only the facts and circumstances which gave rise to
the act committed by the minor, but also his state of
mind at the time the crime was committed, the time he
might have had at his disposal for the purpose of
meditating on the consequences of his act, and the
degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment.
It is clear that the attorney for the defense mistakes the
discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of the
Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for
lack of intention which, as a mitigating circumstance, is
included among other mitigating circumstances in article
13 of said Code. The discernment that constitutes an
exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a
minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who
commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity
to understand the difference between right and wrong,
and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances afforded by the records in each case.
Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs
to the appellant. So ordered.
People of the Philippines vs Allen Udtojan Mantalaba
G.R. No. 186227
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
Task Forcer Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response
(RACER) in Butuan City received a report that
Mantalaba who was 17 yrs old was selling shabu. After a
buy-bust operation, two informations was filed against
Mantalaba which was later on consolidated. Mantalaba
pleaded not guilty.
RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and was penalized of reclusion perpetua to death and
fine of 500k for selling shabu and (2) for illegally
possessing shabu, Mantalaba was penalized, in
application of the ISL, 6 yrs and 1 day as minimum and 8
yrs as maximum of prision mayor and fine of 300k. CA
affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Thus, the
present appeal.
Mantalaba: the lower court gravely erred in convicting
him and that there was no evidence of actual sale
between him and the poser-buyer during the buy-bust
operation. He also claims that the chain of custody of the
seized shabu was not established.
Issue: Whether Mantalaba is guilty of drug trafficking and
possession.
Ruling:
The petition is without merit.
The buy-bust operation was valid, establishing the
following: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefore. From the above
testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well
established that the elements have been satisfactorily
met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly
identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the
marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented.
The testimony was also clear as to the manner in which
the buy-bust operation was conducted.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team
with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable
ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its
non-compliance will not render an accused arrest illegal
or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.
As to his minority, Mantalaba was minor during the
buy-bust operation but was of legal age during the
promulgation of the decision. It must be noted that RA
9344 took effect after the promulgation of the RTC's
decision against Mantalaba. The RTC did not suspend
the sentence in accordance with PD 603 (Child and
Youth Welfare Code) and Rule on Juveniles in Conflict
with the Law that were applicable at the time of
promulgation of the judgment.
But as to the penalty, CA must have appreciated
Mantalaba's minority as privileged mitigating
circumstance in fixing the penalty. Thus, applying the
rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one
degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion
temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the
minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum
penalty shall be taken from the medium period of
reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating
circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.
Ortega vs. People
G. R. No. 151085
NACHURA, J.:
Facts:
At the time of commission of rape, the accused was 13
years old while the victim was 6. The case was pending
when the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A.
9344) was enacted amending among others the age of
criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years
old. At the time of the promulgation of judgment, the
accused already reached the age of majority.
Issue:
Whether or not the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied, in the resolution of
the case.
Held:
The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A.
9344) should be applied. By virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the
age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to
15 years old, this law is evidently favorable to the
accused. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of
the commission of the alleged rape. This was duly
proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own
testimony, and by the testimony of his mother.
Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any
of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA.
Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of
the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No.
9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN
VS QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 225442
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: Following the campaign of President Rodrigo
Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for
minors, several local governments in Metro Manila
started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on
minors through police operations which were publicly
known as part of "Oplan Rody."
Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of
young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and
just society, in particular the protection of the rights and
welfare of the youth and minors - filed this present
petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they:
● result in arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for
vagueness doctrine;
● suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during
curfew hours;
● deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right
to travel without substantive due process; and
● deprive parents of their natural and primary right
in rearing the youth without substantive due
process.
More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew
Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed
standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and
properly determine the age of the alleged curfew
violators.
Petitioners submit that there is no compelling State
interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents'
prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their
natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and
that even if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive
means are available to achieve the same. In this regard,
they suggest massive street lighting programs,
installation of CCTVs (closed-circuit televisions) in public
streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as
other viable means of protecting children and preventing
crimes at night. They further opine that the government
can impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory
parental counseling and education seminars informing
the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that
imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who
allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.
ISSUE: Whether or not primordial issue for the Court's
resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional.
HELD: The petition is partly granted. WHEREFORE, the
petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court hereby
declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local
government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government
of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL
and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of
2014, issued by the local government of the Quezon City
is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in
accordance with this Decision.
Void for Vagueness. The assailed pieces of ordinance
are NOT void for being vague.
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to
the Constitution in two (2) respects:
1. it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and
2. it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."
PEOPLE VS CASTILLO
G.R. No. L-19238
DIZON, J.:
Facts:
Judge Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan
issued a search warrant against the premises of Rabino
for violation of RA 9165. A search was conducted
wherein the PDEA and PNP found 1 sachet of shabu
inside the house of Rabino in Aparri, Cagayan. Rabino
was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.
The case was raffled to RTC, Branch 6, Aparri,
Cagayan, presided by Judge Castillo.
Before arraignment, Rabino filed a Motion to Quash
Search Warrant and for Suppression of Illegally Acquired
Evidence, citing lack of probable cause among other
grounds. Judge Castillo granted the motion to quash,
holding that because the minimum penalty for illegal
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
is imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years,
which penalty is way beyond imprisonment of 6 years,
MTC Gattaran did not have jurisdiction to entertain the
application for and to issue the search warrant. As such,
the search warrant is null and void and all proceedings
had in virtue thereof are likewise null and void.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied.
Issue:
May a municipal trial court issue a search warrant
involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction?
Held:
1. The requisites for the issuance of a search
warrant are: probable cause is present;
2. such probable cause must be determined
personally by the judge;
3. the judge must examine, in writing and under
oatn or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce;
4. the applicant and the witnesses testify on the
facts personally known to them; and
5. he warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
The respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in
quashing the search warrant on a basis other than the
accepted grounds. It must be remembered that a search
warrant is valid for as long as it has all the requisites set
forth by the Constitution and must only be quashed
when any of its elements are found to be wanting.
Apparently, in this case, the application for a search
warrant was filed within the same judicial region where
the crime was allegedly committed. For compelling
reasons, the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan
has the authority to issue a search warrant to search and
seize the dangerous drugs stated in the application
thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the
same judicial region. The fact that the search warrant
was issued means that the MTC judge found probable
cause to grant the said application after the latter was
found by the same judge to have been filed for
compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court was duly complied with.
It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule
does it say that the court issuing a search warrant must
also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant
may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court and the resultant case may be
filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the
offense committed.
SOLOMON VERDADERO Y GALERA, Petitioner, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 216021
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
On March 12, 2009, in the municipality of Baggao,
Province of Cagayan, accused SOLOMON
VERDADERO armed with a Rambo knife, with intent to
kill, assault and stab ROMEO B. PLATA, thereby
inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different parts of
his body which caused his death. Before the incident,
Maynard Plata (Maynard) and his father Romeo were at
the Baggao Police Station. Together with Ronnie Elaydo
(Ronnie), they went there to report that Verdadero had
stolen the fan belt of their irrigation pump. Afterwards
they had a confrontation with Verdadero at the police
station, the three men made their way home on a tricycle
and stopped at the drug store as Maynard intended to
buy a baby supplies and the victim also followed him, on
his way the accused stabbed Romeo on the left side of
the victim’s back twice and his shoulder. Maynard tried
to help his father but Verdadero attempted to attack him
as well, he defended himself using a small stool, which
he used to hit Verdadero at the chest.
Prior to the incident, Solomon Verdadero was notably
going in and out of CVMCs Psychiatric Department, in
the year 1999, 2000, 2003, and March of 2009, Doctors
contended that he suffers a chronic mental disease
called Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy
and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions.
On May 30, 2013, the RTC rendered a decision finding
Verdadero guilty for the crime of homicide.
The RTC ruled that the crime committed was only
homicide, as the prosecution failed to establish the
presence of treachery and evident premeditation to
qualify the killing to murder. The trial court, however,
opined that Verdadero failed to establish insanity as an
exempting circumstance.
Aggrieved, Verdadero appealed before the CA.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S
CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS
INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT WAS
ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE.
RULING:
Supreme Court contends Verdadero insists that he was
able to fully support his defense of insanity. He claims
that Maynard even admitted that he was not in the
proper state of mind when they were at the police station
before the stabbing took place. Further, it appeared that
Verdadero was having hallucinations after the stabbing
incident as testified to by Dr. Andres-Juliana. Verdadero
notes that Dr. Pagaddu concluded that he had a relapse
at the time of the stabbing incident on March 12, 2009.
Moreover, it asserted that the CA did not misapprehend
the facts as the evidence presented failed to completely
establish Verdadero's insanity at the time of the
stabbing.
To completely evade culpability, Verdadero raises
insanity as a defense claiming that he had suffered a
relapse of his schizophrenia. Under Article 12 of the
RPC, an imbecile or an insane person is exempt from
criminal liability, unless the latter had acted during a
lucid interval. The defense of insanity or imbecility must
be clearly proved for there is a presumption that the acts
penalized by law are voluntary.18
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that:
1. as early as 1999, Verdadero was brought to the
Psychiatric Department of CVMC for treatment;
2. he was diagnosed with depression in 2001;
3. he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on July
21, 2003;
4. he was confined in the psychiatric ward
sometime in 2009 due to a relapse;
Thus, it is without question that he was suffering from
schizophrenia and the only thing left to be ascertained is
whether he should be absolved from responsibility in
killing Romeo because of his mental state. Supreme
Court ruled that Solomon Verdadero be acquitted but
ordered to pay civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim
and be confined to National Center for Mental Health for
treatment.
US v Tanedo
G.R. No. L-5418
MORELAND, J.:
FACTS:
petenia, castaneda and lugon conspired to kill and rob
mrs.guanlao of her valuables. petenia covered the
mouth of guanlao, lugon hit her with adobe stone.
petenia delivered fistic blows. as guanlao fell to the
ground, lugon and petenia hit her again twice and
caused her death.
petenia and castaneda were arrested for robbery with
homicide
issue:
- w/n lower court erred in not rejecting their extrajudicial
confessions
-w/n lower court erred in finding crime was committed in
conspiracy
- w/n lower court erred in not acquitting them cause of
exempting circumstance (uncontrollable fear)
held:
- no. burden is on defense to prove that a confession
was obtained as a result of violence, intimidation, threat
or promise of reward or leniency. no evidence to justify
that the extrajudicial confessions were by force.
- no. circumstances under the committed crime show a
single purpose and in unison with each act of the
accused to the attainment of the purpose
- no. requisites must be present. (existence of
uncontrollable fear, fear must be real and imminent, fear
of injury is greater than or equal to the committed act)
petenia contended that he delivered fistic blows because
he was afraid that lugon and castaneda will hit him with
hollow blocks. castaneda claimed that he ransacked
bedroom of guanlao because lugon and petenia poked a
knife at him. court said castaneda could have easily
escaped when he was already at the house of victim.
guilt of accused has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
People of the Philippines vs. Jesus Retubado
G.R. No. 124058
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Facts:
Someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the
appellant’s younger brother who was mentally ill.
Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette
pack and gave it to Edwin. While Edwin and his father
were having dinner, it exploded. The matter was brought
to the attention of the barangay captain who conducted
an investigation. It turned out that Emmanuel Caon, Jr.
was NOT the culprit. The appellant, however, was bent
on confronting Emmanuel Caon, Jr. Thereafter, the
father of Emmanuel Jr., 50 y.o. Emmanuel Caon, Sr.,
(pedicab driver) was confronted by Jesus when the
former was on his way home. Jesus told Emmanuel that
he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel Jr., but Emmanuel
Sr. told the appellant that his son was already asleep.
Norberta went down from the balcony and placed her
hand on her husbands shoulder to pacify him. Jesus
forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and
shot Emmanuel on the forehead. The latter fell to the
floor as the appellant walked away from the scene.
Emmanuel was brought to the Tuburan District Hospital,
but he died shortly thereafter. Jesus surrendered to the
police but failed to surrender the firearm he used to kill
the victim.
Jesus admitted shooting the victim but claimed that he
was merely performing a lawful act with due care hence,
cannot be held criminally liable for the victims death. He
testified that when he insisted that Emmanuel wake up
his son, Emmanuel went to his room and emerged
therefrom holding a handgun. Jesus grabbed
Emmanuel’s hand, they struggled for the gun but
eventually, Emmanuel fell on his knees. Jesus pulled the
gun to the level of Emmanuel’s forehead, and the gun
suddenly went off. Jesus then rushed to his house to
change clothes. He placed the gun on the dining table.
When he went back to the dining room his sister told him
that their brother Edwin had taken the gun and thrown it
into the sea.
Trial court convicted Jesus of murder, and sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
1. WON Jesus was merely performing a lawful act
with due care hence, cannot be held criminally liable for
the victims death
2. WON Jesus is liable for murder
HELD:
No. The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying
circumstance under Article 11, paragraph 4 of the RPC.
It is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the
accused with clear and convincing evidence. By
admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the
accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of the evidence of the
prosecution. Whether the accused acted under a state of
necessity is a question of fact, which is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court.
There is no basis to deviate from the findings of the trial
court that the appellant was the provocator, the unlawful
aggressor and the author of a deliberate and malicious
act of shooting the victim at close range on the forehead.
The court came to this conclusion based on:
1. There is no evidence that the appellant informed
the police authorities that he killed the victim in a
state of necessity and that his brother, Edwin,
threw the gun into the sea.
2. The appellant had a motive to shoot and kill the
victim.
There is no treachery in the present case to qualify the
crime to murder. To appreciate treachery, two (2)
conditions must be present, namely, (a) the employment
of the means of execution that give the person attacked
no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b)
the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted. The prosecution failed to adduce an iota of
evidence to support the confluence of the
abovementioned conditions.
The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SY PIO
G.R. NO. L-5848
LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS:
Note: This is an appeal of the Court of First Instance of
Manila’s judgement finding Sy Pio guilty of frustrated
murder against Tan Siong Kiap, and sentencing him to
suffer an indeterminate sentence of 6 years, 1 month,
and 11 days of prision mayor, to 14 years, 8 months,
and 1 day of reclusion tempora.
The prosecution’s evidence shows:
September 3, 1949, early morning, Sy Pio entered a
store at 511 Misericordia, Sta Cruz, Manila and started
firing with a .45 caliber pistol. First to be shot was Jose
Sy. Tan Siong Kiap, who saw Sy Pio enter and fire at
Jose Sy, asked, “What is the idea?” Sy Pio then turned
around and fired at him as well. Tan was shot in his right
shoulder and then ran to a room behind the store to
hide. Tan heard a few more gunshots before Sy Pio ran
away.
Tan Sion Kiap was brought to the Chinese General
Hospital, where his wound was treated from September
3 to 12. Tan was requested to return for further
treatment, and in a span of 10 days and after five visits,
his wound was completely healed. He spent P300 for
hospital and doctor’s fees.
Sy Pio shot two other people that day – Ong Pian and
Jose Sy – before shooting and wounding Tan Siong
Kiap.
September 5, the Manila Police Department received
information that Sy Pio was in custody of the
Constabulary in Tarlac, so Captain Daniel V. Lomotan of
the Manila police proceeded there. The two had a
conversation and Sy Pio admitted to shooting Tan Siong
Kiap, Ong Pian, and Jose Sy. The Constabulary in
Tarlac delivered to Lomotan the pistol Sy Pio had used,
which the Constabulary had confiscated beforehand.
Lomotan then brought Sy Pio to Manila, where his
statement – detailing the assaults against Tan, Ong
Pian, and Jose Sy – was taken down in writing.
On appeal, Sy Pio’s contentions:
1. The trial court erred in not finding that Tan Siong
Kiap received the shot accidentally from the same bullet
that had been fired at Jose Sy and in finding that Sy Pio
had committed a crime separate from that of Jose Sy’s
murder.
The court found no merit in this contention. Tan Siong
Kiap’s testimony – that Sy Pio turned around and fired at
him instead of answering when he asked why Sy Pio
was shooting – was uncontradicted by Sy Pio.
2. The evidence is not sufficient to sustain the
judgment of conviction.
The court found no merit in this contention. Against Tan
Siong Kiap’s uncontradicted testimony; Sy Pio’s
admissions before Captain Lomotan in Tarlac; and Sy
Pio possession of the .45 caliber pistol, plus testimony of
the physician who examined and treated Tan Siong
Kiap’s wounds, matching his wounds to the caliber .45
bullet, Sy Pio “has only made a very unbelievable story.”
3. Sy Pio should be found guilty only of less
serious physical injuries instead of frustrated murder.
While intent to kill was proven, the wound inflicted was
not fatal because it did not touch any of Tan Siong
Kiap’s vital organs. Additionally, Tan Siong Kiap’s
physician’s medical certification stated that the wound
was to heal within a period of fourteen days.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sy Pio can be convicted of frustrated
murder.
RULING:
In the case at bar, Sy Pio fired at Tan Siong Kiap, and
the latter was hit, but was able to escape and hide in
another room. Sy Pio must have seen that Tan Siong
Kiap was able to escape; Sy Pio knew that he had not
performed all the acts of execution necessary to kill his
victim. It cannot be said that the subjective phase had
been completed. But because Sy Pio ran away after the
incident, there was reasonable doubt in the court that Sy
Pio may have actually believed that he had committed all
the acts of execution. This doubt must be resolved in Sy
Pio’s favor.
Sy Pio was found guilty of attempted murder.
PEOPLE VS ROBIOS
G.R. No. 138453
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Melencio Robios was found guilty with the complex
crime of parricide with unintentional abortion and was
sentenced of death. May 31, 1995, he was accused of
killing his pregnant wife. March 25, 1995 Lorenzo
Robios, son of Melencio heard his parents quarreling
and saw Melencio stab her mom Lorenza with an 8-inch
double bladed knife on the right shoulder. On the same
day, Benjamin, brother of Lorenza reported that
Melencio has also killed their uncle. Benjamin knowing
what Melencio did to her sister, went to her sister’s
house when he saw Melencio and the latter shouted “It's
good you would see how your sister would die.”
Benjamin sought the help of the police.
SPO1 saw Melencio embracing her wife uttering the
words “I will kill myself, I will kill myself”. Lorenza, who
was lying on her back and facing upward, and she
appeared to be dead. Appellant tried to resist the people
who held him but was overpowered.
Special report showed that Lorenza Robios was
six (6) months pregnant. She suffered 41 stab wounds
on the different parts of her body and that the appellant
was under the influence of alcohol and also stabbed
himself.
Melencio admitted that she killed his wife but wish to be
exempted of his criminal liability invoking insanity. His
son testified that Melencio saw someone in their house
that wanted to kill him. A nurse said that Melencio
“isolated himself, laging nakatingin sa malayo, rarely
talked, just stared at her and murmured alone”. A
detention prisoner witnessed the appellant usually
refusing to respond in the counting of prisoners. He
could not remember when he was informed by his
children that he killed his wife. He could not believe that
he killed his wife
Issues at Hand:
Whether or not accused Can he be exempted on the
grounds of insanity?
Held:
1. Testimonies from both prosecution and
defense witnesses show no substantial evidence that
appellant was completely deprived of reason or
discernment when he perpetrated the brutal killing of his
wife. The fact that appellant admitted to responding law
enforcers how he had just killed his wife may have been
a manifestation of repentance and remorse -- a natural
sentiment of a husband who had realized the
wrongfulness of his act.
Since appellant was convicted of the complex
crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, the penalty
to be imposed on him should be that for the graver
offense which is parricide and punishable with reclusion
perpetua to death.
PEOPLE v. NORMA HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-23916
OSTRAND, J.:
FACTS: Vivencio Lascano, 19 y/o, started courting
appellant, Maria Norma Hernandez and after months of
courtship, appellant finally accepted Vivencio. On the
same date, she asked him to bring his parents over her
home so that they could talk about their marriage.

When Vivencio and his parents went to her house, they
brought chickens and goats and they agreed to buy a
wedding dress, 2 vestidas, shoes, P20 for the sponsors
and to repair the uncle’s roof.
While the celebration was
going on, appellant was nowhere to be found. Vivencio
and his parents waited but she never showed up thus
causing them great shame and humiliation.
Norma
Hernandez averred that Vivencio was really courting her
but that she wasn’t really in love with him. Her parents
tried to persuade her to accept the proposal and that she
only accepted it out of obedience to her parents and the
uncle’s insistence.
Before Vivencio’s parents came to
their home, she already counselled them not to bring the
chickens and that they should not regret whatever may
happen later.
 afraid that he might be shot again and that his
Appellant said she felt torture because she wasn’t
honestly in love with Vivencio and so she decided to
leave home as last recourse to prevent the
marriage.
Appellant’s parents also corroborated her
testimony.
 footprints and called on Lagata to inform him about the
RTC convicted her of serious slander by deed because
she purposely and deliberately fled to prevent
celebration of marriage. Thus, she appealed.
 told Lagata he was wounded and in turn, Lagata told
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant should be convicted
on the ground of serious slander by deed. NO.
RULING: Court reversed the RTC judgment and
acquitted the appellant. Malice, one of the essential
requisites of slander hasn’t been proven. There is no
malice in the act of the appellant changing her mind. She
was merely exercising her right not to give her consent
the marriage after mature consideration. Furthermore,
there were no strained relations existing between the
complainant & appellant before the incident. There
always existed good relations between them for they
were neighbors so it cannot be sustained that appellant
was motivated by spite or ill-will in deliberately frustrating
the marriage. Appellant has the privilege to reconsider
her previous commitment to marry and it would be utterly
inconsistent to convict her for slander by deed simply
because she desisted in continuing with the marriage. If
she would be liable, then that would be tantamount to
compelling her to go into a marriage without her free
consent.
Appellant had the right to avoid to herself the evil of
going through a loveless marriage. (Art. 11 par.4, RPC)
PEOPLE v. LAGATA
G.R. Nos. L-1940-42
PERFECTO, J.:
FACTS:
The accused, Ignacio Lagata, a provincial guard of
Catbalogan, Samar, was in charge of 6 prisoners (Jesus,
Tipace, Eusebio, Mariano, Labong & Abria) assigned to
work in the capitol plaza of Samar. Lagata ordered the
prisoners to go to the nursery to pick up gabi. Not long
afterwards, they were called to assemble. Epifanio
Labong was missing so Lagata ordered the 5 remaining
prisoners to go look for him. Eusebio Abria said that
while they were gathering gabi, he heard 3 shots. He
was wounded by the 2nd one. They were already
assembled by the 1st shot and that he did not see
Tipace being shot. He said he ran away because he was
companions were also probably scared and that is why
they ran. Another prisoner, Mariano Ibañez stated that
Epifanio Labong did not answer their call so Ignacio
Lagata ordered to go look for him in the mountain. He
said that Abria went to the camote plantation and found
footprints. When Abria told Lagata of the flattened grass
and that he was unable to look for Labong, Ignacio
Lagata fired at him and he was hit on his left arm. Abria
them to assemble.
Once they were assembled, Lagata cocked his
gun and shot Ceferino Tipace. Mariano said that when
he saw Tipace was shot, he ran away because he also
could have been shot. Eustaquio Galet, another
detainee, received good treatment from Lagata though
his testimony corroborated those of the other prisoners.

Ignacio Lagata, however, said that he fired his gun
because the prisoners were running away from him
when he already ordered them to stop.
ISSUE:
Whether or not justifying circumstance can be
appreciated.
HELD:
Court ruled that Lagata should be sentenced for
homicide and serious physical injuries.m
Appellant was
entitled to the benefit of mitigating circumstance of
incomplete justifying circumstance. (Art.11 par.5, RPC)

It was clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire
at Tipace. 
According to Lagata himself, Tipace was
running towards and around him. How could anyone
intending to escape run towards and around the very
guard one was supposed to escape from?
Even if Lagata sincerely believed that he acted in the
performance of his duties, the circumstances show that
there was no necessity for him to fire directly against the
prisoners as to wound them seriously and even kill one
of them.
While custodians should take care for prisoners
not to escape, only ABSOLUTE NECESSITY would
authorize them to fire against them.
PEOPLE v. BERONILLA
G.R. No. L-4445
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS: Arsenio Borjal was mayor of La Paz Abra at the
outbreak of war and continued to serve as mayor during
the Japanese occupation. Dec 19, 1944
accused-appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed
Military Mayor of La Paz by LT. Col Arnold.
Simultaneously, he received a memorandum issued by
Arnold authorizing them to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen
to try persons accused of treason, espionage or aiding
the enemy. He also received a list of all puppet
government officials of Abra, with a memorandum
instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons
and gather against them complaints. Beronilla, pursuant
to his instructions placed Borjal under custody and
asked residents of La Paz to file case against him.
Two years later, Mayor Beronillo and others
involved in the Borjal case were indicted by CFI of Abra
for murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in
the execution of Borjal. Pres. Roxas issued E.P. no.8,
granting amnesty to all persons who committed acts
penalized, under RPC in furtherance of resistance to the
enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy. All the accused, filed their application to Second
Guerilla Amnesty Commission, which denied their
application on the ground that they were inspired by
purely personal motives, thus remanding case to CFI for
trial on merits. On July 10, 1950 Beronillo, Paculdo,
Velasco and Adriatico were convicted as conspirator and
coprincipals of crime murder. They appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellants are guilty of murder.
NO Whether or not they should be granted Amnesty.
YES
RULING: The records are ample to show that Beronilla
acted pursuant to the orders of the Infantry
Headquarters. Although it was alleged by the state that
there was a radiogram from certain Col. Volkmann to Lt.
Col. Arnold, on the illegality of Borjal's execution, there
are no sufficient evidence to show that it was known to
Beronilla. Furthermore, the messages of Col. Arnold
approving the decisions of Beronilla prove otherwise.
The testimony of Rafael Balmaceda, relative of Borjal
was also unreliable. The state claims that the appellants
held grudges against late Borjal, but the court said that
the conduct of the appellants does not dispose that they
were impelled by malice. The lower court also found that
Borjal was really guilty of treasonable acts.
The court held that the accused appellants just
acted upon the orders of superiors and criminal intent
was not established. Even assuming the
accused-appellant are guilty of murder, they should not
be denied of the amnesty on the ground that the slaying
took place after actual liberation of the area from
enemy control. The court held that any reasonable
doubt as to whether a given case falls within the
amnesty proclamation shall be resolved in favor of
the accused.
TABUENA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 103501-03
FRANCISCO, J.:
FACTS: Following a direct order from President Marcos
(to pay IMMEDIATELY the sum of 55,000,000 to PNCC -
amount supposedly owed by MIAA, which is the
company that Tabuena is a general manager of), Luis
Tabuena withdrew the sum of 55M on three separate
occasions (25M, 25M, 5M - with Adoifo Peralta) and
delivered them to Fe Roa-Gimenez, the private secretary
of President Marcos. It is without dispute that Tabuena
did not follow the normal procedures in withdrawal and
delivery of the money (no disbursement slips and paid in
cold cash). Tabuena was only issued a receipt after the
third delivery and it did not mention anything about the
money being used to pay PNCC, but merely
acknowledged the fact that Gimenez had received the
sum of 55M from Tabuena on three occasions.
Furthermore, there was no receipt from the PNCC
recognizing payment of debt.
PROSECUTION: there were no standing obligations in
favor of the PNCC at the time of disbursement of 55M
TABUENA: he was merely complying with the direct
order of Marcos (plus the MARCOS memorandum which
contained same order) to IMMEDIATELY forward to the
office of the President, 55M in cash, as partial payment
of MIAA's obligations to PNCC and that he believed that
MIAA indeed had those liabilities to PNCC. In short, that
Tabuena acted in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tabuena, in following the orders
of his superior, can invoke justifying circumstance of
following the orders of his superior, in good faith. YES
RULING: The Court, based on the evidence presented,
found that Tabuena had no other choice but to actually
follow the order stated in the Marcos Memorandum,
because, as president of the Philippines, Marcos is
undeniably the superior of Tabuena. Tabuena entitled to
the justifying circumstance of "any person who acts in
obedience to an order issued by a superior for some
lawful purpose because he is only acting in good faith,
faithfully and efficiently carrying out orders from the
highest official in the land. Moreover, there was nothing
in the Marcos Memorandum that may invite suspicion -
there was no question about the lawfulness of the order
contained in such a memorandum. There was also no
evidence showing Tabuena had anything to do with the
creation of said Memorandum. Tabuena had reason to
believe that the 55M was indeed part of a due and
demandable debt, a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC
(existence of such debts determined from testimonies).
So even if the order was illegal and Tabuena was not
aware of the illegality, he would not be liable because
there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good
faith. Tabuena and Peralta acquitted.
PEOPLE v. TANEO
G.R. No. L-37673
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
FACTS: Potenciano Taneo and his wife lived in his
parent's house in Dolores, Ormoc. On January 16, 1932,
a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and
guests were entertained in the house, among them were
Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon,
Potenciano went to sleep and while sleeping, he
suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon
meeting his wife who tried to stop him, wounded her in
the abdomen. He also attacked Fred and Luis and tried
to attack his father, after which, he wounded himself.
Potenciano's wife, who was 7 months pregnant at that
time, died five days later as a result of the wound. The
TC found Potenciano guilty of parricide and was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant acted while in a
dream. YES.
RULING: The apparent lack of motive for committing a
criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are
none, but that simply they are not known to us. Although
an extreme moral perversion may lead a man to commit
a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of
committing it. In the case at hand, the court found not
only lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily
commit the acts complained of (read: he loved his wife
dearly, he tried to attack his father in whose house the
lived and the guests whom he invited), but also motives
for not committing the acts. Dr. Serafica, an expert
witness in the case, stated that considering the
circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in
a dream, under the influence of a hallucination and not in
his right mind. The wife's wound may have been inflicted
accidentally. The defendant did not dream that he was
assaulting his wife, but that he was defending himself
from his enemies.
Court decided that defendant not criminally liable for the
offense. It was also ordered that he be confined in the
government insane asylum and will not be released until
the director thereof finds that his liberty would no longer
constitute a menace

It appears from the evidence that the day before the

commission of the crime, the defendant had a quarrel
over a glass of "tuba" with Collantes and Abadilla, who
invited him to come down and fight. When he was about
to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother.
On the day of the commission of the crime, it was noted
that the defendant was sad and weak, had a severe
stomachache that's why he went to bed in the early
afternoon. The defendant stated that when he fell
asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him
with a bolo while Abadila held his feet. That's why he got
up and it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting
him to come down; he armed himself with a bolo and left
the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to
say to him that she was wounded. Then, he fancied
seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation
wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply
around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.