People vs Simon - The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the adjudication of the

case at bar, are to this effect: The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the
adjudication of the case at bar, are to this effect:

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing

quantities, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.

1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of four tea bags of marijuana
with a total weight of only 3.8 grams and, in fact, stands to be convicted for the sale of only two of
those tea bags, the initial inquiry would be whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty provided thereunder,
pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling:

We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for
offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised
Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases,
however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own
specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or
with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special
laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would
consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main
function is to determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the
Code.

This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the
graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application to special laws,
since the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties
provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special
laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical
impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.

The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished
under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its
technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the
system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision
correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and
absurd to posit otherwise. More on this later.

For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from the medium period
thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or
aggravating circumstance.

5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes in the penalties imposed
for offenses under special laws would be necessary.

Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the United States but
differently from the penalties provided in our Revised Penal Code and its Spanish origins, provided
for one specific penalty or a range of penalties with definitive durations, such as imprisonment for
one year or for one to five years but without division into periods or any technical statutory
cognomen. This is the special law contemplated in and referred to at the time laws like the
Indeterminate Sentence Law  were passed during the American regime.
61

Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct that an offense
thereunder shall be punished under the Revised Penal Code and in the same manner provided
therein. 

We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly
adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their
technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said
sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision
correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium period. Such offense,
although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal
Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid Section
1 which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." (Emphasis ours.)

People vs Puno - Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the
determination of the crime for which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his
acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying
or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts
complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion
thereon.

Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to determine
the specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was committed in the furtherance
of rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own
personal motives for committing the murder independent of his membership in the rebellious
movement in which case rebellion and murder would constitute separate offenses.   Also, where
10

injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was not then in the actual performance of his
official duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of
the previous performance of official duties by the person in authority, the crime would be direct
assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 
11

In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to
or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of
money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both
appellants, without any other esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as
already stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own
testimony

That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her
personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant Puno
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in Article
293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Appellants have
indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought
and community of purpose. In the determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating
circumstances of craft   shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of abuse of confidence
29

shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of
them. At any rate, the intimidation having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be
imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the Code.

People vs Delim

Facts:

On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the evening, Modesto, Rita and Randy were preparing to have
their supper in their home. Joining them were Modesto and Ritas two young grandchildren, aged 5 and
7 years old. They were about to eat their dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald suddenly barged into
the house and closed the door. Each of the three intruders was armed with a short handgun. Marlon
poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim.

Marlon, Robert and Ronald herded Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of
Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Rita and Randy were warned by the intruders not to leave the house. Leon
and Manuel, who were also armed with short handguns, stayed put by the door to the house of
Modesto and ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were.

Randy was advised to report the matter to the police authorities. However, Randy opted to first look
for his father. He and his other relatives scoured the vicinity to locate Modesto to no avail. They
proceeded to Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan,

At around 3:00 in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives,in Paldit,
Sison, Pangasinan and this time they found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area. He was
already dead. 

Rita and Randy divulged to the police investigators the names and addresses of Marlon, Ronald,
Robert, Leon and Manuel, whom they claimed were responsible for the death of Modesto. Marlon,
Ronald and Leon interposed denial and alibi.

Issue: Whether what crime is committed murder or kidnapping.

Ruling:

Murder

It bears stressing that in determining what crime is charged in an information, the material
inculpatory facts recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are
controlling. Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged
such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. 

In People v. Isabelo Puno, et al.,[14] that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty and not where
such restraint of his freedom of action is merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the malefactor.
If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of
the victims liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the
killing, and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim. 16 The crime committed
would either be homicide or murder.

What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the
information or criminal complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is
charged with--that of murder or kidnapping.

Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a crime
requiring specific intent. 18 Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes.

Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred
from the circumstances of the actions of the accused as established by the evidence on record. 19 cräläwvirtualibräry

Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which
prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a
crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the
commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not
establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged such as murder.

In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in
barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely to kill him with the
attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely
incidental to their primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific allegation in the
information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his
freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to kidnapping. 23 Irrefragably
then, the crime charged in the Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.

US vs Apego - Under this hypothesis, it can not be denied that, upon the defendant's awakening,
startled at feeling somebody grasp her left arm and believing that an attempt was being made
against her honor, as she received no reply whatever to her question as to who was beside her in
the darkness of the house, she understood that there was a positive unlawful aggression from which
she had to defend herself with the said pocketknife, and it is also undeniable that there was no
previous provication on her part; but it is unquestionable that, in making use of this deadly weapon,
even in the defense of her person and rights, by decidely wounding him who had touched her or
caught her by the arm, the defendant exceeded her right of defense, since there was no real need of
wounding with the said weapon him who had merely caught by her arm, and perhaps did so to
awake her, as she was asleep and had not replied to her sister's calls; and as the party who she
believed was making an attempt against her honor, because he had caught her by the arm,
performed no other act of aggression such as might indicate a decided purpose to commit an
attempt against her honor than merely to catch her by the arm, and although the defendant believed
that it was the commencement of such an attempt and that she had to defend herself therefrom, it is
true that, once awake and provided with an effective weapon for her defense, there was no just nor
reasonable cause for striking a blow therewith in the center of the body, where the principal vital
organs are seated, of the man who had not performed any act which might be considered as an
actual attempt against her honor.

From the foregoing considerations it is concluded that in the commission of the crime there was
present the circumstance of incomplete exemption from responsibility, as all the three requisites
specified in subarticle 4 of article of the Penal Code are not applicable; wherefore the criminal act is
not altogether excusable, on account of the lack of the second of the said requisites, although a
majority of them were present, that is, the first and the third requisites; and, therefore, in accordance
with the provisions of article 86 of the code, a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by article 404 of the code, in the discretion of the court, must be imposed upon the
defendant.

Padilla vs Dizon - the prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to
violate the law. The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is
not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita. In requiring proof of
malice, the respondent has by his gross ignorance allowed the accused to go scot free. The accused
at the time of his apprehension at the Manila International Airport had in his possession the amount
of US$355,349.57 in assorted foreign currencies and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces),
without any specific authority from the Central Bank as required by law. At the time of his
apprehension, he was able to exhibit only two foreign currency declarations in his possession. These
were old declarations made by him on the occasion of his previous trips to the Philippines.

Although lack of malice or wilfull intent is not a valid defense in a case for violation of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, the respondent nonetheless chose to exonerate the accused based on his defense
that the foreign currency he was bringing out of the country at the time he was apprehended by the
customs authorities were brought into the Philippines by him and his alleged business associates on
several previous occasions when they came to the Philippines, supposedly to be used for the
purpose of investing in some unspecified or undetermined business ventures; that this money was
kept in the Philippines and he precisely came to the Philippines to take the money out as he and his
alleged business associates were afraid that the "attempted revolution" which occurred on July
6,1986 might spread.

Garcia vs CA - Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995
senatorial elections, an information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Alaminos, charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera,
and petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b

The petitioner in this case unlawfully decrease[d] the votes received by senatorial candidate Aquilino
Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in
the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine (159) precincts of the Statement of Votes by
Precincts of said municipality of alaminos

The RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner who was
convicted. Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC
Decision.

Petitioner contends that there was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an
election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.

People vs Pugay - It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants
gave their written statements to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F,
that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and
then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand,
alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who
set him on fire. 

The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having taken
the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the
body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this
flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed
to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act
that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. 

 We agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless
imprudence. A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty
to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment.
He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have
performed except through culpable abandon

With respect to the accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his brief contends that "his conviction
of murder, is proper considering that his act in setting the deceased on fire knowing that gasoline
had just been poured on him is characterized by treachery as the victim was left completely helpless
to defend and protect himself against such an outrage

There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the
deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was
merely a part of their fun-making that evening.

There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body
of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act
of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded
that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act,
however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would
cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised
Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must
be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.

People vs sabalones - Appellants likewise accuse the trial court of engaging in "conjecture" in ruling
that there was aberratio ictus in this case. This allegation does not advance the cause of the
appellants. It must be stressed that the trial court relied on the concept of aberratio
ictus to explain why the appellants staged the ambush, not to prove that appellants did in fact commit
the crimes. Even assuming that the trial court did err in explaining the motive of the appellants, this
does not detract from its findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and sustained by this Court in
the discussion above, that the guilt of the appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

In any event, the trial court was not engaging in conjecture in so ruling. The conclusion of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that the appellants killed the wrong persons was based on the
extrajudicial statement of Appellant Beronga and the testimony of Jennifer Binghoy. These pieces of
evidence sufficiently show that appellants believed that they were suspected of having killed the
recently slain Nabing Velez, and that they expected his group to retaliate against them. Hence, upon
the arrival of the victims' vehicles which they mistook to be carrying the avenging men of Nabing
Velez, appellants opened fire. Nonetheless, the fact that they were mistaken does not diminish their
culpability. The Court has held that "mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as
when the accused zeroes in on his intended
victim." 48

Be that as it may, the observation of the solicitor general on this point is well-taken. The case is better
characterized as error  personae or mistake in the identity of the victims, rather than aberratio
ictus which means mistake in the blow, characterized by aiming at one but hitting the other due to
imprecision in the blow.