G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008 by and between him and [Nave] involving said parcel of land.

However, [Nave] reneged on their agreement when the latter

LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner, refused to accept the partial down payment he tendered to her as
vs. previously agreed because she did not want to sell her property
ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed to him anymore. [Fernando] prayed that after trial on the merits,
PABALE, respondents. [Nave] be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in
his favor, and to pay attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and
DECISION damages.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: [Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be
ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of
[Fernando] based on the following grounds: (1) she was not fully
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of
apprised of the nature of the piece of paper [Fernando] handed to
the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) seeking
her for her signature on January 3, 1984. When she was informed
the reversal and setting aside of the Decision,2 dated 10 April 2001, of the
that it was for the sale of her property in Calamba, Laguna
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133; as well as the
covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604), she immediately returned to
Resolution,3 dated 19 December 2001 of the same court denying
[Fernando] the said piece of paper and at the same time
reconsideration of its aforementioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in
repudiating the same. Her repudiation was further bolstered by
its assailed Decision, upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
the fact that when [Fernando] tendered the partial down payment
dated 20 February 1984, executed by Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in favor of
to her, she refused to receive the same; and (2) she already sold
siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roiler and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale
the property in good faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and
(the Pabale siblings) over a piece of land (subject property) in Calamba,
Amanda, all surnamed Pabale [the Pabale siblings] on February
Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3317
20, 1984 after the complaint was filed against her but before she
(27604); and, thus, reversed and set aside the Decision,4 dated 2
received a copy thereof. Moreover, she alleged that [Fernando]
December 1997, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch
has no cause of action against her as he is suing for and in behalf
119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.5 The 2 December 1997 Decision of the
of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation who is not a party to the
RTC declared null and void the two sales agreements involving the
alleged Contract to Sell. Even assuming that said entity is the real
subject property entered into by Nave with different parties, namely,
party in interest, still, [Fernando] cannot sue in representation of
Sesinando M. Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale siblings; and ordered
the corporation there being no evidence to show that he was duly
the reconveyance of the subject property to Alamayri, as Nave’s
authorized to do so.
successor-in-interest.
Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene
There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present
alleging that they are now the land owners of the subject
Petition, determined by the Court of Appeals to be as follows:
property. Thus, the complaint was amended to include [the
Pabale siblings] as party defendants. In an Order dated April 24,
This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed 1984, the trial court denied [Nave’s] Motion to Dismiss prompting
by Sesinando M. Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty her to file a Manifestation and Motion stating that she was
Corporation [Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before the Regional adopting the allegations in her Motion to Dismiss in answer to
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided over by Judge Salvador [Fernando’s] amended complaint.
P. de Guzman, Jr., docketed as Civil Case No. 675-84-C against
Nelly S. Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of land located in
Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her Amended Answer
Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604).
with Counterclaim and Cross-claim praying that her husband,
[Fernando] alleged that on January 3, 1984, a handwritten
Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo be impleaded as her co-defendant, and
"Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was entered into
including as her defense undue influence and fraud by reason of
the fact that she was made to appear as widow when in fact she
was very much married at the time of the transaction in issue.
Despite the opposition of [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings],
the trial court admitted the aforesaid Amended Answer with
Counterclaim and Cross-claim.
Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo filed a Motion to Admit Second Amended Answer and
Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings],
this time including the fact of her incapacity to contract for being
mentally deficient based on the psychological evaluation report
conducted on December 2, 1985 by Dra. Virginia P. Panlasigui,
M. A., a clinical psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious,
the same was denied by the court a quo.
[Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof asseverating that
in Criminal Case No. 1308-85-C entitled "People vs. Nelly S.
Nave" she raised therein as a defense her mental deficiency. This
being a decisive factor to determine once and for all whether the
contract entered into by [Nave] with respect to the subject
property is null and void, the Second Amended Answer and
Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings]
should be admitted.
Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the
proceedings in this case was suspended sometime in 1987 in
view of the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of [Nave] with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna, docketed
as SP No. 146-86-C with Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as the
petitioner. On June 22, 1988, a Decision was rendered in the said
guardianship proceedings, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Under the circumstances, specially since Nelly S. Nave
who now resides with the Brosas spouses has
categorically refused to be examined again at the National
Mental Hospital, the Court is constrained to accept the
Neuro-Psychiatric Evaluation report dated April 14, 1986
submitted by Dra. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos and the
supporting report dated April 20, 1987 submitted by Dr.
Eduardo T. Maaba, both of the National Mental Hospital
and hereby finds Nelly S. Nave an incompetent within the
purview of Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
person who, by reason of age, disease, weak mind and
deteriorating mental processes cannot without outside aid
take care of herself and manage her properties, becoming
thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation, said
condition having become severe since the year 1980. She
and her estate are hereby placed under guardianship.
Atty. Leonardo C. Paner is hereby appointed as her
regular guardian without need of bond, until further orders
from this Court. Upon his taking his oath of office as
regular guardian, Atty. Paner is ordered to participate
actively in the pending cases of Nelly S. Nave with the
end in view of protecting her interests from the prejudicial
sales of her real properties, from the overpayment in the
foreclosure made by Ms. Gilda Mendoza-Ong, and in
recovering her lost jewelries and monies and other
personal effects.
SO ORDERED."
Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not appeal
therefrom, while the appeal interposed by spouses Juliano and
Evangelina Brosas was dismissed by this Court for failure to pay
the required docketing fees within the reglementary period.
In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9, 1992. On
September 20, 1993, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo, [Nave’s] sole
heir, she being an orphan and childless, executed an Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication pertaining to his inherited properties from
[Nave].
On account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of
the instant case and for the issuance of a writ of execution of the
Decision dated June 22, 1988 in SP No. 146-86-C (petition for
guardianship) was filed by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo on February
14, 1996 with the court a quo. [The Pabale siblings] filed their
Opposition to the motion on grounds that (1) they were not made
a party to the guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be
bound by the Decision therein; and (2) that the validity of the
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the late [Nave] in their favor
was never raised in the guardianship case.
The case was then set for an annual conference. On January 9,
1997, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a motion seeking the court’s
permission for his substitution for the late defendant Nelly in the
instant case. Not long after the parties submitted their respective
pre-trial briefs, a motion for substitution was filed by Lolita R.
Alamayre (sic) [Alamayri] alleging that since the subject property
was sold to her by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale, she should be substituted in his stead. In
refutation, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Manifestation stating
that what he executed is a Deed of Donation and not a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of [Alamayri] and that the same was
already revoked by him on March 5, 1997. Thus, the motion for
substitution should be denied.
On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order declaring that
it cannot make a ruling as to the conflicting claims of [Alamayri]
and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo. After the case was heard on the
merits, the trial court rendered its Decision on December 2, 1997,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell dated
January 3, 1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave and
Sesinando Fernando null and void and of no force and
effect;
2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February
20, 1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave in favor of the
[Pabale siblings] similarly null and void and of no force
and effect;
3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the owner of
the property covered by TCT No. 111249 of the land
records of Calamba, Laguna;
4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a transfer of
title over the property in favor of Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] in
the concept of reconveyance because the sale in their
favor has been declared null and void;
5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender possession
over the property to Ms. [Alamayri] and to account for its
income from the time they took over possession to the
time the same is turned over to Ms. Lolita [Alamayri], and
thereafter pay the said income to the latter;
6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings], jointly
and severally, to pay Ms. [Alamayri]:
a. attorney’s fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and
b. the costs.6
S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation, still represented by Fernando, filed an
appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58133,
solely to question the portion of the 2 December 1997 Decision of the
RTC ordering him and the Pabale siblings to jointly and severally pay
Alamayri the amount of P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133
averring that the RTC erred in declaring in its 2 December 1997 Decision
that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 20 February 1984 executed by
Nave in their favor was null and void on the ground that Nave was found
incompetent since the year 1980.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April 2001, granted the
appeals of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings. It
ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by S. M.
Fernando Realty Corporation, represented by its President,
Sesinando M. Fernando as well as the appeal interposed by
Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale,
are hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered upholding
the VALIDITY of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20,
1984.
No pronouncements as to costs.7
Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the
appellate court, invoking the Decision,8 dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC
in the guardianship proceedings, docketed as SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C,
which found Nave incompetent, her condition becoming severe since
1980; and thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Said
Decision already became final and executory when no one appealed
therefrom. Alamayri argued that since Nave was already judicially
determined to be an incompetent since 1980, then all contracts she
subsequently entered into should be declared null and void, including the
Deed of Sale, dated 20 February 1984, which she executed over the
subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.
According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the
findings of the RTC in its 22 June 1988 Decision in SP. PROC. No. 146-
86-C, having participated in the said guardianship proceedings through
their father Jose Pabale. She pointed out that the RTC explicitly named in
its orders Jose Pabale as among those present during the hearings held
on 30 October 1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayri thus filed on 21 November 2001 a Motion to Schedule Hearing
to Mark Exhibits in Evidence so she could mark and submit as evidence
certain documents to establish that the Pabale siblings are indeed the
children of Jose Pabale.
Atty. Gesmundo, Nave’s surviving spouse, likewise filed his own Motion
for Reconsideration of the 10 April 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, asserting Nave’s incompetence since 1980 as
found by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his right to the
subject property as owner upon Nave’s death in accordance with the laws
of succession. It must be remembered that Atty. Gesmundo disputed
before the RTC the supposed transfer of his rights to the subject property
to Alamayri, but the court a quo refrained from ruling thereon.
In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals denied
for lack of merit the Motions for Reconsideration of Alamayri and Atty.
Gesmundo.
Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the
following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
FINDING THAT NELLY S. NAVE WAS INCOMPETENT IN
SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C ON JUNE 22, 1988
CANNOT RETROACT TO AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE
DEED OF SALE SHE EXECUTED ON FEBRUARY 20, 1984 IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DECISION IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C DATED
JUNE 22, 1988 IS NOT BINDING ON RESPONDENTS
PABALES.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SCHEDULE HEARING TO MARK
DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE
IDENTITY OF JOSE PABALE AS THE FATHER OF
RESPONDENTS PABALES.9
It is Alamayri’s position that given the final and executory Decision, dated
22 June 1988, of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C finding Nave
incompetent since 1980, then the same fact may no longer be re-litigated
in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine of res judicata, more
particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.
This Court is not persuaded.
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." Res judicata lays
the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits,
and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties
or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other
judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in
issue in the first suit.10
It is espoused in the Rules of Court, under paragraphs (b) and (c) of
Section 47, Rule 39, which read:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may
be as follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to
the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could
have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
 parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating the
same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon
its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be
stated as follows: (1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the
litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) Any
right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved
in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a
judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by
the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties
and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or
subject matters of the two suits are the same. These two main rules mark
the distinction between the principles governing the two typical cases in
which a judgment may operate as evidence.11 In speaking of these cases,
the first general rule above stated, and which corresponds to the afore-
quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is
referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while the second general rule,
which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is
known as "conclusiveness of judgment."
The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds provides
the following enlightening discourse on conclusiveness of judgment:
The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different
concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of
judgment.
The second concept — conclusiveness of judgment — states that
a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was
there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity
with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any
future action between such parties or their privies, in the same
court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the
same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains
unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that
a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular
matter in another action between the same parties or their privies,
it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or
question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will
depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be
final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question
was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of
Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not
required but merely identity of issues.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs.
Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction between
bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and
conclusiveness of judgment which bars the relitigation of
particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same
parties on a different claim or cause of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material
facts or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in
former action are commonly applied to all matters
essentially connected with the subject matter of the
litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied
in the final judgment, although no specific finding may
have been made in reference thereto and although such
matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and
were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if
the record of the former trial shows that the judgment
could not have been rendered without deciding the
particular matter, it will be considered as having settled
that matter as to all future actions between the parties and
if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises,
they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.12
Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking
Corporation, further differentiated between the two rules of res
judicata, as follows:
 There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first
case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that
is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in
the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new
action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same
or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second
cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is
conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known
as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right,
fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved
in the determination of an action before a competent court in
which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled
by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between
the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.13
In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second
case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case. The second
case, however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch on
the same fact or question adjudged in the first case. Conclusiveness of
judgment requires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of
causes of action.
Contrary to Alamayri’s assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no
application to the instant Petition since there is no identity of parties and
issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of parties
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty.
Gesmundo for the appointment of a guardian over the person and estate
of his late wife Nave alleging her incompetence.
A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a
minor or an incompetent, the latter being described as a person "suffering
the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals,
deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of
unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not
being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and
other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves
and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and
exploitation."14
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the proceedings for the
appointment of a guardian, to wit:
Rule 93
APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
SECTION 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for
resident. – Any relative, friend, or other person on behalf of a
resident minor or incompetent who has no parent or lawful
guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over,
may petition the court having jurisdiction for the appointment of a
general guardian for the person or estate, or both, of such minor
or incompetent. An officer of the Federal Administration of the
United States in the Philippines may also file a petition in favor of
a ward thereof, and the Director of Health, in favor of an insane
person who should be hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated
leper.
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for the appointment of a
general guardian must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the
appointment necessary or convenient;
(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of
the minor or incompetent, and of the persons having him
in their care;
(d) The probable value and character of his estate;
(e) The name of the person for whom letters of
guardianship are prayed.
 The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or
verification shall render void the issuance of letters of
guardianship.
SEC. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. – When a
petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the
court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, and shall
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the
minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and
may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given.
SEC. 4. Opposition to petition. – Any interested person may, by
filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of
majority of the alleged minor, competency of the alleged
incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for whom letters
are prayed, and may pray that the petition be dismissed, or that
letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable person
named in the opposition.
SEC. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. – At the hearing of
the petition the alleged incompetent must be present if able to
attend, and it must be shown that the required notice has been
given. Thereupon the court shall hear the evidence of the parties
in support of their respective allegations, and, if the person in
question is a minor or incompetent it shall appoint a suitable
guardian of his person or estate, or both, with the powers and
duties hereinafter specified.
xxxx
SEC. 8. Service of judgment. – Final orders or judgments under
this rule shall be served upon the civil registrar of the municipality
or city where the minor or incompetent person resides or where
his property or part thereof is situated.
A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without
the usual parties, i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil
case. Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears the title: In re:
Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y
Banayo, petitioner, with no named respondent/s.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that
the petition contain the names, ages, and residences of relatives of the
supposed minor or incompetent and those having him in their care, so
that those residing within the same province as the minor or incompetent
can be notified of the time and place of the hearing on the petition.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian
under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a
person is indeed a minor or an incompetent who has no capacity to care
for himself and/or his properties; and, second, who is most qualified to be
appointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people
who best could help the trial court settle such issues would be those who
are closest to and most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent,
namely, his relatives living within the same province and/or the persons
caring for him.
It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of
the minor or incompetent be likewise identified and notified. The reason is
simple: because their presence is not essential to the proceedings for
appointment of a guardian. It is almost a given, and understandably so,
that they will only insist that the supposed minor or incompetent is
actually capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity
of said contracts and keep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated
to comply therewith.
Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice
and actually took part in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Nave’s
relatives, nor are they the ones caring for her. Although the rules allow
the RTC to direct the giving of other general or special notices of the
hearings on the petition for appointment of a guardian, it was not
established that the RTC actually did so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayri’s allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC.
No. 146-86-C rests on two Orders, dated 30 October 198715 and 19
November 1987,16 issued by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C,
expressly mentioning the presence of a Jose Pabale, who was
supposedly the father of the Pabale siblings, during the hearings held on
the same dates. However, the said Orders by themselves cannot confirm
that Jose Pabale was indeed the father of the Pabale siblings and that he
was authorized by his children to appear in the said hearings on their
behalf.
Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to
submit and mark additional evidence to prove that Jose Pabale was the
father of the Pabale siblings.
It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials
or further proceedings. In general, however, the Court of Appeals
conducts hearings and receives evidence prior to the submission of the
case for judgment.17 It must be pointed out that, in this case, Alamayri
filed her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence on 21
November 2001. She thus sought to submit additional evidence as to the
identity of Jose Pabale, not only after CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 had been
submitted for judgment, but after the Court of Appeals had already
promulgated its Decision in said case on 10 April 2001.
The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments and
available evidences in support of their respective positions to the court
before the case is deemed submitted for judgment. Only under
exceptional circumstances may the court receive new evidence after
having rendered judgment;18 otherwise, its judgment may never attain
finality since the parties may continually refute the findings therein with
further evidence. Alamayri failed to provide any explanation why she did
not present her evidence earlier. Merely invoking that the ends of justice
would have been best served if she was allowed to present additional
evidence is not sufficient to justify deviation from the general rules of
procedure. Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed
if the parties are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of
the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction.19 Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide
strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a
relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules
applies only to proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice.20
Moreover, contrary to Alamayri’s assertion, the Court of Appeals did not
deny her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence
merely for being late. In its Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the
Court of Appeals also denied the said motion on the following grounds:
While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the [herein
respondents Pabale siblings] participated in the guardianship
proceedings considering that the Jose Pabale mentioned therein
is their late father, [herein petitioner Alamayri] submitting herein
documentary evidence to prove their filiation, even though
admitted in evidence at this late stage, cannot bind [the Pabale
siblings] as verily, notice to their father is not notice to them there
being no allegation to the effect that he represented them before
the Calamba Court.21
As the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence Alamayri wanted to
submit do prove that the Jose Pabale who attended the RTC hearings on
30 October 1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C
was the father of the Pabale siblings, they would still not confirm his
authority to represent his children in the said proceedings. Worth
stressing is the fact that Jose Pabale was not at all a party to the Deed of
Sale dated 20 February 1984 over the subject property, which was
executed by Nave in favor of the Pabale siblings. Without proper
authority, Jose Pabale’s presence at the hearings in SP. PROC. No. 146-
86-C should not bind his children to the outcome of said proceedings or
affect their right to the subject property.
Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C, then any finding therein should not bind them in
Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of issues
Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and
Civil Case No. 675-84-C that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of
judgment, from ruling on Nave’s competency in 1984, when she executed
the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor the Pabale siblings.
In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was
incompetent at the time of filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus,
requiring the appointment of a guardian over her person and estate.
In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale
siblings in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was an
incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in
favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence, rendering the
said sale void.
While both cases involve a determination of Nave’s incompetency, it must
be established at two separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986.
A finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean
that she was so in 1984. In Carillo v. Jaojoco,22 the Court ruled that
despite the fact that the seller was declared mentally incapacitated by the
trial court only nine days after the execution of the contract of sale, it
does not prove that she was so when she executed the contract. Hence,
the significance of the two-year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since
Nave’s mental condition in 1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984 given
the intervening period.
Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously
been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so
long as the contrary be not proved; that is, that at the moment of his
acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind.23 The burden
of proving incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon the
person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented,
capacity will be presumed.24
Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally
incapacitated only in 1986, when the RTC started hearing SP. PROC.
No. 146-86-C; and she was not judicially declared an incompetent until
22 June 1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC,
resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian.
Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still presumed to be capacitated and
competent to enter into contracts such as the Deed of Sale over the
subject property, which she executed in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20
February 1984. The burden of proving otherwise falls upon Alamayri,
which she dismally failed to do, having relied entirely on the 22 June
1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC in its Decision dated
22 June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C on Nave’s condition "having
become severe since the year 1980."25 But there is no basis for such a
declaration. The medical reports extensively quoted in said Decision,
prepared by: (1) Dr. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos, dated 14 April 1986,26 and
(2) by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, dated 20 April 1987,27 both stated that upon
their examination, Nave was suffering from "organic brain syndrome
secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis with psychotic episodes," which
impaired her judgment. There was nothing in the said medical reports,
however, which may shed light on when Nave began to suffer from said
mental condition. All they said was that it existed at the time Nave was
examined in 1986, and again in 1987. Even the RTC judge was only able
to observe Nave, which made him realize that her mind was very
impressionable and capable of being manipulated, on the occasions
when Nave visited the court from 1987 to 1988. Hence, for this Court, the
RTC Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C may be
conclusive as to Nave’s incompetency from 1986 onwards, but not as to
her incompetency in 1984. And other than invoking the 22 June 1988
Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, Alamayri did not bother
to establish with her own evidence that Nave was mentally incapacitated
when she executed the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale over the subject
property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render the said deed
void.
All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC.
No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in
the former on Nave’s incompetency by the year 1986 should not bar, by
conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter case that Nave still had
capacity and was competent when she executed on 20 February 1984
the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it upheld
the validity of the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is
hereby DENIED. The Decision, dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against the petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri.
SO ORDERED.
.R. No. L-33152 January 30, 1982
LUIS PARCO and VIRGINIA BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. UNION C. KAYANAN,
Judge, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH IV),
CALAUAG, and FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, JR., Legal Guardian of
the Incompetent SOLEDAD RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
By this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to set aside the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1971 1 which
revived and declared in full force and effect its decision on August 20,
1970 2 dismissing the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction in CA-
G.R. No. 43732, entitled "Luis Parco, et al. vs. Hon. Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon, Branch IV, Calauag, et al., " and pray that the
decision dated April 15, 1969 3 and all subsequent orders 4 issued by
respondent Judge of Branch IV-Calauag, Court of First Instance of Quezon in
Special Proceedings No. 2641 be declared as null and void.
This case, G. R. No. L-33152, started from Special Proceedings No.
2641. a guardianship proceedings for the incompetent Soledad
Rodriguez of Sriaya, Quezon, which originally pertained to Branch 1,
Court of First Instance of Quezon, then presided by the late Hon. Judge
Vicente Arguelles, 5 later on succeded by Hon. Judge Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court). In 1966, respondent
Judge of Branch IV-Calauag of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Hon.
Union C. Kayanan, took cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 2641 when
the Secretary of Justice authorized respondent Judge to help unclog the
docket of Branch I at Lucena City, Quezon.
For clarity, We have hereunder summarized the sequence of events and
material dates as it appears in the records from the time respondent
Judge of Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Quezon took
cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 2641.
On December 20, 1966, respondent Judge authorized and approved,
upon motion of Fransisco Rodriguez, Jr. (guardian of Soledad
Rodriguez), hereinafter referred to as private respondent, the sale to Luis
Parco and Virginia Bautista, hereinafter referred to as the petitioners, of
Lot Nos. 3437 (613 sq. meters) and 4389 (4,068 sq. meters) covered by
TCT Nos. 16939 and 18035, respectively, for the sum of P4,400.00 for
the support, maintenance and medical treatment of the ward Soledad
Rodriguez.
On January 6, 1967, respondent Judge again approved and authorized,
upon motion of private respondent, the sale to petitioners of Lot No. 1207
covered by TCT No. 16944 containing an area of 63,598 sq. meters,
more or less, for the same reason. All the sales of the three (3) lots being
absolute, new transfer certificates of title were issued in the name of
petitioners.
On May 13, 1968, or almost one year and five months from the approval
of the sale of Lot Nos. 3437, 4389, and 1207, private respondent filed an
urgent petition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Ninth Judicial
District, invoking Section 6 Rule 96 of the Revised Rules of Court,
praying that an order be immediately issued requiring petitioners to
appear before the court so that they can be examined as regards the
three (3) lots in question which are allegedly in danger of being lost,
squandered, concealed and embezzled and upon failure to do so or to
comply with any order that may be issued in relation therewith to hold
them in contempt of court. The pertinent allegations read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That as legal guardian (private respondent) of the
abovenamed incompetent and upon authorization by this
Hon. Court he has transferred in good faith to the spouses
LUIS PARCO and VIRGINIA (UY) BAUTISTA, both of
Atimonan, Quezon, the titles over the following realties
belonging to his ward, namely:
a. A parcel of land (Lot No. 3437 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sariaya) with the
improvements thereon situated in the
Municipality of Sariaya ... containing an
area of Six Hundred Thirteen (613) sq.
meters, more or less;
b. A parcel of land (Lot No. 4389 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sariaya) situated in
the Municipality of Sariaya ... containing
an area of Four Thousand And Sixty-Eight
(4,068) sq. meters, more or less;
c. A parcel of land (Lot No. 1207 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sariaya) situated in
the Municipality of Sariaya ... containing
an area of Sixty-three Thousand Five
Hundred and Ninety-eight (63,598) sq.
meters, more or less.
2. That anent the first TWO (2) PARCELS above-
described he transferred the titles thereto in favor of the
recited spouses under a loan agreement (not an absolute
sale thereto and with the express commitment in writing
that he can recover the same within three (3) months from
December 19, 1966, ...
That prior to the expiration of the cited period of three
months, he tried to recover the stated two parcels of land
from them, however, the same was not carried out
because he was then transacting with them the sale of
PARCEL THREE and under the Agreement that they will
not sell cede, or convey the mentioned two (2) lots to
anyone (except to petitioner now private respondent
herein) and once the stated PARCEL THREE has been
sold at the price of P48,000.00 the borrowed amount of
P4,400.00 shall be deducted therefrom and said two
parcels shall be returned to him;
3. That recently, he discovered that the cited couple, in
bad faith and in violation of their agreement and of the
trust and confidence which he had reposed upon them,
have fraudulently ceded and transferred the titles over the
stated two parcels of land to another person, allegedly for
a price of (over P30,000.00) and in spite of his repeated
request upon them to reconvey to him the titles thereto or
to turn over to him the total proceeds they have received
(minus the sum of P4,400.00), they have maliciously and
unjustly refused to do so, and are intending to keep and
retain said amount for their own personal use and benefit;
4. That as already adverted to in the previous paragraph
hereof, the mentioned couple induced him to transfer to
them the title of parcel three, so that they can sell the
same for the agreed price of P48,000.00 and believing in
good faith that the cited spouses are honest and
trustworthy, he agreed and executed the requisite
document transferring the title to them subject to the
following conditions:
a. They shall pay to him the amount of
Twelve Thousand (Pl2,000.00) Pesos
after they have secured a buyer of the
property, ...
b. They shall pay to NIEVES ALCALA and
PURA AGCAOILE (who are private
respondent's agents and representatives
in negotiating the sale of parcel three) the
sum of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00)
Pesos after they have sold the realty, ...
5. That recently, he discovered that the cited couple have
already sold and ceded the mentioned parcel three to
another person, and despite his repeated request upon
them to pay and deliver to him or to Nieves Alcala the
sum of money specified in the foregoing paragraph, they
have maliciously and unjustly failed and refused to do so,
and have fraudulently retained the said amount of money
for thier own personal use and benefit;
6. That the enumerated parcels of land together with all
the proceeds derived therefrom, undeniably belonged to
his ward as trust properties, which are subject to the
disposition of this Hon. Court, and due to the mentioned
fraudulent, malicious and dishonest acts of the above-
named couple, are in danger of being lost, squandered,
concealed and embezzled;
xxx xxx xxx
In an answer dated June 5, 1968, petitioners contended mainly, among
others, that the three lots have been conveyed to them by deeds of
absolute sale which were duly approved by the guardianship court.
Pre-trial hearings were set for possible amicable settlement beginning on
September 6, 1968 but was postponed and reset to October 9, 1968 on
petitioners' counsel motion. On October 9, 1968, both parties and their
counsels appeared but failed to reach any amicable settlement. Again,
the pre-trial hearing was reset to November 28 and 29, 1968 but was
likewise postponed to January 8, 1969 at petitioners' counsel motion.
On January 8, 1969, for failure to petitioners and their counsel to appear
although there was a telegram requesting for postponement, respondent
Judge issued an order, 6 authorizing private respondent to present evidence
before the Clerk of Court who was instructed to make the corresponding
report which shall be made as the basis of this decision.
In a petition dated January 30, 1969, petitioners prayed for the
reconsideration of the order of January 8, 1969 pointing out, among
others, that there was a First Order dated July 29, 1968, 7 issued by then
Judge Ameurfina M. Herrera, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Quezon that said branch "will henceforth take cognizance of this
case" and thus, asked for the transfer of the incident sought before Branch IV
to Branch I for proper action.
On February 20, 1969, respondent Judge, finding the petition for
reconsideration well-grounded, issued an order directing the Clerk of
Court to transmit the records of the case to the Court of First Instance,
Branch I, Lucena City, quoted below:
ORDER
Acting on the Petition for Reconsideration filed by counsel
for the respondent on February 4, 1969, considering that
Hon. A. Melencio-Herrera, Presiding Judge of Branch 1,
CFI, Lucena City, issued an order on July 29, 1968, the
dispositive portion of which is quoted as follows.
'WHEREFORE, it is hereby confirmed that this court will
henceforth take cognizance of this case,' and considering
that this special proceedings actually belongs to Branch I,
although incidents therein were taken cognizance of by
the Presiding Judge of CFI, Branch IV when he was
holding court session in Lucena City and notwithstanding
Administrative Order No. 261 dated October 7, 1968
which states that 'This administrative order shall not apply
to cases pending in the different salas which have been
partially tried and shall remain therein for final disposition',
because to case was originally filed during the
incumbency of the late Judge Vicente Arguelles, finding
therefore the said petition to be well-grounded, the Clerk
of Court is hereby authorized to transmit these records to
the Deputy Clerk of Court, CFI, Branch I, of Lucena City.
SO ORDERED.
Given at Calauag, Quezon this 20th day of February,
1969.
(SGD.) UNION C. KAYANAN Judge
On March 24, 1969, Private respondent, without the assistance of a
counsel, filed before Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Quezon an
amended petition praying that the three (3) lots subject matter of the
original urgent petition be ordered reconveyed to the ward in said Special
Proceedings No. 2641 for he was informed that petitioners win transfer
and properties to third person.
On March 26, 1969, the Clerk of Court of Branch IV, Court of First
Instance of Quezon, issued the notice of hearing of the amended petition
filed by private respondent dated March 24, 1969 notifying counsel for
both parties that the case will be heard before Branch IV on April 10,
1969 at 2:30 p.m. at Calauag, Quezon. On the date set for hearing,
counsels for both parties appeared but for failure of the petitioners to
appear respondent Judge issued an order 8 reiterating its previous order
dated January 8, 1969 allowing private respondent to present his
evidence ex-parte and considered the case submitted for resolution.
On April 15, 1969, respondent Judge rendered a decision 9 on the basis of
the report of the Clerk of Court dated February 19, 1969 ordering petitioners
to reconvey the three (3) parcels of land to private respondent.
On June 14, 1969, petitioners moved to reconsider the decision stating,
among others, that respondent Judge has no authority to take
cognizance of the case which, according to petitioners, is an issue raised
in the petition for reconsideration of the court order of January 8, 1969,
and that the decision was without legal basis. Petitioners prayed that the
case or incident be transferred to the proper court which had taken
cognizance of this case.
On June 23, 1969, respondent Judge denied the petition for
reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioners' counsel received the said
order of denial on June 26, 1969.
Meanwhile, on June 21, 1969, private respondent filed an urgent motion
in Branch IV praying that petitioners be required to appear before the
court to be examined as regards the properties of the ward and to explain
why they should not be cited for contempt for not complying with a final
order of the court directing the reconveyance of the three (3) parcels of
land to private respondent.
On June 23, 1969, respondent Judge, acting on the urgent motion,
issued an order 10 directing petitioners to explain why they should not be
cited for contempt of court pursuant to par. (b) Section 3 Rule 71 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
On June 27, 1969, petitioners filed an urgent motion claiming that the
urgent motion for contempt of court was premature considering that the
decision ordering the reconveyance of the properties in question has not
yet become final and executory and is still subject to appeal. In their
prayer for the setting aside of the order of June 23, 1969, petitioners
informed the court that they win appeal the decision to the Court of
Appeals and that the corresponding notice of appeal, appeal bond and
the record on appeal will be filed in due time.
The following day, June 28, 1969, petitioners filed the notice of appeal
and appeal bond with a manifestation that the record on appeal will be
filed in due time.
On July 3, 1963, respondent Judge issued an order 11 denying for lack of
merit petitioners' urgent motion of June 27, 1969, thus declaring that the
order dated June 23, 1969 stands considering that petitioners' right to appeal
has already lapsed. In the same order, petitioners were given ten (10) days
upon receipt to explain why they should not be cited for contempt pursuant to
Section 4, Rule 71 in relation to Section 6, Rule 96 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
On July 7, 1969, petitioners filed a petition for extension of ten (10) days
to expire on July 20, 1969 within which to file the record on appeal. In an
order 12 dated July 9, 1969, respondent Judge denied the said petition for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
On July 10, 1969, petitioners filed an unverified second petition for
reconsideration of the decision dated April 15, 1969 and the order of July
3, 1969 contending that Branch IV lost its jurisdiction over the raise from
the time the order dated February 20, 1969 was issued by Judge A.
Melencio- Herrera; that the proceedings under Section 6 Rule 96 do not
authorize the Hon. Court (Branch IV) to determine the question of right
over the property or to order delivery thereof; that the purpose is merely
to elicit information or secure evidence from the person suspected of
having embezzled, concealed or conveyed away any personal property of
the ward; that if the court finds sufficient evidence showing ownership on
the part of the ward, it is the duty of the guardian to bring the proper
action.
On the other hand, on July 17, 1969, a motion for reconsideration of the
order dated July 9, 1969 was filed by petitioners claiming that all the
pleadings related to the intended appeal were filed within the period
allowed by the Revised Rules of Court. After an opposition was filed,
respondent Judge issued an order on 13 July 18, 1969 denying the second
petition for reconsideration for lack of basis and on the ground that the period
to appeal either the decision or any of the previous orders had already
expired.
On August 20, 1969, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction pleading nullity of the
decision of the Court of First Instance, Branch IV,
Quezon dated April 15, 1969 on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and grave
abuse of discretion in denying their right of appeal.
On September 27, 1969, the Court of Appeals dismissal the petition for
lack of merit. 14 On motion by petitioners, the dismissal was reconsidered in
a split resolution dated December 15, 1969 thereby giving due course to the
petition, and private respondent was required to answer.
After private respondent filed their answer and the parties submitted their
respective memoranda, the Court of Appeals, in a three-to-two vote
decision 15 dated August 21, 1970 dismissed the petition.
On motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in
a split resolution 16 dated October 10, 1970 granted the motion for
reconsideration and set aside the decision dated August 20,1970.
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent, the
Court of Appeals, in a three-to-two vote resolution 17 dated January 20,
1971, reverted to its decision of August 21, 1970 dismissing the petition.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of
errors, to wit:
I
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING
THE RETENTION BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGE OF
BRANCH IV-CALAUAG OF THE CASE OF BRANCH I-
LUCENA CITY AFTER HE ORDERED THE RETURN OF
THE CASE TO BRANCH I,LUCENA CITY TO WHICH
THE CASE BELONGS AND AFTER THE PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH I LUCENA CITY HAD RESUMED
AND EXERCISED HER JURISDICTION OVER SAID
CASE.
 II
ASSUMING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COULD
LEGALLY AND VALIDLY RETAIN JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE OF BRANCH I LUCENA CITY DESPITE THE
CIRCUMSTANCES ADVERTED TO IN THE FIRST
ASSIGNED ERROR, THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION
OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN SANCTIONING THE RESPONDENT
JUDGE'S ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION TO
ADJUDICATE THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP AND/OR
ORDER RECONVEYANCE OF PETITIONERS'
PROPERTY SOLD TO THEM AND TITLED IN THEIR
NAMES, NOTWITHSTANDING THE LIMITED
JURISDICTION OF A GUARDIANSHIP COURT.
III
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND
APPROVAL OF THE SALES ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON
THE VALIDITY AND REGULARITY OF SAID SALES
BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THEIR SUCCESSORS
IN INTEREST.
IV
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SANCTIONING BY SILENCE THE QUESTIONED
ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ENFORCING
HIS DECISION BY CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS.
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SANCTIONING DENIAL OF PETITIONERS' RIGHT TO
APPEAL.
This petition was given due course in view of the peculiar incidents during
its trial stage where, as borne out by the records, two (2) branches of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon Province, 9th Judicial District assert
jurisdiction over Special Proceedings No. 2641, which, when the decision
rendered by one branch was brought in the Court of Appeals on certiorari
with preliminary injunction, the Special Division of Five Justices, in a
three-to-two vote resolution in four (4) occasions after its dismissal for
lack of merit on September 27, 1968, reconsidered the same and was
given due course on December 15, 1968, again dismissed on August 21,
1970, but again reconsidered on October 10, 1970, until finally dismissed
on January 20, 1971 when the Special Division of Five reverted to its
August 21, 1970 resolution. The Special Division was equally split on the
issue whether or not the Court of First Instance, Branch IV, Calauag,
Quezon, acting with limited jurisdiction as a guardianship court under
Section 6 Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, has the authority to adjudicate
the question of ownership and order the reconveyance of the three (3)
parcels of land in question to private respondent, guardian of the ward
Soledad Rodriguez. On these two (2) principal issues, We are called
upon to finally resolve the legal controversy peculiar on this case.
After the parties submitted their respective briefs, the case was deemed
submitted for decision on October 28, 1971.
In a Resolution 18 of this Court dated November 29, 1978, the urgent
manifestation and motion of Leonisa S. Rodriguez, the surviving spouse of
Mario Rodriguez (brother of the ward) that the ward Soledad Rodriguez died
on September 15, 1970 and private respondent Francisco Rodriguez, Jr.
died on October 24, 1973; and that the heirs of the ward be substituted as
the private respondents in this case was noted. To begin with, the principal
issue al hand is whether or not respondent Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon, Branch IV-Calauag has the authority or power to take
further action in Special Proceedings No. 2641 after the Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch I-Lucena City asserted its
jurisdiction by issuing two (2) orders dated July 29, 1968 and respondent
Judge correspondingly ordered the return of the case to Branch I in an order
dated February 20,1969.
Petitioners maintain that respondent Judge of Branch IV, Court of First
Instance of Quezon has no power or authority to retain jurisdiction over
Special Proceedings No. 2641 which, at its inception, originally pertained
to Branch I-Lucena City, Court of First Instance of Quezon. To support
such chum, petitioners contend that the Second Order dated July 29,
1968 requiring private respondent for an inventory and accounting of the
ward's property confirms that the Presiding Judge of Branch I has
resumed its jurisdiction over said case, more so, when respondent Judge
ordered on February 20, 1969 the transmittal of the records of the case to
the Deputy Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance, Branch I-Lucena City.
Private respondent, on the other hand, justifies the retention of
jurisdiction by respondent Judge over Special Proceedings No. 2641
contending, among others, that the two (2) orders dated July 29, 1968
issued by then Judge A. Melencio-Herrera are not sufficient bases for
claiming that Branch IV has been deprived of its, jurisdiction because
jurisdiction is vested upon the court not upon any particular branch or
judge thereof and the issuance of such orders constitute undue
interference with the processes and proceedings already undertaken by
respondent Judge; that petitioners are guilty of estoppel when they failed
to raise the issue of jurisdiction from the very beginning and when they
voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge, filed their answer and
other pleadings, and moved for postponements of the scheduled dates of
hearing.
We sustain petitioners' stand. Of course, jurisdiction is vested in the court
not in any particular branch or judge, and as a corollary rule, the various
branches of the Court of First Instance of a judicial district are a
coordinate and co-equal courts 19 one branch stands on the same level as
the other. Undue interference by one on the proceedings and processes of
another is prohibited by law. In the language of this Court, the various
branches of the Court of First Instance of a province or city, having as they
have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and
coordinate jurisdiction should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere
with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. 20 A
contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and might seriously hinder
the administration of justice. A judge is competent to act so long as the case
remains before him, but after it passed from his branch to the other, the case
could be acted upon by the judge of the latter branch. 21 Otherwise, an
anomalous situation would occur at the detriment of the party litigants who
are likewise confused where to appear and plead their cause.
In the case before Us, there is no dispute that both Branch I and Branch
IV of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, have jurisdiction over the
subject matter, a guardianship proceedings under Section 1, Rule 92 of
the Rules of Court and Section 44(a) of the Judiciary Act of 1948. While it
is recognized that when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the
case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the
other branches, 22 We are of the view however, considering the unusual
circumstances and incidents attendant in this case the situation in the case at
bar is different. Here, it must be noted that the Presiding Judge of Branch I
asserted and resumed its prior jurisdiction by issuing two (2) orders, one of
which requires private respondent to render an inventory and accounting of
the property of the ward. On the other hand, respondent Judge of Branch IV,
in confirmation of such resumption of jurisdiction, ordered the return of the
records of Special Proceedings No. 2641 to Branch I-Lucena City, Court of
First Instance of Quezon, but, instead of regularly relinquishing jurisdiction
over the case, respondent Judge continued to take further action on the case
in total disregard of the two (2) orders of the Presiding Judge of Branch I.
Should one branch be permitted to equally assert, assume or retain
jurisdiction over a case or controversy over which another coordinate or co-
equal branch has already resumed its jurisdiction, We would then sanction
undue interference by one branch over another. With that, the judicial
stability of the decrees or orders of the courts would be a meaningless
precept in a well-ordered administration of justice.
There is no question that the prior proceedings had in Branch IV by
respondent Judge were valid and regular as they were admittedly
authorized by the Secretary of Justice. It must be emphasized however,
that Branch IV lost its jurisdiction over Special Proceedings No. 2641
when respondent Judge ordered the return of the records to Branch I
after having been informed in a motion for reconsideration filed on
January 30, 1969 of the existence of the two (2) orders issued by the
Presiding Judge of Branch 1. From that point of time, all subsequent
proceedings and processes in connection with or related to Special
Proceedings No. 2641 undertaken by the respondent Judge became
irregular. It amounted to an undue interference with the processes and
proceedings of Branch I.
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the pertinent law on the matter, it
may be observed that the detail of respondent Judge of Branch IV
stationed permanently in Calauag, Quezon to Branch I in Lucena City,
Quezon authoritatively rests on the provision of Section 51 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 which reads:
Section 51. Detail of judge to another district or province.-
Whenever a judge stationed in. any province or branch of
a court in a province shag certify to the Secretary of
Justice that the condition of the docket in his court is such
as to require the assistance of an additional judge, or
when there is any vacancy in any court or branch of a
court in a province, the Secretary of Justice may, in the
interest of justice, with the approval of the Supreme Court
and for a period of not more than three months for each
time, assign any judge of any court or province, whose
docket permits his temporary absence from said court, to
hold sessions in the court needing such assistance or
whether such vacancy exists. No judge so detailed shall
take cognizance of any case when any of the parties
 thereto objects and the objection is sustained by the
Supreme Court. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Apparently, when the circumstances contemplated under Section 51 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948 occur, the detailed Judge holds sessions in the
court needing such assistance or where such vacancy exists as if he is
the presiding judge of that particular branch where the clogged docket or
vacancy exists. The detailed Judge does not hold sessions therein as if
he is the Presiding Judge of the branch where he is originally or
permanently designated. In the case before Us, respondent Judge
Kayanan was duly authorized to help unclog the docket of Branch I
stationed in Lucena City, Quezon which at that time was rendered vacant
due to the death of Judge Vicente Arguelles. When respondent Judge
Kayanan took cognizance of the cases left by Judge Arguelles, pending
the designation of a replacement, he merely sits as a judge of Branch I,
Court of First Instance of Quezon Province. In the event of designation of
a new Presiding Judge of Branch 1, accepted practice and procedure of
speedy administration of justice requires that the detailed judge turns
over the cases he took cognizance of to the new Presiding Judge.
Justification for the continued retention of jurisdiction over those cases in
the case at bar appears to be not convincing.
We find no plausible indication how estoppel could operate against
petitioners. It is true that petitioners filed their answer to the urgent
petition of private respondent and appeared before respondent Judge of
Branch IV without questioning the latter's authority to hear the case. The
answer to the urgent petition of private respondent dated May 13, 1968
was filed by petitioners on June 5, 1968 or almost two (2) months before
Judge Melencio-Herrera of Branch I issued the two (2) orders dated July
29, 1968 asserting jurisdiction over the case. The appearances of
petitioners and counsel in the sala of respondent Judge during the
intervening period from July 29, 1968 were apparently due to the fact that
petitioners came to know only of the two orders of Branch I when they
examined the records of the case prompted by the manifestation of the
counsel of private respondent, in the course of the proceedings in Branch
IV, to submit for an accounting in connection with the administration of
the properties of the ward Soledad Rodriguez. Petitioners manifested
such information to respondent Judge in a petition for reconsideration of
the order of January 8, 1968 authorizing the presentation of evidence ex
parte. The silence or inaction of petitioners was therefore due to their lack
of knowledge of respondent Judge's lack of authority to retain or take
further action on the case. Such lack of authority was confirmed when
respondent Judge, acting on the petition for reconsideration dated
January 30, 1969, issued on February 20, 1969 an order authorizing the
return of the records of the case to Branch I. In claiming that the records
referred to by the order concern the first portion of the records of Special
Proceedings No. 2641 and not the second portion containing the urgent
petition filed by private respondent on May 13, 1968, private respondent
would then encourage split jurisdiction of courts which is abhorred by the
law.
Assuming that Branch IV-Calauag, Court of First Instance of Quezon has
jurisdiction over Special Proceedings No. 2641 notwithstanding the
attendant circumstances adverted to earlier, We now dwell on another
issue, which standing alone would decisively resolve the assigned errors
raised in this petition, that is, whether or not Branch IV exercising limited
and special, jurisdiction as a guardianship court under Section 6 Rule 96
of the Rules of Court has jurisdiction to order the delivery or
reconveyance of the three parcels of land in question to the ward,
represented herein by private respondent.
In two leading cases, Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839 and Cui vs.
Piccio et al, 91 Phil. 712, this Court laid the rule on the issue raised
before Us as interpreted in the light of Section 6 Rule 96 of the Rules of
Court which reads:
Section 6. Proceedings when person suspected of
embezzling or concealing property of the ward.— Upon
complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any person
having actual or prospective interest in the estate of the
ward as creditor, heir, or otherwise, that anyone is
suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or conveyed
away any money, goods, or interest, or a written
instrument, belonging to the ward or his estate, the court
may cite the suspected person to appear for examination
touching such money, goods, interests, or instrument, and
make such orders as will secure the estate against such
embezzlement, concealment or conveyance.
In Cui vs. Piccio et al., supra, this Court held that the jurisdiction of the
court in guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected
of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property belonging to
the ward for the purpose of obtaining information which may be used in
an action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the
ward. Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited
jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward
found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed. In a categorical
language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where property clearly
belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has been already judicially
decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. 23 In effect, there
can only be delivery or return of the embezzled, concealed or conveyed
property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and
undisputable. However, where title to any property said to be embezzled,
concealed or conveyed is in dispute, under the Cui case, the determination of
said title or right whether in favor of the person said to have embezzled,
concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate
ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings.
In the case at bar, We are not prepared to say, at this premature stage,
whether or not, on the basis alone of the pleadings of the parties in the
trial court, the title or right of the ward Soledad Rodriguez over the three
(3) parcels of land in question is clear and undisputable. What is certain
here is the fact that the sale of the properties in question were duly
approved by the respondent Judge in accordance with the provisions on
selling and encumbering of the property of the ward under Rule 97 of the
Rules of Court. It must be noted that while the original urgent petition
dated May 13, 1968 prayed for the examination of petitioners herein
regarding the alleged concealing, conveyancing and embezzling of the
questioned properties, the amended petition dated March 24, 1969 asked
for reconveyance.
Moreover, it may be observed that private respondent contended that the
sale of the first two lots was actually a loan agreement with right of
recovery while that of the third lot was subject to condition, hence, a
fictitious or simulated sale. On the other hand, according to petitioners,
the sales were all absolute and protected by the Torrens System since
new transfer certificate of titles were issued in their name. Apparently,
there is a cloud of doubt as to who has a better right or title to the
disputed properties. This, We believe, requires the determination of title
or ownership of the three parcels of land in dispute which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the guardianship court and should be threshed out in a
separate ordinary action not a guardianship proceedings as held in Cui
vs. Piccio supra.
The ruling in Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839, relied upon by private
respondent finds no application in the instant case. As differentiated from
the case at bar, in Castillo case, the right or title of the ward to the
property in dispute was clear and undisputable as the same was donated
to her through compromise agreement approved by the court which title
had the authority of res judicata. As enunciated above, the right or title of
the ward to the properties in question is in dispute and as such should be
determined in a separate ordinary action.
Furthermore, private respondent's claim that petitioners are barred by
laches to raise the issue of jurisdiction is without merit. In support of such
claim, private respondent invoked the exception laid down in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, to the rule that the lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter is fatal and may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings; that it is conferred only by law, and in the manner
prescribed by law and an objection on the lack of jurisdiction cannot be
waived by the parties; and the infirmity cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence, or even by express consent, or win of the parties. 24
The doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, supra, and in the latter
case of Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 419 is not applicable in the
case at bar. In Tijam case, the appellant had all the opportunity to challenged
the court's jurisdiction in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals
but instead invoked its jurisdiction to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its
case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision
was rendered by the Court of Appeals and fifteen (15) years later from the
inception of the case that it finally chose to raise the question of j jurisdiction.
I t is clear that t the circumstances present in Tijam case are not present
here. The petitioners in the instant case challenged the authority of the trial
court to take further cognizance of the case the moment they become aware
of Branch I assuming jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction was raised in a
petition for reconsideration of the order dated January 8, 1969, in a petition
for reconsideration of the decision dated April 15, 1969, in a second petition
for reconsideration of the said decision, and alleged as an additional ground
in the petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. In any case, the operation
of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends
upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction. If it had no jurisdiction,
but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction,
the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the
same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of
the parties or by estoppel. 25
As respondent trial court has no jurisdiction, We deem it unnecessary to pass
upon the assigned errors raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 20,
1971 is hereby reversed and set aside, and the decision rendered by
respondent Judge of Branch IV-Calauag, Court of First Instance of
Quezon dated April 15, 1969 and the orders issued thereafter are
declared null and void, and the case is hereby remanded to Branch I-
Lucena City, Court of First Instance of Quezon for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Ericta and Escolin,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J.:, dissenting:
I dissent. I vote for the affirmance of the decision of Judge Union C.
Kayanan, Calauag Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
Province dated April 15, 1969 in Special Proceeding No. 2641, entitled
"Guardianship of the Incompetent Soledad Rodriguez, Francisco
Rodriguez, Jr., Guardian".
In that decision, Judge Kayanan ordered the spouses Luis Parco and
Virginia Bautista to reconvey Lot No. 3437 (613 square meters), Lot No.
4389 (4,069 square meters) and Lot No. 1207 (63,598 square meters), all
of the Sariaya, Tayabas cadastre, to the guardian Francisco Rodriguez,
Jr. upon the latter's payment to the said spouses of the sum of twelve
thousand pesos which he had borrowed from them (p. 65, Rollo).
Since the ward died intestate on September 15, 1970 and the guardian
died on October 24, 1973, the reconveyance should be made to the
ward's heirs, namely, her sisters, Concepcion Rodriguez- Sapalo and
Milagros Rodriguez-Sanchez, and the children of the ward's deceased
brother Mario Rodriguez (who died on March 8, 1972), namely, Mario, Jr.,
Ramoncito, Liza and Rodulfo, all surnamed Rodriguez, represented by
their guardian, their mother, Leonisa S. Rodriguez (pp. 232-236, Rollo).
Said heirs should pay the Parco spouses the sum of twelve thousand
pesos as a condition for the reconveyance.
It should be noted that the said guardianship proceedings was assigned
originally to Branch I presided over by Judge Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera. It was transferred to Branch IV presided over by Judge Kayanan
who was detailed at Lucena City to assist in decongesting the dockets of
Branches I and II.
Judge Kayanan had authorized the sale of the three lots to the Parco
spouses so that the proceeds of the sale could be used for the
maintenance of the ward. it turned out that the sales or transfers were
made under certain conditions which were violated by the Parco spouses.
A copy of Judge Kayanan's decision was received by petitioners' counsel
on May 29, 1969. Sixteen days later or on June 14, they filed a motion for
reconsideration. The order denying that motion was received by the
petitioners on June 26. They filed their notice of appeal and appeal bond
on June 28 (pp- 86 and 92, CA Rollo).
The last day for submitting the record on appeal was July 10. The
petitioners asked for a ten-day extension within which to file their record
on appeal Instead of submitting it, they filed on July 10 a second motion
for reconsideration on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The lower court denied the motion for extension of time within which to
file the record on appeal It also denied the second motion for
reconsideration in its order of July 18, 1969.
The petitioners did not file any record on appeal They filed on August 20,
1969 a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to set aside the said
decision of April 15. The Court of Appeals in its extended resolution of
September 27, 1969 dismissed the petition on the ground that the
petitioners' remedy was an appeal which they had abandoned.
That resolution was reconsidered. The petition was given due course.
The Court of Appeals in its decision of August 21, 1970 dismissed the
petition. (Per Justice Eulogio Serrano with Alvendia and Nolasco JJ.,
concurring. Justice Enriquez and Yatco dissented.)
Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of that decision was denied in
the resolution of January 20, 197 1. (Per Justice Eulogio Serrano with
Justices Nolasco and Soriano concurring. Justices Enriquez and Alvendia
dissented.)
The petitioners appealed to this Court. The decision of the Court of
Appeals should be affirmed because (1) the petitioners inexcusably did
not file a record on appeal (2) the question as to whether the
guardianship court should set aside the conveyances to the petitioners is
not a jurisdictional question but merely a procedural matter which could
be waived (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257 June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262)
and (3) the petitioners and the guardian hoodwinked the guardianship
court to the ward's prejudice.
It is the duty of the courts, in the exercise of the State's prerogative to
protect persons under disability (parents patriae) to set aside the
transfers to the petitioners and thus avoid unjust enrichment at the
expense of the ward and do justice in this case. Technicalities should be
eschewed.
As to the power of a branch of the Court of First Instance to act in a case
transferred to it from another sala of the same court, see Eleazar vs.
Zandueta, 48 Phil. 193; Hizon Mercado vs. Ocampo, 72 Phil. 318; San
Miguel Brewery, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 91 Phil. 178.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J.:, dissenting:
I dissent. I vote for the affirmance of the decision of Judge Union C.
Kayanan, Calauag Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
Province dated April 15, 1969 in Special Proceeding No. 2641, entitled
"Guardianship of the Incompetent Soledad Rodriguez, Francisco
Rodriguez, Jr., Guardian".
In that decision, Judge Kayanan ordered the spouses Luis Parco and
Virginia Bautista to reconvey Lot No. 3437 (613 square meters), Lot No.
4389 (4,069 square meters) and Lot No. 1207 (63,598 square meters), all
of the Sariaya, Tayabas cadastre, to the guardian Francisco Rodriguez,
Jr. upon the latter's payment to the said spouses of the sum of twelve
thousand pesos which he had borrowed from them (p. 65, Rollo).
Since the ward died intestate on September 15, 1970 and the guardian
died on October 24, 1973, the reconveyance should be made to the
ward's heirs, namely, her sisters, Concepcion Rodriguez- Sapalo and
Milagros Rodriguez-Sanchez, and the children of the ward's deceased
brother Mario Rodriguez (who died on March 8, 1972), namely, Mario, Jr.,
Ramoncito, Liza and Rodulfo, all surnamed Rodriguez, represented by
their guardian, their mother, Leonisa S. Rodriguez (pp. 232-236, Rollo).
Said heirs should pay the Parco spouses the sum of twelve thousand
pesos as a condition for the reconveyance.
It should be noted that the said guardianship proceedings was assigned
originally to Branch I presided over by Judge Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera. It was transferred to Branch IV presided over by Judge Kayanan
who was detailed at Lucena City to assist in decongesting the dockets of
Branches I and II.
Judge Kayanan had authorized the sale of the three lots to the Parco
spouses so that the proceeds of the sale could be used for the
maintenance of the ward. it turned out that the sales or transfers were
made under certain conditions which were violated by the Parco spouses.
A copy of Judge Kayanan's decision was received by petitioners' counsel
on May 29, 1969. Sixteen days later or on June 14, they filed a motion for
reconsideration. The order denying that motion was received by the
petitioners on June 26. They filed their notice of appeal and appeal bond
on June 28 (pp- 86 and 92, CA Rollo).
The last day for submitting the record on appeal was July 10. The
petitioners asked for a ten-day extension within which to file their record
on appeal Instead of submitting it, they filed on July 10 a second motion
for reconsideration on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The lower court denied the motion for extension of time within which to
file the record on appeal It also denied the second motion for
reconsideration in its order of July 18, 1969.
The petitioners did not file any record on appeal They filed on August 20,
1969 a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to set aside the said
decision of April 15. The Court of Appeals in its extended resolution of
September 27, 1969 dismissed the petition on the ground that the
petitioners' remedy was an appeal which they had abandoned.
That resolution was reconsidered. The petition was given due course.
The Court of Appeals in its decision of August 21, 1970 dismissed the
petition. (Per Justice Eulogio Serrano with Alvendia and Nolasco JJ.,
concurring. Justice Enriquez and Yatco dissented.)
Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of that decision was denied in
the resolution of January 20, 197 1. (Per Justice Eulogio Serrano with
Justices Nolasco and Soriano concurring. Justices Enriquez and Alvendia
dissented.)
The petitioners appealed to this Court. The decision of the Court of
Appeals should be affirmed because (1) the petitioners inexcusably did
not file a record on appeal (2) the question as to whether the
guardianship court should set aside the conveyances to the petitioners is
not a jurisdictional question but merely a procedural matter which could
be waived (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257 June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262)
and (3) the petitioners and the guardian hoodwinked the guardianship
court to the ward's prejudice.
It is the duty of the courts, in the exercise of the State's prerogative to
protect persons under disability (parents patriae) to set aside the
transfers to the petitioners and thus avoid unjust enrichment at the
expense of the ward and do justice in this case. Technicalities should be
eschewed.
As to the power of a branch of the Court of First Instance to act in a case
transferred to it from another sala of the same court, see Eleazar vs.
Zandueta, 48 Phil. 193; Hizon Mercado vs. Ocampo, 72 Phil. 318; San
Miguel Brewery,
G.R. No. L-58319 June 29, 1982
PATRIA PACIENTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, Presiding Judge of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Leyte and Southern Leyte;
FELICIANA CALLE, court-appointed guardian of the minors Shirley
and Leandro, both surnamed HOMERES; the SOLICITOR GENERAL;
THE CITY FISCAL OF TACLOBAN; and, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS,
Tacloban City, respondents.
RESOLUTION
GUTIERREZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the validity of an
April 24, 1981 order of the respondent Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Leyte which required the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum to —
give and deposit with the clerk of this court the amount of
TEN THOUSAND PESOS (PI0,000.00) more as
additional consideration of Lot No. 3085-G of the
Tacloban Cadastre which the court believes to be fair and
reasonable price of the property. This amount should be
deposited with the clerk of this court on or before June 24,
1981; otherwise TCT No. T-13238 in the name of Patria
Paciente now subject of a mortgage in favor of the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to guarantee an
obligation in the amount of P30,000.00, dated December
27, 1978, will be cancelled.
as well as the validity of its resolution dated August 21, 1981 which
denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner and Conchita
Dumdum of the aforesaid order and directed the Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City —
to cancel TCT No. 13238 of Patria Paciente and issue in
lieu thereof a new transfer certificate of title to the
following present owners of Lot 3085- G of the Tacloban
Cadastre: Patria Paciente, of legal age, Filipino, married,
residing in Tacloban City, 1/3; Shirley Homeres, 10 years
old, residing in Tacloban City, 1/3; and, Leandro
Homeres, 10 years old, residing in Tacloban City,
Philippines, 1/3, subject to the mortgage lien of the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation.
because of their failure to comply with the same aforestated order. The
facts of the case are as follow:
In 1972, Leonardo Homeres died leaving his wife, Lilia Samson Homeres,
and two minor children, Shirley and Leandro, a parcel of land known as
Lot No. 3085-G situated in Sagkahan, Tacloban City, covered by TCT
No. 12138. This lot which he had inherited from his deceased father,
Felizardo Homeres, has an area of one thousand seven hundred one
(1,701) square meters.
On September 9, 19-76, Lilia S. Homeres, sold Lot No. 3085-G to
Conchita Dumdum for P10,000.00.
On November 11, 1976, Lilia S. Homeres filed a petition for guardianship
over the persons and estate of the minors. The petition was granted on
August 9, 1977. Lilia S. Homeres took her oath as guardian on
September 13, 1977,
On September 21, 1977, Conchita Dumdum sold Lot No. 3085-G, which
had been titled in her name under TCT No. T-13121, to petitioner Patria
Paciente for the amount of P15,000.00. Consequently, Patria Paciente
was issued TCT No. T-13238 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City.
On December 27, 1978, the petitioner mortgaged the lot to the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation for P30,000.00.
On September 12, 1980, the Acting City Register of Deeds of Tacloban
City, filed a manifestation informing respondent court that Lot No. 3085-G
which is the subject of the guardianship proceedings had been registered
in the name of the petitioner under TCT No. T-13238 and that it was
mortgaged to the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to guarantee
petitioner's loan of P30,000.00.
Upon being thus informed by the Register of Deeds, the respondent court
issued an order on November 14, 1980, directing the petitioner and the
manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to appear
before the court on January 21, 1981 and show cause why TCT No. T-
13238, covering a parcel of land co-owned by the minors, Shirley and
Leandro Homeres, should not be cancelled for having been alienated
without authority from the court.
When January 21, 1981 came, the petitioner and the manager of
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation did not appear before the
court. Instead, Conchita Dumdum appeared and explained to the
respondent court that she sold the lot which she acquired from Lilia S.
Homeres to the petitioner without obtaining the approval of the court
because she was not aware of such requirement regarding the properties
of the minors. On the same date, the respondent court again issued an
order requiring the petitioner and the manager of the Consolidated Bank
and Trust Corporation to explain why TCT No. T- 13238 should not be
cancelled for their failure to first secure judicial authority before disposing
of the said property.
At the hearing on April 24, 1981, George Go, the petitioner's husband,
apprised the court that the petitioner was an innocent purchaser for value
of the lot in question. Respondent court then issued the questioned order.
A motion for reconsideration filed by her and Conchita Dumdum having
been denied, petitioner filed the present petition.
The issue in this case is whether the respondent court acting as a
guardianship court has jurisdiction to order the Register of Deeds to
cancel the transfer certificate of title of petitioner and to order the
issuance of a new title to include the minors as co-owners with the
petitioner for her having failed to comply with the court's order directing
her to pay the minors the reasonable price of their property that their
mother alienated without authority of a competent court.
Relying on the cases of Cui, et al. vs. Piccio, et al. 91 Phil. 712, and
Parco and Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-33152, January 30,
1982, petitioner contends that respondent court in hearing a petition for
guardianship is not the proper situs for the cancellation of a Torrens Title.
In the Cui case, this Court ruled:
... Out of the cases cited, the only one we find to have
some relevancy is that of Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil.
839. In this case, the court made a distinction between
the provisions of sections 709 and 593 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which now correspond to section 6, Rule
88 and section 6 of Rule 97 of the Rules of Court. This
Court in that case said in effect that while in
administration proceedings the court under section 709
may only question the person suspected of having
embezzled, concealed or conveyed away property
belonging to the estate, section 593 of the same Code of
Civil Procedure authorizes the Judge or the court to issue
such orders as maybe necessary to secure the estate
against concealment, embezzlement and conveyance,
and this distinction is now given emphasis by
respondents' counsel. the way we interpret section 573 of
the Code of Civil Procedure as now embodied in Rule 97,
section 6 of the Rules of Court in the light of the ruling laid
down in the case of Castillo vs. Bustamante, supra, is that
the court may issue an order directing the delivery or
return of any property embezzled, concealed or conveyed
which belongs to a ward, where the right or title of said
ward is clear and indisputable.
xxx xxx xxx
 In conclusion, we hold that the respondent Judge had no
jurisdiction to issue his order of September 5, 1951, in the
guardianship proceedings requiring the petitioners to
deliver the rentals collected by them to the guardian and
authorizing the latter to collect rentals in the future, for the
reason that the jurisdiction of the court in guardianship
proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of
having embezzled, concealed or conveyed property
belonging to the ward for the purpose of obtaining
information which may be used in action later to be
instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward;
and that only in extreme cases, where property clearly
belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has already
been judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to
the guardian.
and in the case of Parco and Bautista the ruling reads as follows:
In Cui vs. Piccio, et al., supra, this Court held that the
jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings,
ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having
embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property
belonging to the ward for the purpose of obtaining
information which may be used in an action later to be
instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward.
Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and
limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the
property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed,
or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court, only
in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the
ward or where his title thereto has been already judicially
decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian.
In effect, there can only be delivery or return of the
embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of the ward,
where the right or title of said ward is clear and
undisputable. However, where title to any property said to
be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, under
the Cui case, the determination of said title or right
whether in favor of the persons said to have embezzled,
concealed or conveyed the property must be determined
in a separate ordinary action and not in a guardianship
proceedings.
Insofar as the acts of the guardianship court intended to effect the
delivery or return of the property conveyed are concerned, We find the
orders of the respondent court valid. The petitioner's contentions in this
regard are untenable. Even the aforecited cases relied upon do not
support her argument. While it is true that in these two cases We ruled
that where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or
conveyed is in question, the determination of said title or right whether in
favor of the ward or in favor of the person said to have embezzled,
concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate
ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings, We also
emphasized that if the right or title of the ward to the property is clear and
indisputable the court may issue an order directing its delivery or return.
In the present case the right or title of the two minors to the property is
clear and indisputable. They inherited a part of the land in question from
their father. The sale of this land, where they are co-owners, by their
mother without the authority of the guardianship court is illegal (Yuson de
Pua vs. San Agustin, 106 SCRA 7, 16).
In issuing the above questioned order and resolution, the respondent
court did not exceed its jurisdiction but merely exercised its duty to
protect persons under disability.
The respondent court's order directing the deposit of an additional
consideration of P10,000.00 is a different matter. It was issued without a
hearing to determine not only the valuation of the property but the time
frame for fixing said valuation which is not clear. It is, consequently, null
and void.
It is true that when the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum failed to give the
additional amount, the second order directing the cancellation of the
petitioner's title may be said to have superseded or cancelled the first
order. The second order directed the issuance of a new title over the land
inherited by Leandro Homeres from his late father with each heir getting
title to one-third of the property. Considering, however, the petitioner's
protestations of violations of due process and the guardianship court's
unusual procedures in dealing with the properties under guardianship, the
respondent court is directed to conduct regular hearings and take
evidence on the reasonable price of Lot No. 3085-G, if its alienation is
found to be in the best interests of the wards and consistent with the
rights of all parties involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The guardianship court in
Special Proceedings No. JP-0156 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Leyte is hereby ordered to conduct further hearings of the case
as above indicated.
SO ORDERED,
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ.,
concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
[G.R. No. L-51369. July 29, 1987.]
The minors ALBERTO, NENITA, HILLY, CRISTY, and MARIA SALOME, all
surnamed BADILLO, assisted by their guardian MODESTA
BADILLO, Appellees, v. CLARITA FERRER, defendant, GREGORIO
SOROMERO and ELEUTERIA RANA, Defendants-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CO-OWNERSHIP; SALE OF LAND SUBJECT THEREOF;
REDEMPTION; PERIOD FOR LEGAL REDEMPTION; WILL RUN AGAINST A MINOR
CO-OWNER IF GUARDIAN IS DULY SERVED WITH WRITTEN NOTICE BY
VENDOR. — Pursuant to Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil Code the father,
or in his absence the mother, is considered the legal administrator of the
property pertaining to his child under parental authority without need of giving
a bond in case the amount of his child’s property does not exceed Two
Thousand Pesos. Rule 93, Section 7, of the Revised Rules of Court goes further
by automatically designating the parent as the legal guardian of the child
without need of any judicial appointment in case the latter’s property does not
exceed Two Thousand Pesos. The period fixed for legal redemption in
accordance with Article 1623 (then Article 1524) of the New Civil Code will run
against a minor co-owner duly represented by a judicially appointed guardian,
provided that said guardian is served with the necessary written notice by the
vendor. Corollary to this, the period fixed for legal redemption will also run
against a minor co-owner whose property is valued no more than Two
Thousand Pesos and who is merely represented by his father or mother with no
judicial appointment as a guardian because according to Rule 93, Section 7 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the parent in this situation is automatically the
child’s legal guardian. Of course, the parent-guardian must first be served with
a notice in writing of the sale of an undivided portion of the property by the
vendor in order that the period for redemption may begin to accrue.
2. ID.; SALE; CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY NATURAL GUARDIAN WITHOUT
AUTHORITY, UNENFORCEABLE; RESTITUTION NOT PROPER. — The Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is not a voidable or an annullable contract under
Article 1390 of the New Civil Code. Article 1390 renders a contract voidable if
one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the
contracting party’s consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud. In this case, however, the appellee minors are not even
parties to the contract involved. Their names were merely dragged into the
contract by their mother who claimed a right to represent them, purportedly in
accordance with Article 320 of the New Civil Code. The Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition and Sale is an unenforceable or, more specifically, an unauthorized
contract under Articles 1403 (1) and 1317 of the New Civil Code. Clearly,
Clarita Ferrer Badillo has no authority or has acted beyond her powers in
conveying to the appellants that 5/12 undivided share of her minor children in
the property involved in this case. The powers given to her by the laws as the
natural guardian covers only matters of administration and cannot include the
power of disposition. She should have first secured the permission of the court
before she alienated that portion of the property in question belonging to her
minor children. The appellee minors never ratified this Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition and Sale. In fact, they questions its validity as to them. Hence, the
contract remained unenforceable or unauthorized. No restitution may be
ordered from the appellee minors either as to that portion of the purchase price
which pertains to their share in the property or at least as to that portion which
benefited them because the law does not sanction any.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
This case was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals which found in its
Resolution dated August 13, 1979, that the issues raised therein are pure
questions of law. The instant case is treated as a petition for review
on certiorari.
The facts of this case as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
jgc:cha nrob les.co m.ph
". . . Macario Badillo died intestate on February 4, 1966, survived by his widow,
Clarita Ferrer, and five minor children: Alberto 16, Nenita 14, Hilly 12, Cristy 9,
and Maria Salome 5. He left a parcel of registered land of 77 square meters in
Lumban, Laguna, with a house erected thereon, valued at P7,500.00, (the
"PROPERTY", for short). Hence, each of the five minor plaintiffs had inherited a
1/12 share of the P7,500.00, or P625.00 each, which is less than the
P2,000.00 mentioned in Article 320 of the Civil Code.
"On January 18, 1967, the surviving widow, in her own behalf and as natural
guardian of the minor plaintiffs, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and
Sale of the PROPERTY through which the PROPERTY was sold to defendants-
appellants, the spouses Gregorio Soromero and Eleuteria Rana. The Register of
Deeds at Sta. Cruz, Laguna, extended recognition to the validity of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition and Sale, recorded the same, and issued a new transfer
certificate of title to defendants-appellants . . .
"On November 11, 1968, Modesta Badillo, a sister of Macario Badillo, was able
to obtain guardianship over the persons and properties of the minor plaintiffs,
without personal notice to their mother, who was alleged "could not be located
inspite of the efforts exerted" (ROA, p. 26).
"On July 23, 1970, their guardian caused the minor plaintiffs to file a complaint
in the case below for the annulment of the sale of their participation in the
PROPERTY to defendants-appellants and, conceding the validity of the sale of
the widow’s participation in the PROPERTY, they asked that, as co-owners, they
be allowed to exercise the right of legal redemption.
"The lower court defined the issues in the case below as follows: cha nro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry
‘(1) Was the sale of the shares of the plaintiffs in the ownership of the land in
question which was made by their mother, defendant Clarita Ferrer Badillo, in
favor of the defendant spouses Gregorio Soromero and Eleuteria Rana as
evidenced by the document marked as Exhibit "A" for the plaintiffs and Exhibit
"2" for the defendants, valid and binding upon the plaintiffs?
(2) May the plaintiffs, as co-owners of the property in question, still exercise
their right of redemption under Art. 1620 and pursuant to Art. 1623 of the Civil
Code; and if so, for how much?
"The lower court, invoking the Nario case (Nario v. Philippine American Life
Insurance Co., 20 SCRA 434), promulgated the appealed judgment annulling
the sale to defendants-appellants of the minor plaintiffs’ participation in the
PROPERTY, and allowing them to redeem the sold participation of their
mother." 1
In this appeal, the defendants-appellants assign the following errors:
I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PERIOD OF THIRTY (30) DAYS
PROVIDED FOR BY ARTICLE 1623 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE FOR PLAINTIFFS
TO REDEEM THE SHARE OF THEIR MOTHER IN THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF
THEIR CO-OWNERSHIP SOLD BY THE LATTER TO DEFENDANTS HAS NOT YET
ELAPSED.
2 Court."cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry
THE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE SALE BY CLARITA FERRER BADILLO OF
THE 5/12 SHARE OF HIS CHILDREN ON THE PROPERTY INVOLVED TO
DEFENDANTS AS NULL AND VOID AND RELATIVE THERETO THE COURT
CONSEQUENTLY ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO ORDER PLAINTIFFS MINORS TO
RETURN TO DEFENDANTS THE PURCHASE PRICE AS WELL AS THE VALUE OF
THE IMPROVEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANTS ON THE PROPERTY.
3
THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEFENDANTS TO RE-SELL TO
PLAINTIFFS THE REMAINING 7/12 PORTION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION
IN THE AMOUNT OF P4,375.00. 2
The Statutory provision involved in the first error assigned is Article 1623 of
the New Civil Code, which is hereunder reproduced, thus: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h
"ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor as the case may be. The deed of sale
shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners.
"The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary
Under their first assignment of error, the appellants advance the view that "the
requisite notice in writing provided for by Article 1623 of the New Civil Code
was already received by the minors-plaintiffs thru their then legal guardian,
Clarita Ferrer Badillo, their mother, on the date the deed of extrajudicial
partition and sale was executed on January 18, 1967. And the thirty-day period
of redemption must be reckoned from this date." 3 Stated differently, under
Article 320 of the New Civil Code, the right granted to Clarita Ferrer Badillo to
administer her children’s property if the same is less than P2,000.00 includes
the right to receive for her minor children such notice in writing. When she
received her copy of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale, Clarita Ferrer
Badillo in effect received a notice in writing of the said sale in behalf of her
minor children. c han robles v irt ual lawl ibra ry
This argument is meritorious.
chan roble s law lib rary : red
Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil Code state that: jgc:chanroble s.com. ph
"ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator
of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property
is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond
subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
"ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s
property. subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of
In other words, the father, or in his absence the mother, is considered the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to his child under parental authority
without need of giving a bond in case the amount of his child’s property does
not exceed Two Thousand Pesos.
Rule 93, Section 7, of the Revised Rules of Court goes further by automatically
designating the parent as the legal guardian of the child without need of any
judicial appointment in case the latter’s property does not exceed Two
Thousand Pesos. It reads, thus: jgc:chanro bles. com.ph
"SEC. 7. Parents as guardians. — When the property of the child under
parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the
mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian.
When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the child’s property, with
the duties and obligations of guardians under these rules, and shall file the
petition required by section 2 hereof. For good reasons the court may,
however, appoint another suitable person."
Our standing jurisprudence reveals that there is a case which is applicable to
the case at bar. This case involved an interpretation of Article 1524 of the Old
Civil Code, the statutory provision from which Article 1623 of the New Civil
Code originated and the one which the latter amended. The two articles are
basically the same except that Article 1623 mandates a longer period for
redemption and limits the manner of transmitting the notice of the sale of the
property co-owned to one in writing served by the vendor.
The case is Villasor v. Medel, Et. Al. 4
In this case, the co-owner plaintiff, upon reaching the age of majority, sought
to redeem a portion of a large tract of land which was sold to the defendant
while the former was still a minor, The plaintiff, during his minority, became a
co-owner of an undivided property which he, together with his cousins,
acquired by donation from his grandmother. A legal guardian was duly
appointed by the court to represent the minor co-owners. This legal guardian
later sold, with the necessary permission of the court, the shares of three co-
owners to the defendant. When the plaintiff reached the age of majority, he
wanted to redeem the said shares. chanroble s.com:c ralaw:re d
This Court ruled in favor of the defendant, holding that:
"The law in prescribing certain contingencies as the starting point from which
the nine-day period should be counted, is to be presumed to exclude all others.
Exclusio unius est exclusio alterius. The starting point is registration or, in the
absence of registration, knowledge of the conveyance by the co-owners. It is
logical to assume that if minority had been contemplated, the law would have
so expressly stated. This is specially true in a code which, unlike an ordinary
statute, is framed with meticulous care and thorough reflection. The role of
minors in cases of legal redemption is too conspicuous and perceptible to have
been overlooked in the framing of article 1524. The onerous position of the
purchaser and considerations of public interest, we believe, forbade liberality
as to time in favor of redemptioners; hence the limitation of the causes of
extension to those factors (actual or constructive notice) without which the
exercise of the right of redemption would not be possible. The shortness of the
period fixed in the above article is itself a safe index, in our opinion, of its
peremptoriness and inflexibility." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary
". . . The present appellant not only had such a guardian but it was this very
guardian, Jose C. Villasor. who, as guardian of plaintiff’s cousins and former
co-owners, sold the lots in question to the defendant-appellee. This guardian
not only could have repurchased those lots for the plaintiff within nine days but
could have sold them, with the court’s authority, directly to the plaintiff himself
instead of to Medalla." 5
In the decision, this Court frowned against a liberal interpretation of the codal
provision prescribing the period for legal redemption, hence, the following
disquisition, to wit:
chan rob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary
. . . legal redemption is in the nature of a mere privilege created by law partly
cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary for reasons of public policy and partly for the benefit and convenience of the
redemptioner, to afford him a way out of what might be a disagreeable or
inconvenient association into which he has been thrust." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry
". . . The right of legal redemption is a pure creature of the law regulated by
law, and works only one way - in favor of the redemptioner. Not having parted
with anything, the legal redemptioner can compel the purchaser to sell but can
not be compelled to buy.
"We do not believe that the framers of the Civil Code ever intended to
countenance a situation so unjust to one of the parties and prejudicial to social
interest. The construction of article 1524 which the plaintiff offers would keep
the property in a state of indivision even if one of the co-owners wanted to
separate. This is contrary to the express policy of the law that `No co-owner
shall be obliged to remain a party to the community, but each may, at any
time, demand partition of the thing held in common.’ (Article 400, Civil Code.)
It would be extremely unfair to the purchaser and injurious to the public
welfare to keep in a state of suspense, for possibility as long as 20 years or
more, what his co-owner might do when he becomes of age. While the
uncertainty continued the purchaser could not make any improvement on the
property without running the risk of losing his investments and the fruits of his
labor." 6
jgc:chanrobles.com. ph
The wisdom that can easily be formulated in reconciling the laws and the case
discussed above is that the period fixed for legal redemption in accordance with
Article 1623 (then Article 1524) of the New Civil Code will run against a minor
co-owner duly represented by a judicially appointed guardian, provided that
said guardian is served with the necessary written notice by the vendor.
Corollary to this, the period fixed for legal redemption will also run against a
minor co-owner whose property is valued no more than Two Thousand Pesos
and who is merely represented by his father or mother with no judicial
appointment as a guardian because according to Rule 93, Section 7 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the parent in this situation is automatically the child’s
legal guardian. Of course, the parent-guardian must first be served with a
notice in writing of the sale of an undivided portion of the property by the
vendor in order that the period for redemption may begin to accrue. chanrobles. com:cra law:red
In the case at bar, the value of the property of each appellee minor does not
exceed Two Thousand Pesos. The Court of Appeals found that each of them
inherited only an undivided portion worth P625.00. 7 Therefore, after the
minors’ father died, their mother, Clarita Ferrer Badillo, automatically became
their legal guardian. As such, she acquired the plenary powers of a judicial
guardian except that power to alienate or encumber her children’s property
without judicial authorization. 8
When Clarita Ferrer Badillo signed and received on January 18, 1967, her copy
of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale, the document evidencing the
transfer of the property in question to the appellants, she also in effect
received the notice in writing required by Article 1623 in behalf of her children.
This manner of receiving a written notice is specifically sanctioned by the case
of Conejero, Et. Al. v. Court of Appeals, Et. Al. 9 Thus, in this case, the period
of redemption began to toll from the time of that receipt.
On the other hand, the judicial guardian of the appellee minors, Modesta
Badillo, was only appointed as such on November 11, 1968. She thereafter
manifested her desire to redeem the property from the appellants, formalizing
such intention in the complaint that was finally filed for this case on July 23,
1970.
Since the required written notice was served on January 18, 1967 and the offer
to redeem was only made after November 11, 1968, the period for legal
redemption had already expired and the appellants cannot now be ordered to
reconvey to the appellees that portion of the undivided property which
originally belonged to Clarita Ferrer Badillo.
Under the second assignment of error, the appellants contend that the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition and Sale, in so far as it sold to them the appellee minors’
share of 5/12, is a voidable contract pursuant to Article 1390 of the New Civil
Code. They then quoted verbatim the text of the said article without identifying
the particular portion of that provision which directly supports their contention.
According to the appellants, in case a voidable contract is annulled, Article
1398 requires the restitution by the contracting parties to each other of the
things received by them under the contract. The appellants, however, concede
that by express mandate of Article 1399, full restitution cannot be ordered
from the minors involved in the contract. Said minors can only be required to
restore partially, only to the extent of the benefits they received by virtue of
the questioned contract. chanroble s.com.p h : virt ual law li brary
This contention is untenable.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is not a voidable or an annullable
contract under Article 1390 of the New Civil Code. Article 1390 renders a
contract voidable if one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the
contract or if the contracting party’s consent is vitiated by mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this case, however, the appellee
minors are not even parties to the contract involved. Their names were merely
dragged into the contract by their mother who claimed a right to represent
them, purportedly in accordance with Article 320 of the New Civil Code. 10
The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is an unenforceable or, more
specifically, an unauthorized contract under Articles 1403 (1) and 1317 of the
New Civil Code. These provisions state that: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph
"ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
ratified:
jgc: chan robles. com.ph
"(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been
given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers; . . ." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary
"ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being
authorized by the latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
"A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or
legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be
unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on
whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other
contracting party." 11
Clearly, Clarita Ferrer Badillo has no authority or has acted beyond her powers
in conveying to the appellants that 5/12 undivided share of her minor children
in the property involved in this case. The powers given to her by the laws as
the natural guardian covers only matters of administration and cannot include
the power of disposition. 12 She should have first secured the permission of
the court before she alienated that portion of the property in question
belonging to her minor children. 13
The appellee minors never ratified this Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale.
In fact, they questions its validity as to them. Hence, the contract remained
unenforceable or unauthorized. No restitution may be ordered from the
appellee minors either as to that portion of the purchase price which pertains
to their share in the property or at least as to that portion which benefited
them because the law does not sanction any.
The third error assigned need not be discussed further because Our
pronouncement on the first assignment of error has rendered it academic.
Suffice it to state that since the 30-day period for redemption had already
lapsed, the appellants cannot be ordered to re-sell to the appellees the
remaining 7/12 portion of the property in question. c hanro bles law lib rary : red
In view of the foregoing, the appellants are hereby ordered to restore to the
appellees the full ownership and possession of the latter’s 5/12 share in the
undivided property by executing the proper deed of reconveyance. The
appellants’ ownership over the remaining 7/12 share in the undivided property
is hereby confirmed.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby modified accordingly and
appellants are directed to deliver possession of above appellees’ share, with no
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (C.J.), Narvasa, Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000
JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L.
JARDELEZA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals and its resolution denying reconsideration2 reversing that of the
Regional Trial Court, Iloilo, Branch 323 and declaring void the special
proceedings instituted therein by petitioners to authorize petitioner Gilda
L. Jardeleza, in view of the comatose condition of her husband, Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr., with the approval of the court, to dispose of their conjugal
property in favor of co-petitioners, their daughter and son in law, for the
ostensible purpose of "financial need in the personal, business and
medical expenses of her ‘incapacitated’ husband."
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein
respondent) on the one hand, against his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza, and
sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza
(herein petitioners) on the other hand. The controversy came about as a
result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s suffering of a stroke on March 25,
1991, which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental
faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein respondent
Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent Gilda
Jardeleza.
"Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the senior
Jardeleza spouses was about to be sold, petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza,
on June 6, 1991, filed a petition (Annex "A") before the R.T.C. of Iloilo
City, Branch 25, where it was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4689,
in the matter of the guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. The
petitioner averred therein that the present physical and mental incapacity
of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. prevent him from competently administering
his properties, and in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the
Jardelezas’ real and personal assets, there was a need for a court-
appointed guardian to administer said properties. It was prayed therein
that Letters of Guardianship be issued in favor of herein private
respondent Gilda Ledesma Jardeleza, wife of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
It was further prayed that in the meantime, no property of Dr. Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. be negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise alienated to third
persons, particularly Lot No. 4291 and all the improvements thereon,
located along Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo City, and covered by T.C.T. No.
47337.
"A few days later, or on June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza
herself filed a petition docketed as Special Proceeding NO. 4691, before
Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, regarding the declaration of
incapacity of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers of
administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the same
(Annex "B"). Therein, the petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza averred the
physical and mental incapacity of her husband, who was then confined
for intensive medical care and treatment at the Iloilo Doctor’s Hospital.
She signified to the court her desire to assume sole powers of
administration of their conjugal properties. She also alleged that her
husband’s medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling
up, accumulating to several hundred thousands of pesos already. For
this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of real property, specifically
Lot No. 4291 and its improvements. Thus, she prayed for authorization
from the court to sell said property.
"The following day, June 14, 1991, Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City
issued an Order (Annex "C") finding the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 4691
to be sufficient in form and substance, and setting the hearing thereof for
June 20, 1991. The scheduled hearing of the petition proceeded,
attended by therein petitioner Gilda Jardeleza, her counsel, her two
children, namely Ernesto Jardeleza, Jr., and Glenda Jardeleza Uy, and
Dr. Rolando Padilla, one of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s attending physicians.
"On that same day, June 20, 1991, Branch 32 of the RTC of Iloilo City
rendered its Decision (Annex "D"), finding that it was convinced that
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, and that the sale of Lot No.
4291 and the improvements thereon was necessary to defray the
mounting expenses for treatment and Hospitalization. The said court also
made the pronouncement that the petition filed by Gilda L. Jardeleza was
"pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code, and that the proceedings
thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings sanctioned
under Article 253 of the same Code x x x.
"The said court then disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, there being factual and legal bases to the petition dated
June 13, 1991, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
"1) declaring Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., petitioner’s husband, to be
incapacitated and unable to participate in the administration of conjugal
properties;
"2) authorizing petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume sole powers of
administration of their conjugal properties; and
"3) authorizing aforesaid petitioner to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral
Survey of Iloilo, situated in Iloilo City and covered by TCT No. 47337
issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza and
the buildings standing thereof.
"SO ORDERED.
"On June 24, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed his
Opposition to the proceedings before Branch 32 in Spec. Proc. Case No.
4691, said petitioner being unaware and not knowing that a decision has
already been rendered on the case by public respondent.
"On July 3, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for
reconsideration of the judgment in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 and a motion for
consolidation of the two cases (Annex "F"). He propounded the argument
that the petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers
of administration, and authority to sell the conjugal properties was
essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. As such, it cannot be prosecuted in accordance
with the provisions on summary proceedings set out in Article 253 of the
Family Code. It should follow the rules governing special proceedings in
the Revised Rules of Court which require procedural due process,
particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. On the other
hand, even if Gilda Jardeleza’s petition can be prosecuted by summary
proceedings, there was still a failure to comply with the basic
requirements thereof, making the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a
defective one. He further alleged that under the New Civil Code, Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. had acquired vested rights as a conjugal partner, and that
these rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced without his consent. Neither
can he be deprived of his share in the conjugal properties through mere
summary proceedings. He then restated his position that Spec. Proc. No.
4691 should be consolidated with Spec. Proc. No. 4689 which was filed
earlier and pending before Branch 25.
"Teodoro Jardeleza also questioned the propriety of the sale of Lot No.
4291 and the improvements thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated
financial obligations arising from Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s hospitalization.
He alleged that the market value of the property would be around Twelve
to Fifteen Million Pesos, but that he had been informed that it would be
sold for much less. He also pointed out that the building thereon which
houses the Jardeleza Clinic is a monument to Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.’s
industry, labor and service to his fellowmen. Hence, the said property has
a lot of sentimental value to his family. Besides, argued Teodoro
Jardeleza, then conjugal partnership had other liquid assets to pay off all
financial obligations. He mentioned that apart from sufficient cash,
Jardeleza, Sr. owned stocks of Iloilo Doctors’ Hospital which can be off-
set against the cost of medical and hospital bills. Furthermore, Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. enjoys certain privileges at the said hospital which allows
him to pay on installment basis. Moreover, two of Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.’s
attending physicians are his own sons who do not charge anything for
their professional services.
"On July 4, 1991, Teodoro Jardeleza filed in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a
supplement to his motion for reconsideration (Annex "G"). He reiterated
his contention that summary proceedings was irregularly applied. He also
noted that the provisions on summary proceedings found in Chapter 2 of
the Family Code comes under the heading on "Separation in Fact
Between Husband and Wife" which contemplates of a situation where
both spouses are of disposing mind. Thus, he argued that were one
spouse is "comatose without motor and mental faculties," the said
provisions cannot be made to apply.
"While the motion for reconsideration was pending, Gilda Jardeleza
disposed by absolute sale Lot No. 4291 and all its improvements to her
daughter, Ma. Glenda Jardeleza Uy, for Eight Million Pesos
(P8,000,000.00), as evidenced by a Deed Absolute Sale dated July 8,
1991 executed between them (p. 111, Rollo). Under date of July 23,
1991, Gilda Jardeleza filed an urgent ex-parte motion for approval of the
deed of absolute sale.
"On August 12, 1991 Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the
motion for approval of the deed of sale on the grounds that: (1) the
motion was prematurely filed and should be held in abeyance until the
final resolution of the petition; (2) the motion does not allege nor prove
the justifications for the sale; and (3) the motion does not allege that had
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. been competent, he would have given his consent
to the sale.
"Judge Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto of Branch 32 of the respondent
Court, who had penned the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 had in the
meantime formally inhibited herself from further acting in this case (Annex
"I"). The case was then reraffled to Branch 28 of the said court.
"On December 19, 1991, the said court issued an Order (Annex "M")
denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and approving
respondent Jardeleza’s motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale.
The said court ruled that:
"After a careful and thorough perusal of the decision, dated June 20,
1991, the Motion for Reconsideration, as well as its supplements filed by
"oppositor", Teodoro L. Jardeleza, through counsel, and the opposition to
the Motion for Reconsideration, including its supplements, filed by
petitioner, through counsel, this Court is of the opinion and so holds, that
her Honor, Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto, Presiding Judge of Branch
32, of this Court, has properly observed the procedure embodied under
Article 253, in relation to Article 124, of the Family Code, in rendering her
decision dated June 20, 1991.
"Also, as correctly stated by petitioner, through counsel, that "oppositor"
Teodor L. Jardeleza does not have the personality to oppose the instant
petition considering that the property or properties, subject of the petition,
belongs to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Ernesto and Gilda
Jardeleza, who are both still alive.
"In view thereof, the Motion for Reconsideration of "oppositor" Teodoro L.
Jardeleza, is hereby denied for lack of merit.
"Considering the validity of the decision dated June 20, 1991, which
among others, authorized Gilda L. Jardeleza to sell Lot No. 4291 of the
Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
47337 issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., and Gilda L.
Jardeleza and the building standing thereon, the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for Approval of Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 23, 1991, filed by
petitioner, through counsel, is hereby granted and the deed of absolute
sale, executed and notarized on July 8, 1991, by and between Gilda L.
Jardeleza, as vendor, and Ma. Glenda Jardeleza, as vendee, is hereby
approved, and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, is directed to register
the sale and issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title to the
vendee.
"SO ORDERED."4
On December 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
reversing the appealed decision and ordering the trial court to dismiss the
special proceedings to approve the deed of sale, which was also
declared void.5
On December 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration,6 however, on March 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion, finding no cogent and compelling reason to disturb the
decision.7
Hence, this appeal.8
The issue raised is whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident,
rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could
not manage their conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers
of administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family
Code and dispose of a parcel of land with its improvements, worth more
than twelve million pesos, with the approval of the court in a summary
proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law, for
the amount of eight million pesos.
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr., the procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article
124 of the Family Code are not applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr.
was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due
to illness that had rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the
appointment of a judicial guardian of the person or estate or both of such
incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed such a petition for judicial
guardianship.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
"ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement,
the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by
the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
"In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors. (165a)."
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family
Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or
separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or
cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-
consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In
this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent"
who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke,
cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a
diagnosis of brain stem infarct.9 In such case, the proper remedy is a
judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal
property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of
administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the
Rules of Court.10
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such
administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the
sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95,
1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings
under the Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under
the Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial court did not even observe
1âw phi 1
the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family
Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the
incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the
petition should not be granted.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to
be heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due
process. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a
denial of due process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever
branch of the government the impress of nullity.11 A decision rendered
without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or
collaterally.12 "A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a
party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard."13 "A void decision may
be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by
means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or
proceeding where it is invoked."14
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G. R. SP No. 26936, in toto.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. L-17809 December 29, 1962
RESURRECCION DE LEON, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
EMILIANA MOLO-PECKSON, ET AL., respondents-appellants.
Cornelio R. Magsarili for plaintiffs-appellees.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for respondents-appellants.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Resurreccion De Leon, et al. filed on November 13, 1958 before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint seeking to compel Emiliana
Molo-Peckson, et al. to convey to the former ten parcel of land located in
Pasay City with an area of 1,749 sq. m. upon payment of P1.00 per
parcel upon the plea that said lots were willed or donated in 1948 to the
latter by their foster parents Mariano Molo y Legaspi and Juana Juan with
the understanding that they should sell them to the plaintiffs under the
terms above-stated.
Defendants, in their answer, disclaimed any legal obligation on their part
to sell the above properties to the plaintiffs for the nominal consideration
of P1.00 per lot alleging that if they executed the document on which the
complaint is predicated it was on the mistaken assumption that their
foster parents had requested them that they executed on August 9, 1956
a document revoking said donation which was acknowledged before
Notary Public Leoncio C. Jimenez.
No testimonial evidence was presented by either party. Instead, both
agreed to submit the case upon the presentation of their respective
exhibits which were all admitted by the trial court.
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered on September 21, 1960
a decision wherein it held that, under the facts established by the
evidence, trust has been constituted by the late spouses Mariano Molo
and Juana Juan over the ten parcels of land in question in favor plaintiffs
as beneficiaries and, as a consequence concluded:
Considering all the foregoing, the Court orders:
1. The defendants, jointly and severally to free the said ten (10)
parcels of land from the mortgage lien in favor of the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (now Development Bank of
the Philippines) and Claro Cortez, and thereafter to sign and
execute in favor of the plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale of the
said properties for and in consideration of TEN (P10.00) PESOS
already deposited in Court after all conditions imposed in Exhibit
A have been complied with;
2. That in the event the defendants shall refuse to execute and
perform the above, they are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay
the plaintiffs the value of said ten (10) parcels of land in question,
the amount to be assessed by the City of Pasay City as the fair
market value of the same, upon orders of the Court to assess
said value;
3. The defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs'
Attorney's fees in the amount of P3,000.00, as defendants acted
in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs'
plainly valid, just and demandable claim, under Article 2208 sub-
paragraph 5 of the New Civil Code;
4. The defendants to render an accounting of the fruits of said ten
(10) parcels of land from the time plaintiffs demanded the
conveyance of said parcels of land on August 11, 1956 as per
Exhibits B and C, in accordance with the provisions of Article
1164, New Civil Code which provides that the creditor has a right
to the fruit of the thing from the time the obligation to deliver it
arises; and
5. The defendants to pay the costs.
Defendants took the present appeal.
On January 24, 1941, Mariano Molo y Legaspi died leaving a will wherein
he bequeathed his entire estate to his wife, Juana Juan. This will was
probated in the Court of First Instance of Pasay City, Rizal, which was
affirmed by the Supreme Court on November 26, 1956 (G.R. No. L-
8774). On May 11, 1948, Juana Juan in turn executed a will naming
therein many devisees and legatees, one of whom is Guillermo San
Rafael, mother of the plaintiffs and defendant Pilar Perez Nable. On June
7, 1948, however, Juana Juan executed a donation inter vivos in favor of
Emiliana Molo-Peckson and Pilar Perez Nable of almost all of her entire
property leaving only about P16,000.00 worth of property for the devisees
mentioned in the will. Among the properties conveyed to the donees are
the ten parcels of land subject of the present action. Juana Juan died on
May 28, 1950.
On December 5, 1950, Emiliana Molo-Peckson and Pilar Perez Nable
executed a document which they called "MUTUAL AGREEMENT" the
pertinent provisions of which are:
That the above named parties hereby mutually agree by these
presents . . . that the following lots should be sold at ONE (1)
PESO each to the following persons and organization:
xxx xxx xxx
 TO — JUSTA DE LEON and RESURRECCION DE LEON,
several parcels of land located at Calle Tolentino (South of
Tenorio and Kapitan Magtibay), Pasay City, share and share alike
or half and half of TEN (10) LOTS described in:
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 28157 — and allocated as follows:
(a) To JUSTA DE LEON Five (5) Lots.
(b) To RESURRECCION DE LEON, the remaining Five (5) Lots.
That this agreement is made in conformity with the verbal wish of
the late Don Mariano Molo y Legaspi and the late Dona Juana
Francisco Juan y Molo. These obligations were repeatedly told to
Emiliana Molo Peckson, before their death and that same should
be fulfilled after their death.
On August 9, 1956, however, the same defendants, assisted by their
husbands, executed another document in which they revoked the so-
called mutual agreement mentioned above, and another relating to the
same subject matter, stating therein that the parties, "after matured and
thorough study, realized that the above-mentioned public instruments . . .
do not represent their true and correct interpretation of the verbal wishes
of the late spouses Don Mariano Molo y Legaspi and Dona Juana
Francisco Juan y Molo." But after the execution of this document, that is,
on August 11, 1956, the beneficiary Resurreccion de Leon and Justa de
Leon, thru their counsel demanded the conveyance to them of the ten
parcels of land for the consideration of P1.00 per parcel as stated in the
document of December 5, 1950. And having the defendants refused to do
so, said beneficiaries consigned on July 8, 1957 the amount of P10.00 as
the consideration of the ten parcels of land.lawphil.net
In this appeal, appellants assign the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
SPOUSES, MARIANO MOLO AND JUANA JUAN,
CONSTITUTED A TRUST OVER THE PROPERTIES IN
QUESTION PETITION WITH PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES AS
BENEFICIARIES.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 1440,
1441, 1449, 1453 AND 1457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE TO THE
CASE AT BAR.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLEES' EXHIBIT "A" TO BE A DECLARATION AGAINST
INTEREST AND AN ADMISSION BY DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS HAD NO RIGHT TO REVOKE
EXHIBIT "A".
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED, IN ORDERING APPELLANTS TO
RENDER AN ACCOUNTING OF THE FRUIT OF THE
PROPERTIES IN QUESTION.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING APPELLANTS TO
FREE THE PROPERTIES FROM THE MORTGAGE LIENS IN
FAVOR OF THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND CLARO CORTEZ.
VII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S
FEES TO THE APPELLEES.
VIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT.
There is no merit in the claim that the document executed on December
5, 1950 does not represent the true and correct interpretation by
appellants of the verbal wish of their foster parents relative to the
conveyance for a nominal consideration to appellees of the ten parcels of
land in question considering the circumstances obtaining in the present
case. To begin with, this document was executed by appellants on
December 5, 1950, or about two years and six months from the time they
acquired title to the lands by virtue of the donation inter vivos executed in
their favor by their foster mother Juana Juan and six months after the
death of the donor. There is nobody who could cajole them to execute it,
nor is there any force that could corce them to make the declaration
therein expressed, except the constraining mandat of their conscience to
comply with "the obligations repeatedly told to Emiliana Molo Peckson,"
one of appellants, before their death, epitomized inthe "verbal wish of the
late Don Mariano Molo y Legaspi and the late Doña Juana Francisco
Juan y Molo" to convey after their death said ten parcelsof land at P1.00
a parcel to appellees. In fact, the acknowledgement appended to the
document they subscribed states that it was "their own free act
andvoluntary deed." 1awphi1.net
Indeed, it is to be supposed that appellants understood and
comprehended the legal import of said documents when they executed it
more so when bothof them had studied in reputable centers of learning,
one being a pharmacist and the other a member of the bar. Moreover,
they have more than ample time — the six months intervening betwen
the death of the donor and the execution of the document — to ponder
not only wish of their predecessors-in-interest but also on the propriety of
putting in writing the mandate they have received. It is, therefore,
reasonable to presume that that document represents the real wish of
appellants' predecessors-in-interest and that the only thing to be
determinedis its real import and legal implications.
That the document represents a recognition of pre-existing trust or a
declaration of an express trust impressed on the ten parcels of land in
question is evident. A declaration of trust has been defined as an act by
which a person acknowledges that the property, title to which he holds, is
held by him for the use of another (Griffith v. Maxfield, 51 S.W. 832,
66Ark. 513, 521). This is precisely the nature of the will of the donor: to
convey the titles of the lands to appellants with the duty to hold them
intrust for the appellees. Appellants oblingly complied with this duty
byexecuting the document under consideration.
True it is that to establish a trust the proof must be clear, satisfactory and
convincing. It cannot rest on vague, uncertain evidence, or on a
loose,equivocal or indefinite declaration (In re Tuttle's Estate, 200 A. 921,
132 Pa. Super 356); but here the document in question clearly and
unequivocallydeclares the existence of the trust even if the same was
executed subsequent to the death of the trustor, Juana Juan, for it has
been held that the right creating or declaring a trust need not be
contemporaneous or inter-parties (Stephenson v. Stephenson, 171 S.W.
2d 265, 351 Mo. 8; In re Corbin's Trust Orhp., 57 York Leg. Rec. 201). It
was even held that an express trust maybe declared by a writing made
after the legal estate has been vested in the trustee (Kurtz v. Robinson,
Tex. Civ. App. 256 S.W. 2d 1003). The contention, therefore, of
appellants that the will and the donation executed by their predecessors-
in-interest were absolute for it did not contain a hint that the lots in
question will be held in trust by them does not merit weight because the
fact that an express trust was created by a deed which was absolute on
its face may be shown by a writing separate from the deed itself (Mugan
v. Wheeler, 145 S.W. 462, 241 Mo. 376).
The fact that the beneficiaries were not notified of the existence of the
trust or that the latter have not been given an opportunity to accept it isof
no importance, for it is not essential to the existence of a valid trustand to
the right of the beneficiaries to enforce the same that they had knowledge
thereof the time of its creation (Stoehr v. Miller, 296 F. 414).Neither is it
necessary that the beneficiary should consent to the creation of the trust
(Wockwire-Spencer Steel Corporation v. United Spring Mfg. Co.,142 N.E.
758, 247 Mass. 565). In fact it has been held that in case of a voluntary
trust the assent of the beneficiary is not necessary to render itvalid
because as a general rule acceptance by the beneficiary is presumed
(Article 1446, new Civil Code; Cristobal v. Gomez, 50 Phil. 810).
It is true, as appellants contend, that the alleged declaration of trust was
revoked, and having been revoked it cannot be accepted, but the
attempted revocation did not have any legal effect. The rule is that in the
absence of any reservation of the power to revoke a voluntary trust is
irrevocable without the consent of the beneficiary (Allen v. Safe Deposit
and Trust Co.of Baltimore, 7 A. 2d 180, 177 Md. 26). It cannot be revoked
by the creatoralone, nor by the trustee (Fricke v. Weber, C.C.A. Ohio,
145 F. 2d 737;Hughes v. C.I.R., C.C.A. 9, 104 F. 2d 144; Ewing v.
Shannahan, 20 S.W. 1065,113 Mo. 188). Here, there is no such
reservation.
Appellants contend that the lower court erred in applying the provisions of
the new Civil Code on trust. This is correct. The express trust was
constituted during the lifetime of the predecessor-in-interest of
appellants,that is, before the effectivity of the new Civil Code, although
the instrumentrecognizing and declaring such trust was executed on
December 5, 1950, afterthe effectivity of said Code. The Civil Code of
1889 and previous laws andauthorities on the matter, therefore, should executory; and (4)that appellants should free said lands from all liens and
govern the herein trust under the provisions of Article 2253 of the new encumbrances.
Civil code.
WHEREFORE, with the modification as above indicated with regard to
But the Civil Code of 1889 contains no specific provisions on trust as accounting,we hereby affirm the decision appealed from, without
doesthe new Civil Code. Neither does the Code of Civil Procedure of pronouncement as to costs.
1901 for thesame merely provides for the proceeding to be followed
relative to trustsand trustees (Chapter XVIII). This silence, however, does Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal,
not mean that thejuridical institution of trust was then unknown in this JJ., concur.
jurisdiction, for theprinciples relied upon by the Supreme Court before the Padilla and Concepcion, JJ., took no part.
effectivity of thenew Civil Code were those embodied in Anglo-American
jurisprudence as derivedfrom the Roman and Civil Law principles
(Government v. Abadilla, 46 Phil. 42).And these are the same principles
on which we predicate our ruling heretoforestated and on which we now
rely for the validity of trust in question.

The trial court ordered appellants to render an accounting of the fruits of

the properties in question even if appellees did not expressly ask for it
intheir prayer for relief. We, however, believe that this is covered by the
general prayer "for such other relief just and equitable under the
premises."What is important is to know from what what date the
accounting should bemade. The trial court ordered that the accounting be
made from the time appellees demanded the conveyance of the ten
parcels of land on August 11, 1956, in accordance with Article 1164 of
the new Civil Code which provides that the creditor has a right to the fruit
of the thing from thetime the obligation to deliver it arises. But this cannot
be done without first submitting proof that the conditions stated in the
mutual agreement hadbeen complied with. And this only happened when
the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-8774 became final and
executory. The ruling of the trialcourt in this respect should therefore be
modified in the sense that the accounting should be made from the date
of the finality of the said decision.

We find no error in the directive of the trial court that appellants

shouldfree the lands in question from the encumbrance that was created
thereon by them in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines and
one Claro cortez, for as trustees it is their duty to deliver the properties to
the cestui que trust free from all liens and encumbrances.

To recapitulate, we hold: (1) that the document executed on December 5,

1950 creates an express trust in favor of appellees; (2) that appellants
had no right to revoke it without the consent of the cestui que trust; (3)
that appellants must render an accounting of the fruits of the lands from
the datethe judgement rendered in G.R. No. L-8774 became final and