1.
SPOUSES RUTH DIZON DEVISFRUTO AND
ALLAN DEVISFRUTO, PETITIONERS, V.
MAXIMA L. GREENFELL, RESPONDENT.
FACTS: The case involves a Petition for Review
on Certiorari questioning the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 136663.
Maxima Greenfell (Greenfell) filed a Complaint
for Reconveyance and Damages against
Spouses Ruth Dizon Devisfruto and Allan
Devisfruto (the Devisfruto Spouses) and the
Office of the Municipal Assessor of Botolan,
Zambales, before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court on October 18, 2011. Greenfell, initially a
Filipino citizen who later became an Australian
citizen, claimed that she financed the purchase
of a house and two lots in Tampo, Botolan,
Zambales, from Spouses Dante and Erna
Magisa (the Magisa Spouses), prior to
reacquiring Filipino citizenship.
According to Greenfell, the lots were registered
in the name of her niece, Ruth Dizon Devisfruto
(Ruth), through deeds of sale executed by the
Magisa Spouses. The Devisfruto Spouses
subsequently took possession of the properties,
and Ruth declared herself the owner in tax
declarations. In April 2009, after regaining
Philippine citizenship through Republic Act No.
9225, Greenfell demanded the transfer of the
properties to her name. When Ruth refused,
Greenfell filed the Complaint alleging that a
purchase money resulting trust existed, and the
Devisfruto Spouses were holding the legal title
on her behalf.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court ruled in favor of
Greenfell, finding that a purchase money
resulting trust existed under Article 1448 of the
Civil Code. The court held that the intent was to
give legal title to Ruth, with the Devisfruto
Spouses as mere depositories obligated to
convey the property to Greenfell upon her
request. The Regional Trial Court affirmed this
decision in 2013.
The Devisfruto Spouses appealed to the Court
of Appeals, which upheld the lower courts'
decisions. The Court of Appeals agreed that a
trust was created, emphasizing the intention to
create a trust, supported by Greenfell providing
the purchase money and the condition that the
Devisfruto Spouses surrender the properties
upon her regaining Philippine citizenship. The
former owner, Dante Magisa, testified to an
agreement where Ruth was obliged to transfer
the titles to Greenfell once permitted by law.
The Court of Appeals denied the Devisfruto
Spouses' motion for reconsideration, leading
them to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
the subject of the current proceedings.
ISSUE: WON an implied trust was created
between Maxima Greenfell and the
Devisfruto Spouses in relation to the
properties in question. Additionally, the
Court considers whether the properties were
gratuitously given to the petitioners.
RULING: YES. Not Gratuitous. The Supreme
Court refers to Article 1448 of the Civil Code,
which establishes an implied trust when the
legal estate is granted to one party but the price
is paid by another for the purpose of having the
beneficial interest in the property. The Court
acknowledges the findings of both the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Court that the
legal estate over the properties was granted to
petitioner Ruth while the purchase price was
paid by respondent Greenfell. The purpose of
this arrangement was for Greenfell to have
beneficial interest over the property. The Court
sees no reason to overturn these conclusions.
The petitioners argue that if a trust was created,
it was an express trust, not an implied one,
based on respondent Greenfell's testimony that
there was a verbal understanding and
agreement that Ruth would represent her in the
purchase of the properties, with the intention of
returning them to Greenfell later. However, the
Court notes that this argument was not raised
before the Court of Appeals and, therefore,
cannot be considered for the first time on
appeal. The Court emphasizes the general rule
that issues not raised below may not be
entertained on appeal.
Addressing the second issue, the Court
considers the possibility that, assuming no trust
was created, the transaction could be governed
by the laws on donation. If the purchase money
for the properties was gratuitously given to the
petitioners, the Court notes that Article 748 of
the Civil Code requires donations of personal
property exceeding P5000.00 to be in writing.
The Court highlights that the petitioners did not
present evidence demonstrating compliance
with the formal requirements of Article 748.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court denies the
petition, affirming the Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 136663.
The Court finds no reversible error in the lower
court's decisions and emphasizes the
importance of adhering to formal requirements
when dealing with donations, as stipulated by
the Civil Code.
HEIRS OF TRANQUILINO LABISTE (also known as Tranquilino Laviste)
represented by:
(1) GERARDO LABISTE, representing the Heirs of Gregorio Labiste;
(2) OBDULLIA LABISTE GABUAN, representing the heirs of Juan Labiste;
(3) VICTORIA G. CHIONG, representing the Heirs of Eulalia Labiste;
(4) APOLINARIA LABISTE YLAYA, representing the Heirs of Nicolasa
Labiste;
(5) DEMOSTHENES LABISTE, representing the Heirs of Gervacio Labiste;
(6) ALEJANDRA LABISTE; representing the Heirs of SINFROCIO LABISTE,
and
(7) CLOTILDE LABISTE CARTA, representing the Heirs of Andres Labiste,
Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE LABISTE, survived by his children,
(1) ZACARIAS LABISTE, deceased and survived by his children, namely:
CRESENCIA LABISTE and EUFRONIO LABISTE;
(2) BERNARDINO LABISTE, deceased and survived by his children,
namely: POLICARPIO LABISTE, BONIFACIO LABISTE, FELIX LABISTE,
GABINA LABISTE, CAYETANA LABISTE and ISABEL LABISTE;
(3) LUCIA LABISTE, deceased and survived by her children, namely: ISAAC
LABISTE, GENARO LABISTE, BRAULIA LABISTE, BRAULIO LABISTE,
ASUNCION LABISTE, ALFONSO LABISTE and CLAUDIA LABISTE;
(4) EPIFANIO LABISTE and CLAUDIA LABISTE; deceased and survived by
his children, namely SILVESTRE LABISTE, PAULA LABISTE and GERARDA
LABISTE;
(5) ANA LABISTE, deceased and survived by her children, namely: MAXIMO
LABISTE, MOISES LABISTE, GERVACIO LABISTE, SATURNINA LABISTE
and QUIRINO LABISTE;
(6) SEVERO LABISTE, deceased and survived by his children, Namely:
FELIX LABISTE, RUFINA LABISTE, SIMPLICIO LABISTE, VICENTE LABISTE
and PATRICIO LABISTE, Respondents.
FACTS: This petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeks to challenge the Court
of Appeals' Decision dated June 30, 2003, which
reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 9. The appellate
court also denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration in a Resolution dated January
15, 2004.
The factual background of the case begins on
September 29, 1919, when Epifanio Labiste, on
behalf of himself and his siblings, the heirs of
Jose Labiste, purchased Lot No. 1054 of the
Banilad Friar Lands Estate in Guadalupe, Cebu
City, from the Bureau of Lands for ₱36.00. A
Deed of Conveyance No. 12536 was executed
on June 9, 1924, conveying Lot No. 1054 to
Epifanio and his siblings. Prior to the issuance of
the deed, Epifanio executed an Affidavit on July
10, 1923, affirming co-ownership with his uncle,
Tranquilino Labiste, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest.
In 1928, Lot No. 1054 was subdivided into two
lots, 1054-A for Tranquilino and 1054-B for
Epifanio. The heirs of Tranquilino purchased the
half-interest of the heirs of Jose over Lot No.
1054 on October 18, 1939, for ₱300.00, as
evidenced by the Calig-onan sa Panagpalit
executed in Visayan dialect.
During World War II, the heirs of Tranquilino fled
Cebu City, and upon their return, they found their
homes and possessions destroyed, with
squatters occupying the property. In October
1993, petitioners learned of a reconstitution
petition filed by one of the respondents,
Asuncion Labiste, for Lot No. 1054. A
compromise agreement was reached in March
1994, wherein petitioners withdrew their
opposition to expedite reconstitution, with the
understanding that they would be given time to
file a complaint. The reconstituted title, TCT No.
RT-7853, was issued on December 14, 1994,
but respondents did not honor the compromise
agreement.
Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of
title, seeking reconveyance and damages on
January 13, 1995. Respondents claimed forgery
of the Affidavit and the Calig-onan sa Panagpalit
and raised the defenses of prescription and
laches.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners in a
decision dated August 23, 1999, finding the
documents genuine and authentic and holding
that the action had not been prescribed. The
Court of Appeals affirmed petitioners' right to the
property but reversed the RTC's decision based
on prescription and laches, citing Article 1144 of
the Civil Code.
ISSUE: WON petitioners' cause of action,
involving an express trust, has been
prescribed.
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court held that the
Court of Appeals erred in applying rules on
prescription and laches since the case involves
an express trust. Express trusts are created by
direct and positive acts of the parties, and the
action to enforce such trusts is not prescribed
until the trust is repudiated. Prescription and
laches begin to run only from the time the
express trust is repudiated. In this case, the
repudiation occurred when respondents filed the
petition for reconstitution in October 1993, and
since petitioners filed their complaint in January
1995, their cause of action had not yet been
prescribed.
The Court emphasized that the equitable
remedy of laches is inapplicable in this case
because it cannot be used to defeat justice or
perpetrate fraud and injustice. The rightful
owners should not be barred from recovering
property fraudulently registered in another's
name.
However, the Court noted that to recover the
other half of the property covered by the private
Calig-onan sa Panagpalit, petitioners should
have filed an action to compel respondents, as
heirs of the sellers in the contract, to execute a
public deed of sale. Such an action, if filed,
would have already been prescribed based on
the Old Code of Civil Procedure.
In summary, the petition is partially granted, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
set aside, and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court is reinstated with the modification that
petitioners are declared the absolute owners of
one-half of Lot No. 1054. The Register of Deeds
is ordered to cancel TCT No. RT-7853 in part
and issued a new Transfer Certificate of Title to
petitioners, heirs of Tranquilino Labiste, covering
Lot No. 1054-A.
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY,
petitioner, vs. LAURENCIO AYING, IN HIS
OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE
OTHER HEIRS OF EMILIANO AYING,
PAULINO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND
IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF
SIMEON AYING, AND WENCESLAO
SUMALINOG, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN
BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF
ROBERTA AYING, respondents.
FACTS: The case involves a disputed property,
Lot No. 4399, measuring 34,325 square meters
in Dapdap, Lapu-Lapu City. Crisanta Maloloy-on
initially petitioned for a cadastral decree over the
land. Following her demise in 1930, a Cadastral
Court Decision directed the issuance of a decree
in favor of Crisanta's eight children, specifically
Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano, Francisco, Simeon,
Bernabe, Roberta, and Fausta Aying. The
original title was lost during the war.
Subsequently, all heirs of the Aying siblings
executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real
Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale in 1964,
conveying Lot No. 4399 to Aznar Brothers
Realty Company. This deed was registered
under Act No. 3344. In 1988, Aznar Brothers
Realty Company filed a successful Petition for
Reconstitution, resulting in the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2856.
In 1991, asserting ownership, the petitioner sent
eviction notices to property occupants and filed
an ejectment complaint. The Metropolitan Trial
Court ruled in favor of Aznar Brothers Realty
Company in 1994. Meanwhile, respondents,
claiming to be descendants of the Aying siblings,
initiated a complaint for cancellation of the
Extra-Judicial Partition, recovery of ownership,
injunction, and damages in 1993 (Civil Case No.
2930-L).
During the trial, respondents argued
co-ownership of the property as descendants of
the registered owners under OCT No. RO-2856.
They alleged continuous possession since time
immemorial, disrupted only in 1991 when
petitioner claimed ownership, leading to forceful
entry and destruction of property. They
contended that the Extra-Judicial Partition was a
fraud, with not all co-owners' signatures and
some purported signatories already deceased.
Petitioner countered, asserting actual
possession, tax payments, and the validity of the
Extra-Judicial Partition. Affirmative defenses
included failure to state a cause of action and
prescription.
The RTC, in its 1997 Decision, dismissed the
complaint based on prescription, declaring the
Extra-Judicial Partition valid. It held that the
action, considered for reconveyance or
annulment, had been prescribed.
The RTC Decision concluded that respondents
failed to prove the Extra-Judicial Partition was
simulated. It ruled the action prescribed in 10
years from the deed's registration in 1964 or, if
viewed as an annulment based on fraud, within
4 years from fraud discovery. Respondents also
lacked admissible proof of filiation to the Aying
siblings.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA), challenging the prescription ruling. The
CA, in its 2000 Decision, affirmed but modified
the RTC decision. It declared heirs of Emiliano,
Simeon, and Roberta Aying as rightful owners of
3/8 of the property, rejecting prescription
arguments. It maintained the Extra-Judicial
Partition's validity but excluded the mentioned
heirs' shares.
Petitioner sought the Supreme Court's review,
contesting the CA decision. The case involves
issues of prescription, validity of the
Extra-Judicial Partition, and rightful ownership.
The detailed proceedings depict a complex legal
battle over the contested property, highlighting
conflicting claims, reconstitution efforts, and
disputes over the Extra-Judicial Partition's
legitimacy.
ISSUE: WON the cause of action of the
respondents, involving an Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale, is imprescriptible, and if so,
whether the principle of laches is applicable.
Additionally, the Court is tasked with
determining the applicable prescriptive
period and the specific date from which it
should be reckoned. The Court must also
address the application of Article 1104 of the
Civil Code, which pertains to partitions made
with preterition of compulsory heirs.
RULING:
1. Prescription and Laches:
The Court concurs with the lower courts that
the Extra-Judicial Partition is valid only as to the
heirs who participated in its execution. While the
heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying, who did not
partake in the execution, are not bound by the
document, the heirs of Roberta Aying, having
known about it since 1967, are barred by
prescription, as their amended complaint was
filed in 1993. However, laches cannot be applied
against the heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying,
who initiated their action within the prescribed
period.
2. Applicable Prescriptive Period:
The Court determines that the prescriptive
period for an action for reconveyance based on
an implied or constructive trust is ten years from
the issuance of the Torrens title. As the
Extra-Judicial Partition was registered under Act
No. 3344, the prescriptive period did not
commence with its registration. Instead, it
started when the respondents had actual notice
of the document. The heirs of Emiliano and
Simeon Aying, having filed their action within the
ten-year period from the notices to vacate in
1991, are not barred by prescription.
3. Application of Article 1104 of the Civil Code:
The Court clarifies that the Extra-Judicial
Partition is not being rescinded. Its validity is
upheld, but only as to the parties who
participated in its execution. The law imposes an
obligation on the petitioner to act as a trustee for
the benefit of the respondent heirs of Emiliano
and Simeon Aying. Thus, Article 1104 is not
directly applicable to the situation.
Final Declaration:
The Supreme Court partially grants the petition,
dismissing the amended complaint of the heirs
of Roberta Aying on the ground of prescription.
However, it declares the heirs of Emiliano and
Simeon Aying as the lawful owners of a 2/8
portion of the land covered by the Original
Certificate of Title No. RO-2856. This ruling is
based on the heirs' timely initiation of the action
for reconveyance within the applicable
prescriptive period.
JOSE JUAN TONG, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. GO
TIAT KUN, ET AL., Respondents.
FACTS: The present petition for review seeks to
annul and set aside the Decision dated October
28, 2010, and the Resolution dated March 3,
2011, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 03078. These rulings reversed the
Decision dated May 21, 2009, of the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 37, in Civil Case
No. 05-28626.
The factual background of the case involves an
action for Nullification of Titles and Deeds of
Extra-Judicial Settlement and Sale and
Damages initiated by the petitioners against the
respondents concerning Lot 998-A of the
Cadastral Survey of Iloilo. The petitioners, being
nine of the ten children of Spouses Juan Tong
and Sy Un, claimed ownership of Lot 998-A,
now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 134082. The property was originally
acquired by Juan Tong for the family's lumber
business, with the title registered in the name of
his eldest son, Luis, Sr., the only Filipino citizen
among his children.
After the incorporation of Juan Tong Lumber,
Luis, Sr. passed away in 1981. The
respondents, surviving heirs of Luis, Sr.,
subsequently claimed ownership of Lot 998-A
through an Extra-Judicial Settlement, which
resulted in the cancellation of TCT No. 10346
and the issuance of TCT No. T-60231 in their
names. Lot 998-A was later subdivided, and new
titles were issued to different heirs.
The petitioners discovered the alleged breach of
the trust agreement when they received a letter
from a third-party buyer. This led to the filing of
an action for Annulment of Sales, Titles,
Reconveyance, and Damages, wherein the trial
court ruled in favor of the petitioners, ordering
the reconveyance of Lot 998-B. Subsequently,
the petitioners filed the instant case for
Nullification of Titles, claiming ownership of Lot
998-A.
The trial court found an implied resulting trust,
with Luis, Sr. as a mere trustee and the
beneficial interest belonging to Juan Tong and
the Juan Tong Lumber, Inc. It declared various
titles and deeds null and void, ordering the
respondents to pay damages and directing the
issuance of a new TCT in the petitioners' names.
However, the CA reversed this decision,
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
The CA reasoned that an express trust was
created, and even if it were an implied resulting
trust, the action was barred by prescription. The
court also invoked a presumption of donation
under Article 1448 of the Civil Code, suggesting
that a gift was made in favor of the child. The CA
further held that the petitioners were estopped
and barred by laches.
Despite the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration being denied by the CA, they
pursued this petition for review seeking the
Supreme Court's intervention. The petitioners
contend that the CA erred in its legal
conclusions, and they seek the reversal of the
appellate court's decision.
ISSUE: (1) Was there an implied resulting trust
constituted overLot 998 when Juan Tong
purchased the property and registered it in the
name of Luis, Sr.? (YES)
(2) May parol evidence be used as proof of the
establishment of the trust? (YES)
(3) Were the petitioners’ action barred by
prescription, estoppel and laches? (NO)
RULING: 1) The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
the petitioners, concluding that the petition is
meritorious. The Court justified a previous case
involving Lot 998-B that had already established
that said lot was held in trust by Luis Sr.in favor
of his siblings by virtue of an implied resulting
trust. Thus, Lot 998-A, the subject of this instant
case, andLot 998-B, are similarly situated as
they comprise the subdivided Lot 998.
the Court is in conformity with the finding of the
trial court that an implied resulting trust was
created as provided under the first sentence of
Article 1448 which is sometimes referred to as a
purchase money resulting trust, the elements of
which are:
(a) an actual payment of money, property or
services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable
consideration; and
(b) such consideration must be furnished by the
alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust.
Here, the petitioners have shown that the two
elements are present in the instant case. Luis,
Sr. was merely a trustee of Juan Tong and
the petitioners in relation to the subject
property, and it was Juan Tong who provided
the money for the purchase of Lot 998 but
the corresponding transfer certificate of title
was placed in the name of Luis, Sr.
2) Regarding the use of parol evidence, the
Court affirmed its admissibility to establish the
existence of an implied trust. Because an
implied trust is neither dependent upon an
express agreement nor required to be evidenced
by writing, Article 1457 of our Civil Code
authorizes the admission of parol evidence
to prove their existence. Parol evidence that is
required to establish the existence of an implied
trust necessarily has to be trustworthy and it
cannot rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite
declarations."
3) Addressing the issue of prescription, the
Court clarified that implied resulting trusts do not
prescribe unless the trustee repudiates the trust.
Since the title to Lot 998 was still registered in
the name of Luis, Sr. at the time of his death,
and the implied trust was repudiated through his
death, the action for reconveyance did not
prescribed.
The Court also rejected the arguments of laches
and estoppel, noting that the petitioners
promptly filed an action to protect their rights
upon discovering the breach of the trust
agreement. It emphasized that the doctrine of
laches is not strictly applied between near
relatives.
In summary, the Supreme Court granted the
petition, reversing and setting aside the decision
of the Court of Appeals. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court, which declared the nullity
of various titles and deeds, and ordered
reconveyance of Lot 998-A to the petitioners,
was reinstated. The Court underscored the
establishment of an implied resulting trust and
the admissibility of parol evidence in proving the
intention to create the trust, ultimately rejecting
the arguments of prescription, laches, and
estoppel.
SOLEDAD CAÑEZO, substituted by WILLIAM
CAÑEZO and VICTORIANO CAÑEZO
Petitioners, vs. CONCEPCION ROJAS,
Respondent.
FACTS: This case involves a petition for review
on certiorari from the Court of Appeals' Decision,
dated September 7, 2000, and Resolution, dated
May 9, 2001. The dispute centers around a
piece of unregistered land measuring 4,169
square meters in Higatangan, Naval, Biliran.
On January 29, 1997, Soledad Cañezo initiated
a complaint for the recovery of the said property
against her father's second wife, Concepcion
Rojas. Cañezo claimed to have purchased the
land in 1939 from Crisogono Limpiado, although
the transaction was not documented. She
entrusted the property to her father, Crispulo
Rojas, in 1948 when she and her husband
relocated to Mindanao. In 1980, she discovered
that Rojas' second wife, Concepcion, was in
possession and cultivating the land. Cañezo
filed the complaint, supported by a Joint Affidavit
executed in 1979 by witnesses attesting to her
ownership.
In response, Concepcion Rojas contended that
Crispulo Rojas acquired the land from Crisogono
Limpiado in 1948. She argued that the 1948 tax
declaration under Crispulo's name reflected this
acquisition. The respondent maintained
continuous possession and cultivation of the
property after Crispulo's death in 1978.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) ruled in favor of
Cañezo in 1998, declaring her the lawful owner
of the land and ordering Concepcion Rojas to
vacate and surrender possession. The MTC
rejected the objection that the verbal sale
violated the Statute of Frauds.
Concepcion Rojas appealed to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), which initially reversed the
decision in 1998, citing prescription and
acquisitive prescription. However, upon
reconsideration in December 1998, the RTC
modified its decision, stating that the action had
not yet been prescribed since the petitioner
merely entrusted the property to her father.
The Court of Appeals, in its September 7, 2000
decision, reversed the amended RTC decision,
dismissing Cañezo's complaint on grounds of
laches, prescription, and lack of merit. The CA
questioned the petitioner's inaction for 17 years
after discovering Concepcion's possession and
argued that Crispulo Rojas owned the property.
The CA also asserted that even if there was an
implied trust, the action would still be barred by
prescription due to the 49 years of adverse
possession by Crispulo Rojas since 1948.
The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied on May 9, 2001, leading to the filing of
this petition for review. The petitioner, now
represented by her heirs, raises errors in the
CA's dismissal, contesting the conclusions on
laches, prescription, and ownership of the
property by Crispulo Rojas.
ISSUE: WON there was an express trust
between the petitioner and her father.
RULING: NEGATIVE we hold that there was no
express trust or resulting trust established between
the petitioner and her father.
In the case at bench, an intention to create a trust
cannot be inferred from the petitioner’s testimony and
the attendant facts and circumstances. The petitioner
testified only to the effect that her agreement with her
father was that she will be given a share in the
produce of the property
This allegation, standing alone as it does, is
inadequate to establish the existence of a trust
because profit-sharing per se, does not necessarily
translate to a trust relation. It could also be present in
other relations, such as in deposit.
What distinguishes a trust from other relations is
the separation of the legal title and equitable
ownership of the property. In a trust relation, legal
title is vested in the fiduciary while equitable
ownership is vested in a cestui que trust.
Such is not true in this case. The petitioner alleged in where the trust is personal to the trustee in the
her complaint that the tax declaration of the land was sense that the trustor intended no other person
transferred to the name of Crispulo without her to administer it.
consent. Had it been her intention to create a trust
and make Crispulo her trustee, she would not have
If Crispulo was indeed appointed as trustee of
made an issue out of this because in a trust
agreement, legal title is vested in the trustee. the property, it cannot be said that such
appointment was intended to be conveyed to the
The trustee would necessarily have the right to respondent or any of Crispulo’s other heirs.
transfer the tax declaration in his name and to pay Hence, after Crispulo’s death, the respondent
taxes on the property. These acts would be treated as had no right to retain possession of the property.
beneficial to the cestui que trust and would not At such point, a constructive trust would be
amount to an adverse possession. created over the property by operation of law.
Where one mistakenly retains property which
Thus, in the absence of a trust relation, we can
rightfully belongs to another, a constructive trust
only conclude that Crispulo’s uninterrupted
is the proper remedial device to correct the
possession of the subject property for 49 years,
situation
coupled with the performance of acts of
ownership, such as payment of real estate
As previously stated, the rule that a trustee
taxes, ripened into ownership.
cannot, by prescription, acquire ownership
over property entrusted tohim until and
The statutory period of prescription commences
unless he repudiates the trust, applies to
when a person who has neither title nor good
express trusts and resulting implied trusts.
faith, secures a tax declaration in his name and
may, therefore, be said to have adversely
However, in constructive implied trusts,
claimed ownership of the lot.
prescription may supervene even if the
trustee does not repudiate the relationship.
While tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership and do not
Necessarily, repudiation of the said trust is not a
prove title to the land, nevertheless, when
condition precedent to the running of the
coupled with actual possession, they constitute
prescriptive period.
evidence of great weight and can be the basis of
A constructive trust, unlike an express trust,
a claim of ownership through prescription.
does not emanate from, or generate a fiduciary
relation.
Moreover, Section 41of Act No. 190 allows
While in an express trust, a beneficiary and a
adverse possession in any character to ripen
trustee are linked by confidential or fiduciary
into ownership after the lapse of ten years.
relations, in a constructive trust, there is neither
There could be prescription under the said
a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of
section even in the absence of good faith and
and the so-called trustee neither accepts any
just title.
trust norintends holding the property for the
beneficiary.
All the foregoing notwithstanding, even if we
sustain petitioner’s claim that she was the owner
The relation of trustee and cestui que trust does
of the property and that she constituted a trust
not in fact exist,and the holding of a constructive
over the property with her father as the trustee,
trust is for the trustee himself, and therefore, at
such a finding still would not advance her case.
all times adverse.

Assuming that such a relation existed, it

a number of other factors militate against the
terminated upon Crispulo’s death in 1978. A
petitioner’s case.
trust terminates upon the death of the trustee
1 First, the petitioner is estopped from
asserting ownership over the subject
property by her failure to protest its
inclusion in the estate of Crispulo. Cañezo
never contested the inclusion of the contested
property in the estate of her father. She even
participated in the project of partition of her
father’s estate which was approved by the
probate court in 1984. After Personally
receiving her share in the proceeds of the estate
for 12 years, she suddenly claims ownership of
part of her father’s estate in 1997.

2 Second, the action is barred by laches. The

petitioner allegedly discovered that the property
was being possessed by the respondent in
1980. However, it was only in 1997 that she filed
the action to recover the property. Laches is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to it has either abandoned or
declined to assert it

Finally,dismissed the complaint for failure to

implead the other heirs who are
indispensable parties. Without them being
impleaded, no relief is available, for the court
cannot render valid judgment.