TOPIC: LAND CLASSIFICATION
The Spouses
NATIVIDAD STA. ANA VICTORIA VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179673 June 8, 2011
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as
a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or
statute.
The applicant may secure a certification from the government that the lands
applied for are alienable and disposable, but the certification must show that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
pubic domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must also present a copy of the
original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the
DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.
SPS. GABRIEL LLANES and MARIA LLANES vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 177947 November 27, 2008
FACTS: The Spouses Llanes applied for registration of their title over a parcel of
land located in Malvar, Batangas. The land had been in the possession of Gabriel’s
grandmother since the 1930s and declared the said property for taxation
purposessince 1948. It was classified as agricultural land and was being cultivated
by Eugenia’s son and Gabriel’s father.
On 29 December 1995, the subject property came into the possession of the
Spouses Llanes when they purchased the same from Servillano (Gabriel’s brother)
and Rita as evidenced by a Kasulatan ng Bilihan. Gabriel himself cultivated the
subject property and religiously paid real property taxes.
In 1996, however, the Spouses Llanes conveyed the subject property to ICTSI
Warehousing, Inc. (ICTSI), by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.
ICTSI filed an application for registration of title over the subject property before
the RTC of Batangas, but has to amend the application due to the alleged
technicality that the sale between ICTSI and the Spouses Llanes could not push
through because the tax declaration covering the subject property was still in the
names of the Spouses Llanes and could not be transferred and declared in the
name of ICTSI.
The Republic submitted to the RTC its Opposition to the Spouses Llanes’
application.
On 21 April 1993, the Court issued Administrative Circular No. 64-93 delegating to
first level courts the jurisdiction to hear and decide cadastral and land registration
cases. Pursuant thereto, the RTC issued an Order remanding the entire records of
the Spouses Llanes’ application to the MCTC.
The Spouses Llanes filed their formal offer of evidence before the MCTC. Among
the evidence they submitted were the Certifications issued by the DENR IV, Forest
Management Bureau (FMB) dated 9 March 2000 and by the CENRO, Batangas City
dated 15 June 2000, both declaring the subject property as alienable and
disposable.
The MCTC rendered a Decision granting the Application for Registration of Title of
the Spouses Llanes.
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the MCTC erred in
granting the Application for Registration of Title of the Spouses Llanes because the
latter failed to comply with the statutory requirement of possession for 30 years,
the subject property becoming alienable and disposable only on 22 December
1997 per the CENRO Certification.
It was only at this point that the Spouses Llanes realized that the Certifications
issued to them by the government agencies concerned stated different dates when
the subject property became alienable and disposable. Based on the DENR-FMB
Certification, the subject property became alienable and disposable on 26 March
1928. However, according to the CENRO Certification, the subject property became
alienable and disposable only on 22 December 1997. The Spouses Llanes then
verified the correctness of the CENRO Certification and found that CENRO
committed a mistake therein. CENRO itself rectified its gaffe by issuing another
Certification dated 20 July 2004, consistent with the DENR Certification, that the
Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds
1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
subject property became alienable and disposable on 26 March 1928.
Llanes attached the corrected CENRO Certification as Annex "A" to their Appellees’
Brief submitted to the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court, without providing
any reason, did not consider the same.
Hence, the present petition.
The CA granted the appeal of the Republic.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the
grant by the MCTC of the Spouses Llanes’ Application for Registration of Title
based on its finding that the subject property became alienable and disposable
only on 22 December 1997.
HELD: YES. The three requisites for the filing of an application for registration
of title are: (1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession has been under abona
fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, or an
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a
legislative act or statute. A certification by the CENRO of the DENR stating that the
land subject of an application is found to be within the alienable and disposable
site per a land classification project map is sufficient evidence to show the real
character of the land subject of the application.
In the instant case, the Spouses Llanes submitted to the MCTC Certifications from
DENR Region IV and CENRO, Batangas City, to prove the alienability and
disposability of the subject property. However, the two Certifications contained
different dates as to when the subject property became alienable and
disposable: 26 March 1928 per the DENR Certification, but 22 December
1997 according to the CENRO Certification. The discrepancy between the two
Certifications was overlooked by the parties during the trial stage of the case
before the MCTC. The MCTC granted the Spouses Llanes’ Application for
Registration of Title without mentioning the said discrepancy between the two
Certifications. The discrepancy was discovered only when the present case was
already before the Court of Appeals. The Spouses Llanes immediately verified and
secured a corrected Certification from the CENRO, which confirmed the DENR
Certification that the subject property became alienable and disposable on 26
March 1928. The appellate court, however, did not consider the corrected CENRO
Certification and, in ruling against the Spouses Llanes’ application, still relied on
the first CENRO Certification which incorrectly stated that the subject property
became alienable and disposable only on 22 December 1997.
Since the determination of the true date when the subject property became
alienable and disposable is material to the resolution of this case, it behooves this
Court, in the interest of substantial justice, fairness, and equity, to consider the
corrected CENRO Certification even though it was only presented during the
appeal to the Court of Appeals.
G.R. No. 179905 August 19, 2009
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NEPTUNA G. JAVIER
F:
- Javier acquired property through Deed of Donation executed by her
paternal aunt, Catalina Javier, a childless widow, on 27 Nov 1956.
Javier’s cousins questioned the execution of DD. CFI declared DD void,
since, being unnotarized, failed to comply with the legal requisites for a
valid donation. Nevertheless, in a Deed of Partition, Catalina’s heirs
allocated property to Javier. Catalina and her husband had been in
possession of the property since 1907. Javier gained personal
knowledge of Catalina’s ownership when Catalina came to live with
Javier in 1940. The subject property was being tilled by a kasama when
Javier acquired the said property, but at the time she filed her
Application for Registration, there were no more tenants on the subject
property. -> Javier had been in OCEN possession and occupation,
together with her PII, for more than 30 years. Catalina declared the
subject property in her name for taxation purposes even before 1945,
Javier subsequently declared the subject property in her name under
Tax Dec in 1966. Javier had been paying real property tax
- 25 March 1999: Javier (75yo) filed before MTC a verified Application for
Original Registration of Title to the subject property
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 - Petitioner filed its Notice of Appearance and Opposition: neither Javier
nor her PII had been in OCEN possession and occupation of the land
since 12 June 1945; that the muniments of title alleged in the
Application did not constitute sufficient evidence of a bona fide
acquisition; that the subject property was a portion of the public
domain
- Laguna Lake Development Authority also filed its Opposition: property
was public land, forming part of the bed of Laguna de Bay (located
below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters)
- During the hearing, no private oppositor appeared except for LLDA ->
court issued an Order of General Default
- Pablo Javier Quinto also offered his testimony in support of Javier’s
claims: familiar with property because he and his siblings co-owned a
lot adjacent to the same (both part of Javier’s inheritance from
Catalina)
- MTC granted Javier her Application for Registration
- Republic, through OSG, filed a Notice of Appeal: testimonies of Javier
and Quinto hardly established that Javier and her PII have occupied
property OCEN, and under a claim of title since 12 June 1945 or earlier;
tax decs submitted were not conclusive proof of ownership.
- CA again ruled in Javier’s favor
- Republic: Possession of the subject property by Catalina, then Javier,
can only be characterized as casual cultivation of the same; Deed of
Partition executed by Catalina’s heirs do not prove ownership of the
subject property; and Javier has not been able to positively establish
that property is A&D
I: WON MTC erred in granting Javier’s Application for Registration.
H: NO.
- Javier was able to sufficiently establish her title under Sec14(1) of PRD:
The following persons may file an application for registration of title to
land: Those who by themselves or through their PII have been in OCEN
possession and occupation of A&D lands of PUBD under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
- Assertion of Republic that property is not A&D is belied by: To prove
alienability, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the gov
- In this case: (1) CENRO Report confirms that the subject property falls
within A&D zone and that the same was neither covered by any public
land application nor embraced by any administrative title; (2) Javier’s
Approved Plan contains the statement that the subject property is
within A&D area of PUBD as Project No. 5-A
- Evidence on record likewise supports the fact that Javier and PII
occupied property in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or
earlier
- Per CENRO Report, property is not covered by any public land
application or embraced by any administrative title. The Report of the
Office of the Provincial Engineer of Rizal, likewise affirmed that there
were no provincial projects that would be affected by the registration of
the subject property in Javier’s name.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPS. NAPOLEON & EMILIA HUBILLA
G.R. No. 157683. February 11, 2005
While the petitioner correctly asserts that the submission in evidence of the
original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, is a mandatory
requirement, this Court has recognized instances of substantial compliance with
this rule. In previous cases, this Court ruled that blueprint copies of the original
tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands and other evidence could also provide
sufficient identification to identify a piece of land for registration purposes.
The petitioner’s contention that the Property’s status as alienable and disposable
land was unsubstantiated is likewise unavailing. As stated earlier, the respondents
offered as evidence before the trial court a certification from the DENR CENRO
stating that the Property is entirely within the alienable and disposable zone
classified under Project No. 8, Land Classification Map No. 582 and certified on
December 31, 1925.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC.
G.R. No. 154953 June 26, 2008
Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds
1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
FACTS:
T.A.N. Properties filed an Application for Original Registration of Title for a land
located at Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
During the trial, the only oppositor is the Republic..
The testimonies of respondent’s witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga
(Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession of the
land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was
succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960,
Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of his
children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato
another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial
Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of Antonio’s children,
Prospero Dimayuga (Porting). On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to
respondent.
The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for
registration of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have
possessed the land for 30 years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts
showed that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the
concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which possession converted the land to
private property.
Petitioner appealed from the trial court’s Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial
court erred in granting the application for registration absent clear evidence that
the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of
possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner alleged that the
testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general in nature. Considering the area
involved, petitioner argued that additional witnesses should have been presented
to corroborate Evangelista’s testimony.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s Decision.
ISSUE: 1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; and
3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land
under the Public Land Act.
HELD: YES.
On the first issue, the well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be
clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State. The onus to overturn,
by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City,
certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San
Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls
within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land
Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925." The second
certification in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by
the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-
DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land,
Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No.
20, dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices
within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates
of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land
classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38, dated 19 April
1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained
the authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for
areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates
of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. In this case,
respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot
10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate
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covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as
per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as
alienable and disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20
and 38 to issue certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional
Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications
submitted by respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications
were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial
court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the
facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and
admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land
is alienable and disposable.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in
Section 19 (a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy…The CENRO is not the official repository or legal
custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as
alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication
of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
As to the second issue, The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that
requires that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration. However, in
this case, we find Evangelista’s uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in the
concept of an owner for more than 30 years. The Court cannot consider the
testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the
fact of respondent’s acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be related to the
Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession of the land was hearsay. He did not
even tell the trial court where he obtained his information.
The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax
declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of
claim of ownership. Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the
realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas
were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty
taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed
ownership or possession of the land only in that year.
As to the third issue, the 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, the
"land x x x was already private property at the time it was acquired x x x by
Acme." In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting,
who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of
that date, in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land for 30 years
since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the land from Porting, the
land was not yet private property.
For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of
alienable and disposable land, the corporation must have acquired the land when
its transferor had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to the
land by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse possession of the land in the
concept of an owner for at least 30 years since 12 June 1945.
What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the
corporate applicant for land registration to establish that when it acquired the
land, the same was already private land by operation of law because the statutory
acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of
possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to complete the
statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of
Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds
1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit
corporations from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land
under the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 9176 (RA 9176) further
amended the Public Land Act and extended the period for the filing of applications
for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:
Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12
hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a
private individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and
disposable land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual
owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in excess of 12 hectares.
Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess area
of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying for land
registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher than its
predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This assumes, of course,
that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when the land
had already become private land by operation of law. In the present case,
respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private
land when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO ESPINOSA
G.R. No. 171514 July 18, 2012
F:
- March 3, 1999, R filed an application for land registration covering a
parcel of land (5,525sqm) in Consolacion, Cebu; alleged that: (a)
property is A&D; (b) he purchased the property from his mother, Isabel
Espinosa, on July 4, 1970; and (c) he and his PII had been in possession
of the property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years
- R submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan, 2 tax dec for the
years 1965 and 1974 in Isabel’s name, Certification issued by the Office
of the Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu and 3 tax dec for the years 1978,
1980 and 1985
- P opposed: (a) Sec 48(b) of CA141had not been complied with as
Espinosa’s PII possessed the property only after June 12, 1945; and (b)
tax dec do not prove that possession are in the character and for the
length of time required by law
- MTC granted Espinosa’s petition: Espinosa was able to establish his
ownership and possession over the subject lot which is within the area
considered by DENR as A&D; applicant has been in OCEN and under
claim of title thereto within the time prescribed by law (Sec. 14, sub-
par. 1, P.D. 1529)
- CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal and affirmed MTC: possession for at
least 30 years, despite the fact that it commenced after June 12, 1945,
sufficed to convert the property to private.
I: WON Espinosa has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property that is
worthy of confirmation and registration.
H: NO
- Erred in not applying the present text of Section 48(b) of the PLA
- Sec 14(2) of PD 1529: The following persons may file an application for
registration: Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
- Sec 48(b) of the PLA originally states: Those who by themselves or
through PII have been in OCEN possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since July
26, 1894, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
- June 22, 1957: RA 1942 amended Sec 48(b) of the PLA by providing a
30-year prescriptive period for JC of imperfect title
- Jan 25, 1977: PD 1073 was issued, changing the requirement for
possession and occupation for a period of 30 years to possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier
- PD 1073, in effect, repealed RA 1942 such that applications under Sec
48(b) of PLA filed after the promulgation of PD 1073 should allege and
prove possession and occupation that dated back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier
- For one to invoke Sec 48(b), it must be demonstrated that such
possession and occupation commenced on Jan 24, 1947 and 30-year
period was completed prior to the effectivity of PD 1073.
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 - There is nothing on record showing that as of Jan 25, 1977 or prior to
the effectivity of PD 1073, he or Isabel had already acquired title by
means of possession and occupation of the property for 30 years
- it is Sec 14(2) of PD 1529 categorically provides, only private properties
may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of
the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for public use,
public service or intended for the development of national wealth, are
considered private.
- There must be an express declaration by the State that PUBD property
is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
- As the property is not held by the State in its private capacity,
acquisition of title thereto necessitates observance of the provisions of
Sec 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 or
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945.
- Notation on the survey plan does not constitute incontrovertible
evidence that would overcome the presumption that the property
belongs to the inalienable public domain: a mere surveyor has no
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.
Republic vs Hanover
G.R. No. 172102, July 2, 2010
Pursuant to PD 1529 and CA 141, applicants for registration of title must prove: (1)
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
No testimonial evidence was presented to prove that respondent or its
predecessors-in-interest had been possessing and occupying the subject property
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Hanover’s President and General Manager testified
only with respect to his claim that he was the former owner of the subject
property and that he acquired the same from the heirs of a certain Damiano
Bontoyan; that he caused the payment of realty taxes due on the property; that a
tax declaration was issued in favor of Hanover; that Hanover caused a survey of
the subject lot, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands; and that his and Hanover’s
possession of the property started in 1990.
Settled is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the
applicant who must show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his
alleged possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration
required by law.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LUCIA M. GOMEZ
G.R. No. 189021 February 22, 2012
Lot No. 2872 was alleged to have been originally possessed by Gabriel Gomez. In
1936, his nephew Emilio Gomez, who was the father of respondent herein, bought
the lot in a public auction and declared it under the name of the heirs of Gabriel
Gomez.
The lot was declared for taxation purposes and in 1955, Emilio declared part of Lot
No. 2872 under his name. When he died in 1969, his surviving spouse and children
allegedly took continuous possession and occupancy of the lot, for which they paid
real property tax. On 29 December 1986, the lot was allegedly partitioned by
Emilio’s heirs when they executed a Deed of Adjudication with Consolidation and
Extrajudicial Partition, by which Lot No. 2872-I was allegedly partitioned to
petitioner.
Respondent filed an Application for registration of title with regard to her part.
Meanwhile, herein petitioner filed its Opposition to the Application.
The MTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondent. the dispositive portion of
which states:
On appeal, petitioner asserted that respondent had the burden to prove that the
subject lot was alienable and disposable. Failing to present this certification, she
failed to overcome that burden.
Subsequently, the CA dismissed the appeal. It held that the Certification made by
Geodetic Engineer Rafael Escabarte that the land was alienable and disposable was
sufficient.
Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds
1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that respondent was able to sufficiently
prove that the land was alienable and disposable; and that she had possessed the
subject lot in the manner and for the duration required by law
HELD: YES.
In Republic v. Doldol, we said that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant
must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land; and (b) that the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land must
have been either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public
Land Act.
In resolving the case at bar, we find Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc. is on all fours with the present case. (refer to the tan case, on the first issue..
as in un ang ruling reiterated dito. Ung naka-highlight un na un.)
In conclusion, respondent was not able to comply with Sec. 14(1) of P.D. 1529.
TOPIC: FRIAR LANDS
SOLEDAD BACALZO, ET AL. vs. MARTINA PACADA
G.R. No. L-10915 March 30, 1960
Facts:
 A certificate of sale was constituted over a lot, forming part of friar
land, between the Government and Carmiano Bacalzo, which is payable
in installments
o The certificate of sale also stipulated that upon complete
payment of the stipulated price, the Director of Lands would
issue a final deed of sale to the purchaser
 Carmiano Bacalzo then contracted a second marriage with the
respondent Martina Pacada. Carmiano died.
 Consequently, herein petitioners filed a special action for declaratory
relief for a determination of their rights to the lot in question as against
Martina Pacada, surviving widow of their deceased father. However the
court did not grant the same.
 Such decision was predicated on the theory that the deceased
Carmiano Bacalzo, prior to and until his death was a mere holder of a
certificate which is only an agreement to sell, and that the purchase
price of the lot was not fully paid until when respondent paid the
amount of 45 centavos (P0.45) for the additional 5 square meters
discovered upon resurvey of the lot.
o According to the court, respondent Martina Pacada, under
section 16 of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120), succeeded
in the right of her deceased husband.
Issue: Whether petitioners’ father became the actual owner of the lot in question
upon full payment during his lifetime of the purchase price thereof, and as his legal
heirs, they succeeded him in the ownership of said lot
Held: Yes
 All the requirements of the law for the purchase of the lot having been
complied with by said Carmiano Bacalzo, the Government on that date
was legally bound to issue to him "the proper instrument of
conveyance" by reason of section 12 of the Friar Lands Act, which
provides that
o Upon the payment of the final installment together with all
accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler
and occupant the said land so held by him by proper
instrument of conveyance in the manner provided in section
122 of the Land Registration Act
 It is not the issuance of the deed of conveyance that vests ownership in
the purchaser under the Friar Lands Act.
 Section 16 of the said law is only applicable in the case where the
purchaser-applicant dies before completing payment of the purchase
price.
 The friar lands — as was said by this Court in the case of Director of
Lands et al. vs. Rizal, et al. supra — "are surveyed before they are sold.
The purchaser buys a definite parcel with fixed boundaries, at an
agreed price, not a parcel yet to be surveyed when he pays the final
installment and whose price is to be ascertained and fixed according to
the area then found by the survey
o Hence, respondent by virtue of the payment she made is not
entitled to receive the deed of the subject lot, specially since
said payment was made more than 4 years after the original
purchase price had been paid in full.
 Hence, petition was granted.
4
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, MATIAS NAREDO, VALENTIN NAREDO, and JUANA DE
LEON vs. RICARDO RIZAL, POTENCIANA RIZAL, ELENA RIZAL, BENJAMIN RIZAL, and
SATURNINA RIZAL
G.R. No. L-2925 December 29, 1950
Facts:
 The Subject lot owned by Calamba Friar Lands Estate Subdivision
located in Calamba, Province of Laguna was sold to Santos Alcaraz in
1910 under certificate of sale, the sales price to be paid in 15 annual
installments.
 Upon payment of some installments, Alcaraz assigned all his rights to
the certificate of sale to Severino Rizal, and this assignment was
approved by the Bureau of Lands
 After paying all the installments, the final deed of conveyance was
executed in his favor by the Bureau of Lands, and its certificate of title
was issued, which was later on lost during the Pacific was
 Severino Rizal died in 1934 and his heirs, the appellees and respondents
herein, succeeded him in the ownership of the lot.
 The present case had its origin in the Court of First Instance of Laguna
where the heirs of Severino Rizal, the respondents herein filed an action
to recover title and possession of the lot in question or rather the
portion added by the river (by accretion), from the petitioners who
since 1938 cultivated said portion, as their tenants.
 The Director of Lands then intervened and claimed that portion as
belonging to the Government.
 This was granted by the lower court, which was affirmed by CA. Hence,
this petition.
 Petitioners’ contention: The sale to the predecessor in interest of the
respondents is governed by the Friar Lands Act, where in section 15
thereof, the Government reserves title to any lot sold under it until the
sales price is fully paid, that inasmuch as the accretion to the lot in the
form of alluvium was formed before the sales price was fully paid in
1930, after which the corresponding final deed of conveyance was
issued, the Government became the owner of said addition or
accretion, and consequently, the respondents herein have no right to
said property.
Issue: Whether petitioners’ contentions are meritorious
Held: No
 It is true that the Government under section 15 of Act 1120 reserves
title to any parcel sold under said Act until the full payment of all
installments of the sales price. -> Only refer to the bare, naked title
 The equitable and beneficial title really went to the purchaser the
moment he paid the first installment and was given a certificate of sale.
o Reservation of government is made merely to protect the
interest of the Government so as to preclude or prevent the
purchaser from the payment in full of the purchase price.
o Outside of this protection the Government retains no right
as an owner.
o Pending the completion of the payment of the purchase
price, the purchaser is entitled to all the benefits and
advantages which may accrue to the land as well as suffer
the losses that may befall it.
 The petitioners contend that the contract between the Government
and the purchaser of a Friar Lands lot involves a mere promise to sell on
the part of the Director of Lands and a promise to buy and to pay the
purchase price in installments, on the part of the purchaser, and that
the Government continues to be the real owner until the purchase price
is completed.
o If this were true, then in case of default of the purchaser to
pay any installment the Director of Lands could merely
cancel the certificate of sale, cancel its promise to sell and,
considering the installments already paid as mere rentals for
the occupation of the land, eject the purchaser, and the
relation between the Government and the said purchaser is
ended. But this theory runs counter to the very law
governing the disposition of the Friar Lands.
 Act No. 1120 itself, despite the reservation of title in the Government
pending the payment of the full purchase price under section 15
thereof, really considers the purchaser as the owner of the lot or parcel
purchased even before the payment of the last installment.
 Section 17 of Act No. 1120 inevitably leads to the conclusion that the
purchaser, even before the payment of the full price and before the
execution of the final deed of conveyance, is considered by the law as
the actual owner of the lot purchased, under obligation to pay in full
the purchase price, the role or position of the Government being that of
a mere lien holder or mortgagee.
 If the rule were otherwise, then as regards Friar Lands lots bordering on
rivers, upon the payment of the final installment, the Government
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would find itself under the obligation of making a new survey of every
such lot so that the purchaser may be held to pay for any increase or to
be reimbursed for any decrease in area.
o This will involve considerable work and expense to the
Government and to the purchasers and may even result in
court litigation as where the Government agents and the
purchasers cannot agree as to the valuation of the area
involved for purposes of additional payment or
reimbursement, or even the area gained or lost.
 The spirit behind the Friar Lands Act was to resell the land to the actual
tenants or occupants at cost. The Government did not intend to make
any profit.
 In conclusion, the sale of a Friar Lands lot or parcel under Act 1120,
pending payment in full of the purchase price, although the
Government reserves title thereto, for its protection, the beneficial and
equitable title is in the purchaser, and that any accretion received by
the lot before payment of the last installment belongs to the purchaser
thereof.
FRANCISCO ALONSO (Deceased), substituted by MERCEDES V. ALONSO, TOMAS V.
ALONSO and ASUNCION V. ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC.
G.R. No. 130876 December 5, 2003
Facts:
 In the January 2012 decision of the Court, it was ruled that:
o Neither Tomas N. Alonso nor his son Francisco M. Alonso or
the latter’s heirs are the lawful owners of the lot in dispute.
o Neither has the respondent Cebu Country Club, Inc. been
able to establish a clear title over the contested estate.
 Hence, petitioners and respondents filed separate motions for
reconsideration
 Petitioners’ contentions:
o the majority decision unduly deprives petitioners of their
property without due process of law and "in a manner
shocking to good conscience";
o in invalidating the sale of Lot 727 to the late Tomas Alonso,
the ponencia unfairly deviated from established doctrine to
favor a mere obiter dictum as misapplied in Liao vs. Court of
Appeals, using as basis factual findings either unsupported
by the evidence or contradicted by the appellate court’s
findings of fact;
o the core issues of fraud and want of jurisdiction afflicting the
reconstitution of respondent Cebu Country Club’s title were
not squarely and frontally met, to the prejudice and damage
of the petitioners; and
o the dissenting opinion deserves a second hard look as it
presents a more balanced, sober, factually accurate, and
juridically precise approach to the critical issues of this case,
including prescription and laches.
 Respondent Cebu Country Club, on the other hand, assails the decision
insofar as it declared that "Lot 727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate
legally belongs to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines".
o Respondent argues that the OSG, as representative of the
Government, has not intervened nor has it been impleaded
in the RTC nor during the appeal in the Court of Appeals,
and, the Torrens Certificate of Title of respondent, Banilad
Friar Lands Estate, cannot be collaterally attacked and
nullified in this case at bar.
Court’s ruling:
 Section 18 of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act unequivocally
provides: "No lease or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of Public
Lands (now the Director of Lands) under the provisions of this Act shall
be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior (now, the
Secretary of Natural Resources).
o Thus, petitioners’ claim of ownership must fail in the
absence of positive evidence showing the approval of the
Secretary of Interior.
o Approval of the Secretary of the Interior cannot simply be
presumed or inferred from certain acts since the law is
explicit in its mandate. This is the settled rule as enunciated
in Solid State Multi-Products Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals5 and reiterated in Liao vs. Court of Appeals.
 It must be borne in mind that the disputed property is part of the "Friar
Lands" over which the Government holds title and are not public lands
but private or patrimonial property of the Government and can be
alienated only upon proper compliance with the requirements of Act
No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act.
5
  On the other hand, respondent relies solely on its reconstituted title
which, by itself, does not determine or resolve the ownership of the
land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
o The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost
duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition.
It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land
covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title,
like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest
ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.
 The declaration in the Court’s judgment that the subject property
belongs to the Government is not an offshoot of a collateral attack on
respondent’s title.
o The validity of the reconstitution of title to the land in
question was directly in dispute, and the proceedings before
the trial court was in the nature of a direct attack on the
legality of respondent’s title.
 The Court’s declaration that the subject lot legally belongs to the
Government does not amount to reversion without due process of law
insofar as both parties are concerned.
o The disputed property is a Friar Land and both parties failed
to show that it had ceased to belong to the patrimonial
property of the State or that it had become private property.
 Hence, the motions for reconsideration filed by the parties were denied
with finality.
FRANCISCO ALONSO, substituted by MERCEDES V. ALONSO, TOMAS V. ALONSO
and ASUNCION V. ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. 188471 April 20, 2010
Facts:
 Herein petitioner Francisco Alonso, the only son and sole heir of the
late spouses Tomas N. Alonso and Asuncion Medalle, discovered
documents showing that his father had acquired a lot of the Banilad
Friar Lands Estate from the Government in or about the year 1911
o Original vendee of the lot assigned his rights to Tomas
o Tomas was consequently issued a patent
o Director of lands had executed a final deed of sale in his
favor, but the final deed of sale had not been registered with
the Register of Deeds because of lack of requirements, like
the approval of the final deed of sale by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, as required by law.
 Subsequently, Francisco discovered that a reconstituted title covering
the subject lot was issued in favor of Cebu Country Club’s predecessor,
and the name of registered owner in the TCT had been changed to that
of Cebu Country Club
 Francisco then commenced against Cebu Country Club an action for the
declaration of nullity and non-existence of deed/title, the cancellation
of certificates of title, and the recovery of property (then follow the
aforecited case)
 The Congress ultimately enacted a law to validate the TCTs and
reconstituted titles covering the Banilad Friar Lands Estate in Cebu City.
This was Republic Act No. 9443
 Thereafter, both Cebu Country Club and the OSG brought the passage
of R.A. No. 9443 to the attention of the RTC for its consideration in
resolving the OSG’s motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
 Upon being directed by the RTC to comment on the petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration, the OSG manifested in writing that the
Government was no longer seeking the execution of the decision in the
previous case
 RTC’s Ruling:
o R.A. No. 9443 "confirms and declares as valid" all "existing"
TCTs and reconstituted titles; thereby, the State in effect
waived and divested itself of whatever title or ownership
over the Banilad Friar Lands Estate in favor of the registered
owners thereof
o The situation of the parties had materially changed,
rendering the enforcement of the final and executory
judgment unjust, inequitable, and impossible, because Cebu
Country Club was now recognized by the State itself as the
absolute owner of the subject lot
 Hence, this petition
Issue: Whether petitioners have superior right over the lot than respondent
Held: No
 In G.R. No. 130876, the Court found that the petitioners did not validly
acquire ownership of the land in dispute
 Neither petitioners nor their predecessor had any title to the land in
question. The most that petitioners could claim was that the Director of
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Lands issued a sales patent in the name of Tomas N. Alonso. The sales
patent, however, and even the corresponding deed of sale were not
registered with the Register of Deeds and no title was ever issued in the
name of the latter. This is because there were basic requirements not
complied with, the most important of which was that the deed of sale
executed by the Director of Lands was not approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hence, the deed of sale was void.
 R.A. No. 9443 gives petitioners no legal interest to assail the denial of
the motion for execution
o The law expressly declares as valid "(a)ll existing Transfer
Certificates of Title and Reconstituted Certificates of Title
duly issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu Province and/or
Cebu City covering any portion of the Banilad Friar Lands
Estate," and recognizes the registered owners as absolute
owners. To benefit from R.A. No. 9443, therefore, a person
must hold as a condition precedent a duly issued Transfer
Certificate of Title or a Reconstituted Certificate of Title.
 Although the lot was earlier declared to be owned by the Government
in G.R. No. 130876, R.A. No. 9443 later validated Cebu Country Club’s
registered ownership due to its holding of TCT in its own name.
o In the aforecited case, which declared the Government as
the owner of the lot based on the absence of signature and
approval of the then Secretary of Interior;" and that the
decision in G.R. No. 130876 had "ceased to have any
practical effect" as the result of the enactment of R.A. No.
9443, and had thereby become "academic."
 On the other hand, the petitioners could not benefit from R.A. No. 9443
because of their non-compliance with the express condition of holding
any Transfer Certificate of Title or Reconstituted Certificate of Title
respecting the lot or any portion thereof.
 Petitioners next argue that the reconstituted title of Cebu Country Club,
Inc. had no lawful source to speak of; it was reconstituted through
extrinsic and intrinsic fraud in the absence of a deed of conveyance in
its favor.
o Reconstitution was based on the owner’s duplicate of the
title, hence, there was no need for the covering deed of sale
or other modes of conveyance.
o Cebu Country Club, Inc. was admittedly in possession of the
land since long before the Second World War, or since 1931.
o More importantly, Cebu Country Club, Inc. paid the realty
taxes on the land even before the war, and tax declarations
covering the property showed the number of the TCT of the
land. Cebu Country Club, Inc. produced receipts showing real
estate tax payments since 1949.
 Hence, petition was denied for lack of merit
Severino Manotok vs. Heirs of Homer Barque
G.R. Nos. 162335 and 162605
Facts:
 Homer Barque filed a petition for administrative reconstitution of the
original copy of a TCT before the RD of Quezon City, alleging that the
OCT was destroyed when a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June
1988.
 In support of the petition, Barque, Sr. submitted the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title, Real Estate Tax Receipts and Tax Declaration.
 Ruling of the Reconstitution Officer: Denied petition
o Lots covered by the Barque’s TCT appear to duplicate lots
covered by another TCT owned by herein petitioners which
was reconstituted in 1991
o The subdivision plan of the subject lots covered by Barque’s
TCT is a spurious document, as stated by the Chief of
Geodetic Surveys Division (Engr. Dalire)
 Barque moved for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit,
hence, filed an appeal before the LRA
 Ruling of LRA: Granted appeal
o Only the owner’s or co-owner’s duplicate of an original or
transfer certificate of title may be used as a source of
administrative reconstitution.
 Hence, Atty. Bustos (Reconstitution officer) erred
in requiring the submission of documents other
than the owner’s duplicate TCT
o Engr. Dalire’s failure to deny or question the genuineness of
his signature in the letter of 2 January 1997, affirming the
existence of the record of the lots subdivision plan, which
was he later on reversed
o Property in question is located at Barrio Matandang Balara,
Quezon City, contrary to several documents submitted by
herein petitioners, which state that the subject lot is
situtated at Barrio Payong, and/or Barrio Culiat
6
 o Claim of petitioners that property in question covers only
one lot is inaccurate -> the property plan shows that it is
composed of 2 lots, which was corroborated by the Certified
copy of the tax map over the property in question
o Examination of the technical description and boundaries
appearing in petitioners’ TCT do not conform o the certified
technical description and boundaries of the lot, issued by the
Bureau of Lands
o Reconstitution of the subject TCT may only be considered
after cancellation of petitioners’ TCT
 Barques filed a petition for review before the CA, praying for immediate
reconstitution of their title. This was granted, ordering cancellation of
petitioners’ TCT, hence this petition
 The subject lot is a part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land
acquired by the Philippine Government from the Philippine Sugar
Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar,
the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the
Philippine Islands on December 23, 1903, as indicated in Act No. 1120
(Friar Lands Act)
 Controversy arising from conflicting claims over the lot began to surface
after a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988
which destroyed records stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City.
December 12, 2005 decision by Justice Ynares-Santiago (1st Division):
Issue: Whether LRA has no authority to annul their title
Held: Yes
 By enumerating the hierarchy of sources to be used for the
reconstitution, it is the intent of the law to give more weight and
preference to the owner’s duplicate certificate of title over the other
enumerated sources.
o Since respondents’ source of reconstitution is the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title, there is no need for the
reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan
 In the reconstitution proceedings, the LRA is bound to determine from
the evidence submitted which between or among the titles is genuine
and existing to enable it to decide whether to deny or approve the
petition. Without such authority, the LRA would be a mere robotic
agency clothed only with mechanical powers.
o Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case
to the RTC to determine anew which of the two titles is
sham or spurious and thereafter appeal the trial court’s
ruling to the Court of Appeals. After all, the LRA and the two
divisions of the appellate court have already declared that
petitioners’ title is forged.
 Court applied ruling in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v.
Velasco: The validity of respondents’ and petitioners’ title have been
squarely passed upon by the LRA and reviewed and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, which factual findings are no longer reviewable by
this Court.
 By opposing the petition for reconstitution and submitting their
administratively reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to the
authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the
Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority to pass judgment on
their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered by these
tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners’ claim that they were
deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the
essence of due process.
December 18, 2008 decision by Justice Tinga (En Banc):
 After the 2005 Decision, Barques filed multiple motions with the Court’s
First Division concerning the execution of the judgment, including a
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession or For Execution.
 In response, the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for
Possession to the Supreme Court En Banc
 Subsequently, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion
to intervene, alleging that they own the subject property
o Their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued
Sales Certificate covered lot 823 of the Piedad Estate,
attaching to their petition the findings of the NBI that the
documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they were
purported to be.
 OSG was required to file its comments on these cases
Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds
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 In the context of an administrative reconstitution proceeding before the
LRA, the Barques have sought that the LRA exercise the power to cancel
the Manotok title and forthwith cause the reconstitution of their own
title.
o The LRA refused to do so, although it did rule that the
Manotok title was spurious and thus subject to cancellation
through the proper judicial proceeding. Upon appellate
review of that LRA decision, the Court of Appeals initially
upheld the LRA’s position, but ultimately, upon motion for
reconsideration, directed the cancellation of the Manotok
title and the reconstitution of the Barque title
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals was empowered to direct the annulment of
the Manotok title through the petitions raised before it by the Barques and the
Manotoks
Held: No
 Section 48 of PD 1529, the Property Registration Decree: A certificate of
title shall not be subject to collateral attack […and] cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with
law
o Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise
incidentally from the administrative proceeding for
reconstitution of the Barque title even if the evidence from
that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor
could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of
the LRA’s administrative proceeding.
 For the appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens
title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must
have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place.
o Not provided in Sec. 6 of PD 1529
 Hence, neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to
cancel the Manotok title.
Issue: Whether the LRA had acted correctly in ordering, conditional as it may have
been, the administrative reconstitution of the Barque title
Held: No
 RA 26 and 6732 establish that the administrative reconstitution of
Torrens titles is intended for non-controversial cases, or especially
where the subject property is not covered by an existing title in favor of
a person other than the applicant. Such an implication is consonant
with the rule that the reconstitution proceedings are not the venue for
confirmation or adjudication of title, but merely a means by which a
previously adjudicated title whose original has been lost or destroyed
may be reissued to its owner.
 None of the provisions pertaining to administrative reconstitution in
Rep. Act No. 26 or 6732 extraordinarily empowers the LRA to exercise
jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution, where the property is
already covered by a Torrens title.
 If a petition for administrative reconstitution is filed with the LRA, and it
appears from the official records that the subject property is already
covered by an existing Torrens title in the name of another person,
there is nothing further the LRA can do but to dismiss the petition.
 The 2005 Decision placed heavy reliance on Ortigas & Company Limited
Partnership v. Velasco, where in the course of reviewing an action for
judicial reconstitution of title, the Court opted not to remand the
reconstitution case filed by Molina to the court of origin in order to
permit the appeals of Ortigas and the Solicitor General, which had been
improvidently disallowed by the trial court. Instead, owing to the "fatal
infirmities" of Molina’s cause of action, the Court itself nullified the
reconstituted titles issued by the trial court. Ortigas had been cited by
the Court of Appeals and also by the 2005 Decision, in ruling on the
Barques’ petition.
o Unlike in Ortigas, the Court of Appeals herein was not
endowed with the proper appellate jurisdiction to annul the
Manotok title. As earlier pointed out, since the LRA had no
original jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title, it follows
that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdictional competence
to extend the same relief, even while reviewing the LRA’s
ruling.
Testing the premises under which the LRA and the Court of Appeals had concluded
that the Barques had a valid claim to title:
 The Barques assert that they bought the subject property from a certain
Setosta. However, TCT of the latter was registered under the name of
Manotok Realty, Inc.
o This detracts from the Barques’ claim that the Manotoks do
not have title to the property, as in fact the Barque title was
7
 a transfer from a title registered under the name of the
Manotoks
 The Barques hinge their claim on a purported subdivision plan, made in
favor of Setosta
o Based on the records, it appears that there is a conflict as to
its actual existence in the files of the government
o Examining the subdivision plan, here are critical changes
with respect to the boundaries named therein
o Findings of Land Projection and LMB show that the land as
described in the Barque title "when plotted thru its tie line
falls outside Quezon City." -> subject lot is within QC
o These discrepancies highlight the error of the LRA and the
Court of Appeals in acknowledging the right of the Barques
to seek reconstitution of their purported Barque title. Even
assuming that the petition for reconstitution should not
have been dismissed due to the Manotok title, it is apparent
that the Barques’ claim of ownership is exceedingly weak.
Re Motion of Intervene filed by Manahan:
 The Chief of the Legal Division of the LMB recommended that the
appropriate proceedings be taken in the proper court for the
cancellation of the Manotok title
 DENRL: Titles of the Manotoks could not have been derived from the
mother title of the subject lot; TCT prior to transfer to Manotoks do not
appear on record
 An investigation report by the CENRO through its land investigator
provides that records show that original claimant of the land is the
predecessor of Manahan’s predecessor
The Court cannot engage in the review of an original action for the cancellation of
such title
 Direct the Solicitor General to duly investigate the circumstances
behind the transmission of Lot No. 823, formerly a Friar Land, to private
persons
 Thereafter, the Solicitor General can file the appropriate proceedings
for cancellation if warranted.
 Can the Court declare the Manotok title void? No
o The Alonso approach especially appeals to the Court
because, as in this case, the subject property therein was a
Friar Land which under the Friar Lands Law may be disposed
of by the Government only under that law. Thus, there is
greater concern on the part of this Court to secure its proper
transmission to private hands, if at all.
o At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet
any sufficient evidence for us to warrant the annulment of
the Manotok title.
 Hence, the Court set aside the assailed decision and remand the case to
the CA for futher proceedings
On March 6, 2012 Decision by Justice Villarama:
At bar are the motions for reconsideration separately filed by the Manotoks,
Barques and Manahans of the August 2010 decision:
 Petitions of Manotoks and Manahan were denied as well as the petition
for reconstitution filed by Barques
 The subject lot was declared to belong to the national government,
without prejudice to the institution of REVERSION proceedings by the
State through the Office of the Solicitor General
Issue: Whether the subject lot belongs to the State and not to any of the claimants
Held: Yes
 As it turned out, none of the parties were able to establish by clear and
convincing evidence a valid alienation from the Government of the
subject friar land. The declaration of ownership in favor of the
Government was but the logical consequence of such finding.
 No officer of the DENR-NCR or LMB having official custody of sale
certificates covering friar lands testified as to the issuance and
authenticity the sale certificate submitted by the Manotoks.
o Even assuming that such was actually sourced from the
DENR-LMB, there was no showing that it was duly issued by
the Director of Lands and approved by the DENR Secretary
 Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.: “approval by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce of the sale of friar lands is indispensable for
its validity, hence, the absence of such approval made the sale null and
void ab initio.”
o No legal right over the subject friar land can be recognized in
favor of the Manotoks under the assignment documents in
the absence of the certificate of sale duly signed by the
Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds
1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
 The Deed of Conveyance covering the subject lot in favor of Felicitas
Manahan was issued by then Director of the LMB, which was based on
General Memorandum Order, authorizing the the Director of Lands,
now Director of LMB, to approve contracts of sale and deeds of
conveyance affecting Friar Lands.
o It is stressed that the confirmation of the Deed by this office
is only as to the execution and issuance based on the
authority of LMB Director under GMO
o However, in the absence of a valid certificate of sale duly
signed by the Secretary of Interior or Agriculture and Natural
Resources, such alleged confirmation of the execution and
issuance by the DENR-LMB of Deed of Conveyance is still
insufficient to prove the Manahans’ claim over the subject
land.
 On the basis of Art. 1317 of the Civil Code, the Manahans contend that
deeds of conveyance not bearing the signature of the Secretary can also
be ratified.
o Court held that contracts of sale lacking the approval of the
Secretary fall under the class of void and inexistent contracts
enumerated in Art. 1409 which cannot be ratified. Section 18
of Act No. 1120 mandated the approval by the Secretary for
a sale of friar land to be valid
 Manotoks’ and Manahan’s reliance n MO 16-05 issued by the Secrtary,
which provides that all these deeds of conveyance lacking the signature
of the Secretary of Natural Resources are thus deemed signed or
otherwise ratified, is of no merit
o The argument that the Director of Lands had delegated
authority to approve contracts of sale and deeds of
conveyances over friar lands ignores the consistent ruling of
this Court in controversies involving friar lands.
 Justice Carpio’s Dissenting Opinion:
o Based on Section 12 of the Friar Land Act, it is the Deed of
Conveyance that must bear the signature of the Secretary of
Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources "because it is
only when the final installment is paid that the Secretary can
approve the sale, the purchase price having been fully paid."
o It was pointed out that the majority itself expressly admit
that "it is only a ministerial duty on the part of the Secretary
to sign the Deed of Conveyance once the applicant had
made full payment on the purchase price of the land", citing
jurisprudence to the effect that "notwithstanding the failure
of the government to issue the proper instrument of
conveyance when the purchaser finally pays the final
installment of the purchase price, the purchase of the friar
land still acquired ownership.
o Ruling in Alonso "was superseded with the issuance by then
DENR Secretary Defensor of DENR Memorandum Order No.
16-05." It was argued that the majority had construed a
"limited application" when it declared that the Manotoks
could not benefit from said memorandum order because the
latter refers only to deeds of conveyance "on file with the
records of the DENR field offices".
 The Court do not agree with the above said opinion that only the
Director of Lands who signs the Certificate of Sale
o The official document denominated as "Sale Certificate"
clearly required both the signatures of the Director of Lands
who issued such sale certificate to an applicant
settler/occupant and the Secretary of the
Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources indicating his
approval of the sale -> as provided in Section 18 of Act No.
1120
o Where there is no certificate of sale issued, the purchaser
does not acquire any right of possession and purchase, as
implied from Section 15. By the mandatory language of
Section 18, the absence of approval of the Secretary of
Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in the lease or
sale of friar land would invalidate the sale.
o It would result in the absurd situation wherein thecertificate
of sale and deed of conveyance both lacked the signature
and approval of the Secretary, and yet the purchaser’s
ownership is ratified, courtesy of DENR Memorandum
o Disagree also on Justice Carpio’s contention on Alonso case:
DENR MO No. 16-05 explicitly makes reference only to
Deeds of Conveyances, not to Sale Certificates by which,
under the express language of Section 15, the purchaser of
friar land acquires the right of possession and purchase
pending final payment and the issuance of title, such
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 certificate being duly signed under the provisions of Act No.
1120
 The existence of a valid certificate of sale therefore must first be
established with clear and convincing evidence before a purchaser is
deemed to have acquired ownership over a friar land notwithstanding
the non-issuance by the Government, for some reason or another, of a
deed of conveyance after completing the installment payments. In the
absence of such certificate of sale duly signed by the Secretary, no right
can be recognized in favor of the applicant. Neither would any assignee
or transferee acquire any right over the subject land.
 The perceived disquieting effects on titles over friar lands long held by
generations of landowners cannot be invoked as justification for
legitimizing any claim or acquisition of these lands obtained through
fraud or without strict compliance with the procedure laid down in Act
No. 1120.
 As consistently held by this Court, friar lands can be alienated only upon
proper compliance with the requirements of Act No. 1120. The issuance
of a valid certificate of sale is a condition sine qua non for acquisition of
ownership under the Friar Lands Act. Otherwise, DENR Memorandum
Order No. 16-05 would serve as administrative imprimatur to holders of
deeds of conveyance whose acquisition may have been obtained
through irregularity or fraud.
 The enactment of RA 9443 signifies the legislature’s recognition of the
statutory basis of the Alonso ruling to the effect that in the absence of
signature and/or approval of the Secretary of Interior/Natural
Resources in the Certificates of Sale on file with the CENRO, the sale is
not valid and the purchaser has not acquired ownership of the friar
land.
 RA 9443 expressly excludes from its coverage those cases involving
certificates of title which were shown to have been fraudulently or
irregularly issued. As the reconstitution and remand proceedings in
these cases revealed, the Manotoks’ title to the subject friar land, just
like the Barques and Manahans, is seriously flawed. The Court cannot
allow them now to invoke the benefit of confirmation and validation of
ownership of friar lands under duly executed documents, which they
never had in the first place. Strict application by the courts of the
mandatory provisions of the Friar Lands Act is justified by the laudable
policy behind its enactment -- to ensure that the lands acquired by the
government would go to the actual occupants and settlers who were
given preference in their distribution.
Detailed Justice Carpio’s Dissenting Opinion:
 The former DENR Secretary states in his Affidavit that all the deeds
examined by LMB personnel on file with the LMB, CENRO and the
National Archives do not have the signature of the Secretary of the
Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. To
repeat, former DENR Secretary Defensor states that upon examination,
all deeds of conveyance involving friar lands did not have the signature
of the Secretary.
 Hence, DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 was issued precisely to
"remove doubts or dispel objections as to the validity of all Torrens
transfer certificates of title issued over friar lands, where such doubts or
objections arise either from the lack of signature of then Secretary of
the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on
the deed of conveyance that have led to the issuance of said titles, or
because of the loss or unavailability of such deeds or of the records
from which the Secretary’s signature or approval may be verified."
DENR Memorandum Order No. 16-05 was not limited to the Banilad
Estate but applied to all friar lands in the Philippines because all deeds
of conveyance, regardless of where located, did not have the signature
of the Secretary.
 Since the lack of signatures and absence of approval by the Secretary of
Interior/Agriculture and the Director of Lands were cured with the
passage of RA 9443, the benefits of the law should also apply to other
lands similarly situated.
o While RA 9443 refers only to the Banilad Estate, to limit its
application solely to the Banilad Estate will result in class
legislation. RA 9443 should be extended to lands similarly
situated; otherwise, there will be violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
 The majority assert that the dissent suggests that Memorandum Order
No. 16-05 "would apply even to those deeds of conveyance not found
in the records of DENR or its field offices, such as the Manotoks’ Deed
of Conveyance No. 29204 sourced from the National Archives. It would
then cover cases of claimants who have not been issued any certificate
of sale but were able to produce a deed of conveyance in their names."
o The majority mistakenly denigrate the records of the
National Archives. It cannot be disputed that the National
Archives is the official repository of government and public
documents.
Case Digest in Land Titles and Deeds
1stSem AY 2013-2014, Arellano University School of Law
o The Court recognizes that documents from the National
Archives have the same evidentiary value as public
documents from government offices which, after all, are the
source of the archived documents.
o The records of the National Archives on the existence of Sale
Certificate submitted by the Manotoks are supported and
confirmed by the records of the LMB. The LMB has on its file
the original of Assignment of Sale Certificate between M.
Teodoro and Severino Manotok as assignors and Severino
Manotok as assignee and approved by the Acting Director of
Lands.
o Contrary to the majority opinion, the Manotoks’
incontrovertible proof of existence of the three Assignments
of Sale Certificate, as well as the existence of the other
supporting documents, clearly and convincingly establishes
beyond any doubt the existence of Sale Certificate No. 1054.
 It is the Deed of Conveyance that must bear the signature of the
Secretary of Interior/Agriculture because it is only when the final
installment is paid that the Secretary can approve the sale, the
purchase price having been fully paid.
o Under Section 18 of Act No. 1120, any sale of friar land by
the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now Director of
Lands) shall not be valid until approved by the Secretary.
This means that the Secretary, under Section 18, approves
the sale and thus signs the Deed of Conveyance upon full
payment of the purchase price. However, under Section 12
of Act No. 1120, only the Director of Lands signs the Sales
Certificate upon payment of the first installment.
o The Sales Certificate operates as a contract to sell which,
under the law, the Director of Lands is authorized to sign and
thus bind the Government as seller of the friar land. This
transaction is a sale of private property because friar lands
are patrimonial properties of the Government.
 The majority insist that where there is no certificate of sale issued, the
purchaser does not acquire any right of possession and purchase.
o Section 12 of Act No. 1120 provided that "upon payment of
the last installment together with all accrued interest[,], the
Government will convey to [the] settler and occupant the
said land so held by him by proper instrument of
conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in
the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-
two of the Land Registration Act."
o The Manotoks paid the full purchase price to the
Government on 7 December 1932. Deed of Conveyance No.
29204, dated 7 December 1932, on its face acknowledged
receipt by the Government of the amount of P2,362 in
consideration for Lot 823 granted and conveyed to Severino
Manotok. Thus, the Manotoks acquired ownership.
 Since the majority expressly admit that upon full payment of the
purchase price it becomes the ministerial duty of the Secretary to
approve the sale, then the majority must also necessarily admit that the
approval by the Secretary is a mere formality that has been complied
with by the issuance of Memorandum Order No. 16-05.
 Since the majority further expressly admit that upon full payment of the
purchase price ownership of the friar land passes to the purchaser,
despite the failure of the Secretary to sign the Deed of Conveyance,
then the majority must also necessarily admit that the Manotoks
became the absolute owners of the land upon their full payment of the
purchase price on 7 December 1932.
 The Manotoks should not be punished if the documents leading to the
issuance of the TCT could no longer be found in the files of the
government office, considering that these were pre-war documents and
considering further the lack of proper preservation of documents in
some government offices.
 The Certificate of Sale to the original assignors is not on file with the
LMB for reasons that could not be attributed to the Manotoks’ fault.
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