Republic of the Philippines The RCAM attached the following documents to support its application:
SUPREME COURT amended plan Psu-223919; technical description of Lots 1 and 2;9 surveyor s
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179181 November 18, 2013
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, Petitioner,
vs.
CRESENCIASTA.TERESA RAMOS, assisted by her husband PONCIANO
FRANCISCO, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this petition for review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court the challenge to the April 10 2007 decision 2 and the August 9, 2007
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84646. This CA
decision affirmed, with modification, the January 17, 2005 decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 156 of Pasig City (RTC), in LRC Case No. N-5811
that denied the application for confirmation and registration of title filed by the
petitioner, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM).
The Factual Antecedents
At the core of the controversy in the present petition are two parcels of land –
Lot 1 with an area of 34 square meters and Lot 2 with an area of 760 square
meters- covered by amended Plan PSU-2239195 property), both located in
what used to be Barrio Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal. On September 15, 1966,
the RCAM filed before the R TC, (then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
11, acting as a land registration court, an application for registration of title 6
(application) of property, pursuant to Commonwealth Act C.A.) No. 141 (the
Public Land Act).7On October 4, 1974, the RCAM amended its application8 by
reducing Lot 2 to 760 square meters (from 1,832 square meters).
In its amended application, the RCAM claimed that it owned the property; that
it acquired the property during the Spanish time; and that since then, it has
been in open, public, continuous and peaceful possession of it in the concept
of an owner. It added that to the best of its knowledge and belief, no mortgage
or encumbrance of any kind affects the property, and that no person has any
claim, legal or equitable, on the property.
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certificate;10 and Tax Declaration No. 9551 issued on September 6, 1966.11
On May 22, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the
Director of Lands, filed an opposition12to the application. The Republic claimed
that the property is part of the public domain and cannot be subject to private
appropriation.
On August 18, 1992, respondent Cresencia Sta. Teresa Ramos, through her
husband Ponciano Francisco, filed her opposition13 to the RCAM's application.
She alleged that the property formed part of the entire property that her family
owns and has continuously possessed and occupied from the time of her
grandparents, during the Spanish time, up to the present. Cresencia submitted
the following documents,14 among others, to support her requested
confirmation of imperfect title:
1.) the death certificates of Cipriano Sta. Teresa and Eulogia Sta. Teresa Vda.
de Ramos (Cresencia's parents);
2.) her marriage certificate;
3.) their children's birth certificates;
4.) certificates of ownership covering two bancas;
5.) photographs of these two bane as with her youngest child while standing
on the property and showing the location of the RCAM' s church relative to the
location of the property;
6.) photographs of a pile of gravel and sand (allegedly for their gravel and sand
business) on the property;
7.) photographs of the RCAM's bahay ni Maria standing on the property;
8.) a photograph of the plaque awarded to Ponciano by ESSO Standard
Philippines as sole dealer of its gasoline products in Bagumbayan, Taguig,
Rizal;
9.) a photograph of their La Compania Refreshment Store standing on their
titled lot adjacent to the property;
10.) a photograph of the certificate of dealership given to Ponciano by a
Tobacco company for his dealership in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal; and
1
11.) the registration certificate for their family's sheet manufacturing business
situated m Bagumbayan, Taguig,15 Rizal.
The RCAM presented in evidence the following documents, in addition to
those already on record:16 tax declarations issued in its name in 1948, 1973,
1981, 1990, 1993, and 1999;17 the certified true copy of Original Certificate of
Title No. 0082 covering the lot in the name of Garcia, which adjoins the
property on the south; and the affidavit of Garcia confirming the RCAM's
ownership of the property.18 It likewise submitted several testimonial evidence
to corroborate its ownership and claim of possession of the property.
The ruling of the RTC
In its decision of January 17, 2005, 19 the RTC denied the RCAM's application
for registration of title. The RTC held that the RCAM failed to prove actual
possession and ownership of the property applied for. The RTC pointed out
that the RCAM's only overt act on the property that could be regarded as
evidence of actual possession was its construction of the bahay ni Maria in
1991. Even this act, according to the RTC, did not sufficiently satisfy the actual
possession requirement of the law as the RCAM did not show how and in what
manner it possessed the property prior to 1991. The RCAM's tax declarations
were also inconclusive since they failed to prove actual possession.
In contrast, the numerous businesses allegedly conducted by Cresencia and
her family on the property, the various pieces of documentary evidence that
she presented, and the testimony of the RCAM' s own witnesses convinced
the RTC that she and her family actually possessed the property in the manner
and for the period required by law.
This notwithstanding, the RTC refused to order the issuance of the title in
Cresencia's name. The RTC held that Cresencia failed to include in her
opposition a prayer for issuance of title.
The RCAM assailed the R TC' s decision before the CA.
The CA ruling
In its April 10, 2007 decision,20 the CA affirmed with modification the RTC's
January 17, 2005 ruling. The CA confirmed Cresencia's incomplete and
imperfect title to the property, subject to her compliance with the requisites for
registration of title.
The CA agreed with the RTC that the totality of the evidence on record
unquestionably showed that Cresencia was the actual possessor and
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occupant, in the concept of an owner, of the disputed property. The CA held
that Cresencia s use of the property since the Spanish time (through her
predecessors-in-interest), as confirmed by the RCAM s witnesses, clearly
demonstrated her dominion over the property. Thus, while she failed to register
the property in her name or declare it for taxation purposes as pointed out by
the RCAM, the CA did not consider this non-declaration significant to defeat
her claim. To the CA, Cresencia merely tolerated the RCAM s temporary use of
the property for lack of any urgent need for it and only acted to protect her right
when the RCAM applied for registration in its name. Thus, the CA declared that
Cresencia correctly waited until her possession was disturbed before she took
action to vindicate her right.
The CA similarly disregarded the additional tax declarations that the RCAM
presented in support of its application. The CA pointed out that these
documents hardly proved the RCAM s alleged ownership of or right to possess
the property as it failed to prove actual possession. Lastly, the CA held that it
was bound by the findings of facts and the conclusions arrived at by the RTC
as they were amply supported by the evidence.
The RCAM filed the present petition after the CA denied its motion for
reconsideration.21
Assignment of Errors
The RCAM argues before us that the CA erred and gravely abused its
discretion in:22
1. confirming the incomplete and imperfect title of the oppositor when the
magnitude of the parties evidence shows that the oppositors merely had
pretended possession that could not ripen into ownership;
2. failing to consider that the RCAM had continuous, open and notorious
possession of the property in the concept of an owner for a period of thirty (30)
years prior to the filing of the application; and
3. confirming the oppositor’s incomplete and imperfect title despite her failure
to comply with the substantial and procedural requirements of the Public Land
Act.
The Issue
In sum, the core issue for our resolution is who -between the RCAM and
Cresencia -is entitled to the benefits of C.A. No. 141 and Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1529 for confirmation and registration of imperfect title.
2
 The Court s Ruling
Preliminary considerations: nature of he issues; factual-issue-bar rule
In her comment,23 Cresencia primarily points out that the present petition
essentially questions the CA’s appreciation of the evidence and the credibility
of the witnesses who attested to her actual, public and notorious possession of
the property. She argues that these are questions of fact that are not proper for
a Rule 45 petition. In addition, the findings of the RTC were well supported by
the evidence, had been affirmed by the CA, and are thus binding on this Court.
We are not entirely convinced of the merits of what Cresencia pointed out.
The settled rule is that the jurisdiction of this Court over petitions for review on
certiorari is limited to the review of questions of law and not of fact. "A question
of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of
law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call
for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth
or falsehood of the facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when a doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query
invites calibration of the whole evidence x x x as well as their relation to each
other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation."24
An examination of the RCAM's issues shows that the claimed errors indeed
primarily question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the lower courts'
conclusion that Cresencia, and not the RCAM, had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the period required by law. When the presented
question centers on the sufficiency of the evidence, it is a question of fact 25 and
is barred in a Rule 45 petition.
Nevertheless, jurisprudence recognizes certain exceptions to the settled rule.
When the lower courts grossly misunderstood the facts and circumstances
that, when correctly appreciated, would warrant a different conclusion, a review
of the lower courts' findings may be made.26 This, in our view, is the exact
situation in the case as our discussions below will show.
Moreover, the RCAM also questions the propriety of the CA s confirmation of
Cresencia's title over the property although she was not the applicant and was
merely the oppositor in the present confirmation and registration proceedings.
Stated in question form -was the CA justified under the law and jurisprudence
in its confirmation of the oppositor's title over the property? This, in part, is a
question of law as it concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to
recognized facts.
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Hence, we find it imperative to resolve the petition on the merits.
Requirements for confirmation and registration of imperfect and incomplete
title under C.A. No. 141 and P.D. No. 1529
C.A. No. 141 governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain. Section 11 of C.A. No. 141 provides, as one of the modes of disposing
public lands that are suitable for agriculture, the "confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles." Section 48, on the other hand, enumerates those who are
considered to have acquired an imperfect or incomplete title over public lands
and, therefore, entitled to confirmation and registration under the Land
Registration Act.
The RCAM did not specify the particular provision of C.A. No. 141 under which
it anchored its application for confirmation and registration of title.
Nevertheless, the allegations in its application and amended application readily
show that it based its claim of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of C.A. No.
141. As amended by P.D. No. 1073 on January 25, 1977, Section 48(b) of C.A.
No. 141 currently provides:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. [emphases
and italics ours]
Prior to the amendment introduced by P.D. No. 1073, Section 48(b) of C.A. No.
141, then operated under the Republic Act R.A.) No. 1942 (June 22, 1957)
amendment which reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
3
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years, immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. [emphases and italics
ours]
Since the RCAM filed its application on September 15, 1966 and its amended
application on October 4, 1974, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by
R.A. No. 1942 (which then required possession of thirty years), governs.
In relation to C.A. No. 141, Section 14 of Presidential Decree P.D.) No. 1529 or
the Property Registration Decree specifies those who are qualified to register
their incomplete title over an alienable and disposable public land under the
Torrens system. P.D. No. 1529, which was approved on June 11, 1978,
superseded and codified all laws relative to the registration of property.
The pertinent portion of Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 reads:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. [italics ours]
Under these legal parameters, applicants in a judicial confirmation of imperfect
title may register their titles upon a showing that they or their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, 27 since June 12, 1945, or
earlier (or for at least 30 years in the case of the RCAM) immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. The burden of
proof in these cases rests on the applicants who must demonstrate clear,
positive and convincing evidence that: (1) the property subject of their
application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) their
alleged possession and occupation of the property were of the length and of
the character required by law.28
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On the issue of whether the RC M is entitled to the benefits of C A No. 141 and
P.D. No. 1529
Reiterating its position before the RTC and the CA, the RCAM now argues that
it actually, continuously, openly and notoriously possessed the property since
time immemorial. It points out that its tax declarations covering the property,
while not conclusive evidence of ownership, are proof of its claim of title and
constitute as sufficient basis for inferring possession.
For her part, Cresencia counters that the RCAM failed to discharge its burden
of proving possession in the concept of an owner. She argues that the
testimonies of the RCAM s witnesses were replete with inconsistencies and
betray the weakness of its claimed possession. Cresencia adds that at most,
the RCAM s possession was by her mere tolerance which, no matter how long,
can never ripen into ownership. She also points out that the RCAM s tax
declarations are insufficient proof of possession as they are not, by
themselves, conclusive evidence of ownership.
We do not see any merit in the RCAM s contentions.
The RTC and the CA as it affirmed the RTC, dismissed the RCAM s
application for its failure to comply with the second requirement – possession
of the property in the manner and for the period required by law.
We find no reason to disturb the RTC and the CA findings on this point. They
had carefully analyzed and weighed each piece of the RCAM s evidence to
support its application and had extensively explained in their respective
decisions why they could not give weight to these pieces of evidence. Hence,
we affirm their denial of the RCAM' s application. For greater certainty, we
expound on the reasons below.
a. The RC M failed to prove possession of the property in the manner and for
the period required by law
The possession contemplated by Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 is actual, not
fictional or constructive. In Carlos v Republic of the Philippines, 29 the Court
explained the character of the required possession, as follows:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make
one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds
the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
4
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that
for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual
possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
Accordingly, to prove its compliance with Section 48(b)' s possession
requirement, the RCAM had to show that it performed specific overt acts in the
character an owner would naturally exercise over his own property. Proof of
actual possession of the property at the time of the filing of the application is
required because the phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, and in
concept of owner," the RCAM used to describe its alleged possession, is a
conclusion of law,30 not an allegation of fact. Possession is open when it is
patent, visible, apparent [and] notorious x x x continuous when uninterrupted,
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when [the possession is
characterized by acts manifesting] exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to [the applicant's] own use and benefit; and notorious when
it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the
people in the neighborhood."31
Very noticeably, the RCAM failed to show or point to any specific act
characterizing its claimed possession in the manner described above. The
various documents that it submitted, as well as the bare assertions it made
and those of its witnesses, that it had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the property, hardly constitute the "well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence required in cases of this nature.32 We elaborate
below on these points.
First, the tax declarations issued in the RCAM's name in 1948, 1966, 1977,
1984, 1990, 1993 and 1999 did not in any way prove the character of its
possession over the property. Note that the settled rule is that tax declarations
are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when
not supported by any other evidence showing actual, public and adverse
possession.33 The declaration for taxation purposes of property in the names of
applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest may constitute
collaborating evidence only when coupled with other acts of possession and
ownership;34 standing alone, it is inconclusive.
This rule applies even more strongly in this case since the RCAM's payments
of taxes due on the property were inconsistent and random. Interestingly, while
the RCAM asserts that it had been in possession of the property since the
Spanish time, the earliest tax declaration that it could present was that issued
in 1948. Also, when it filed its application in 1966 and its amended application
in 197 4, the RCAM presented only two tax declarations (issued in 1948 and
1966) covering the property. And since then, up to the issuance of the January
1 7, 2005 decision of the R TC, the RCAM presented only five other tax
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declarations -those issued in 1977, 1984, 1990, 1993 and 1999. The case of
Tan v. Republic35 teaches us that this type of intermittent and sporadic
assertion of alleged ownership does not prove open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation.
Second, even if we were to consider the RCAM' s tax declarations as basis for
inferring possession, 36 the RCAM still failed to prove actual possession of the
property for the required duration. As already noted, the earliest tax declaration
that it presented was for 1948. We are in fact inclined to believe that the RCAM
first declared the property in its name only in 1948 as this tax declaration does
not appear to have cancelled any previously-issued tax declaration. Thus,
when it filed its application in 1966, it was in possession of the property for only
eighteen years, counted from 1948. Even if we were to count the possession
period from the filing of its amended application in 1974, its alleged possession
(which was only for twenty-six years counted from 1948) would still be short of
the thirty-year period required by Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended
by RA No. 1942. The situation would be worse if we were to consider the
amendment introduced by P.D. No. 1073 to Section 48(b) where, for the
RCAM's claimed possession of the property to give rise to an imperfect title,
this possession should have commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Third, the amended plan Psu-223919, technical description for Lots 1 and 2,
and surveyor s certificate only prove the identity of the property that the RCAM
sought to register in its name.37 While these documents plot the location, the
area and the boundaries of the property, they hardly prove that the RCAM
actually possessed the property in the concept of an owner for the required
duration. In fact, the RCAM seemed to be uncertain of the exact area it
allegedly possesses and over which it claims ownership. The total area that
the RCAM applied for, as stated in its amended application and the amended
survey plan, was 794 square meters (34 square meters for Lot 1 and 760
square meters for Lot 2). Yet, in its various tax declarations issued even after it
filed its amended application, the total area declared under its name was still
1,832 square meters. Notably, the area stated in its 1948 tax declaration was
only 132.30 square meters, while the area stated in the subsequently issued
tax declaration (1966) was 1,832 square meters. Significantly, the RCAM did
not account for or provide sufficient explanation for this increase in the area;
thus, it appeared uncertain on the specific area claimed.
Fourth, the RCAM did not build any permanent structure or any other
improvement that clearly announces its claim of ownership over the property.
Neither did it account for any act of occupation, development, maintenance or
cultivation for the duration of time it was allegedly in possession of it. The
"bahay ni Maria" where the RCAM conducts its fiesta-related and Lenten
activities could hardly satisfy the possession requirement of C.A. No. 141. As
found out by the CA, this structure was constructed only in 1991 and not at the
5
time of, or prior to, the filing of its application in 1966.
Last, the RCAM s testimonial evidence hardly supplemented the inherent
inadequacy of its documentary evidence. While apparently confirming the
RCAM s claim, the testimonies were undoubtedly hearsay and were not based
on personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the RCAM’s claimed
actual, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession.
b. The RC M failed to prove that the property is alienable and disposable land
of he public domain
Most importantly, we find the RCAM s evidence to be insufficient since it failed
to comply with the first and most basic requirement – proof of the alienable and
disposable character of the property. Surprisingly, no finding or pronouncement
referring to this requirement was ever made in the decisions of the R TC and
the CA.
To prove that the property is alienable and disposable, the RCAM was bound
to establish "the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute."38 It could have also secured a certification from the government that
the property applied for was alienable and disposable. 39 Our review of the
records shows that this evidence is fatally absent and we are in fact
disappointed to note that both the RTC and the CA appeared to have simply
assumed that the property was alienable and disposable.
We cannot tolerate this kind of approach for two basic reasons. One, in this
jurisdiction, all lands belong to the State regardless of their classification. 40 This
rule, more commonly known as the Regalian doctrine, applies with equal force
even to private unregistered lands, unless the contrary is satisfactorily shown.
Second, unless the date when the property became alienable and disposable
is specifically identified, any determination on the RCAM' s compliance with the
second requirement is rendered useless as any alleged period of possession
prior to the date the property became alienable and disposable can never be
counted in its favor as any period of possession and occupation of public lands
in the concept of owner, no matter how long, can never ripen into ownership.41
On this ground alone, the R TC could have outrightly denied the RCAM' s
application.
On the CA’s authority to confirm the title of the oppositor in land registration
proceedings
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The RCAM next argues that the CA’s act of confirming Cresencia's title over
the property is contrary to law and jurisprudence. The RCAM points out that it
filed the application for registration of title under the provisions of C.A. No. 141
or alternatively under P.D. No. 1529; both statutes dictate several substantive
and procedural requirements that must first be complied with before title to the
property is confirmed and registered. In affirming Cresencia's title without any
evidence showing her compliance with these requirements, it claims that the
CA, in effect, made Cresencia the applicant entitled to the benefits of the land
registration proceedings that it initiated before the lower court.
We differ with this view.
Section 29 of P.D. No. 1529 gives the court the authority to confirm the title of
either the applicant or the oppositor in a land registration proceeding
depending on the conclusion that the evidence calls for. Specifically, Section
29 provides that the court "x x x after considering the evidence x x x finds that
the applicant or the oppositor has sufficient title proper for registration,
judgment shall be rendered confirming the title of the applicant, or the
oppositor, to the land x x x x." (emphases and italics ours)
Thus, contrary to the RCAM's contention, the CA has the authority to confirm
the title of Cresencia, as the oppositor, over the property. This, of course, is
subject to Cresencia's satisfaction of the evidentiary requirement of P D No.
1529, in relation with C.A. No. 141 in support of her own claim of imperfect title
over the property.
The issue of whether Cresencia is entitled to the benefits of C.A. No. 141 and
P.D. No. 1529
The RCAM lastly argues that the evidence belies Cresencia's claim of
continuous, open and notorious possession since the Spanish time. The
RCAM points out that, first, Cresencia failed to declare for taxation purposes
the property in her name, thus effectively indicating that she did not believe
herself to be its owner. Second, Cresencia did not have the property surveyed
in her name so that she could assert her claim over it and show its metes and
bounds. Third, Cresencia did not register the property in her name although
she previously registered the adjoining lot in her name. Fourth, Cresencia did
not construct any permanent structure on the property and no traces of the
businesses allegedly conducted by her and by her family on it could be seen at
the time it filed its application. And fifth, Cresencia did not perform any act of
dominion that, by the established jurisprudential definition, could be sufficiently
considered as actual possession.
We agree with the RCAM on most of these points.
6
While we uphold the CA' s authority to confirm the title of the oppositor in a
confirmation and registration proceedings, we cannot agree, however, with the
conclusion the CA reached on the nature of Cresencia's possession of the
property.
Under the same legal parameters we used to affirm the RTC's denial of the
RCAM' s application, we also find insufficient the evidence that Cresencia
presented to prove her claimed possession of the property in the manner and
for the period required by C.A. No. 141. Like the RCAM, Cresencia was bound
to adduce evidence that irrefutably proves her compliance with the
requirements for confirmation of title. To our mind, she also failed to discharge
this burden of proof; thus, the CA erred when it affirmed the contrary findings of
the RTC and confirmed Cresencia’s title over the property.
We arrive at this conclusion for the reasons outlined below.
First, the various pieces of documentary evidence that Cresencia presented to
support her own claim of imperfect title hardly proved her alleged actual
possession of the property. Specifically, the certificates of marriage, birth and
death did not particularly state that each of these certified events, i.e.
marriage, birth and death, in fact transpired on the claimed property; at best,
the certificates proved the occurrence of these events in Bagumbayan, Taguig,
Rizal and on the stated dates, respectively.
Similarly, the certificate of ownership of two bancas in the name of Ponciano,
the registration certificate for their family s sheet manufacturing business, the
photograph of the certificate of dealership in the name of Ponciano given by a
tobacco company, and the photograph of the plaque awarded to Ponciano by
ESSO Standard Philippines as sole dealer of its gasoline products did not
prove that Cresencia and her family conducted these businesses on the
disputed property itself. Rather, they simply showed that at one point in time,
Cresencia and her family conducted these businesses in Bagumbayan, Taguig,
Rizal. In fact, Cresencia s claim that they conducted their gasoline dealership
business on the property is belied by the testimony of a witness who stated
that the gas station was located north (or the other side) of Cresencia s titled
lot and not on the property.42
The presence on the property, as shown by photographs, of Cresencia s
daughter, of the two bancas owned by her family, and of the pile of gravel and
sand they allegedly used in their gravel and sand business also hardly count
as acts of occupation, development or maintenance that could have been
sufficient as proof of actual possession. The presence of these objects and of
Cresencia s daughter on the property was obviously transient and
impermanent; at most, they proved that Cresencia and her family used the
property for a certain period of time, albeit, briefly and temporarily.
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Finally, the records show that the La Compania Refreshment Store business
(that they allegedly conducted on the property) actually stood on their titled lot
adjoining the property.
Second, while Cresencia registered in her name the adjoining lot (which they
had been occupying at the time the RCAM filed its application and where their
La Compania Refreshment Store stood), she never had the property registered
in her name. Neither did Cresencia or her predecessors-in-interest declare the
property for taxation purposes nor had the property surveyed in their names to
properly identify it and to specifically determine its metes and bounds. The
declaration for taxation purposes of property in their names would have at
least served as proof that she or her predecessors-in-interest had a claim over
the property43 that could be labeled as "possession" if coupled with proof of
actual possession.
Finally, the testimonies of Ponciano and Florencia Francisco Mariano
(Cresencia's daughter) on the nature and duration of their family's alleged
possession of the property, other than being self-serving, were mere general
statements and could not have constituted the factual evidence of possession
that the law requires. They also failed to point out specific acts of dominion or
ownership that were performed on the property by the parents of Cresencia,
their predecessors-in-interest. They likewise failed to present any evidence
that could have corroborated their alleged possession of the property from the
time of their grandfather, Cipriano, who acquired the property from its previous
owner, Petrona Sta. Teresa. Interestingly, other than Ponciano and Florencia,
none of the witnesses on record seemed to have known that Cresencia owns
or at least claims ownership of the property.
At any rate, even if we were to consider these pieces of evidence to be
sufficient, which we do not, confirmation and registration of title over the
property in Cresencia' s name was still improper in the absence of competent
and persuasive evidence on record proving that the property is alienable and
disposable.
For all these reasons, we find that the CA erred when it affirmed the RTC's
ruling on this matter and confirmed Cresencia's imperfect title to the
property.WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we hereby DENY the
petition. We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the decision dated April 10, 2007
and the resolution dated August 9, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 84646 to the extent described below:
1. We AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals as it affirmed the January
17 2005 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156, in LRC
Case No. N-5811 that DENIED the application for confirmation and registration
of title filed by the petitioner, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila; and
7
2. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the confirmation made by the Court of
Appeals of the title over the property in the name of respondent Cresencia Sta.
Teresa Ramos for lack of sufficient evidentiary basis.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

LTD 8
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 175578 August 11, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ZENAIDA GUINTO-ALDANA, in her own behalf as Attorney-in-fact of MA.
AURORA GUINTO-COMISO, MA. LUISA GUINTO-DIONISIO, ALFREDO
GUINTO, JR., PACITA R. GUINTO, ERNESTO R. GUINTO, NATIVIDAD R.
GUINTO and ALBERTO R. GUINTO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of
the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, assails the March
30, 2006 Decision1 and the November 20, 2006 Resolution,2 both of the Court
of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80500. The assailed decision reversed and set
aside the July 10, 2003 judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City,
Branch 199 in LRC Case No. 02-0036, one for original registration of title,
whereas the assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
The facts follow.
On April 3, 2002, respondents Zenaida Guinto-Aldana4 (Zenaida), Ma. Aurora
Guinto-Comiso, Ma. Luisa Guinto-Dionisio, Alfredo Guinto, Jr., Pacita R.
Guinto, Ernesto R. Guinto, Natividad R. Guinto and Alberto R. Guinto, filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 199 an
Application for Registration of Title5 over two pieces of land in Talango,
Pamplona Uno, Las Piñas City. These lands, identified as Lot No. 4 and Lot
No. 5 in Conversion Consolidation Subdivision Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D,6
measure 1,509 square meters and 4,640 square meters, respectively.7
Respondents professed themselves to be co-owners of these lots, having
acquired them by succession from their predecessors Sergio Guinto (Sergio)
and Lucia Rivera-Guinto (Lucia)—Zenaida’s parents—who, in turn, had
acquired the property under a 1969 document denominated as "Kasulatan sa
Paghahati ng Lupa na Labas sa Hukuman na may Pagpaparaya at Bilihan."
Under this document, Sergio and Lucia Guinto acquired for a consideration the
respective shares on the property of Pastor Guinto, Dionisio Guinto,
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Potenciana Guinto and Marcelina Bernardo who, together with Luisa, had
derived the same from Romulado Guinto. 8 Respondents also alleged that until
the time of the application, they and their predecessors-in-interest have been
in actual, open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous possession of
these lots in the concept of owner and that they had consistently declared the
property in their name for purposes of real estate taxation.9
In support of their application, respondents submitted to the court the blueprint
of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D,10as well as copies of the technical descriptions
of each lot,11 a certification from the geodetic engineer12 and the pertinent tax
declarations,13 together with the receipts of payment therefor. 14 Expressly, they
averred that the property’s original tracing cloth plan had previously been
submitted to the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 255 (Las Piñas RTC) in
connection with the proceedings in LRC Case No. LP-128—a previous
registration case involving the subject property which, however, had been
dismissed without prejudice.15
The trial court found the application to be sufficient in form and substance;
hence, it gave due course thereto and ordered compliance with the publication
and notification requirements of the law.16
Opposing the application, petitioner, through the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Las Piñas City, advanced that the lots sought to be registered were
inalienable lands of the public domain; that neither respondents nor their
predecessors-in-interest had been in prior possession thereof; and that the
muniment of title and the tax declaration submitted to the court did not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition or of prior
possession in the concept of owner.17
At the hearing, Zenaida identified her herein co-respondents to be her siblings,
nephews and nieces. She likewise identified the adjoining lot owners named in
the application and the supporting documents attached to the application as
well. She testified that the subject lots had been surveyed at the instance of
her family sometime between 1994 and 1995, and that said survey was
documented in Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D and in the geodetic engineer’s
technical description of the lots. She implied that they did obtain the original
tracing cloth plan of the property, but it was forwarded to the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) by the Las Piñas RTC in connection with the proceedings in
LRC Case No. LP-128. Notwithstanding this admission, and without objection
from the oppositor, the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D and the
technical description of the property were provisionally marked in evidence.18
Furthermore, Zenaida—61 years old at the time of her testimony—declared
that she has known that the subject lots were owned by her family since she
was 5 years old and from her earliest recollection, she narrated that her
9
grandparents had lived in the subject lots until the death of her grandmother in
1961. She implied that aside from her predecessors there were other persons,
caretakers supposedly, who had tilled the land and who had lived until
sometime between 1980 and 1990. She remembered her grandmother having
constructed a house on the property, but the same had already been
destroyed. Also, sometime in 1970, her family built an adobe fence around the
perimeter of the lots and later, in the 1990s, they reinforced it with hollow
blocks and concrete after an inundation caused by the flood. 19 She claimed
that she and her father, Sergio, had been religious in the payment of real
estate taxes as shown by the tax declarations and tax receipts which she
submitted to the court and which, following identification, were forthwith
marked in evidence.20
Zenaida’s claim of prior, open, exclusive and continuous possession of the
land was corroborated by Josefina Luna (Josefina), one of the adjoining lot
owners. Josefina, then 73 years old, strongly declared that the subject lots
were owned by Zenaida’s parents, Sergio Guinto and Lucia Rivera, since she
reached the age of understanding, and that she had not come to know of any
instance where a third party had placed a claim on the property. When asked
whether there was anyone residing in the property and whether there were
improvements made thereon, she said there was no one residing therein and
that there was nothing standing thereon except for a nipa hut. 21
At the close of Josefina’s testimony, respondents formally offered their exhibits
without the oppositor placing any objection thereto.22 After weighing the
evidence, the trial court, on July 10, 2003, rendered its Decision denying the
application for registration. It found that respondents were unable to establish
with certainty the identity of the lots applied for registration, because of failure
to submit to the court the original tracing cloth plan as mandated by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. It likewise noted that the fact of adverse,
continuous, open, public and peaceful possession in the concept of owner has
not been proved by the evidence as Zenaida’s and Josefina’s respective
testimonies did not establish the nature of the possession of respondents’
predecessors.23 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the applicants to comply with the requirements of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Application for Original Registration of Title
is hereby DENIED.
ORDERED.24
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on March 30,
2006, issued the assailed Decision reversing the trial court as follows:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant appeal is hereby
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.25
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.26 Hence, it filed the instant
petition which attributes error to the Court of Appeals in reversing the trial
court’s July 10, 2003 decision.
Petitioner principally posits that under Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, the
submission in court of the original tracing cloth plan of the property sought to
be registered is a mandatory requirement in registration proceedings in order
to establish the exact identity of the property. While respondents admitted that
the original tracing cloth plan of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 in this case was in the
custody of the LRA as a consequence of their first attempt to have the property
registered, petitioner, invoking Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines, 27
believes that respondents, on that score alone, are not relieved of their
procedural obligation to adduce in evidence the original copy of the plan,
because they could have easily retrieved it from the LRA and presented it in
court.28
Furthermore, petitioner suggests that the blueprint of the subdivision plan
submitted by respondents cannot approximate substantial compliance with the
requirement of Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529. Again, relying on the
aforementioned Del Rosario case, petitioner observes that the blueprint in this
case, allegedly illegible and unreadable, does not even bear the certification of
the Lands Management Bureau.29 Lastly, petitioner attacks respondents’ claim
of prior possession. It notes that there is no clear and convincing evidence that
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
adverse, public and exclusive possession of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 for 30 years.30
Commenting on the petition, respondents observe that petitioner’s arguments
are mere reiterative theses on the issues that have already been addressed by
the Court of Appeals in the assailed Decision and Resolution, and that there
are no new matters raised which have not yet been previously passed upon.
Accordingly, they prayed that the petition be denied.31
We find the petition to be unmeritorious.
Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as The Property Registration
Decree of 1978, materially provides:
Section 17. What and where to file.–The application for land registration shall
10
be filed with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the land is
situated. The applicant shall file, together with the application, all original
muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan of the land approved
by the Bureau of Lands.
The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the
applicant has furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the application and
all annexes.
The provision denotes that it is imperative in an application for original
registration that the applicant submit to the court, aside from the original or
duplicate copies of the muniments of title, a copy of a duly approved survey
plan of the land sought to be registered. The survey plan is indispensable as it
provides a reference on the exact identity of the property. This begs the
question in the instant case: Does the blueprint copy of the survey plan suffice
for compliance with the requirement? In not so many cases, 32 it was held that
the non-submission, for any reason, of the original tracing cloth plan is fatal to
the registration application, since the same is mandatory in original registration
of title. For instance, in the Del Rosario case relied on by petitioner, the Court
ruled that the submission of the original copy of the duly approved tracing cloth
plan is a mandatory condition for land registration as it supplies the means by
which to determine the exact metes and bounds of the property. The applicant
in that case was unable to submit the original tracing cloth plan of the land he
was claiming because apparently, as in the present case, it was previously
transmitted by the clerk of court to the LRA. Yet the Court, deeming it the
applicant’s obligation to retrieve the plan himself and present it in evidence,
denied the application, to wit:
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by
the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a
mandatory requirement. The reason for this rule is to establish the true identity
of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion
thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the
possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any
adjoining land.1avvphi1 The failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to
petitioner’s application for registration.
Petitioner contends, however, that he had submitted the original tracing cloth
plan to the branch clerk of court, but the latter submitted the same to the LRA.
This claim has no merit. Petitioner is duty bound to retrieve the tracing cloth
plan from the LRA and to present it in evidence in the trial court. x x x33
Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original
tracing cloth plan is merely to provide a convenient and necessary means to
afford certainty as to the exact identity of the property applied for registration
LTD
and to ensure that the same does not overlap with the boundaries of the
adjoining lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration application must
be denied for failure to present the original tracing cloth plan, especially where
it is accompanied by pieces of evidence—such as a duly executed blueprint of
the survey plan and a duly executed technical description of the property—
which may likewise substantially and with as much certainty prove the limits
and extent of the property sought to be registered.
Thus, sound is the doctrinal precept laid down in Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals,34 and in the later cases of Spouses Recto v. Republic of the
Philippines35 and Republic of the Philippines v. Hubilla,36 that while the best
evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the original
tracing cloth plan issued by the Bureau of Lands (now the Lands Management
Services of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]),
blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient identification.
Pertinently, the Court in Hubilla, citing Recto, pronounced:
While the petitioner correctly asserts that the submission in evidence of the
original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, is a
mandatory requirement, this Court has recognized instances of substantial
compliance with this rule. In previous cases, this Court ruled that blueprint
copies of the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands and other
evidence could also provide sufficient identification to identify a piece of land
for registration purposes. x x x37
In the case at bar, we find that the submission of the blueprint of Plan Ccs-
007601-000040-D, together with the technical description of the property,
operates as substantial compliance with the legal requirement of ascertaining
the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 applied for registration. The blueprint, which is
shown to have been duly executed by Geodetic Engineer Rolando Roxas
(Roxas), attached to the application and subsequently identified, marked, and
offered in evidence, shows that it proceeded officially from the Lands
Management Services and, in fact, bears the approval of Surveys Division
Chief Ernesto Erive. It also shows on its face that the survey of the property
was endorsed by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of
the DENR.38 This, compounded by the accompanying technical description of
Lot Nos. 4 and 5 duly executed and verified also by Roxas, 39 should
substantially supply as it did the means by which the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and
5 may be ascertained.
Verily, no error can be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that
respondents were able to approximate compliance with Section 17 of P.D. No.
1529. Also telling is the observation made by the Court of Appeals that there
was no objection raised by the oppositor or by the LRA to the admission of the
blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D despite the fact that they were well-
11
informed of the present proceedings, to wit:
In the instant case, the plaintiffs-appellants do not deny that only the blueprint
copy of the plan of the subject lands (Exh. "J") and not the original tracing cloth
plan thereof was submitted to the court a quo since they had previously
submitted the original tracing cloth plan to the Land Registration Authority.
However, despite the failure of the plaintiffs-appellants to present the original
tracing cloth plan, neither the Land Registration Authority nor the oppositor-
appellee question[ed] this deficiency. Likewise, when the blueprint copy of the
plan (Exh. "J") was offered in evidence, the oppositor-apellee did not raise any
objection thereto. Such silence on the part of the Land Registration [Authority]
and the oppositor-appellee can be deemed as an implied admission that the
original tracing cloth plan and the blueprint copy thereof (Exh. "J") are one and
the same, free from all defects and clearly identify the lands sought to be
registered. In this regard x x x, the blueprint copy of the plan (Exh. "J"),
together with its technical descriptions (Exhs. "K" and "L"), is deemed
tantamount to substantial compliance with the requirements of law.40
We now proceed to the issue of possession. Petitioner theorizes that not only
were respondents unable to identify the lots applied for registration; it also
claims that they have no credible evidence tending to establish that for at least
30 years they and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed
the property openly, continuously, exclusively and notoriously under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.41We do not agree.
In an original registration of title under Section 14(1) 42 P.D. No. 1529, the
applicant for registration must be able to establish by evidence that he and his
predecessor-in-interest have exercised acts of dominion over the lot under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.43 He must prove
that for at least 30 years, he and his predecessor have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land.
Republic v. Alconaba44 well explains possession and occupation of this
character, thus:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make
one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds
the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact
that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere
fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts
of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise
over his own property.45
LTD
Proceeding from this fundamental principle, we find that indeed respondents
have been in possession and occupation of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 under a bona fide
claim of ownership for the duration required by law. This conclusion is primarily
factual.
From the records, it is clear that respondents’ possession through their
predecessor-in-interest dates back to as early as 1937. In that year, the
subject property had already been declared for taxation by Zenaida’s father,
Sergio, jointly with a certain Toribia Miranda (Toribia). 46 Yet, it also can be
safely inferred that Sergio and Toribia had declared the land for taxation even
earlier because the 1937 tax declaration shows that it offsets a previous tax
number.47 The property was again declared in 1979,48 198549 and 199450 by
Sergio, Toribia and by Romualdo.
Certainly, respondents could have produced more proof of this kind had it not
been for the fact that, as certified by the Office of the Rizal Provincial Assessor,
the relevant portions of the tax records on file with it had been burned when
the assessor’s office was razed by fire in 1997. 51 Of equal relevance is the fact
that with these tax assessments, there came next tax payments. Respondents’
receipts for tax expenditures on Lot Nos. 4 and 5 between 1977 and 2001 are
likewise fleshed out in the records and in these documents, Sergio, Toribia and
Romualdo are the named owners of the property with Zenaida being identified
as the one who delivered the payment in the 1994 receipts.52
The foregoing evidentiary matters and muniments clearly show that Zenaida’s
testimony in this respect is no less believable. And the unbroken chain of
positive acts exercised by respondents’ predecessors, as demonstrated by
these pieces of evidence, yields no other conclusion than that as early as
1937, they had already demonstrated an unmistakable claim to the property.
Not only do they show that they had excluded all others in their claim but also,
that such claim is in all good faith.
Land registration proceedings are governed by the rule that while tax
declarations and realty tax payment are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are a good indication of possession in the concept of owner.
These documents constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not
only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property. It also
announces his adverse claim against the state and all other parties who may
be in conflict with his interest. More importantly, it signifies an unfeigned
intention to contribute to government revenues—an act that strengthens one’s
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.53
12
Indeed, that respondents herein have been in possession of the land in the
concept of owner—open, continuous, peaceful and without interference and
opposition from the government or from any private individual—itself makes
their right thereto unquestionably settled and, hence, deserving of protection
under the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 30, 2006 Decision and the
November 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No.
80500, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
had it not been for the fact that, the relevant portions of the tax records on file
with the Provincial Assessor had been burned when its office was razed by fire
in 1997. With the tax assessments therecame next tax payments.
Respondents’ receipts for tax expenditures were likewise in therecords and in
these documents the predecessors of respondents were the named owners of
the property. Tax declarations and realty tax payment are not conclusive
evidence ofownership, nevertheless, they are a good indication of possession
in the concept of an owner. No one in his right mind would be paying taxes for
a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. Indeed,
respondents herein have been in possession of the land in the concept of an
owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without interference and opposition
from the government or from any private individual. Itself makes their right
thereto unquestionably settled and hence, deserving of protection under the
law.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Zenaida Guinto-Aldana

G.R. No. 175578, August 11, 2010

FACTS:

Respondents filed an application for registration of title over 2 pieces of land,

professing themselves to be co-owners of these lots having acquired them by
succession from their predecessors. That until the time of the application, they
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful,
adverse, exclusive and continuous possession of these lots in the concept of
an owner and that they had consistently declared the property in their name for
purposes of real estate taxation. In support of their application, respondents
submitted to the court the pertinent tax declarations, together with the receipts
of payment thereof. Petitioner opposed the application for the reason that the
tax declaration submitted to the court did not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition in good faith or of prior possession
in the concept of an owner.

ISSUE:

WON respondents have occupied and possessed the property openly,

continuously, exclusively and notoriously under a bona fide claim of ownership.

HELD:

Respondents’ possession through their predecessors-in-interest dates back to

as early as 1937 when the property had already been declared for taxation by
respondent’s father. Respondents could have produced more proof of this kind
LTD 13

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 76371 January 20, 2000
MARIANO TURQUESA, ABRAHAM LALUGAN and LAYAO, MANUEL
MAGALA substituted by his Heirs, OTILIO DAMASEN and SEGUNDINA
DAMASEN, ANTONIO ESCALANTE, METODIO TULLAS, FLORA
LABUGUEN and JUANA LABUGUEN, LOURDES SINDON BAYUBAY,
MANUEL MEDRANO and JOSE MEDRANO, petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO VALERA and the HONORABLE COURT of APPEALS,
respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
More than half a century ago,1 private respondent applied for the registration of
two parcels of land located in Barrio Pulot, Laguyan, Abra described in Plan
PSU-119561 with a total land area of 232,908 square meters. The first lot
(hereinafter referred to as Lot 1) has an area of 210,767 square meters
whereas the other lot (Lot 2) has an area of 22,141 square meters. In support
of her application, private respondent presented documents showing that when
she was still single, she bought Lot 1 during the years 1929-1932 from Cristeta
Trangued and the heirs of Juan Valera Rufino who were allegedly in
possession thereof since the Spanish regime in the concept of owners and
who declared it in their name for taxation purposes. From 1929, she continued
possession of said land in the concept of owner and continued to pay the tax
thereon in her name. Notices of the application for registration were published
in the Official Gazette, with copies thereof sent to persons mentioned therein
and posted in the proper places.
The Director of Lands together with petitioners and other persons2 opposed
the application of private respondent. These oppositors were excluded from
the order of general default issued by the lower court on June 16, 1950. 3 In the
course of the hearing, the oppositors (except the Director of Lands) aver that
their lands were included in Lot 1 which private respondent sought to register
in her name. In support thereof, they contend that the land embraced by Lot 1
at the time it was bought by private respondent is not the same land covered in
her application for registration. To avoid confusion, oppositors moved for an
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ocular inspection in order to determine the correct boundary limits of the lands
they respectively claim, however, the same was not allowed by the court a
quo. For his part, the Director of Lands' opposition was denied for failure to
substantiate his claim that the subject lands were part of the public domain.
The opposition of the oppositors other than the herein petitioners were likewise
denied for various reasons including failure to present their evidence.
After trial, in a decision dated April 23, 1956, the lower court disposed of the
application for registration as follows:
In view of all the foregoing, the applicant Rosario Valera married to Juan
Valera, a resident of Bangued, Abra, has proven that she has a registerable
title to Lot 1, Psu-119561, with an area of 210,767 square meters as her
exclusive property, subject to the encumbrance in favor of the Philippine
National Bank in the sum of P1,000.00; and to Lot 2 in the same plan, with an
area of 22,141 square meters, without liens or encumbrances, as conjugal
partnership property with her husband, Juan Valera.
After this decision has become final, let the corresponding decree be entered
and the corresponding title issue in accordance with law.4
Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar only as Lot 1 is
concerned, arguing, among others, that the trial court erred in not granting
their motion for new trial and their demand for ocular inspection. On March 15,
1966, the Court of Appeals set aside the appealed decision and remanded the
case to the lower court for further proceedings, and ordered the conduct of an
ocular inspection. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside. This
case shall be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings which shall
include an ocular inspection of the land applied with a view to determine its
identity, location and boundary limits whether the latter have been included in
Lot 1 of the applicant's plan to warrant their exclusion from the plan, or their
registration in the names of the oppositors who have presented evidence in
support of their claim. Thereafter judgment shall be accordingly rendered.5
In accordance with the CA directive, three commissioners were appointed by
the trial court to conduct the ocular inspection. The commissioners found:
That the property sought to be registered under survey plan Psu-119561 was
relocated and the extent and bounds of the portions claimed by the oppositors
were pointed to by them personally or by their supposed representative, the
results of which are clearly shown in the accompanying sketch plan marked as
Annex "A" of their report by the corresponding names, area and dimensions.
14
That the survey of the claims was continued the following day, January 29,
1967.
OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS
1. The claims of Manuel Magala, Abraham Lalugan, and Layao, Juan Medrano
and Eugenio Medrano as shown now in the sketch plan Annex "A" are not
shown in the original survey plan Psu-119561;
2. That claims of Otilio Damasen, Nicolas Bigornia, Ricardo Bersamira,
Bonifacio Brangan, Cristeta Medrano, Matias Turdil, Mariano Turqueza, Flora
Labuguen, Cornelio Bayubay, Ponce Talape, and Metodio Tullar, appeared in
the original survey plan Psu-119561 and likewise in sketch plan Annex "A"
although three of these claims bear different identifying names in the sketch
Annex "A";
3. That out of the original area of 210,767 square meters in original survey plan
Psu-119561, the remaining portion not subject of opposition as appearing in
sketch plan Annex "A" is 69,683 square meters;
4. That the "Calle para Collago" which according to the decision of the Court of
Appeals and is stoutly maintained until the present by the oppositors to be the
extent or boundary of the property of the applicant on the South side is existing
and still is the boundary on the South and on the Southeast side, as shown in
the Sketch Plan, Exh. "A";
That the property of Francisco Santua abound also the applicant's property
sought to be registered on the South sides, at present as was the case during
the original survey.6
The oppositors filed an opposition to the commissioner's report, whereupon a
second ocular inspection was ordered by the trial court. After the second
inspection, the trial court, on August 28, 1967 again rendered judgment
reiterating its original decision ordering the registration of the aforesaid Lot 1 of
PSU 119561 with an area of 210,7677 square meters in the name of private
respondent. The judge made the following observations based on the ocular
inspection:
The Commissioners and the Presiding Judge, upon their ocular inspection,
found out a visible boundary on the South-east side of Lot 1 known as "Calle
para Collago" which is represented in the relocation plan Exh. HH running from
the intersection to Lagayan between points 22 and 21 down to point 18. This,
in the opinion of the Court, is the extension of the "Calle para Collago" referred
to by the applicant Rosario Valera as boundary exactly on the South but which
LTD
was converted into ricefields by Francisco Santua. This circumstance now
could explain the presence of Francisco Santua as boundary owner on the
South which the parties stoutly maintained in the former proceedings that the
"Calle para Collago" was on the South but which oppositors now repudiate
claiming that the "Calle para Collago" is on the East. Taking a good view over
Lot 1, it could safely be concluded that the existing "Calle para Collago" is
more to the South than to the East.
With respect to the claim of the Damasens over Lot A mentioned in Exh. D
which the Court inadvertently failed to pass upon, the Court has found that it is
within the property of the applicant.8
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court reiterates its former decision ordering the
registration of Lot 1 of Plan Psu-119561, Exh. D, with an area of 210,767
square meters in the name of applicant ROSARIO VALERA of Bangued, Abra,
and a conjugal property with her husband Juan Valera of the same
municipality. The encumbrance with the Philippine National Bank in the amount
of P1,000.00 having already been settled (Exh. JJ-1) same shall no longer be
annotated on the title henceforth to be issued.
Upon this decision becoming final, let the corresponding decree issue.
The applicant Rosario Valera is hereby directed to pay within seventy two
hours from notice hereof the sum of P182.00 as fees for the commissioner
Santiago Alejandre who made the relocation survey.9
The case was again appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 40796-R) by
the oppositors, some of whom are now the petitioners in this case. 10 They
argue that the lower court erred in not excluding the areas they claimed as
their own which were wrongfully included in Lot 1 but was ordered registered in
private respondent's name. Disposing of the appeal, the CA ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, with the modification that the
registration of Lot 1 of appellees (private respondent herein) should be
confined to the extent only as indicated in the sketch annexed to the
Commissioner's report, Exhibit HH, and excluding therefrom the landholding of
the oppositors, as indicated in the same sketch, the judgment of the trial court
is hereby AFFIRMED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED. 11
The decision became final and executory for which a corresponding entry of
15
judgment was issued by the Court of Appeals. 12 Later, private respondent filed
with the trial court a motion for the issuance of writ of possession over two lots
respectively tenanted by Trium Donato and Rudy Donato which were likewise
respectively claimed by Santiago Partolan (not an oppositor in the land
registration case) and Crispin Baltar (one of the oppositors). 13 In an Order
issued on September 14, 1981, the court a quo denied the motion. 14 When her
subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied in another Order dated
November 25, 1981, 15 private respondent appealed to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC) which reversed the said two orders and forthwith issued
a decision with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES, CONSIDERED, the ORDERS appealed from are
hereby REVERSED and judgment is hereby entered ordering:
1. The issuance of a WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of applicant-appellant
covering the landholding claimed by oppositor Crispin Baltar and tenanted by
Rudy Donato;
2. Confirming the word "Landholding" in the dispositive portion of the decision
in CA-G.R. No. 40796-R as singular and referring only to the landholding
opposed by oppositors Segundina and Otilio Damasen as the only landholding
excluded from lot 1; and
3. Ordering the issuance of the WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of the
applicant-appellant covering the landholdings opposed by the other oppositors
who did not appeal the decision of the lower court dated August 28, 1967.
Without any special pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED. 16
Oppositors filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the
Court of Appeals. 17 Hence this petition for review initiated by some of the
oppositors in the trial court. The petition was initially denied by the Court. On
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, the case was reinstated and
respondent was required to submit her comment to the petition. 18
After a painstaking review of the vintage records of this case and after
deciphering the ambiguous discussions in the petition, 19 the assailed ruling of
the respondent court cannot be sustained. The burden of proof in land
registration cases is incumbent on the applicant 20 who must show that he is
the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. 21 On him also
rests the burden to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain 22 considering that the inclusion in a
LTD
of the public domain nullifies the title. 23 Undoubtedly, a land registration
proceeding is one which is in rem in character, so that the default order issued
by the court binds the whole world and all persons whether known or unknown,
24
except those who have appeared and filed their pleadings in the registration
case. 25 In the case at bar, those exempted from the order of general default
are the petitioners and the other oppositors mentioned in footnote number 2.
There is no dispute that the lands occupied and claimed by oppositors-
petitioners Segundina and Otilio Damasen were already finally adjudged
excluded from Lot 1 and cannot be registered in private respondent's name. In
other words, the Damasens were declared to have a rightful and registrable
right over their claims of specific portions of Lot 1. What private respondent
wants is that she be installed in possession of the area claimed by Santiago
Partolan and Crispin Baltar. Of these two, only Baltar entered his opposition to
private respondent's application for land registration. Being a proceeding in
rem, Partolan is charged with knowledge of the application of private
respondent since the notice was published in accordance with law.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, private respondent is not entitled to a
writ of possession of that portion of Lot 1 occupied by Partolan and Baltar. No
evidence was shown that private respondent had a rightful claim whether
possessory or proprietary with respect to those areas. Even if Partolan was
excluded by the order of general default and Baltar did not appeal from the trial
court's decision of April 23, 1956, the applicant must still prove and establish
that she has registrable rights over the land which must be grounded on
inconvertible evidence and based on positive and absolute proof. The
declaration by the applicant that the land applied for has been in the
possession of her predecessor-in-interest for a certain period, does not
constitute the "well-nigh inconvertible" and "conclusive" evidence required in
land registration. 26 Allegations of her predecessors' ownership of the lot during
the Spanish period is self-serving 27 and the declaration of ownership for
purposes of assessment on the payment of tax is not sufficient evidence to
prove ownership. 28 It should be noted that tax declaration, by itself, is not
considered conclusive evidence of ownership in land registration cases. 29
Private respondent should have substantiated her claim with clear and
convincing evidence specifically showing the nature of her claim. Her
description of the circumstances of her own possession in relation to that of
her predecessors-in-interest are mere conclusions of law which require further
factual support and substantiation. If an applicant does not have any rightful
claim over real property, the Torrens system of registration can confirm or
record nothing. 30
Private respondent, being the applicant for registration of land and one who
relies on some documents enforcing her alleged title thereto, must prove not
only the genuineness of said title but also the identity of the land therein
16
referred to, 31 inasmuch as this is required by law. The dispute in this case substituted by his heirs who are represented by Maria Bayubay and his widow
pertains to the correctness of the survey of specific areas of lands. It must be Lourdes Sindon Bayubay, one of the petitioners; Bonifacio Bringas; Matias
borne in mind what defines a piece of land is not the size or area mentioned in Turdil; and Juan Medrano. See Decision in CA-G.R. No. 69366 of the
its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) — First Civil Cases Division before it was
indicating its limits.32 Considering that the writ of possession was sought by again renamed Court of Appeals (CA) — promulgated March 26, 1984 penned
private respondent against persons who were in "actual possession under by Justice Rosario Quetulio-Losa with Justices Ramon Gaviola, Jr. and
claim of ownership," the latter's possession raises a disputable presumption of Eduardo Caguioa, concurring, p. 2; Rollo, p. 22; CA Rollo, p. 23;
ownership. 33This unrebutted resumption militates against the claim of private
respondent, especially considering the evidentiary rule under Article 434 of the
Civil Code that a claimant of a parcel of land, such as private respondent, must
rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's
claim. 34

Private respondent's contention that the dispositive portion of the CA decision

on April 30, 1979 in CA GR 40796-R which mentioned only "landholding" and
not "landholdings", thus referring only to that area claimed by the Damasen
spouses, is too trivial. A reading of the said decision and the foregoing
discussion clearly indicates that the land to be registered in private
respondent's name is limited to a certain area stated in the sketch annexed to
the Commissioner's report. It categorically excluded those portions pertaining
to the oppositors. Since private respondent failed to show that she has a
proprietary right over the excluded areas, such as the portions occupied by
those against whom the writ of possession was sought for, then the trial court
was correct in refusing to grant the writ as the same has no basis.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the two orders of the trial court dated
September 14, 1981 and November 25, 1981 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., took no part (Had some participation in court below).

Footnotes
**
Some of the petitioners are already dead.
1
April 18, 1949.
2
The other oppositors aside from petitioners were: Nicolas Bergonia; the heirs
of Ricardo Bersamira; Perico Talape whose rights were transferred to oppositor
Mateo Valera; Galingan; Manuel Magala later substituted by his heir
represented by Louisa Magala Bayle; Agaton Pajo; Cornelio Bayubay

LTD 17

Mariano Turquesa vs. Rosario Valera & Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 76371,
January 20, 2000 (379 Phil. 618)
"What defines a piece of land is not the size/area mentioned in its
descriptions but the boundaries laid down as enclosing the land and
indicating its limits. "
Facts:
Respondent applied for registration of 2 parcels of land referred to as Lot 1
and Lot 2. She alleged to have bought Lot 1 and declared it in her name for
taxation purposes. Notice for the application for registration was published in
the Official Gazette. Oppositors were the Director of Bureau of Lands and
herein petitioners. The opposition of Bureau of Lands was denied for failure to
substantiate his claim that the land is part of the public domain. Other
petitioners claim that their lands were included in Lot 1 sought to be registered
by the respondent. The lower court decided in favor of the respondent and
denied petitioner’s motion for ocular inspection of the land in dispute.
Oppositorsappealed to CA regarding Lot 1. CA remanded the case to the lower
court for ocular inspection. 3 Commissioners were appointed for the ocular
inspection but their findings were opposed and a second ocular inspection was
ordered. The trial court reiterated its former judgment to register the whole are
of Lot 1 to the respondent with its encumbrance to PNB in the amount of
P1,000 removed as it was already paid and thus no longer annotated on the
title. The oppositors appealed with the argument that their properties were
erroneously included in the respondent’s land registration. CA modified the
land registration on lot 1 excluding the landholdings of the oppositors.
Respondent filed a suit for a writ of possession over 2 lots occupied by
Santiago Partolan and Crispin Baltar which the court denied. Upon appeal, the
CA reversed the court decision and granted the motion for writ of possession
on the landholdings of Partolan, Baltar and oppositors who did not appeal the
decision of the lower court while excluding the landholdings of Segundina and
Damasen who proved they have rightful and registrable rights over their claim
on a specific portion of land. Thus, the oppositors filed a motion for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled for land registration of the entire area
LTD
of Lot 1 including those owned by the oppositors?
Ruling:
The court held that the burden of proof in land registration is encumbered upon
the applicant who must show he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of
the land applied for. Because the land registration proceeding is an in rem
proceeding, a default order issued by the court binds the whole world except
those appearing in court to file their opposition or pleadings in the registration
case. Thus, the oppositors are exempted from the general default order by the
court. On the respondent’s motion for writ of possession on the lots occupied
by Baltar and Partolan, the court finds no merit in granting their motion.
Respondent did not provide evidence on her rightful claim over these land
areas. Although Partolan was excluded in the general default issued by the
court while Baltar did not appeal on the trial court’s decision, respondent is still
required to prove and establish her registrable rights over the land even in the
absence of opposition. The payment of tax by her predecessor-in-interest is
not sufficient evidence to prove ownership.
Respondent should also prove not only the genuineness of her title but also to
identify the land in dispute with the boundaries comprising it.What defines a
piece of land is not the size/area mentioned in its descriptions but the
boundaries laid down as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. The
writ of possesion sought by the private respondent against persons who are in
actual possession under claim of ownership and their possession of the land
raises a disputable presumption of ownership. Therefore, the land areas to be
registered to the respondent are limited only to certain areas in the sketch that
is annexed to the Commissioner’s report as the respondent failed to establish
proprietary right over the excluded areas.
18

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 160895 October 30, 2006
JOSE R. MARTINEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The central issue presented in this Petition for Review is whether an order of
general default issued by a trial court in a land registration case bars the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, from
interposing an appeal from the trial court’s subsequent decision in favor of the
applicant.
The antecedent facts follow.
On 24 February 1999, petitioner Jose R. Martinez (Martinez) filed a petition for
the registration in his name of three (3) parcels of land included in the Cortes,
Surigao del Sur Cadastre. The lots, individually identified as Lot No. 464-A, Lot
No. 464-B, and Lot No. 370, Cad No. 597, collectively comprised around 3,700
square meters. Martinez alleged that he had purchased lots in 1952 from his
uncle, whose predecessors-in-interest were traceable up to the 1870s. It was
claimed that Martinez had remained in continuous possession of the lots; that
the lots had remained unencumbered; and that they became private property
through prescription pursuant to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Martinez further claimed that he had been constrained to initiate the
proceedings because the Director of the Land Management Services had
failed to do so despite the completion of the cadastral survey of Cortes,
Surigao del Sur.1
The case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-30 and raffled to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao del Sur, Branch 27. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) was furnished a copy of the petition. The trial court set
the case for hearing and directed the publication of the corresponding Notice
LTD
of Hearing in the Official Gazette. On 30 September 1999, the OSG, in behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines, opposed the petition on the grounds that
appellee’s possession was not in accordance with Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141; that his muniments of title were insufficient to
prove bona-fide acquisition and possession of the subject parcels; and that the
properties formed part of the public domain and thus not susceptible to private
appropriation.2
Despite the opposition filed by the OSG, the RTC issued an order of general
default, even against the Republic of the Philippines, on 29 March 2000. This
ensued when during the hearing of even date, no party appeared before the
Court to oppose Martinez’s petition.3
Afterwards, the trial court proceeded to receive Martinez’s oral and
documentary evidence in support of his petition. On 1 August 2000, the RTC
rendered a Decision4 concluding that Martinez and his predecessors-in-interest
had been for over 100 years in possession characterized as continuous, open,
public, and in the concept of an owner. The RTC thus decreed the registration
of the three (3) lots in the name of Martinez.
From this Decision, the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal dated 28 August 2000,5
which was approved by the RTC. However, after the records had been
transmitted to the Court of Appeals, the RTC received a letter dated 21
February 20016 from the Land Registration Authority (LRA) stating that only Lot
Nos. 464-A and 464-B were referred to in the Notice of Hearing published in
the Official Gazette; and that Lot No. 370, Cad No. 597 had been deliberately
omitted due to the lack of an approved survey plan for that property.
Accordingly, the LRA manifested that this lot should not have been adjudicated
to Martinez for lack of jurisdiction. This letter was referred by the RTC to the
Court of Appeals for appropriate action.7
On 10 October 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision,8
reversing the RTC and instead ordering the dismissal of the petition for
registration. In light of the opposition filed by the OSG, the appellate court
found the evidence presented by Martinez as insufficient to support the
registration of the subject lots. The Court of Appeals concluded that the oral
evidence presented by Martinez merely consisted of general declarations of
ownership, without alluding to specific acts of ownership performed by him or
his predecessors-in-interest. It likewise debunked the documentary evidence
presented by Martinez, adjudging the same as either inadmissible or
ineffective to establish proof of ownership.
No motion for reconsideration appears to have been filed with the Court of
Appeals by Martinez, who instead directly assailed its Decision before this
Court through the present petition.
19
We cannot help but observe that the petition, eight (8) pages in all, was
apparently prepared with all deliberate effort to attain nothing more but the
perfunctory. The arguments raised center almost exclusively on the claim that
the OSG no longer had personality to oppose the petition, or appeal its
allowance by the RTC, following the order of general default. Starkly put, "the
[OSG] has no personality to raise any issue at all under the circumstances
pointed out hereinabove."9 Otherwise, it is content in alleging that "[Martinez]
presented sufficient and persuasive proof to substantiate the fact that his title
to Lot Nos. 464-A and 464-B is worth the confirmation he seeks to be done in
this registration case";10 and that the RTC had since issued a new Order dated
1 September 2003, confirming Martinez’s title over Lot No. 370.
In its Comment dated 24 May 2004,11 the OSG raises several substantial
points, including the fact that it had duly opposed Martinez’s application for
registration before the RTC; that jurisprudence and the Rules of Court
acknowledge that a party in default is not precluded from appealing the
unfavorable judgment; that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Lot No. 370 since
its technical description was not published in the Official Gazette; and that as
found by the Court of Appeals the evidence presented by Martinez is
insufficient for registering the lots in his name.12 Despite an order from the
Court requiring him to file a Reply to the Comment, counsel for Martinez
declined to do so, explaining, among others, that "he felt he would only be
taxing the collective patience of this [Court] if he merely repeats x x x what
petitioner had succinctly stated x x x on pages four (4) to seven (7) of his said
petition." Counsel for petitioner was accordingly fined by the Court.13
The Court’s patience is taxed less by redundant pleadings than by
insubstantial arguments. The inability of Martinez to offer an effective rebuttal
to the arguments of the OSG further debilitates what is an already weak
petition.
The central question, as posed by Martinez, is whether the OSG could have
still appealed the RTC decision after it had been declared in default. The OSG
argues that a party in default is not precluded from filing an appeal, citing
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals,14 and asserts that "[t]he
Rules of Court expressly provides that a party who has been declared in
default may appeal from the judgment rendered against him."15
There is error in that latter, unequivocal averment, though one which does not
deter from the ultimate correctness of the general postulate that a party
declared in default is allowed to pose an appeal. Elaboration is in order.
We note at the onset that the OSG does not impute before this Court that the
RTC acted improperly in declaring public respondent in default, even though
an opposition had been filed to Martinez’s petition. Under Section 26 of
LTD
Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended, the order of default may be issued
"[i]f no person appears and answers within the time allowed." The RTC
appears to have issued the order of general default simply on the premise that
no oppositor appeared before it on the hearing of 29 March 2000. But it cannot
be denied that the OSG had already duly filed its Opposition to Martinez’s
petition long before the said hearing. As we held inDirector of Lands v.
Santiago:16
[The] opposition or answer, which is based on substantial grounds, having
been formally filed, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking
cognizance of such registration case to declare the oppositor in default simply
because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial healing. The pertinent
provision of law which states: "If no person appears and answers within the
time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to
the contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded . . . ," cannot be
interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer before it,
which has long been filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing less
than illogical, unwarranted, and unjust. Had the law intended that failure of the
oppositor to appear on the date of the initial hearing would be a ground for
default despite his having filed an answer, it would have been so stated in
unmistakable terms, considering the serious consequences of an order of
default. Especially in this case where the greater public interest is involved as
the land sought to be registered is alleged to be public land, the respondent
Judge should have received the applicant's evidence and set another date for
the reception of the oppositor's evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and
petitioner herein should have been accorded ample opportunity to establish
the government's claim.17
Strangely, the OSG did not challenge the propriety of the default order,
whether in its appeal before the Court of Appeals or in its petition before this
Court. It would thus be improper for the Court to make a pronouncement on
the validity of the default order since the same has not been put into issue.
Nonetheless, we can, with comfort, proceed from same apparent premise of
the OSG that the default order was proper or regular.
The juridical utility of a declaration of default cannot be disputed. By forgoing
the need for adversarial proceedings, it affords the opportunity for the speedy
resolution of cases even as it penalizes parties who fail to give regard or
obedience to the judicial processes.
The extent to which a party in default loses standing in court has been the
subject of considerable jurisprudential debate. Way back in 1920, in Velez v.
Ramas,18 we declared that the defaulting defendant "loses his standing in
court, he not being entitled to the service of notices in the case, nor to appear
in the suit in any way. He cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at the
20
final hearing."19 These restrictions were controversially expanded inLim Toco v.
Go Fay,20 decided in 1948, where a divided Court pronounced that a defendant
in default had no right to appeal the judgment rendered by the trial court,
except where a motion to set aside the order of default had been filed. This,
despite the point raised by Justice Perfecto in dissent that there was no
provision in the then Rules of Court or any law "depriving a defaulted
defendant of the right to be heard on appeal."21
The enactment of the 1964 Rules of Court incontestably countermanded the
Lim Toco ruling. Section 2, Rule 41 therein expressly stated that "[a] party who
has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment rendered
against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for
relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in
accordance with Rule 38."22 By clearly specifying that the right to appeal was
available even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default had been
filed, the then fresh Rules clearly rendered the Lim Toco ruling as moot.
Another provision in the 1964 Rules concerning the effect of an order of default
acknowledged that "a party declared in default shall not be entitled to notice of
subsequent proceedings, nor to take part in the trial."23Though it might be
argued that appellate proceedings fall part of "the trial" since there is no final
termination of the case as of then, the clear intent of the 1964 Rules was to
nonetheless allow the defaulted defendant to file an appeal from the trial court
decision. Indeed, jurisprudence applying the 1964 Rules was unhesitant to
affirm a defaulted defendant’s right to appeal, as guaranteed under Section 2
of Rule 41, even as Lim Toco was not explicitly abandoned.
In the 1965 case of Antonio, et al. v. Jacinto,24 the Court acknowledged that the
prior necessity of a ruling setting aside the order of default "however, was
changed by the Revised Rules of Court. Under Rule 41, section 2, paragraph
3, a party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the
judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even
if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by
him in accordance with Rule 38."25 It was further qualified in Matute v. Court of
Appeals26 that the new availability of a defaulted defendant’s right to appeal did
not preclude "a defendant who has been illegally declared in default from
pursuing a more speedy and efficacious remedy, like a petition for certiorari to
have the judgment by default set aside as a nullity."27
In Tanhu v. Ramolete,28 the Court cited with approval the commentaries of
Chief Justice Moran, expressing the reformulated doctrine that following Lim
Toco, a defaulted defendant "cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at
the final hearing, although [under Section 2, Rule 41,] he may appeal the
judgment rendered against him on the merits."29
LTD
Thus, for around thirty-odd years, there was no cause to doubt that a defaulted
defendant had the right to appeal the adverse decision of the trial court even
without seeking to set aside the order of default. Then, in 1997, the Rules of
Civil Procedure were amended, providing for a new Section 2, Rule 41. The
new provision reads:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal.—An appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief
from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession
or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground
vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against or one or more of several parties or
in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints,
while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom;
and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable,
the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Evidently, the prior warrant that a defaulted defendant had the right to appeal
was removed from Section 2, Rule 41. On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 9
of the 1997 Rules incorporated the particular effects on the parties of an order
of default:
Sec. 3. Default; declaration of.—If the defending party fails to answer within
the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party
21
with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the
defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render
judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless
the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such
reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.
(a) Effect of order of default.—A party in default shall be entitled to notice of
subsequent proceedings but shall not take part in the trial.
(b) Relief from order of default.—A party declared in default may any time after
notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the
order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious
defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms
and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
(c) Effect of partial default.—When a pleading asserting a claim states a
common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom
answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon
the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded.—A judgment rendered against a party in
default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for
nor award unliquidated damages.
xxx
It cannot be escaped that the old provision expressly guaranteeing the right of
a defendant declared in default to appeal the adverse decision was not
replicated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Should this be taken as a sign
that under the 1997 Rules a defaulted defendant no longer has the right to
appeal the trial court decision, or that the Lim Toco doctrine has been
reinstated?
If post-1997 jurisprudence and the published commentaries to the 1997 Rules
were taken as an indication, the answer should be in the negative. The right of
a defaulted defendant to appeal remains extant.
By 1997, the doctrinal rule concerning the remedies of a party declared in
default had evolved into a fairly comprehensive restatement as offered in Lina
v. Court of Appeals:30
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before
judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the
LTD
ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec 3, Rule 18)
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered
the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a
motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final
and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to
the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default
has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)31
The fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the
1964 Rules. Yet even after that provision’s deletion under the 1997 Rules, the
Court did not hesitate to expressly rely again on the Lina doctrine, including
the pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may appeal from the judgment
rendered against him. This can be seen in the cases of Indiana Aerospace
University v. Commission on Higher Education,32 Tan v. Dumarpa,33 and
Crisologo v. Globe Telecom, Inc.34
Annotated textbooks on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure similarly
acknowledge that even under the new rules, a defaulted defendant retains the
right to appeal as previously confirmed under the old Section 2, Rule 41. In his
textbook on Civil Procedure, Justice Francisco answers the question "What are
the remedies available to a defending party in default?" with a reiteration of the
Lina doctrine, including the remedy that a defaulted defendant "may also
appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or
to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been
presented by him."35 Justice Regalado also restates the Linarule in his
textbook on Civil Procedure, opining that the remedies enumerated therein,
even if under the former Rules of Procedure, "would hold true under the
present amended Rules."36 Former Court of Appeals Justice Herrerra likewise
reiterates the Lina doctrine, though with the caveat that an appeal from an
order denying a petition for relief from judgment was no longer appealable
under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules.37 Herrera further adds:
Section 2, paragraph [2] of the former Rule 41, which allows an appeal from a
denial of a petition for relief, was deleted from the present Rule, and confined
appeals to cases from a final judgment or final order that completely disposes
of the case, or of a particular matter therein, when declared by these rules to
be appealable. A judgment by default may be considered as one that
completely disposes of the case.38
22
We are hard-pressed to find a published view that the enactment of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure accordingly withdrew the right, previously granted
under the 1964 Rules, of a defaulted defendant to appeal the judgment by
default against him. Neither is there any provision under the 1997 Rules which
expressly denies the defaulted defendant such a right. If it is perplexing why
the 1997 Rules deleted the previous authorization under the old Section 2,
Rule 41 (on subject of appeal), it is perhaps worth noting that its counterpart
provision in the 1997 Rules, now Section 1, Rule 41, is different in orientation
even as it also covers "subject of appeal." Unlike in the old provision, the bulk
of the new provision is devoted to enumerating the various rulings from which
no appeal may be taken, and nowhere therein is a judgment by default
included. A declaration therein that a defaulted defendant may still appeal the
judgment by default would have seemed out of place.
Yet even if it were to assume the doubtful proposition that this contested right
of appeal finds no anchor in the 1997 Rules, the doctrine still exists, applying
the principle of stare decisis. Jurisprudence applying the 1997 Rules has
continued to acknowledge the Lina doctrine which embodies this right to
appeal as among the remedies of a defendant, and no argument in this petition
persuades the Court to rule otherwise.
In Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina v. Land Bank of the Philippines,39 the Court,
through Justice Callejo, Sr., again provided a comprehensive restatement of
the remedies of the defending party declared in default, which we adopt for
purposes of this decision:
It bears stressing that a defending party declared in default loses his standing
in court and his right to adduce evidence and to present his defense. He,
however, has the right to appeal from the judgment by default and assail said
judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the amount of the judgment is
excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to
prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary
to law. Such party declared in default is proscribed from seeking a modification
or reversal of the assailed decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by
him in the Court of Appeals, for if it were otherwise, he would thereby be
allowed to regain his right to adduce evidence, a right which he lost in the trial
court when he was declared in default, and which he failed to have vacated. In
this case, the petitioner sought the modification of the decision of the trial court
based on the evidence submitted by it only in the Court of Appeals.40
If it cannot be made any clearer, we hold that a defendant party declared in
default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default on the ground
that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the complaint, or that
the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion
to set aside the order of default. We reaffirm that the Lim Toco doctrine,
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denying such right to appeal unless the order of default has been set aside,
was no longer controlling in this jurisdiction upon the effectivity of the 1964
Rules of Court, and up to this day.
Turning to the other issues, we affirm the conclusion of the Court of Appeals
that Martinez failed to adduce the evidence needed to secure the registration
of the subject lots in his name.
It should be noted that the OSG, in appealing the case to the Court of Appeals,
did not introduce any new evidence, but simply pointed to the insufficiency of
the evidence presented by Martinez before the trial court. The Court of Appeals
was careful to point out that the case against Martinez was established not by
the OSG’s evidence, but by petitioner’s own insufficient evidence. We adopt
with approval the following findings arrived at by the Court of Appeals, thus:
The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant
who must show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land
applied for. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing
evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors by
any of the means provided for the proper acquisition of public lands, the rule is
settled that the property must be held to be a part of the public domain. The
applicant must, therefore, present competent and persuasive proof to
substantiate his claim. He may not rely on general statements, or mere
conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title.
Considered in the light of the opposition filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, we find the evidence adduced by appellee, on the whole, insufficient
to support the registration of the subject parcels in his name. To prove the
provenance of the land, for one, all that appellee proffered by way of oral
evidence is the following cursory testimony during his direct examination, viz:
xxxx
Q You mentioned that you are the owner of these three (3) parcels of land.
How did you begin the ownership of the same?
A I bought it from my uncles Julian Martinez and Juan Martinez.
xxxx
Q x x x x Who took possession of these parcels of land from then on?
A I took possession, sir
23
Q As owner? would naturally exercise over his own property. It is not enough for an
applicant to declare himself or his predecessors-in-interest the
A Yes, as owner. possessors and owners of the land for which registration is sought. He
must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and
Q Up to the present who is in possession as owner of these parcels of land? cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law
requiring evidentiary support and substantiation.
A I took possession.
The record shows that appellee did not fare any better with the documentary
Q Before Julian Martinez and Juan Martinez sold these parcels of land before evidence he adduced before the trial court. The October 20, 1952 Deed of
you took possession who were the owners and in possession of these? Sale by which appellee claims to have purchased the subject parcels
from his uncle, Julian Martinez, was not translated from the vernacular in
A Hilarion Martinez, the father of my predecessors-in-interest and also my which it was executed and, by said token, was inadmissible in evidence.
grandfather. Having submitted a white print copy of the survey plan for Lot Nos. 464-A
and 464-B, appellee also submitted the tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 370
xxxx which does not, however, appear to be approved by the Director of
Lands. In much the same manner that the submission of the original tracing
Court: cloth plan is a mandatory statutory requirement which cannot be waived, the
rule is settled that a survey plan not approved by the Director of Lands is not
Q Of your own knowledge[,] where [sic] did your grandfather Hilarion Martinez admissible in evidence.41
acquire these lands?
These findings of the Court of Appeals, arrived at after a sufficiently extensive
A According to my grandfather he bought that land from a certain Juan Casano evaluation of the evidence, stand in contrast to that contained in the RTC
in the year 1870’s[,] I think. decision, encapsulated in a one-paragraph précis of the factual allegations of
Martinez concerning how he acquired possession of the subject properties.
xxxx The Court of Appeals, of course, is an appropriate trier of facts, and a
comparison between the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and that of the
Q By the way[,] when did your grandfather Hilarion Martinez die? RTC clearly demonstrates that it was the appellate court which reached a more
thorough and considered evaluation of the evidence.
A Either in 1920 or 1921.
As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the burden of proof expected of the
petitioner in a land registration case has not been matched in this case.
Q Since you said your immediate predecessors-in-interest Julian Martinez and
Juan Martinez inherited the same from your grandfather. Can you say it the
same that your predecessors-in-interest were the owners and possessors of WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
the same since 1921 up to the time they sold the land to you in 1952?
SO ORDERED.
A Yes, sir.
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio Morales, and Velasco, Jr., JJ.,
xxxx concur.

In the dreary tradition of most land registration cases, appellee has

apparently taken the absence of representation for appellant at the
hearing of his petition as license to be perfunctory in the presentation of
his evidence. Actual possession of land, however, consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
LTD 24

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-53768 May 6, 1991
PATRICIA CASILDO CACHERO and the HEIRS OF TOMAS CACHERO
(Alejandria Cachero-Estilong, Lolita Cachero-Teodoro, Severa Cachero-
Simplinam, Bernardo Cachero, and Luzviminda Cachero-
Balinag),applicants-appellees,
vs.
BERNARDINO MARZAN, HILARIO MARZAN, CIPRIANO PULIDO, MAGNO
MARZAN and GUILLERMO HIPOL, oppositors. ADELINA PULIDO
GENOVA, and the HEIRS OF PAULINA NUDO AND FELIX GENOVA
(Cornelio Genova, Herminia Genova, Carmelita Genova, Josefina Genova
and Margarita Genova), petitioners-appellants.
Luis L. Lardizabal for applicants-appellees.
NARVASA, J.:
The Spouses Tomas Cachero and Patricia Casildo brought suit in the Court of
First Instance of La Union against Bernardino Marzan, Julian Marzan and
Cipriano Pulido for recovery of possession and ownership of two (2) adjoining
parcels of land having an aggregate area of some fifteen (15) hectares,
located in Barrio Basca, Aringay, La Union. In that action, docketed as Civil
Case No. 384, judgment was rendered declaring the plaintiff spouses "owners
of the nine hectares piece of land described in the complaint." 1 The judgment
became final and executory.
About seven (7) years later2 the Cachero Spouses, instituted proceedings for
the registration under the Torrens Act of the parcels of land subject of Civil
Case No. 384, supra—identified as Lot No. 6860 of the Cadastral Survey of
Aringay La Union, with an area of 109,480 square meters and another parcel
of land identified as Lot No. 6859 of the same Cadastral Survey, measuring
50,412 square meters, both lots being situated in Sitio Iriw, Basca (now Barrio
San Antonio), Aringay, La Union. In said case, docketed as Land Registration
Case No. N-824, separate oppositions were filed by Atty. Agaton Yaranon, Jr.
LTD
in behalf of five individuals, namely:
1) Bernardino Marzan, claiming 10,000 square meters on the northeastern
portion of lot No. 6860;
2) Cipriano Pulido, claiming 50,412 square meters of Lot No. 6859;
3) Hilario Marzan, claiming 39,480 square meters on the western portion of Lot
No. 6860;
4) Magno Marzan, claiming 30,000 square meters on the southeastern portion
of Lot No. 6860; and
5) Guillermo Hipol, claiming the eastern central portion of the same Lot No.
6860.
Note that two of the five oppositors, the first two above named, were parties in
the aforementioned Civil Case No. 384 which, as already mentioned, was
decided some seven years earlier.
The Registration Court thereafter issued an Order to the effect that "excepting
Bernardino Marzan, Cipriano Pulido, Magno Marzan, Hilario Marzan and the
Bureau of Lands, a special entry of default is declared against the whole
world." 3
Tomas Cachero died before judgment and was substituted by his children. The
registration proceedings culminated in a verdict favorable to the applicant
spouses. The Court found that the applicant spouses and their predecessors-
in-interest had been in continuous and notorious possession of Lots Numbered
6859 and 6860 for more than sixty (60) years in concept of owners, to the
exclusion of others, except for a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6860 which the
Cacheros had sold to Bernardino Marzan; that Tomas Cachero had inherited
said lots from his late father, Simeon Cachero; and that the applicant spouses
had been religiously paying the realty taxes on the parcels of land as owners
thereof. The Court's judgment 4 made the following disposition, to wit:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby grants the application and
orders that the two adjoining lots, namely, Lots No. 6859 and 6860, which are
described in plan (LRC) SWO-7861, Exh. "A" and plan (LRC) SWO-4204, Exh.
"D" respectively, and the technical descriptions, Exhs. "B" and "E,"
respectively, be registered in the name of Patricia Casildo, widow, Alejandria
Cachero, married to Estilong, Lolita Cachero, married to Fidel Teodoro; Severa
Cachero, married to Hilario Simplina; Bernardo Cachero, married to Aniceta
Rumbaoa; and Luzviminda Cachero, married to Abraham Balinag, all Filipinos,
25
of legal age, and residents of Alicia, Isabela, excepting the one hectare portion
of Lot No. 6860 which now belongs to Nicolas Abejona. Once this decision has
become final, let the corresponding decree be issued.
The oppositors' counsel, Atty. Yaranon, filed a motion for reconsideration of the
judgment on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction over the subject-
matter, the lands in question having earlier been subject of cadastral
proceedings in which, as shown by the records, neither the Cacheros nor their
predecessors-in-interest had ever entered a claim for either lot. The Cacheros
opposed the motion. They argued that by the time the motion for
reconsideration was filed, the judgment sought to be reconsidered had already
become final, more than thirty (30) days having elapsed from the time that the
oppositors' counsel was served with notice thereof. 5 The motion was denied. 6
About seven (7) months after the filing of the oppositors' aforesaid motion for
reconsideration, 7 persons not parties to the registration proceedings filed a "
petition for review of judgment and/or decree." They were Paulina Nodo and
the spouses Felix Genova and Adelina Pulido Genova, residents of Alicia,
Isabela. They were represented by the same attorney who represented the
oppositors in the registration case, Atty. Agaton Yaranon, Jr. They alleged that
—they not the Cacheros, or any of the original oppositors (the Marzans,
Pulido, Hipol) represented by their own lawyer, Atty. Yaranon,—were the
owners of the land designated as Lot No. 6859, having purchased the same
sometime in 1929 and having been in continuous possession thereof since
then; that the Cacheros fraudulently omitted to give them notice of their
application for registration; and (echoing the same theory on which the
oppositors' motion for reconsideration was based) that in the earlier cadastral
survey, Lots Numbered 6859 and 6860 had been declared public land for lack
of any original claimant and at the cadastral hearing only the Director of Lands,
the Director of Forestry, and they (Nodo and the Genova Spouses) had filed
"cadastral answers," but not Tomas Cachero or his predecessors-in-interest.
The petition prayed for the re-opening, review and setting aside of the
judgment and for the accord to them of an opportunity to prove their asserted
contentions.
This petition for review was denied. In its order of denial 8 the Registration
Court cited the report of the chief surveyor of the Land Registration
Commission stating that no decree of registration had been issued as regards
lots 6859 and 6860 and no decision had been furnished the Commission. The
Court also ruled that the movants had failed to show fraud on the Cacheros'
part, that "lack of actual notice or knowledge of pendency of the proceeding
does not in itself establish fraud," and that there had been "due publication in
accordance with law, . . . (the) proceedings being an action in rem," apart from
the fact that "said movants are represented by Atty. Yaranon, who also is the
lawyer for the oppositor(s) who presented a written opposition to the
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application."
Paulina Nodo and Felix Genova subsequently died. Felix Genova was
substituted by his heirs, Adelina P. Vda. de Genova, and Cornelio, Juanito,
Magdalena, Herminia, Carmelita, Josefina and Margarita, all surnamed
Genova, Paulina Nodo was substituted by her heir, Adelina P. Vda. de Genova.
These heirs, the Genovas, then submitted through Atty. Yaranon, Jr., and
"amended petition for declaration of nullity of the judgment and/or review of the
decree," reiterating and expatiating on the averments of the "petition for review
of judgment and/or decree" earlier filed by the same Atty. Yaranon, Jr.
The amended petition for declaration of nullity, etc. suffered the same fate as
the original petition. It was denied by the Registration Court, 9 which pointed out
that the petitioners were "total strangers" who had "no personality to contest
the legality of the decision which has become final," that they failed to file any
"timely opposition to the registration proceedings," or to show that they had
"been denied or deprived of their day in Court." The Genovas thereupon
appealed to the Court of Appeals, upon the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE DECISION DATED
NOVEMBER 15, 1972 NULL AND VOID, FOR WANT OR LACK OF
JURISDICTION OVER LOT NOS. 6859 AND 6860 OF THE ARINGAY (LA
UNION) CADASTRAL SURVEY, B.I. CASE NO. 106, CAD. CASE NO. 6,
G.L.R.O. CAD. REC. NO. 249, (1) LOT 6859 HAVING BEEN SURVEYED AS
PUBLIC LAND, AND/OR (2) INASMUCH AS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
THE CADASTRAL ACT (ACT NO. 2259), THE PETITION FOR THE
STATEMENT AND ADJUDICATION OF THE TITLE TO THE SAID LOTS AND
OTHER LOTS INVOLVED IN SAID CADASTRAL SURVEY HAD LONG BEEN
AUTHORIZED DIRECTED, PRESENTED, AND IN FACT TRIAL HAD
COMMENCED, ORDER OF DEFAULT ISSUED AND/OR ADJUDICATION
BEEN MADE, BEFORE THE CADASTRAL COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
LA UNION, LONG BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE LAST PACIFIC WAR
IN 1941, AND/OR THE FAILURE OF THE APPLICANTS TO FILE THEIR
PETITION UNDER PERTINENT REGISTRATION FOR RE-OPENING OF
CADASTRAL PROCEEDING;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE DECISION DATED
NOVEMBER 15, 1972 NULL AND VOID FOR FATAL INFIRMITY THEREOF;
26
 III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE DECREE.
After the parties' briefs were filed and duly considered, the Appellate Court
promulgated a Resolution forwarding the case to this Court; it opined that it
had no appellate jurisdiction over the appeal since only "purely legal
questions" were involved therein.10 In its Resolution, the Appellate Court
declared that the appellants (the Genovas) "are not the oppositors in the
proceedings below but are third persons who came into the case, through a
petition for review of judgment, later amended as a petition for nullity of
judgment, after the decision of the lower Court had become final and
executory;" that the purely legal issues involved are:
1) whether or not "persons declared in default by an entry of special default
because they did not file any answer after publication of the notice of hearing
(may) still file a petition for review of judgment and/or decree on grounds that
the decision is null and void for want of jurisdiction;" and
2) whether or not "a Court of First Instance (may) acquire jurisdiction over
voluntary land registration proceedings covering lots that are already subject to
a pending cadastral proceeding instituted by the Director of Lands;" stated
otherwise—"once a Cadastral Court has acquired jurisdiction over all lots in a
given cadastre—e.g., the Aringay, La Union Cadastre—and all holders
claimants, possessors, and occupants of said lots have been required to show
their interests or rights to the end that titles of all lands in the cadastral area
may be settled and adjudicated" whether or not "that cadastral jurisdiction"
excludes or bars "voluntary land registration proceedings in court or even
administrative concessions such as homesteads, free patents and sale
patents," or, stated in still another manner, whether or not persons who "wish
to assert rights of ownership or to acquire titles to any lots covered by the
cadastral survey are . . . limited to pursuing their causes of action before the
cadastral court" and "other modes of acquiring title (will) have to wait until after
the cadastral proceeding is closed;" and if "this requirement (is) jurisdictional."
The Genova's contention that the earlier cadastral proceedings should be
deemed a bar to the institution by the Cacheros of registration proceedings, if
not indeed to the acquisition of jurisdiction over these later proceedings by the
Court of First Instance, is without merit.
The fact that, as claimed by the Genovas, the Cacheros, by failing to intervene
in the aforementioned cadastral case commenced before the outbreak of the
Pacific War, had been comprehended in the order of general default therein
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entered and forever barred from substantiating any claims to the areas therein
involved, is inconsequential. For it is clear from the record, in fact it is admitted
on all sides, that at least as far as the parcels of land involved in the appeal at
bar are concerned—Lots No. 6859 and No. 6860—the cadastral proceedings
had been abandoned, had not been continued or resumed after the war, and
had never eventuated in any adjudication of any sort.11 Of no little significance
in this connection is that although the Director of Lands had presented an
opposition to the Cacheros' application for registration of their title over Lots
No. 6859 and No. 6860, (a) his opposition contains no reference whatever to
the earlier cadastral proceedings or any challenge, on account thereof, to the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the subject matter of the
Cacheros' application, and (b) no appeal had been taken by him from the
judgment declaring the Cacheros owners of the land in question and decreeing
the issuance of title to them.
Hence, said compulsory cadastral proceedings under Act 2259 (the Cadastral
Act) cannot be invoked and set up as a bar to the registration proceedings
under Act 496 (the Torrens Act) initiated more than twenty years later by the
Cacheros. Indeed, when the latter registration case was begun, the cadastral
proceedings had long been discontinued and abandoned and, to all intents
and purposes, had ceased to exist. In any event, it is undisputed that the
cadastral proceedings had resulted in no judgment or final order affecting the
lands now in question. There having been no final adjudication in the cadastral
proceedings at all, there is no occasion whatever to refer to the familiar
doctrine of res judicata—which this Court applied, for instance, in Republic vs.
Vera (1983), in pronouncing a Court of First Instance to be without jurisdiction
over lands subject of voluntary registration proceedings under Act No. 496 (the
Torrens Act), it appearing that many, many years earlier, the same property
had been declared public land by a decision handed down by the Cadastral
Court in compulsory registration proceedings under Act 2259 (the Cadastral
Act) and which decision had become "final and conclusive." 12 The conclusion
here reached renders unnecessary adjudgment of the other questions posed
by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of April 14, 1980 referring the case at
bar to this Court for the reason that only "purely legal questions" were
involved.
Of no little significance, too, is that the Cacheros and their children had
succeeded in establishing and vindicating their ownership over Lots No. 6859
and No. 6860 in no less than two (2) appropriate judicial proceedings in both of
which the judgments rendered had become final and executory. In Civil Case
No. 384, mentioned in this opinion's opening paragraph, the Spouses Tomas
Cachero and Patricia Casildo were declared by final judgment of the Court of
First Instance of La Union to be the owners of the parcels of land in question in
an action instituted by them against Bernardino Marzan, Julian Marzan and
Cipriano Pulido. And in Land Registration Case No. N-824—where oppositions
27
were submitted by five persons two of whom were parties-defendant in Civil
Case No. 384, and whence the present appeal proceedings emanated
—————Mrs. Cacheros and her children (her late husband's heirs) were
similarly declared owners of the same property. Surely, these judicial
pronouncements should not be set aside except for the gravest and most
compelling causes. No such cause has been presented by the Genovas.
All the Genovas have done, to repeat, is to claim that the compulsory cadastral
proceedings instituted before the Pacific War, involving among others Lots No.
6859 and 6860, constituted an insuperable obstacle to the acquisition by the
Court of First Instance of jurisdiction over the voluntary registration
proceedings involving the same lots, initiated some twenty (20) years later by
the Cacheros—a claim singularly lacking in merit, as already pointed out.
Moreover, the Genovas were and are bound by the order of default issued in
Land Reg. Case No. N-824, a proceeding undoubtedly in rem in character.
That default order was entered "against the whole world," with the exception
only of the parties who had appeared and filed pleadings in the registration
case, namely: Bernardino Marzan, Cipriano Pulido, Magno Marzan, Hilario
Marzan and the Bureau of Lands. The Genovas were charged with knowledge
of the Cacheros' application since notice of the application had been published
in accordance with law. They could and should have taken part in the case to
assert and prove their rights over the property subject thereof The fact that
they did not, cannot operate to exclude them from the binding effects of the in
rem judgment rendered in the proceedings. Their claim that they were
precluded from doing so by fraud perpetrated by the Cacheros has not been
substantiated, and was not found by the Court of Appeals to be a proper issue
in their appeal, since it declared that the only issues were "purely legal" ones.
Besides, that unsubstantiated claim of fraud does not at all explain why they
should not be bound by the published notices of the Cacheros' application,
accomplished in accordance, with law and by direction of the Registration
Court.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the petitioners-appellants — ADELINA PULIDO
GENOVA, and the HEIRS OF PAULINA NUDO AND FELIX GENOVA (Cornelia
Genova, Herminia Genova, Carmelita Genova, Josefina Genova and
Margarita Genova) — is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the judgment of the
Court in Land Registration Case No. N-824 entitled "In Re Application for Land
Registration under Act 496: Tomas Cachero & Patricia Casildo (Spouses),"
rendered on November 15, 1972 is AFFIRMED in toto, without pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
LTD
V. HEARING, JUDGMENT, AND DECREE OF REGISTRATION
B. EFFECT OF PRIOR DECISION
CACHERO VS. MARZAN 196 SCRA 601 (1991)G.R. No. L-53768 May 6,
1991
FACTS:
The Spouses Cachero filed acase in the CFI of La Union against the
respondents for recovery of possession and ownership of 2 parcels of land in
Barrio Basca, Aringay, La Union. The lower court rendered judgment declaring
the petitioners owners of the subject land. The judgment became final and
executory.
About 7 years laterthe SpousesCacherofiledfor the registration under the
Torrens Act of the subject land (109,480 sq. m.) identified as Lot No. 6860 of
the Cadastral Surveyand another parcel of land (50,412 square meters)
identified as Lot No. 6859 of the same Cadastral Survey, both lots being
situated in SitioIriw, Basca Aringay, La Union. Subsequently, Atty. Yaranon filed
oppositions in said case in behalf of the respondents.
Tomas Cachero died before judgment and was substituted by his children. The
judgment was rendered in favor of the spouses finding that the spouses and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous and notorious
possession of subject lotsfor more than 60 years in concept of owners except
for a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6860 which the Cacheros had sold to
Bernardino Marzan; that Tomas Cachero had inherited said lots from his late
father, Simeon Cachero; and that the applicant spouses had been
religiously paying the realty taxes on the parcels of land as owners thereof.
The respondents thru their counsel, Atty. Yaranon,filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case
and thatthe subject lands, which have been the subject of cadastral
proceedings, showed that neither the Cacheros nor their predecessors-in-
interest had ever entered a claim for either lot. The Cacheros opposed the
motion and argued that by the time the motion for reconsideration was
filed, the judgment sought to be reconsidered had already become final. The
motion was denied.
About 7 months after the filing of the motion for reconsideration,persons not
parties to the registration proceedings filed a "petition for review of judgment
and/or decree." They alleged that they were the owners of the land
designated as Lot No. 6859 which they purchased sometime in 1929 and
28
that they have been in continuous possession thereof since then. They
also alleged that the petitioners fraudulently omitted to give them notice of their
application for registration and that in the earlier cadastral survey, Lots
Numbered 6859 and 6860 had been declared public land for lack of any
original claimant and at the cadastral hearing only the Director of Lands,
the Director of Forestry, and they had filed "cadastral answers". The
petition prayed for the re-opening, review and setting aside of the judgment
and for the accord to them of an opportunity to prove their asserted
contentions.

The petition for review was denied. The Registration Court ruled that the
according to the report of the chief surveyor of the Land Registration
Commission, there was no decree of registration issued as regards the
subject lots. It also ruled that the movants had failed to show fraud on the
Cacheros' part. Paulina Nodo and Felix Genova subsequently died and
were substituted by their heirs. These Genova heirs filed an amended
petition which was also denied by the Registration Court. Then, they
appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which forwarded it to the Supreme
Court, holding that the former had no appellate jurisdiction over the matter. The
CA also declared that the Genovas are third persons who came into the case.

ISSUE: WON the cadastral proceedings should be deemed as a bar to the

Registration Proceedings.

HELD: NO. The cadastral case mentioned commenced before the outbreak of
the Pacific war. It had been abandoned and had not been continued or
resumed after the war, thus, it had ceased to exist. Hence, said compulsory
cadastral proceedings under the Cadastral Act cannot be invoked and set up
as a bar to the registration proceedings under the Torrens Act initiated more
than twenty years later by the Cacheros.

A cadastral proceeding which had long discontinuedand abandoned, and

which had resulted in no judgment or final order affecting the lands involved in
a subsequent registration act under Act 496, cannot be invoked and set up as
a bar to the latter proceedings. There being no final adjudication in the
cadastral proceeding, there is no reason to apply the doctrine of res judicata.

LTD 29

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42859 March 17, 1938
GABRIEL LASAM, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and JOSE CHAN HONG HIN, ET AL.,
opponents-appellants.
Acting Solicitor-General Melencio and B. Pobre for appellants.
Alfredo Catolico for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:
On January 24, 1930, Gabriel Lasam filed with the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan an application for the registration of 152 parcels of land containing a
total area of 24,723,436 square meters, situated in the municipality of Solana,
Province of Cagayan, described in the plan Exhibit K attached to the
application. These 152 parcels include the parcel No. 9 here involved.
According to the lower court, the portions of said parcel No. 9 which opposed
during the time of survey were delimited and marked on its plan Psu-67516
attached to the record as lots A to Z, AA to HH, MM to ZZ, AAA to ZZZ, AAAA
to ZZZZ, AAAAA, to FFFFF, NNNNN, 35 to 38, and 111 to 143, all inclusive.
(Decision of the lower court, Bill of Exception of the Government, p. 35.)
The Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that it is not
supported by any title fit for registration and that the land sought to be
registered is public land. The brothers Felipe, Jose and Salvador, all surnamed
Narag, who are first cousin to the applicant Lasam, also filed opposition on the
ground that they are the owners of parcels No. 9. Opposition were also filed by
Tomas Furigay and 35 other persons as homesteaders; by the provincial fiscal,
representing the Directors of Forestry, on the ground that portions thereof are
public forest; by Francisco Caronan and some 71 others parties, claiming the
LTD
parcels occupied by them as their exclusive properties; by Jose Chan Hong
Hin, on the ground that the applicant includes his property of about 22
hectares and 50 ares; and by Mauro Antonio, on the ground that the applicant
includes the portion occupied by him and belonging to him. Pablo Soriano
succeeded in having the order of general default set aside as to him and was
allowed to registered his opposition at a latter date. Amendede applications
and oppositions by the parties were subsequently permitted to be filed.
After a protracted hearing, the lower court rejected and the oppositions filed,
declaring the applicant, Gabriel Lasam, the owner of parcel No. 9 as indicated
in the plan Psu-67516 (Exhibit K), and decreed the registration of said parcel in
his favor.
On September 10, 1934, counsel for various oppositors, after excepting to the
decision, filed a motion for new trial which was denied, and the case was
brought before this court by bill of exceptions.
The Narag brothers and the Directors of Forestry appear to have abandoned
their opposition. They made no attempt to substantiate their claims at the trial.
Counsel for the Director of Lands, et al. and for Jose Chan Hong Hin, et al.
make various assignments of error in their respective briefs. It is not believe
necessary however, to consider each and every assignment made as the
questions presented may, in our opinion, be reduced to the following
propositions: (a) Whether or not the applicant, Gabriel Lasam, is entitled to the
registered of parcel No. 9 on the basis of the document presented as Exhibit L,
hereinafter to be referred to, or in the alternative, whether or not he is entitled
to registered on the basis of public, continuous, and adverse possession under
a claim of ownership during the time prescribed by law (par. 9, application);
and the negative, (b) whether or not the numerous oppositors — excluding the
homesteader — are entitled to the parcels which they allege are included in
the controverted parcel No. 9. The rights of the homesteader necessarily
depend on the resolution of these two propositions.
Exhibit L purports to be an application dated June 27, 1873 addressed by
Domingo Narag 1.º to the Alcalde Mayor, in which the former stated that he
had been in possession of the land above described and asked
thatinformacion testifical be admitted. The informacion testifical was had before
the Alcalde Mayor and appears to have been approved by the Judge of the
Court of First Instance without objection on the part of the fiscal. It is the theory
of the applicant that Domingo Narag 1.º the original owner of parcel No. 5,
described in Exhibit L, owned P1,000 from the applicant's which amount Narag
needed for his candidacy gobernadorcillo of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in 1880;
that the original of Exhibit L was turned over by the applicant to his lawyer,
Vicente Marasigan, who lost it, and for this reason, only a certificate copy of
30
the document marked Exhibit L presented; and that the fifth parcel mentioned
in the document, Exhibit L, is the parcel No. 9 described in the plan, Exhibit K.
The Government contends that Exhibit L is not a valid titled and does not
confer ownership that even if it were valid, it does not cover so extensive an
area as that appearing on the plan, Exhibit K.
The land designated as the fifth parcel is described in Exhibit L as follows:
5.ª Un terreno o pasto de ganados vacunos llamado Marguirig o Cagguban
que linda al poniente con el estero Pagul, oriente con el pueblo de la Solana al
norte con el sitio llamado y Calabbacao y al sur con el sitio llamado Atayo el
cual tiene un cabida de siete mil brazaz y herede de mis Padres hace viente y
dos años y en la actualidad es donde mis granados de procreacion.
Parcel No. 9, the registration of which is applied for in these proceedings, is
described thus (brief of claimant-appellee p. 61):
Por el norte con barrios de Iraga, Bauan y Bangag;
Por el este con el Centro y los barrios de Basi, Natapian y Lanna;
Por el sur con la carretera provincial; y
Por el oeste barrios de Maguirig, Cagguban y estero Pangul.
We are of the opinion that the court below committed no error in receiving
Exhibit L as evidence for the claimant, but its admission by the court does not
necessarily entitled the applicant Gabriel Lasam, to the registration of the
parcel claimed by him in these proceedings. It is apparent that parcel No. 9, as
indicated in the plan, Exhibit K, is not the same parcel No. 5 described in
document Exhibit L. Whereas Exhibit L gives as boundaries on the north the
sitios of Maasin and Calabbacao, Exhibit K gives the barrios of Iraga, Bauan,
and Bangag; on the east Exhibit L gives the pueblo of Solana, whereas Exhibit
K gives "el Centro y los barrios de Basi, Natappian y Lanna"; on the west
Exhibit L gives estero Pangul, whereas Exhibit K gives the barrios of Maguirig,
Cagguban and estero Pangul; on the south Exhibit L gives the sitio of Atayao,
whereas Exhibit K gives the carretera provincial. While there may be partial
indentity as to boundaries on the east and west, such indentity is lacking as to
the boundaries on the north and south. This discrepancy is accentuated by the
admmission of the applicant that the parcel whose registered is sought is much
smaller than that described in paragraph 5 of Exhibit L. The explanation given
by the surveyors Jose Mallanao, presented as witness by the claimant, is a
follows:
LTD
Because on the north side when we went around the lot and I asked for the
barrios of Maasin and Calabacao the applicant pointed to me a place very far
from where he was at the time and where he actually occupied the land, and
on the south side he indicated to me the provincial road. I asked why he
should not take the actual land indicated by this title and he told me that he
was not occupying that portion . That is the reason why I took up the boundary
on the south as provincial road. On the east side he indicated to me the center
of the municipality of Solana, barrios of Basi, Nangalisan and Lanna, and on
the west is a public land party bounded by the barrios of Maguirig, and
Cagguban and estero Pangul.
An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing his
title thereto, must prove not only the genuiness of his title but the indentity of
the land therein referred to. The document in such a case is either a basis of
his claim for registration or not at all. If as in this case, he only claims a portion
of what is included in his title, he must clearly prove that the property sought to
be registered is included in that title. The surveyor, Jose Mallannao, did not
actually check up the boundaries of parcel No. 5, as described in Exhibit L,
and in testifying that parcel No. 9, in Exhibit K, is smaller than that described
as parcel No. 5 in Exhibit L, he relied on hearsay. For instance, when asked
whether north of barrios Iraga, Bauan and Bangag of the land described in
plan Exhibit K, he would locate the sitios of Maasin and Calabacao, he replied:
"They said that Calabbacao is north of that barrio Iraga yet." (Emphasis ours.)
Aside from what has been said with reference to discrepanies in the
boundaries, we cannot overlook the fact that the area in Exhibit L is vaguely
given as 7,000 brazas. The surveyor for the applicant, Jose Mallannao,
calculated the area of the property described in paragraph 5 of Exhibit L on the
basis of 7,000 square brazas or 49,000,00 square as 15,695,500 hectares
more or less (s.n. pp. 820-822). The area claimed here according to the
amended application of February 26, 1930, and the plan Exhibit K is
24,723,437 square meters. According to the applicant before his occupation of
the land ceded by Domingo Narag 1.º, only about 2 hectares were cultivated.
(s.n. p. 56, Gabriel Lasam.) And, with reference to the payment of the land tax,
the Solicitor-General in his brief (p. 12) makes the following observation:
The property appears to have been declared for taxation purposes as
evidenced by revisions of tax declarations, Exhibit G-20 and G-21 (pp. 136,
137, record). There had been previous declarations with an area of about 294
hectares (id.) but, according to Exhibit G-22 (p. 138, record), the area which
was not previously declared contains 1,685 hectares.
With the exception of a statement in which it appears that tax was paid in 1902
(p. 140, id.) there appears in the record no tax receipts evidencing the
payment of taxes continuously from 1902 up to this time.
31
It is not necessary to pass upon the contention of the Solicitor-General that the
informacion testifical (Exhibit L) is no legal effect because of failure
subsequently to solicit composition title pursuant to the Royal Decree of June
25, 19880 (Fuster vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 40129, Dec. 29, 1934), or to
convert possession into a registration of ownership in accordance with article
393 of the Mortgage law (Fernandez Hermanos vs. Director of Lands, 57 Phil.,
929), for even if we were to accord all the legal force to this document (Exhibit
L), it would not serve as a basis for the registration of 24,723,437 square
meters.
Having arrived at this conclusion as to Exhibit L, is the applicant entitled to
registration because of the required possession during the time prescribed by
law? We have examined the evidence on this point both testimonial and
documentary, and while there is evidence showing that the claimant might
have possessed a portion of the parcel claimed by him and the registration of
which is sought, we find the evidence lacking in certainly as to the particular
portion occupied and the extend thereof. Counsel for the applicant invokes the
doctrine laid down by us in Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil., 175, 180).
(See also Roales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil., 302, 304.) But it should be
observed that the applicant of the doctrine of constructive possession in that
case is subject to certain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe
that among these qualifications is "one particularly relating to the size of the
tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the
claimant." While, therefore, "possession in the eyes of the law does not mean
that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can
be said that he is in possession", possession under paragraph 6 of section 54
of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is
not gained by mere nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of
possession cannot justify a Magellan like claim of dominion over an immense
tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may
be constructive, is not a mere fiction. In the present case, upon the description
of 7,000 brazas as the area of the land said have been originally possessed by
Domingo Narag 1.º and conveyed to the applicant, only two hectares of which
were according to the applicant cultivated at the time of such transfer, the
applicant would on the basis of the computation hereinabove referred to and
given at the trial by surveyor Jose Mallannao, be entitled under Exhibit L to
more than 13,000 hectares, although only 2,432 odd hectares are now being
sought for registration in these proceedings. The fact, however, that he is
claiming only a portion of the land claimed by him to be included in his title, the
further fact that according to his own testimony he has given up more than
1,000 hectares to the Bureau of Forestry, the discrepancies in the boundaries,
his tax declarations, and the existence of numerous homesteaders and
claimants are significant and tend to show that his possession over the entire
portion of the land sought to be registered is not "such as to apprise the
community and the world that the entire land was for his enjoyment." (Ramos
LTD
vs. Director of Lands, supra.)
Our attention is next directed to the decision of this court in Pamittan vs.
Lasam and Mallonga (60 Phil., 908) which according to counsel for the
claimant Lasam, is determinative of the ownership of the property now sought
to be registered. Said case refers to an action for partition between the heirs of
Sofia Pamittan, wife of Gabriel Lasam, originally brought in the Court of First
Instance and appealed to this court. The trial court in that case found that
parcel No. 7 — which is said to correspond to parcel No. 9 sought to be
registered in these proceedings — "although during the existence of the
conjugal partnership, was proven to be the exclusive property of the husband
Gabriel Lasam". This court not have passed upon the question whether parcel
No. 7 was the same parcel No. 9 in these proceedings; nor could it have
passed upon the conflicting claims with reference to parcel No. 9, now sought
to be registered. Whatever was said in that case could not bind the oppositors
in the present case, who were not parties thereto.
The grounds for opposition of the various oppositors are divergent and are
based on (a) possession from time immemorial: (b) acquisition by inheritance,
purchase and donations propters nuptias and inter vivos; (c) payment of land
taxes from 1906, 1915 and 1918 up to the filing of oppositions; and (d)
acquisition "a titulo de composicion" with the State. These oppositors denied
tenants of the applicant Lasam. After persual of the evidence presented by
them, we are constrained to accept the conclusion of the lower court that none
of the portions or lots claimed by them or any one of them has been sufficiently
identified, either by the oral or documentary evidence which they presented. In
view thereof, and because of the insufficiency of the evidence presented, we
are of the opinion that the lower court committed no error in dismissing their
oppositions.
In view of the foregoing, the judgement of the lower court is reserved, without
prejudice to the filing by the applicant. Gabriel Lasam, of a new application and
plan covering the portion of the land actually occupied by him since July 25,
1894. Upon the determination of that portion by the lower court, let judgement
be rendered accordingly. The remaining portion or portions of lot No. 9 as
indicated on plan Psu-67516 (Exhibit K) are hereby declared public lands, to
be disposed of or otherwise death with in accordance with law. Without
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ.,
concur.
LASAM V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS- Possession
32
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his
feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession, however, possession is not gained by mere nominal CLAIM.
FACTS:
Lasam files a case in Court for the registration of a parcel of land, containing
an area of around 24,000,000 hectares. He presents Exhibit L as proof of his
possession over the land. Exhibit L is a certified copy of an application. This
application states that Lasam’s predecessor in interest, Domingo Narag, has
owned the land since time immemorial. However, the property described in
Exhibit L is 15,000,000 hectares only and the property sought to be registered
is 24,000,000 hectares.
Furthermore, the document, mentions a fifth parcel of land which is the same
parcel described in another Exhibit K. Apparently, the surveyor of the land
delineated the property based on what the possessor at that time pointed out
to him; he based his study mostly on hearsay. According to the applicant,
before his occupation of the land, only about 2 hectares were cultivated. But
then, they justified this by invoking the doctrine of constructive possession
(That a person in possession of the land does not have to have his feet on
every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession).
Thus, the Director of Lands opposed the registration on the ground that
a) it is not supported by any title fit for registration and
b) that the land sought to be registered is public land.
ISSUE:
Is the applicant entitled to registration because of the required possession
during the time prescribed by law? Is he entitled to the 24,000,000 hectares of
land considering that the area possessed is only 2 hectares?
HELD:
First, the Court ruled that Exhibit L cannot be a valid application because the
identity o the land was not clearly established.
Second, although there is proof that Lasam might have possessed a portion of
the parcel land, the proof is lacking in certainty as to the portion occupied and
the extent thereof. Although the counsel invokes the doctrine of constructive
possession, the said application is subject to certain qualifications, and this
court was careful to observe that among these qualifications is one particularly
relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion of
LTD
land actually in possession of the claimant. While, therefore, possession in the
eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession,
possession is not gained by mere nominal CLAIM. The mere planting of a sign
or a symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion
over an immense tract of territory
Lasam vs. Director of Lands 65 Phil. 367
G.R. No. L-42859 March 17, 1938
Facts:
On January 24, 1930, Gabriel Lasam filed with the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan an application for the registration of 152 parcels of land containing a
total area of 24,723,436 square meters, situated in the municipality of Solana,
Province of Cagayan, described in the plan Exhibit K attached to the
application. These 152 parcels include the parcel No. 9 here involved.
The application states that Lasam’s predecessor in interest, Domingo Narag,
has owned the land since time immemorial. However, the property described in
Exhibit L is 15,000,000 hectares only and the property sought to be registered
is 24,000,000 hectares
Issue:
Whether or not he is entitled to register the whole parcel of land on the basis of
public, continuous, and adverse possession under a claim of ownership during
the time prescribed by law.
Held:
No. It should be observed that the doctrine of constructive possession is
subject to certain qualifications, among this is “one particularly relating to the
size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in
possession of the claimant.” While, therefore, “possession in the eyes of the
law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said that he is in possession”, the mere planting of a
sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan like claim of dominion
over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring
ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction.
The fact, however, that he is claiming only a portion of the land claimed by him
to be included in his title, the further fact that according to his own testimony
he has given up more than 1,000 hectares to the Bureau of Forestry, the
33
discrepancies in the boundaries, his tax declarations, and the existence of
numerous homesteaders and claimants are significant and tend to show that
his possession over the entire portion of the land sought to be registered is not
“such as to apprise the community and the world that the entire land was for
his enjoyment.”

LTD 34