Lurey Grace B.

Agilles JD 1-A

TELEBAP vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998

Facts: Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881. on the ground (1) that it takes
property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and
television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of
the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of
communication or information during the period of election.

Issue: Whether is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
operation of media of communication or information during the period of election.

Held: No. The petition is dismissed.

With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and
COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their
qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for
their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government
would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art. III, §7 of the Constitution provides
that “the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized,”
while Art. XII, §6 states that “the use of property bears a social function [and] the right to own,
establish, and operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the State to promote
distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.”
To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to
see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is maintained. For
while broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities with free speech rights, they
are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the
diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of
broadcast media. To affirm the validity of §92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people’s right
to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social function and is
subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their
just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in
connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.
Lurey Grace B. Agilles JD 1-A

PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is

confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a
non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be
represented

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member

of House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot
be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than
six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-
appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a
week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such
an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it
also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

Lurey Grace B. Agilles JD 1-A

Facts:
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010
elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of
graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino
people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted
the good senator to the presidency.

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner
Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order
No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office
and to appropriate funds therefor.

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua,
Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order
No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).

Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and
question Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

Held:
Legal Standing of the Petitioners
The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and
paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be
resolved for the guidance of all.Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to
know the status of the President’s first effort to bring about a promised change to the country.
The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that
clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to
perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to
society.
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.
Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the
Lurey Grace B. Agilles JD 1-A

investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team
and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of
the latter in conducting the inquiry.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated
by the Court in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care
and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be
accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano
Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in
nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide
whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of
their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible
indictments for violations of graft laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional
safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such
that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an
"adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission
must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of
former President Arroyo.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.
Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative
of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration"only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out
the provisions of Executive Order No. 1.

COMELEC vs CONRADO CRUZ

G.R. No. 186616 November 20, 2009
Lurey Grace B. Agilles JD 1-A

Facts:
When RA 9164 entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections” was passed, questions of the constitutionality were raised against Section 2 which
states that “No barangay elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the
same position: Provided however, that the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994
barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official was elected.
Before the 2007 Synchronized Barangay and SK Elections, some of the then incumbent officials
of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to
challenge the constitutionality of the said provision as it is violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution in as much as the barangay officials were singled out that there
consecutive limit shall be counted retroactively.

Issue:
Whether or not the provision in Section 2 of RA 9164 is violative of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.

Ruling:
The equal protection clause is under Sec 2 Art III of the Constitution which provides: “Nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” This is however considering equality
under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated. The law can treat barangay
officials differently from other local elective officials because the Constitution itself provides a
significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to length of term and term
limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the
Constitution provides for a 3-year term and 3-term limit for local elective officials, it left the
length of term and the application of the 3-term limit or any form of term limitation for
determination by Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize
substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform
treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions.

Jose Miguel Arroyo vs Department of Justice

Facts:
Lurey Grace B. Agilles JD 1-A

The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee with the
Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged
election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.
Due to allegations of electoral fraud and manipulation during the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In
its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May
14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao
were indeed perpetrated.
The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners to be subjected to preliminary
investigation for electoral sabotage. After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc
adopted a resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed
against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo,
among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, the petitioners assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and
of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.
Arroyo raised the issue in his petition that the creation of the Joint Committee is violative of the
equal protection clause since it was created with the sole purpose of investigating and
prosecuting certain persons and incidents only, specifically those involving the 2004 and 2007
elections to the exclusion of others contrary to the finding of the Supreme Court in Biraogo vs
Philippine Truth Commission.

Issue:
Whether or not the creation of the Joint Committee is violative of the equal protection clause.

Held:
No, the creation of the Joint Committee does not violate the equal protection clause.
The Supreme Court held that Joint Order No. 001-2011 cannot be nullified on the ground that it
singles out the officials of the Arroyo Administration and, therefore, infringes the equal
protection clause.
The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 was expressly created for the purpose of investigating
alleged graft and corruption during the Arroyo Administration since Executive Order No. 177
specifically referred to the “previous administration”; while the Joint Committee was created for
the purpose of conducting preliminary investigation of election offenses during the 2004 and
2007 elections.
While Mike Arroyo and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary
investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who
were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties.
Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee.
Equal protection merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and conditions shall
be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Given that the creation
of the Joint Committee was not purposefully created to investigate only the involved parties
specifically, there is no violation of the equal protection clause in this case.

Republic vs Daisy Yahon

G.R. No. 201043

Facts:
Lurey Grace B. Agilles JD 1-A

Sgt. Yahon was married to respondent. A TPO has been issued against Sgt Yahon to
protect the respondent from further abuses. In the TPO, Sgt Yahon was ordered to provide
reasonable financial spousal support to the respondent. In his failure to appear before the court
with a counsel and with an answer to the charges against him, the court has granted PPO for
the respondent against Sgt Yahon. It was also reiterated that Sgt Yahon should provide for the
financial spousal support to his wife from his retirement benefits. However, the Armed Forces of
the Philippines Finance Center contended that half of the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon
cannot be given to the respondent as it is from a military institution. The petitioner contended
that money due to government employees is not liable to the creditors of the said employees in
the process of garnishment.

Issue:
Whether or not the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon be subject to the ruling of the court
to provide for the financial spousal support of respondent.

Held:
Retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon are subject to the financial spousal support of
respondent. As a rule in statutory construction, when the law does not distinguish, the court
should not distinguish. As section 8 (g) of RA No. 9262 used the general term 'employer', it
includes in its coverage the military institution, which is the employer of Sgt Yahon.

Manalili vs Court of Appeals (GR 113447) Oct. 9, 1997

Facts:
Lurey Grace B. Agilles JD 1-A

At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted
surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after
receiving information that drug addicts were roaming around said area.
Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the petitioner, in
front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was
walking in a swaying manner.
Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce themselves
and asked him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked
him if he could see what the petitioner had in his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet and
allowed the officer to examine it. Policeman Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana
residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents and took petitioner to
headquarters to be further investigated.
The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis.

Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence
inadmissible as evidence.

Held:
The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial
warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any
evidence obtained in violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in
any proceeding.
The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving
vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their
right against unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure may be
made only with probable cause. Probable cause being at best defined as a reasonable ground of
suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or
the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or
object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by is in
the place to be searched.
Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule
against a search without a warrant.
In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally
obtained when he failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial.

The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
respondent court.