Zamora vs CIR L15290, L15280, L15281, L15289

Statutory construction; Antecedents or legislative history of statute to be considered in its

interpretation.—Courts are permitted to look into and investigate the antecedents or the legislative
history of the statutes involved (Director of Lands v. Abaya, et al., 63 Phil. 559).

ACORD vs Zamora 144256

Statutory Construction; Doctrine of Contemporaneous Construction; While statutes and implementing

rules are entitled to great weight in constitutional construction as indicators of contemporaneous
interpretation, such interpretation is not necessarily binding or conclusive on the courts; The
application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the
interpretation of constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory provisions.—While statutes
and implementing rules are entitled to great weight in constitutional construction as indicators of
contemporaneous interpretation, such interpretation is not necessarily binding or conclusive on the
courts. In Tañada v. Cuenco, the Court held: As a consequence, “where the meaning of a constitutional
provision is clear, a contemporaneous or practical . . . executive interpretation thereof is entitled to no
weight and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning.” The reason is that
“the application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the
interpretation of constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory provisions,” and that “except
as to matters committed by the constitution itself to the discretion of some other department,
contemporaneous or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a
doubtful case.” Hence, “if in the judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further
application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy, it may be
rejected.” The validity of the legislative acts assailed in the present case should, therefore, be assessed
in light of Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution.

“The important legal effect of Section 5 (of Article X of the 1987 Constitution) is that henceforth, in
interpreting statutory provisions on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will have to be resolved in
favor of municipal corporations.” (San Pablo City v. Reyes, GR 127708, 03.25.99)
ACORD v. Zamora (GR 144256, 06.08.2005) Constitution provides for automatic release of IRA.
The General Appropriation Act of 2000 cannot place a portion of the Internal Revenue Allotment
(P10B) in an Unprogrammed Fund only to be released when a condition is met i.e. the original revenue
targets are realized, since this would violate the automatic release provision under Section 5, Article X
of the Constitution. As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the
just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that
might prevent the executive from performing this duty. Both the executive and legislative are barred
from withholding the release of the IRA. If the framers of the Constitution intended to allow the
enactment of statutes making the release of IRA conditional instead of automatic, then Article X,
Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded differently. Congress has control only over the
share which must be just, not over the manner by which the share must be released which must be
automatic since the phrase “as determined by law” qualified the share, not the release thereof.
Phil. Global Communication vs Relova L60548

Courts; Statutes; First duty of courts is to apply the law. Internretation is to be resorted to only when
application is impossible or inadequate.—It is always timely to reiterate that: “the first and fundamental
duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it
has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.” (Lizarraga
Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 PhiL 504, 513; Republic Flour Mills, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, 39
SCRA 269)

Phil. Global Communication vs Relova L60548

Same; Same; Franchises; Communications; Construed as a whole, R.A. 4617authorizes thePhil Global
Communications, Ina to any station in the Philippines apart from its single principal station in Makati
subject to M.C. 08–8-83 of the Ministry of Transportation and Communication, and not only one
station as construed by the lower court.—However, a reading of other sections of the law aside from
Sections 1 and 17 cited by the lower court would lead to no other conclusion than that said law
authorizes petitioner to construct, maintain and operate, apart from its principal station in Makati, other
stations or branches within the Philippines for purposes of its international communications operations.
Section 3 of the law provides that “for the purpose of carrying out the privilege granted herein, the
grantee may establish stations in such places in the Philippines as the grantee may select and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications may approve. x x x” Section 4 (a) provides that “the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications shall have the power to allot to the grantee the
frequencies and wave lengths to be used thereunder and determine the stations to and from which each
such frequency and wave lengths may be used, and issue to the grantee a license for such use.”

Statutes; Administrative Law; Couris; Opinions of the Secretary and Undersecretary of justice are
material in the construction ofstatutes in pari materia.—The above-quoted opinion was reiterated and
reaffirmed by the Undersecretary of Justice on November 28, 1973, in answer to the query of the Acting
Chairman of the Foreign Trade Zone Authority as to whether or not Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation is “authorized under its franchise to set a relay station inside the Foreign Trade Zone in
Mariveles, Bataan, which will receive interstate communications for onward transmission by its main
station in Manila.” The above-stated opinions of the Secretary of Justice and Undersecretary of Justice
are material because Republic Acts Nos. 4630 and 4617 are inpan materia.

Same: Same: Administrative construction of statute upheld—The last- quoted provision confirms that
the existing public offices of Interaational Record Carriers were duly authorized by their respective
legislative franchises.

Orencia vs Enrile L28997

Statutory Construction; Contemporaneous construction of statute by executive officials bound to

enforce the same.— Assuming ambiguity in the applicable statute, it must receive a construction in
accordance with and not in disregard of the cardinal postulate of a public office being a public trust.
Moreover, if there is any other principle of legal hermeneutics that can be invoked, it is that of
contemporaneous construction. “Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous construction
placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such
interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby.”
PNOC vs CA 109976, 112800

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; After re- examining the provisions on
jurisdiction of Rep. Act No. 1125 and P.D. No. 242, the Supreme Court finds itself in disagreement with
the pronouncement made in Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 609
(1989), that P.D. No. 242 repealed Section 7(2) of R.A. No. 1125. —The PNB and DOJ are of the same
position that P.D. No. 242, the more recent law, repealed Section 7(1) of Rep. Act No. 1125, based on
the pronouncement of this Court in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
quoted below: The Court ... expresses its entire agreement with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals
—and the basic premises thereof—that there is an “irreconcilable repugnancy...between Section 7(2) of
R.A. No. 1125 and P.D. No. 242,” and hence, that the later enactment (P.D. No. 242), being the latest
expression of the legislative will, should prevail over the earlier. In the said case, it was expressly
declared that P.D. No. 242 repealed Section 7(2) of Rep. Act No. 1125, which provides for the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA over decisions of the Commissioner of Customs. PNB
contends that P.D. No. 242 should be deemed to have likewise repealed Section 7(1) of Rep. Act No.
1125, which provide for the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA over decisions of the BIR
Commissioner. After re-examining the provisions on jurisdiction of Rep. Act No. 1125 and P.D. No.
242, this Court finds itself in disagreement with the pronouncement made in Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al., and refers to the earlier case of Lichauco & Company, Inc. v.
Apostol, et al., for the guidelines in determining the relation between the two statutes in question, to
wit: The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the assumption that if the
act of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the law making power to abrogate the prior
law, this intention must be given effect; but there must always be a sufficient revelation of this
intention, and it has become an unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a
former law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions,
with reference to which the question arises bear to each other the relation of general to special. (Italics
ours.)

PNOC vs CA 109976, 112800

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When there appears to be an inconsistency or conflict between
two statutes and one of the statutes is a general law, while the other is a special law, then repeal by
implication is not the primary rule applicable—what should principally govern is the rule that between
a general law and a special law, the special law prevails.— When there appears to be an inconsistency
or conflict between two statutes and one of the statutes is a general law, while the other is a special law,
then repeal by implication is not the primary rule applicable. The following rule should principally
govern instead: Specific legislation upon a particular subject is not affected by a general law upon the
same subject unless it clearly appears that the provisions of the two laws are so repugnant that the
legislators must have intended by the later to modify or repeal the earlier legislation. The special act
and the general law must stand together, the one as the law of the particular subject and the other as the
general law of the land. (Ex Parte United States, 226 U. S., 420; 57 L. ed., 281; Ex Parte Crow Dog,
109 U. S., 556; 27 L. ed., 1030; Partee vs. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 204 Fed. Rep., 970.) Where there
are two acts or provisions, one of which is special and particular, and certainly includes the matter in
question, and the other general, which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus
conflict with the special act or provision, the special must be taken as intended to constitute an
exception to the general act or provision, especially when such general and special acts or provisions
are contemporaneous, as the Legislature is not to be presumed to have intended a conflict. (Crane v.
Reeder and Reeder, 22 Mich., 322, 334; University of Utah vs. Richards, 77 Am. St. Rep., 928.) It has,
thus, become an established rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a special law,
the special law prevails—Generalia specialibus non derogant.
PNOC vs CA 109976, 112800

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 1125, specifically Section 7 thereof on the jurisdiction
of the CTA, constitutes an exception to P.D. No. 242, which is a general law that deals with
administrative settlement or adjudication of disputes, claims and controversies between or among
government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations—disputes, claims and controversies, falling under Section 7 of R.A. No. 1125, even though
solely among government offices, agencies, and instrumentalities, including government-owned and
controlled corporations, remain in the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA.—Sustained herein is
the contention of private respondent Savellano that P.D. No. 242 is a general law that deals with
administrative settlement or adjudication of disputes, claims and controversies between or among
government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Its coverage is broad and sweeping, encompassing all disputes, claims and controversies.
It has been incorporated as Chapter 14, Book IV of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised
Administrative Code of the Philippines. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 1125 is a special law dealing
with a specific subject matter—the creation of the CTA, which shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the tax disputes and controversies enumerated therein. Following the rule on statutory
construction involving a general and a special law previously discussed, then P.D. No. 242 should not
affect Rep. Act No. 1125. Rep. Act No. 1125, specifically Section 7 thereof on the jurisdiction of the
CTA, constitutes an exception to P.D. No. 242. Disputes, claims and controversies, falling under Section
7 of Rep. Act No. 1125, even though solely among government offices, agencies, and instrumentalities,
including government-owned and controlled corporations, remain in the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the CTA. Such a construction resolves the alleged inconsistency or conflict between the
two statutes, and the fact that P.D. No. 242 is the more recent law is no longer significant.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; An administrative officer, such as the BIR
Commissioner, may revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of his predecessor in office
—the construction of a statute by those administering it is not binding on their successors if, thereafter,
the latter becomes satisfied that a different construction should be given.—It had been declared by this
Court in Hilado v. Collector of Internal Revenue, et al., that an administrative officer, such as the BIR
Commissioner, may revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of his predecessor in office.
The construction of a statute by those administering it is not binding on their successors if, thereafter,
the latter becomes satisfied that a different construction should be given. It is evident in this case that
the new BIR Commissioner, Commissioner Ong, construed E.O. No. 44 and its implementing rules and
regulations differently from that of his predecessor, former Commissioner Tan, which led to
Commissioner Ong’s revocation of the BIR approval of the compromise agreement, dated 22 June
1987. Such a revocation was only proper considering that the former BIR Commissioner’s decision to
approve the said compromise agreement was based on the erroneous construction of the law (i.e., E.O.
No. 44 and its implementing rules and regulations) and should not give rise to any vested right on
PNOC.
Insular Bank of Asia and American Employees Union vs Inchiong L52415

Same; Same; Same; Same.—It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the
language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the
case at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear
and explicit—it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefits. In Policy Instruction
No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally
intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their
regular holiday pay. This is a flagrant violation of the mandatory directive of Article 4 of the Labor
Code, which states that “All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this
Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.” Moreover,
it shall always be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid and permanent statute which
would have the most beneficial effect that its language permits (Orlosky vs. Haskell, 155 A. 112).

Same; Same; Same; Courts; The judiciary’s role invokes the work of making a correct interpretation of
the actions of the three branches of government.—While it is true that the contemporaneous
construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it should be given
great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, as in the instant case, the same
must be declared as null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct
constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches of
the government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that
stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (The Supreme Court in Modern
Role, C. B. Swisher, 1958, p. 36).

Same; Judgment; Ruling in De Luna vs. Kayanan, 61 SCRA 49, not being a labor case, cannot be
invoked by the herein public respondents. Labor is constitutionally protected.—To start with, unlike the
instant case, the case of De Luna relied upon by the public respondent is not a labor case wherein the
express mandate of the Constitution on the protection to labor is applied. Thus Article 4 of the Labor
Code provides that, “All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code,
including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor”; and Article 1702
of the Civil Code provides that, “In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.”
Del Mar vs PAGCOR 138298, 138982

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; P.D. No. 1869 does not have the
standard marks of a law granting a franchise to operate jai-alai as those found under P.D. No. 810 or
E.O. 135; There is no reason to resist the beguiling rule that acts of incorporation, and statutes
granting other franchises or special benefits or privileges to corporations, are to be construed strictly
against the corporations; and whatever is not given in unequivocal terms is understood to be withheld.
—In fine, P.D. No. 1869 does not have the standard marks of a law granting a franchise to operate jai-
alai as those found under P.D. No. 810 or E.O. 135. We cannot blink away from the stubborn reality that
P.D. No. 1869 deals with details pertinent alone to the operation of gambling casinos. It prescribes the
rules and regulations concerning the operation of gambling casinos such as the place, time, persons who
are and are not entitled to play, tax exemptions, use of foreign exchange, and the exemption of casino
employees from the coverage of the Civil Service Law and the Labor Code. The short point is that P.D.
No. 1869 does not have the usual provisions with regards to jai- alai. The logical inference is that
PAGCOR was not given a franchise to operate jai-alai frontons. There is no reason to resist the
beguiling rule that acts of incorporation, and statutes granting other franchises or special benefits or
privileges to corporations, are to be construed strictly against the corporations; and whatever is not
given in unequivocal terms is understood to be withheld.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase “affected with public
interest” means that an industry is subject to control for the public good, and has been considered as
the equivalent of “subject to the exercise of the police power”; Constitutions are widely understood to
withhold from legislatures any authority to bargain away their police power for the power to protect the
public interest is beyond abnegation.—Lest the idea gets lost in the shoals of our subconsciousness, let
us not forget that PAGCOR is engaged in business affected with public interest. The phrase “affected
with public interest” means that an industry is subject to control for the public good; it has been
considered as the equivalent of “subject to the exercise of the police power.” Perforce, a legislative
franchise to operate jai-alai is imbued with public interest and involves an exercise of police power.
The familiar rule is that laws which grant the right to exercise a part of the police power of the state
are to be construed strictly and any doubt must be resolved against the grant. The legislature is
regarded as the guardian of society, and therefore is not presumed to disable itself or abandon the
discharge of its duty. Thus, courts do not assume that the legislature intended to part away with its
power to regulate public morals. The presumption is influenced by constitutional considerations.
Constitutions are widely understood to withhold from legislatures any authority to bargain away their
police power for the power to protect the public interest is beyond abnegation.
Del Mar vs PAGCOR 138298, 138982

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; It is widely acknowledged that a
statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in
either of two or more senses.—We reject this simplistic reading of the law considering the social, moral
and public policy implications embedded in the cases at bar. The plain meaning rule used in the dissent
rests on the assumption that there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of the law. The fact,
however, that the statute admits of different interpretations is the best evidence that the statute is vague
and ambiguous. It is widely acknowledged that a statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being
understood by reasonably well- informed persons in either of two or more senses. In the cases at bar, it
is difficult to see how a literal reading of the statutory text would unerringly reveal the legislative
intent. To be sure, the term “jai-alai” was never used and is nowhere to be found in the law. The
conclusion that it is included in the franchise granted to PAGCOR cannot be based on a mere cursory
perusal of and a blind reliance on the ordinary and plain meaning of the statutory terms used such as
“gaming pools” and “lotteries.” Sutherland tells us that a statute is “ambiguous,” and so open to
explanation by extrinsic aids, not only when its abstract meaning or the connotation of its terms is
uncertain, but also when it is uncertain in its application to, or effect upon, the fact-situation of the case
at bar.

Victoriano vs Elizalde Rope Worker’s Union 25246

Constitutional law; Construction and integration; There is a presumption of constitutionality in

statutes.—All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute,
alleging unconstitutionally, must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work
hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which
supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts
are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal
interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.

Same; Construction and interpretation; Statute is not unconstitutional merely because it is not proper,
necessary or denimble.—Appellant contends that the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350
is not called for— in other words, the Act is not proper, necessary or desirable. Anent this matter, it has
been held that a statute which is not necessary is not, for that reason, unconstitutional; that in
determining the constitutional validity of legislation, the courts are unconcerned with issues as to the
necessity for the enactment of the legislation in question. Courts do inquire into the wisdom of laws.
Moreover, legislatures, being chosen by the people, are presumed to understand and correctly
appreciate the needs of the people, and it may change the laws accordingly.
Peralta vs COMELEC L47771

FOOTNOTE
Quoted in the same case was the decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in Todd v. Election
Commissioners (104 Mich. 474; 62 N.W. 564; 64 N.W. 496; 29 L.R.A. 330), wherein it was said:
“The Constitution does not guaranty that each voter shall have the same facilities with every other voter
in expressing his will at the ballot box, * * *. The constitutionality of the law is not to be tested by the
fact that one voter can cast his ballot by making one mark, while another may be required to make two
or more to express his will. When each has been afforded the opportunity and been provided with
reasonable facilities to vote, the Constitution has been complied with. All else is regulation, and lies in
the sound discretion of the Legislature, to whom alone such regulation is committed. Courts cannot
hold such provisions unconstitutional because, in their judgment, they are harsh or unwise, or have their
origin in partisan purposes. Constitutional laws often have their origin in such purposes, and
unconstitutional laws are often based upon pure motives an honest intentions. Courts have nothing to
do with the motives of legislators, nor the reasons they may have for passing the law. The polar star of
interpretation to guide them is the language of the Constitution itself, and the sole question always is,
does the law destroy or abridge the right.” (61 Atlantic 349).

Barredo, J. concurring:
Constitutional law; Martial law; Statutory construction; In this formative period of our government, it
might not be very helpful to disregard the issue of wisdom or unwisdom in favor of pure legality.—At
the same time, as a Filipino, I have been entertaining the feeling that perhaps, in this particular stage of
our transition from the old political traditions to the idealistic concepts of the New Society, there could
be enough justification to disregard the strict rule that unconstitutionality must be based only on
manifest and indubitable collision between a questioned legislation or actuation, on the one hand, and
the provisions of the Constitution, on the other. I feel that in these formative period of our new
government, it might not be very helpful to disregard the issue of wisdom or unwisdom in favor of pure
legality, such that any instance where the language of the Charter can somehow be construed in a
manner that would promote more effectively the objective of establishing a parliamentary system with
its inherent concomittants in our country, that construction should be adopted, even if in doing so, there
might be a slight departure from the area circumscribe within the literal meaning of the words
employed in the statutory provisions under scrutiny. After mature reflection, however, I have come to
the conclusion that even my best efforts along such line of thinking would not suffice to tilt the balance
in favor of the petitioners.
Ursua vs CA 112170

Statutory Construction; Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the
evils sought to be remedied—the court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal
meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers.—Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the
purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for
its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended
scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning
would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; There exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute
is fairly susceptible is favored which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful,
evil and injurious consequences.—While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of
law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he
is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related
statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those
contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption
that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of
which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The reason for the principle that a penal statute should be construed
strictly against the State and in favor of the accused is the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe,
and the discretion of the court limited.—Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be
construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. Indeed, our mind
cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly
penalize the act done by him.

Macabenta vs Davao L27489

Statutory construction; Ascertaining policy of the law; Duty of courts once policy is ascertained.—
Once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary.
Same; Same; Interpretation of provisions of Workmen’s Compensation Act.—No provision of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act should be interpreted as to deny protection to the laboring elements and
their dependents and thus frustrate the constitutional objective of social justice.
Labor law; Workmen’s Compensation Act; Conclusive nature of conclusion of Workmen’s
Compensation Commission.—The conclusion of the Workmen’s Compensation cannot be repudiated
unless “on a clear showing of failure to consider the fundamental and patent logical relationships on
evidence, amounting to a clear travesty of justice or grave abuse of discretion.
Radiola vs IAC 75222

Statutory Construction; Where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, court should
adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and
effective and harmonious with each other.—But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated
that in construing a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a
statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut magis valeat quam pereat or that
construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute—its every word. Hence,
where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable
and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious
with each other.

Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano L24022

Same; Statutory construction; General repealing clause; Presumption against implied repeal.—A
repealing clause in an Act which provides that “all laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly” is certainly not an express repealing clause
because it fails to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a
clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found
in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule
against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore.

REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:

Same; Statutory Construction; Revision of Laws; Whatever is excluded in revised law is repealed.—
While as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a later one is not favored, yet if the later
act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate
similarly as a repeal of the earlier act (Posadas vs. National City Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 497, 80
Law Ed. 513) in such a revision of the law, whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed.

ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC. V. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND COURT OF TAX APPEALS

Statutory construction; Administrative or executive interpretations of statutes; Weight of consideration

where statute has not been interpreted by court of last resort.—Where the court of last resort has not
previously interpreted the statute, the rule is that courts will give consideration to construction by
administrative or executive departments of the State.
Same; Same; Same; Interpretation of office charged with enforcement of statute.—The construction of
the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of a statute should be given
controlling weight.
Same; Construction of tax statutes; Rule on exemptions.—Exemption from taxation are not favored, and
tax statutes are to be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the
taxing authority.
AGCAOILI V. SUGUITAN G.R. NO. 24806. FEBRUARY 13, 1926

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PUNCTUATION.—The punctuation used in statutes may be

referred to for the purpose of determining the meaning and construction of a law. A semicolon is a mark
of grammatical punctuation, to indicate a separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than
that expressed by comma, and what follows the semicolon must have relation to the same matter which
precedes it. What follows a semicolon always has relation to the same subject matter of that which
precedes it. A semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. A semicolon is used for
the purpose of continuing the expression of a thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a mere
comma. It is never used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon are both
used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences and parts of sentences, the only difference being
that the semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the comma. The punctuation used
in a law may always be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of a doubtful
statute.

ADASA VS. ABALOS G.R. No. 168617 FEBRUARY 19, 2007

Same; Statutory Construction; The all too-familiar rule in statutory construction, in this case, an
administrative rule of procedure, is that when a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation
need not be resorted to.—The all too-familiar rule in statutory construction, in this case, an
administrative rule of procedure, is that when a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation
need not be resorted to. Since Section 7 of the subject circular clearly and categorically directs the DOJ
to dismiss outright an appeal or a petition for review filed after arraignment, no resort to interpretation
is necessary.

ROMUALDEZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN GR. NO. 152259 July 29, 2004

Statutory Construction; The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to
free-speech cases.—It is best to stress at the outset that the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines
have special application only to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of
penal statutes.

TINGA, J., Separate Opinion:

Statutes; Statutory Construction; A statute that lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the due
process clause.—A challenge to a penal statute premised on the argument that the law is vague is a
proper invocation of the due process clause. A statute that lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the
due process clause, for failure to accord persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid.
Mitsubishi vs BOC

Verily, the foregoing provisions explicitly provide that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over tax collection cases originally decided by the RTC.
In the instant case, the CA has no jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal; hence, it cannot perform any
39
action on the same except to order its dismissal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
Therefore, the act of the CA in referring respondent’s wrongful appeal before it to the CTA under the
guise of furthering the interests of substantial justice is blatantly erroneous, and thus, stands to be
40
corrected. In Anderson v. Ho, the Court held that the invocation of substantial justice is not a magic
41
wand that would readily dispel the application of procedural rules, viz.:
x x x procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the
application of the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules
with impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper cases of
demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation
is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance
with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Party-
litigants and their counsels are well advised to abide by rather than flaunt, procedural rules for these
rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice.42 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Jaime Tan vs CA

Remedial Law; Statutory Construction; Statute; Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the
petitioner.—We hold that Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be
given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly,
petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed
the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of
the period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was
changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his
losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this
procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot
when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the
redemption.

Same; Same; Same; The manner of exercising the right cannot be changed and the change applied
retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner which is already vested.—
Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure on the date
of reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous. The manner of exercising the right cannot be
changed and the change applied retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of redemption of the
petitioner which is already vested.