Evidence of accomplice: An Introduction

Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, 18721 is the only absolute rule of law dealing with
accomplice evidence.2 However it is the opinion of some that this section is redundant as
Section 118 makes all persons competent to testify except those persons which the section
specifically bars. Moreover there is no rule which requires that the evidence of an accomplice
should be corroborated. But Section 133 might lead persons to suppose that the Legislature
desired to encourage convictions on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice. This
interpretation however cannot hold good in light of Section 114 (b) which lays down the
presumption that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material
particulars. Thus owing to this conflict between Section 114(b) and Section 133 some experts
feel that Section 133 should have been omitted and the law relating to accomplice evidence
would have been the same as it is now and the awkwardness of appearing to sanction a
practice so universally condemned would have been avoided.3

However the Courts have resolved this apparent conflict between the two sections by
harmoniously reading Sections 114(b) and 133 together and held that while it is not illegal to
act upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice it is a rule of prudence so universally
followed so as to amount almost to a rule of law that it is unsafe to act upon the evidence of
an accomplice unless it is corroborated in material respects so as to implicate the accused. 4
This in a nutshell is the core of accomplice evidence and must be kept in mind at all times
while dealing with the subject of accomplice evidence.

To the lay man, accomplice evidence might seem untrustworthy as accomplices are usually
always interested and infamous witnesses but their evidence is admitted owing to necessity as
it is often impossible without having recourse to such evidence to bring the principal
offenders to justice. Thus accomplice evidence might seem unreliable but it is often a very
useful and even invaluable tool in crime detection, crime solving and delivering justice and
consequently a very important part of the Law of Evidence.

Who is an Accomplice?
It is extremely important to understand what the term accomplice means and signifies as to
attract Section 133 a person must be an accomplice.

The word ‘accomplice’ has not been defined by the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and should
therefore be presumed to have been used in the ordinary sense by the legislature. However
the judiciary has dealt with this issue extensively and has tried to explain comprehensively as
to who an accomplice is.

1
Section 133- An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and a conviction is not
illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
2
The procedural aspects relating to Accomplice Evidence are dealt with in Sections 306-308 and 315 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
3
B. Malik et al., Law of Evidence- Volume V (Allahabad: Law Publishers India Private Limited, 1990) at 4651.
4
Ibid at 4652.

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An accomplice is a guilty associate or partner in crime, or who sustains such a relation to the
criminal act that he could be jointly indicted with the principal.5

Usually most of the crimes are committed at secluded places where there will not be any eye
– witness to testify regard to these offences, and it would not be possible for the police to get
sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the accused. In such cases what police does is that it
picks up one of the suspects arrested who is usually least guilty and offers to him an
assurance that if he is inclined to divulge all information relating to the commission of the
crime and give evidence against his own colleagues, he will be pardoned. So any such person
who is picked up or who is taken by the police for the purpose of giving evidence against his
own colleagues is known as an accomplice or an approver.

In Davies v. Director of Public Prosecutions6, the House of Lords has classified accomplices
as follows:

i. Participants in the crime charged (participes criminis) whether as principals or

accessories before or after the fact (in felonies) or persons committing, procuring or
aiding and abetting (in the case of misdemeanours).
ii. Receivers in respect of the thieves from whom they receive goods, on a trial of the
latter for larceny.
iii. Parties to the crimes which may be proved as facts similar to the offences charged.

An accomplice is a person who participates in the commission of the actual crime charged
against an accused.7

If an accomplice is jointly indicted with his fellows, he is incompetent to testify, unless he

tendered a pardon or unless he has been discharged, acquitted or convicted.

Competency of Accomplice as Witness

An accomplice is a competent witness if he is not being tried in the case in which he is
required to give evidence, but if he himself on trial in the case, he is altogether incompetent,
for being an accused person in the case, he cannot be examined on oath. If an accomplice is
jointly indicted with his fellows, he is incompetent to testify, unless he tendered a pardon or
unless he has been discharged, acquitted or convicted. Therefore, an accomplice is a
competent witness, if, at the time he is required to give evidence, he is not an accused person
in the case in which he is required to testify.

An accomplice by accepting a pardon under Section 306 CrPC becomes a competent witness
and may as any other witnesses be examined on oath; the prosecution must be withdrawn and
the accused formally discharged under Section 321 CrPC before he can become a competent
witness.

5
Govinda Balaji v. E. 1936 N 245.
6
1954 AC 378.
7
R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1962 SC 1821.

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Under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, 1950 no accused shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. But as an accomplice accepts a pardon of his free will on condition
of a true disclosure, in his own interest and is not compelled to give self-incriminating
evidence the law in Sections 306 and 308, Code of Criminal Procedure is not affected. So a
pardoned accused is bound to make a full disclosure and on his failure to do so he may be
tried of the offence originally charged and his statement may be used against him under
Section 308.

Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114: Harmonious Construction

The provisions of the Evidence Act relating to the evidence of an accomplice are contained in
Section 133 and Illustration (b) of Section 114 of the Act.

S.133. Accomplice:- An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person;

and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the un corroborated
testimony of an accomplice.

S.114. Illustration (b):- The court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit,
unless he is corroborated in material particulars.

Section 133 provides that the evidence of an accomplice, though it is uncorroborated, may
form the basis for a conviction. This section is the only absolute rule of law as regards the
evidence of an accomplice.

Section 114 enables the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to
have happened, having regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct and
public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. In this section
are also included certain maxims by way of illustrations which are founded on the experience
gained in the past. These illustrations are in two parts. The first part of illustrations contains
maxims and the later part exceptions to their application. The first part of illustration (b)
provides that the court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is
corroborated in material particulars. However, when we turn to the later part of illustration
(b) it becomes clear that the Legislature itself has envisaged cases where such a presumption
may have no application. It provides, “But the Court shall also have regard to such facts as
the following, in considering whether such maxims do or do not apply to the particular case
before it......... As to illustration (b)— A crime is committed by several persons. A, B and C,
three of the criminals, are captured on the spot and kept apart from each other. Each gives an
account of the crime implicating D, and the accounts corroborate each other in such a manner
as to render previous concert highly improbable”.

Illustration (b) is only a rule of caution or guidance to be observed in practice, it is not at all a
rule of law. In that respect the illustration is complementary to section 133.

The combined effect of Section 133 and Section 114, illustration (b) it that Section 133 is a
clear authorization to the courts to convict on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice,
but since such a witness, being criminal himself, may not always be trustworthy, the courts

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are guided by the illustration appended to section 114 that, if it is necessary the court should
presume that he is unreliable unless his statements are supported or verified by some
independent evidence.

A statement to this effect to be found in the judgment of Chandrachud J. (afterwards C.J.), in

Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra8

"There is no antithesis between S. 133 and illustration (b) to S. 114, because the illustration
only says that the court 'may' presume a certain state of affairs. It does not seek to raise a
conclusive and irrebutable presumption. Reading the two together the position which emerges
is that though an accomplice is a competent Witness and though a conviction may lawfully
rest on his uncorroborated testimony yet the court is entitled to presume and may indeed be
justified in presuming that no reliance can be placed on the evidence of an accomplice unless
that evidence is corroborated in material particulars, by which is meant that there has to be
some independent evidence tending to incriminate the particular accused in the commission
of the crime. It is hazardous, as a matter of prudence, to proceed upon the evidence of a self-
confessed criminal, who, in so far as an approver is concerned has to testify in terms of the
pardon tendered to him".

Accomplice Evidence: The Question of Corroboration

Reading Section 133 of the Evidence Act along with Section 114(b) it is clear that the most
important issue with respect to accomplice evidence is that of corroboration. The general rule
regarding corroboration that has emerged is not a rule of law but merely a rule of practice
which has acquired the force of rule of law in both India and England.

Once it is determined that the person who has appeared as a witness in fact an accomplice,
the question then arises as to what value is to be attached to his evidence, namely, whether it
should be acted upon in itself or some independent verification should be thought of his
statements. It has been observed from the earliest times as a rule of caution which has now
become virtually a rule or law, that the evidence of an accomplice should stand the test of
verification at least in main points. This is known as corroboration.

However to understand the question of corroboration with respect to accomplice evidence in

its entirety one must look at the following aspects:

Necessity of Corroboration

An approver on his own admission is a criminal and a man of the very lowest character who
has thrown to the wolves his erstwhile associates and friends in order to save his own skin.
His evidence, therefore, must be received with the greatest caution if not suspicion.
Accomplice evidence is held untrustworthy and therefore should be corroborated for the
following reasons:9

8
(1977) 3 SCC 68 at pp. 74-75 : AIR 1977 SC 1579 : 1977 CrU 1206.
9
M. Monir, Principles and Digest of the Law of Evidence (Allahabad: Universal Book Agency, 7th Ed) at 801.

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  He has been criminal himself, and, therefore, his testimony should not carry the same
respect as that of a law-abiding citizen.
 He has been faithless to his companions and may be faithless to the court because he
has motive to shift the guilt from himself to his former companions, and
 If he is an approver, he has been favoured by the State and is therefore, likely to
favour the state.

Nature and Extent of Corroboration

Generally speaking corroboration is of two kinds. Firstly the court has to satisfy itself that the
statement of the approver is credible in itself and there is evidence other than the statement of
the approver that the approver himself had taken part in the crime. Secondly the court seeks
corroboration of the approver’s evidence with respect to the part of other accused persons in
the crime and this evidence has to be of such a nature as to connect the other accused with the
crime.

Corroboration in material particulars means that there should be some additional or

independent evidence:

i. Rendering it probable that the story revealed by the accomplice is true and that it is
reasonably safe to act upon it;
ii. Identifying the accused as one of those, or among those, who committed the crime;
iii. Showing the circumstantial evidence of his connection with the crime, though it may
not be direct evidence; and
iv. Ordinarily the testimony of one accomplice should not be sufficient to corroborate
that of the other.

“Independent” merely means independent of source which is likely to be tainted. The

corroboration of an accomplice required by the rule is corroboration by independent
evidence, i.e., by evidence other than that of another accomplice. Tainted evidence is not
made better by being doubled in quantity, and, when there are two sets of evidence, each
requiring corroboration, one cannot be used to corroborate the other. It is, therefore, a rule
that one accomplice cannot corroborate, or be corroborated by, another accomplice, nor can
accomplice corroborate himself; tainted evidence does not lose its taint by repetition.

An accomplice may occupy one of three different positions. He may be, (i) an approver, to
whom pardon has been tendered under Section 337 of the "Criminal Procedure Code; or (ii)
he may be a confessing accused, making statements from the dock implicating himself and
his fellow prisoners; or (iii) he may neither be an approver nor an accused, but an ordinary
witness who,, by reason of his connection with the crime, is in fact an accomplice. Now the
rule being that one accomplice cannot corroborate another accomplice, whichever of the three
position mentioned above a person may occupy, he cannot corroborate, or be corroborated
by, another person occupying any one of the three aforesaid positions. Thus an approver
cannot corroborate, or be corroborated by, another approver or a confessing co-accused, or an
unpardoned accomplice witness, a confessing co-accused cannot corroborate or be
corroborated by, another confessing co-accused, or an unpardoned accomplice witness, and

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an unpardoned accomplice witness cannot corroborate or be corroborated by another
unpardoned accomplice witness.

In the case of Rameshwar v. State of Rajesthan10, according to the Supreme Court the four
principles with regard to the nature and extent of corroboration are:

i. that it is not necessary that there should be independent confirmation of every

material circumstance in the sense that the independent evidence in the case, apart
from the testimony of the complainant or the accomplice, should in itself be sufficient
to sustain conviction; all that is required is that there must be some additional
evidence rendering it probable that the story of the accomplice (or complainant) is
true and that it is reasonably safe to act upon it,
ii. that independent evidence must not only make it safe to believe that the crime was
committed, but must in some way reasonably connect or tend to connect the accused,
with it by confirming in some material particular the testimony of the accomplice or
complianant that the accused committed the crime,
iii. that the corroboration must come from independent sources and thus ordinarily the
testimony of one accomplice would not be sufficient to corroborate that of another,
iv. that the corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the
crime- it is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with the
crime.

The best and most uptodate exposition of the nature and extent of corroboration is contained
in a judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v. Baskerville11, in which all the leading
authorities were reviewed and the principles to be observed were enunciated in the clearest
possible terms by Lord Reading, L. C. J., who delivered the judgment of the Court. The
general rules laid down by the Court in that case may be summarized as follows :—

i. The corroboration must be by some evidence other than that of an accomplice; and,
therefore, one accomplice's evidence is not corroboration of the testimony of another
accomplice.
ii. The corroborative evidence must be evidence which implicates the accused, that is,
which confirms in some material particular not only the evidence that the crime has
been committed, but also that the accused committed it. In other words, the
corroboration must be both as to the corpus delicti and as the identity of the accused.
iii. It is not necessary that the story of the accomplice should be corroborated in every
detail of the crime, since, if this were so, the evidence of the accomplice would be
necessary.
iv. The corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the crime;
it is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with the crime.
v. The rule of practice requiring corroboration of the evidence of the accomplice in some
material particular implicating the accused has virtually become equivalent to, a rule
of law.

10
AIR 1952 SC 54.
11
(1916) 2 KB 658.

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Here, it becomes important to mention a very significant case of Bhuboni Sahu v. The King12,
In this case, eight persons were prosecuted for a murder. Two of them were acquitted by the
trial judge and two others by the Patna High Court. Of the remaining, one appealed to the
Privy Council. The evidence against the appellant consisted of (a) evidence of an accomplice
who had taken part in the murder and had become an approver; (b) the confession of another
accused person implicating himself and the appellant; (c) the recovery of a cloth which the
deceased was wearing and a khantibadi, an instrument for cutting grass, in circumstances
which were taken to verify the evidence of the accomplice.

Their Lordship allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant. It was laid down:

i. That the court should be slow to depart from the rule of caution which requires some
independent evidence implicating the accused,
ii. That the evidence of one accomplice cannot be used to corroborate the testimony of
another accomplice,
iii. That the recovery of the cloth and khantibadi could not corroborate the story held out
by the accomplice because the recovery of the cloth at the suggestion of the
accomplice did not show that it was put there by the appellant and the recovery of a
khantibadi from him, particularly one which was not blood-stained, was not an
unusual thing, for, a farmer is likely to possess it.

Accomplices in Sexual offences

Corroboration is a common point between the victim of rape and an accomplice because
though the woman who has been raped is not an accomplice; her evidence has been treated by
the courts on somewhat similar lines. Her evidence requires corroboration the same way as
that of an accomplice13 because she is treated as an interested witness.

In this case, Rameshwar was charged with committing rape on a young girl of eight years.
Her mother was at the time out in her field. She came after about four hours of the incident
and found her daughter bleeding. On being asked by the mother why she was bleeding, she
wept and told her mother what had happened. Medical examination showed that the girl was
in fact raped.

The commission of the crime as a fact was thus proved by medical evidence. But only
evidence to connect the crime was the statement of the girl in the witness-box and her
complaint to the mother of which the evidence was given by the mother. So the only
corroboration available was child’s statement to her mother, that is, the earlier statement of
the child is offered as corroboration of her present statement to the court.

The Assistant Sessions Judge did not consider this as a sufficient corroboration and acquitted
him. But the High Court of Rajasthan set aside the acquittal and convicted him. The Supreme
Court first approved the admission of the evidence of the child under section 118, because,

12
(1949) 76 I.A. 147.
13
Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, 1952 SCR 377.

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though she did not understand the meaning of oath and therefore no oath was administered to
her, yet her unsworn statement inspired confidence.

The learned judge expressed the opinion that what she said at or about the time of occurrence
being part of res gestae can be corroborative evidence of her evidence and conviction can be
based on the testimony of the prosecutrix.

In Sheikh Zakir v. State of Bihar14, the court said:

“If a conviction is based on the evidence of a prosecutrix without any corroboration, it will
not be illegal on that sole ground. But in the case of a grown-up or married woman, it is
always safe to insist on corroboration, which can be sought from either direct or
circumstantial evidence or both.”

In State of Maharashtra v. C.K. Jain15, the Supreme Court observed:

“A prosecutrix of a sex offence is not at par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the
crime. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as
in the case of an injured complainant. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and
conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the
outcome of the charge leveled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it
can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in
the Evidence Act similar to the illustration (b) to section 114 which requires the court to look
for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the
testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her
testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice.”

The law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that statement of prosecutrix, if found to be
worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the
accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix.

Conclusion
The Courts in this country have by harmoniously reading Section 114(b) and Section 133
together laid down the guiding principle with respect to accomplice evidence which clearly
lays down the law without any ambiguity. This principle which the courts have evolved is
that though a conviction based upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is not
illegal or unlawful but the rule of prudence says that it is unsafe to act upon the evidence of
an accomplice unless it is corroborated with respect to material aspects so as to implicate the
accused. This guiding principle though very clear is often faced with difficulties with respect
to its implementation. While implementing this principle different judges might have
different levels of corroboration for accomplice evidence and thus with no hard and fast rules
relating to the extent and nature of corroboration an element of subjective ness creeps in
which can result in injustice.

14
AIR 1983 SC 911.
15
AIR 1990 SC 658.

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However in spite of the problems and complexities associated with accomplice evidence it
must be borne in mind that accomplice evidence is of extreme importance and can often play
the decisive role in a criminal trial. The testimony of an accomplice can be equated to an
expert’s testimony. Just as a scientist may give evidence with respect to DNA etc. an
accomplice can testify about the entire background and facts and circumstances of the
offence as he was involved in the commission of the offence and has first hand knowledge of
everything related to the offence. Thus accomplice evidence can help investigators to crack
even the toughest of cases and the accomplice is often the star prosecution witness who by his
testimony can bring the whole truth out into the open and help the Court bring the offenders
to justice. Detractors of accomplice evidence might argue that the testimony of an accomplice
is unreliable and untrustworthy as the accomplice is one who has betrayed his own people to
save his own skin. However such arguments although not baseless can be circumvented by
exercising due care and diligence while dealing with accomplices. Thus Accomplice
Evidence is a necessary evil. However its importance far outweighs its drawbacks and the
complexities it poses. Accomplice Evidence, thus, plays an extremely important role in
crime detection, crime solving and delivering justice and Accomplice Evidence in the trial
can make the difference between delivery of justice and the offender getting away scot-free.

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 Case Law: Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan 1952 SCR 377

Introduction

This case has, being so significant, been cited by so many judgments. The only reason being
that the case has covered various questions of law of general importance. Basically the case
talks about the necessity of corroboration in rape cases; nature and extent of corroboration
necessary; admissibility of statement made "at or about" the time of occurrence; omission to
administer oath in case of a child witness; mother as an “independent” witness in rape cases.

Brief Facts of the Case

1. Purni, a girl of 8 years of age, was living with her mother, Ghisi, in a house which
was situated in the same locality as opposite to that of the accused Rameshwar. On
23rd October, 1946, sometime in the afternoon, when the incident took place, Ghisi
happened to be away. Purni was playing outside her house along with two other girl-
friends, namely, Rukamani a girl of 14 years of age, and Shanti. It was stated that
while these girls were playing together the accused Rameshwar, standing on the roof
of his own house, called them. Out of the three girls he took Purni to his room. In the
room there was a cotton mattress on which Purni was made to lie and attempt was
made by the accused to ravish her. She tried to cry but her mouth was gagged and
after the act was over she was allowed to go away. After coming down from house of
Rameshwar she went to chabutara of her house and was found lying there. When her
mother, Ghisi returned from the field at about 4 p.m. Purni narrated to her what had
happened.
2. The accused Rameshwar was convicted by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Sawai
Jaipur, and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 250.
3. An appeal was made to the Sessions Judge at Jaipur, that being the appropriate
appellate tribunal in that area. The learned Sessions Judge held that the evidence was
sufficient for moral conviction but fell short of legal proof because, in his opinion, the
law requires corroboration of the story of the prosecution in such cases as a matter of
precaution and the corroborative evidence, in so far as it sought to connect the
appellant with the crime, was legally insufficient though morally enough. He was
satisfied however that the girl had been raped by somebody. Accordingly, he acquit-
ted the accused giving him the benefit of the doubt.
4. The State of Sawal Jaipur and Gangapur appealed against the acquittal to the High
Court at Jaipur.
5. The learned High Court Judges held that the law requires corroboration in such cases
but held that the girl's statement made to her mother was legally admissible as
corroboration and considering that sufficient they set aside the acquittal and restored
the conviction and sentence.
6. The High Court later granted leave to appeal under article 134 (1) (c) of the
Constitution as the case involved questions of law of general importance.

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Issues Involved in the Case

1. Whether the evidence of a child under 12 years of age is admissible?

2. Whether a victim of rape is an accomplice?
3. Whether the law requires corroboration in rape cases?
4. What should be the nature and extent of corroboration when it is not considered safe
to dispense with it?
5. Whether the previous statement of an accomplice, or a complainant, be accepted as
corroboration?
6. Whether the mother can be regarded as an "independent" witness in rape cases?

Observations made with regard to the issues involved

The Supreme Court has made the following observations:

1. An omission to administer an oath, even to an adult, goes only to the credibility of the
witness and not his competency; so also an omission of the Court or the authority
examining a child witness formally to record that in its opinion the witness
understands the duty of speaking the truth though he does not understand the nature of
an oath or affirmation, does not affect the admissibility of the evidence given by that
witness. According to Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, there is always
competency in fact unless the court considers otherwise.

Though it is desirable that judges and magistrates should always record their opinion
when a child is to be examined that the child understands the duty of speaking the
truth, and state why they think so, whether a magistrate or judge was really of that
opinion can be gathered from the circumstances when there is no formal certificate to
that effect on the record. That is why, in the present case, it is plain that the learned
Judge had the proviso16 in mind because he certified that the witness does not
understand the nature of an oath and so did not administer one but despite that went
on to take her evidence.

2. A woman who has been raped is not an accomplice. If she was ravished she is the
victim of an outrage. In sexual crimes, the other person, usually the woman, mayor
may not be an accomplice, according to whether she is by the nature of the crime a
victim of it or a voluntary partner in it. Thus, in adultery, the other party may well be

16
The proviso to section 5 of the Indian Oaths Act, 1873, prescribes that--"Provided that where the witness is a
child under twelve years of age, and the Court or person having authority to examine such witness is of opinion
that, though he understands the duty of speaking the truth, he does not understand the nature of an oath or
affirmation, the foregoing provisions of this section and the provisions of section 6 shall not apply to such
witness, but in any such case the absence of an oath or affirmation shall not render inadmissible any evidence
given by such witness nor affect the obligation of the witness to state the truth."

11 | P a g e
 an accomplice, and so also perhaps in incest, and in pandering and pimping. But the
woman is not an accomplice in rape, rape under age, seduction or abortion.
3. In rape cases, the victim can be a consenting party as well as an interested witness.
Keeping all such reasons in mind, a large volume of case law has grown up which
treats the evidence of the complainant somewhat along the same lines as accomplice.
The rule which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that
corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of
corroboration as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to
dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge before a conviction without
corroboration can be sustained. The tender years of the child, coupled with other
circumstances appearing in the case, such for example, as its demeanour, unlikelihood
of tutoring and so forth may render corroboration unnecessary but that is a question of
fact in every case. The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to
the mind of the judge. There is no rule of practice that there must be corroboration
before a conviction can be allowed to stand.

It was laid down that the court can convict without corroboration but the judge should
give some indication in his judgment that he had the rule of caution in mind and
should give reasons why he did not consider corroboration to be necessary or that why
he considered it to be safe to convict without corroboration.

4. Considering the question of the nature and extent of corroboration, the Supreme Court
has pointed to the following guiding principles:

i. It is not necessary that there should be independent confirmation of every

material circumstance in the sense that the independent evidence in the case,
apart from the testimony of the complainant or the accomplice, should in itself
be sufficient to sustain conviction. All that is required is that there must be
some additional evidence rendering it probable that the story of the
accomplice (or complainant) is true and that it is reasonably safe to act upon it.
ii. The independent evidence must not only make it safe to believe that the crime
was committed but must in some way reasonably connect or tend to connect
the accused with it by confirming in some material particular the testimony of
the accomplice or complainant that the accused committed the crime. This
does not mean that the corroboration as to identity must extend to all the
circumstances necessary to identify the accused with the offence. Again, all
that is necessary is that there should be independent evidence which will make

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 it reasonably safe to believe the witness's story that the accused was the one,
or among those, who committed the offence.
iii. The corroboration must come from independent sources and thus ordinarily
the testimony of one accomplice would not be sufficient to corroborate that of
another. But of course the circumstances may be such as to make it safe to
dispense with the necessity of corroboration and in those special
circumstances a conviction so based would not be illegal.
iv. The corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the
crime. It is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection
with the crime. Were it otherwise, "many crimes which are usually committed
between accomplices in secret, such as incest, offences with females" (or
unnatural offences) "could never be brought to justice."

5. A previous statement of an accomplice or a complainant is admissible as evidence of

conduct; it is also admissible as corroborative evidence provided it fulfills the
conditions laid down in see. 15717 of the Evidence Act. The main test as to whether a
previous statement was made "at or about the time when the fact took place", within
the meaning of sec. 157, Evidence Act, is whether the statement was made as early as
can reasonably be expected in the circumstances of the case and before there was an
opportunity for tutoring or concoction.

So, the Supreme Court expressed the opinion that the former statement of an
accomplice can be used as corroboration. This is so by virtue of the illustration (j)18 to
section 8 according to which a complaint about a rape is relevant as evidence of
conduct and also by virtue of section 157 which permits the former statement of a
witness to be proved.

6. Independent merely means independent of sources which are likely to be tainted. It

may be that all mothers may not be sufficiently independent to fulfill the requirements
of the corroboration rule but there is no legal bar to exclude them from its operation
merely on the ground of their relationship. In the absence of enmity against the
accused there is no reason why she should implicate him falsely.

17
"In order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement made by such witness relating to the
same fact at or about the time when the fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to investigate
the fact, may be proved."
18
"The question is whether A was ravished. The facts that, shortly after the alleged rape, she made a complaint
relating to the crime, the circumstances under which, and the terms in which, the complaint was made are
relevant."

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Judgment Pronounced

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and directed the appellant to surrender to his bail in
accordance with the terms of his bond, serve out his sentence and pay the fine.

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 Bibliography

1. B. Malik et al., Law of Evidence- Volume V, Allahabad: Law Publishers India Private
Limited, 1990.
2. Monir, Chief Justice M., Textbook On The Law Of Evidence, Universal Law
Publishing Co., Lucknow, 17th Ed.
3. Pasayat, Dr. Arijit, The Indian Evidence Act 1872 (A Concise Commentary), Asia
Law House, Hyderabad, 1st Ed., 2007.
4. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, Law Of Evidence, Wadhwa & Co., Nagpur, 21st Ed., 2007.
5. Singh, Dr. Avtar, Principles of The Law of Evidence, Central Law Publications,
Allahabad, 19th Ed., 2011.
6. Woodroffe, Sir John & Syed Amir Ali, Law Of Evidence Vol. 3, Lexis Nexis,
Nagpur, 18th Ed., 2009.

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