People vs CA GR no.

108000

In resolving the issue in this petition, the proper question we should address is: Was there a failure to
observe the spirit and intent of Sec. 9, Rule 119 in the case at bar? We rule in the negative. The
prosecution has submitted the sworn statement of accused Nonilo Arile and its evidence showing that
the conditions for discharge have been met. Neither can it be denied that the defense was able to
oppose the motion to discharge Nonilo Arile. With both litigants able to present their side, the lack of
actual hearing was not fatal enough to undermine the court's ability to determine whether the
conditions prescribed under Section 9, Rule 119 were satisfied. Having received evidence for and against
the discharge, the Court avoided a repetition of the case of Flores v. Sandiganbayan (Supra).

Nor was there a violation of due process as private respondent Jose Pring insists. As held in the case of
Juanita Yap Say and William Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.6

. . . "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court. Where a party was given the
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, there can be denial of procedural
due process. "Due process is not semper et ubique judicial process."

We reiterate: private respondent Jose Pring has filed his opposition to the motion to discharge Nonilo
Arile and even discussed the material points of the latter's testimony in his petition for bail. His assertion
then that there was a denial of due process for failure to conduct a hearing in support of the discharge is
unfounded and not substantiated after a perusal of the records of the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No.
28933 rendered on October 23, 1992 is SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Order of Discharge of Nonilo Arile
issued by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 94159 on September 8, 1992 is thus REINSTATED. The
temporary restraining order of March 30, 1993 issued by the Court En Banc is hereby LIFTED.

Bogo-medellin v Judge Son

Won there was improper discharge and will constitute Dounlenjeopardy

Notwithstanding, however, the apparent failure to comply with all of the above listed requisites for the
discharge of one of several accused to be a witness for the prosecution, the discharge of petitioner
Hermosa must be considered as valid for present purposes, that is, for determination of whether a
second and prohibited jeopardy would attach upon reinstatement of Hermosa as a co-accused in the
qualified theft information. The general rule is that the discharge of an accused in order that he may turn
state witness, is expressly left to the discretion of the trial court.

Until it is shown that the discharged accused has in fact failed or refused to testify against his co-
defendant, subsequent proof showing that any or all of the conditions listed in section 9 of Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court had not been actually fulfilled, would not affect the legal consequence of the
discharge, i.e., would not wipe away the resulting acquittal. Using an analogy drawn from the civil law,
the failure or refusal of the discharged accused to testify against his co-accused constitutes a resolutory
condition that results in lifting of the defense of double jeopardy. The actual testimony of the discharged
accused against his co-accused is not, contrary to what respondent Judge Son believed, a condition
precedent to the availability of the double jeopardy defense.

-this is a repetition of the previous case. It is a subject to a resolutory condition. Only when he fails or
refuse to be a witness. The moment you are discharged, acquitted na yan. The testimony is not a
condition precedent for the acquittal. It is only a resolutory condition.