BATONG BUHAY V.

DELA SERNA
August 6, 1999
G.R. No. 86963
Petitioner: Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc.
Respondents: Hon. Dionisio dela Serna, Elsie Rosalinda Ty, Antonia Mendelebar,
Ma. Concepcion Reyes, and the other complainants
Ponente: J. Purisima

FACTS:
The petitioner, Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc., in a Petition for Certiorari, prays to
annul the three orders dated September 16, 1988, December 14, 1988 and February 13, 1989
issued by the respondent, Department of Labor and Employment Undersecretary Dionisio
dela Serna.
Respondent-employees, Ty, Mendelebar, and Reyes, first filed a complaint against
Batong Buhay for the non-payment of basic pay and allowances. The Regional Director
issued an order directing Batong Buhay to pay the appropriate amount. When the latter failed
to pay, the Regional Director appointed a Special Sheriff to collect the appropriate amount
from Batong Buhay by means of an auction sale of the latter’s properties. Batong Buhay
appealed, but, on September 16, 1988, dela Serna upheld the decision of the Regional
Director. Motions for Reconsideration were filed by Batong Buhay, but, the assailed orders,
dated December 14, 1988, and February 13, 1989, denied the former, directing the exclusion
from annulment of the properties sold at the auction sale.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by
the employees of BBGMI; and
(2) Whether or not the auction sales conducted by the said Special Sheriff are valid.

DECISION:
(1) Yes. The Regional Director has jurisdiction over the Batong Buhay employees.
As stated under Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, “the Minister of Labor or his duly
authorized representative shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice
and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of this Code based on the
findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of
inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the
enforcement of their order, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of
the labor regulations officers and raises issues which cannot be resolved without
 considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the ordinary course of
inspection.”

(2) The auction sale in the first Order were NULL and VOID since the petitioner’s
properties constituted a mortgage with the Development Bank of the Philippines. With
respect to the auction sale in the second Order, public respondent had no authority to
validate the said auction sale since MFT Corporation and Salter Holdings Pty., Ltd., as
purchasers for value, acquired legal title over subject properties. Properties. Thus, the
auction sale in the second Order is also NULL and VOID. The third Order, declaring
the auction sale as valid, was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and was set aside.

JMM PROMOTION V. CA
August 5, 1996
G.R. No. 120095
Petitioners: JMM Promotion And Management, Inc., and Kary International, Inc.
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Hon. Ma. Nieves Confessor, Hon. Jose Brillantes, and
Hon. Felicisimo Joson
Ponente: J. Kapunan

FACTS:
The government, through the Secretary of Labor and Employment, created the
Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which was tasked with issuing guidelines
on the training, testing, certification and deployment of performing artists abroad. The
Department of Labor, following the EIAC's recommendation, issued a series of orders
implementing a new system. Such orders provide that performing artists successfully
hurdling the test, training and certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record
Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA); and provide for the minimum
salary to be received.
The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines, in a civil case,
assailed the orders stating that the orders violated the right to travel, abridged existing
contracts for employment, and deprived artists of their individual rights. Herein petitioners
intervened in the said case, but, the Trial Court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
EIAC.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the issued orders constitute a valid exercise of the State’s police power.

DECISION:
Yes. “Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good.”
Following the alarming number of abused Filipina performing artists overseas, “the
government began instituting measures. The issued orders “rationalize the method of
screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them,
and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable
demands of employment as artists abroad. ”

Hence, finding no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed, petition is

hereby denied.

CALALANG V. WILLIAMS
December 2, 1940
G. R. No. 47800
Petitioner: Maximo Calalang
Respondents: A. D. Williams, Vicente Fragante, Sergio Bayan, Eulogio Rodriguez, and Juan
Dominguez
Ponente: J. Laurel
FACTS:
The National Traffic Commission, in a resolution, recommended to the Director of
Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn
vehicles be prohibited from passing along some streets in certain time for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The latter approved the
recommendation with modification. Thus, the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of
Police of Manila have enforced the rules and regulations adopted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the rules and regulations complained of violate the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people.

DECISION:
No. “Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by
the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est
suprema lex.” The legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in CA No. 548 is
“to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest.”

Hence, the Writ of Prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the
petitioner.
PLDT V. NLRC
August 23, 1988
G.R. No. 80609
Petitioner: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
Respondents: The National Labor Relations Commission, and Marilyn Abucay
Ponente: J. Cruz

FACTS:
Private respondent, Marilyn Abucay, a traffic operator of the PLDT, received an amount
of P3,800.00 to facilitate the approval of applications for telephone installation. Proven guilty,
she has been removed from service. Abucay went to the Ministry of Labor and Employment
claiming she had been illegally removed. However, her complaint was dismissed for lack of
merit, but, with separation pay. The National Labor Relations Board also upheld the said
decision in toto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of separation pay is justified.

DECISION:
No. The private respondent has been dismissed for dishonesty, as found by the labor
arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC, and by which she has impliedly admitted. She should not
have betrayed the company given the fact that she has worked with the PLDT for more than a
decade. If the separation pay has been justified, it will be more of a prize for disloyalty, and
thus “perverting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor.”
The Court states that, “separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only
in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious
misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid
dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like
theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give
the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is
called, on the ground of social justice.”
 Hence, the petition is granted. The challenged resolution of September 22,1987, is
affirmed in toto except for the grant of separation pay in the form of financial assistance,
which is hereby disallowed.

AGABON V. NLRC
November 17, 2004
G.R. No. 158693
Petitioners: Jenny Agabon, and Virgilio Agabon
Respondents: National Labor Relations Commission, Riviera Home Improvements, Inc., and
Vicente Angeles

Ponente: J. Ynares-Santiago

FACTS:
Herein petitioners, Jenny Agabon and Virgilio Agabon, were employees of the private
respondent, Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. since 1992. However, they were dismissed in
1999 for abandonment of work. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
payment of money claims. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring their dismissals
illegal, and ordered private respondent to pay the monetary claims. The NLRC reversed the
Labor Arbiter’s decision, and stating that the petitioners were not entitled to backwages and
separation pay since they had abandoned their work. The Court of Appeals reversed NLRC’s
ruling, and ordered the payment of money claims.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were illegally dismissed.

DECISION:
Yes. Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code states that “gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties” is a just cause for the termination by the employer. In February 1999,
petitioners were frequently absent since they also do installation work for another company.
“Subcontracting for another company clearly showed the intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship with private respondent.” This was not the first time they did
this since in January 1996, they also did not report for work because they were working for
another company.
“The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners
abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not
follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known
addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately
for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice
requirements to the employees last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for
non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.”

Hence, the petition is denied.

SERRANO V. NLRC
January 27, 2000
G.R. No. 117040
Petitioner: Ruben Serrano
Respondents: National Labor Relations Commission, and Isetann Department Store
Ponente: J. Mendoza

FACTS:
Herein private respondent, Isetann Department Store, hired petitioner, Ruben Serrano, in
1984 as a security checker to apprehend shoplifters and prevent theft of merchandise. In 1988,
he became Head of the Security Checkers Section. However, as a cost-cutting measure in
1991, private respondent decided to “phase out its entire security section and engage the
services of an independent security agency.” With this, petitioner has been terminated from
service.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal layoff,
unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of salary and overtime pay.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner. Private respondent appealed to the NLRC.
The latter reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, and ordered petitioner to be given
separation pay. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but, was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the hiring of an independent security agency by the private respondent to
replace its current security section a valid ground for the dismissal of the employees classed
under the latter.

DECISION:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that “the termination of petitioner’s services was for an
authorized cause, i.e., redundancy. Pursuant to Art. 283 of the Labor Code, petitioner should
be given separation pay at the rate of one month pay for every year of service.” However,
petitioner was denied his right to be given written notice before the termination of his
employment. “With respect to Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the employer’s failure to comply
with the notice requirement does not constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to
observe a procedure for the termination of employment which makes the termination of
employment merely ineffectual.”
 Hence, “the petition is granted and the resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission is modified by ordering private respondent Isetann Department Store, Inc. to pay
petitioner separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, his unpaid
salary, and his proportionate 13th month pay and, in addition, full backwages from the time
his employment was terminated on October 11, 1991 up to the time the decision herein
becomes final.”

DUNCAN V. GLAXO
September 17, 2004
G.R. No. 162994
Petitioners: Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO, and Pedro A. Tecson
Respondent: Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.
Ponente: J. Tinga

FACTS:
The petition, filed before the Supreme Court, alleged the following:
(a) Petitioner Pedro Tecson signed a contract of employment by which he agreed to disclose to
management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with
co-employees or employees of competing drug companies, and should management find
that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company;
(b) In September 1998, Tecson married Betsy, a branch coordinator of Astra Pharmaceuticals
(Glaxo’s competitor) in Albay;
(c) In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del
Sur sales area due to conflict of interest;
(d) On November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board rendered
its Decision declaring Glaxo’s policy as valid on relationships between its employees and
persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxos right to transfer
Tecson to another sales territory; and
(e) On May 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for
Review on the ground that the NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision stating that
Glaxo’s policy is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Glaxo’s Policy against its employees
marrying employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said
policy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution; and
 (2) Whether Tecson was constructively dismissed.

HELD:
(1) No. No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeal’s ruling stating that Glaxo’s
policy is a valid exercise of management prerogative. “The prohibition against personal or
marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise
the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims
to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to
its secrets and procedures.”
(2) No. “The Court finds no merit in petitioners’ contention that Tecson was constructively
dismissed. The record does not show that Tecson was demoted or unduly discriminated
upon by reason of such transfer. As found by the appellate court, Glaxo properly exercised
its management prerogative in reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales area. In this
case, petitioner’s transfer to another place of assignment was merely in keeping with the
policy of the company in avoidance of conflict of interest.”

Hence, the petition is denied for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

YRASUEGUI V. PAL
October 17, 2008
G.R. No. 168081
Petitioner: Armando Yrasuegui
Respondent: Philippine Airlines, Inc.
Ponente: J. Reyes

FACTS:
Herein petitioner, Armando Yrasuegui, an international flight steward, was dismissed
because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the respondent, Philippine Airlines,
Inc. (PAL). The ideal weight for a man of his height and body structure is 166 pounds, as
mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL. He weighed more than 40
pounds beyond the limit. Because of this, he was given vacation leaves in order to lose
weight. However, with a span of almost five years given to him, the petitioner still failed to
attain the ideal weight. Thus, in 1993, PAL terminated his services.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL. The Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC ruled in favor of the petitioner. However the Court of Appeals reversed the prior
decision, and declared it null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was validly dismissed.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal
under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. The weight standards violated establish continuing
qualifications for an employee’s position, which in this case, a cabin crew. The test of
reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to the bona fide
occupational qualification which provides that it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance. “A common carrier, from the nature of its
business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the
safety of the passengers it transports. It is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances.” Also, prior to petitioner’s employment, PAL’s
weight standards has been made known to him, and “never did he question the authority
of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim down his weight.”
“Separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act of social justice,or
based on equity given that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) does not
reflect on the moral character of the employee.”
Hence,“the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed but modified in that
petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui is entitled to separation pay in an amount equivalent
to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of service, which should include his regular
allowances.”

PUNZAL V. ETSI
March 9, 2007
G.R. No. 170384-85
Petitioner: Lorna Dising Punzal
Respondents: ETSI Technologies, Inc., Werner Geisert, and Carmelo Remudaro
Ponente: J. Carpio Morales

FACTS:
Herein petitioner, Lorna Punzal, was a Department Secretary in ETSI Technologies, Inc.
In November 26, 2001, her services have been terminated because of the electronic mail
message she sent to her colleagues, which read: “Sorry for the mail that I sent you,
unfortunately the SVP of ETSI Technologies, Inc. did not agree to our idea to bring our
children in the office for the TRICK or TREATING. He was so unfair para bang palagi
siyang iniisahan sa trabaho bakit most of the parents na mag-joined ang anak ay naka-VL
naman. Anyway, solohin na lang niya bukas ang office. Anyway, to those parents who would
like to bring their kids in Megamall there will be Trick or Treating at Mc Donalds Megamall
Bldg. A at 10:00 AM tomorrow and let’s not spoil the fun for our kids.” Petitioner received a
a letter “finding her explanation not acceptable and terminating her services, effective
immediately, for committing Article IV, No[s]. 5 & 8, improper conduct or act of discourtesy
or disrespect and making malicious statements concerning company officer.”
“On February 11, 2002, petitioner filed before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) a complaint for illegal dismissal against herein respondents. The NLRC held that she
was legally dismissed, but to be awarded with separation pay. The Court of Appeals also held
that the termination of petitioner’s services was just.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was validly terminated.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that “in circulating the said e-mail message, petitioner
violated Articles III (8) and IV (5) of ETSI’s Code of Conduct on making false or malicious
statements concerning the Company, its officers and employees or its products and
services, and improper conduct or acts of discourtesy or disrespect to fellow employees,
visitors, guests, clients, at any time. In petitioner’s case, her assailed conduct was related to
her work. It reflects an unwillingness to comply with reasonable management directives.”
Given the fact that the petitioner has worked with the company for 12 years, she must have
greater responsibility for knowledge and compliance with the norms of conduct and the code
of discipline in the company.
The said e-mail message shows that her remarks were not merely an expression of her
opinion about Senior Vice President Werner Geisert’s decision, rather, they were directed
against Geisert himself. Punzal’s e-mail also encouraged her colleagues to ignore Geisert’s
authority. “Petitioner, having been dismissed for just cause, is neither entitled to
reinstatement nor to backwages.”
Hence, “the petition is in part granted. The questioned decision is affirmed with
the modification that respondent ETSI Technologies, Inc. is ordered to pay petitioner, Lorna
Punzal, nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.”
PASCUAL JR. V. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS
May 26, 1969
G.R. No. L-25018
Petitioner-Appellee: Arsenio Pascual Jr.
Respondent-Appellant/Intervenors-Appellants: Board of Medical Examiners, Salvador
Gatbonton, and Enriqueta Gatbonton
Ponente: J. Fernando

FACTS:
Herein petitioner-appellee, Arsenio Pascual, Jr., filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against
respondent-appellant, Board of Medical Examiners, on February 1, 1965. It was alleged
therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, it was
announced that herein petitioner-appellee would present himself as a witness to the
malpractice charge. Arsenio Pascual Jr., through counsel, made an objection, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself.
Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, yet stated that at
the next scheduled hearing, the petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as such
witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent
authority.
The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner-appellee, finding the latter’s claim to be
well-founded, and prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and
testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against
himself."

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the right against self-incrimination can be availed of in an administrative
hearing.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that “in an administrative hearing against a medical
practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot,
consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take
the witness stand without his consent.”
“The Self-Incrimination Clause extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other
individuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment
and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it. Such a principle is equally
applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the
medical profession.” The constitutional guarantee also states that “the accused has a perfect
right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt.”

Hence, “the decision of the lower court of August 2, 1965 is affirmed. Without
pronouncement as to costs.”

CABAL V. KAPUNAN JR.

December 29, 1962
G.R. No. L-19052
Petitioner: Manuel Cabal
Respondents: Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and The City Fiscal of Manila
Ponente: J. Concepcion

FACTS:
On or about August 1961, herein petitioner, Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, was charged with “graft, corrupt practices, unexplained
wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman dictatorial tendencies, giving false
statements of his assets and liabilities in 1958, and other equally reprehensible acts.” The
President of the Philippines created a Committee of five members to investigate the charge of
unexplained wealth and submit its report and recommendations as soon as possible. The
Committee requested Cabal to take the witness stand in support of his aforementioned charge
of unexplained wealth. However, petitioner objected invoking his constitutional right against
self-incrimination. The committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn
to, yet, petitioner respectfully refused. Thus, the Committee referred the matter to respondent,
City Fiscal of Manila, by which the decision was in favor of the Committee.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness stand
violates his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

HELD:
 Yes. “In general, both at common law and under a constitution provision against
compulsory self-incrimination, a person may not be compelled to answer any question as a
witness which would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, or testify in action against him for
a penalty.”
“The purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the
forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income and
the income from legitimately acquired property. Such for forfeiture has been held, however,
to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of proper
are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from
the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.”

Hence, “the writ prayed for is granted, and respondent Judge hereby enjoined
permanently from proceeding further in Criminal Case No. 60111 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila.”

WATEROUS DRUG V. NLRC

October 16, 1997
G.R. No. 113271
Petitioners: Waterous Drug Corporation, and Emma Co
Respondents: National Labor Relations Commission, and Antonia Melodia Catolico
Ponente: J. Davide Jr.

FACTS:

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness stand
violates his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

HELD:

Hence, “the instant petition is hereby dismissed, and the challenged decision and
resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated September 30, 1993 and
December 2, 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are affirmed, except as to
its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiters decision, viz., that the evidence against private
respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights
of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby
set aside. Costs against petitioners.”