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SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS CASES: RULES 62-63

RULE 62

1. Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005

2. Ramos v. Ramos, G.R. No. 144294, March 11, 2003
3. Mesina v. IAC, G.R. No. L-70143, November 13, 1986
4. RCBC v. Metro Container, G.R. No. 127913, September 13, 2001
5. Lim v. Continental Dev’t Corp. (161 Phil. 453), 1976

RULE 63

1. BIR v. First E-Bank Tower, G.R. No. 215801, January 15, 2020
2. Dep’t of Finance v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 209331, August 24, 2015
3. City of Lapu-Lapu v. PEZA, G.R. No. 184201, November 26, 2014
4. Commissioner v. Standard Insurance, G.R. No. 219340, November 7, 2018
5. AISL, Inc. v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 222239, January 15, 2020
6. Martelino v. NHMF Corp., G.R. No. 160208, June 30, 2008
7. Baguio Citizen’s Action v. City Council, G.R. No. L-27247, April 20, 1983
8. Allied Broadcasting Center v. Republic, G.R. No. 91500, October 18, 1990
9. Salvacion v. Central Bank, G.R. No. 94273, August 21, 1997
10. De la Llana v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-47245, December 9, 1977

RULE 62

1. Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioner Leonardo Ocampo bought the subject land from Rosauro Breton, heir of the subject
land’s registered owner, Alipio Breton Cruz. Ocampo possessed and administered the subject land
although the TCT is not yet in his name. Respondent Leonora Tirona, on the other hand, is a lessee
occupying a portion of the subject land.
Ocampo notified Tirona about the sale. Tirona religiously paid her rents to Ocampo. However,
when the subject premises were declared under area for priority development, Tirona invoked her right of
first refusal and refused to pay her rent until the National Housing Authority processed her papers.
Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. In her Answer, Tirona asserted that Doña
Yaneza was the owner of the land and not Ocampo. She also reiterated her right of first refusal over the
land.
In the RTC, Tirona changed her theory and stated that Alipio Breton is the registered owner of the
subject land. When Alipio Breton died, his children, Rosauro Breton and Maria Lourdes Breton-
Mendiola, inherited the subject land. Tirona claimed that she has never stopped paying her rent to Maria
Lourdes.
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ISSUE:
W/N the action for interpleader is proper.
HELD:
No. Ocampo notified Tirona that he purchased the subject land from Tirona’s lessor. An action
for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to
conflicting claims on the property. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence and
not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader.
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or
real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both,
or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court
and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand
compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally
who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double
liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability.

2. Ramos v. Ramos, G.R. No. 144294, March 11, 2003

FACTS:
A parcel of land in Tondo, Manila is co-owned by petitioners’ late father, Paulino Chanliongco
Jr., his sister Narcisa, and his brothers Mario and Antonio. By virtue of a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) executed by the co-owners in favor of Narcisa, her daughter Adoracion Mendoza had sold the lot
to herein respondents.
Respondents filed with the RTC a Complaint for interpleader to resolve the various ownership
claims because of conflict among the heirs of the co-owners as to the validity of the said sale. RTC ruled
that Adoracion had no authority to sell the shares of the other co-owners since the SPA had only been
executed in favor of her mother, Narcisa.
CA, however, modified the ruling of the RTC and held that while there was no Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Adoracion, the sale was valid since she had been authorized by her mother to be the
latter’s sub-agent.

ISSUE:
W/N the Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC called for an interpleader to determine the
ownership of the real property in question.

HELD:
Yes. It forced person claiming an interest in the land to settle the dispute among themselves as to
which of them owned the property. Essentially, it sought to resolve the ownership of the land and was not
directed against the personal liability of any particular person. It was a real action which affected title to
or possession of real property. As such, the Complaint was brought against the deceased registered co-
owners: Narcisa, Mario, Paulino, and Antonio Chanliangco, as represented by their respective estates.
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3. Mesina v. IAC, G.R. No. L-70143, November 13, 1986

FACTS:
Associated Bank filed an Interpleader against Jose Go and Petitioner Marcelo Mesina regarding
their conflicting claims over Associated Bank Cashier's Check No. 011302.
Go purchased a cashier's check for P800,000.00 from Associated Bank. He left said check on top
of the bank manager’s desk when he left the bank. The bank manager entrusted the check for safekeeping
to bank official, Albert Uy. While Uy went to the men's room, the check was stolen by his visitor,
Alexander Lim. Upon discovering that the check was lost, Go accomplished a "STOP PAYMENT"
order.
Two days later, Associated Bank received the lost check for clearing from Prudential Bank. After
dishonoring the same check twice, Associated Bank received summons and copy of a complaint for
damages of Mesina who was in possession of the lost check and is demanding payment. Petitioner claims
that a cashier's check cannot be countermanded in the hands of a holder in due course.

ISSUE:
W/N the interpleader filed by Associated Bank is proper.
HELD:
Yes. Respondent bank merely took the necessary precaution not to make a mistake as to whom to
pay, and therefore interpleader was its proper remedy. The interpleader suit was filed by respondent bank
because petitioner and Jose Go were both laying their claims on the check.
Bank filed the interpleader suit not because petitioner sued it, but because petitioner is laying
claim to the same check that Go is claiming.

4. RCBC v. Metro Container, G.R. No. 127913, September 13, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure
proceeding against Ley Construction Corporation (LEYCON) when the latter failed to settle its loan
obligations. In a bidding, RCBC was the highest bidder. LEYCON promptly filed an action for
Nullification of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and Damages against RCBC. Meanwhile, RCBC
consolidated its ownership over the property due to LEYCON's failure to redeem the mortgaged property
within the 12-month redemption period. RCBC, then, demanded rental payments from Respondent Metro
Container Corporation (METROCAN) which was leasing the mortgaged property from LEYCON.
LEYCON filed an action for Unlawful Detainer against METROCAN. Consequently,
METROCAN filed a complaint for Interpleader against LEYCON and RCBC to compel them to
interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves, and to determine which among them shall
rightfully receive the payment of monthly rentals on the subject property.
In a judgment rendered in the Unlawful Detainer case, METROCAN was ordered to pay
LEYCON whatever rentals due on the subject premises. METROCAN and LEYCON separately filed a
motion to dismiss the interpleader case. However, the said motions were dismissed for lack of merit.
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METROCAN appealed to the Court of Appeals which granted the petition and ordered the dismissal of
the interpleader case. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
W/N METROCAN may unilaterally cause the dismissal of the interpleader case.

HELD:
Yes. METROCAN moved for the dismissal of the interpleader action not because it is no longer
interested but because there is no more need for it to pursue such cause of action.
It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is afforded to protect a person not against
double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability. It requires, as an indispensable
requisite, that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-
in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the claimants." The decision in the Unlawful Detainer case resolved the conflicting
claims insofar as payment of rentals was concerned.

5. Lim v. Continental Dev’t Corp. (161 Phil. 453), 1976

FACTS:
Continental Development Corporation filed a complaint for interpleader against the defendants
Benito Tan and Zoila Lim. Tan has been demanding from the plaintiff company, by letters and telegrams,
the release to him of the certificates of stock but which the plaintiff cannot do because of an adverse claim
by the other defendant. Lim alleges that the same shares of stocks really belonged to her late mother, So
Bi.
Plaintiff contends that it is not sufficiently informed of the rights of the claimants and thus, not in
a position to determine justly and correctly their conflicting claims.

ISSUE:
W/N the complaint for interpleader is proper.

HELD:
Yes. There is an active conflict of interests between Tan and Lim over the disputed shares of
stock.
An interpleader merely demands as a sine qua non element that there be two or more claimants to
the fund or thing in dispute through separate and different interests. The claims must be adverse before
relief can be granted and the parties sought to be interpleaded must be in a position to make effective
claims. Also, the fund, thing, or duty, over which the parties assert adverse claims, must be one and the
same and derived from the same source.
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RULE 63

1. BIR v. First E-Bank Tower, G.R. No. 215801, January 15, 2020

FACTS:
Respondent First E-Bank filed a petition for declaratory relief seeking to declare as invalid
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 65-2012 (RMC No. 65-2012).
Respondent bank was a non-stock non-profit condominium corporation. It owned and possessed a
condominium office building. RMC No. 65-2012 imposed on it 2 tax liabilities: 1) value-added tax
(VAT); and b) income tax.
It alleged that RMC No. 65-2012 burdened the owners of the condominium units with income tax
and VAT on their own money which they exclusively used for the maintenance and preservation of the
building and its premises. It also claimed that it was oppressive and confiscatory because it required
condominium unit owners to produce additional amounts for the 32% income tax and 12% VAT.

ISSUE:
W/N a petition for declaratory relief is proper for the purpose of invalidating RMC No. 65-2012.

HELD:
No. The Court rules that certiorari or prohibition, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy to
assail the validity or constitutionality of executive issuances.
One of the requisites for an action for declaratory relief is that it must be filed before any breach
or violation of an obligation. Thus, there is no actual case involved in a Petition for Declaratory Relief. It
cannot be the proper vehicle to invoke the judicial review powers to declare a statute unconstitutional.
It is elementary that before this Court can rule on a constitutional issue, there must first be a
justiciable controversy. A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.

2. Dep’t of Finance v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 209331, August 24, 2015

FACTS:
EO 140 created the Customs Policy Research Office (CPRO) in the Department of Finance
(DOF). On the same day of EO 140’s publication, Bureau of Customs (BOC) Commissioner issued
Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 (CPO 189-2013) detailing 27 BOC personnel, including
respondents. CPO 189-2013 was approved by DOF Secretary Cesar Purisima.
Respondents filed an action for Declaratory Relief before the RTC, regarding the validity and
constitutionality of CPO 189-2013 and EO 140. Petitioners, then, alleged that the case involves personnel
action affecting public officers which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC). It also alleged that CPO 189-2013 is an internal personnel order with application that is limited to
and only within BOC and as such, it cannot be the subject of an action for declaratory relief.

ISSUE:
W/N RTC has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief filed by respondents.
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HELD:
Yes. Disciplinary cases and cases involving personnel actions, including "appointment through
certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and
separation," are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC.
The petition, however, went beyond questioning the detail of respondents. When respondents
raised the issue of validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, the issue took the case beyond the
scope of the CSC's jurisdiction because the matter is no longer limited to personnel action. Thus, the RTC
did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of the action.

3. City of Lapu-Lapu v. PEZA, G.R. No. 184201, November 26, 2014

FACTS:
PD 66 created the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) to operate, administer, and manage
the export processing zones. Under the decree, EPZA was declared as non-profit in character and exempt
from real property tax.
By virtue of RA 7916, the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) was created to operate,
administer, manage, and develop economic zones in the country. Subsequently, EPZA was absorbed by
PEZA.
Lapu-Lapu City demanded payment of real property tax from PEZA for the latter’s property in
the Mactan Economic Zone. However, PEZA did not pay.
PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC, praying that the trial court declare it
exempt from the payment of real property tax. RTC granted PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief and
declared it exempt from the payment of real property tax. The City appealed to the CA, but the CA
dismissed the appeal.

ISSUE:
W/N RTC has jurisdiction over PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief.

HELD:
No. An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. It may be entertained only before the breach or
violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers.
In the instant case, the City had already issued demand letters and real property tax assessment
against the PEZA. The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the subject matter of PEZA’s petition for
declaratory relief, had already been breached.
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4. Commissioner v. Standard Insurance, G.R. No. 219340, November 7, 2018

FACTS:
Respondent Standard Insurance initiated a declaratory relief which enjoins petitioner
Commissioner or any person acting on her behalf from proceeding with the implementation or
enforcement of Sections 108 and 184 of the National Internal Revenue Code against the respondent.
Respondent received a demand for the payment of its deficiency income tax, value-added tax,
premium tax, DST, expanded withholding tax, and fringe benefit tax for taxable year 2012, and
deficiency DST for taxable year 2013. Thus, it commenced Civil Case No. 14-1330 in the RTC for the
judicial determination of the constitutionality of Section 108 and Section 184 of the NIRC with respect to
the taxes to be paid by non-life insurance companies.

ISSUE:
W/N the action for declaratory relief was a proper remedy.

HELD:
No. The requisites for the remedy of declaratory relief are not all present. The third, fourth, fifth,
and sixth requisites were not met.
An action for declaratory relief is governed by Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. It is
predicated on the attendance of several requisites, specifically: (1) the subject matter of the controversy
must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or
ordinance; (2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction; (3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; (4) there must be an actual
justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; (5) the
issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and (6) adequate relief is not available through other means
or other forms of action or proceeding.

5. AISL, Inc. v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 222239, January 15, 2020

FACTS:
Petitioners Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc., Apl Co. Pte Ltd., and Maersk-
Filipinas, Inc. initiated the present petition for declaratory relief, challenging Section 4.4 of Revenue
Regulation No. 15-2013 (RR 15-2013). They argued that said Section invalidly subjects demurrage and
detention fees collected by international shipping carriers to regular corporate income tax rate.
Petitioners also alleged that RR 15-2013 unduly widens the scope of RA 10378 by imposing
additional taxes on international shipping carriers not authorized or provided by law. They claim that
demurrage and detention fees are not income but penalties imposed to allow the carrier to recover losses
or expenses associated with or caused by the undue delay in the loading and/or discharge of shipments
from containers, which are then akin to damages.
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ISSUE:
W/N a petition for declaratory relief is proper for the purpose of invalidating RR 15-2013.

HELD:
No. There is no actual case involved in a petition for declaratory relief. Thus, it cannot be the
proper vehicle to invoke the power of judicial review to declare a state as invalid or unconstitutional. The
proper remedy is certiorari or prohibition.
However, there are precedents for treating a petition for declaratory relief as one for prohibition if
the case has far-reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved for the public good.
The Court has also held that a petition for prohibition is a proper remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of
executive officials that amount to usurpation of legislative authority. Although the petition does not
strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 65, the Court has ample power to waive such technical
requirements when the legal questions to be resolved are of great importance to the public.

6. Martelino v. NHMF Corp., G.R. No. 160208, June 30, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition against the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), herein
respondents, and Sheriff Alberto Castillo before the RTC. Petitioners alleged that they obtained housing
loans from respondents who directly released the proceeds thereof to the subdivision developer, Shelter
Philippines, Inc. (Shelter).
Respondents ignored their right to suspend amortization payments for Shelter’s failure to
complete the subdivision, charged interests and penalties on their outstanding loans, threatened to
foreclose their mortgages and initiated foreclosure proceedings against petitioner Rafael Martelino.
Petitioners prayed that respondents be restrained from foreclosing their mortgages, and that they
be allowed to pay their housing loans without interest and penalties.

ISSUE:
W/N the petition for declaratory relief was proper as a petition for prohibition.

HELD:
No. Under Section 1, Rule 63, a person must file a petition for declaratory relief before breach or
violation of a deed, will, contract, other written instrument, statute, executive order, regulation, ordinance
or any other governmental regulation.
Petitioners’ actual suspension of payments defeated the purpose of the action to secure an
authoritative declaration of their supposed right to suspend payment for their guidance. Thus, RTC could
no longer assume jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief because there was an occurrence of
breach before filing the action.
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7. Baguio Citizen’s Action v. City Council, G.R. No. L-27247, April 20, 1983

FACTS:
Petitioners-Appellants, Baguio Citizens Action Inc., and Junior Chamber of Baguio City, Inc.,
filed a petition for declaratory relief in the Court of First Instance of Baguio regarding the validity of
Ordinance 386 passed by the City Council of Baguio City. Such ordinance is primarily designed to extend
a helping hand to the numerous landless city residents and the so-called ‘Squatters’ within the Baguio
Townsite in their desire to acquire residential lots which they may rightly call their own.
The petition was dismissed where it was alleged that those who come within the protection of the
ordinance have not been made parties to the suit in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 63 and it has been
held that the non-joinder of such parties is a jurisdictional defect.

ISSUE:
W/N joinder of all necessary parties is required in the present action for declaratory relief.

HELD:
No. Here, the squatters are not necessary parties where the determination of the issue would after
all be binding upon them. The reason for the law requiring the joinder of all necessary parties is that
failure to do so would deprive the declaration of the final and pacifying function the action for declaratory
relief is calculated to promote, as they would not be bound by the declaration and may raise the identical
issue.
Although it is true that any declaration by the court would affect the squatters, the latter are not
necessary parties because the question involved is the power of the Municipal Council to enact the
Ordinances in question. Whether or not they are impleaded, any determination of the controversy would
be binding upon the squatters.

8. Allied Broadcasting Center v. Republic, G.R. No. 91500, October 18, 1990

FACTS:
RA 3001 granted petitioner the permit or franchise to construct, maintain and operate radio
broadcasting stations in the Philippines. Through said broadcasting stations, petitioner was able to provide
adequate public service which enabled the government to reach the population on important public issues,
and assist the government in programs relating to public information and education. Its radio stations
have never been used for the broadcasting of obscene or indecent language or speech, or for the
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dissemination of misleading information or willful misrepresentation, or to the detriment of the public

health, or to incite, encourage or assist in subversion or treasonable acts.
When PD 576-A, "Decree Regulating the Ownership and Operation of Radio and Television
Stations and for Other Purposes," was issued, petitioner’s franchise or permit, among others, has been
deemed terminated or revoked.
Petitioner, having left with only 3 radio stations, alleged that the Decree has caused it great and
irreparable damage which even resulted to a loss of income.

ISSUE:
W/N declaratory relief is within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

HELD:
No. A petition for declaratory relief is not among the petitions within the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved.
The petition seeks a declaration of the unconstitutionality and/or nullity of PD 576-A. As such, it
must be treated as one seeking declaratory relief under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Such an action
should be brought before the Regional Trial Court and not before the Supreme Court.
Moreover, there is no actual case or controversy involving the law sought to be annulled. All that
petitioner seeks is the nullification of PD 576-A and the reinstatement of its rights under RA 3001. Hence,
present petition should be dismissed.

9. Salvacion v. Central Bank, G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997

FACTS:
Respondent Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape
and serious illegal detention against petitioner, Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar
checks and a dollar account in China Bank. He was, however, able to escape from prison.
In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and
attorney’s fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00. Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar
deposit of Bartelli with China Bank, but, the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Hence,
this present action for declaratory relief.

ISSUE:
W/N SC may entertain the instant petition.

HELD:
Yes. SC has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. However,
exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and
raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus.
Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. However, this petition for
declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for mandamus to require respondents to
honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214.
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10. De la Llana v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-47245, December 9, 1977

FACTS:
Petitioner Gualberto Dela Llana filed a petition for prohibition or declaratory relief against
respondents Commission on Elections, Commission on Audit, Secretary of Finance and Budget
Commissioner for holding a referendum which reads, "Do you vote that President Ferdinand E. Marcos
continue in office as incumbent President and be Prime Minister after the organization of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa as provided for in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments to the Constitution?"

ISSUE:
W/N the petition for declaratory relief would prosper.
HELD:
No. The matter is a political and non-justiciable question, involving as it does the wisdom, no
more and no less, of the decision to call for a referendum. The power to determine when a referendum
should be called and what matter is important for referral to the people, resides in the political branch of
the Government, the exercise of which involves consideration of a multitude of factors —political, social,
economic, etc. Such factors are normally outside the periphery of competence of the courts.