1. Sagrada Orden vs.

National Coconut Corporation (91 SCRA 503)

Facts Petitioner, Sagrada Orden owned a land which was acquired by a Japanese corporation during the Japanese
military occupation. After the liberation, the Alien Property Custodian took possession, control and custody of the
land. The Copra Export Management Company occupied the property and when it vacated, the respondent, National
Coconut Corporation occupied it through the representation made by the Philippine Government to the Alien
Property Custodian. The property was returned to Sagrada Orden upon judgment that the contract of sale of the
property in favour of the Japanese corporation was null and void and upon payment of the consideration it received
for the property to the Philippine Alien Property Administration. Sagrada Orden was also given the right to recover
from National Coconut Corporation reasonable rentals for the use and occupation of the premises. Sagrada Orden
filed an action to recover rentals from National Coconut Corporation from the time it used and occupied the
premises. National Coconut Corporation claimed that it was willing to pay only from the time the property was
returned to Sagrada Orden and not before, for it occupied the property in good faith, under no obligation to pay the
rentals

Issue Was National Coconut Corporation liable for rentals prior to the date the property was
returned to Sagrada Orden?

Held No. National Coconut Corporation was not liable for the rentals prior to the date the
property was returned to Sagrada Orden. For National Coconut Corporation to be liable, its
obligation must arise from the law, contract or quasi- contract, crime or negligence as provided
by Article 1157 of the Civil Code which was taken from Article 1089 of the old Civil Code. As
none of these sources were present, National Coconut Corporation cannot be held liable. There
was also no express agreement between the entity which had legal control and administration of
the property and the National Coconut Corporation for the latter to pay rentals on the property so
there was no obligation

2. THE METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, vs

ANA GRACE ROSALES AND YO YUK TO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 183204               January 13, 2014

FACTS:

                Petitioner Metrobank is a domestic banking corporation duly organized and existing

under the laws of the Philippines. Respondent Rosales is the owner of a travel agency while Yo
Yuk To is her mother.

                In 2000, respondents opened a Joint Peso Account10 with petitioner’s Pritil-Tondo
Branch.

                In May 2002, respondent Rosales accompanied her client Liu Chiu Fang, a Taiwanese
National applying for a retiree’s visa from the Philippine Leisure and Retirement Authority
(PLRA), to petitioner’s branch in Escolta to open a savings account. Since Liu Chiu Fang could
speak only in Mandarin, respondent Rosales acted as an interpreter for her.
                On March 3, 2003, respondents opened with petitioner’s Pritil-Tondo Branch a Joint
Dollar Account with an initial deposit of US$14,000.00.

                On July 31, 2003, petitioner issued a “Hold Out” order against respondents’ accounts.

                On September 3, 2003, petitioner, through its Special Audit Department Head Antonio
Ivan Aguirre, filed before the Office of the Prosecutor of Manila a criminal case for Estafa
through False Pretences, Misrepresentation, Deceit, and Use of Falsified Documents.

                Respondent Rosales, however, denied taking part in the fraudulent and unauthorized
withdrawal from the dollar account of Liu Chiu Fang.

                On December 15, 2003, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila issued a
Resolution dismissing the criminal case for lack of probable cause. On September 10, 2004,
respondents filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint for Breach of Obligation and Contract
with Damages.

ISSUE:

                Whether Metrobank breached its contract with respondents.

HELD:

                YES. The Court held that Metrobank’s reliance on the “Hold Out” clause in the
Application and Agreement for Deposit Account is misplaced.

                Bank deposits, which are in the nature of a simple loan or mutuum, must be paid upon
demand by the depositor.

                The “Hold Out” clause applies only if there is a valid and existing obligation arising
from any of the sources of obligation enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code, to wit: law,
contracts, quasi-contracts, delict, and quasi-delict. In this case, petitioner failed to show that
respondents have an obligation to it under any law, contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-
delict. And although a criminal case was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosales, this is
not enough reason for petitioner to issue a “Hold Out” order as the case is still pending and no
final judgment of conviction has been rendered against respondent Rosales.

                In fact, it is significant to note that at the time petitioner issued the “Hold Out” order,
the criminal complaint had not yet been filed. Thus, considering that respondent Rosales is not
liable under any of the five sources of obligation, there was no legal basis for petitioner to issue
the “Hold Out” order. Accordingly, we agree with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the
“Hold Out” clause does not apply in the instant case.
                In view of the foregoing, the Court found that petitioner is guilty of breach of contract
when it unjustifiably refused to release respondents’ deposit despite demand. Having breached
its contract with respondents, petitioner is liable for damages.

 3. Saludaga v. FEU and De Jesus, G.R. No. 179337, 30 April 2008. 19 MAR
[YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.]

FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern
University (FEU) when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the security guards on
duty at the school premises on August 18, 1996. Petitioner was rushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor
Reyes Medical Foundation (FEU-NRMF) due to the wound he sustained. Meanwhile, Rosete
was brought to the police station where he explained that the shooting was accidental. Saludaga
thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents on the ground that they breached
their obligation to provide students with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere
conducive to learning. Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy
Development and Management Corporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted by respondent FEU
to provide security services within its premises and Mariano D. Imperial (Imperial), Galaxys
President, to indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor of petitioner, if any; and
to pay attorneys fees and cost of the suit.

ISSUE#1: What is the source of FEU’s obligation to indemnify Saludaga? What is needed to
prove that this obligation of FEU exists? ISSUE#2: In the alternative, is FEU vicariously liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

HELD#1: Culpa contractual. It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the
existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding
right of relief. In the instant case, we find that, when petitioner was shot inside the campus by no
less the security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a prima
facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its o/bligation to provide a safe and secure
environment to its students. HELD#2: NO. [R]espondents cannot be held liable for damages
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because respondents are not the employers of Rosete. The l

4. - People's Car Inc. Vs. Commando Security Service Agency G.R. No. L-36840 May 22, 1973

Facts:
People’s Car Inc. acquired the services of the Commando Security Service Agency to “safeguard
and protect the business premises of the [People’s Car Inc.] from theft, pilferage, robbery,
vandalism, and all other unlawful acts of any person or persons prejudicial to the interest of the
[company].” On April 5, 1970 at around 1:00 A.M., however, defendant's security guard on duty
at plaintiff's premises, "without any authority, consent, approval, knowledge or orders of the
plaintiff and/or defendant brought out of the compound of the plaintiff a car belonging to its
customer, and drove said car for a place or places unknown, abandoning his post as such
security guard on duty inside the plaintiff's compound, and while so driving said car in one of
the City streets lost control of said car, causing the same to fall into a ditch along J.P. Laurel St.,
Davao City by reason of which the plaintiff's complaint for qualified theft against said driver,
was blottered in the office of the Davao City Police Department."

As a result of these wrongful acts of defendant's security guard, the car of plaintiff's customer,
Joseph Luy, which had been left with plaintiff for servicing and maintenance, "suffered
extensive damage in the total amount of P7,079." besides the car rental value "chargeable to
defendant" in the sum of P1,410.00 for a car that plaintiff had to rent and make available to its
said customer to enable him to pursue his business and occupation for the period of forty-
seven (47) days (from April 25 to June 10, 1970) that it took plaintiff to repair the damaged car,
or total actual damages incurred by plaintiff in the sum of P8,489.10. People’s Car Inc.,
(Plaintiff) claimed that CSC Agency (defendant) was liable for the entire amount under
paragraph 5 of their contract whereunder defendant assumed "sole responsibility for the acts
done during their watch hours" by its guards, whereas defendant contended, without
questioning the amount of the actual damages incurred by plaintiff, that its liability "shall not
exceed one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos per guard post" under paragraph 4 of their contract.

Issue:
WON COMMANDO SECURITY SERVICE AGENCY should be liable for the total damages incurred.

Ruling:
Yes. CSC Agency is liable for the total damages. The court misread the contractual provisions of
the parties in Paragraph 4, which limits the liability of the service agency to PHP 1,000.00, only
pertains “if there is any loss or damage through the negligence of its guards during watch
hours.” This is inapplicable to the facts at hand because the security guard was not negligent
besides he acted unlawfully and wrongfully when he drove the car out of the premises without
the consent of PC or CSC Agency. So paragraph 5 will really apply because CSC Agency assumes
the responsibility of proper performance by their guards and shall be solely responsible for all
the acts done during watch hours. It specifically releases PC from any liabilities to 3rd parties
arising from the acts or omissions done by the guards during their duties since CSC Agency
presumes that their SGs are doing their job in good faith, they have contracted to be liable if
the SGs did not do a proper performance of the job.

According to Art 1159, “Obligations has the force of the law between contracting parties should
it be complied in good faith.” In the case at bar, PC has the obligation to repair the damaged car
of the client to honor their contract to the client and cannot tell that under their contract, the
Security Guard was liable, because the client does not have a contract with CSC Agency, so
People’s Car Inc., paid for it first, to be reimbursed by CSC Agency.
5. FAUSTINO CRUZ
vs.
J.M. TUASON & COMPANY, INC. vs. GREGORIO ARANETA, INC.
G.R. No. L-23749 April 29, 1977

FACTS: Faustino Cruz’ complaint alleged two causes of action, namely:

(1) that upon request of the Deudors (the family of Telesforo Deudor who laid claim on the land in question on the
strength of an "informacion posesoria" ) plaintiff made permanent improvements valued at P30,400.00 on said land
having an area of more or less 20 quinones and for which he also incurred expenses in the amount of P7,781.74, and
since defendants-appellees are being benefited by said improvements, he is entitled to reimbursement from them of
said amounts and
(2) that in 1952, defendants availed of plaintiff's services as an intermediary with the Deudors to work for the
amicable settlement of Civil Case No. Q-135, then pending also in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, and
involving 50 quinones of land, of Which the 20 quinones aforementioned form part, and notwithstanding his having
performed his services, as in fact, a compromise agreement entered into on March 16, 1963 between the Deudors
and the defendants was approved by the court, the latter have refused to convey to him the 3,000 square meters of
land occupied by him, (a part of the 20 quinones above) which said defendants had promised to do "within ten years
from and after date of signing of the compromise agreement", as consideration for his services.
CFI of Quezon City dismissed the complaint on the grounds of unenforceability, lack of cause of action, and
prescription.
ISSUE: WON Faustino Cruz can claim reimbursement for the expenses and services rendered?

HELD: No. We hold that the allegations in his complaint do not sufficiently Appellants' reliance on Article 2142 of
Civil Code is misplaced. Said article provides:

Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one
shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.

From the very language of this provision, it is obvious that a presumed quasi-contract cannot emerge as against one
party when the subject matter thereof is already covered by an existing contract with another party. Predicated on the
principle that no one should be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, Article 2124 creates the
legal fiction of a quasi-contract precisely because of the absence of any actual agreement between the parties
concerned. Corollarily, if the one who claims having enriched somebody has done so pursuant to a contract with a
third party, his cause of action should be against the latter, who in turn may, if there is any ground therefor, seek
relief against the party benefited. It is essential that the act by which the defendant is benefited must have been
voluntary and unilateral on the part of the plaintiff. As one distinguished civilian puts it, "The act is voluntary.
because the actor in quasi-contracts is not bound by any pre-existing obligation to act. It is unilateral, because it
arises from the sole will of the actor who is not previously bound by any reciprocal or bilateral agreement. The
reason why the law creates a juridical relations and imposes certain obligation is to prevent a situation where a
person is able to benefit or take advantage of such lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts at the expense of said actor."
(Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Law, Vol. VI, p. 748, 1969 ed.) In the case at bar, since appellant has a clearer and more
direct recourse against the Deudors with whom he had entered into an agreement regarding the improvements and
expenditures made by him on the land of appellees. it Cannot be said, in the sense contemplated in Article 2142, that
appellees have been enriched at the expense of appellant.

6. GUTIEREZ HERMANOS
vs.
ENGRACIO ORENSE
G.R. No. L-9188 December 4, 1914
FACTS: Engracio Orense is the owner of a parcel of land, which nephew, Jose Duran, with the former’s consent and
knowledge, sold and conveyed the same to Hermano’s company for P1,500 with the reservation of the right to
repurchase it for the same price within a period of 4 years. But the same land was not repurchased by Jose Duran
due to insolvency. Despite repeated demand upon Duran, the latter never vacated the land.
His refusal was based on allegations that he did not know of said sale and that he remains the owner of the land.
Petitioner filed a complaint for estafa against Jose Duran. However, at the trial of the case Engracio Orense, called as
a witness, being interrogated by the fiscal as to whether he had consented to Duran's selling the said property under
right of redemption to the firm of Gutierrez Hermanos, replied that he had. In view of this statement by the
defendant, the court acquitted Jose Duran of the charge of estafa.
As a result of the acquittal of Jose Duran, based on the explicit testimony of his uncle, Engacio Orense, the owner of
the property, to the effect that he had consented to his nephew Duran's selling the property under right of
repurchase to Gutierrez Hermanos, counsel for this firm filed a complainant praying, among other remedies, that the
defendant Orense be compelled to execute a deed for the transfer and conveyance to the plaintiff company of all the
right, title and interest with Orense had in the property sold, and to pay to the same the rental of the property due
from February 14, 1911.

ISSUE: WON Orense can be compelled to deliver the property to Hermanos as premised above?
HELD: YES. It having been proven at the trial that he gave his consent to the said sale, it follows that the defendant
conferred verbal, or at least implied, power of agency upon his nephew Duran, who accepted it in the same way by
selling the said property. The principal must therefore fulfill all the obligations contracted by the agent, who acted
within the scope of his authority.
Even should it be held that the said consent was granted subsequently to the sale, it is unquestionable that the
defendant, the owner of the property, approved the action of his nephew, who in this case acted as the manager of
his uncle's business, and Orense's ratification produced the effect of an express authorization to make the said sale.
Article 1259 of the Civil Code prescribes: "No one can contract in the name of another without being authorized by
him or without his legal representation according to law.
A contract executed in the name of another by one who has neither his authorization nor legal representation shall
be void, unless it should be ratified by the person in whose name it was executed before being revoked by the other
contracting party.
The sworn statement made by the defendant, Orense, while testifying as a witness at the trial of Duran for estafa,
virtually confirms and ratifies the sale of his property effected by his nephew, Duran, and, pursuant to article 1313 of
the Civil Code, remedies all defects which the contract may have contained from the moment of its execution.
On the testimony given by Engacio Orense at the trial of Duran for estafa, the latter was acquitted, and it would not
be just that the said testimony, expressive of his consent to the sale of his property, which determined the acquittal
of his nephew, Jose Duran, who then acted as his business manager, and which testimony wiped out the deception
that in the beginning appeared to have been practiced by the said Duran, should not now serve in passing upon the
conduct of Engracio Orense in relation to the firm of Gutierrez Hermanos in order to prove his consent to the sale of
his property, for, had it not been for the consent admitted by the defendant Orense, the plaintiff would have been
the victim of estafa.
If the defendant Orense acknowledged and admitted under oath that he had consented to Jose Duran's selling the
property in litigation to Gutierrez Hermanos, it is not just nor is it permissible for him afterward to deny that
admission, to the prejudice of the purchaser, who gave P1,500 for the said property.
The contract of sale of the said property contained in the notarial instrument of February 14, 1907, is alleged to be
invalid, null and void under the provisions of paragraph 5 of section 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure, because the
authority which Orense may have given to Duran to make the said contract of sale is not shown to have been in
writing and signed by Orense, but the record discloses satisfactory and conclusive proof that the defendant Orense
gave his consent to the contract of sale executed in a public instrument by his nephew Jose Duran. Such consent
was proven in a criminal action by the sworn testimony of the principal and presented in this civil suit by other sworn
testimony of the same principal and by other evidence to which the defendant made no objection. Therefore the
principal is bound to abide by the consequences of his agency as though it had actually been given in writing.
The repeated and successive statements made by the defendant Orense in two actions, wherein he affirmed that he had given
his consent to the sale of his property, meet the requirements of the law and legally excuse the lack of written authority, and,
as they are a full ratification of the acts executed by his nephew Jose Duran, they produce the effects of an express power of
agency.

7. RUSTICO ADILLE
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EMETRIA ASEJO, et. al.
G.R. No. L-44546 January 29, 1988
FACTS: Feliza Azul owns a parcel of land. She married twice in her lifetime: the first, with Bernabe Adille,
with whom she had a child, Rustico Adille; the second marriage with Procopio Asejo, her children were
Emetria Asejo, et. al.
Sometime in 1939, said Felisa sold the property in pacto de retro to certain 3rd persons, period of
repurchase being 3 years, but she died in 1942 without being able to redeem and after her death, but
during the period of redemption, herein defendant repurchased, by himself alone, and after that, he
executed a deed of extra-judicial partition representing himself to be the only heir and child of his mother
Felisa with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name alone also , so that OCT. No.
21137 in the name of his mother was transferred to his name, that was in 1955; that was why after
some efforts of compromise had failed, his half-brothers and sisters, herein plaintiffs, filed present case
for partition with accounting on the position that he was only a trustee on an implied trust when he
redeemed,-and this is the evidence, but as it also turned out that one of plaintiffs, Emeteria Asejo was
occupying a portion, defendant counterclaimed for her to vacate that.
ISSUE: WON Adille can acquire exclusive ownership over the land?
HELD: NO. It is the view of the respondent Court that the petitioner, in taking over the property, did so either on
behalf of his co-heirs, in which event, he had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under Article 2144 of the
Civil Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is guilty of fraud, and must act as trustee, the private
respondents being the beneficiaries, under the Article 1456. The evidence, of course, points to the second
alternative the petitioner having asserted claims of exclusive ownership over the property and having acted in
fraud of his co-heirs. He cannot therefore be said to have assume the mere management of the property
abandoned by his co-heirs, the situation Article 2144 of the Code contemplates. In any case, as the respondent
Court itself affirms, the result would be the same whether it is one or the other. The petitioner would remain liable
to the Private respondents, his co-heirs.

8. Andres vs. Mantrust

G.R. No. 82670 September 15, 1989
Art. 2154 of the Civil Code, which embodies the doctrine of solutio indebiti
This legal provision, which determines the quasi-contract of solution indebiti, is one of the concrete manifestations of the ancient
principle that no one shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.

FACTS: Petitioner Andres, using the business name “Irene’s Wearing Apparel”, transacts with Facets Funwear, Inc (Facets), one of
its foreign buyers.
In one transaction, Facets instructed the First National State Bank of New Jersey (FNSB) to transfer to herein petitioner, via
Philippine National Bank (PNB), the amount of $10,000.00. Acting on the instruction, FNSB instructed herein private respondent
Manufacturers Hanover and Trust Corporation (Mantrust) to effect the above-mentioned transfer through its facilities and to charge
the amount to the account of FNSB with private respondent. However, due to communication problems, delay and unawareness
that herein petitioner already received the amount remitted, effectuated another delivery to herein petitioner for the same amount.
Thereafter, upon discovery that herein petitioner received the same amount twice, private respondent demanded herein petitioner
the return of the second remittance, but the latter refused to do so. As such, private respondent filed an action against herein
petitioner for the recovery of the said amount. The trial Court rendered its decision in favor of herein petitioner. On appeal,
respondent appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial Court, hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON private respondent Mantrust has the right to recover the second $10,000.00 remittance it had delivered to herein
petitioner, on the ground of Article 2154 of the Civil Code?

HELD: Yes, the Court held that herein petitioner has the right to recover the second remittance, as provided for under Article 2154
of the Civil Code. The resolution of this issue would hinge on the applicability of Art. 2154 of the New Civil Code which provides
that: Art. 2154. If something received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the
obligation to return it arises. This provision is taken from Art. 1895 of the Spanish Civil Code which provided that: Art. 1895. If a
thing is received when there was no right to claim it and which, through an error, has been unduly delivered, an obligation to
restore it arises. In Velez v. Balzarza, 73 Phil. 630 (1942), the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bocobo explained the nature of
this article thus: Article 1895 [now Article 2154] of the Civil Code abovequoted, is therefore applicable. This legal provision, which
determines the quasi-contract of solution indebiti, is one of

For this article to apply the following requisites must concur:

"(1) that he who paid was not under obligation to do so; and
(2) that payment was made by reason of an essential mistake of fact".
It is undisputed that private respondent delivered the second $10,000.00 remittance. However, petitioner contends that the
doctrine of solutio indebiti, does not apply because its requisites are absent.
The contention is without merit.

The contract of petitioner, as regards the sale of garments and other textile products, was with FACETS. It was the latter and not
private respondent which was indebted to petitioner. On the other hand, the contract for the transmittal of dollars from the United
States to petitioner was entered into by private respondent with FNSB. Petitioner, although named as the payee was not privy to
the contract of remittance of dollars. Neither was private respondent a party to the contract of sale between petitioner and FACETS.
There being no contractual relation between them, petitioner has no right to apply the second $10,000.00 remittance delivered by
mistake by private respondent to the outstanding account of FACETS.
Petitioner invokes the equitable principle that when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the wrongful act of a third person,
the loss must be borne by the one whose negligence was the proximate cause of the loss.
The rule is that principles of equity cannot be applied if there is a provision of law specifically applicable to a case [Phil. Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. v. Arciaga, G.R. No. L-29701, March 16, 1987,148 SCRA 433; Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L36958, July 10,
1986, 142 SCRA 587; Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. v. Remolado, G.R. No. 62051, March 18, 1985, 135 SCRA 409; Cruz v. Pahati,
98 Phil. 788 (1956)]. Hence, the Court in the case of De Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-20264, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA
129, citing Aznar v. Yapdiangco, G.R. No. L-18536, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 486, held:
The common law principle that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes
the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case
which is covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law principle and a
statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction. [at p. 135.]

8. Puyat & Sons

vs.
City of Manila
G. R. No. L-17447 April 30, 1963
It is too well settled in this state to need the citation of authority that if money be paid through a clear mistake of law or fact,
essentially affecting the rights of the parties, and which in law or conscience was not payable, and should not be retained by the
party receiving it, it may be recovered. Both law and sound morality so dictate.
FACTS: Appellee Puyat & Sons requested for refund of Retail Dealer’s Taxes it paid to appellant City of Manila, on the ground that
it is tax exempt on the sale of the various kinds of furniture manufactured by it pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 18(n) of Republic
Act No. 409 (Revised Charter of Manila), as restated in Section 1 of Ordinance No.3816. However, such request was denied by
herein appellant.
Appellee filed an action for refund with the Court of First Instance, which ruled in its favor, hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellee Puyat & Sons are entitled to the refund of the taxes paid erroneosly, on the ground that it is tax
exempt, pursuant to the Revised Charter of Manila.
HELD: Yes, the Court held that appellee Puyat & Sons are entitled to the refund of the taxes paid erroneously.
If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligationto retun it
arises.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the payments made by appellee was due to a mistake in the construction of a doubtful question
of law. The reason underlying similar provisions, as applied to illegal taxation, in the United States, is expressed in the case of
Newport v. Ringo, 37 Ky. 635, 636; 10 S.W. 2, in the following manner:
"It is too well settled in this state to need the citation of authority that if money be paid through a clear mistake of law or fact,
essentially affecting