1. MEA Builders, Inc. vs.

CA, Metrobank

MEA entered into a contract with CRC for the construction of housing units payable in cash and Metrobank entered
into a tripartite agreement. Metrobank advised MEA to hold off construction work until after CRC would have sold a
substantial number of the completed units. MEA objected to the indefinite suspension and demanded payment for
all their work accomplishments. In the meantime, MEA defaulted on the ₱1.5 M PN so Metrobank instituted Civil
Case for the recovery of the amount covered by PN.

HELD: MEA Builders is not entitled to 9M actual and compensatory damages despite the fact that there is
no document presented by Llave to prove such claim.

In legal contemplation, the term "damages" is the sum of money which the law awards or imposes as a pecuniary
compensation, a recompense, or satisfaction for an injury done or a wrong sustained as a consequence either of a
breach of a contractual obligation or a tortious tortuous act. Moreover, the grant of award of attorney’s fees is the
exception rather than the rule, hence, it is necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which would
bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of the award.

Here, aside from the fact that we find neither breach of contractual obligation nor bad faith on the part of Metrobank
when it suggested the suspension of construction work for the protection of the parties’ mutual interests, petitioners
failed to establish actual or compensatory damages with a reasonable degree of certainty. The trial court’s sole
basis for the award of compensatory damages was the testimony of petitioner Llave who made a sweeping
statement that the ₱9M represents unrealized profits plus 3% monthly interests. This is was not sufficient. The
award of actual or compensatory damages could not be sustained without any tangible document any proof to
support such claim.

2. Sps. Custodio Vs. CA, Pacifico

A Civil Case for the grant of an easement of right of way was filed by Pacifico Mabasa against Custodio et al. before
the RTC. He was able to acquire said property through a contract of sale. It was surrounded by other immovables
and a Septic Tank. Sps. Santos constructed a fence. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the Pacifico
ordering Custodios and Santoses to give him permanent access to the public street and ordering to pay Custodios
and Santoses the 8K as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. He went to the CA which affirmed
RTC with modification, ordering petitioners to pay Pacifico 65k as Actual Damages, 30k as Moral Damages, and 10k
as Exemplary Damages.

HELD: RESPONDENT ARE NOT ENTITLED FOR AWARD OF DAMAGES

The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. It was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff,
Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by
reason of the closure of the passageway. The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a
right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal
wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or
damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed
for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the
premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and
the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there
should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.

There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm
or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does
not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle
of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites
concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy;
(2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject
to any servitudes. Prior to the decision granting right of way to respondents, petitioners had an absolute right over
their property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the
employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private
respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria. The courts can
give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means. 

3. Borlado vs. CA, Bulan G.R. No. 114118, August 28, 2001

The original owner of the lot was Serapio, grandfather of petitioners. Serapio sold the lot to Bacero
for 300P. After Bacero died, his heirs sold it to spouses Bulan. Bulan filed a complaint for ejectment
case against petitioners which the court favored them. Instead of appealing, petitioners filed the
present case with the RTC but was dismissed for lack of cause of action. They assail the decision that
they are to be jointly and solidarily liable to defendants the quantity of 100 cavans of palay every
year from 1972 until plaintiffs vacate the premises of the land in question. The court declare
defendants as owner of the land and entitled to possession and ordered them to pay defendants the
sum of 5K attorney’s fees and the sum of P5k as litigation expenses; and To pay the costs of the suit.

HELD: Petitioners are not liable to pay respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay.
The one hundred cavans of palay was awarded as a form of damages. We cannot sustain the award.
"Palay" is not legal tender currency in the Philippines. SC DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
decision of the CA with modification that petitioners’ liability to pay respondents one hundred (100)
cavans of palay every year from 1972 until petitioners vacate the land in question is deleted, for lack
of basis.

4. Farolan Vs. Solmac

Solmac was the assignee, transferee, and owner of an importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic Products of
polypropylene film. Ramon Farolan was then the Acting CoC while Parayno was then the Acting Chief, Customs
Intelligence and Invest. Div. They were thus sued in their official capacities as officers in the government in a petition
for mandamus filed by SOLMAC. They were both held personally liable for the awarded damages since their act of
detention of the goods was irregular and devoid of legal basis, hence, not done in the regular performance of official
duty. CA ordered public officers to pay solidarily and in their private personal capacities respondent Solmac
temperate damages in the sum of P100K, exemplary damages in the sum of P50K, and P25K, as attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation. This challenged resolution of the respondent court modified its decision by reducing into
halves the original awards for exemplary damages and attorney's fees and litigation expenses, respectively, keeping
intact the original grant of P1000K in the concept of temperate damages.

HELD: Petitioners acted in good faith in not immediately releasing the questioned importation, or, simply,
can they be held liable, in their personal and private capacities, for damages to the private respondent.

- PETITIONERS ARE NOT LIABLE TO PAY FOR DAMAGES.

Even granting that the petitioners committed a mistake in withholding the release of the subject, whatever damage
they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a  damnum
absque injuria. Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not actionable absent any clear showing that
they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. After all, "even under the law of public
officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith. Omnia praesumuntur rite
et solemniter esse acta. (All things are presumed to be correctly and solemnly done.) It was private respondent's
burden to overcome this juris tantum presumption.

5. Chiang Kai Shek School vs. CA, Fausta Oh

Fausta Oh reported for work at the Chiang Kai Shek School on the first week of July, 1968. She was told she had no
assignment for the next semester. She demanded separation pay, social security benefits, salary differentials,
maternity benefits and moral and exemplary damages.
HELD: Oh is entitled for awards of damages.

Since no cause was shown and established at an appropriate hearing, and the notice then required by law had not
been given, such dismissal was invalid. Hence, for the wrongful act of the petitioner, the private respondent is
entitled to moral damages. As a proximate result of her illegal dismissal, she suffered mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and even besmirched reputation as an experienced teacher for more than three
decades. We also find that the respondent court did not err in awarding her exemplary damages because the
petitioner acted in a wanton and oppressive manner when it dismissed her. 

6. Suario vs. BPI

Suario filed a complaint for separation pay, damages and attorney’s fees against the BPI alleging that
he has been a loyal employee of the respondent bank. He requested VP for a 6-month leave of
absence without pay purposely to take the 1976 pre-bar review in Manila. Later, he received a verbal
notice from the new Branch Manager that the respondent’s Head Office approved only a 30-day leave
of absence without pay. He never suspected that his application would be disapproved. During his
leave, he was ordered to report back for work. Later, he received another letter - Clearance to
terminate on the ground of resignation/or abandonment. NLRC denied his claim for damages arising
from an alleged illegal dismissal. In addition to the separation pay already awarded to him, the
petitioner asks for P9,995.00 actual damages, P300,000.00 moral damages, P200,000.00 exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees to be determined by the Court.

HELD: NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner’s claim
for actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorney’s fees in addition to his separation
pay.

LA has jurisdiction to award to the dismissed employee not only the reliefs specifically provided by
labor laws, but also moral and the forms of damages governed by the Civil Code. Moral damages
would be recoverable, for example, where the dismissal of the employee was not only effected
without authorized cause and/or due process — for which relief is granted by the Labor Code — but
was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy — for which the obtainable relief is
determined by ‘the Civil Code (not the Labor Code). Stated otherwise, if the evidence adduced by the
employee before the LA should establish that the employer did indeed terminate the employee’s
services without just cause or without according him due process, the LA’s judgment shall be for the
employer to reinstate the employee and pay him his back wages, or exceptionally, for the employee
simply to receive separation pay. These are reliefs explicitly prescribed by the Labor Code. But any
award of moral damages by the LA obviously cannot be based on the Labor Code but
should be grounded on the Civil Code. Such an award cannot be justified solely upon the
premise (otherwise sufficient for redress under the Labor Code) that the employer fired
his employee without just cause or due process. Additional facts must be pleaded and proven to
warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, to repeat, that the act of
dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy; and, of course, that social
humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., resulted therefrom.

"Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. It is however not enough that such
injuries have arisen; it is essential that they have sprung from a wrongful act or omission of
the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. ‘Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or
omission.’ (Civil Code, Article 2217).

7. Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa

Spouses Baesa and their children were aboard a passenger jeepney driven by David Ico, who was
also the registered owner when a speeding PANTRANCO bus collided with it. As a result of the
accident, they died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. Maricar Baesa filed separate
actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO which invoked the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver. CFI award 2.3M as damages, plus 10% thereof
as attorney’s fees and costs to Maricar Baesa and the total 662K as damages, plus 10% thereof as
attorney’s fees and costs to Fe Ico and her children. On appeal, it modified the decision of the trial
court by ordering PANTRANCO to pay 1.189M as damages, plus 29K as attorney’s fees to Maricar,
and P344K plus 10K as attorney’s fees to Fe Ico and her children, and to pay the costs in both cases.

Petitioner assails court’s findings because no documentary evidence in support thereof, such as
income tax returns, pay-rolls, pay slips or invoices obtained in the usual course of business, were
presented. Petitioner argues that the "bare and self-serving testimonies of the wife of the deceased
David Ico and the mother of the deceased Marilyn Baesa have no probative value to sustain in law
the CA’s conclusion on the respective earnings of the deceased victims." It is petitioner’s contention
that the evidence presented by the PR does not meet the requirements of clear and satisfactory
evidence to prove actual and compensatory damages.

HELD: LACK OF documentary evidence in support claim of damages would still warrant the
court to award damages.

The testimony of Fe Ico and Francisca Bascos as to the earning capacity of David Ico, and the
spouses Baesa, respectively, are sufficient to establish a basis from which the court can make a fair
and reasonable estimate of the damages for the loss of earning capacity of the three deceased
victims. Moreover, in fixing the damages for loss of earning capacity of a deceased victim, the court
can consider the nature of his occupation, his educational attainment and the state of his health at
the time of death.

The indemnity for the death of a person was fixed by this Court at 30K. Maricar should therefore be
awarded 60K as indemnity for the death of her brothers, Harold and Marcelino or 30K for the death
of each brother.

8. Mercenas vs. CA

M/T, a barge-type oil tanker, left Amlan and headed towards Bataan. M/V "Don Juan," left Manila bound for Bacolod
with 750 passengers. In the evening, the two collided. Among the ill-fated passengers were the parents of
petitioners, the spouses Mecenas, whose bodies were never found despite intensive search by petitioners.
Petitioners filed a complaint against Negros Navigation and Capt. Roger Santisteban, the captain of the "Don Juan"
without, however, impleading either PNOC- based on quasi delict. Petitioners prayed for actual damages of not less
than P100K as well as moral and exemplary damages in such amount as the Court may deem reasonable to award
to them. Another complaint was filed in the same court by Lilia Ciocon claiming damages against Negros
Navigation, PNOC and PNOC Shipping for the death of her husband Manuel Ciocon. CA held defendants to pay
plaintiffs by reducing from 400k to P100K as actual and compensatory damages and P15K as attorney's fees and
the cost of the suit.

HELD: Such reduction of the damages awarded was not proper.

- Petitioners were entitled to an award of damages other than actual or compensatory damages, that

is, whether they were entitled to award of moral and exemplary damages.

In an action based upon a breach of the contract of carriage, the carrier under our civil law is liable for the death of
passengers arising from the negligence or willful act of the carrier's employees although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or even in violation of the instructions of the carrier,  which liability may
include liability for moral damages.  It follows that petitioners would be entitled to moral damages so long as the
collision with the "Tacloban City" and the sinking of the "Don Juan" were caused or attended by negligence on the
part of private respondents.

In respect of the petitioners' claim for exemplary damages, it is only necessary to refer to Article 2232 of the Civil
Code:

Article 2332. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. 
The behaviour of the captain of the "Don Juan" in tills instance-playing mahjong "before and up to the time of
collision constitutes behaviour that is simply unacceptable on the part of the master of a vessel to whose hands the
lives and welfare of at least seven hundred fifty (750) passengers had been entrusted.

Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts to reshape behaviour that is socially
deleterious in its consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents against such behaviour. One of
those instruments is the institution of exemplary damages; one of those ends, of special importance in an
archipelagic state like the Philippines, is the safe and reliable carriage of people and goods by sea. Considering the
foregoing, we believe that an additional award in the amount of P200K as exemplary damages, is quite modest.

9. Simex International (Manila) Inc. vs. CA

Petitioner is a private corp engaged in the exportation of food products. It buys these products from various local
suppliers and then sells them abroad, particularly in US, Canada and the M.E. It deposited to its account in the bank
the amount of P100K, thus increasing its balance as of that date to P190K. Checks were dishonored for insufficient
funds. As a consequence, the California Manuf. sent a letter of demand to the petitioner, threatening prosecution if
the dishonored check issued to it was not made good. It also withheld delivery of the order made by the petitioner.
The petitioner complained to the bank. P100K deposit had not been credited to it. It demanded reparation from the
bank for its "gross and wanton negligence." It then filed a complaint in the then CFI claiming from bank moral
damages in the sum of 1M and exemplary damages in the sum of 500K plus 25% attorney's fees, and costs.
Observing that the plaintiff's right had been violated, he ordered the defendant to pay nominal damages in the
amount of P20K plus P5K attorney's fees and costs. CA affirmed. It found that PR was guilty of negligence but
agreed that the petitioner was nevertheless not entitled to moral damages.

HELD: Petitioner is entitled to the said damages.

The bank has not even explained why it was committed at all. It is true that the dishonored checks were, as the CA
put it, "eventually" paid. However, this took almost a month when, properly, the checks should have been paid
immediately upon presentment. The initial carelessness of the bank, aggravated by the lack of promptitude in
repairing its error, justifies the grant of moral damages. This rather lackadaisical attitude toward the
complaining depositor constituted the gross negligence, if not wanton bad faith, that the respondent court said had
not been established by the petitioner.

The fact is that the petitioner's credit line was canceled and its orders were not acted upon pending receipt of actual
payment by the suppliers. Its business declined. Its reputation was tarnished. Its standing was reduced in the
business community. All this was due to the fault of the respondent bank which was undeniably remiss in its duty to
the petitioner.

Article 2205 of the Civil Code provides that actual or compensatory damages may be receive"(2) for injury
to the plaintiff s business standing or commercial credit." There is no question that the petitioner did
sustain actual injury as a result of the dishonored checks and that the existence of the loss having been
established "absolute certainty as to its amount is not required."   Such injury should bolster all the more
the demand of the petitioner for moral damages and justifies the examination by this Court of the validity
and reasonableness of the said claim.

Moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may
have suffered. 

In the case at bar, the petitioner is seeking such damages for the prejudice sustained by it as a result of the PR’s
fault. Moral damages are not susceptible of pecuniary estimation. Article 2216 of the Civil Code specifically provides
that "no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary
damages may be adjudicated." That is why the determination of the amount to be awarded (except liquidated
damages) is left to the sound discretion of the court, according to "the circumstances of each case."

Award of nominal damages of P20K was not the proper relief to which the petitioner was entitled. Under Article
2221 of the Civil Code, "nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him." As we have found that the petitioner has indeed incurred loss through the fault
of the private respondent, the proper remedy is the award to it of moral damages, which we impose, in our
discretion, in the same amount of P20,000.00.

Now for the exemplary damages.

Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
 Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

Exemplary damages OF 50K "by way of example or correction for the public good," in the words of the law. It is
expected that this ruling will serve as a warning and deterrent against the repetition of the ineptness and
indefference that has been displayed here, lest the confidence of the public in the banking system be further
impaired.

10. Radio Communications vs. Rodriguez

Rodriguez, as President of WALS, sent two cablegrams overseas through RCPI. The cablegram were in turn,
relayed to GLOBE for transmission to their foreign destination. The telegram to Taha advised him of Rodriguez's
pending arrival in Khartoum, while the telegram to Merger advised her of the scheduled WALS conference in
Khartoum. Rodriguez left the Phil and arrived in Khartoum, Sudan at night. He was forced to sleep at the airport.
Because of the non-receipt of the cablegram, Taha was not able to meet him. Worse all preparations for the
international conference had to be cancelled. It turned out that the wire sent by Rodriguez to Merger was delivered
to the address on the message but the person who delivered it was told that the address was no longer staying
there. Rodriguez filed a complaint for compensatory damages in the amount of P45K, moral damages in the amount
of P200K and exemplary damages in the amount of P50Kagainst RCPI and GLOBE.

HELD: RCPI is responsible for the non-delivery of the two (2) telegrams notwithstanding the fact that RCPI
relayed said telegrams to Globe Mackay and

- RCPI is liable for moral damages in the amount of P100K; exemplary damages in the amount of
P50K; actual damages in the amount of P43K and attorney's fees in the amount of P20K.

RCPI cannot escape liability for damages by passing off the blame for negligence to Globe Mackay. It has an inter-
connecting agreement with Globe Mackay. RCPI receives messages for overseas destinations and conducts its
business to transmit foreign messages only through Globe Mackay.

For recovery of damages, Article 2217 of the New Civil Code applies. It is provided therein that: "Moral damages
include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feeling, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission." 

There is no doubt that RCPI's failure to deliver the two questioned telegrams resulted in the suffering that
respondent Rodriguez, had to undergo. Respondent Rodriguez left Manila for Khartoum, Sudan believing that Taha
received his telegram and would meet him at the airport.

The 100K as moral damages in favor of Rodriguez excessive and unconscionable. Trial courts are given discretion
to determine the amount of moral damages, CA can only modify or change the amount awarded when they are
palpably and scandalously excessive 'so as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on
the part of the trial court'.

In any case the Court held that 'moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a
complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party
to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he
has undergone, by reason of the defendants' culpable action.' The award of moral damages
must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.

The amount of P10K as moral damages in favor of the respondent would be reasonable considering the facts and
circumstances surrounding the petitioner's liability.

The award of exemplary damages is not proper considering that there is no showing that RCPI acted in "a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." (Article 2232, New Civil Code).

As for Attorney’s fees, the trial court failed to justify the payment of attorney's by RCPI, therefore, the award of
attorney's fees as part of its liability should be disallowed and deleted.

11. Zenith Insurance Corp. vs. CA, Fernandez

PR Lawrence Fernandez insured his car for "own damage" with Zenith. The car figured in an accident and suffered
actual damages in the amount of P3,640. After allegedly being given a run around by Zenith for 2 months,
Fernandez filed a complaint with RTC of Cebu for sum of money and damages resulting from the refusal of Zenith to
pay the amount claimed. Aside from actual damages and interests, Fernandez also prayed for moral damages in
the amount of P10K , exemplary damages of P5K, attorney's fees of P3K and litigation expenses of P3K.

Zenith assailed the decision arguing that there is no legal basis on CA in awarding moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney's fees in an amount more than that prayed for in the complaint. It contended that while the
complaint of PR prayed for damages, the lower court awarded twice the amount,.

HELD: PR IS NOT ENTITLED FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND MORAL DAMAGES TWICE AS WHAT IT
HAD PRAYED FOR.

"The purpose of moral damages is essentially indemnity or reparation, not punishment or correction. Moral damages
are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant, they are awarded only to
enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he
has undergone by reason of the defendant's culpable action. While it is true that no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be adjudicated, the assessment of which is left to the discretion of the
court according to the circumstances of each case (Art. 2216, New Civil Code)

It is equally true that in awarding moral damages in case of breach of contract, there must be a showing that the
breach was wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudently or in bad faith.

In the instant case, there was a finding that PR was given a "run-around" for two months, which is the basis for the
award of the damages granted under the Insurance Code for unreasonable delay in the payment of the claim.
However, the act of petitioner of delaying payment for two months cannot be considered as so wanton or malevolent
to justify an award of P20K as moral damages, taking into consideration also the fact that the actual damage on the
car was only P3,460. The reason for petitioner's failure to indemnify PR within the two-month period was that the
parties could not come to an agreement as regards the amount of the actual damage on the car. The amount of
P10K prayed for by private respondent as moral damages is equitable.

On the other hand, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good (Art. 2229, New Civil Code of the Philippines). Exemplary damages were not awarded as the insurance
company had not acted in wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. The same is true in the case at bar.

The amount of P5K awarded as attorney's fees is justified under the circumstances of this case considering that
there were other petitions filed and defended by PR in connection with this case.

As regards the actual damages incurred by private respondent, the amount of P3,640.00 had been established
before the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court. Respondent appellate court correctly ruled that the
deductions of P250.00 and P274.00 as deductible franchise and 20% depreciation on parts, respectively claimed by
petitioners as agreed upon in the contract, had no basis. Respondent court ruled:

Therefore, the award of moral damages is reduced to P10K and the award of exemplary damages is hereby
deleted.

1) P3,640.00 as actual claim plus interest of twice the ceiling prescribed by the Monetary Board
computed from the time of submission of proof of loss;

2) P10,000.00 as moral damages;

3) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;

4) P3,000.00 as litigation expenses; and

5) Costs.

12. Northwest Orient Airlines vs. CA

FACTS:   Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant on behalf of the plaintiff under
the said agreement, plaintiff sued defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the
ticket sales, with claim for damages.

13. People vs. Ereo G.R. No. 124706 February 22, 2000
14. Philippine Hawk Corporation vs. Vivian Tan Lee G.R. No. 166869 February 16, 2010

15. Libcap Marketing Corp. vs. Baquial G.R. No. 192011 June 30, 2014

FACTS:

 
Petitioner Libcap Marketing Corporation (Libcap) is engaged in the freight forwarding business with offices in Iloilo City.
Petitioner Celiz is Libcap’s Human Resources Division Head, and petitioner Mondragon is Libcap’s Vice
-President for Administration.

 
Respondent Baquial was employed by  Libcap as ac
counting clerk for Libcap’s Super Express branch in Cagayan de Oro City.Her functions included depositing Libcap’s daily
sales and collections in Libcap’s bank account with Global Bank.

 
Sometime in March 2003, an audit of Libcap’s Super Express branch in
 Cagayan de Oro City was conducted, and the resultingaudit report showed that respondent made a double reporting of a
single deposit made on April 2,2001.

 
Celiz required respondent to explain why the cash sales of
₱
1,437.00 each for March 31, 2001 and April 1, 2001
 –
 as reportedin the daily collection reports
 –
 were covered by a single April 2, 2001 validated bank deposit slip for only
₱
1,437.00.

 
Respondent claimed that on April 2, 2001, she deposited with the bank two separate amounts of
₱
1,437.00 each, but that itappears that both separate deposits were covered by a single bank validation, which defect
should not be blamed on her buton the bank. Respondent then forwarded to Libcap
’
s head office two bank deposit slips to show that she deposited twoamounts of
₱
1,437.00 each on April 2,2001 with Global Bank.

 
Libcap discovered that only one
₱
1,437.00 deposit was made on April 2, 2001. On verification with PS Bank, its branch headconfirmed in an August 7, 2003
letter that only a single deposit of
₱
1,437.00 was posted on April 2, 2001, and that there wasno misposting or deposits to other accounts of the same amount
made on such date. The two bank deposit slips forwardedby respondent revealed that only one of them was validated by
the bank.

 
Finally, Libcap
’
s Global Bank bank statement covering April 1
 –
30, 2001 showed that only one cash deposit of
₱
1,437.00 wasmade on April 2, 2001.

 
Meanwhile, the amount of
₱
1,437.00 was deducted from respondent
’
s salary each payday on a staggered basis
 –
 or on April30, June 15, and June 30, 2003, respectively.

 
On July 26, 2003, respondent received a Notice of Administrative Investigation requiring her to attend investigation at
Libca
p’s
Iloilo office. Respondent was unable to attend due to lack of financial resources subsequently, respondent received a
2ndNotice of Administrative Investigation requiring her to attend another investigation in Iloilo City. Again, respondent
failed toattend.

 
Respondent was placed on preventive suspension from July 29, 2003 to August 12, 2003.

 
On August 16, 2003, respondent received a Notice of Termination, stating that she was terminated from employment
effective
 August 12, 2003 for dishonesty, embezzlement, inefficiency, and for commission of acts inconsistent with Libcap’s work
standards.

 
Respondent filed a labor complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners
 

 
Ruling of LA:
 Respondents are jointly and severally ordered to pay the complainant, Lanny Jean Baquial, her backwagesfrom August
12, 2003 to November 30, 2005
 

 
The LA held that respondent was dismissed for just cause, but the dismissal was ineffectual as she was deprived
ofprocedural due process; it was error for Libcap to schedule the investigation at its Iloilo office when it could very
wellhave held it in CDO.

 
In awarding backwages, the Labor Arbiter relied on the ruling in
Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commissio
n, whichheld that an employee dismissed for just cause but without notice need not be reinstated, but must be paid
backwagesfrom the time of termination until it is determined that his termination was for a just cause.

 
Ruling of NLRC
: The assailed decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
 

 
Ruling of CA
: The CA upheld the labor tribunals’ findings that while there was just cause to dismiss respo
ndent for dishonestyand embezzlement, petitioners failed to comply with procedural due process in effecting her
dismissal.
 ISSUE/s:
1.
 
W/N the court of appeals erred when it ruled that there was non-compliance with the procedural due process
requirementwhen the records show that the respondent was given full opportunity to explain the charges against her. -
NO

16. Sulpicio Lines vs. Sesante G.R. No. 172682 July 27, 2016

Facts:
On September 18, 1998, at around 12:55 p.m., the M/V Princess of the Orient, a passenger vessel owned
and operated by the petitioner, sank near Fortune Island in Batangas. Of the 388 recorded passengers, 150
were lost.[3] Napoleon Sesante, then a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and a lawyer, was
one of the passengers who survived the sinking. He sued the petitioner for breach of contract and
damages.[4]
Sesante alleged in his complaint that the M/V Princess of the Orient left the Port of Manila while Metro
Manila was experiencing stormy weather; that at around 11:00 p.m., he had noticed the vessel listing
starboard, so he had gone to the uppermost deck where he witnessed the strong winds and big waves
pounding the vessel; that at the same time, he had seen how the passengers had been panicking, crying for
help and frantically scrambling for life jackets in the absence of the vessel's officers and crew; that sensing
danger, he had called a certain Vency Ceballos through his cellphone to request him to inform the proper
authorities of the situation; that thereafter, big waves had rocked the vessel, tossing him to the floor where
he was pinned by a long steel bar; that he had freed himself only after another wave had hit the vessel;[5]
that he had managed to stay afloat after the vessel had sunk, and had been carried by the waves to the
coastline of Cavite and Batangas until he had been rescued; that he had suffered tremendous hunger,
thirst, pain, fear, shock, serious anxiety and mental anguish; that he had sustained injuries,[6] and had lost
money, jewelry, important documents, police uniforms and the .45 caliber pistol issued to him by the PNP;
and that because it had committed bad faith in allowing the vessel to sail despite the storm signal, the
petitioner should pay him actual and moral damages
In its defense, the petitioner insisted on the seaworthiness of the M/V Princess of the Orient due to its
having been cleared to sail from the Port of Manila by the proper authorities; that the sinking had been due
to force majeure; that it had not been negligent; and that its officers and crew had also not been negligent
because they had made preparations to abandon the vessel because they had launched life rafts and had
provided the passengers assistance in that regard.
On October 12, 2001, the RTC rendered its judgment in favor of the respondent,... The petitioner sought
reconsideration, but the RTC only partly granted its motion by reducing the temperate damages from
P500,000.00 to P300,000.00
Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed.[12] It was pending the appeal in the CA when Sesante passed away.
He was substituted by his heirs.
On June 27, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision. It lowered the temperate damages to
P120,000.00, which approximated the cost of Sesante's lost personal belongings; and held that despite the
seaworthiness of the vessel, the petitioner remained civilly liable because its officers and crew had been
negligent in performing their duties
Issues:
(1) Is the complaint for breach of contract and damages a personal action that does not survive the death
of the plaintiff?; (2) Is the petitioner liable for damages under Article 1759 of the Civil Code?; and (3) Is
there sufficient basis for awarding moral and temperate damages?
Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
An action for breach of contract of carriage survives the death of the plaintiff
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the proper procedure in the event of the death of a
litigant, viz.:Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and
the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty
(30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative
or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.The
heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
A contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty, neglect or malfeasance of the
carrier's employees and gives ground for an action for damages.[19] Sesante's claim against the petitioner
involved his personal injury caused by the breach of the contract of carriage. Pursuant to the aforecited
rules, the complaint survived his death, and could be continued by his heirs following the rule on
substitution.
The petitioner is liable for breach of contract of carriage
The petitioner submits that an action for damages based on breach of contract of carriage under Article
1759 of the Civil Code should be read in conjunction with Article 2201 of the same code; that although
Article 1759 only provides for a presumption of negligence, it does not envision automatic liability; and
that it was not guilty of bad faith considering that the sinking of M/V Princess of the Orient had been due
to a fortuitous event, an exempting circumstance under Article 1174 of the Civil Code.
Article 1759 of the Civil Code does not establish a presumption of negligence because it explicitly makes
the common carrier liable in the event of death or injury to passengers due to the negligence or fault of the
common carrier's employees. It reads:Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.This
liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.The liability of common carriers under
Article 1759 is demanded by the duty of extraordinary diligence required of common carriers in safely
carrying their passengers.[
On the other hand, Article 1756 of the Civil Code lays down the presumption of negligence against the
common carrier in the event of death or injury of its passenger, viz.:Article 1756. In case of death of or
injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
Clearly, the trial court is not required to make an express finding of the common carrier's fault or
negligence.[21] Even the mere proof of injury relieves the passengers from establishing the fault or
negligence of the carrier or its employees.[22] The presumption of negligence applies so long as there is
evidence showing that: (a) a contract exists between the passenger and the common carrier; and (b) the
injury or death took place during the existence of such contract.[23] In such event, the burden shifts to the
common carrier to prove its observance of extraordinary diligence, and that an unforeseen event or force
majeure had caused the injury.
Sesante sustained injuries due to the buffeting by the waves and consequent sinking of M/V Princess of
the Orient where he was a passenger. To exculpate itself from liability, the common carrier vouched for the
seaworthiness of M/V Princess of the Orient, and referred to the BMI report to the effect that the severe
weather condition - a force majeure - had brought about the sinking of the vessel.
A common carrier may be relieved of any liability arising from a fortuitous event pursuant to Article
1174[25] of the Civil Code. But while it may free a common carrier from liability, the provision still requires
exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.[26] Else stated, for a common carrier to be
absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by a
fortuitous event. The common carrier must still prove that it did not contribute to the occurrence of the
incident due to its own or its employees' negligence.
The petitioner has attributed the sinking of the vessel to the storm notwithstanding its position on the
seaworthiness of M/V Princess of the Orient. Yet, the findings of the BMI directly contradicted the
petitioner's attribution,... The Captain's erroneous maneuvers of the M/V Princess of the Orient minutes
before she sunk [sic] had caused the accident. It should be noted that during the first two hours when the
ship left North Harbor, she was navigating smoothly towards Limbones Point. During the same period, the
ship was only subjected to the normal weather stress prevailing at the time. She was then inside Manila
Bar. The waves were observed to be relatively small to endanger the safety of the ship. It was only when
the MV Princess of the Orient had cleared Limbones Pt. while navigating towards the direction of the
Fortune Island when this agonizing misfortune struck the ship.
Initially, a list of three degrees was observed. The listing of the ship to her portside had continuously
increased. It was at this point that the captain had misjudged the situation. While the ship continuously
listed to her portside and was battered by big waves, strong southwesterly winds, prudent judgement [sic]
would dictate that the Captain should have considerably reduced the ship's speed. He could have
immediately ordered the Chief Engineer to slacken down the speed. Meanwhile, the winds and waves
continuously hit the ship on her starboard side. The waves were at least seven to eight meters in height
and the wind velocity was a[t] 25 knots. The MV Princess of the Orient being a close-type ship (seven
decks, wide and high superstructure) was vulnerable and exposed to the howling winds and ravaging seas.
Because of the excessive movement, the solid and liquid cargo below the decks must have shifted its
weight to port, which could have contributed to the tilted position of the ship.
Even assuming the seaworthiness of the MA/ Princess of the Orient, the petitioner could not escape
liability considering that, as borne out by the aforequoted findings of the BMI, the immediate and
proximate cause of the sinking of the vessel had been the gross negligence of its captain in maneuvering
the vessel
The Court also notes that Metro Manila was experiencing Storm Signal No. 1 during the time of the
sinking.[31] The BMI observed that a vessel like the M/V Princess of the Orient, which had a volume of
13.734 gross tons, should have been capable of withstanding a Storm Signal No. 1 considering that the
responding fishing boats of less than 500 gross tons had been able to weather through the same waves
and winds to go to the succor of the sinking vessel and had actually rescued several of the latter's
distressed passengers
We agree with the petitioner that moral damages may be recovered in an action upon breach of contract
of carriage only when: (a) death of a passenger results, or (b) it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud
and bad faith, even if death does not result.[33] However, moral damages may be awarded if the
contractual breach is found to be wanton and deliberately injurious, or if the one responsible acted
fraudulently or with malice or bad faith.
Principles:
In order to be considered a fortuitous event, however, (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of human will;
(2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitute the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen it
must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in any manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
[T]he principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely
by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of
the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether due to
his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed
from the rules applicable to the acts of God.

17. Samson vs. BPI

FACTS:

Samson deposited a Prudential Bank check worth P3,500.00 to his savings account. Subsequently, he asked his daughter
to withdraw P2,000, but the request for withdrawal was denied due to insufficient funds. Samson had a valued creditor
who was waiting at his residence. The creditor was waiting for Samson to pay an obligation that was due at that time.
Unable to pay, Samson's credit line was severed. He also suffered humiliation and besmirched reputation. Following
this incident, Samson deposited P5,500.00. Here, he discovered that his balance remained P342.38, and that the
earlier deposit of P3,500.00 had not been credited. When he inquired about what happened, BPI confirmed
the deposited check but could not account for it. Upon further investigation, it was found out that their security guard
had encashed the check and that, despite knowledge of the irregularity, BPI had not informed Samson. Samson also
claimed that while probing the incident, BPI manager Cayanga allegedly displayed arrogance, indifference, and
discourtesy towards him, prompting him to file a complaint for damages against BPI. The trial court  rendered a
decision in favor of Samson, including an award for moral damages amounting to P200,000. CA affirmed the trial court's
ruling but reduced the amount of moral damages to P50,000.00.

HELD: The award for moral damages should be increased to P100,000.00 because Samson was a businessman and the
highest lay person in the United Methodist Church. It was proven that he was regarded with arrogance and a
condescending manner, and that BPI had successfully postponed compensating him for more than a decade.

Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly caused.
Moreover, although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount must somehow be proportional to and in
approximation of the suffering inflicted. Moral damages are not punitive in nature and were never intended to enrich
the claimant at the expense of the defendant.

There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining moral damages; each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts.
Trial courts are given discretion in determining the amount, with the limitation that it “should not be palpably and
scandalously excessive.”

Moral damages are awarded to restore the spirit quo ante (actual damages compensate tangible damages, moral
damages restore the damages in spirit). Compensation is made by uplifting the morale, spirit, mental, and emotional
state of the victim.

18. Tan vs. OMC Carriers Inc.

FACTS: OMC Carriers owned a truck, driven by Arambala, which crashed into the home of petitioners Tan when its
braking mechanism failed. This caused the death of the head of the family, Celedonio Tan. The Tans went to court to
demand damages due to the negligence of OMC. The RTC found OMC to be liable. The RTC awarded actual damages,
both on the loss of property and earning capacity of Celedonio. Exemplary damages were also awarded. Upon appeal to
the Court of Appeals, the actual damages for loss of property was reduced as they were insufficiently substantiated. The
damages for loss of earning capacity was deleted for being totally unsubstantiated. The Tans were unable to present
documents to ascertain the amount of earning capacity lost. Exemplary damages were also reduced.
Temperate damages are awarded when the exact amount of damages is unknown. The petitioners clearly suffered
damages. Their home and property were damaged. The provider of the family passed away. It is clear and undisputed that
they did suffer losses. However, since the value of the properties damaged could not be determined with certainty because
of the nature of the property, temperate damages are in order. Also, even if there are no documents supporting the earning
capacity of the deceased, the damage caused is still undisputed. Temperate damages must be awarded. The reduction of
exemplary damages are proper as exemplary damages are not meant to enrich or reduce another party to poverty.
Consistent with pertinent jurisprudence, the interest on these awards must be computed from the date when the RTC
rendered its decision in the civil case, or on June 17, 2008, as it was at this time that a quantification of the damages may
be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained.

19. Sps. Estrada vs. Philippine Bus Rabbit Lines Inc.

FACTS: A bus owned by Rabbit Bus, Lines had a collision with another vehicle along the national highway.
Estrada was a passenger of the said bus, and due to the accident, his right arm was amputated. Petitioner sued
PRBL and its driver Saylan for damages before the RTC arguing that pursuant to the contract of carriage
between him and Philippine Rabbit, respondents were duty-bound to carry him safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, with utmost diligence of a very cautious person, and with due regard for all the
circumstances from the point of his origin to destination. However, through the fault and negligence of
Philippine Rabbit's driver, Eduardo, and without human care, foresight, and due regard for all circumstances,
respondents failed to transport him safely by reason of the aforementioned collision, which resulted in the
amputation of Dionisio's right arm. And since demands for Philippine Rabbit to pay him damages for the injury
he sustained remained unheeded, Dionisio filed the said complaint wherein he prayed for the following awards:
moral damages of ₱500,000.00 actual damages of ₱60,000.00, and attorney's fees of ₱25,000.00. RTC, treating
the complaint of the petitioner as one predicated on breach of contract of carriage, found respondent to be
jointly and severally liable with Eduardo. CA modified the RTC decision and held PRBL to be solely and
exclusively liable to petitioner for actual damages and deleted the award for moral damages and
attorney’s fees. Petitioner raised the issue before the SC, stating that their claim for moral damages is based
purely on the fact that Dionisio lost his right arm. They argue that while in a strict sense, Dionisio incurred
actual damages through the amputation of his right arm, such loss may rightly be considered as falling under
moral damages. This is because a right arm is beyond the commerce of man and loss thereof necessarily brings
physical suffering, mental anguish, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and similar injury to a person. At
any rate, should this Court award the amount of ₱500,000.00 as actual damages due to the loss of Dionisio's
right arm, petitioners also find the same proper and appropriate under the circumstances.

Petitioner’s claim of moral damages should be granted based on the fact that the Dionisio lost his right
arm by reason of the accident.

HELD: Moral damages; Instances when moral damages can be awarded in an action for breach of contract.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act
or omission. Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the following and
analogous cases: (1) a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts; (4) adultery or concubinage; (5) illegal or arbitrary
detention or arrest; (6) illegal search; (7) libel, slander, or any other form of defamation; (8) malicious
prosecution; (9) acts mentioned in Article 309; and (1) acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 32, 34, and 35. x x x [C]ase law establishes the following requisites for the award of moral damages: (1)
there must be an injury clearly sustained by the claimant, whether physical, mental or psychological; (2) there
must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award for damages is predicated on any of
the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Since breach of contract is not one of the items enumerated
under Article 2219, moral damages, as a general rule, are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on
breach of contract. x x x As an exception, such damages are recoverable [in an action for breach of contract:]
(1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to
Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in x x x cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Article 2220. Moral damages are not recoverable in this case.

It is obvious that this case does not come under the first of the abovementioned exceptions since Dionisio did
not die in the mishap but merely suffered an injury. Nevertheless, petitioners contend that it falls under the
second category since they aver that Philippine Rabbit is guilty of fraud or bad faith. It has been held, however,
that "allegations of bad faith and fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence." They are never
presumed considering that they are serious accusations that can be so conveniently and casually invoked.

Fraud has been defined to include an inducement through insidious machination. Insidious machination refers
to a deceitful scheme or plot with an evil or devious purpose. Deceit exists where the party, with intent to
deceive, conceals or omits to state material facts and, by reason of such omission or concealment, the other
party was induced to give consent that would not otherwise have been given. Bad faith, on the other hand,
"does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that
partakes of the nature of fraud."

20. Tan vs. Bantegui

Facts:
The property was registered in the name of Bantegui married to Jesus Bayot. "Bantegui acquired the
property sometime in 1954 and rented it to spouses Caedo who resided therein until 1994. In 1970, she
left for the US. She returned in 1988 and... executed her special power of attorney making her
representative.
"For failure of Bantegui to pay said taxes, the [c]ity [t]reasurer sold said property at public auction held on
to the spouses Capistranos for brevity. The property was later sold to spouses Pereyra who also did not
take... possession of the property in question. They, however, mortgaged the same to the Rural Bank.
"These transfers were unknown to Bantegui and the Caedos despite the fact that Pereyra is the daughter
of the Caedos, as the latter did not inform them about anything concerning these transactions. All this
time[,] the actual occupants, the Caedos, considered... themselves as tenants of Bantegui, such that they
paid rent to her until December 1993, when they handed the water pump as payment of their arrears.
"Meanwhile, said property was again sold to the spouses Tan who did not take immediate possession of
the property [or inform] the occupants. Later, they subsequently filed an action for ejectment against the
Caedos

21. People vs. Manero

FACTS:
Edilberto, Elpidio, Rodrigo, Severino, Rudy, Efren, and Roger, were inside the eatery of one
Deocades. They were conferring with Arsenio their plans to liquidate a number of suspected
communist sympathizers. Arsenio scribbled on a cigarette wrapper the following “NPA v. NPA,
starring Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning.” “Fr.
Peter” is Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected of having links with the communist
movement; “Bantil” is Rufino Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is the complaining witness in the
Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay leader, while the others are simply
“messengers”. On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to Edilberto’s proposal that
should they fail to kill Fr. Peter, another Italian priest would be killed in his stead.

Later, at 4:00 o’clock, accused-appellants, all with firearms, proceeded to the house of “Bantil”,
their first intended victim. Upon meeting “Bantil”, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the
forehead of “Bantil”. “Bantil” was able to parry the gun, albeit his right finger and the lower
portion of his right ear were hit. Then they grappled for its possession until “Bantil” was
extricated from the fray. But, as he was running away, he was again fired upon by Edilberto.
“Bantil” however managed to seek refuge in the house of a certain Gomez. Norberto ordered his
men to surround the house and not to allow anyone to get out so that “Bantil” would die of
hemorrhage. Then Edilberto went back to the restaurant of Deocades and pistol-whipped him
on the face and accused him of being a communist coddler. Edilberto strewed him with a burst
of gunfire. Deocades cowered in fear as he knelt with both hands clenched at the back of his
head. This again drew boisterous laughter and ridicule from other accused-appellants.
At 5:00 o’clock, Fr. Favali arrived on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of Gomez. While
inside, Norberto, and his co-accused Pleñago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the
highway. Norberto opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned the
motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, accused-appellants raved and rejoiced. Upon seeing his
motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto. At this point, Edilberto asked the priest: “What is
it you want, Father? Do you want me, Father, to break your head?” Thereafter, Edilberto fired at
the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, Norberto taunted Edilberto if that
was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the
prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually
shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto flaunted
the brain to the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang “Mutya Ka Baleleng” to the
delight of the accused-appellants who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from
possible assistance. Informations for Murder, Attempted Murder and Arson were accordingly
filed against accused-appellants.

ISSUE:
Are the accused-appellants liable for all the crimes committed by Norberto and Edilberto
although they have not directly participated in the commission of those crimes?

HELD:
YES. Under Article of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons
come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it. It is not essential that all the
accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense. It is enough that an
accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose and unity in its
execution is present.

From the foregoing narration of facts, it is clear that accused-appellants were not merely
innocent bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage murder of Fr. Favali
and the attempted murder of Robles. For sure, they all assumed a fighting stance to discourage
if not prevent any attempt to provide assistance to the fallen priest. They surrounded the house
of Gomez to stop Robles and the other occupants from leaving so that the wounded Robles may
die of hemorrhage. Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure success of the commission of
the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. The accused-appellants acted in
concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in the attempted murder of Robles. While accused-
appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a
common intent to commit the criminal acts. Conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal
design being sufficiently shown, the act of one is the act of all the other conspirators, and the
precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary. Therefore, all of
the accused-appellants are liable collectively for the individual acts of their co-accused.

22. GSIS vs. Labung-Deang

Spouses Deang obtained a housing loan from the GSIS secured by REM. Spouses Deang settled their
debt with the GSIS and requested for the release of the owners duplicate copy of the title since they
intended to secure a loan from a private lender and use the land covered by it as collateral security
for the loan.However, personnel of the GSIS were not able to release the owners duplicate of the title
as it could not be found despite diligent search. GSIS issued a certificate of release of
mortgage. Spouses Deang filed a complaint against GSIS for damages, claiming that as result of the
delay in releasing the duplicate copy of the owners title, they were unable to secure a loan from
Milagros Runes, the proceeds of which could have been used in defraying the estimated cost of the
renovation of their residential house and which could have been invested in some profitable business
undertaking. In its defense, GSIS explained that the owners duplicate copy of the title was released
within a reasonable time since it had to conduct standard pre-audit and post-audit procedures to
verify if the spouses Deangs account had been fully settled. 18
cräläwvirtualibräry
The Court renders judgment ordering the GSIS to pay temperate damages, attorneys fees, etc. First,
since GOCC charters provide that they can sue and be sued have a legal personality separate and
distinct from the government, GSIS is not covered by Article 2180 of the Civil Code, and it is liable
for damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Second, the
GSIS is liable to pay a reasonable amount of damages and attorneys fees, which the appellate court
will not disturb.

HELD: GSIS, as a GOCC primarily performing governmental functions, is liable for a negligent act of
its employee acting within the scope of his assigned tasks.  GSIS is liable for damages.

GSIS, citing the sixth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code argues that as a GOCC, it falls
within the term State and cannot be held vicariously liable for negligence committed by its employee
acting within his functions. 

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business of
industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts though a special agent, but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task was done properly pertains , in which case
what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.

Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages.

Article 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good
faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the
obligation was constituted xxx.

In a breach of contract, moral damages are not awarded if the defendant is not shown to have acted
fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. The fact that the complainant suffered economic hardship or
worries and mental anxiety is not enough.

Actual damages to be compensable must be proven by clear evidence. A court can not rely on
speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend on
actual proof. 

Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.

When the court is convinced that there has been such loss, the judge is empowered to calculate
moderate damages, rather than let the complainant suffer without redress from the defendants
wrongful act. cräläwvirtualibräry

Attorneys fees which are granted as an item of damages are generally not recoverable.  36 The award
of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule and counsels fees are not to be awarded every
time a party wins a suit. The award of attorneys fees demands factual, legal and equitable
justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation or conjecture.

23. Philtranco Service Enterprises vs. Paras

FACTS: Paras is engaged in the buy and sell of fish products. On his way home, he boarded a bus, operated by Inland
Trailways and driven by Coner. It bumped at the rear by another bus, owned and operated by Philtranco. As a result, the
Inland bus was pushed forward and smashed into a cargo truck. The accident bought considerable damage to the vehicles
involved and caused physical injuries to the passengers and crew of the two buses, including the death of Coner who was
the driver of the Inland Bus at the time of the incident. Paras was not spared from the pernicious effects of the accident.
Paras underwent two (2) operations affecting the fractured portions of his body. Paras filed a complaint for damages based
on breach of contract of carriage against Inland. In its answer, defendant Inland denied responsibility, by alleging , among
others, that its driver Coner had observed an utmost and extraordinary care and diligence that the Philtranco bus driver
was the one which violently bumped the rear portion of the Inland bus, and therefore, the direct and proximate cause of
Paras’ injuries. Inland filed a third-party complaint against Philtranco and Apolinar Miralles. RTC rendered its judgment
against Philtranco and Apolinar Miralles and are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff jointly and severally actual damages,
moral damages and attorney’s fees and costs.

HELD: Paras is entitled to moral damages despite the fact that the complaint had been anchored on breach of
contract.
- CA can award temperate damages despite the fact that it was not raised by the claimants

The award of moral damages to Paras was nonetheless proper and valid on the theory of liability that the proximate cause
of the collision between Inland’s bus and Philtranco’s bus had been "the negligent, reckless and imprudent manner
defendant Apolinar Miralles drove and operated his driven unit, the Philtranco Bus Impleading Philtranco and its driver
through the third-party complaint was correct. It is settled that a defendant in a contract action may join as third-party
defendants those who may be liable to him in tort for the plaintiff’s claim against him, or even directly to the plaintiff.

- In awarding temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, the CA did not err, because Paras and Inland were definitely
shown to have sustained substantial pecuniary losses. There is no question that Article 2224 of the Civil Code expressly
authorizes the courts to award temperate damages despite the lack of certain proof of actual damages, to wit:
Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may
be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be proved with certainty.
-Paras’ loss of earning capacity must be compensated The omission should be rectified, for there was credible proof of
Paras’ loss of income during his disability. According to Article 2205, (1), of the Civil Code, damages may be recovered
for loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury. 4. Increase in award of
attorney’s fees having been compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect their interests, 35 as well as by virtue of
the Court now further deeming attorney’s fees to be just and equitable. 36

24. Titan vs. Uni-Field

Facts: Titan Construction purchased on credit various construction supplies and materials from respondent but was only able to pay
P6m, leaving a balance of P1m. Respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for collection of sum of money with damages against
petitioner. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent plus liquidated, Attorney’s Fees and Costs of suits.

Held:

Petitioner insists that the trial court and the Court of Appeals had no legal basis to award interest, liquidated damages, and attorney’s
fees because the delivery receipts and sales invoices, which served as the basis for the award, were not formally offered as evidence
by respondent. Petitioner also alleges that the delivery receipts and sales invoices were in the nature of contracts of adhesion and
petitioner had no option but to accept the conditions imposed by respondent.

On the allegation that the delivery receipts and sales invoices are in the nature of contracts of adhesion, the Court has repeatedly held
that contracts of adhesion are as binding as ordinary contracts. Those who adhere to the contract are in reality free to reject it entirely
and if they adhere, they give their consent. It is true that on some occasions the Court struck down such contract as void when the
weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant party and is reduced to the alternative of accepting the contract or leaving it,
completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.

Considering that petitioner and respondent have been doing business from 1990 to 1993 and that petitioner is not a small time
construction company, petitioner is "presumed to have full knowledge and to have acted with due care or, at the very least, to have
been aware of the terms and conditions of the contract.” The Court, therefore, upholds the validity of the contract between petitioner
and respondent.

However, the Court will reduce the amount of attorney’s fees awarded by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In this case, aside
from the award of liquidated damages, it also ordered petitioner to pay respondent attorney’s fees "equivalent to 25% of whatever
amount is due and payable."

Articles 1229 and 2227 of the Civil Code empower the courts to reduce the penalty if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. The
determination of whether the penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and depends on
several factors such as the type, extent, and purpose of the penalty, the nature of the obligation, the mode of breach and its
consequences.

The Court notes that respondent had more than adequately protected itself from a possible breach of contract because of the
stipulations on the payment of interest, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees. The Court finds the award of attorney’s fees
"equivalent to 25% of whatever amount is due and payable" to be exorbitant because it includes (1) the principal of P1,404,114.00; (2)
the interest charges of P504,114.00 plus accrued interest charges at 24% per annum compounded yearly reckoned from July 1995 up
to the time of full payment; and (3) liquidated damages of P324,147.94. Moreover, the liquidated damages and the attorney’s fees
serve the same purpose, that is, as penalty for breach of the contract. Therefore, we reduce the award of attorney’s fees to 25% of the
principal obligation, or P351,028.50.

AFFIRM the appealed Decision with MODIFICATION as regards the award of attorney’s fees.

25. People vs. Dadulla

The accused was charged in the RTC with rape and attempted rape through separate informations. The accused
denied molesting AAA. RTC found the accused guilty of rape and imposed the death penalty, ordering him to pay to
AAA ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱20,000.00 as moral damages. CA held that the correct penalty in Criminal
Case was reclusion perpetua because the accused was liable only for simple rape by virtue of the information not
alleging any qualifying circumstances; and the second case, the accused was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness,
not attempted rape, because his act of opening the zipper and buttons of AAA’s shorts, touching her, and pulling her
from under the bed constituted only acts of lasciviousness.

Civil liability must be modified

Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, the attendance of any aggravating circumstance (generic, qualifying, or
attendant) entitles the offended party to recover exemplary damages. Here, relationship was the aggravating
circumstance attendant in both cases. We need to award ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages in rape and of
₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages in acts of lasciviousness.

Although, as earlier mentioned, an aggravating circumstance not specifically alleged in the information
(albeit established at trial) cannot be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of the accused, the
established presence of one or two aggravating circumstances of any kind or nature entitles the offended
party to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code because the requirement of specificity in
the information affected only the criminal liability of the accused, not his civil liability.