A contempt is indirect when it occurs out of the presence of the court, thereby

requiring the court to rely on the testimony of third parties for proof of the
offense. It is direct when it occurs under the court's own eye and within its own
hearing. SeeMatter of Heathcock, 696 F.2d 1362, 1365 (11th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Peterson, 456 F.2d 1135, 1139 (10th Cir. 1972). The requirement that
direct contempt be committed in the presence of the court does not limit direct
contempts to those which take place in the courtroom, but some degree of
formality usually found in the courtroom setting must accompany an exercise
of the judicial function for the proceedings to be in the actual presence of the
court. Matter of Jaffree, 741 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1984). Direct contempt for
conduct in the court's presence may be punished summarily. McGuire v. Sigma
Coatings, Inc., 48 F.3d 902 (5th Cir. 1995).

Contempt: Rules of Court

RULE 71
CONTEMPT
Section 1. Direct contempt punished summarily.-A person guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness,
or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may
be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not
exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days,
or both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or
by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment net exceeding (1)
day, or both, if it be a lower court. (1a)
Sec. 2. Remedy therefrom.-The person adjudged in direct contempt by any
court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of
certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended
pending resolution of such petition, provided such person flea a bond fixed by
the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by
and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. (2a)
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.-After a
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties
or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment
of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected
from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent
jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such
real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or
in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of
this�Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such
without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of
an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from
issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in
custody pending such proceedings. (3a)
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced.-Proceedings for indirect contempt may
be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was
committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a
verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal
action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but
said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court
in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision. (n)
Sec. 5. Where charge to be filed.-Where the charge for indirect contempt has
been committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher
rank, or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such
court. Where such contempt has been committed against a lower court, the
charge may be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place in which the lower
court is sitting; but the proceedings may also be instituted in such lower court
subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court of such place in the same manner
as provided in section 2 of this Rule. (4a)
Sec. 6. Hearing; release on bail.-If the hearing is not ordered to be had
forthwith, the respondent may be released from custody upon filing a bond, in
an amount fixed by the court, for his appearance at the hearing of the charge.
On the day set therefor, the court shall proceed to investigate the charge and
consider such comment, testimony or defense as the respondent may make or
offer. (5a)
Sec. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt.-If the respondent is adjudged guilty
of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of
equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty
thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If he is
adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower court, he may be
punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding one (1) month, or both. If the contempt consists in the violation of a
writ of injunction, temporary restraining order or status quo order, he may also
be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by such violation
of the property involved or such amount as may be alleged and proved.
The writ of execution, as in ordinary civil actions, shall issue for the
enforcement of a judgment imposing a fine unless the court otherwise provides.
(6a)
Sec. 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed.-When the contempt consists in the
refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to
perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he
performs it. (7a)
Sec. 9. Proceeding when party released on bail fails to answer.-When a
respondent released on bail fails to appear on the day fixed for the hearing, the
court may issue another order of arrest or may order the bond for his
appearance to be forfeited and confiscated, or both; and, if the bond be
proceeded against, the measure of damages shall be the extent of the loss or
injury sustained by the aggrieved party by reason of the misconduct for which
the contempt charge was prosecuted, with the costs of the proceedings, and
such recovery shall be for the benefit of the party injured. If there is no
aggrieved party, the bond shall be liable and disposed of as in criminal cases.
(8a)
Sec. 10. Court may release respondent.-The court which issued the order
imprisoning a person for contempt may discharge him from imprisonment
when it appears that public interest will not be prejudiced by his release. (9a)
Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.-The judgment or final
order of a court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper
court as in criminal cases. But execution of the judgment or final order shall not
be suspended until a bond is filed by the person adjudged in contempt, in an
amount fixed by the court front which the appeal is taken, conditioned that if
the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment
or final order. (10a)
Sec. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities.-Unless otherwise provided by
law, this Rule shall apply to contempt committed against persons, entities,
bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory
effect to such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to
them by law to punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place
wherein the contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over such
charges as may be filed therefor.

Freedom of peaceful assembly, sometimes used interchangeably with the freedom of association,
is the individual right or ability of people to come together and collectively express, promote, pursue,
and defend their collective or shared ideas.[2] The right to freedom of association is recognized as
a human right, a political right and a civil liberty.
The terms freedom of assembly and freedom of association may be used to distinguish between the
freedom to assemble in public places and the freedom to join an association. Freedom of assembly
is often used in the context of the right to protest, while freedom of association is used in the context
of labor rights and in the Constitution of the United States is interpreted to mean both the freedom to
assemble and the freedom to join an association.[3]
The United States Constitution explicitly provides for 'the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances' in the First Amendment.
Freedom of Assembly

The right of peaceful assembly enjoys primacy in the hierarchy of rights.

In relation to other rights, how do you classify or consider the right to

peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances? The Supreme
Court in a case said that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression and of
the press, a right that enjoy primacy in the realm of constitutional protection.
For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic policy,
without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. As
stated in Jacinto vs. CA, 346 SCRA 665 (1997) the right to assembly and
petition has been upheld thus:

“There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assembly to

petition the government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to
organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to
engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less
than the Constitution. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements
defending and promoting the people’s rights. As early as the onset of this
country, the Court in U.S. vs. Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly
and petition and even went as far as to acknowledge:

‘It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public
assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or
imaginary, because eon such occasions feelings is always wrought to a high
pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the
feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders
over their irresponsible followers. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on
such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished
therefore, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line
between an essentially peaceably assembly and a tumultuous uprising.’”
(citing U.S. vs. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422; Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid
ng Pilipinas (KMP), et al. vs. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006).

Case Doctrines Section 4- Constitution. No law shall be passed

abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances.

A. Prior Restraint

Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans – The test of limitations on freedom of expression

continues to be the CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE – that words are used in
such a circumstance and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantial evils that a lawmaker has a right to prevent.
Government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite listeners to
overthrow it

Chavez v. Gonzales – Hello Garci Case – Tests for restraint – dangerous tendency
doctrine, clear and present danger rule and balancing of interest test; aspects of
freedom of the press – freedom from prior restraint and freedom from subsequent
punishment

B. Subsequent Punishment

People v. Perez – seditious remarks – Criticisms against the branches of government

within the range of liberty and speech unless the intention and the effect be seditious

Gonzales v. COMELEC – prolonged political campaigns – freedom of expression not

absolute; The speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment.
There is to be then no previous restraint to the communication of views or subsequent
punishment unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that
Congress has the right to prevent.

C. Freedom of Expression and the electoral process

Sanidad v. COMELEC – prohibition regarding certain forms of propaganda a valid

exercise of police power of the state to prevent perversion and prostitution of electoral
process

Adiong v. COMELEC – using stickers to campaign – ed

ABS-CBN v. COMELEC – exit polls – allowed

SWS v. COMELEC – releasing surveys results before the election – allowed

D. Freedom of Expression and the Courts

IN RE: EMIL JURADO – journalist and lawyer at the same time - Right to private
reputation. Judges are commonly and rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting
themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of honesty,
integrity, and competence than are commonly required from private persons. Although
honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free
speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a
public
official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement and the false
statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional
protection.

PEOPLE V. GODOY - cited for contempt based on the latter’s article in the newspaper -
(1) There’s a need to make a distinction between adverse criticism of the court's
decision after the case is ended and
"scandalizing the court itself." The latter is not criticism; it is personal and scurrilous
abuse of a judge as such, in which case it shall be dealt with as a case of contempt.
Contempt proceedings dismissed. Such comments may constitute a libel against the
judge, but it cannot be treated as in contempt of the court's authority. (2) In case of a
post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its
proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court,
even though the case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by either of
these two circumstances:

a. Where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the
court; or
b. Where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would be
impeded. And this brings us to the familiar invocation of freedom of expression usually
resorted to as a defense in
contempt proceedings.

IN RE: RESOLUTION A.M. 98-7-02 SC - resolution prohibiting demonstrations within a

radius of 200 meters from the boundary of any hall of Justice. - The Court, it would
seem, has the power to
promulgate “rules concerning conduct of demonstrations in the vicinity of the courts to
assure the people of an impartial and orderly administration of justice. It was anchored
on Art. VIII Sec. 5 (5)

RE: RADIO/TV COVERAGE OF ESTRADA TRIAL - Can the trial of Estrada in the
Sandiganbayan or any other court be broadcasted in TV or radio? NO. An accused has
a right to a public trial, but it is
not synonymous with a publicized trial. Freedom of the press and the accused’s
protection from a possible prejudicial publicized trial must be taken into consideration.
And unless there are safety nets to prevent this event, broadcast media cannot be
allowed to publicize the trial.
E. UNPROTECTED SPEECH – LIBEL, OBSCENITY

BORJAL V. COURT OF APPEALS - Borjal published in his editorial column in the

Philippine Star about certain anomalous activities of an “organizer of a conference” - (1)
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defense in an action for libel or slander. The
doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt
is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when
the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it
is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false
allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an
expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion
happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts.

OCAMPO V. SUN STAR PUBLISHING - graft charges filed against the judge. - (1)
Generally, every defamatory information is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true,
if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following
instances:

a. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any

legal, moral or social duty;
b. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative, or other official proceeding which are not of confidential nature, or of
any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.—the subject articles are
under this exemption.

Pita v. CA – Pinoy Playboy - Miller test (3 Tests)

(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary standards’ would find the work,
taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest. (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law. (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

F. ASSEMBLY AND PETITION

PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO - public meeting at Plaza Miranda - (1) A statute requiring
persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license
therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of
assembly or a freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the
state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in them issuance of licenses, to
a consideration, the time, place, and manner of the parade and procession, with a view
to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper
policing and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license. (2) In
the exercise of police power, the council may, in its discretion, regulate the exercise of
such rights in a reasonable manner, but cannot suppress them, directly or indirectly, by
attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other officer. The
discretion with which the council is vested is
a legal discretion, to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not discretion to
transcend it or to confer upon any city officer and arbitrary authority, making him in its
exercise a petty tyrant.

NAVARRO V. VILLEGAS - Sunken Gardens as alternative to Plaza Miranda - The

Mayor cannot be compelled to issue the permit. A permit should recognize the right of
the applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice, another place may
be designated by the licensing
authority if it be shown that a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no change
was made.

JBL REYES V. MAYOR BAGATSING - a peaceful march and rally from Luneta park to
the gates of the US Embassy. - (1) The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly
should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time
when it will take place. (2) If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the
one entitled to its legal possession is required. (3) Application for permit should be filed
well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may
be valid objections to the grant but at another place. It is an indispensable condition to
such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for
the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such imminent and grave danger
of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. (4) Decision of the
licensing authority must be transmitted to the applicants at the earliest opportunity.

MIRIAM COLLEGE V. COURT OF APPEALS – Libog Article - (1) The right of the
students to free speech in school premises is not absolute. The right to free speech
must always be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.
Thus, while the court upheld the right of the students to free expression in these cases,
disciplinary action by the school for "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which
for any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - which materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others
were not ruled out. (2) The school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the
basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such articles materially disrupt
class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

JACINTO V. COURT OF APPEALS – teachers and mass actions - mass actions then
staged. That given the return-to-work orders issued by the then DECS Secretary, they
still refused to return to work, they were then suspended and later on dismissed from
service. - Where public school teachers absent themselves without proper authority,
from their schools during regular school days, in order to participate in mass protest,
their absence ineluctably results in the non-holding of classes and in the deprivation of
students of education, for which they are responsible, and they may be penalized not for
their exercise of their right to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances but for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Article 11 protects your right to protest by holding

meetings and demonstrations with other people
You also have the right to form and be part of a trade union, a political party or any
another association or voluntary group. Nobody has the right to force you to join a
protest, trade union, political party or another association.

Are there any restrictions to this right?

There are some situations where a public authority can restrict your rights to freedom of
assembly and association.

This is only the case where the authority can show that its action is lawful, necessary
and proportionate in order to:

 protect national security or public safety

 prevent disorder or crime
 protect health or morals, or
 protect the rights and freedoms of other people.

Action is ‘proportionate’ when it is appropriate and no more than necessary to address

the issue concerned.

You may face a wider range of restrictions if you work for the armed forces, the police or
the Civil Service.

What the law says

Article 11: Freedom of assembly and association
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.

2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the state.

Example case
In August 2010, the English Defence League (EDL) planned a protest in Bradford. A
counter demonstration by Unite Against Fascism was also planned. Some local people
wanted the protest banned and there were concerns about a repeat of the violent
clashes that had happened at previous EDL events. West Yorkshire Police had a duty
to protect the protest unless there was clear evidence that violence would occur. They
examined the human rights aspect of the situation and talked to local people, in
particular the Muslim community, about the right to peaceful protest. After this
explanation the community realised that the police had to allow the protest. Community
groups worked with the police to persuade young people not to get involved in criminal
activity on the day.

See the publication ‘Human rights, human lives: a guide to the Human Rights Act for
public authorities’ for more examples and legal case studies that show how human
rights work in practice.

Freedom of peaceful assembly, sometimes used interchangeably with the freedom of

association, is the individual right or ability of people to come together and collectively
express, promote, pursue, and defend their collective or shared ideas.[2] The right to
freedom of association is recognized as a human right, a political right and a civil liberty.
The terms freedom of assembly and freedom of association may be used to distinguish
between the freedom to assemble in public places and the freedom to join an
association. Freedom of assembly is often used in the context of the right to protest, while
freedom of association is used in the context of labor rights and in the Constitution of the
United States is interpreted to mean both the freedom to assemble and the freedom to
join an association.[3]
The United States Constitution explicitly provides for 'the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances' in the First
Amendment.
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