People vs.
Bandian, 63 Phil 530 (1936) US vs Tanedo
FACTS: One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor,
Josefina Bandian, got to a thicket apparently to respond to
the call of nature. Few minutes later, Bandian emerged
from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in
the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of
not being able to support herself. Rushing to her aid, he
brought her to her house and placed her on the bed. He
called on Adriano Comcom to help them Comcom saw he
body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket
where the appellant had gone a few
moments before. She claimed it was hers. Dr. Emilio
Nepomuceno declared that the appellant gave birth in her
own house and three her child into the thicket to kill it. The
trial court gave credit to this opinion.
Issue: WON Bandian is guilty of infanticide
Held: No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be
punishable, must be committed willfully or consciously, or
at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and
free act or omission. The evidence does not show that the
appellant, in causing her child’s death in one way or
another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully,
consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or
abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a
former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover,
Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her
married life with Kirol—she considers him her husband as
he considers him his wife—began a year ago; as he so
testified at the trial, he knew of the pregnancy and that it
was his and that they’ve been eagerly awaiting the birth of
the child. The appellant, thus, had no cause to be ashamed
of her pregnancy to Kirol.
Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she
was, it did not occur to her or she was unable, due to her
debility or dizziness, which cause may be considered lawful
or insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting
circumstance, to take hernchild from the thicket where she
had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and
exposed to the danger of losing its life. If by going into the
thicket to pee, she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to
her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not
because of imprudence or any other reason than that she
was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she
could not be blamed because it all happened by mere
accident, with no fault or intention on her part. The law
exempts from liability any person who so acts and behaves
under such circumstances (Art. 12(4), RPC). Thus, having the
fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor,
she is acquitted of the crime that she had been accused of.
Facts: That on or about the 26th day of January of this year,
the accused, with the intention of killing Feliciano Sanchez,
invited him to hunt wild chickens, and, upon reaching the
forest, with premeditation shot him in the breast with a
shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed him. After
seeing that Sanchez was wounded, Tanedo ran back to his
workers and asked one,"Bernardino Tagampa, to help him
hide the body, which they did by putting it amidst the
tallcogon grass, and later burying in an old well. Only one
shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by a
gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were found at the scene
of the crime prior to the trial, the accused denied all
knowledge of the crime, but later confessed during the trial.
The CFI of Tarlac found the accused guilty of homicide,
having invited the deceased into the forest and
intentionally shooting him in the chest So far as can be
ascertained, there was no enmity and no unpleasant
relations between them. There appears to have been no
motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The only
possible reason that the accused could have for killing the
deceased would be found in the fact of a sudden quarrel
between them during the hunt. That idea is wholly negative
by the fact that the chicken and the man were shot at the
same time, there having been only one shot fired. Hence,
the decision was appealed
Issue: Whether or not the court is correct in ruling that
there is criminal liability
Held: NO, If life is taken by misfortune or accident while in
the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and
without intention of doing harm, there is no criminal
liability. In the case where there is no evidence of
negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither is there
any question that he was engaged in the commission of a
lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there any
evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death
of the deceased. The only thing in the case at all suspicious
upon the part of the defendant are his concealment and
denial.
Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the
accused is not required to prove such defense by a
preponderance of the evidence, because there is denial of
intentional killing. The burden is upon the State to show
that it was intentional. Evidence of misadventure gives rise
to an important issue in a prosecution for homicide which
must be submitted to the jury, and since a plea of
misadventure is a denial of criminal intent which constitutes
an essential element in criminal homicide, to warrant a
conviction, to warrant a conviction it must be a negative by
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Jusgement is reversed.
People vs PO3 Fallorina
Facts: At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent
Jorojoro, an eleven-year old minor and the third child of
Vicente and Felicisima Jorojoro, residing at Sitio Militar,
Brgy. Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon City, asked permission
from his mother Felicisima if he could play outside. She
agreed. Together with his playmate Whilcon “Buddha”
Rodriguez, Vincent played with his kite on top of the roof of
an abandoned carinderia beside the road.
Beside the carinderia was a basketball court, where a
fourteen-year old witness Ricardo Salvo and his three
friends, were playing basketball. Ricardo heard the familiar
sound of a motorcycle coming from the main road across
the basketball court. Cognizant to Ricardo of the appellant,
PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina, a Philippine National Police (PNP)
officer, detailed in the Traffic Management Group (TMG),
knew that he abhorred kids playing on the roof, since one
of his friends was previously been scolded by the appellant
before.
Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from
the roof. When PO3 Fallorina saw them, the former stopped
his motorcycle, he shouted and badmouthed at them. After
hearing the shouts of the appellant, Whilcon rushed to
jump off from the roof while Vincent was lying on his
stomach on the roof flying his kite. When he heard the
appellant’s shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the
latter. As soon as Vincent turned his back, ready to get
down from the roof, suddenly, the appellant pointed the .45
caliber pistol towards the direction of Vincent and fired a
shot. Vincent fell from the roof, lying prostrate near the
canal beside the abandoned carinderia and the basketball
court.
The appellant approached Vincent and carried the latter’s
hapless body in a waiting tricycle and brought him to the
Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent was pronounced
dead on arrival caused by a single gunshot wound in the
head.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal
liability?
(b) Whether or not the appellant can offset the aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of public position from a
mitigating circumstance of his voluntary surrender?
Held:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) cites that the basis
for exemption from a criminal liability under Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is the
complete
absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused.
For the accused to be guilty for a felony, it must be
committed either with criminal intent or with fault or
negligence.
Thusly, the elements of exempting circumstances are (1) a
person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he
causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4)
without any fault or intention of causing it.
In the case at bar, the Court a quo erred in inequitably
appreciating exculpatory and inculpatory facts and
circumstances which should have been considered in favor
of the accused. The court also failed to appreciate the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of
the accused since it was only after three days that the
appellant gave himself up and surrendered his service
firearm. And lastly, the court considered the aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of his position by the
accused.
On January 19, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting the appellant-accused of murder, qualified by
treachery and aggravated by abuse of public position. The
trial court did not appreciate in favor of the appellant the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender.
The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, found
the accused PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder defined
and penalized by Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by the
Republic Act No. 7659, and in view of the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage by the
accused of his public position (par. 1, Art. 14, RPC). Hence,
the accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of late
Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the amounts of actual damages of
P49,174.00 (paid for funeral services); P50,000.00 for moral
damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
P50,000.00 as death indemnity. The court a quo sentenced
the appellant to suffer the Death Penalty.
People vs Praxedes AYAYA GR- L-29396
FACTS:
Jose Fajardo (chief of police) went to the house of Benito de
la Cruz(deceased)(because of a complaint of some drunk
guy vomiting) only to find the latter wounded on the left
upper eyelid which was bleeding. He was brought to the
hospital where he died 4 days later. The cause of death was
cerebral hemorrhage due to the wound inflicted. Ayaya
then was tried and charged for the death of his husband.
AYAYAS DEFENSE:
On appeal, Ayaya defense states She, Benito, and her son
Emilio drank tuba and went to the cinema. No quarrels
occurred on that night or even before the incident. But on
their way home, Benito gave a blow without warning to
ayaya which she dodged. Benito then went home before
them. When Ayaya and Emilio arrived at their house, Benito
was preventing the door from being opened. The door
slightly gave an opening and Emilio succeeded in putting his
head between the wall and door, however, the door was
crushing Emilio’s head and when Benito poked his head on
the door,
Ayaya jabbed him with his umbrella. When they gained
access to the door, they found Benito already lying in bed
with a wound on his head. The testimony was supported by
her son.
ISSUE:
W/N Ayaya is criminally liable
RULING:
No. Ayaya’s action in thrusting her umbrella was did so to
free her son from imminent danger of being crushed in the
head, the absence of any reasonable motive to her husband
made the court believe that it was a mere accident without
any fault or intention of causing it. She incurred no criminal
liability because it was a licit act to free her son from the
grave danger of crushing his head. Decision is reversed and
Ayaya is acquitted.
People vs Genita, Jr.
On December 17, 1991, at around 8:00 oclock in the
evening, while the victims Reynaldo Timbal and Jesus
Bascon were loading firewood in a truck in Barangay
Bugsukan, Butuan City, appellant who was drunk and armed
with an M-14 rifle, asked Reynaldo for a Christmas
gift. Reynaldo told him to just come back because they were
still loading firewood. Appellant left the place. Not long
after, he returned and fired his gun at Jesus feet, hitting his
left leg. He immediately jumped into the truck. Appellant
then went near its bumper and fired at the tire near the
chassis. Then he changed the magazine of his gun and fired
again at Jesus, this time, hitting his right leg. Reynaldo ran
away, his right hand covering his head. Appellant chased
him and fired at him, hitting his nape and right hand. After
the commotion, the victims co-workers who were able to
take refuge from the cascade of bullets returned to the
scene and found the dead body of Reynaldo. Jesus was
immediately brought to the Butuan City General Hospital
but died thereafter.
GENITA’s DEFENSE
Appellant, relying on the exempting circumstance of
accident as his defense, presented a different version. He
testified that he was a member of the Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) stationed at Bugsukan, Butuan
City, hence, he was officially issued an M-14 rifle. On the
evening of December 17, 1991, while on his way to his
camp, he saw a truck parked at the right side of the road
with its rear lights on. While approaching the vehicle,
somebody grasped his neck. As a consequence, he
accidentally pulled the trigger of the M-14 rifle slung on his
shoulder. The weapon automatically fired. At this instance,
his assailant set him free. Immediately he rushed to the
camp and reported the incident to Sgt. Montealto who
placed the camp on alert. Appellant stayed in the camp
during the entire evening. The following morning, he
learned that two persons were killed.[6]
On June 14, 1996, the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads
ISSUE:
W/N Genita can use Article 12 Sec 4 of RPC as a defense.
Held.:
No. It must be stressed that in raising this defense,
appellant has the burden of the evidence and it was
incumbent upon him to establish that he was exempt from
criminal liability.[9] He must show with clear and convincing
proofs that: 1) he was performing a lawful act with due
care, 2) the injury caused was by a mere accident, and 3) he
had no fault or intention of causing the injury. Considering
appellants evidence, it is clear that the requisites of
accident as an exempting circumstance were not
proven. First, appellants manner of carrying his M-14 rifle
negates his claim of due care in the performance of an
act. Knowing that his rifle was automatic, he should have
seen to it that its safety lock was intact. Worse, he admitted
that his finger was constantly on the trigger. With the safety
lock released and his finger on the trigger, how can we
conclude that he acted with due care? We cannot accept his
version that he was just following his trainer’s instruction to
release the safety lock while in a critical area. For one, he
never presented his trainer to corroborate his statement;
and for another, he was not in a critical area. Second, the
number of wounds sustained by the victims shows that the
shooting was not merely accidental. Both victims sustained
more than one wound. While it could have been possible
that the first wound sustained by both victims was by
accident, however, the subsequent wounds sustained by
them in different parts of their bodies could not have been
similarly inflicted. And third, appellant manifested an
unmistakable intent to kill the victims when he reloaded his
rifle after his first unsuccessful attempt to kill them. Jesus
had already sought refuge by jumping into the truck when
another bullet hit his right leg. Reynaldo was already
running away when he was shot on his nape and right
hand. That appellant chased the victims and shot them
several times clearly show that he had the intent to kill
them. His defense must necessarily fail.
Amployo vs. People
Facts:
Alvin Amployo was charged with violation of RA 7610 for
touching, mashing and playing the breasts of Kristine Joy
Mosguera, an 8-year-old Grade 3 pupil without her consent.
The petitioner was charged with forcefully and by means of
intimidation and threats committing lascivious acts on an
eight-year-old girl and molesting her against her will and
consent. Amployo contends that the element of lewd
design was not established since: (1) the incident happened
at 7am, in a street near the school with people around; (2)
the breast of an 8-year-old is still very much
underdeveloped; and (3) suppose h intentionally touched
her breast, it was merely to satisfy a silly whim. He also
argues that the resultant crime is only acts of lasciviousness
under Art 336 RPC and not child abuse under RA 7610 as the
elements thereof had not been proved.
In herein case, petitioner argues that lewd design cannot be
inferred from his conduct firstly because the alleged act
occurred at around seven oclock in the morning, in a street
very near the school where people abound, thus, he could
not have been prompted by lewd design as his hand merely
slipped and accidentally touched Kristine Joy's breast.
Issues:
In relation to art 12 –
W/N Amployo can use accident as an exempting
circumstance as his defense.
Other:
WON lewd design was established; WON Amployo violated
RA 7610.
Held:
Main issue:
No. the allegations by the petitioner that the acts were
accidental presented were contradicted by his threats to
the victim to keep silent and not tell on him. The petitioner
have also failed to prove in any way or substance that his
acts were not intentional.
Other issue:
*Before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through
lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years of age, the
requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual
abuse under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610.The first
element is lewd design.
The term ‘lewd is commonly defined as something indecent
or obscene;[12] it is characterized by or intended to excite
crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd
or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the
existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out
such intention,i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted
as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd
designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves
and the environmental circumstances. What is or what is
not lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot be pigeonholed
into a precise definition.
Lewd design was established. Amployo cannot take refuge
in his version of the story as he has conveniently left out
details which indubitably prove the presence of lewd
design. It would have been easy to entertain the possibility
that what happened was merely an accident if it only
happened once. Such is not the case, however, as the very
same petitioner did the very same act to the very same
victim in the past.
*The first element of RA 7610 obtains. petitioner’s act of
purposely touching Kristine Joy’s breasts (sometimes under
her shirt) amounts to lascivious conduct.
The second element is likewise present. As we observed
in People v. Larin,[24] Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610 does
not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for
profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious
conduct through coercion or intimidation. As case law has
it, intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. As to the
third element, there is no dispute that Kristine Joy is a
minor, as she was only eight years old at the time of the
incident in question.

People of the Philippines vs. Isaias Castillo y Completo
FACTS:
In the evening of 5 November 1993, the accused-appellant
came home drunk and angry. His father-in-law (Guillermo)
tried to subdue him but to no avail which caused the former
to leave the house. As he was leaving, Guillermo saw him
take out his sling and arrow. Consorcia, the accused’s wife,
was heard crying and screaming. Thereafter, the accused-
appellant was seen carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia
out of the house and was later taken to the hospital but to
no avail. Cause of death was the cut jugular vein caused by
a fatal weapon which could have been a “pointed
instrument like a nail.”
ISSUE:
Whether the fatal injury inflicted on the victim was
accidental
RULING:
No. The essential requisites for this exempting
circumstance are (1) a person is performing a lawful act (2)
with due care; (3) he causes and injury to another by mere
accident (4) without fault or intention of causing it. The
mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the
law. In penalizing the act, the consideration of the deadly
weapon was used for no legal purpose, but to inflict injury.
Also, the fact that the accused-appellant disappeared while
his wife was in the hospital is unbecoming of a husband with
a dying wife. Due to the weakness of the defense’s
evidence, the claim that the act was accidental cannot be
appreciated in favour of the accused.
Wherefore, the accused was found guilty of the crime of
Parricide wherein the court imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua
flourescent lamp. Guban tried to assist accused-appellant.
However, for unknown reason, accused-apellant and
Guban shouted at each other and grappled face to face.
Accused-appellant pulled out his knife, stabbed Guban at
the abdomen. and ran away. When Fajardo got hold of
Guban, the latter said, I was stabbed by Feding
Abrazaldo.[8] Fajardo, together with the other barangay
tanod, rushed Guban to the Gov. Teofilo Sison Memorial
Hospital where he was operated by Dr. Alberto Gonzales,
a Medical Officer III. But after a few hours, Guban died. Dr.
Gonzales issued a Medico-Legal Certificate stating that the
cause of death was stab wound, epigastrium, massive
hemothorax right.
Invoking self-defense, accused-appellant presented a
different version. On July 15, 1995 at about 10:00 in the
evening, he was making fans inside his house at Barangay
Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. His wife Lydia and children
Mary Jane, Melvin and Christelle were with him.
Suddenly, Delfin Guban, who was then drunk, went to
his house and shouted at him, saying, Get out Feding I
will kill you!When accused-appellant went out, Guban hit
him with an iron pipe. Accused-appellant ran towards his
house and got his two children. Guban, now armed with a
knife, followed him and they grappled for its possession. In
the course thereof, both fell down. It was then that the
knife held by Guban ACCIDENTALLY HIT HIM. Accused-
appellant did not know which part of Gubans body was hit.
Thereafter, he got the knife in order to surrender it to the
police.
ISSUE:
W/N the accused can invoke accident as an exempting
circumstance.
Held: No. In this case, since the appellant has the burden of
proof that the deceased was indeed killed by mere accident.
The accused here was not able to prove his claim. Contrary
to his testimony, his own sister testified against him.

People vs Abrazaldo

Facts:
On July 15, 1995, at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, at
Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, accused-
appellant, then intoxicated, attempted to hack his uncle,
Bernabe Quinto, but instead, hit the post of the latters
house. The incident was reported to the barangay
authorities, prompting Delfin Guban, Rosendo Fajardo, Sr.,
Alejandro Loceste (all are members of the barangay tanod),
and Cesar Manaois to rush to the scene. Upon reaching the
place, Fajardo heard accused-appellant shouting at his
uncle, I will kill you! Thereafter, he saw accused-appellant
coming out of Quintos house with blood oozing from his
forehead. At that time, the place was well lighted by a

People vs Latosa
Facts:
On February 5, 2002, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, Susan
Latosa, hereinappellant, together with his husband Major
Felixberto Sr. and two children Sassymaeand Michael, were
in their house in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig. While Major
Felixberto Sr.was asleep, Sassymae saw her mother take
Felixberto Sr.’s gun and leave. She askedher mother where
she was going and if she could come along, appellant
refused.Moments later, appellant returned and told
Sassymae to buy ice cream. AfterSassymae left, appellant
instructed Michael to join his sister, but he
refused.Appellant thereafter turned up the volume of the
television and radio to full. Shortyafter that, appellant gave
her son money to buy food. After buying his food, Michael
went back to their house and thereupon saw hisfriend Mac-
Mac who told him that he saw appellant running away from
their house.Moments later, a certain Sgt. Ramos arrived
and asked if something had happened intheir house.
Michael replied in the negative then entered their house. At
that point,he saw his father lying on the bed with a hole in
the left portion of his head and a gunat his left hand.Michael
immediately went outside and informed Sgt. Ramos about
whathappened. Sgt. Ramos told him that appellant had
reported the shooting incident tothe Provost Marshall
office. Then, Sassymae arrived and saw her father with a
bulletwound on his head and a gun near his left
hand.Appellant claimed that the killing was an accident,
that when Felixberto, Sr.woke up, he asked her to get his
service pistol from the cabinet adjacent to their bed.As she
was handing the pistol to him it suddenly fired, hitting
Felixberto, Sr. who wasstill lying down. weak, it cannot be
disbelieved after the appellant has admitted the killing.
bakit mo inamin. Sana pinahawak mo kay Major iyong baril
saka mo pinutok ”; (9) appellant’s children testified that
theywere informed by Felixberto, Sr. regarding the threat of
appellant’s paramour,Sta. Inez, to the whole family; and
(10) Francisco Latosa presented amemorandum showing
that appellant was terminated from her teaching jobby
reason of immorality
Issue:
WON appellant has strongly established the exempting
circumstance of accident to relieve him from criminal
liability.
Ruling:
No. SC held that it was incumbent upon appellant to prove
with clear and convincing evidence, the following essential
requisites for the exempting circumstance of accident. To
prove the circumstance, she must rely on the strength of
her own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution, for even if this be weak, it cannot be
disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. SC
find no merit in appellant’s contention that the prosecution
failed to prove by circumstantial evidence her motive in
killing her husband. Intent to kill and not motive is the
essential element of the offense on which her conviction
rests. The following circumstantial evidence considered by
the RTC and affirmed by the CA satisfactorily established
appellant’s intent to kill her husband and sustained her
conviction for the crime. WHEREFORE, the appeal of Susan
Latosa y Chico is DISMISSED. The April 23, 2008Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02192 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The amount of exemplary
damages is increased toP30,000.00.

The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt

for the crime of parricide. The RTC, in finding appellant
guilty, considered the followingcircumstantial evidence
established by the prosecution: (1) shortly before
theshooting, appellant asked her two (2) children to do
errands for her whichwere not usually asked of them; (2) at
the time of the shooting, only theappellant and Felixberto,
Sr. were in the house; (3) appellant was seen running away
from the house immediately after the shooting; (4)
whenMichael went inside their house, he found his father
with a hole in the headand a gun in his left hand; (5) the
medico-legal report showed that the causeof death was
intracranial hemorrhage due to the gunshot wound on the
headwith the point of entry at the left temporal region; (6)
the Firearms IdentificationReport concluded that appellant
fired two (2) shots; (7) Felixberto, Sr. was right-handed and
the gun was found near his left hand; (8) Sassymae testified
thatshe heard Sta. Inez tell appellant “