RUSSIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION

2019, VOL. 11, NO. 3, 253–273

https://doi.org/10.1080/19409419.2019.1679663

Discursive activism in the Russian feminist hashtag campaign:

the #ItIsNotAReasonToKill case
Elena Arbatskaya
Department of Journalism, Tyumen State University, Tyumen, Russia

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

This paper describes a study of the feminist hashtag campaign Received 15 February 2019
against blaming victims #этонеповодубить (it is not a reason Accepted 21 September 2019
to kill), which was launched in the Russian social media in 2018.
KEYWORDS
This article considers #этонеповодубить as a case of discursive Hashtag campaigns; Russian
activism and combines techniques of discourse analysis with online feminism; Russian
network analysis to reveal how the participants in the temporary hashtag campaigns;
community were opposed to the victim-blaming discourse. The discursive strategies;
strategies of legitimization that the participants used to justify discursive activism
their opinions and the provocative style of the campaign were
investigated based on Reyes’ classification. Visual network analysis
and text analysis were facilitated by Netlytic.

Introduction
In January 2018, a hashtag campaign #этонеповодубить took place in the Russian
segment of Instagram and Twitter. The campaign was launched after the murder of a
young woman called Tatiana Strakhova by her ex-boyfriend. The campaign was in
response to victim-blaming in social networks. Tatiana’s revealing photos on her Instagram
account were the cause for her to be blamed. The participants of the campaign posted
their own provocative photos with a hashtag that meant ‘It is not a reason to kill.’ The cam-
paign #этонеповодубить is a vivid example of a Russian hashtag campaign. At the same
time, it is an example of a display of discursive activism and online feminism. A study of
such a campaign might shed light on these phenomena.
A hashtag, created as a means of structuring content in social networks, is increasingly
used to attract attention to social and political issues and events. After its emergence,
hashtag campaigns were considered mainly in the context of protests against government
actions and decisions. Nowadays more and more attention is being attracted to hashtag
campaigns, which are against existing social practices, behavior and norms. In these cases,
the protest is addressed not so much to the state as it is to power in a broader sense, which
Fuko (2005) referred to as governmentality (‘gouvernementalitee’). Such campaigns often
take the form of discursive activism that was described by F. Shaw (2012) as ‘speech or
texts that seek to challenge opposing discourses.’ Here the issue of participants’ choice
of discursive strategies might be raised.

CONTACT Elena Arbatskaya e.arbatskaya@utmn.ru

© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
254 E. ARBATSKAYA

Some studies of the discourse of social networks have been done in the tradition of
critical discourse analysis (CDA). Jackson and Banaszczyk (2016), Barker-Plummer and
Barker-Plummer (2017) and other scholars critically analyzed inflectional posts inside fem-
inist hashtag campaigns on Twitter. However, studies of online activism by discourse
analysis are still fewer compared to studies of the discourse of mainstream media and
other channels on the reproduction of power.
Russian discursive activism was studied on examples of LGBT campaigns (Kondakov,
2013; Lapina, 2013). Nevertheless, there have been only isolated studies of Russian femin-
ist hashtag campaigns. Lokot (2018), Aripova and Johnson (2018), examined the most pro-
minent Ukrainian-Russian campaign #IamNotAfraidtoSayIt that happened in 2016 and
considered the campaign as a feminist action and the first attempt of wide discussion
about the culture of rape in the post-Soviet space.
Meanwhile, feminist hashtag campaigns in Russia are occurring more frequently and
forms of participants’ personal statements are becoming more diverse. There is a need
to analyze new cases against the background of the changing situation of feminism in
the world and Russia. On the one hand, the position of feminism in the world and
Russia is strengthening and the actions of women’s movements for their rights are becom-
ing more daring. On the other hand, the resistance of opponents of these movements –
who support patriarchate – is also growing. The researchers of Russian feminism
(Johnson & Saarinen, 2013; Теmkina, 2008; Temkina & Zdravomyslova, 2015) observed
the lack of legitimacy of Russian feminist movements. In this connection, the legitimization
of anti-patriarchal practices seems to be an urgent aim for feminist movements.
The #этонеповодубить is an example of the participants’ attempts to delegitimize the
old values and to legitimize new rules of the game in direct confrontation with bearers of
patriarchal culture.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the case of #этонеповодубить as an example of
discursive activism. The discursive nature of this campaign determined the focus on dis-
cursive strategies that the participants applied, especially the strategies for legitimization
and delegitimization. That is why the classification of Reyes’s legitimization strategies was
used as the main method of speech strategies analysis.
A qualitative analysis of discursive strategies was supported by a quantitative lexical
analysis, which was facilitated by Netlytic: the computer program. Netlytic was also
used for network analysis, which allowed the revelation of the most important discussions
and supported understanding of relationships between the participants of the campaign
and their opponents and amongst the participants themselves.

Literature Review
Hashtag campaigns and feminist hashtags
A hashtag is a keyword and a tool for organizing content in social media such as Twitter,
Facebook, and Instagram. Almost immediately after the emergence of the hashtag, it
became a tool for political influence and agenda-setting. This is particularly apparent
after the so-called Arab spring (e.g. Aday, Farrell, Lynch, Sides, & Freelon, 2012; Gerbaudo,
2012; Howard et al., 2011). Tamara A. Small (2011) noted that political hashtags are increas-
ingly used to inform about events. Researchers have paid rapt attention to hashtag
 RUSSIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 255

campaigns related to conflicts and street protests such as #OccupyWallStreet and #Fergu-
son (e.g. Bonilla & Rosa, 2015; Castells, 2015) and to hashtag campaigns associated with
political events such as elections (Larsson & Moe, 2012). Subsequently, functions of a
hashtag have become more diverse, and the design of hashtag campaigns has become
more sophisticated. Nowadays hashtag campaigns against inequality, violence and
social abjection have begun to surface.
Many hashtag campaigns contain personal stories as their main element or as a comp-
lement to other forms of posting: videos, creative pictures, etc. Readers are encouraged to
participate and tell their own stories. Some researchers point out that in the process of
campaign development one collective story is created. Yang (2016, p. 14) believes that
a proper time deployment and distinctive ‘beginning, middle and end’ might give
hashtag campaigns a form of narrative.
The digital storytelling in social networks is at times seen as a way to create a meta-nar-
rative for the unheard or dissenting voices, as well as a narrative which tries to contest an
opposed narrative. For example, Siapera, Boudourides, Lenis, and Suiter (2018) studied
refugee-related hashtags in Twitter – #refugee, #refugeecrisis, #flüchtling – and defined
the actions of refugees as ‘positioned, personalized and diverse narratives constructing
a kind of overarching distributed story framed through hashtags and addressivity
markers’ (p. 3). Poole, Giraud, and de Quincey (2019) investigated the example of creating
a counter-narrative inside the hashtag #stopIslam. Following Bruns and Burgess (2011),
Dawes (2017), he described temporary loose-knit connected communities as ‘connected
communities’ that are linked by a common response to an event or discourse, which
have a possibility of reframing dominant discourse and ‘briefly allowing marginalized
voices centrality’ (p. 31).
Narrative-based hashtag campaigns are generally based on ‘speaking about oft-
silenced experiences and making them visible’ (Keller, Mendes, & Ringrose, 2018, p. 33).
Studying discursive activism through a case of the hashtag campaign #WhyIStayed,
Clark (2016), stressed ‘discursive influence of collective storytelling’ (p. 789), its power to
intervene on oppressive discourses (p. 800) and spread new norms and valuation of
social phenomena. Hashtag campaigns against rape culture and harassment such as
#BeenRapedNeverReported and #MeToo were studied by Ringrose, Renold, and Mendes.
A striking example of campaigns against blaming and shaming women was #SlutWalk
(Carr, 2013; Mendes, 2015). In solidarity, women collectively demonstrated the particular
behavior for which other women, particularly victims of sexual violence, were subjected
to shaming for. The hashtag was the tool for gathering and spreading information
about the campaign, which was mostly offline, and the statement of the campaign was
mostly visual: the participants of the campaign marched dressed as ‘sluts.’ However, the
focus on the word ‘slut’ as a collective attempt to change the practice, which is related
to using this word, can attribute the campaign to discursive activism. Ringrose and
Renold (2014, p. 778) noticed that ‘a discursive-embodied category “slut” works as an
affective intensity’ in campaigns which aim to ‘disrupt the sexual regulation of girls and
women’s bodies. This action might be interpreted as an attempt to legalize the behavior
patterns of women and delegalize slut-shaming.
The most noticeable Russian campaign was #Янебоюсьсказать #IAmNotAfraidToSayIt
(Lokot, 2018) that following the Ukrainian one. The campaign was based on telling per-
sonal stories about violence. Even though the subsequent campaigns have been less
256 E. ARBATSKAYA

visible, their numbers have increased and they have become more diverse in form and
content. Commenting on the campaign #Янебоюсьсказать in BBC site, Temkina
(Temkina, 2016) mentioned that this campaign showed that the society is changing,
and there is a brewing resistance to patriarchal attitudes.

Women’s position and feminism in Russia

When discussing women’s position and feminism in Russia, it is essential to take into
account the Soviet background where women had the same legal rights as men but
were expected to perform traditional women’s roles in their private lives; feminist move-
ments were not present in the public sphere, and women’s movements were rigidly incor-
porated into the ideological system with its sanctimonious morality that involved the
taboo on discussion of sex. (Sperling, 1999; Temkina, 2008).
In the post-Soviet period, women’s sexuality became more freely discussed (Темкина,
2008). Along with the liberalization, Temkina also identified trends of repatriation that
mean gender asymmetry, the ‘double standard,’ neglect of female sex-needs and
control of women’s sex life (pp. 354, 359). Summing up the results of her empirical research
on the women’s position in post-Soviet Russia, Temkina (2008) argued that women were
expected to ‘service men, including sexual’ (p. 358) while at the same time avoiding any
signs of sexuality in their appearance. Based on interviews of women’s post-Soviet gener-
ation, Temkina and Zdravomyslova (2015) revealed several sexual scripts of middle-class
urban women of the post-soviet generation. Along with the scripts reflecting the liberation
of female sexuality, the authors identified the scripts that reflected the women’s consent
to control their sexual and reproductive life as a double standard.
The same duality is attributed to the post-Soviet period by Johnson and Saarinen
(2013). They emphasized a rollback from liberalization and reducing opportunities for fem-
inist movements. Johnson and Saarinen argued that ‘there seems to be even less space
than in the mid-1990s for feminisms that challenge men’s power in their professional
and personal relationships with women’ (p. 548). In addition, they noted the dominance
of the rhetoric of masculinism in the governmental discourse. Sundstrom (2018) also
emphasized the deterioration in the representation of women in the public sector in com-
parison to the Soviet period.
The rhetoric of masculinism was described by Sperling (2014) as a key element of
Putin’s legitimization as a ‘strong president.’ She also noted that the Pro-Kremlin and
opposition youth movements use erotica to attract young people (2012, 2014).
Describing women’s movements in Russia, Zdravovyslova and Temkina (2015) noted
that most of them tend to distance from feminism assuming that this can be explained
by the participants’ willingness to distance themselves from politics. Thus, the feminist
understanding of the private as political (Hanisch, 1969) seems to be neglected in
Russia. However, there are areas of Russian feminism that are highly politicized. Using
Pussy Riot’s example, Johnson (2014) described the practice of informal feminism as ‘a
response to nongovernmental organization (NGO) feminism and the regime’s repression
of NGO feminism.’ According to Johnson, ‘swearing … violated the political cleaner role
that the Kremlin has given women in the last few years’ (p. 583).
Thus, the position of women and feminism in Putin’s period in Russia can be described
as ambivalent. Liberalization coexists with patriarchy and separate feminist actions occur
 RUSSIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 257

in the background with weak popularity and a low legitimacy of feminism in general in
addition to political apathy among women’s movements.

Discourse analysis and discursive strategies

Discourse analysis has traditionally been applied to reveal language-based social practices,
including subordination and violence. Van Leeuwen (2018, p. 140) states that ‘Discourse
analysis can reveal … how texts transform and evaluate the social realities they represent.’
Discourse analysis, particularly critical discourse analysis (СDA), has mainly been used to
analyze the relationship between power, ideology, and the ways of socio-cultural
changes via a language (e.g. Fairclough, 2013). Van Dijk (1995) defined the goals of the
CDA: ‘CDA especially focuses on (group) relations of power, dominance and inequality
and the ways these are reproduced or resisted by social group members through text
and talk’ (p. 18). Thus, Van Dijk pointed out that the СDA can also be applied to the analysis
of counteraction to domination.
Discourse analysis, particularly the CDA, has accumulated a wealth of tools for the
analysis of discursive strategies. The definitions of discursive strategies, which were
given by Gumperz (1982), Wodak and Van Leeuwen (1999), Wodak and De Cillia (2007),
contain two key features: the purposefulness and the use of discourse as a tool. In particu-
lar, Wodak and De Cillia (2007) defined strategy as ‘a more or less accurate and a more or
less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a par-
ticular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim’ (p. 325). Russian scholars use the
term ‘speech strategies’ whose meaning is close to the term ‘discursive strategies.’ Issers
defines this term as the complex of speech acts aimed at achieving communicative
goals [Issers, 2008, p. 54]. This paper focuses on discursive strategies as ways to achieve
a goal through discourse.
In political discourse, the goal that the actors are trying to achieve may be the legitimi-
zation of social practices or particular actions. The term of legitimization, related to the
notion of legitimacy, in general means a process that makes the society accept some
phenomena as useful and consistent with its norms and values (Deephouse & Suchman,
2008). Drawing on Van Leeuwen’s classification, Reyes (2011, p. 804) revealed five strat-
egies of legitimization and delegitimization of social practices. He argues that ‘social
actors justify social practices through: emotions […], a hypothetical future […], rationality
[…], voices of expertise […], and altruism […].’
According to Reyes, legitimization through emotions means the use of emotions
(usually negative ones) to confirm the need for certain behaviors. Appealing to fear,
sadness and outrage not only legitimizes the position of the speaker but also helps
social actors form ‘their community’s vision of social behavior’ (p. 788) thus constructing
opposition: ‘we-they.’ Describing a legitimization through hypothetical future, Reyes fol-
lowed by Dunmire (2007), defined it as ‘a threat in the future that requires our imminent
action in the present.’ Legitimization through rationality, according to Reyes, is a strategy
to ensure that ‘decisions have been made after a heeded, evaluated and thoughtful pro-
cedure’ (p. 786). Reyes describes the legitimization through voices of expertise as a speak-
er’s appellation to their knowledge in a specific field. The strategy of legitimization
through altruism aims to demonstrate concerns about the interests of the whole
society. Explaining this strategy, Reyes refers to Lakoff: ‘This legitimization is often
258 E. ARBATSKAYA

presented as part of what Lakoff considers the plot of a story, more specifically “The Fairy
Tale of the Just War” (Lakoff, 2013), where there is a villain, a victim and a hero’ (p. 788).
Reyes also notes the proximity to the strategy of legitimization through altruism and
‘moral evaluation,’ described by Van Leeuwen (2008).
This study comes from a hypothesis that feminist campaigns struggling against patri-
archal culture used the same discursive strategies that CDA researchers described as tra-
ditionally implied by power agents for conquest and retention of dominance. Thus, the use
of CDA methodology, particularly Reyes classification, seems relevant to analyze feminist
campaigns.

Methodology
To analyze the case of #этонеповодубить on Instagram and Twitter, two datasets were
formed automatically by Netlytic (Ahmed, 2018). Data for exploring the hashtag campaign
on Instagram were extracted by query ‘этонеповодубить.’ Then the dataset was selected
from the 24th to the 30th of January 2018 (from the day when the campaign was launched
to the day when the number of the posts became almost zero), to exclude posts that were
not part of the campaign. This dataset contained 5969 total records of 2974 unique
posters. The dataset for exploring the hashtag campaign in Twitter was prepared similarly
and contained 793 total records out of 652 unique posters.
Text analysis facilitated by Netlytic was used to identify word frequency. A list of words
sorted by frequency was created as a CSV file. Likewise, the word cloud for the top 100
words was formed. Then the semantic group of words inside the top 100 was identified,
and the words included in the group were counted throughout the dataset.
Qualitative analysis was used to identify speech strategies. At the first stage, the most
significant discussions and the most popular topics were revealed based on the results of
the frequency text analysis and visual network analysis.
Then the most common speech strategies of legitimization within the campaign were
revealed. This research analysis was done according to Reyes’s classification.
To understand participants’ interactions, network analysis facilitated by Netlytic was
used. The visualization of the name network revealed connections of each commentator
to users who mentioned them. The chain network visualized network connections of
commentators with the posters. Then visualizations and numerical properties were
analyzed.
The hashtag #этонеповодубить combined posts of supporters and opponents of the
campaign. Therefore, the dataset of the campaign included posts of the people who cri-
ticized the campaign. This part of the dataset was reviewed to make sure that the detected
phenomena were related not to the opponents’ posts but to those of the campaign par-
ticipants and to better understand the strategies of those participants who wrote their
posts while engaged in polemics with their opponents.
A typical post of participants of #этонеповодубить consisted of a visual statement (such
as a photograph of the author of a post with partial nudity, clothing or accessories that
could be interpreted as sexual or provocative) and an accompanying text. In this research,
only the text – including commentaries-was analyzed. However, in the analysis of the
posts, the images accompanying the text were reviewed to consider the context in
which they were used.
 RUSSIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 259

Results
An analysis of the campaign # этонеповодубить on Instagram
Which words did the participants use most frequently?
The frequency text analysis revealed top10 keywords shown in Table 1.
The top 100 included a group of words that were related to violence: убивать (kill), уби-
йство (murder), убил (he killed), насилие (violence), жертва (victim), насиловать (rape),
убитой (murdered woman), изнасиловал (raped), насильник (rapist). Within the whole
dataset comprised of 91,241 words, 1772 words (1.94%) were related to violence while
384 (0.42%) words were obscene and profane.
Which speech strategies were dominant?
The qualitative analysis confirmed a high level of emotional intensity, which mani-
fested itself in an increased number of expressive statements. Most of the posts were
written in a strong emotional tone, mainly negative, with exclamations and rhetorical
questions.
Дань отвращения нашему обществу. Девушку изнасиловали? Сама виновата. Девушку изна-
силовали толпой? Сама виновата. Девушку избили, изнасиловали, убили, еще несколько раз
изнасиловали труп? Сама виновата. Где та грань, за которой наше общество обвинит пре-
ступника за содеянное, а не найдет причины для обвинения жертвы? Как показывают
последние события – нет этой грани.

A tribute to the disgust at our society. Has a girl been raped? It’s her own fault. Was the girl
raped by a mob? It’s her own fault. The girl was beaten, raped, killed, and then they raped
her corpse several times? Her own fault. Where is the limit beyond which our society will
blame the criminal for what they have done and not find a reason to blame the victim? As
recent events have shown, there is no such limit.

In this statement, the author not only displays emotion (disgust) but also uses rhetorical
constructions to create the effect of infection with emotion. The vocabulary associated
with death and crime amplifies the emotion of fear. Thus, legitimization through emotions
(primarily fear) is used.
Legitimization through emotions was the dominant strategy of legitimization. Some of
the posts contained describing emotions.
Прочитала и расплакалась. Как же это отвратительно [emotion icon ] я стараюсь не пер-
еходить по тегу чтобы не читать этот ад, но они уверенно пишут мне в личку, участницам
в комментариях и просто везде. Убить. Бить. Насиловать. Унижать. И эти люди рядом

Table 1. Top 10 Most Frequently Used Word within #этонеповодубить on Instagram.

Word in Russian Translation number of messages instances
фото photo 409 570
людей people 275 329
повод reason 267 370
жизни life 203 248
девушка girl 185 219
человека person 182 198
девушки girl 179 212
виновата guilty 175 213
флешмоб flash mob 171 203
убивать to kill 160 184
260 E. ARBATSKAYA

I read it and cried. How disgustingg it was! [emotion icon ] I tried not to click the tag so as to
avoid reading that hell but they unhesitatingly wrote to me in PM, to participants in the com-
ments and just everywhere. ‘Kill. Beat. Rape. Humiliate’. And these people are all around.

Emotions were also attributed to the bearers of the opposing discourse.

В этой лютой агрессии я вижу прежде всего страх.

In this fierce aggression, first and foremost, I see fear.

The campaign was highly polemical. Examples of the opposing discourse were inside the
dataset.
[…] жить с влюбленным в нее неуравновешенным бывшим, сидящим на АД и шатающимся
по психотерапевтам, подкатывать к его лучшему другу у него на глазах, […] ласково назы-
вать его Педиком (мимими, прям) – это вообще норма? Да тут оба ебанутые! Естественный
отбор во всем его великолепии. P.S. Ни в коем случае не оправдываю долбоеба мужского
пола-это же полная дичь. То, что он сделал. Я до сих пор в ахуе … Но и девочке не
мешало бы мозгов заиметь при жизни. […]

[…] to live with an unbalanced ex in love with her, who takes antidepressants and hangs
around psychotherapists, to flirt with his best friend in front of him […], to tenderly call him
faggot (it’s so cute!) – is it normal? They are both fucked up! Natural selection in all its
splendor! P.S. In any case, I do not justify the fucking males- this is complete savagery.
For what he did, I’m still pissed … But the girl should have had brains when she was
alive […].

Какой же тупой шлюший флешмоб!

What a stupid slut flash mob!

In some posts with the hashtag, users made fun of the campaign by posting parody
photos. For example, a photo of a young man who is lying on a bed in a funny pajama,
exposing his belly, and parodying an ‘erotic’ pose. The post said:
Да, у @[user name] есть тело, оно сексуально, но #этонеповодубить

Yes. @[user name] has a body, it is sexy, but #itisnotareasontokill.

Users also published photos of pizza, socks, and other items using the hashtag
#этонеповодубить
A significant number of the posts were addressed to the authors of the posts that con-
tained the victim-blaming discourse.
Запомните, монополией на убийство человека владеет только государство. А пока если вас
не устраивает человек, переживите это как-то самостоятельно’.

Remember, only the state has a monopoly on killing a person. In the meantime, if you are not
satisfied with the person, deal with it on your own.

Подрастешь, поймешь какую хрень пишешь. А еще лучше поймешь, когда встретишь
психопата или когда изнасилуют. Вот тогда точно побудешь в чужой шкуре;)

When you grow up, you’ll understand the crap you write. You’ll understand better when you
meet a psychopath or when you’re raped. That’s when you will definitely get in someone else’s
skin;)
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The second example shows how legitimization through an emotion (fear) strategy com-
bined with a hypothetical future strategy. The same combination might be seen in the fol-
lowing example containing a direct appeal to the future.
Какое будущее у страны, где пишут комментарии ‘она была сама виновата … ?????????

What can the future be for the country where they write commentaries such as “it’s her own
fault”?????????

The hypothetical future strategy was often revealed not in the form of a conditional sen-
tence but in the form of logical reasoning.
Ребята, которые оправдывают убийство Татьяны аргументами шкура, заслужила, сама вино-
вата и так далее … Знаете, что вы делаете? Вы признаете, что вас можно невозбранно
убивать, если вы на чей-то вкус слишком блондин или через чур в джинсах. Обвиняя
жертву, вы соглашаетесь, что на любое ваше нет к вам могут применить силу, а вы
будете в этом виноваты. Крича, что девушку, которая в 19 лет сфоткалась с бутылкой алко-
голя, можно было убить и изнасиловать, вы отказываетесь от любой защиты в случае, если
на вас нападут. Если вас изобьют – это потому, что вы слишком шли мимо. Если вас ограбят
– это потому, что у вас было, что отнять. Если вас убьют – это за то, что вы были живыми
[…].

Guys who justify the murder of Tatiana with the argument that she is a slut, she deserved it, it’s
her fault and so on … Do you know what you are doing? You are admitting that you are
allowed to be killed if you are too blonde or are wearing jeans too much. In blaming the
victim, you admit that your ‘NO’ means that they can apply force, and you will be guilty. By
shouting that the 19-year-old girl who took a photo with a bottle of alcohol is allowed to
be killed and raped deny you any defense if you were to be attacked. If you are beaten –
it’s because you just walked past too much. If you are robbed – it’s because you have some-
thing to be taken away from you. If they kill you – it’s just because you are alive […].

This excerpt also contains an offer to place yourself in the victim’s shoes in what can not
only be seen as an additional strategy but can also be defined as a call for empathy.
Some posts contained statements that might be described as ‘Yes, we are Sluts because
we are in solidarity with women who are called Sluts.’
Шлюхи, говорят, сделали в инсте флешмоб в поддержку зверски убитой Тани Страховой.
Да, шлюхи сделали, и нам, ‘шлюхам’, больше нельзя молчать, иначе нас сперва загонят в
халифат, а потом и в инквизицию, и каждую, кто сексуально выглядит, но не даёт, будут
пытать и жечь на костре (у меня научная работа была по инквизиции, там оч много сек-
суального мотива).

Sluts, as they call them, have made a flash mob in the Insta to support the brutally murdered
Tanya Strakhova. Yeah, sluts have done it, and we, ‘sluts,’ must no longer be silent, otherwise
we will be driven directly to the Caliphate and later to the inquisition, and everyone who looks
sexy but doesn’t put out will be tortured and burned (my scientific work was about inquisition
and there was a lot of sexual motive present).

The post referenced the author since she was knowledgable having done an academic
research on this topic. This speech strategy might be categorized as a voice of expertise
according to Reyes. In some posts, the campaign participants declared directly that they
have the ‘right to … ,’ first and foremost, make speeches of freedom:
заявляю на весь мир, что я:
262 E. ARBATSKAYA

- имею право красить волосы в яркий цвет

- имею право употреблять алкоголь

- имею право выставлять любые фото в соцсети с любыми подписями под ними

- имею право на самовыражение через одежду, либо ее отсутствие

- имею право делать пирсинг, татуировки

- имею право говорить, что хочу, потому что это все НЕ ПОВОД, сука, УБИТЬ.

I declare to the whole world that I:

- have the right to dye my hair in bright colours

- have the right to consume alcohol

- have the right to put any photos on social networks with any captions

- have the right to express myself through any clothing, or the absence of it

- have the right to have body piercing, tattoos

- have the right to speak as I see fit because it’s NOT a REASON TO KILL, for fuck’s sake

The author’s position in this post is reinforced by the repetition of the expression ‘I have
the right,’ which is not only a stylistic device but also an imitation to the rhetoric of Con-
stitution or the Declaration of human rights.
How did the campaign participants interact with each other?
The Netlytic found 3072 unique personal names in the dataset. According to the name
analysis (Table 2), the reciprocity was about 0.45, which means that participants responded
to each other relatively actively. However, the properties did not indicate significant signs
of close ties between the participants.
The visual network analysis (Figure 1) revealed a visible connection between several
central clusters but a rather weak connection between the rests of them. In most cases,
the participants discussed, inside a small group of supporters, the behavior of an opposing
side. In these cases, they agreed with each other (Figure 2). In the cases in which they
directly communicated with their opponents, replies often contained insults and obscen-
ities from both sides.

An analysis of the campaign #этонеповодубить on Twitter

Which words did the participants use most frequently?

Table 2. The properties of network analysis #этонеповодубить

on Instagram.
Properties Name analysis Chain analysis
Diameter 53 33
Density 0.000817 0.000335
Reciprocity 0.448200 0.000803
Centralization 0.018190 0.025560
Modularity 0.964900 0.962200
 RUSSIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 263

Figure 1. Visualization of name network analysis (who mention whom) in Instagram.

The analysis revealed the top10 words, which are shown in Table 3. The analysis
showed that the top 10 words became the most used because they were included in
the posts that were actively reposted. Inside the top 100, there was an increased frequency
of swear words, with the word шлюхи often being used in different forms: шлю … (40,40),
шлюхи (10,10), шлюха (11,11). Even though this word was majorly used in the posts of the
campaign opponents, the campaign participants also used it. The whole dataset (8435
words) revealed 271 (3.21%) swear words and 907 (10.75%) words related to violence,
especially to murder and rape.
Which speech strategies were dominant?
The analysis showed that foul language was used in both the opponents’ and partici-
pants’ posts. Swear words were used as an insults and emotion amplifiers.
[…]я имею в виду ту новостную ДИЧЬ, которую все обсуждают и сами собственно бл..ть
обсуждения!!!!Очень сложно писать без мата …

I mean the news ROT that everyone is talking about and the fuсking discussions themselves!!!!
It is very difficult to write without swearing …
264 E. ARBATSKAYA

Figure 2. Screenshot from Netlytic. The answer of the initiator of campaign 2day4night to a supporter:
‘Really! This should be the norm. But now I look at this wave of hate as signs of that everything is very
bad. Now it isn’t possible to say that everything is f … good and it was invented by disgusting phena-
zepams (The word that sounds similar to the drug means feminists – E.A), it’s real aggression, it’s real
treats, it’s real sexism and oppression. It’s all before our eyes. And it contains the important effect: they
see us.’

Table 3. Top 10 Most Frequently Used Word within #этонеповодубить on Twitter.

Word in Russian Translation Number of messages Instances
Девушки Girls 149 151
выкладывают post 45 45
твиты tweets 43 43
сексуальность sexuality 43 43
тела bodies 41 41
опа instead of word which means ass 41 41
заслуживают deserve 41 41
модели models 41 41
говорящие talking 41 41
оголяющие baring 41 41

As in the Instagram campaign, the participants’ speech strategies were largely influenced
by the fact that the posts of those who condemned the campaign or the murder victim
Tatiana Strakhova, were published under the campaign hashtag. The number of
opponents on Twitter was higher than on Instagram. Some of the opponents’ posts con-
tained a call to violence.
Я никого не собирался убивать но прошёл по хэштегу #этонеповодубить и увидел столько
биомусорного шкурья, что теперь ищу зондер-команду, оплата едой, пишите

I wasn’t going to kill anyone but when I went through the hashtag #этонеповодубить, I saw so
many biotrash scum that I’m now looking for the Sondercommando. Write to me, I’ll pay with
food.

Some posts of people who criticized the campaign contained direct moral evaluation.
Важное обращение к девушкам, устроившим флэшмоб #этонеповодубить. Выкладывать
свои обнажённые фото в поддержку убитой – плохо.

An important message to the girls who launched the flashmob #этонеповодубить. It’s wrong
to place one’s nude photos in support of the murdered girl.
 RUSSIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 265

Поступок убийцы оправдан в принципе быть не может но этими ебланскими флешмобами с

голыми селфи с хештегом #этонеповодубить люди только показывают свое непонимание
ситуации и желание срубить внимания на больной теме вы просто омерзительны.

The acts of the killer cannot be justified in principle, but these fucking flash mobs with naked
selfies with the hashtag #этонеповодубить only show their misunderstanding of the situation
and the desire to grab attention using using a sore point, you are just disgusting.

Apparently, the opponents’ posts strongly influenced the speech strategies of the cam-
paign participants. They contained both insults and assumptions about the motivation
of the authors of such posts, for example, an assumption that opponents of the campaign
have psychological or sexual problems.
которые считают, что ‘б*** нашли повод выставить с*** с ж***’, в голове ничего нет кроме их
влажных фантазий.

Those who believe that ‘w*** (whores) find a reason to show t*** (tits) and a*** (asses),’ have
got nothing in their heads except wet fantasies.

At the same time, some participants attempted to explain the objectives of the campaign
in a more polite tone. Such posts were also emotional but did not insult their opponents.р
Ребята, хеш-тег #этонеповодубить запущен не потому, что бабу убили за её фото, а потому
что многие поддерживают парня, т.к. по их мнению он избавил мир от очередной шлюхи.
Девушки кричат (!!!) о том, что нельзя судить книгу по обложке.

Guys, the hashtag #этонеповодубить was launched not because of the woman was murdered
due to her photo but because many people supported the guy who, in their opinion, had
saved the world from another whore. Girls yell (!!!) that it is impossible to judge a book by
its cover.

In some posts, the participants stated: ‘I’m the same as the victim.’
Курю, пью, крашу волосы, но #этонеповодубить

I smoke, drink, dye my hair, but #itsnotareasontokill.

Generally, on Twitter legitimization through the emotion strategy had greater domination
than on Instagram.
Some threads inside the campaign #этонеповодубить on Twitter had features of con-
versation-focused switching. One example of this kind of switching is commentaries on
the post of a photographer who published the girls’ photos, who wrote:
Я и мои модели. #этонеповодубить. Люди, говорящие, что девушки, оголяющие свои тела на
фото, вполне заслуживают смерти, – асоциальные бесчеловечные личности, опасные для
общества. Никто не вправе распоряжаться чей-либо жизнью.

My models and I, #этонеповодубить. People who say that girls take nude photos deserve
death are asocial non-human persons, dangerous to society. Nobody has the right to
control anybody’s life.’

Then in two additional comments, the author further developed his thought. His commen-
tator replied that the one photo left ‘a very pleasant feeling.’ Then eight other commen-
tators paid compliments to the author and the girls, and the author responded with
gratitude. The topic set by the author was not discussed.
266 E. ARBATSKAYA

цHow did the campaign participants interact with each other?

The network analysis by Netlytic found 726 names in the dataset. The name analysis
properties (Table 4) demonstrated weak ties within the community. The density and cen-
tralization were low: most participants did not connect with many others. Only a few par-
ticipants replied to each other (e.g. the reciprocity according to name analysis was about
0.004). The modularity about 0.9 demonstrated clear divisions between clusters. According
to visual network analysis (Figure 3), the campaign #этонеповодубить on Twitter demon-
strated some visible connections between several central clusters while that between the
rest of the clusters was quite weak.

Table 4. The properties of network analysis #этонеповодубить onTwitter.

Properties Name analysis Chain analysis
Diameter 3 2
Density 0.001874 0.014100
Reciprocity 0.004329 0.000000
Centralization 0.038600 0.025640
Modularity 0.880400 0.933800

Figure 3. Visualization of name network analysis (who mention whom) in Twitter.

 RUSSIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 267

Discussion
The campaign #этонеповодубить protected women’s right to control their body and
image by themselves. In general, the campaign was anti-patriarchal, and its purpose
was to reduce the pressure on women in their private lives. The trigger for the campaign
was a discussion in social networks of the murder of Tatiana Strahova, who was accused of
neglecting the sexual interests of her partner and having erotic photos in her social
network account. Thus, the patriarchal expectations of a woman to serve her partner
but not publicly display her own sexuality, as described by Temkina (2008), were mani-
fested in these accusations.
The study investigated the example of the Russian hashtag campaign, triggered by dis-
course, as a case of discursive activism. Therefore, I focused mainly on discursive strategies
through which the participants delegitimized opposing discourse and legitimized their
discourse thereby asserting their values. The strategies that the campaign participants
used were congruent with the values they defended.
The hypothesis that the participants used the same speech strategies that CDA fol-
lowers had identified in the speech strategies of power agents was confirmed. The cam-
paign had examples of almost all strategies proposed by Reyes. The collective position of
the majority of participants can be described as follows. To expose a photo with elements
of eroticism is a bold act in defence of the victim, who even after death is persecuted by
the ‘villains’ (legitimization through altruism). Victim-blaming is dangerous to the society
because it justifies future victims (legitimization through an appeal to a hypothetical
future). It is terrible to live in a world where women are killed and then blamed for
what transpired. (legitimization through emotions: fear).
The strategy of legitimization through emotions was dominant. At the same time, legit-
imization through altruism and a hypothetical future was actively used inside the #этоне-
поводубить. Despite their expressive manner, most of the posts in the campaign
#этонеповодубить were in the form of logical reasoning.
The campaign had features of binary conceptualization which Reyes defined as ‘a con-
stant creation of two sides, groups and perspectives that allows for the construction of
“otherness”’ (2011, p. 787). Some posts written in the polemic by people who criticized
the campaign with the hashtag #этонеповодубить followed the same strategy as in the
campaign #Slutwalk. Solidarity was expressed in the statements that can be summarized
as: ‘We also behave like those women who are called sluts. And we think this behavior is
normal.’ Therefore, the main strategy of the campaign can be defined as «legitimization of
the practice through the practice». This strategy, which goes beyond mere speech strat-
egies, can also be attributed to the use of obscene vocabulary. Participants legitimized
usage of swear words targeting women by actually using them. Publication of sexual
photographs, as well as obscene vocabulary, might be attributed to also being used as
a provocation. This strategy helped not only to attract public attention but also caused
a predictable reaction of gatekeepers of patriarchal values and inspired a direct discussion
with them. The campaign’s participants also used the call for empathy by suggesting place
ourselves in the victiтm’s shoes. In addition, the participants of the campaign directly
declared their right to act in a certain way. Such a legitimization strategy can be
defined as a direct declaration. Thus, I propose to widen the list of strategies of legitimiza-
tion, which were described in the CDA, as follows: (a) legitimization of the practice through
268 E. ARBATSKAYA

the practice; (b) provocation; (c) call for empathy; (d) direct declaration of the legitimacy of
the practice.
The campaign demonstrated strong emotional intensity that was expressed, not only
through obscene vocabulary but also through the participants’ emotional support they
expressed to each other. Similar effects inside feminist campaigns were described by
Keller, Mendes and Ringrose, who noticed ‘the affective nature of postings’ (2018,
p. 33), including obscene words and stated that ‘conversation through a hashtag commu-
nity enabled what we called “warm” – that is comforting solidarities and connections
between strangers via a trending hashtag’ (2018, p. 33). Swearing within feminist action
was also described by Johnson (2014) who interpreted it as a protest against the role of
‘innocence’ imposed on women. I also interpreted the obscene vocabulary within the cam-
paign as a means of protesting against patriarchal stereotypes.
The percentage ratio of swear words and words related to violence on Twitter was
much higher than on Instagram. It seems that participants of the campaign on Instagram
were less inclined to adopt the tone of opponents of responding to insults with insults.
There were more attempts to clarify the meaning of the campaign on Instagram in a
neutral tone.
Instagram attracted more participants while clusters of campaign opponents seemed
more visible on Twitter. However, that was not adequate to explain such a conspicuous
higher level of aggression on Twitter. Still, the question remains as to why Instagram has
become more of a platform for campaigners while Twitter has attracted more opponents.
Probably, the platform’s factor was decisive. This assumption is driven by the conclusions
of other studies. Bossetta (2018) and Papacharissi (2009) recognized the dependence
of spontaneous user behavior and the design of public campaigns on the platform
architecture. Gibbs, Meese, Arnold, Nansen, and Carter (2015) introduced the term ‘platform
vernaculars’ which refers to a unique style of behavior and convention, which is collectively
created and adhered to by users of a particular platform due to its features.
The main feature of Instagram is its focus on images. Perhaps that’s why Instagram
attracted more participants to the campaign in which the main action of the participants
was the publication of their erotic photos. The main feature of Twitter is its restrictions on
the volume of messages. This platform also has a sufficiently high degree of anonymity
(Peddinti, Ross, & Cappos, 2014; Smith, 2019). Mendes (forthcoming) studied Twitter’s plat-
form vernaculars concerning feminist campaigns. She noted that Twitter’s restrictions lead
users to skip details. She also considered Twitter’s anonymity as a factor which encouraged
users to share unspeakable experiences. In addition to Mendes’s findings, it might be
argued based on the #ItIsNotAReasonToKill case study that Twitter’s anonymity can also
liberate its users to show aggression.
There are still only individual studies on how patriarchal discourse is reproduced on
Twitter, e. g. Demirhan and Çakır-Demirhan (2015), Dragiewicz and Burgess (2016),
Usher, Holcomb, and Littman (2018). Based on an analysis of the case of the campaign
#этонеповодубить, it’s possible to add to this the assumption that women who are launch-
ing feminist campaigns on Twitter fall into in a hostile environment. However, the question
of whether Twitter is a more patriarchal platform than Instagram and other social media is
for further research.
I assume that in most cases the speeches of the participants were spontaneous. The
analysis showed that most commentators of the campaign discussed issues in the
 RUSSIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 269

context of private lives, not politics. Hashtag campaigns deal with a hybrid type of dis-
course: connecting private conversation with public communication. Participants commu-
nicate not only with political co-thinkers but also and frequently with their usual followers.
The campaigns analyzed in this paper have shown that even though the participants
might discuss the topic as a social issue, they often switch to discussing topics which
are not related to the campaign. Many discussions ended with an exchange of remarks
that contained either with consolations or compliments. Therefore, the political goal to
change the social attitude to women was in some cases displaced by the goal to have
emotional support and to reduce their stress. At first glance, such a motivation might
increase the involvement of users of a social network, who are not related to the move-
ment and make the movement more visible, but concurrently, switching goals for some
participants might explain the sporadic character of a campaign.
The network analysis didn’t show signs of forming strong ties inside the #этонеповоду-
бить. Indicators of the dataset have revealed weak ties within the community. Centraliza-
tion properties have shown that they were not strong leaders who were dominant in
conversation. This is typical for hashtag campaigns. Horizontal structures and no hierarchy
were considered as characteristic features of online movements, which makes them more
democratic than traditional ones (Castells, 2015). The campaign #этонеповодубить seems
to be of temporary loose-knit ‘connected communities’ (Bruns & Burgess, 2011; Dawes,
2017; Poole et al., 2019).
Although the campaign had all the hallmarks of a feminist campaign, the feminism
itself was practically not discussed. The frequency of feminist vocabulary was low. While
a case of the use of a strategy «voices of expertise» was identified among the legitimization
strategies of the participants, the discussion rarely used theoretical knowledge related to
feminist theory. The only analytical category tightly related to feminist theory, which some
participants made more or less explicit references to, was the category of ‘victim-blaming.’
It seems that in the case of #этонеповодубить, the participants preferred to construct a
collective identity based on an opposition to patriarchal culture or victim-blaming and
did not feel the need to identify themselves with the wider movement. Some of them
could embrace the ideas without tight connections to feminism, which, presently, is still
only gaining popularity in Russia. Perhaps, the case of the campaign #небоюсьсказать is
an example of how the participants became feminists in the discursive practice process.
It resonates with Foucauldian’s (Fuko, 1996) idea on the game of identity and normalized
role of discourse.
Some of them could embrace the ideas without tight connections with feminism, which
is still only gaining popularity in Russia at present. Perhaps, the case of the campaign
#небоюсьсказать is the example how the participants became feminists in process of dis-
cursive practice. It resonates with Foucauldians (Fuko, 1996) idea of the game of identity
and normalized role of discourse.
It seems that most of the campaign participants were poorly informed about the fem-
inist theory. Most participants were unlikely to have had any idea on how discursive fem-
inism and hashtag campaigns ‘must be.’ Therefore, it is particularly noteworthy that the
campaign, which for most of the participants had become a spontaneous act, would
have many similarities with some feminist hashtag campaigns that had earlier taken
place in other countries.
270 E. ARBATSKAYA

Acknowledgements
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Valeria Evdash and Nadezhda Zhuravleva for their
valuable advice which helped me to improve the structure and style of this article.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor
Elena Arbatskaya works at the Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities, Tyumen State University,
as an Associate Professor in the Department of Journalism. Her research interests are in new media,
public campaigns, and digital activism. She has more than twenty publications on these topics. Elena
Arbatskaya received a degree in Journalism from Ural State University. She previously worked as a
political columnist and an editor-in-chief. As a journalist, Elena Arbatskaya received professional
awards. In 2003, she successfully defended her candidate thesis on philosophy and started to
work at Tyumen State University in 2005. She has had work experience as the Head of the Depart-
ment of Journalism and as a researcher at the School of Advanced Studies, Tyumen State University.
Apart from working at the University, she has held editorial positions in the media outlets. She is the
author of numerous articles and co-author of several books.

ORCID
Elena Arbatskaya http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7599-6688

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